The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1812-03-20
Os8..TS. IN SENATE.
vEFop1Ep ~os T'EE AMEsicAS.1
" s-.NA rE-.Inn,r.ry ~.
Ds0Gfe on sHF 6tlt Pr raising .tf.y ti'oasand y
~, Gurs ,x an -, ! :, .r1nx

and i'm s,,fci.t mum Der we're not vet oht,i,,e,
fD "a The places OF these, who. having performed
rue N1puiaeti duty, insisted oa returning home The
impaticncc 10 revisit their trends. discovered! by the
soldiers, entitled to discharge, SO extreme. and
nnS''verahe "s To overcome ali their soicitu for
keeping the encrav in state OF blockade ann MANY
o them could not DC declined in ca,np even for ton
Say, at the emil o. which period was expected tie
arrival VI holy OF militia which had been orl.r,
10 supply th.ir places; nor Was 1t without great diff
sny, ami some degree ut violence, that ans of th.
were prevailed To rc'pain for that time This
fact, howcve, did not sufficiently impress on the 90
vernments OF the United Colonies. that it was posi-
bic To rely too much on Individual patriotism aud
thst the American cause, il detcndel entirely by
Temporary armies, he often opposed TO the most
imminent hazards. Vol. 9, p. $50, 20
ne disadvantages. says gen. Washington, in n
letter to congress- date in January, l716; attend.
ing the limited enlistment at troops, too apparent
TO those who are eye-witnesses oil them, to render
any aaimadversions necessary; but TO gentlemen mt
distance, whose attention is cngrossed nv a thou
sanhInportant objects, the case may he otherwise.
That this cause Precipatei the fate of the brave
anu much to he lamented general Montgomery and
brought on the defeat which followed thereupcn, l
nave not the most distant doubt for had he not been
appreacnsive OF the troops leaving him at so imnor
tant crisis, but continued the blockade OF Ouehec
ea.tuation from the best accounts have been nb,c
TO collect, must inevitably have followed and tb,t
We were not obliged, n. time, tn dispute these,
lines unlcr disadvantageous circumstance proceed
ING from the same cause, tn w.t. the troops iisban.
Ing OF themselves before the militia could he On, in
u, 10 me- matter OF wonder and establishment: aud
proves that general Howe either unncuua;,,tc,l
with our stl'tion restrained hy his instructions
from putting any thing to hazard until his reinforce
nients should arrive. "',,
8 The instance of general Montgomery II mention
1t because it is striking one, for number of others
might he atlnced,) proves that, instead of bav;pr
men to take advantage OF circumstances YOU ARE i'm
manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circrm-
stances yield to secondary consideration Since the
ist OF Dee. have been devsing every means in INV
power tn secure these eneampments; and though L
ara sensipie that We never have, since that period,
been able to act te Offensive and at times not in
acondition to defend; yet the cost OF marching home
one set OF men, and bringing in another the havoc
aud waste occasoned by the first the repa;,.s neces
sary TOR the second, with thousand incidental char
si.s and Inconvenience which have arisen and which
Is scarcely possible either recoIleet or describe
amount To near as much as keepingup respectable
ooiy ct troops the whole time ready for any emer
gency would have done. =
io this may be added, that you never can have
well disciplined. srnly
make men well ccqi;nted with the duties of
soldier, requires time. To bring them under Dro
per discipline and authorizations not only requires
time, bat is az work of great difficulty and in this
army, where there so little distinction between Of
heers and soltiel's requires uncommon degree of
attention. 10 expect then the same service from
raw and untseiphned recruits. rs from veteran SOL
oies, IS To expect what never did, AMI perhaps ne
yer Win happen.
Men who fami!iarizei to danger. approaeb
It without thinking; whereas, troops unused to SER
Hes s anPrehe'd danger where no danger exists.
inree things prompt men to regular dischsree
o. ticr duty IN time OF acton--natura bravery hnne
Oh reward, and fear OF punishment. The two first
are common to the untntored and the dscipIined
soldier but the last most obviously distinguishes one
from Tie other. coward taught believe that il
ne breaks his ranks and abanlons his coors he viii
DC punished with death by his own party, will take
ms chance against the enemy; but the man who
.inks little OF the one, and is fearful of the other
1'''-
Again, men of days standing viii not look for
ward and, from experience, we find, that as the |
tune approaches for ther discharge they grow care
less OF their arms, am nlunitinn eamp itens;ls 80
nay, even the barracks themselves have felt uncom
mon MARKS of wanton lcpretlation and we are laid
h'er fresh trouble and additional expense in proyid-
ihS tor every fresh party, at time when we find it
next 10 impossible TO procure the articles absolutely
necessary, an the first instance. To this NAV be nj.
yea the seasoning which new recruits must have to
camp, ana the loss consequent thereupon
y but this is not all. Men engaged for short IL |
snted time only, have the officers too much in their
power 10 obtaIn degree of popularity in or;Ierto
ihuuce second enlistment, kind of Familiarity takes
place which brings relaxation of dsciplne un- |
ecehsed fur'oughs, and other intulgences incom ma
ubie with order and good government, by which |
means the latter part OF the time for which the SOL
der was engaged, spent in undong what il reouir
gu much labor to ineuicatc in the first.
" 10 SO INTO an enumeration of sll the evils we
nae experienced IN tins great chansc Of the army
su ,ne expense incidental to it, to say nothing oftke
hazard we have run anil must run between the d,
emerging OF one army and tie enlist nent Of another
(uhiess an enormous expense of militia is incurred
would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter What
have already taken the liberty of saving win serve
tn convey general idea OF tie matter; and there
tore, shall, with ali due Difference taLet free
daa to give it as my opinion, that Il .onq?ess have
any reason to believe there will be occasion ion from.
shathei year, and c;t; f,. another. enlist
ment, they would save money, and have infinitely
better troops, If they were, even at the bounty of
twenty, thirty dollars to engage the men al
realty enlisted until January next and such otbers
may be wanted to complete the establishment for
and during the | will not un,icrtatc to say tat
the lneu may be bad these terms but nm, gst;sf
eI that will do to let the matter alone no
was last year, until the time OF service is near ryr;
ring IN the fr's place, the hazard is too great in
hs next, the trouble and pcTyle1ity of disbandin-
one army and raising another az the same instant |
AMI IN siiei critical situation as the ig.t was are
scarcely IN tie power of words 70 describe and such
az no inan who has experienced it. will ever IN
aeISo agnin' Vol. 9, pa. ESQ., 29i, 49, z83, 2Si
Here follows the comment OF the historian
unfortunately, congress did not feel so sensibly rs
heir general, the inca pacty OF TEMPORARY arrnirs
70 oppose those which arc permanent Nor were |
s oficers OF high rank yet sufficiently impress
oil on this subject In eoi,Icil he'll pre,ors Ia H.
ne" noieihng OF the army they had been of s,pii,n
That The en!5tfnents might be only for one vcar''-
fOl. ?, p. 2s4.
" scarcely YES this first success obtainel, in Nov.
ITy, by Montgomery when tie fstd consequences
~ s'ift eiflistnents began discover themselves
ie time OF service for which the trDors had epq
Ed beng now near expiring, great difficulty wascS
Dei1enced ia prey iling them tn prGceed further
'nh The gener'l was under ti,c necessity of Stimulation