Martinsburgh gazette. [volume] (Martinsburgh, Va. [W. Va.]) 1810-1825, 1812-03-20

confusion u cDnnfCtiuE opinions, ud1BeFS anu SOitilio
ton, competent TO ieadin The path OF duty or safety
THE governor 5 an industrious, rudent man, and has
more personal influence than any other--but his abii-
ties are not suited to the situation in which a civil war
would place h'm.
am, &c. a, b.
AinherSt, (Neao-H hampshire Feb. %, 1909.
sIR-A gentleman going direct to Canada,
affords a safe and favorable opportunity of CIV
ing you SONS further account of my progress.
| will not make use OF the post-offices, when l
can avoid it because private occasions super
cede the necessity of writing in cypher; and
the contempt of de eency and principle, which
forms part OF the morals of the subaltern Off
GERS OF a democracy, would incline them to
break a seal with the same indifference that
they break their words, when either curiosity
or interest is to be INDUCED.
] have not had sufficient time nor evidence,
to enable me % form any opinion for my
self of the length to which the federal party
will carry their opposition to the national go
vernment in the event of a war. Much may
be inferred from the result of the elections of
Governors, which within two months will be
made 20 the States of Massachusetts, New
\ Hampshire, and Rhode Island. From all |
know and all can learn of the general 60
vernment, | am not apprehensive of an i'm
mediate war. The embargo is the favorite
measure and it is probable that other means
will be employed to excite England to com
nit some act of hostility, for the sole purpose
of placing the responsibility of war on that
country this | most particularly recommend
TO the consideration of ministers. The dread
of opposition, and the loss of popularity, will
certainly keep the ruling party at Washington
inactive. They will risk any thing but the
1oea &C a&nov a,l than o~o I'LL nu.oro 4boE
their power would pass away with the first ca
lamity which their measures might bring up
on the common people from what that power
emsnates1 unless indeed they could find a
Sufficient excuse in the conduct Of g. Britain.
This impression cannot be too deeply felt by
his maiest 5 ministers nor too widely spread
throughout the British nation. 1t will furnish
a sure guide in evey policy that may be adopt
ed towards The u. States.
Ihave the honor TO be, &c. A. B.
No. 6.
Boston, March E, 1909.
Sill am favored with another opportunity
OF writing TO you by q private conveyance; and
think it probable, at this season, that the FIRE
qnency Of these will rendctit unnecessary to
write to You in cypher.
1t does not yet appear necessarythat | should
discover to any person the purpose of my visit
Go Boston nor is it probable that | shall be
compelled, fer the sake Of gaining more know.
ledge of the arrangements OF the Federal par
ty in these states, to avow myself as a regular
authorised agent of the Brie4sh government,
even to those individuals who would feel e.
qually bound with myself to preserve with the
utmost inscrutibility SO important a secrcI
from tie public eye.
have sufficient means of information tc
enable me to Judge of the proper period fol
Offering the ca operation ofGreat Britain, anC
opening a correspondence between the govern
or general Of British America and those indi
viduals who, from the part they take in the
opposition to the natlOal government, or thu
influence they may possess in any new ordel
Fittings, that may grow out Of the presen
differences, should be qualified to act ON be
hfH OF tie northern states. An apprehension
of any such state Of things, as is presupposet
by u-eir remarks, begins to subside, since i
has appeared, by the conduct of the genera,
government, that it is seriously Harmed a
the menacing attitude OF the northern stat es
But although it is believed that there is n,
probability Of an immediate war, yet no doubt
are entertained, that Mr.. Madison will fall up
on some new expedients to bring about hosti
hties. What these may be, can only be deduc
ed from what appears to be practicable. 4
non.intercourse with England and France vii
probably supercede the embargo; which, b.
opening with the rest OF Europe a partial legi
innate commerce, and a~tlording strong temp
tations to that which is Illegal, will expos,
the vessels 10 capture, detention, and embar
rassment; will Justify the present policy anC
produce such a degree Of irritation and resent
ment as will enable the government Of thi.