Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1812-11-12

4 " IN expressing our opinion with respect Ia
| the multiplied publications, which VIC find in
the newspapers, from, him and about him.
We believe that these publications have an
| injurious tendency, and although they may
| he overlooked as the exurberances of minds
II a jealous temperament, vet we feel as
| sured that they are calculated to do Gen
Harrison injury. It is ALWAYS bad policy to
over-rIte any matter-and there is such
thing 2. diminishing the enormous bulk of an
elephant bY too great swelling of the de
scription of it's magnitude. Now, although
we believe the second north western army
to be ten thousand men strong; although we
believe the troops of which Il is composed TO
be as Courageous as human beings can be
and that Gen Harrison is just as able to CON
duct it to victory and glory as almost any
person III the Union yet from the hurried
manner III which these troops have been got
together, from the inevitable want of that
habit which is called discihine, from the dis
lance to Detroit, the hands of wagrant Indi-
ans, and the various obstacles to be en-
countcred in the march, we are very sure
that the nnumerable paragraphs which we
perpetually encounter on the subject, excite
| more brilliant prospects than we Can have
any reason to expec. to- sec realized by Gen.
Harrison or by julius Cesar himself, were
! he living and placed in like circumstances.
~ Gen. Harrison reaches Detroit in safety,
and by the time he gets there has habituated
his men To service, so as to be effective &C
cording to the rules of the ART Of war it is quite
, as ouch as we look fer iu the first Instance.
When he has restored thing, q little in the
capitol of the Michigan Territory, he NAV
proceed further, enter Upper Canada, sub
due Maiden, divide the enemy's a tentinn, &
! assist the operations Of major general Dear
borne against Montreal.
In making these observations we consider
| ourselves as the friends and preservers of
! Gen. Harison's reputation for whatever
he may write. or his friends may write, of
what heis doing, or what he will do, he and
| they may rely upon it, that If more is not
| done than is Promised, the grumbers will
| soon be in motion, and he will sink instead
of rising in the popular estimation. And If
he should, by some unucky incident, be de
| teated, which, although not probable, is Ger
family possible, the very vauntings aud boast
| ngs now circulating in print, will be irdYnt
! by rofe 10 cast i1,to his teeth. These publ
Cations are not, we are confident, in the least
| degree necessary to rouse our fellow citi-
zens to arms The people of the West, as
the President very accurately remarks, re
| CURED to have their patriotic zeal iinited ra-
| ther than ercited. Let no man suppose that
| these structures are intended to damp the
feelings of a spirited yeomanny: They can
not have that effect: They are meant sole.
7, ly to prevent disappointment by bringing
down expectation to the rational Of circum-
stances. Let our youth embndy and advance /;
let them display all the fervor they can bur
let them remember that discipline and ODE
1 dience arc the indispenyible requisites of
| soldier and let our generals never forget
that GOODNESS of mind and Steddiness of de
meanur, are the principal gredients In the
rnpo It.on ia good Commander Let the
| Character of the warrior be formed in the
camp and displayed on the field OF battle. *
leave If to the pen of admiration to prone
gate his panegyrick.
There may be some severity in what we
have said. We know that we have been
cutting cleSc upon a quality OF the mind ttlat
does not bear pairing very well. But the ge
neral good is not to be sacrificed to vanity,
either singular or plural; and we prefer
! cpurting the impartial judgement of reason
s9me years hence, to paying present court
to thc passions
he notice which the message takes OF
the battle of Queens Town, is strictly ap-
propriate; the motive for the attack is
briefly stated the bravery of Our troops i:
mentioned; the death of those who fell is
properly lamcntcd; and the general resul.
and probable influence of the action is adver.
tel 20 We have so recently given our OPT
mon IN relation to this couflct, that it is unne
cessary to repeat it. 1t will be recollected
mat among other things, we alletlgcd tina,
the native which influenced Gen. Van Rem
saiaer to make the attack was a GOOD one
and that the effect upon the enemy would be
sanitary TO the United States. Adherinr ia
these sintlnehts, and giving to them their
cue weight. we, nevertheless cannot allow,
IRON the Generals own shelving, that he dis
Played the most consummate ability. We
thihk there was want of management, es-
PeClaiIy IN the 6o0ftTg part of the enterprize
and there can be but little doubt that Gen
BROCK, who was slain, employed persons to
mislead Gen. Van Rensselaer, by false intel
lIsence for, instead of being at. or ON his
way to Maiden, Brock was lying near the
SCENE OF battle. We do not know what the
precise number of the British were in killed
-bui Mr.. Madison is doubtless correct in es-
tmat'ng their loss as more IcLt BY them than
ours is by us. The loss of 4 major genera.
III me service of Great Britain is always re-
garCied as a serious affair. If we recur 70
tne british military official accounts, we shall
md that they think it great achievement
to kill or take prisoner an officer of snch
high grade. In the battle of Salamanca It
was considered quite an important occur
renee that the French General Marnont
had lost his arm And when the French
take general officer from the British. or
Kill one itnever fails to make flaming f.
cure in the bulletins In truth, there is
much reason for giving importance to an e.
vent OF TINS kind; because it takes many
years and great experience to form such an
1ihcer In this respect the death of General
Brock IS double loss 20 Great Britain; FIR