Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1812-01-23

y Y 2 N 49, - Z
ie VAS w,hnp 20 submit 10 the verde, of the |
id' 'onri SPIRIT and expectations.
But IL Is NOW SAID az intimst,d IN substance,
that tins official responsible standard is only
osscns bic, and hat the true standard for esti.
mat,rg the qaantum "a fo-cc demanded, must
bc derived from the dccrcpid st-te Of The trea
suiv, AMI the Rnaucid iamc OF tho gentleman a,
tho head OF that department. This subject will
"q'ure distinct consideration; but in the
mean sllnc, At is sufficient To saw, that the COM
mittee unanimously refused To be influenced bv
any considerations, Int these resulting from
the o'hc'al Responsible communications. End
Their own reflections upon the state Of the nation
10 disclosed thcrchv. They unanimo,isly re-
le,ted informal Unofficial communications
II wIi be observed too, IN the message, the
~ sidSht, IN has more specific rccominonda-
iion., hier desl2na5irw the kinds OF furce suit
81, to III" occasion, leaves TIE Juantura of each
to &c l"d%ed OF. ard decided hy CONGRESS.
where the responsibility did and ought 20 rest !;
ana he was unwilling, by receding from his
constitutional duty, To revert this responsibility
upon the executive.
IL thus appearing, said Mr. Giles, hat the
i"rce demanded, was Tor the purposes of war, If
unfortunately we should be driven by c. f,ai-
tam 10 that last resor, ard that although The
war would be undertaken upon principles strict
~ defensive; vet in its operation il must no.
cessriy became offensive on our part and
that congress was 20 Determine exclusively up
on the Adequacy OF the means for contluc ING
At; he would now proceed to inquire more
Particularly, lst whether the committee had
recommended force more than adequate to
the purposes of the war; and Sd whether il was
within the capacity of the U. States 10 supply
the force thus recommended ,
Mr.. u SAID, that in estimating the uranium
OF force demanded by the existing crisis, it APP
Feared to him, gentlemen had not given suffi-
Gent consideration TO the attitude. assumed by
tEe U. States IN relation to the Floridas, 10 the
eStentlon o. our southern and western frontiers
to tho late hostile acts and threatenirrs in that
Quarter; nor to the Importance of Orleans i,s
exposed position and defenceless situation
These circumstances, however, entered deeply
INTO the consideration OF the committee and in
cnced 1t TO conclude that the whole military cs-
adjustment now authorised by law, if comp!et-
ca, would not be more than sufficient pcrhaps
insufficient, to answer the necessary objects of
the government in the scenes Just described il
was therefore intended that the whole of that
force should be left free to act therein accord
'leg 10 circumstances, aud that the additional
iorce no" recommended, should act excIusiyel y
IN the northern and eastern portion of the un-
ION. ms force no gentleman will pretend can
De TOO great for our objects in that quarter, in
,he event OF war, unaided 10y the existing estab-
prise to him, that tlc western gentlemen should
wish to diminish the number of rncn now pro-
posed 10 be raised because he believed, that
every man deducted from the proposed force
would take one from the force intended by the
committee II protect our southern and western
frontiers. These gentlemen he presumed. must
be better Judges than himself, how many of
these men they can generously spare from their
own protection but for his part he thought
n 81.
and The committee were willing to give the
whole OF them that destination.
:" ith respect to the protection of Orleans, he
knew 1t YRS the expectation OF the late admins
ration, that i'll the event of war; Great Britain
would possess herself of that city; and il was
MOI thelr intention to incurthe expense OF being
constantly prepared 10 repel tho first incur sions
OF the enemy he did not know the intention of
.ne present administration in that respect, but
presumed It was acting on the same policy Tn
case the British should take possession Of Or.
leans, the western people must necessarily no
cared on 70 drive them out, and he loubtei We
~ ''Ich whether It would be either very &c
P'apie occupation, or very easy task He
nad arrays Unsupported of this policy. and in
the event OF war, he thought it wise. not only IN
dc prepared tor defence at all points. but IN
give the brst blow. He believed. in the end. Il
would be found, not only the wisest but the
most economical policy, both in blood and trea-
sure.
Having presented to the senate the objects to
"hich tae axisting military establishment ought
DI "sS'ohed, according 10 tho views of the
committee, he would proceed TO inquire. who.
Their the additional force recommended. would
ne more than competent to the objects to which
niNSt necessarily be assigned, and which
ought unqHe5tionably TO be effected bv if. In
case OF war, an event he deprecated rs much as
any geht'eT.n present, the new army would
cave 70 man your Publications on the sea board
rom Norfolk to the extremities Of our TERRITORY
horts ana east, md TO occupy Canada. These
are the contemplated and INDISPENSABLE obiec,e
ofthis army, in the estimation of the excci,tive
and the honorable mover, rs well as of the com.
mittee The Question will therefore turn unon
inc accu. acy and correctness of their respective
Calculations rs TO The quantum Of force neces-
sary to effect these objects.
Mr., Giles said il. had a conversation with
inc secretary COR the department Of War. in
his character Of chairman Of the committee of
foreign relations, 10 which Tie secretary did en-
ce2yor to demonstrate 70 him, that a smaller
number of men than $4,000, would answer these
oGJec-s-but 80 tar from producing this con
Yietion, If satisfied him that the number was
100 small. Iie thought thar every inference
drawn by the honorable Secretary, ought to
have been inverted. For instance he was ask
eh, how many men were indispcnsabiy necessa-
~ 10 man We iCrtihcatlons at New York The
honorable Secretary replied, 1900; bat he in
tended to make 1000 answer, aud would rely
Tor the rest Of the complement on tie local mi
ltia. Nov, said SIR Giles, he Inferred, If ., 900
men were necessary for that most exposed and
important position, cha. LOCO would not answer
with the precarious aud accidental aid of the
local militia that 1900 ought to be calcul.-
ted on for that service and if Nth the aid of
lie local militia, thcy could protect New York
against the force Great Britain might detach a.
giinst that city, they would perform their full
share Of the tolls and perls of the war. Two
thousand men, completely furnished With AL the
m.nna q . lrlnr.un--cn ....aa.I &C I'll LIZ.