The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1812-01-16

ToIcsS-l am SIRE you Will peruSe with II
terest the incloscd declaration, signed by 4,
;ae field officers OF the army, ne onl, *
cepted who VS. abscnt,) and the. solution
en- cred into by the militia Of tbs countr,
who served upon the expedition the tcsti
mony OF men who fought and suffered by m
side, ought snuuld suppose to be conciu
sivc.
An idea seems TO prevail in your state
that IN the action IF the 9th, the whole arm,
was completely surprised, and that they wcr,
placed In Situdd II where bravery only de-
cided the contest, and where there was II,
! opportunity whatever for the exercise OF mi
litary skill of any kind-this was, however
| far from being the case.
| 1t is true that the two companies tornin.
the left angle If the rear line, (barton's {,
! Geiger'S) were attacked before they were
| formed, and that some of the men were Kill
cd In coming out of their tents but it is e.
qually true chat all the other companies
were formed before shcy were fired on. and
that even those Two companies lost but We
/ ry few men before tsey were able to resist
Notwithstanding the darkness, tue order vi
battle (such as had been previously prescrib-
ed) was taken by all the troops--the eff
| GERS were active-tle men cool and cbedicnt
and perhaps, taere never was an action
where for (the number of men cngagcd)
there were so many changes of position per-
formed; not in disorder and confusion, but
with military propricty-thc comp Q. ;es,
both regulars and militia, were eXten.cd,
contracted, wheeled, marched and made to
/ i.ii up, by word OF command. NV orders
>and they were not few were obeyed with
prcmptitude and precision. And i'll am not
most grossly deceived, that mutual depend
1 erce which ought to exist between a COM
| nIander and his army was reciprocaily felt
| 1t has b. EN- said that the Indians should
| ave been ttacked upon our arrival before
| their town, the evening oi the 9th. There
| we're two r. asons which prevented this
| arst, that tic direction, which | received
| Il ON the Gro ernment, made it necessary,
| that should endeavor, if possible to accom-
t:IiSh the object OF the expedition (thc dis
pe;sion OF the Prophets forcc) without
5oodshed-and secondly, that the success
vi an attack 6y day upon the Town was We
nv probematical.
Icertainiy did not understand my nstruc-
tons, to mean that / should jeopa disc the
safety OF the troops, by underwriting TO bring
about accommodation without fighting. But
II had commenced an attack upon them,
after they had sent chief to inform me that
they were DESTROYS of an accommodation,
and that they had three days before sent "a
dePuJation to rue for that purpose-who can
doubt but that much greater Ciamor would
have been raised than exists at present. the
cruelty of attacking these innocent people,
would have been pourtrayed in the strongest
colors (; the administration would have bee.
represented as murderers, and myself as
their wretched instrument. But the army
were exposed to the 'nigntly incursions' ii
the Indians: IL has been well observed by
writer in Tie .Hi,ynS, that if nightly
lncursion' was really so much to be dread
ed by the army, it had no business there
But the author of these objections perhaps
will be still more surprised when he learns
that nightly Incurson was precisely what
l wished-because from such a one only
could j hope for close and decisive action.
If they had attacked us by day they would
certainly have done it upon ground favora-
Die to their mode of fighting they would
have killed as In Gen. Wayne's action1
number of our men, and when pressed they
wou d nave escaped, with a loss compa tive
ly trIting. In night attacks disciple al
ways prevails over disorder, the party hich
is able to preserve its order lcngest, must
succeed. | haG with me $50 regular thar
were highly disciplined. and my milit: had
been instructed to rm in order of ba. tie to
receive the enemy i'll any direction, with
facility and precision But in the imme-
date neighborhood of the enemy, why were
not the Troops made to continue under arms
through the night ? i answer that troops
can only bear certain portion of fatigue,
and when iii the presence of the enemy, it is
a matter OF calculation with the commander,
when they should be kept under arms and
when permitted to rest Upon this occasi-
on, must acknowledge, that my calculate
ons were erroneous. In common with the
whole army, did believe that they would
not attack that night fit was their in
Jention to attack, why had they not done it
pon oUr march where situations favorable
t. them might easily have been found III
deed within three niles Of the town we pass
ed over ground so broken and DISADVANTAGE
Gus TO us, that / was obliged to change the
position Of the troops several times III the
course of mile. They had fortified their
town with care and with astonishing labor
fur them, all indicating that they there
meant TO sustain the shock. 1t was the scene
OF those mysterious rites which we're so much
generated, and the Prophet had taught rs
followers to believe that both his person and
his Town we're equally invioable to US. ]
expected that they would have met me ;hc
ac;lt day to hear my terms, but did not
believe however, that they would acccde to
them--and it was my determination to at
tack and burn the Town the following night
1t vas necessary therefore that the troops
should be as much refreshed as possible ;
But although the men were not made q re-
main all night nnder arms, every other pre-
caution was used as IL at attack had been
certain. In fact the troops were placed pre-
cisciy in that situation, that is called by mi
lhary mon tgiag upon their arn1s - the