The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1812-11-12

and vet to haze olTcrcl less NIGH. have &
ven n ON Il cavilisrs ,oq, esiion the since
ri,y of the desire fer reace from which the
proposition resulted. The prospect OF
peace having Vanished, let every man rail,
round his Country's standard, and in the
sp,rit of the Message. derive fresh viz or &
Spirit fiom the rartal ie>erses cur ;ins
have experienced III the commence IN, mt
Of our military operations, from causes into
which We will not now enquire.
The other topics embraced oy the Mes
sage possess a minor ir,ercst, in conpari-
son with that OF cur relations with Britain.
We viii cny at present rcmark, that the
people of THIS country, will be greatly and
justly disappointed to learn that, in n pc
Rod Of six months, no change has occurred
IN our relations with France, of whose for
mer violence and rapacitv, yet unatoned
TOR. we have 80 much rcasch to complaim.-
The document announcing that revocatoa
OF her DEGREES which had long time PIE
viously taken plsce, and which is alluded
'oin the Message, was at best ungraciously
published & unactompanied by a restura.
lion of any part ofthc property seized, is
little less than mockery of our claims for
redress. These mast he adjusted, on the
nation will not be satisfied.
AS for the Algerines, we trust the re-
newal of hostilities on their part will be the
signal for an exemption, hencefofth * for
yer from tribute to Barbarian Gesputs. We
a e always view cd it SIAN ignoulnious pur
chase of their forbearance, which h: J the
m.ney expended ona suitable armament
would long ago have coerced. And we
Cannot help wishing the war with England
speedy conclusion. (supposing England
tn have had no hand in tomenting their
present hostility if it were only to give or
gallant sons OF ocean an opportunity to chas-
tise the insolenCe Of these piratiCal states.
From The Bx6alo Gazette. October Q.
QUEENSTON BATTLE.
1t has long been maxim with the world
that the reputation and character of Cen
erai are not to be established by his merit,
or talents, but by his success. Men of sense
know the cruel and wicked consequences of
this error; but it is SO much easier To glide
along IN the current of popular opinion, than
TO labor IN giving 1t its just and proper di
rectlon, that even good citizens are often
iess brave IN their duty upon such occasi
OH than justice requires. The plain and
melancholy, truth is, the appetite of the
weird is whet for SANDER; and it's keen
ness is, generally, in proportion to the ex-
cellence of the object destined to be de-
voured.
The application of these undeniable pro-
positions is to the current reports of the day
Many are unreservediy open-mouthed in
feprooating the late movement of the army
on this frontier. This ought not to surprizc
any one. Every man of sense knows that
II has been long Understood, nay predeter-
| mined, that whatever movements the army
might make was to be reprobated. And il
Is Ito sooner done, than said. Men also
who know little more of the matter than
that battle has been most gallantly fought
are already lavish of their censure upon
GENERAL VAN RENSSELAER,, and all his
principal officers. Justice would, at least,
require these men to recollect that the tar
- and diSJointed movements of the whole
campaign have extorted the confession Of
aiSahfoinfmcnt from the most ardent advo-
Gates of the war. The season for military
operations was tar advanced and if we are
correctly informed, such, already, was the
difficulty of procuring the current supplies
of provisions and forage, that strong appre-
tensions were entertained that the prospect
rather warranted the fear that the army
would grow less, than the hohe that it would
encredse by delay. 1t is by many believed
that General Van Rensselaer,, impressed
with these considerations, was constrained
to make up his mind to meet the alternative
OF attempting an immediate blow, CT relin-
gushing all hopes of the campaign. Pru-
dence may, at present. forbid detail on this
subject; but, if we mistake not there are
facts vitality connected with it which must
ere long out.
But after all the cavils, what does it a.
mount to! What was General Van Rens-
selaer's plan, which is by some reprobated |?
1t was to cross the Niagara he did il; and
with less loss than ever had been expected
What was his objects To possess himself
OF the Heights of Queenston position the
most Indispensable for future operations, of
any on the Niagara. They. were galantly
carried in the morning, and retained until
nearly night. This fact prostrates all OBJ.
lection to the ftan. But why were not the
Heights retained, and the victory complete ?
For this one plain. solitary, and undeniable
reason: The TROOPS WOULD NOT MARCH
ACROSS THE RIVER. But had General
Van Rensselaer,. at Lewiston, troops enough
to have maintained his position Let this
question be answered once for all, he had
don6te the humber necessary. He had 1000
regulars, and 1000 Militia. And if 5000
men could not make good their landing in
Canada, how many would it take to retain
1t! But why did not General Van Rensse
,aer before discover that his troops would