Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1812-02-27
Mr.. PoRTRR'S PESoLLy1r2v

Mr.. PoRTRP'S RESOLUTION
Inc toAo7rfHg srtract from a sketch Of mr.. Por-
ters Remarks on his tyo6ositiou far a uoluifeey
J9rce Of 10000 men, she5os Cqre think } that
rte gentleman JUDGES correctly. I'VE r.ally re-
6ret that the resolution z-as Gcgc.;ueA.
Wing.
"The only hope ofbis constituents. in the e.
vent OF an INVASION Of Canada was in the 'FRONT.'
titaae, vigor and eaectwith which it should be
undertaken ana prosecuted: their hope was in
the celebrity with which it should be subiuga.
ted their safety depended upon this The on
ly question was then with respect to the best
Kind OF force which could be most sbeediiy bro't
INTO action to effect the contemplated object
From personal observation, and from the knowl-
edge OF the British provinces which he had de-
rlycd from other sources, he undertook to state
that Canada possessed only a force of6OOO rec,I-
lars, stationed At Quebec, and about 90, 900 mi-
iitia, not well organized, armed or discontinued
He was willing to admit, in the abstract, that
regular army, enlisted for period, was gener!
ally the most efficient force TO carry on war
but IT would be a long time before such an army
could be raised. IT we meant 10 invade Canada
with prospect OF success, it ought to be done
before the British could throw reinforcements
INTO It, The ice in the st. Lawrence would
break up by the last OF May; reinforcements
could be thrown into the Upper Country bv the
last ofJune His idea was that a provisional
force, to consist Of Is or 10000 northern volun-
teers, already disciplined and armed for acttal
service, should be Immediately Organized, and
marched into Canada before the last OF NAV
They could have taken Canada while we have
been talking about it. They would be enabled
to subJuSate Canada in few weeks, with the
exception OF Quebec. They should then fall
down ut some eligible position below Montreal,
establish fort, the officers exercise and make
themselves acquainted with the practical use
and duties OF artillery and proceed st their lei
sure to the siege and reduction Of Quebec A
part OF them could return into Ysw England,
and with other forces, proceed thence into The
eastern provinces and to Halifax for the pur.
pose ct taking possession of them. The milf
tary maxim, advanced the other day By his hon.
friend from Georgia (Mr. TFoup) that an unsub-
dued enemy garrison should not be left in the
rear Of an invading army, did not apply to the
case OF proceeding 20 take Halifax previous TO
the reduction Of Quebec. The distance between
Quebec and ilalitax was so great, the country
so rugged, that The best plan would be 10 pro-
coed to Halifax, not from Quebec, from the nor
thcrn section OF our own country.-Bcsides, it
would be imprUdcnt and iinpOss ible, without
the greatest hazard, for any part Of the British
forces stationed for the defence OF Quebec, to
leave that garrison for The purpose Of attacking
the American army sent against Halifax, Or for
the purpose Of retaking any part of Canada oc-
CuPicu ny TIC Americans. Inc army authOri.
sed TO be raised and enlisted for years could,
IN the mean time, be organized and disciplined
to reinforce the troops contemplated 90 act in
the first operations Of the war. 1t was mprac-
ticablc, he said, 20 raise tlis army in due time
The people Of toe northern states were willing
to serve IN the war; they were willing TO in.
wade Canada; but they must do il as vo!un-
teers. They we're not willing to become mill
tary slaves for years"
.f~
~ Several tingcommunicatiors are
unavodably crouded out Of this days paper,
to make room for the late news from Enc-
land. They shall be particularly attended
to in our next
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- RHETORICAL LETTERS" No, XXI. in