Alexandria daily gazette, commercial & political. [volume] (Alexandria [Va.]) 1808-1812, 1812-07-18

she has SO much need of repose. Friendw
however, If NOT alliance, may still be may
tanned between the two nations and the;r :"
vernments.
In the present state of political relations,
tween France and Russia, it cannot be dort,
ed that one condition of an alliance betss"
France and Sweden would be to regain r.
land but, doubtless, that must be damn
Gus enterprise, at least while little probabGir,
existed Of France being able to give adeon,'
support to Swedish army in Finland. Tr.
power being unable to appear the Baltic VIE,
feet capable Of meeting the naval force =
Britain and Russia, the English sQuaGron
could easily cut off all communication betwee'
Sweden aud the army which she might land /
in Finland and which, thus left to isrT
without rcinforcements or supplies must SUP.
render at discretion, causing new losses btth
in men and money to Sweden.
But this is not all the coasts Of Sweds,
would be exposed to all the mschiels of war
The French naval force, SO inferior to ,b,,
of Britain, could afford them no protection.
and while the Swedish army was in Finland
the English squadrons might burn our mar.
time towns, destroy our unfortined ports, and
seize the greater part of our shipping Thu,
for the precarious object of recovering Fin.
land, to risk not only the ruin Of Sweden, bur
the loss of a part Of her army, would be the
most dangerous policy that we could 4
present pursue and for which, even the re.
covery of Finland would form no sufficient IN
dem ication.
1t does not appear that France has any thing
to offer Us as compensation for such dangers
and losses. The restoration of PomeraDb
could be no equivalent. 1t would have
been well perhaps for Sweden, bad she lone
since got rid Of this foreign possession, which
very often involved her in expensive and use.
less connexions with the continental powers,
The system which France pursues of govern.
ing the continent with absolute sway, and her
Conduct in the recent invasion of Swedish Pc.
meranla, present no flatterng prospects Of
the advantages which Sweden would derive
from her alliance and which are not to be
compared with our present independence as
an insulated country.
Our former declaration Of war against Bri.
tain has hitherto been attended with trhing
Inconvenience but closer connection win
France would doubtless involve US in real
hostilities with the English. During sucha
war, Sweden would be unable to protect her
commerce, and her flag. France, however
much inclined to assist us, could lend us no
adequate support by sea; our commerce and
navigation would be destroyed and such is
the naval superiority of England that our CON.
municaion even with the continent might be
cut off
The inevitable and immediate effects, then,
of an alliance with France would be,-wat
with Russa,--the great expense OF largs
army in Finland, its probable destruction and
a corresponding loss both of men and money
which Sweden is i'll able to afford war with
Britain, the total stagnaton OF our commerce,
tho loss Of our merchantmcn,-cur COM
munication with tho continent cut oh,-and
the danger of having our towns bonibarded
and our ports destroyed. The nation would
be exhausted without object, and weakesed
without tho hope of indcmnifcation. A hum'
liating peace would be the consequence, and
would leave us less able to defend in future
the little that re .Dained Of our national ln4e'
pendence.
Very different will be our future prospects,
if we attack nobody: if we husband our re-
sources, and remaining always on the deteh-
sive, prepare the means Of repelling future
aggression. Then shall we concentrate OUT
strength instead of destroying it; and gainih:S;
friends instead of enemies, we shall ayaA
ourselves of our existing situation without
though,essly changing it. In fine, he who
shall think proper to attack us, will pay dear
for an attempt SC contrary to the rights OF Ia
tons.
To attain the great object of true indePend'
ence, it appears necessary to cultivate peace
with Britain. 1t is the only country whence
we can derive a supply of our wants Of TIC
first necessity-particularly that OF salt aAu
that in return, can take off such OF our eXPoF'
as the annual produce of the country can fu''
nish.
Stockholm, April 81, 1912.