Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1811-10-14
VIRGINIA ARGUS.
z re II " q " n.
MONDAY, OcroBEa Il. 1911.
JcR qaE .4Rcus.
PROSPECTS II EIROpE.

| 4
true, that TIC com, is about To abdic;.te Inc
| premiership, the fact is decisive Of the nrc-
dominance Of British politics in tic cal!;r.c;
OF tle Emperor ot Russia. Ronanzow has,
Ter a long time, stood alone at ST. Petersburg,
! the champion OF what is called the corfinesi-
| tai system or III other words, resistance to
| "A monopoly ot Commerce. by the merchants
OF Great Britain. It's some proof of tic pcn-
etration, and indeed, Of ti.e for.itn,.c az n
| 'eXanFler, that he has for 50 ionr time,
wtbsIood the bois,crous camcurs of the
merchants OF the Russian Empire, and of tic
Idle, drcn;sl nobility, wh, arc Chiefly de-
| Pendent upon them for the supply Of their
| luxurious appetiscs The influence OF the
British inAmerico is strong enough but il
kessiS, tie strength oiiS is almost irresisti-
Die. one must be pretty well acquainted with
! tie Current OF business at ST. Pctcrsbur,,
| inc connection between the English fsctian-
and the Russian trader; between the latter
| ana tic nol1!ity, and the piincr linksof traf-
| nc between the traders a.ll the Doors, who
are the slaves Of the nobility, in order 70
| form an accurate opinion Of the vchemence
| with which the politics ofihe London Count
ing houses bcarcvca Rrcr tie Russian throne.
The governments of Russia is not SO much an
| absolute monarchy rs itis monarchy CON-
trclied by the aristcoraCy and we have seen
| that there have been cases where, tle soye-
reign, not yielding to the solicitations cf the
mobiles, mas IAilen a sacrifice to their views OF
avaricc CIR ambition. Alexander has been long
swaycl by the counsel OF Romanzow if at
| last he abandons it, the abandonment rlust
| proceed from two causes: /. The clamors
of the idle nobility, instigated by the less Ct
their usual income and indulgcnci2s ari-
sing from the trade with Great Britain
And, 2. The inpcricus manner irtwh;ch 30
y ann - I~N~ts t.4as ~
even TO. his best allies The necessities Of
The mobiles may have pressed hard upoa the
! Russian monarch, and the fear Of iaurdcr
from the desperate resolutions of the nal
contents may have cc-oporateG with feelings
| OF proud resentment ut the lortlly mannerin
which Napoleon has Threatened vengeance in
case of non-obediencc from Alexander. A
combination CT the two emotions may have
been too powerful fer the well mcaning En-
peror OF Russia, who, peradvShture, has
yielded to notions ofpcrscral safety and impc-
rial disaity, what he would not have Welded TO
! any other advocates. In this event Roman
zaw mpst be the victim, and war with
France the result.
How viii such war end
II, IN a case involving SO many points, it is
Permitted us to form an opinion, it would be
that new war between France and Rus
STA will end in a complete possession of all
the shores Of the iialtic by the French.
II we reflect, that Preach prince reigns
| III Sweden, thai French troops occupy alrca-
dy the main coasts Of the Baltic On orc side
as far as Dantzic at least, that an army fro;a
Sweden and one irX m Dacal Prussia, push
on towards St. Petersburg at the same mo-
ment, would, with little difficulty drive the
russian court back untn bI.sc0w, and de-
prive 1t cfall control in the Gu;pbs Of Both
MIA and Finland it IS impossible to deny Tint
the kossian forces woulG be compelled 70 re-
treat upon the centre of taeir TERRITORY, ard
Yield by repulsion TO Il continental system
| which they won'dnot corr5bora.c IS acccg-
son. J las repulsion from Gle shoes OF the
Baltic IS all THAI Bonapartc would desire
Inc Russians III the interior, checked by an
/ army CT trcnchBlen, of Germans and Po.es,
via &c as Inefficient r. Great Di.ta.in as Il
Il they were hSianlca up in tho moon; and
British Commerce viii Re eifectpally exc!a-
dcd from the north Of Elrcpe, i we except
the piecaTious port q .ATchangci, place
too distant as depot O. venue for general
trade.
! But, then, there IS tlie Tuiksi True Yei
the Turks, distracted by Observation-Disclosures, by
the ever-recuriiug lusur-ccticrs Of Tic rebel
lious Janssaries, are at best but feeble aux
iliary. And We are, ia tbe esfimase, n re-
collect that a nation 50 deeply wounded by
tiiy Combine with them Ills, in tr,lth, much
easier for the French 60 excite tho Tsrl,s to
war with Russia, than for the Eaglish to
bride them into cs-operatien.
But the war IL Spain and Portugal True
again. The British have seen pouring into
that quarterali their dslasable fierce. And
why, IT. order that the aticntion Of france,
inorder that Che armies o. France might be
powerfully attracted tisither; and that Rus
STA, taking heart rom the Efforts Of tie Bril-
tish IN spain, might be induced more readily
{ to listen 50 the oVer.ures of thc court Of Lon
don. Yet when we look al the maps, and
trace the progress Of arms on both sides in
Spain and Portugal We find that nearly tic
whole OF the Spanish kingdom is ut the MGR
cy OF France; and that Portugal, defended
by Briush troops, entronched camps, and
strong lines, can be regarded as nothing
more than place besiosed, which may sur
: rerder from day to day; and viii AS certain
, " be subdued by procrastnaticn as by assault.
But Will not war between Russia and
I, France be beneficial to the United States
! No. II viii be prejudicisl. Because, at
; present the friendly disposition of Russia adj.
mits Amctican produce in American bot
4 toms. il British policy prevails. English na.
- vigaticn VIII superccde that &C the United
- States; American produce viii End no mar
g kei unless its sale IS made instrumental e
n The disposal cf british manufactures: md
J, in The cDd, IL France succeeds against Russia
instead e the friendly leaning towards Il,
4 which Russia at present manifests, we shall
d. have 20 encounter the itoa policy Of France
her enormous cuStom-house duties, and he
e restrictive municipal regulations.
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