The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1810-11-02

war is perhaps the worst on the continent
of Europe. Catalonia, Gallicia, or even l.
saly. would be preferable.
On the other hand, the views of the French
being at peace every where else. do not call
SO much for prompt action, as when the Bri.
fish force was landed at Walcheren, at
Quiberon, at Leghorn, or Cala5ria. The
armies OF France are fed by the country in
which they make war and British forces,
though considerably aided from, the sea,
must bear as heavy upon the theatre ofwar
as their enemy all this pressure must Ell
Their produce depression or despair in the
Portuguese. An immediate action. which
should not be completely decisive. could not
aid the French the resources Of the coun
try, as well as the external means by which
any deficiency may be supplied, have Ger
tain limits ; and all the resources of Spain
which are not required for the force nn-
der Victor before Cadiz, will be directed
to the support of the grand army under Mas
sena. ~ =
The procrastination Of the war in Portu..
xal. cannot alter the ultimate destiny of Por-
tugal OF Spain; this the British know S, the
Spanish Junta koow, as well as the French
che expence to France is comparatively
small, since Spain must supply it. In the
scarcity of bullion. and all the other expen
ditures for British army of 40 900 men.
pressure becomes more heavy in proportion
TO the prolobgation of the campaign. No
thing, then, but keeping the war from Eng
land. would countenance the maintenance of
the war in Portugal under such indispensi-
Bic and enormous expenses.
tits thus only that we can nationally account
FOR the unusually deliberate progress of the
hero of the Rhetian Alps, and for the calm
ness with which the hero of 'ralavera look
~.
Rodrigo and Almeida, and the defamation
of his force at the latter place.
The position taken by lord Wellington, on
the west of the river Goa, and in sigh, of
Almeida, was by no means calculated to ia
spire the officer and corps which he threw
into Almeida with confidence they were
indeed fcrlorn hope, and gen. Cox placed
there. appears as if destined to appease some
angry God of the Wellesley family.
We must now enquire into the positions
of the armies. Almeida, which SURRENDER
ed on the 27th August, is abou, IS mile N /.
w. Of Ciudad Rodrigo, about 20 south of
the Douro, and 80 south of east from Opor
to. The main read from the province of
Tfas os Monies and the Douro. leads on the
east side Of the Goa. as far as Castelbono.
z miles south from, Almeida, and runs south
through the mount aims nf Beira, by Celerico
to the strong position Ct Guarda, which is
S. miles south of Alme1a ridge which
forms the east side of the valley of the river
Goa, separates the road from Cudad Rod
xigo, which runs parallel to il at a dis.
sance of abou, 90 miles. as far as the pass
of Torrecilla, where the mountains fork.
and send off main south west sour into
Portuguese Estramadura, within 90 miles of
Lisbon.
he place named as the head quarters of
che British after the loss of Almeida, is Al
perica the direction Of which we cannot
discover; and this ia of some moment, be
cause its direction in relation to Lisbon
would enable US to form SOM judgment who
Their they proposed retreating upon Lisbon,
which is 22O miles south west of Almeida,
or upon Oporto. which is only 80 miles west
The movements of Massena's force we
can no other wise discover, than by assum..
ing either, the military asrec. e the country
or some plan of military stratagem, which
he may seek to employ against the British
commander.
The entrance of column Of 10, 600 men
into Badajoz on the LIST of September. indu-
ces an opinion of this nature. The corps
must be that of Souls, which appears to have
rraversed the valleys OF the Guadiana, and
suddenly occupied that place. The topo-
graphic position of Badajoz is a very i'm
portant circumstance. in forming iudg..
hCht VII tiito tcplC ~ IL Ouly loV mics Que
east of Lisbon. From Badajoz there are
swo great roads. one leading N W. 10 the
Tagus, which is distant from Badaioz so
miles. TO Rosmar inhai on the right side of
the 'Tagus from whence there is a road in
the rear of Guarda & another to Lisbon a
hong the Tagus BY Arantes.
The western roadf ON Badajoz, is by FL
vas. Estremos, V Diera, across the Soro ri
yer, along the valley OF Belora to Belmon,e
Beneven'e Figueras, and Salvatierra, where
the roads on hoth sides OF the Tagus follow
its s'nuosItes.
The suddea appearance of 10 600 men,
60 remote from the main army as $50 miles
indicates some combined operations and
as we know that Romano had been laborine
70 collect body of the Spaniards from the
Morena mountains, and valleys of the Gau
diana, we hardly suppose, that the force
there is limitsdto the 10 600 which had
entered Badajos, but rather that the whole
corps of Regnier or perhaps more, had by
concert with the grand army intended to
march by the route of $50 miles for Lisbon
or TO take such position on the road from
the Douro for Lisbon, as would cut off the
British communication with that place, and
force them upon Oporto while Massena
himself, taking the Douro by the road to
Perquiera, might cut off the communication
with Oporto, should the British move upon
Guarda o" should they move upon
Oporto, pursue them, and by a forced march
ON the right Of the Dours. intercept them
In any attempt to embark at that place.
There Cab be no doubt that the Whole of
the todte hon hlmeida to Lisbon by the