The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1810-02-03


cution tor domestic objects aud to impair
Or destroy IT'S efficacy IN resisting foreign
agSrcssions. HE theory, therefore, of the
Irepub,ic21s, as opposed to tina, OF the ied.
RAISES, was Inc relaxation of COVE rnmenta!
restraints, or the extension of individual Ii
oerty. Il was natural, that in the vibration
OF the political pendulum, it should go from
one extreme 70 another and that this has
been too much che case with the republican
administration. he regretted TO say, he fear.
ed. "ould be demons rated by very super
fcial review of the events of the last two
or three Years. He said it had been his for
tune tooppose both of these extremes That
he thought the true policy of the United
states would be found in the medium between
these two extremes; that he had steadfastly
placed his footing upon that ground and that
he should not lie driven from il, until he was
convinced he had assumed an uawise posi-
ton. He said, he was equally averse from
mourning expence, or devising expedien,s,
merely toprocure ideal energy for the govern
ment and from an undue relaxation of its
powers, stimulated by visionary phlan-
throphy, IN "a vain pursuit of the extension of
individual liberty beyond the susceptibility of
human nature, or in other words, irreconci-
liable with the imperfections of the hunian
character. He alwas had been, and still
was willing 10 call into action the whole
constitutional powers of the government. for
the purpose OF efiectirg all its prac,lcable,
legitimate and expsdieni objects, whether of
foreign or domestic character. And he
believed the government had powers sufTici
ent tor all its objects. if wisely aud efficient
| ly applied. Ee said, if any example was
wanted to illustrate the truth and correct
ness OF theSe observations, it wonlc be found
IN the case under consideration. In the Oh
r. I'M t,Na 4.
less by three f'-igates, than was deemed rea-
sonaDie IN $500 1901; aud in the intimated
inconsistency III the conduct of those, who
then approved that establishment, aud who
now approve OF one of less extent Perhaps
tue truth IS, that gentlemen have Gone so far
In. tae pleasing and laudable effort to i'm
prove the happiness Of man, by extending
the scope of individual liberty, that they
nuppose those who stand still are receding
from them In an opposite direction. while
tney are not sensible of their own motions.
lie saId, under the view of THIS part of the
subject, lie would vote for the bill and if
circumstances should, in his Judgment, here
after render 1t eXpedient, he would vote for
still lurther extension of naval equip
ments. He said there was no Danger in his
Judgment, OF having navy in this country
| beyond very limited extern. because the
agricultural and mechanical interests were
greatly superior to the commercial and
they would always afford a complete securi-
ty against too great extension of a navy
Mr. U. said, the second consideration
which induced the committee to report the
bill, was to employ the, frigates as inssra-
ments OF protection and defence, and even
OF annoyance in the event of war. Gentle
men have asked whether the whole of the
irigates are competent to resist the British
meet, or even small squadron of it? To
winch 1t. is answered, no, they are not
But 1t by no means follows, that because
they are incompetent to atchieve those
| splendid exploits. that therefore they can
not be OF any use Mt all. He conceived they
might be materially useful, in defending a
town In case OF a naval attack They would
form an essential part. of combined force
TOR that object Notifications on land have
been erected at an immense expence Gun.
boats have been provided for the defence If
the seaport towns, &C. and frigates are in
many respects essential 10 their combined
operation They are besides important in
furnishing officers and men for the gun
boats, etc. etc. and it has always been un
derstood, that their operations must be in
complete without the Cooperation of vessels
OF war. He therefore Considered it incor
rect to single out this particular part of the
naval force; and 10 ask, what it can at
chIeve sngly and alone? 1t would be more
just and proper, to Consider it as part of a
combined system of force. In that point of
view, he believed it would be Inefficient
He believed they might also be occasional
iy employed in harrassingk the commerce
OF an enemy with considerable effect, parti
cuarly it Great Britain should be that enc
my.
Mr.. G. said, he should avail himself of
that occasion to be explicit in stating his
views OF the question Of peace or war. He
was induced to do this because his views I'D
on that question had been misunderstood.
or AT least misrepresented 10 the public, and
p ctended to be derived from conversations
and other sources OF information easily to be
misconceived, aud more easily to be mjsre
presented; and for which he did not feel
himself at all responsible. He had ALWAYS
been IN the habit of frankly exposing his
views without reserve in his place on that
iloor upon all subjects, when required by
the duties ofhis station; he should now do
so, and Tor their correctness in that place
he acknowledged himself to be responsible
to the pubic.
lie SAID, with respect to peace or war. it
should be ooserved--that i'm a d,spste be
tween nations, war was at the option of Ell
ther party peace was not--peace required
tie consent OF both Whilst, therefore war
may DC Ill cur power, peace may be beyond
our control! Great Britain may make " n
upon US; and IL is our most imperious duty
to be prepared to NEST it. He said, as to the
Prooai MY OF that event. he had no certain