The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1810-06-15
mo. II.

Gond God. sir. talk of a couhde nlain with
4 10 600 men, and IS sail of The lins, Gentle
men might as we'll talk of I. con,r de man in
The court Of chancery. Loud and coutinued
| laughter. }
| haze 40 wish, sir, to excite merriment
upon this melancholy occasion, but the :! hole
| OF the conduct OF ministers is so pregnsns
with blunders-----so full of ridcule, that it il
impossible barely to describe it without pro-
d1cIng lauga Eut the noble lord Castle
| reagh) has had the modesty to assert, thar
tue expedition went on very we'll that Bon
aparts did nothing for the defence OF Ant.
werp and that WI Ell our commanders gave
up the enterprise, there ere ouIy 90, COO
troops in and near Antwerp, and of those
troops. the "oole lord has thoughs proper to
speak IN terms of the utmost contempt.
What was there in the composition OF those
troops to iuduce The noble lord 70 speak OF
them in terms OF riilicule. Were they vo.-
lnnteers, " were they local militia !--CA
tdaugh. }
ihis assertion of the noble lord, IF * a
moauts 70 any ming, amounts to a censure-of
the officers entrusted with the command oc
the expedition. Tie noble lord and ais col.
leagues evidently wish to have it Inferred
shat the commanders ~ the expedition have
been to blame. Why, then, do they NOT
plainly tel us so? Iaoy point their fingers
them. 1t is fortunate Tor the country, how.
ever, that the Commanders were not mad
enough to attempt 10 pressed to Antwerp
caiamltonS and GisgraceFLl as the result OF
the expedition has been, our ruin would, in
that event, have been still more complete.
II It be asked why BonapArte did not send
mote troops to Antwerp, the answer is evi..
dent-----his troops. though nor under the
walls OF Antwerp, were III stu ltiuns from
whence they could b. speedily sent either
there or TO any other place likely to be at
tackled by US. The troops then in the garr-
sen were sufficient for present defence and
it, therefore, was not worth his while to send
more troops, uacii he asccrtaiued that oui.
commanders we.e desperate enough to at
tempt the siege OF the place. lie we'll kns "
(though cur ministers did no;) what sort oe
an enemy our brave army had TO contend
with, in the peStilentiai marshes OF Wa.che-
Zen; and much would he rejoice, when lie
found that ministers had been insane enough
TO send their armament to the Scheldt. When
he first heard, that such was the destination
OF our boosted expedition, with what a
smile OF satisfaction would he say TO his min
listers,
g There let them lie, till famine and the ague
eat them mp"
Upon consideration, sir. Of all the evidence
laid on your table. feel myself bound So
! lcmny 10 call upon this house for the con-.
demnaiion OF those ministers who have vans
| toaly compromised the SAFETY end aolor OF
The country, by undertaking an expedition,
IN which success was absolutely impossible.
Il shall now, sir, attempt to shew, that
even Success would not haYe justified his ma
lesty's ministers ia putting 10 hazard the
last army OF the country upon this eXpediti-'
on. Inc al ADMINISTRATION, sir, with 5hoN +
mad The honor to act, m@deit their uniform
study To husband the resources the Coun-
try rcgsrd!es, of popular ctamor, they de-
termined not 20 eXDcud, in frnitiess eypedi~
tlons, that blood and that treasure, which, at
no very distant period, may be required IN
the defence oE al that is dear 10 us. am
however, ready to admit sir, that there may
DC occasions which call for departure from
the rules OF ordinary prudence the SPAN
Ish revolution was, IN my opinion, enc of
those occasions /; and had I been in ofice.
when that event occurred, 1 Tor one would
have concurred in the uropriety Of sendiug to
the Peninsula, the largest dispOseablc force
which the country could possibly spare.
When first heard that tie expeGNioa
which was afterwards sent to the Schs ldt.
was in contemplation, did hops that it was
destined to reinforce our gallant army then
IN Spain. was al that time it, the cnun.
| try, but, before the sailing Of tha expe d+tis,.
L came 10 london, where heard, from per.
sons upon whose Information could RELY.
such an account Of the state of the public
mind, and OF the events then Passing In the
north OF Germany, as to induce me to form
! an opinion, that to send our disposeabie
force there wouli be preferable even 10 send
ing 1t to Spain. Schiil. and many other in.
teres'iDg men. had embarked in a cause, in
which their lives were at stake, and had
they been supported by powerful British
army, something might nave been achieved
to avert the sinking destiDies of Europc,
The hopes Of the Continent we're turned to-
wards his majestys ministers but, alas
how cruelty were those hopes disappointed:
Pulled UP with the selfish expectation of OBJ
| tanning little momentary popularity, by the
capture OF few ships, and the destruction
u an arsenal, the kings ministers sent this
mighty armament (whicn might poseibly
have decided the fate of Ehropc) rpon a pre-.
datoiy expedition. How could the expedl-
ton to Antwerp produce diversion in favor
OF Austria II monsters had realized the
absurd hope OF taking Antwerp. what wonId
ON army have done nezt? Must they not
Instantly have turned their backs upon the
enemy, md got ON hoard their ships as fast
as their IS could carry them tVOold they
net Otherwise have b.en exposed 60 inevita-
bic destiuc ION Wen might Austria com
pain, and bittei.y Complain. OF Che selfish
ness and meaDncss ofNoJt conduct. But min
isters say; that they were prevented fron
sending tue expedition 60 The uOrtls Of Ser
many by motives oi lnmanity ;theirhumsne