The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1809-07-28


mon disaster land your diversions will be- on the
mass OF the enemy's forces, only so many feeble
| puhctures--intinitely costly to you--altogether
harmless to h,m--hurtful only to your allies, by
/ dePriving them of more eifectual support
Having laid down these plain and iicontcstible
principles, SO obvious, indeed, that only the utter
neglect OF them which prevails IN our counci!s
could have justified us for stating them at any
length, we need not examine which of the three
modes OF assisting ally is the best adapted to
| the circumstances of this country This is a
question which can only be resolved by weigh
| my the pecu!iarities Of each case And, aitno'
some general positions might be laid down APP
Phcsoie TO every state ofour foreign affairs as.
Tor example, that the subsidy system is liable to
the greatest risk of abuse, and, in general, gives
tne worst return in proportion to the expense -
that 1t is scarcely possible to apply il so exactly
as a., 10 escape, ut once, the danger of bribnE an
any TO premature operations ofhostly & to avoid
on the other hani, the risk Of delay; that Il re-
quires, perhaps too great 4 degree of Submission
to the plls views or our aisy has e.f the other,
two modes OF cooperating, the direct one is se-
neraiy the most eiicctual chat it gives orr voice.
| a greater weight in the cu,nihon councils of the
| contederacy; that 1t produces. in this way the
incstimabie advantage Of making that party, in
some sort, ain umpire aInenS lhe allies whose
| views are necessarily the most free from al sus-
piciop of sinister and selfish policy thu it more
over tends, more than amy other plan, to the rad
Cal Improvement OF our own military system'
whist At, above all modes OF acting, raises our
name, and Increases our real influence, in the af-'
fairs III Europe although these, and other max
inns equally general, could be illustrated at length
| IN such manner as 10 bear upon almost every
Case that might be supposed yet we snail for.
| bear pushing the state fiuiei, and hasten to
otter few observations The branch Of the SUBJ
Ject, more Immediately connected with tue pre-
1 sent Crisis OF .fairs.
IT, then, at amy time, it is deemed most expe-
dieht AS IT must almost always be) to aid the al
1 HSu cause with that 80
Pian common sense conceive to be the most eff.
iectIal way OF dong it Ee would ask himself
where are our allies in the greatest straits -.
Where does the pressure OF the war fall heaviest.
! because 1T is morally certain thatin that Quarter
wherever it be-, the enemy is most anxious u,
succeed, and will lie most injured by failure 1t
may indeed 50 happen, that he shall carry on ge-
neral system OF attack, and make great variety
| OF smaller efforts IN different places In that
case, however, the allies viii naturally chuse one
OF these points, ahd endeayor to oyerpower him,
until ina short time, the contest comes as IL were
| nearly to an IsSue-to struggle at one important
| point, subordinate TO, and depending upon Which
| man struggle, every other movement of the war
| must prove. lhe next Question will be, are our
| allies IN this Grand point quite secure If they
are not, II is there that we can best help them
and that they can never be sufficiently strength
ened there, without our assistance, is manifest
from tins consideration, that were it so the enc.
| my would not there have made his push and it
IS,
we rave only got an extreme case, in which no
assistance OF ours is of any use. But i'm truth no
war was ever wased ON the continent, in which
the fate Of the whole did not turn upon some
grand operation III one quarter, carried on by the
bulk OF the contending forces Upon the fate of
the cause in that quarter, every thing else hinges
in the most distant scenes and if we attend to
the constant, steady, maaterly, resistess policy
of our enemy, from the attack of post I'D 10
the combination of entire, campaigns, we shall
lind 1T built upon this single, view of the sub
ljcct.
He means to gain several objects, we shall saw.
in different parts of his extensive ,omimioms--tc
drive the English out of Portugal, for example,
TO reducethe King of Sweden to an an,icaolc ac-
encouragement of hiS title--to expel the Neapo-
Titan family IRON the Continent, or TO defend his
new kingdoms in Italy-to take province or two
from the German princcs-and TO punish per-
haPs, destroy Prussst. Now, if Bonaparte's
comSeilors were taken from the English ooHticaI
caste, it is Very plain what method he would a
dept TO gain all those points. He would, in the
first place, take care TO make war without the
shadow OF 2 Pretence, and put himself clcsrly IN
tlie wrong before all Europe---he would next de-
lay in doing any thing until the season for opera
tons was nearly gone by--he would then proba-
bly, treat little, and be duped by his allies, and
cayil and wrangle good dead, and quarrel with
some OF them, and excite hatred Of all of item
and OF himself, aud contempt of iiis plans az
monG his own subjects But all these prelip,inas
ries OF failure being settled, nc would AZ last
Come to his operations and his policy .lyold
be, to get up number OF neat little expeditions
equal IN number, to the things he wants To take,
4 just one for each thing. He would send an sx-
petition towards Sweden and the sea not be-
ing his element, it would probably fail of Itself.
he would then send tolersbiy large. and intol-
lerable expensive expedition to some part Of Ger
many-anUther towards Itsiy--a sniger expedi-
ton to Portuga-a nice little one to talsa slice
Off Bayaria-besIdes s,rt of Ey.expeditiAn to
I. plumber Hamburger /; and burn for stage effect,
some other capital in alliance vstf him, merely
to astonish the people and looK vigorous
Instead enqulrirg, what would he the proba-
bic result of all this dwelling, which is indeed
too plain TO require any statement, let us remark
rather, how B0naparte 5os5 act, not having En-.
giisl politicians to advise him. He leaves Ma
pies alone II Joseph can support himself, we'll
If not, he will restore him after the cImpaigt is
won. lie leaves Sicily alone, filled with English
troops, who are just cscfuly employed for him
as if he had them IN hin depot Of prisoners-fl-
led too with tire Squabbies and intrigues of his
faithful allies, the old royal soveregns and cour-
tiers of Europe. Portugal ne leaves to the Eli
giish army, there assembled for the precise pur-
%------
Examine the battles Of Bonapayfc, asd iadsl
IF al tie greet coanrianders n lfdrcs, and yoa
0W 6dd MH the p!a II eGch enlargement is si,,lt-
lar to fhe general systct Of their 'Viiitdry policy
Jhey dyec, yds! column to one gYeH cho<>a boisf
break Mroagh the line at Mat qlafler, Gas zve do