The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1809-10-31

ter TO Gen. O'Donog,ue, of which enclose
a copy. but without effect; and he did not
idetach Gen. Bassecourt till the moraing of
the 2d, after we had heard that the enemy
had entered Bejar, and it was obvious that
the troops in the Puerto would make no de-
fence. On the I'd, we received accounts.
that the enemy had entered Placentia in two
columns The Marquis de la Regina. whose
two battalions consisted of only 600 men,
with only twenty rounds of ammunition each
man, retired from the Puerto and from Pla-
centia without firing shot. and went to the
bridge Of Almaraz. which he declared that
ne intended to remove; the hattalions of Be-
jar dispersed without making any resistance
The Gen. called upon me on that day, and
proposed thathalf of the army should march
to the rear to oppose the enemy. while the
other half should maintain the post at Iala,
vera. My answer was. that if by half the
army, he meant half of each army. could
only answer that was ready either to go or
Co stay with the whole British army, bur that
could not separate. it. He then desired n,e
to cl.use whether would go OF STAY, and
preferred to go. from thinking that the Bri.
tish troops were most likely to clio the bust
ness effectually, and without contes. and
from being of opinion it was more important
to us than to the Spanish army, to open a
Communication through Placentia, although
very important to them. With this decision
Gen. Cuesta appeared perfectly satisfied
| The movements of the enemy in our front
1 since the LIST, had induced me to be of OPT
Mon. that despairing of forcing us at Taia-
vera, they intended to force a passage by
Escalona, and thus to open commnnic alton
with the French corps coming from Placen-
tia. This suspicion was confirmed on the
night OF the Cd, by letters received from Sir
Robert Wilson, of which enclose copies !;
and before Iquitted Talavera on the Sd, I
waited upon Gen. o 'Donoghue and conversed
with him upon the whole of our situation,
and pointed out to him the possibility, that in
case OF the enemy coming through Escalona,
Gen. Cuesta might find himself obliged to
lquit Talavera. before should be able to
return to him /; and urged him to collect all
the carts that could be got, in order to remove
our hospital AT his desire put the pur-
port OF this conversation in writing. and sent
him letter to be laid before Gen. Cuesta,
OF which enclose a COPY.
| The British army marched on the Sd to
Oropesa, Gen. Bassecourt's Spanish corps
being at Centinello. where desired that il
might halt the next day, in order that l
might be nearer it. About o'clock i'm the
evening Iheard that the French had arrv
ed from Placentia at Navalmoral, whereby
they were between us and the bridge If All
4 "
ed from Gen. O'Donoghue the letter and it's
enclosures, of which l inclose copies, an
nouncing to me the intention of Gen. Cuesta
to march from Talavera in the evening and
to leave there my hospital, excepting such
men as could be moved by the means he al
ready had, on the ground of his apprehen-
sions that l was not strong enough for the
corps coming from P.acenta, & that the enc
my was moving upon his flank, and had re-
turned to Santa Oala in his 'front.' / ac
knowledge that these reasons did not ap
pear to me sufficient for giving up soimpor
tant post as Talavera, for exposing the
combined armies to an attack i'm front and
rear at the same time, and for abandoning
my hospital and wrote the letter of which
inclose copy This unfortunately reach
led the gen. after he had marched, and he
arrived at Orapesa shortly after day light,
on the morning of the 4,h.
The question what was to be done, was
then to be considered. The enemy, stated
to be thirty thousand strong, but at all events
consisting of the corps Of Sout and New, eli
Their united or not very distant from each o.
lther, and supposed by Marshal Jourdan and
Joseph Bonaparte, to be sufficiently strong
to attack the British army, stated to be TWEEN
Ity hve thousand strong. were on one side, in
possession of the high road to the passage of
the Iagus at Almaraz, the bridge at which
place We knew had been removed, although
the boats still necessarily remained in the
river.
On the other side we had reason to ex
Ipect the advance of Victor's corps to Tala-
vera, as soon as General Cuesta's march
should be known, and after leaving IL, 600
men to watch Venegas, and allowing from
10 to IL, 900 killed and wounded in the late
action, this corps would have amounted 10
Is 900 We could extricate ourselves from
this difficult situation only by great celebrity
OF movement, to which the troops were une
Iqual, as they had not had their allowance of
provisions for several days. and by success
in two battles. If unsuccessful in either, we
should have been without retreat /; and if
Soult and Ney avoiding an action had retir-
ed before us, and had waited the arrival of
Victor, we should have been exposed to a
general action with $4,000 men, equally
without retreat.
| We had reason to expect that as the Mar
| guis de la Reyna could not remove the boats
| from the river Almaraz. Soult would have
destroyed them.
] Our only retreat was. therefore, by the
bridge OF Arcobispo and if we had moved
on, the enemy, by breaking that bridge while
the army should be engaged with Soult and
Ney, would have deprived us of that on ly
| resource. @
! We could not take possession at Oropesa,
as we hereby left open the road to the bridge
! OF hrcobispo from Talavera by Calera &c,
after considering the whole subject maturely
! j was of opinion that il was advisable to re-
tire to the bridge Of Arco Bispo. and to
take up defensive position upon the Ia
gus.
/ ] was induced to adopt this last opinion,