Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1809-10-31

The gensra! called npoa me on that day
aud prcpescd tnaS half ct the army should
p'areh 20 the rear to oppose the enemy,
while he other half should maintain the
post q. 1alavera.
My answer was, that if by by half the
army he meant half of each army, could
only answer, that l was ready to go or to
stay with the whole British army, but that
] could not separate it. He then desired
me 10 choose whether would go or stay,
and preferred to go from thinking that
the British troops were most likely to do
the business eifectually, and without con-
test and from being of opinion, that to o..
pen the commune ation through Placentia
was more important to us than to them,
although very important to them. With
this decision general Cuesta appeared pre-
fecty satisfied.
The movements of the enemy in our
front since the LIST, mad induced me to be
of opinion, that departing of for cling us at
Taiavera, they intended to force pas
sage by Escalona, and thus, open a COM
muncation with the French corps coming
from scentia.
This suspicion was confirmed on the
night of the I'd. by letters received from
sir Rcbt Wilson, of which l inclose CO.
pies and before Quilted Talavera on the
Sd, waited on general 0'Donnoghue, and
convsrsed with him upon the whole of our
situation, and pointed out to him the possi-
bili,y that, in case of the enemy coming
through E.scalona, general Cuesta might
find himself obliged to quit Talavera be-
fore / shouid be able to return to him !; and
j urged hun to collect all the carts that
could be- got, III order to remove our hos.
piIa'. At his desire I put the purport of
this Conversation in writing, and sent him
letter to be laid before general Cuesta,
OF sshich ! inclose a copy.
The British army marched on the Sd to
Prospesa general Bassecour's Spanish
corps being at Centinelo, where / desired
il might halt the next day, in order that
l might be nearer it.
About O'Clock in the evening, heard
that the French had arrived from Piacen-
TIA at Navaimodal. whereby they were be-
twern US and the bridge of AImarez.
About an hour afterwards 1 received
from general O'Dcnnoghue, the letter, and
us enclosures otwhich inclose copies an.
ncuncipg to ME the intention of general
Gu sta to march from Talayera i'll the ev.
eIirg, and to leave there my hospital, ex-
cept such men as could be moved by the
means he already had, en- the ground of
his apprehension that | was not strong en-
ougl tor the corps Coming from PlaCeutia,
and that the enemy was moving upon has
flank, and had returned to Santa Ollalla
Ia his front.
acknowledge that these reasons did not
appear TO me sufficient for giving no so
important post as Talavera, for expo
- 60, the combined armies to All attack IN
sN "u 10" at the same Ilme, and Tor
aoahooh'hs my hospital and wrote the
husr OF winch inciose a copy.
ihis unfortunately reached the general
ai'Sr ne had marched, and he arrived at
ofopesa shortly after daylight on the
morning OF the 4ih.
ne question what was to be done, was
then TO be cons dersd. The enemy. sta
tee 10 be $4,000 strong, but at all events
eYns'Stihg OF the corps of Soult and New.
e"her uhiteo or not very far distant from
eac" o,n9r, ana supposed by marshal Jour. |
~ stropg to attack the British army. sta
ted To be 25 900 strong, were ON on. eide
III possession OF the ingh road to the pas |
sage "i The Tagus at A.malez, the bridge |
az WINCH place we knew had been removed |
aitheSeh the boats sui necessarily remain |
ed in the RIVER.
va the other side, we had reason to ex
PeC' Toe acVarce OF Victor's corps TO Tala
vera, as soon as general Cues.a's march |
sn"uia oe known, and after leaving % 200 |
men 10 WStch ytDogas, aud allowing from |
~ w - wv hbitu and wounded in the |
iate acton, this corps would have amonn- |
ted To % Goo. We could extricate our
selves from this difficult situation only by |
gre at ceterIty of movement ITO which the |
troops were unequal, as they had not had |
the'r allowance Of provisions for several |
days. aud by success in two battles. Ii
nnsuccessiui in either we should have bee n !
without retreat; and if 5ouit and Ney |
avoiding all action, had retired before us. &
hau waited the arrival OF Victor, we should 1
nave been exposed to general action win |
9u.OVo men rqurlly without a retreat.
We had reason to expect that as the |
Marquis de la Reyns, could no, remove the |
boats ircm the river Alnarez, SouIt wound
have destroyed them.
Our only retreat was, therefore, by the
pride OK AroO ~ 20 ana u we rad NOV.
fd OF, the enemy 10y breaking that bridge 1
while the army should be engaged win i
oouit and Ney, would have deprived Us of
hat only resource.
We could nor take position at Orope. {
IA, as We thereby left opsn the road To- tbe
,ridSe Of Arco Bispo from Talavera bv
Iaicra aud after considering the whole S
ubJect malureiy, was of the opinion that {
I was advisable TO retire to the bridge of
arco Bispo, and to take up position up.
~ the Tagus,