The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1809-10-31
whom .hesh.d formerly addressed on their

whom they had formerly addressed on their
knees. .te 49,,
But, " there is no hope in the dispositions
OF the feohie of Austria. or of any other coun-
try, and if Banaparte should become com
pletely master of the whole of tile continent
the ports and naval arsenals included, still j,
may be said. ''tne sea is ours let US take
that and keepit, ifhe take and keep the land
True. and SO obviously true. that it requires
not moments reflection. II is evident, that
unless we command the seas as completely
as he commands the land, we must fall. And
then the question is, can we do it? five can.
hon Some persons may think perhaps, that
the discussions Of these questions are unne-
cessary. seeing that we command che sea
nom but from the fact stated in my last
letter. it appears that we do nor command
the sea now for would it not be absurd to
call that command of the sea. which per-
mits convoy Of 200 or 500 vessels of the
enemy to pass (coastwAys.) unmolested, and
to carry on uninterrupted, between the coun.
tries of the enemy, all that sort of commerce
which is essential to their mutual comfort
and prosperity, and which furnishes the enc.
my with all the means of forming. in a short
time. vast naval force Yes, 1t would be
a6surdity itself, to give to this the name of
absolute command Of the sea. We have an
absolute command upon the sea where we
cannot injure the enemy, unless he choose to
come out to us but as to that sort of com
mand, which is capable of really annoying
him, and preventing the growth Of his naval
power. If We have it, it is manifest, that we
turn it tono account. The erhedition now.
perhaps. in the act of attacking the enemy,
may, indeed, do some service; that is sort
OF command of the sea. which, if the effect
oe froforfioncd Ia the nteanc, must tend to
the great object, at which aim, the des,ruc
ton OF the enemy's valuable commercial in.
tercourse and of course of his means of
rapidly rising, and sending forth navy,
equal, or superior, in numbers, to that of En-
gland.
but, sir, if this mighty armament; this
really great force this, probably, more an
nall OF the force which England can com and,
Is intended to do nothing, or should be able
TO do nothing, but merely to capture an island,
to Keep which wiitrequire very great strength
and expence, and which. after all, is Of no
great consequence if this. even adding to
1t the destruction of a few ships Of war and
a naval arsenal; if these are to be the at
|chievements OF, perhaps, 5000 men, by land
and sea, and OF an expence of millions if
not to reckon the loss of lives, such effects
are to be purchased with such means, what
must be our situation before this day five
years. At this rate of proceeding. accor-
ding to this mode of carrying on the war.
the destruction of every French ship will cost
US half million of money Besides, shall
we, when Napoleon has settled the affairs of
the continent, dare attempt such mode of
warfare 1t, instead of his now having a
war in Spain and another in Austria, he had
no war but his war with US to attend to !:
should we in that case. have attempted this
expeditions 1t il clear that we should not
have dared to attempt it. because when our
torce was bent towards the Scheldt, he would
nave had, from several ports to the south
ward, squadrons sallying out for ireland, or
other ports of the sea islands. If at time
when Napoleon has wars in Spain and Aus.
tria, and while he himself is, perhaps, zoo
miles distant from our point of attack if. at
such a time. under such circumstances. il
requires such an armament to destroy few
French ships, what can we expect to be able
to co, when these circumstances shall be
totally changed. and when not one circum-
stance favorable to US will remain.