The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1809-07-28
FROM THE ED1yBuRc REVIEW.

That Bonaparte Will ultimately succeed, we
apprehend rs highly probable; that he will sue
coed without great efforts and losses, is absolute
iy impossible and no man beyond the precincts
of court, is frantic enough to suppose that the
utmost success of lis arnis can subdue the PEG.
pie of Spain into natioa Of willing and peaceful
slaves. THIS he knows rs well as do and
we may be assured, that he will not only offer
them good terms, after the tide of fortune has
begun to turn in his favor, but viii finally grant
them such capituation, as their ( liant rcsis-
lance at once deserves, and renders it absolutely
necessary for the conqueror to allow. He will
rule Spain with very light rod, if he ever rules
her at all; because he knows there is 10 other
chance of ruling ier long. We ascribe here NO
thing TO his virtue only give him credit for
come ottliat prudence which never !orsook him
before the march into SPAN, and Of which, there
IS too much reason to dread, he has long ere now
regained possession.
Having sketched out hastily and inperfectly.
some of the consequences which VIC deem most
likely TO How from the present state Of affairs in
SPAN, whatever may be its ultimate issue, we
shall now bring these remarks to- d close by tur-
ming our attention towards the policy which this
country should adort with respect to its new oil
lies. And here it mnhappily is, as upon every for
| mer occasion, our lot to complain against all that
has already been dene for Spain, and TO confine
| our commentators to the generosity of the in
tentions manifested by the British government
We shall state our objections plainly, at the risl,
OF repeating the doctrines we formerly advan-
ced (Rcview Of Centz's last work. because their
application to the present question, IS extremely
obvious, and because it is now more important
| than ever, to incucate them.
When any operation of war is to be performed
| by our allies, whether they have to attack the
common enemy, or 20 defend themselves against
his nvasios, hold it to be sclEeyidcnt, that
England assist the common cause, only in one
Of three wtys---by Subsidy, By direct co operat-
en-, or by diversiOn.--We might almost lay IL
down broadly, tbat having chosen one of these
ways none Of the other two should be combined
with it ard for this simple reason that il is much
better TO exert whole power in one wav. tgsr
! choosing, Of course, the one most beneficial 10
the cause, than to fr,tter away and o.igtract our
force, by attempting; al at once. II is scarcely
possible, in tbc present state of our finances, that
we should safely afford Large sums so an ally, K
pay the eXpence, also, of large expeditions to as
| 5ist him Be-. employ the whole money either
| in helping him TO draW forth his own resources
rs hebest thinks he can TOR without implicit con.
/ fidence all con'edcracics worse than nugato.
| ry,) or wholly direct tile same SUNS to fit out
| such expeditions Us my really influence the fate
! OF the general operations IN Ike manner if il is
deemed fuOss advisable TO aid the cause with
! troops Of your own, choose wcil between the on.
| ly two ways in which those forces can act. You
have no chance Of raising such armies as may s,rf-
fee, at once, 20 influence the fate Of the cam
PaIGn, IN The quarter where tie great effort Is
hakd'S, ..'.d .ss:st tiie pycrs..a"a Of ,le spi