The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1809-09-12

,gueras to Corona, with ammunition for the
French enemy was attacked, and six of
the Wagons taken. On the 10, 90 French
wagons were taken, and 20 prisoners made
- French soldiers were Killed.
e MANREsA, June 90.
The French continue the siege of Corona,
and the inhabitants defend it bravely. A
successful sortie was made on the 9Th, in
which 200 were killed and as many wounded.
From Bells (London) Messenger
CAUSES OF THE MISFORTUNE OF THE
AUsTRrANs.
The disasters of the Austrians have hap
pened SO unexpectedly, and SO completely,
that an opinion is generally prevalent, that
they. could not have happened fairly; that
the enemy has availed himself of his usual
weapon, and trinmphed more by corruption
than by arms. There are certain reasons S,
efficient and always so ready, that they are
uniformly brought forward in cases of diff.
Guilty. If king dies at the exact nick Of
time for the fortunes of his successor, he is
always said to have been poisoned, If an
army be defeated contrary to expectation,
the assigned cause is trcachery, procured'
by corruption. There certainly cannot be
doubt that both treachery; and poison have
been occasionally employed, for these and
similar purposes for fortunately for human
nature, these must still be considered as
unnatural and extraordinary expedients, and
therefore should never be imputed without
the strongest positive or presumptive evil
dence. No one will pretend that there can
be any thing of positive evidence in the
corruption and consequent treachery now
alledged. And as to presumptive evidence (;
where the ordinary causes are sufficient, it
is surely unnecessary to have recourse to
such as are extraordinary, 1t is in reason.
ing as in poetry, he is an Inferior dram atist
who can only resolve his catastrophe by the
bowl and the dagger. He is narrow logi-
sician, who In all cases has no arguments but
| treaehery and corruption.
The defeat of the Austrians has been &C.
| casioned by those causes. which in the con-
fiict of armies always determine the event.
War is strictly game of skill, in which
| those are certain Of victory who possess the
greater portion of that quality which com.
mands it. The Austrians have been defeat
ed by the French from the very simple rea-
son, that the French were their superiors in
| military skill-that the French military sys-
tenn was superior to that of the. Aus,rians,
and that the French officers and French sol
diers have discharged their duties in a more
mastery manner than the Austrians.
! 1t It's still within the memory of many, when
even the naval battles of England, though
constantly in our favor, were almost always
frultless. The enemy escaped us almost un.
| injured-and barren victory, a mere lau
! rel, was the only result of our gener raj engage
ments. At that period however. our sea
men and our officers were as brave as they
are at present. Whence then originated the
difference between the. results of our yicto
ries in the period of which we are speaking
at present! Simply in one point-we had u
| wa ,e ubn
being in circumstances which required pecu-
liar efforts, entirely departed from the an
cient system, and substituted one of his own
According to thS ancient system, ship en-
gagged ship, and each tried to get to the lee
| ward of the other. According to lord Rod
ney's system, the English feet formed into
one strong line, and then bore down upon the
enemy SO as to break and divide his line in
which case they directed the main efforts of
the whole fleet to destroy one of the divisi-
! ons OF the enemy so separated, and content
cd themselves with keeping the others in
check, till having destroyed the one, they
had leisure to attend to the remainder
Since the days of Rodney, this has been the
common system of the English admirals, & it
\ has always been attended with the same sue
cess. Instead Of mere barren glory, vic
tory now is nothing, unless the fruit of it have
| been the. capture and destruction Of nearly
| whole fleet.
| 1t is the same with the French military as
| with the English naval system. The system
1 OF Bonaparte is founded upon precisely the
same principles. In description nothing can
be more simple. Its Characteristic point
is obvious to every one. 1t consists in com
pressing and compacting all his strength in
one point or part, and having thus formed a
kind of wedge, driving it through some GER
tain part Of the enemy. For example, if he
drew up his army in three bodies or divisi-
ons, he will throw all his strength into the
centre, leaving only such a strength in his
wings, as may enable them to keep the enc
my at bay. With his centre thus constitat-
ed, he will fall upon the weakest part of his
enemy's line, and by dint of mass and num-
bers, he is sure to penetrate and break it. The
very circumstance of having their line bro
ken throws them into confusion, and gives
moreover an advantage in point of position
| which is almost certain of being decisive.
The broken part being routed, the French
centre, under this hypothesis, is in the rear
OF the remaining part of their enemy's line,
whilst in the mean time the French wings
| are attacking them in front Such positi-
| on as this almost necessarily decides the fate
| of the daV