Alexandria daily advertiser. [volume] (Alexandria [Va.]) 1803-1808, 1808-05-03
[cogcLuDED

Having replied so your objections to the
several articles Of the treaty. aud the pa
'pers connected with il, aud given our view
OF them. shall proceed TO make some re.
marks on the whole sabject,.to do justice
60 the conduct of the American commits.
sisners in that transaction.
10 every case which involved question
OF neutral right, or even OF commercial
accommodation, Great Britain was resolv-
ed TO yield no ground which she could q.
void, add vas evidently prepared 70 hazard
war, rather than yield much. There seem.
ed 10 be 20 mode of compelling her TO
yield, than thar of embarking in the war
with the opposite beiligereus, 90 which
grea. question i, belonged 70 the national
eouncil. 60 decide. We had pressed the
Charms of the u S. 10 the negosiatian, to
the utmost limis that we could do. without
provoking the issue. I. is most certain
shat better terms could not have been 90
tanned at the time NC signed the treaty,
than - contains.
The state of the war 10 Europe suggest
ed, likewise. the proprlety OF caution on
orr part. Russia was then on the side OF
England, aud likely TO continue SO; and
Austria, Known TO be 10 the same interest,
was holding an equivocal attitude, andrea.
dy 20 take advantage OF any favorable e..
vent that might occur. Prussia, lately
powerful, had been defeated, but was not
absolutely subdued her king the ally aud
friend of Alexander. kept the field with
him, and On AIDE head against France. The
emperor of France, far removed from his
domioions, was making the bold and dan.
gerous experiment., of the effect which his
absence might produce 10 the Interior, ADD
in situation 10 be compelled to risk every
thing, if pressed by his adversary, Ga, toe
precarious issue of single battle. These
were strong reasons why we should no.
throw ourselves too decisively. isto that
scale.
The situation of the u. S. always re.
spectacle one, was sheo less important than
il usually was. Ii was known ,ha. they
were not 90 good terms with Spain, and
France was the ally of Spain. Their 10,
terror TOO, was disturbed by conspiracy
Of doubtful extent and dangerous tendency,
the consequences OF which arc sure to De
greatly msgni6ed by all WIS were unfsiend.
" 20 our happy system OF government.
Those circumstances could not fail to be
saken into view ,bylany the most: friendly ad-
minisua,ion 10 England, when pressed to
make concessions which il was unwilling
20 snake. Add to these considerations,
the important ones that the British minis
try had become much impaired in its
strength, especially 10 what CONCERNED the
u. S. by the death of very eminent aod
distinguished statesman, and had not the
power, or shoughs it had not, to pursue
liberal policy towards the u. S. and that its
power was evidently daily diminishing.
These considerations induced Us TO sign
the treaty, aud subnsit is TO the wisdom Of
our government, after obtaining the best
conditions that ii was possible 10 obtain.
We were aware thar, 10 several points, il
fell short of the just claims of our coan
try. But we were persuaded that such an
arrangement was made of the whole sub.
iecs as justi6sd Us 10 the pars WHICH we
took. In the rejection or adoption of the
,reasy. felt no personal interest. Having
The highest confidence in the wisdom, the
rectitude, and patriotism OF the admiois.
trasion, was satisfied that it would pur.
sue the course which an enlightened view
of the public inseress, and a jusf sensibill,y
TO the national honor might dictate.
Oar letter of January Sd was written in
haste, and was deficient 10 many of the ex.
plantations which would otherwise have
beeD given of the treaty. was happy,
when at Washington, to 6od that you
were perfectly willing to receive any ex.
planasions which might DOW be disposed