The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1808-09-13
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Leaves
4,550,000

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Leaves 4,55O,O0O
Computing that every ninth person is cempe-
tent to bear arms, there would be applicable to
that service 100000.
Deduct one half for agriculture, rural and me-
chanical pursuits, there would remain 100000
men from which deduct the troops in Germa-
NY and the dsposable force of the nation if
brought into the field by this computation, would
be $4,000 that is calculating the whole nation
| as united. But should the provinces that appear
passive or detached remain should any
portion of them follow those mobiles who adhere
to the French then the national force would be
deplorably ADMINISTRATION il appears that the
provinces actually occupied by France S contain
nearly one halt OF the population was either in
state or neutrality, apathy, or indecision. The
forces, resources and resistance would necessa
rily be affected by all these incidents and we
have no data from which we can draw any other
differences.
The usual regular peace establishment of
Spain, has been from so to $4,000 men at
which several corps were composed of foreign
ers, Swiss, Walloons and Irish the war es-
Establishment the Spanish force amounted to 10,
OOO so that after drawing the $4,000 regulars
INTO Pomcrania, there remained $4,000 on the
war establishment which were distributed in
the provinces, 10000 only were at the camp of
st. Roche, near Gibraltar, and were marched to
Seville and Catliz.
The annual revenues of Spain have been est-
mated at $4,000 coo dollars principally derived
from the IndieS-a re source which must from
the present disorder of things cease.
This onjectiral picture of Spain is very
gloomy one; and if the character which travel.
lcrs give of the inhabitants of the sea ports were
added, 1T might appear much more dcplorable,
for even British travellers talk very harshy of
the zVOrthieSs part Of the community" in the
,r~lN,.
should DC supposed that we want to say the Bril-
t.3h arc never at q loss where to look for allies
wherever there are sea ports.
But as it would be cruel TO surrender Spain TO
its haplcSs fortunes, without struggle we shall
endeavor TO form plan obedience < resistance
suited to the Of the nation reused BIZ that en-
thusiasm which abandoning reason, relies upon
instinct or passion ; or reused by the tanatcism of
100000 priests, when in 1892, they rose upon
the Moors in Granada, and after a bloody con
fIct by whatever means eXtirpated them, after
they had reigned in Spain tor eight centuries
The main efforts OF the Spaniarcls III resist
and repelling France should seem to be on the
side of AsIurias.
The whole force that could be collected in Cal
lcia and Asturas, should rendezvous between
LugO and Arense IN Calcia whateverforce the
Portuguese are competent to assemble, should
cross the Duro and occupy the province Of Ira
los Montes from BragaEza to i.amcgo r; and ifthe
British should land 10000 men in Portugal, they
siioull form the right wing, < march directly up
on Bcyra.
This force organized to 90 or 100. 900, men,
might advance into Leon and concerning with
the Spaniards in the south and east might cause
the southern Spanish force to rally in Andalusi-
a, 8. advance into Esuamadura, & New CASTLE
ifthey could succeed in raising force o. $4,000
men IN the eastern provinces, the country from
Malaga to Carthagena from its capacity for de.
fence, would be a proper position to commence
operations which should compel the French un-
der Marshal Money to fall back upon, Madrid.
or to occupy the Sierra Pcochera or mountai-
nous district which separates CASTLE from Valen-
tia, and the yallics between the Xucar and Ca
bricl rivers.
This part ef Spain is peculiarly calculated for
the discursiye war; and those whose habits are
formed to the climate must possess advantages
that strangers would feel most severely i'll an ac-
tive and inCessant dIscu sive war--all rife shoot
ing--would speedily force any stranger army to
concentrate its force and take defensive pOsti-
on and troops employed in their own country
if under proper discipline and no traifors among
them, need never risk a pitched battle, but
keep an enemy in q perpetual state Of dispute
tudc.
Operations of this kind on that side, and with
a sufficient force on the cast, would favour the
main object which ought to be the occupation
of ali the passes Of the Pyranecs, between Spain
and France this should be the sole object of the
troops called liz Gallacla, Asturia, and Portugal
and if the British were anxious of exhibiting, in
opposition to their enemies, the opportunity
would there be favorable
Whatever force could be collected in Arragon,
FROM the Gallego to the Legre in Catalonia,
should be light armed, mounted, and detached
should they amount to 10000 men, either thro'
the Pyreuncan valley d. Andora, and take, by
surprilc, tie French military depots at Taras-
con and Foix and return BY BagAieres, and the
Valley de Jafboust or, should these positions
be too strictly garded, they might move rapidly
along the vaes at the sources of the Cinca and
Essara rivers, north west to the sources of the
Gave river, along whose banks they might dcs-
cend 90 Bregcs, Campan ( above all, the ma.
gaines at Tarbc on the Adour river.
The failure 60 destroy these magazines would
not even render tins diversion useless because i'll
the impression we're made with CELEBRITY, and in
an imposing manner, the necessary effect weuld
be TO draw the attention of the French at Bay
Onne and Pampsllma, and in that way favor tue
impression which might be contemplated by the
combined army Leon.
In short, the plan Of cutting off the cOmmuni.
cation between France and Spain, by the north
western dehles OF the Pyrannces, IS tic only CT
fcctual mode BY which the Spaniards can expect
The feast success.
Ii world draw the French from the interior e.
chat extremity an object Of itself OF the Est con.