The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1808-02-06
Pn.g7lHa Legislature.
HOUSE OF DEL TES,
DEsATE on The amendment TO the Federal
Constitution, restricting the Judiciary.
FRIDAY, Jan. 8.
M. GhoLson ga continnati0n.

III, Mr. Thurman, we compare tue judi
ciary of the United States, with that of any
other government, which recognizes at all
the independently of it's judiciary, we shall
find the former more absolute and possess
ing a greater degree of permanency, than
any other in the world. The judicial indie
pendence IN Eng, is well understood, & has
furnished for ages, a theme of unceasng eulo-
GUM. Yet, in that country, at any tim c, when
Judge has forfeited the public confidence, he
can, without trial. be removed by the address
of Parliament to the King. In almost every
state government, in the union, we find that
their judges can be ousted from office, with
the utmost facility, for any misconduct what
ever.
In New-Hampshre, New-York, New-Jer-
scy, Maryland, Virginia and Vermont, they
are removable for any species of mal-admi-
nistration, that shall be deemed sufficient -
1nsMassachusctts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Georgia and Kentucky, they are removable
by the respective governors, on the address
OF the legislatures and i'll Rhode-Island,
Connecticut, Ncw-Jerscy and Ohio they are
elected at stated periods. In Tennessee,
North-Carolina and South Carolina, the ten
urc bears some resemblance to the tenure
under the general government but since
there is no specification OF particular causes
OF removal, it may be safely concluded, that
the judges in those states likewise, are re-
movable fer any kind of misbehavior-that
being the term of official duration, used in
their constitutions
We viii next enquire, as to the extent of
powers exercised by the federal judiciary /?
And here, a particular enumeration, is deem
ed unnecessary. Suffice it to observe, that
the ''judicialpower extends to all cases a.
rising under the treaties Of the United States,
. to controversies to which the United States
shall be party or which may exist be-
tween two more states, and to any questi-
on arising under the constitution of the o.
beheve, sir, may pronounce without the
rear OF contradiction, that the judicial branch
OF no ether government OF which history
furnishes any ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS so many
traDscendant jurisdictions Jurisdictions in
the exercise whereof, your judges are pa
rainounr not only to your President, your
congress and your Laws, but to the constitu-
ton Itself. They undertake whether right
fully or by usurpation, L shall not at present
saw to decide upon the constitutiohalltv of
laws, and thas at pleasure, without the fear
Oh punishment, unless convicted of some in
dLcfa6ie clt'ae, they may paralyse the best
efforts OF the Executive ard Legislature, for
the public welfare.
fdr. Chairnan-from the imperfect view,
VIII oh | have taken Of this subject, these
facts must appear most obvious That OH
the T 1T OF the judiciary, there is no etfec-
tuai connection with, or dependence on the
people nat their tenure OF Office is more
durable and permanent than is holden by
similar departme OF any other government,
and that their powers are infinitely more
extensive and IMPORTANT
Nov permit me to ask, sir, where is the
responsibility Of Judge, occupying such n
position, and rlaced thus beyond the control
o. the people' twill be sought for IN vain.
II is a mere shadow. The history Of your
Own country proves it to be entirely delusive.
he constitution, however perfect it NAV be
an ether respects, as it relates to the present
question, prostrates the great fundamental
ard eteinaipincipie in politics, that respon-
xIilit and pow er ought always to be increa-
set in the same ratio. The reverse of this
proposition, when applied to federal Judge,
IS IKE -aci. 1t seems that yoa render him ir-
Iesp3nsib Gin the same proportion, that you
invest him ith absolute authority.
But gent enen argue. that the iuiiciaryis
nov amcnabef So, what objection can be
'urged to the proposed plan of removal The
argument mo- nc! cd on, IS, that by making
the Judges removable by Congress, YOU rem
der The Former coo dependent on, and Concern
trate too great portion of power, in the lat
ter--or in cher words, you destroy the
CHECKS and balances OF the government We
WIZ conclsey examine this objection. 1t will
be easy tosnew that the salutary influence of
checks aud balances, does not at present
reach the judiciary. BY the constitution.
the senate Of the u. States, is a check upon
tn Presdcnt-the House of Representatiye,
uI'oa the Senate, and the Senate and Presi
Gent, composing the entire Executive, form
a check upon the House Of Representatives.
will thank gentlemen, to point out to me. A.
nv check orbaance which exists to the de-
crces of the Judiciary | believe none can
be shewn Their decisions are omnipo-
tent.
As to the concentration Of power that would
be lodged in the legislative by ADOPTING. the
pr posed amendment, there might be some
we ght in toe argument against it, if tie lcgis.
iatdI'e were in point Of Office equally perIna-
Eent with the Judiciary. But that is not the
fact The legislature frequently returning
to, and Incorporating with the people, is the
only legitimate organ of thcirwill. What the
pc pie Go by their representatives, mean.
their immediate representatives, they do
themselves, and in democratical institutions
1T may be asserted that the people and tlrc5F
representatives are SYNONYMOUS expressions
Then why not crust the representative branch
ofyour government with the power of reno
val,
Every objection against it, is predicated np-
on ATistooTdtlcal principles, and goes direct
Iy TO distrlst the people themselves tn SIM
prt what sydney calls the "damnable con-
clusion," that the people are incapable of
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