Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1808-04-22

iexpress purpose of securing interests sane
toned by acknowledged rights, makes sucf
iciaIm irresistible. We were, therefore, de.
Icioediy OF opinion, that the paper of the
brltish commissioners placed the interest
or impressment on ground which il was
both safe and honorable for the u s. to ad
mt; that IN short it gave their govern.
ment the command of the subject for eve
ry necessary and useful purpose.
| Attached to the treaty it was the basis OF
conGition, on which the treaty res ed
ctrong IN It's character in their favor on the
great question of right, and admitting IA
/ Voraoie construction on others, it placed
them on more elevated ground in those res.
pects than they had held before; and by
keeping the negotiation open to obtain a
more complete adjustment, the administra-
ton was armed with the most effectual
means OF securing it. BY this arrangement
the government possessed power to CO.
cree without being compelled to assume the
character belonging to coercion, and it was
Seie 10 give effect TO that power without
violating the relations OF amity between
the countries. The right to break of the
lnegociation and appeal to force, could ne
yer be lost sight Of in any discussion on the
subject; while there was no obligation to
make that appeal till necessity compelled
IT. 1t CT. Britain cobforined her practice
to the rule prescribed by the paper of No
vember 8, and the explanations which ac-
lcoElpanied it, our government might rest
ion that ground with advantage; bu, il She
departed from that rule and favorable CD.
| portunity offered for the accomplishment,
OF more complete and satisfactory ar
rangement, by decisive effort, it would
be at liberty to seize such opportunity for
the advantage of the country.
These considerations. founded On view
OF the proposed arrangement itself, furnish
I'd strong iDducement to us to proceed tc
the other objects OF the negotiation. There
were other considerations of different cha
racteT, which recommended it with s,ill
greater force. Had we refused to procec ed
| IN the negotiation, what was the altsrna-
i've which such a refusal presented 90 cur
view! The negoci a-ion would have been at
IN cad, after having failed in all its objects /;
'or II this iaterest was not arranged, none
others could be. The attitude which the
governments held towards each other, was
IN Certain degree hos lie. Injuries had
leen inflicted BY one party, and resentment
siiewn by the other, the latter having taken
step n the case OF the non-importatioB
~, which -Saa-j ntcndod to Wind cate the
public rights and honor by being made the
means OF obtaining redress of those iniu
lies. Inc measure was intended for the
ministry of Mr.. Pitt, from which the min
ries were received. but by the removal of
;hat ministry, and the delay which took
plAce in the passage Of The law, il came
into operation against the ministry If MIR.
Fox and lord Grenville, who would no,
have rendered those injuries, and against
whom OF course such. a weapon would no;
have been raised. Notwithstanding the ex-
lstence OF that law, and the attitude which
st'll remained between the governments, il
was impossible 70 appeal 70 it as a strong
motive of action with the new ministry.
such an appeal was sure to produce more
harm than good. 1t would have lost ms ALI
claim on the generous feelings and liberal
policy, which the ncw>ministry was beliey.
ed to indulge and disposed to adopt towards
the United States. The negotiation, there.
tore, with the new ministry, Yves conduct
ed by policy, as well as by inclination, ON.
friendly & conciliatory principles. Should
1t TAIL, however, in its object, and be bro
ken oil, the relation between the parties
would change in IN instant. From thar mo-
ment the new ministry would stand ON the
ground of the old one. and tic nation be II.
nited IN all its political parties against us.
The attitude would become in fact, what
the exterior announced it to be, hostile, and
1t was difficult To perceive how ic could be
changed, and peace be preserved, with ho-
hor to the UBited States. They could not
reccde from the ground which they had ia.
ken, or accept. by compulsion, terms which
they had rejected in an amicable neencia.
ton. War, therefore, seemed to be the IN
evtable consequence OF such a state of
things, and ] was far from considering it am
alternative, which ought to be preferred to
the arrangement which was offered 10 rs
When l took into view the prosperous and
happy condition Of the United States. COM
pared with that Of other nations that, as
a neutral power, tdey were almost the ex-
elusive carriers of the productions OF the
whole world and that in commerce thew
hourished beyond example, notwithssand
Ing the losses which they occasionally suf-
tered, / was strong in the opinion that
those blessings ought rot to be hazarded
in such question. Many other considera-
lions tended TO confirm me in that senti
ment. knew that the United States were
not prepared for war that their coast was
unforiihed, and their cities in a great mca-
sure dcienceless; that their militia, in ma
ny oil the states, was neither armed nor
trained and that their whole revenue was
derived from commerce. 1 could not pre-
suree that there was just cause to doubt
which OF the alternatives ought TO be pre-
terred. Had 1t, however, been practica-
bic TO terminate the negotiation, without
cFasIts an, s.rna