Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1808-04-22

parties, 70 winch The re su.iisans %, Zach
whether they exceeded or lei SHORE ri *,
should be brought. Ii could not be doubt
ed that the British export tusy was of the
nrst description, that it violated the PRIV
ciple or the most favored nation. The
British commissioners admitted the fact.
and did not pretend to justly IL ch that
ground. Ihey urged in "a favor org, ti:&t
the same duty was imposed ", e-pnrts Ia
their own colonies in America, and that :
any Change was made in it. TO safety he.
CLAIM OF the u. ). on the pzincjois IL the
right OF the most favored nation, il wc,ll,,
De 10 raise IL on he goods exported 10 ol.ser
Coonti les; not to reduce 1t OF those sent u
the .. The principle, however, esia-
oiiShed by tnis article, being applicable Il.
| that duty, 1t was TO be pIesutIed that =
might fairly be relied on TO oh ain a motij-
hcation OF 1t, either by reducing the dufy
on exports TO the u. s. or raising il a..
those to other nations. There is nctbinr in
! TINS article 20 restrain the u. s from aCiop
Nhg measures TO couBteract he British DO
| lacy with respect TO the West ladies. I;
| that c6ject had not been secured by > spa-
claI article, from the possibility of beng ~.
i7ceeo oy the others, the principle, csta-
oi.sheo oy thspresent one, could no; have
anected 1T, otherwise than beoehci5iiy
Having replied to your objections IN the
4 - N'NsN" VI hiiS ttGHtJl anu INc Dit.
pers Connected with it, and gwen our vicw
OF them, shall proceed TO make so..e re-
marks OH the whole subject to d.. ins;icr
TO he conduct of the American coa,r.. ssi..
oners in that transaction.
IN every case which involved a question
OF neutral right, or even Of curnme,ciaiac..
commodatioE, Great Britain WIS re.o,,ed
to ye!d no ground which she could avoid.
and wa Violently prep red 20 hRzard var,
rather than yield mu, There seemed 10
| pe no mode ofcompelling her 10 Yield, III. ~
mat OF eniharking in the war with the o,-
posite beliIgerent, on which great question
l; belonged TO the nationa! c.uncils 20 do,
i cc!!qe. We had pressed the claims ct the
y. States in the negotiation, 10 the utmost
! i,"is that We could sp, withrut provoking
'iist issue. II IS most certain that better
terms cCuiS. not have been o5,;. ned at the
TINE we signed the treaty, than il contains.
he state OF the war in Europe suggested
likewise the prcpriety ef caut or ON our
| part Russia was then on the side % En-
gland, and likely to continue SO; and Aus
ira, known To be III the saHie in'erest, was
noid'Dg ~ equivocai attitude, and ready 20
'Ahs advantage OF any favorable event that
might occur. Prussia, lately powerful, had
been defeated, out was nos absclr.e,, s,,b'
dneg: her king, the ally ard friend If A.
iexaoder, kept the field viz. HIM, and
made mead against France. The enneror
OF rance, far removed frum his tlamIniops
was making tho bold and dangerous exne-
rIment, OF the effect which his absence
might produce In the interior. and in
SITUATION 10 be compelled risk every thing.
1t pressed by his adversary, en- the prrcs.
rions issue OF Il single bate, These were
strong reasons why We should TO, throw
ourselves too decis,yely into mat scale.
The situation o. the u S always u re
spectacle one, wasthen less imposing than
II usually was. ]; was known mai they
were not on rood terms with Snais a,,t
.hae france was the ally Of spain. Their
interior too, was disturbed ty consn,,..,.
cy OF doubtfulexIent and dangercus ,end, n
cy' the consequences of which were sure
10 DC greatly magnifcd by al who were
uhIriehoiy to our happy system of gcvern- |
ment. nose circumstances Gould Tot IA ! |
10 De taken INTO view, by any TIE ,roSt
friendly adm nistration in England, when
pressed 70 make Concessions winch II We
unwilling to make Add to these conside
rauonS, the important one, that the British
ministry had become much Impaired in IFS
strength, especially in what concerned the
y. by the death of very em;nent nd
distinguished statesman, and had MOI ,b.
power, or thought that it had not. 10 mr.
sue liberal policy towards the II aud
mat Its power was evidently daily diminish.
ing.
These considerations Induced US 70 SIGN
the treaty, and submit it to the wisdom Of
cur government, after obtaining tine best
conditions that it was possible 10 obsain.-
we were aware that, in SIEVE raj points II
iell short OF the just claims of cur c. uutrv
nut we were persuaded that such an ar
rangement was made OF the whole subiect
as justified US in the part which we took.
IN The rejection or adoption Of the treatv.
ielt no personal interest Having d.
charged my duty with integrity and ga.
neither wished applause nor dreaded
censure. Having the highest CONFIDENCE
IN the wisdom, the rectitude and patriot
ism OF the administration, was satis6ed
that 1t would pursue the course, which an
enl siltencd view of the pubic ibtercst, snd
Just ehsibility to the national honor, might
dictate.
Our letter Of January Sd, was written in
haste anil was deficient in many of the
explanations which would othe, wise have
been gwen OF the treaty | was happy
when at Washington 70 find that YOU were
perfectly willing to receive any expjansti-
| ons which might nov e dis9C,ee T. give of
tilrt tfansa et'on, and TO allow them tie weigln
hich they might deserve. In making thi e5n,.
nunication d indugtd the So dom .hi.h
belonged 10 j., "a fuii toa6dcace that IL ,v3u.d