Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1807-04-10
JOHN STARK.
FROM THE AURORA.
POLITICS FOR FARMERS


"A man who should say, / will raise
thousand bushels of corn OH an acre of land,
would be deemed mad /; yet those who are
the DRAWERS for a naval establishment,
are not less preposterous in their projects
or pretensicns
We have thousand times shewn. that
naval establishment is incompatible and
impracticable in our national circumstan-
ccs and that even if il were practicable
to form and fit out and support such an es-
adjustment, that it would after all, be
wiser to have no military naval establish
ment whatever.
The readers of the Aurora NAV perhaps
recollect series of ESSAYS published last
year, under the title of the .Sopereigntu of
E"c ocean; that superior naval establish
nent, has always been productive of great
er eviis than advantages, to every nation
mat mas possessed naval superiority and
that the only advantages derived from such
force, was the enrichment or the ag-
grardizement of a .fcqo hersons ofthe No.
non, at the expense of the liberty, virtue,
happiness and security, of all the rest of
the nation.
Another view we had in that discussion
was to slIew, that the affected alarms set
afoat by the connivance of English emissa-
RES, or danger to be apprehended from
France, was so far from being real; that
the very necessity which was imposed ON
france, by the conduct of the infatuated
powers of Europe, of keeping them in sub
Jection, would render it equally necessary
to keep the whole force of that nation, to
watch them, and to suppress promptly, any
new coalitions that might arise; much of
our anticipations on this topic, have been
already fulfilled; and as we then Showed,
the policy which conccptrates all the force
OF France, will also keep that force CONT
guous and disposable; and for that reason
the accumulation of shihs, the augmentation
OF commerce, and the establishment of colo
mes Will be not remote, but contiguoHs-
These were our views in that discussion,
time has strengthened them
A military naval force, has been produc-
tive only of disaster to France, Holland and
spain, for the last century and what has
1t produced for England! Let its debts, its
poor houses, its prisons and its declension
from civil liberty declare 1t. But she has
conquered Ashland for whOm1 Read
Hurke's speeches on Hastings, in which
with all his capacity for high colorinc, he
has faiIen far short Of the picture Of mise
ry produced by English conqucsts in Asia.
The English company after rayaging all
Asia, in debt rs, 100000 of dollars Was
the conquest for the good Of the people of
England? No, the people of England have
refrigerated from liberty and comfort al
most IN the same proportion as the mono
polists OF Asia have been aggrandized.
Her national debt is three thousand m lii
ons Of dollars.
These then are tho effects Of naval SUI
per ority, and a competition of naval glory.
in the annals of naval achievement, Moth
ing can be more awfully splendid and hor-
ribly brilliant, than the battles of 1'rafal-
gar and the Nile. But what have they ac-
complshcd 1.-The battle OF Aboukir only
transferred Egypt to Turkish bar5arism
or Mamelukc anarchy, and Trafa gar lost
its objcct--it has not saved Naples, nor vet
secured Sicily; it has not prevented the
conquest OF the whole European continent,
it has not kept foot of land or an accessi-
b port for England, on the Whole coast
from the Cape of Otranto to the Cattegat
Yet ldeOts--fOr none bit knayes or idc-
OTIS can talk of our establishing navy 70
contend with either the victor or the van
quished--competitorsf for the sovereignty cf
the ocean. a military naval power can be
of no other use than for defence on tho high
seas we have not the means to bu Id a ma
w for that purpose defcrce on our coasts
and harbors is the only eligible or even ius-
tifiable system that we can ad0pt--But
martial navv for the nigh seas, is the most
eXtravagant notion that can be conceived,
because Fhv8icai imhossi6iHky meets it Oh
the threshold.
a navy for the ocean must be at least e.
quail 70 the navy which commits the agrees
sion. This brings the question then to the
simple point-Can we build and support
such navy This is a question Of simple
arithmetic. To see this in it's simplest
light, we have only to state our actual re-
venue, and let us SUPPOSE as necessary
consequence, that our revenue would be
doubled TO maintain navy.
Our whole gross revenue, let us suppose
to be exclusively applied to the naval esta-
blishmeDt, and that the so 100000 oil reyo-
lutionary debt is all paid Off