The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1806-04-11

70 tie bSn'sraae SECRETARY # tx Macy Of ~ Used
States.
!csss,ski)
On the esd March, the sommodors in his infirutai-
ons to Captain Hull, Rates&-
aAsy you viii perceive BY my letter to NJ Eaton,
have left the application oftfels fuceorrs ~'I
cquentiy the responsibility wholly to him, which !
conceive proper, weldon account ofhs having the
chief dre4iUn OF the land operations, that by the
time you arrive on the eoaR he will have il in his
poweseo form = juR efurase of the chances of fuc-
seis and henoe how far it is sTs aud expedieut to
pnrfue the obje9.''
Irsvert to this elaufe in the Cu,motore's inflruc-
ton TO capt. Hull, to corroborase what my former
Pusmunestion Rated~ that understanding fub-
bd3efwsep the eonpapdsf ~ fhief and n,yielf,
that hedH 70 forward and exescife diicrctioharv,
nAeafutes for bridging Hames Bahaw forward with
all his influence in order TO intercept fTpes to the
enemy from the country, and to cut of his efcape in
the rear--Mr. Lear has nilrepreienred this faa at
Malta, and elfewhere.
Tho the communications which came forward
from the Commodore by Captain Hull, and which
were delivered me at Bon,ba, were extremely diff
courasing. could fnd nothing in them which would
juitfy an abandonment, my parr Of the expedite
on thus far conducted--But, after we had gained
ponefiion of Detne, and Gill more 70 after having
beaten the eneniys army in that province and OPEN
ed our way to the gates Of Tripoli, could not but
hope the Commodore would take confidence from
thoie fnccees and be animated 20 pssi ms
ons by jqssiate xnioa--- What then ought to have
been my atonilhmeot to receive, on the frR June,
his letter Of lcsh A1ay, containing the following Pc
the Bafhaw, after having been put in poffefii-
on OF Derne, his former government aud the diftria
in which his inseref is faid to be moR powerful, has
not in hinelf energy and talent, and is 70 detitute
on,eans and refoutces not to be able to move en
with fucceffal progrefs feeonded by our naval force
nm he AMI t,er h. hall r
further fuPport, and the cooperation as meafure
TOP expenlive and little pregnsnt with hope and
advantage juftify its further profecuton.
6 In lhort. Sir, the matter reduces felf to this
We are ready aud willing to futport the Baf,aw by
an union of operations the coa 70 long as the war
with Tripoli continues, but his excellency mnl be
explicitly informed that our fupplies of money arms
and proviiions are at an end and, that he nuh now
depend on his own refoufces and exertons."
In conlequence OF recent advcas from Tripoli 7
have thought it my duty ffate to the Confit &C.
neral, Col Lear lnow this place) my candid OPT
mon that the Preient is moment highly favorable
TO treat OF peace and communication has ut been
handed me from that gentleman espreiing his deter
mnation to meet the overtures Of the reienng Ba-
fsaw 10 far as to found on the commencement of
anegociation, and to proceed to Tripo in the Eiex
frigate in the courfe of the week. From variety
ofeoncarring circumstances the preient period APP
pears propitious to fuch Rep."
This letter labors ingeuiouly to find forae pretext
for deferting Hamet Ba(haw at the very nipment
we profit of his operations and his insenc. to fecure
peace TO ourfelves-But the ingenuity of the piece is
not fircient to dsuife the hypocrfy of the deGgn-
We are fill to an,uie the exile with an idea Of CO.
Operation and laa operafioa be eos9 at the very
moment that pending negotiation necsIarily fuf-
ponds all hottie operations on the part of eur COM
mander in chief. But this was moment b;g5ly fa-
porabie TO treat fpeaee. What rendered it 70 AT
the period this enHdepinion expre-d by the Conn
modore he had not feen Tripo during the lan eight
months, not even within gun fhot fome of his fri
gates had not even been nearer than Malta iellom
if ever more than two Of them cruiGng eff the port
and generally NOT bit one his fquadron had never
been diplayed to the eneny's view; nor hot ex-
changed with the batteries of Trpol lince Connno-
dore Preble left the COAT, except sneaRaut and,
what is truth equally denlonRrable, no v6ble pre-
parations we're making head quarters for the in
setuient the >nfdipg THINNER which would give the
enemy any unea6nefs The Commodore, / am fen
fble, was too much an invalid to take an active part
in an expedition. But was he 70 deatute of energy
ofnnd TO be incapable ofdireeting its operations
and had he no commander in The fleet to whom he
could conade the conduct of an expedition under his
own direaion! If defitute of thofe capacities HIM
fef his councillors polIsled the,,and is would have
colt them no more exercife Of mind to encourage
than to derange plans.
But the theatre of the war was transferred to the
eaftefn provinces. Why not then fupport us there
with the means of fubffence and deiachments OF
marines All that was now necsFary was to GSno,t
ms and Goru hinfelf. The idea ibis Rep furpading
his authority is ridiculous, and could not have orr
ginated with hin--What commander in chief
without authority make dfcretionsl dfpoGtions OF
his forces and rhe of fulfilling them? Il is oh
je2ed that Be ,1ies fbe efee,s 7vrfaH 70 be eaAeG
jar 5aardtbdr yee7iv. Si3J oa as osxcye ss,a-
fires entered mon In bombardment or a crufe
marines of little more ufe in man of war than
cavary pioneers and while the yeeis are layn,
in port they uid only badges Of ranleand ma
chimes of ceremony. Why no, fend them where they
could be ufsfu at lean till e,ye ares 4ue,t enter
ri y6on? Gentlemen of that corps am well aifil-
red, actuated, like their brethren of the navy by a
manly zealto dRnguiA theu,fe!ves, were ready to
volunteer in the expedition. Ari it did not require
greater latitude of difcretion to indulge them the
perniibnn to fight at Derne than to furough them
on parties Of plesfme at Cataua and they might
have been fpbGited cheaper the coat than at any
port in italy. Bur compelled TO facri6ce
rs days that Poit, fixed. within an hours march Of
the main force of the eusmy. without the power OF
attacking them with AIRY realonable profpec of fuc-
cefs and only FOR the want OF two hundred bayo-
nets Would fueh detachment have defeated the
great operations carrying on by the fqualron
VIXEN t,eare ycasI in,liv refo;ved NM, ,t,.