Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1806-02-04

OerS OF the house! Where is the reSpOn.
sibility imposed upon them! Their vote
is not recorded: when they return to their
constituents, how easy will it be for them
to escape the odiu.n of voting for an OBJ
noxious candidate, by declaring he voted
for his opponent?
There IS one appointment, which the
Legislature had the power of making
that would have been more properly en-
trusted TO the Executive. The Execu-
tive may choose (said Mr.. 3D. all the mi
litary officers OF subordinate degree |;
but they have no voice in the election of
a general and other important military of
hcers. What then would be the SITUATE
on of the commonwealth. If in moment
ofpublic peril, when an active, disciplined
and well-commanded enemy was pres
sing upon us, we were 10 send forth the
militia under the orders of a general, who
had Obtained his commission from the le-
gislature, not by the force of his merits:
but by dint of solicitation aud favor! II
was perhaps under this point of view, that
Judge Tucker had observed: True ii
is, the inconyeniebces Of tn S conduct in
times of profound peace and tranquility,
are neither SO obvious, nor so numerous
or dangerous, as in times of war or diff
Guilty; but it should be re membered that
when such times arrive, there is little lei
sure for reformation, however requisite.
If by any fatal event the federal union
should harpen to be dissolved, or broken,
there is not state in the cenicdsracy, that
would sooner feel the total inadeQuacy OF
its constitution, to support its liberty and
Independence, than Virginia 4"
The organization of the legislature il
self IS liable to many we;gh'y objections.
Not the least Of its defects is, that it VIC
.lates that great principle of republican
government, that the will of the majority
ought to prevail. say nothing tsald MIR
b } of that artificial division of interest
produced by the Blue Ridge | say no
thing as TO the comparative influence pos
sessed in this house by The people on this
or that side oflhe ronuntain. My remark
applies not so much 10 the natural division
OF the state into two great districts, as to
its artificial distribution Tor The purpose
of repre- Are not our coun,ie,
possessed of unequal, population and pro
per,ys Still they are endowed with an e
quail right representation in the legisIa
ture. We have reduced the representa-
ION OF each county, to standard not les
arbitrary and uniform than the tabled bed
of PROGRESSES; and wha ever be It's size
we allow II no more nor less than tzvo re.
personalities. Is not the consequence OF
this arrangement TOO obvious to be mieiak
en-! Whenever a measure comes to be
decided by the legislature, combination
OF the smaller Counties may decide The
question in opposition to the Will of the
larger, however inferior they may be To
the latter in the number and property oil
It's inhabitants. 1t is vain to say, tina kese
smaller counties are equally d,fTused
thro' every portion of the state, and are
therefore incapable of combining into any
dis,in6 local interest. Fnr this argument,
equally applies in favor Of the rotten DO.
roughs of England. And is any repubi-
can prepared to justify the check, which
Mey impose upon the will of The majority
of England!
There is another feature, in which the
organization ofthe legislature, is obvious
ly at war with the grea principle of a re-
publican government. Each county sends
TWO members 10 the House of Delegates.
But ono of these may say yes, when The
other says no. Is il not however com.
plcte solecism to say, that each county
has two distinct wills Is il not preposte
rous thus to neutralise the influence of a
county, aud to compleatly destroy the eff
feel OF its representation in the general
vote! Who does not petceive its effect
in defeating the will of the majority of the
state, on deciding any legislative questi
on? Suppose there were 100 counties in
the state: 10 are neutralised by this ar
rangement: 46 are in favor OF any pro-
position, and III against IL: 10 being neu
tralised, the question is decided by the
vote of 40. But does this constitute
majority of the whole state Does it not
VIC. ate the fundamental principle of a re-
publican government, thus to give eGeet
TO the viii Of the minority?
There is another defect in the legisla.
ture, 1t consists of too many members.
Its magnitude makes it oppressive to the
people, and too unwieldy to permit an ca
sy discharge oftheir public duties. The
principle Of deliberatIve body is, that il
should never be so small as To eudangsr
the public liberty, nor so large as to clog
the public business. IL waa a remark of