Alexandria daily advertiser. [volume] (Alexandria [Va.]) 1803-1808, 1806-04-02

nfbs;nc forced ta carry on a war cfseig-
win an enormous consumption OF men.
and money, and without a prospect OF any
happier issue of the campalgn,slt the best,
than by the reduction OF one ofthose strong
snl,ce,. To undertake the siege OF Mentz,
AT least so 900 men would be necessary 70
blockade the place, and TO cover the opera.
tons of the sege. The extent and
strength of Mentz are such, that we should
be detained before that place alone Tor
half the campaign; and no operation sub.
seuuent to IT'S surrender, could lead to any
but very uncertain and insecure results ;
because the places upon the Mease on
the one side, and in Alsace on theio,her,
would every where arrest the progress OF
our armies. Add toshese another consi-
dera.ion Of not less weight that since
neither of those operations could be carried
into efec. but by great armies, there would
be few troops left to cover the Upper
Rhine. The enemy might avail himself OF
that local weakness might direct his at
tack there, while we should be occupiedn
the seipe OF Landau or Mentz and might
thus advance in line cooperation shorter
than ours might possess himself OF our
communications aud might Get between
,3us and all our supplies. 10 avoid being
cut off from these, we should, IN that case,
| be obliged TO abandon every thing without
striking a blow. s
An aaempt through Switzerland, against
Franode Compte, would be indlspusahly
The most formidable to the enemy. Ills
! frontiers are there open. But as such
| plan Of operation could not be carried into
efectbut through Suabia, by the Voral-
berg, or below the Lake Of Constance, on
account of the impossibility of having sup.
plies conveyed through the Tyrol; it would
be necessary before attempting it, to have
made considerable progressin Swaoia, and
to have an army OF observation opposite
Strasburg, to watch the enemy. 1t would
even be necessary to have obtained some
advantages in Italy, before hazarding an
attack in Switzerland. Aretreat of the army
in Italy towards KIakenfurt, would prevent
the army in the Iyrol from joining 10 the o.
perations 10 Switzerland. The enemywould
possess themselves Of the Puster Thai,
(the Puster Thai is in Tyrol, between
Br!xen and Lientz, and communicates with
the vale of the Adige) on the great roads
for our COMMUNICATIONS and conyeyances TO
and from Tyrol. We SHOULD be COMPEL.
ed to detach troops from the army in Ger.
many, for the Interior defence OF Austria,
anu ouiy TO rvlipquish all offensive @.
perations, bur even TO confne ourselves
within the line OF the Lech, or possibly,
the Inn In Germany, and there to take
defensive position, in order not to be at
too greata distance from Austria, and to
be ready to supply with due promptitude,
til assistance which might there be want
ed. 1t follows from all these considerati-
ons, that the war should begin with vigor-
Gus offensive operations in Italy. Ii is
shere we should act with the superior force
of our army. A victory gained there would
afford US the same advantages for the pro.
secution of offensive operations against
France, which France would acquire from
our loss of battle. in order 20 penetrate
into the Austrian hereditary dominions.
If the difficulties of our situation render il |
even impossible for US to arm, and advance
to act upon the frontier as soon as the enc
my, how much less is it to be expected, .
that the troops Of. the emperor Of r ussia, |
could arrive in time TO act at the very com.
mence ment of the war.
1t would be the interest Of France to use
every means to anticipate their arrival. by |
an early and decisive superiority. ANY
concentration OF our troops, or the march
Of the Russians, would not fail to afford
Bonaparte specious pre,ext to declare
war. The;force of this observation is to
prove, that in the case of war with France,
the plan of operations, the first distribution