The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1806-12-18


the other, the taking polleiIion of Hanover wv
Pruiia, in return for the cefficn of three pro-
| vinces. N
The hrfpart ofthis Treaty promifed, at Leaf
tor the future, an Acknowledged, puo,an,eea.
and " N'-7"'eon had 70 pleaied, firm. poii,i-
Cal Contribution. The refnlts Of the peace of
treibTg were general misfortune for Europe.
ost Prn'iIa facrihced herfeif alone when ll,e &C.
| cepted them; and to place a limit to the in
ceiiant ufurpstions Of France, thould the treaty
be conlidered by the Court of St. Cloud as any
| thIng more than words appeared an advantage:
the king therefore,, ratified this article uncon-
ditto ,alIy.
The fecond half Of the Treaty OF Vienn, re.
lated m IN oeiett, the importance Of which nd
been maniteitsd by ferrous experience. Prufia
could '0t rely on iecu,i,y for a moment, 10 lone
| as Hanover remained involved in a war, in which
that country hal. in fatf, no CONCERN, IT
whatever price it mirht he purchar-d, prnl;ia
was rciolYed that the French ilould not return
thither. She had her choice to obtain this end
either by treaty or a war. The celfion of
three provinces, which had been faithful and
| happy for long ferries Of years, was a facriGce
not to be made for the plan of vain ambition
but sheie, provinces, in cafe of war, would
have been the irlf iufftrers all the calamiiiss
o. that war would have preiicd upon the Mon
! archy; while the acquiItion of Hanover, could
It have been made under leis unhappy circum.
frances, would have been productive of tie
mott valuable advantages to Pruiiia. The King,
therefore, conceived, that he reconciled his
wiihes with his principles, when he accented
| the propoted exchange, only under the conditi-
on, that the fulflment of the fame ihould he
deferred ri the genera! peace, and the content
OF his Majeily the King Of G. Britain fnould be
obtained.
All the advantages of this treaty were for
france On the one fide, fl,c received guaran-
tees, which put the zeal on her conquefts; on
the other, ihe gave what ille did not pofTers,
what might be again conquered by the chances
of an uncertain war while in the ceiIions of
Pru!iia ihe found the means of enriching her
Allies.
But between policy which will do every
thing in its power, and an integrity which re-
CARDS its duties, and Especially its pronifts. the
CONTEXT is ever unequal. The king approached
the moment when he was convinced of this hy
experience: this moment WAS the MOT painful
OF hia reign
1t was the affair of France to reieja the mo.
difcations under which the King had confirm
ed the treaty, If :he did not approve them. Bue
line avoided doing this, fer the whole Prufiiau
army was Gill nndcr arms. She continued 10
he iavifh Of aifurauces Of friendrip rl,e fulfill
led the treaty rs far asit iuted her hut when
his Hiaiey wifhed TO reap the only advantage
which he had Propoied to himiclf from the late
negotiations, and which was neareh to his heart,
he fuddeny altered her language. The modi-
hcations, added to the treaty of Vienna, were
now rejected at Paris. Endeavours were made
to force Prufia into the mott injurious ucs-
lures ; and when Count Haugwitz, who was
at Paris, remonfrated againft this, the uncon-
dtional fu,flment OF the treaty was haughtilv
Unified on, as were the immediate celiion ofthe
three provinces, and the recall OF the patent by
which the occupation of Hanover was declared
prcvIhona. Pruhia was required to REIGN
part of the advantages Stipulated, and to ihut
the ports agsnR the Britiih Gag in the fame man
ner as the French had returned into the ElcGto-
rate.
The king, at length, was perfectly convinced
of>the true character Of the frieadlllip of the
Emperor OF the French--a fopoTific dranght for
power which fill feels its own ftrength an
initrumentof degradation, and finally of ftlb-
ie&ion, to every power which no longer polIef-
ies frength.
Tn the mean time, Napolean was in pofe1ion
Of every advantage. The Pruiiian army had
returned his own, after fornc movements of
no confeeueuce, at which deceived Germany
prematurely rejoic ed, on forne frivolous preteu-
ces, efsohed itfe,f on this fide of the Rhine.
The fra conflict might produce misfortunes.
War, whicbis not, under all circumstances the
greatef of evils, might become fllch under
tiOaS thS'' S}>HtihS. HS mug bCtC'i'iiSu tO
continue the part he had hitherto acted for fome
time longer. Whiting to preferye his force,
now more than ever necefary to Europe, and at
the leaf to iecure the tranquility of the North,
he confirmed the new treaty. Confidence, how
ever, was now utterly loft. Pru1fa was con-
WINGED that, on the firh opportunity to weaken
her without danger, flle might expect an attack
from her pretended ally convinced there is
degree of ambition which nothing can atisfy--.
which proceeds, without ntermiiiion, from u
furpaion to ufurpation, fometimes without
plan, but ever intent on deftruetion carelefs Of
the choice of means, and employing alike arms,
and the pen, violence, and oaths. But even
with this conviction, 70 great is the unfortunate
fuperiority obtained by fuch policy, over thofe
who with only to he juf, the King fulfilled all
conditions Of the Treaty with the pun6tuaity
of faithful Ally. 1t is known what the cooie-
queuces were with rcfpee to the connections of
his MaeRy with England. France gained no.
thing by this: but flie triumpbed in fecret at
the thought of having difunted two Courts the
union of which might have been dangerous to-
her and what, in the view of France, gave the
princip value TO her alliance with the king was
that this alliance inlolated his Maiefy, fince it
produced an opinion, that Prullia was partici-
pator in the caufe of 70 many misfortunes.
But not content with this, we iball foon fee
in what manner the politics of France, anured
that fhe had now no enemy to fear, believing
that fhe had annihilated Auftria, forming aJudg-