Berkeley and Jefferson intelligencer. [volume] (Martinsburg, Va.) 1802-1810, 1806-06-20

Alish king mad neither foreglven nor loE'
gotten it. He considered Mr.. Fox as a
Iacobin, and resolved to deny the impor.
tunities of both parties to admit Mr.. Fox
to his counsels. Lord Granville thought
himself bound in consequence to stand
with Mr.. Fox, and to decline Office.
When the death Of Mr.. Pitt, and the
desertion ofthe alliesin Germany. SEEM
ed to force Mr.. Fox upon the king, for
all men agreed it was necessary to drop
party divisions, and to unite against the
common danger, we are told, Lord
Granville was closeted with his Majesty,
and finally arranged the ministry to mu-
tual satisfaction. As Lord Grenville 10
an honest man, we cannot believe such
man would recommend a Jacobin to the
king, or that he could prevail over his
Maiesty's aversion to Mr.. Fox, without
being personally responsible for his con-
duct and principles.
When it is considered too, that those
two eminent men formerly acted in OPP
position to each other, and that for three
years past they have come to mutual
good understanding, the grounds OF di.
vision in the present ministry must have
been fully explored, and such engage
ments mutually required and given, as
will prevent their collision. Those who
had always acted together before they
came into the ministry we think more
likely to fall out afterwards.
The union of the present ministry is
the motc probable too, when we advert
to the known sincerity and amiable tenn
per Of Mr.. Fox. The attachment Of no
mans friend has been stronger than Mr..
Fox's have ever manifested towards him
and those who remember his famous
coalition with Lord North, will believe
that too much stubbornness to maintain
the appearance Of consistency is not one
of that gentfeman's faults.
Mr.. Fox is the only member Of the
new administration who can be the cham
pion Of peace measures. Lord Greh-
Vile and MIR. Wyndham love their coun-
try too we'll. and its dangers are too emf
nent to permit US to believe that they are
disposed to adopt the fatal counsels ofthe
old opposition.
On these grounds, therefore we pre-
sumo to conjecture that the English min
istry will be united in favor Of prosecu.
ton of the war.
We have not yet enqu:red whether
there Is sense and magnanimity enough
in the nation to support the ministry in
such resolution. The nation no doubt
is weary ofthe war, and staggers under
the weight of its burthens. But pc ace
can scarcely cheat the blind multitude
with the delusive hope of respite from
those burdens. A vigorous and able op.
position to the war in parliament might
afford alimens to popular disconteut.-
But the men who used to lead that oppo-
sition are now in the ministry. They
may say they did not choose and have
made the war; their predecessors, whom
they were accustomed to oppose, left it
a sad necessity on their hands. ."'
Besides, pracehas once been tried and
proved not only .delusise, but almost IA
tai. Bonaparte gained more territory in
peace than in war; and England volun-
tarily gave up her eonquests, except NAL
Ia, Trinidad and Ceslon. Such another.
peace would ruin her.
Under these circumstances it may be
expected, that even the poPulace viii see
that the continuance of the war is the hard
but inevitable condition of English iiber-
" aud independence.
If we are not deeeivedin these specu-
la,ions, the British ministry and nation
will concurin pursuing the war.
i With what hope Of ultimate success
they will pursue it is a more difficult
problem.
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