The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1806-03-28
Gbe Gilquirer.
RICHMOND. astb March.
GLANCE AT THE TREATY OF PRES
BURG

pointed our expectation. IF we reafon from
the relations which it efablifl,es between Auf.
tria and France, we can no longer con-
template Bonaparte under that character of
daring ambition, which we have for long
time extracted from his hiRory. At the bat.
tie Of Aufterlitz, he feemed folicitous to ac
quire the merits Of a humane conqueror. By
the treaty OF Preiburg. he appears ambitious to
interweave the laurel Of political moderation
with the wreathe of his military virtues.
Contrary to our expectations, Bonaparte has
not hipulated for the pofeffion Of Ehrenbrei,.
itein, CaRel, Kehi, and old Brifack on the
right bank ofthe Rhine. They are the maj.
ter pafes and keys Of Germany on the wei,
and yet he has waved the poi1efIion ofthem.
Contrary to our expectation, he has not an.
nexed the country of Tyrol to his kingdom of
Italy; for he has confented to transfer It to the
king of Bavaria. The territories which he bat
annexed to It, are, however, in all confidence,
extenfive enough: for agreeably to the srd ar.
tcle OF the treaty of Luneville, referred to in
the 5th of the treaty of Preiburg, thefe acou.
fitions comprehend Sc Iftria, Dalmatia and the
Venetian lies in the Adriatic, dependent up.
on thofe. countries, the Bocca de Cattaro, the
city ot Venice, the canals and the country in.
Guided between the hereditary ftates Of his ma
Jety the emperor and king the Adriatic fca,
andt the Adige, from it's leaving the TyroI ia
the mouth of the faid Tea, the towing.path of
the Adige ferving as the line of limitation"
Contrary to our expectation, Bonaparte has
once more formally ratified his promife of re-
hgnng the crown of Italy, 70 foon as the
parties named in (his) declaration ff1all have
tnihlled the conditions therein expreiTed."
iheie conditions are in the third article
of the confaltum of fate of March nth 1905,
in the following terms:
YIN the moment when the foreign armies E,aTf
nave withdrawn from the ftates Of Naples the Ionian
liies and the Hand of Nfaita the emperor Napoleon
man traninit the hereditary crown of Italy to one of
ms legitimate male children, either natural or adop.
t'v.."
Some time. it is true, may yet elapfe, before
Nu'lia ny the abandonment of the Ionian lies
may call upon him for a rrlinquifhmrnt of Ita-
iy: and it is alto true that when tb.t renauin,.
ment IA made, Bonaparte will afumc the right
or nominating a fuccef1or, devoted to his in
tereh. hut theic were petty advantages. in
companion OF what we believed his irre(iiti-
bic force and inordinatc ambition would have
induced him to claim. We expected him to
claim nothing lefs than the perpetual and un.
conditional iurifhiaion ofItsly.
Such in fact was the predo -ninance which we
thought him to have porIefTed and the lHft of
power winch has apparently influenced his
whole life. that w. expected him to place no
limits to his views and requifitions Was it too
htt'e to expect that fuch man as this would
place his faithful ally of Bavaria on the
throne Of Auftria itfelf, or that he himfelf
would retain the conquered country in his hands
and, 'nini,ation Of the great Charlcmagne, would
unite Germany * France under the fame fcep.
tire.
No doubt Bona?arte 6as gained comfortable
advantages from the treaty of Prefbur-. He
has cut down Auftria 10 the rank of a fecond.
rate power in Europe fnGric, which was for
'evcrSI years the ally of Britain, drawback
upon France in her dfputes with that nation,
'"o connterponc to her power on the CONT
nent' he has ereefcd the Celebrates Of Ba-
oen, OF Nuremberg and Bavaria into more
Respectable powers. he has enlarged the KING.
dom OF Italy in faa he has eitabliihed 70 MANY
iittie tafes, whole fovereigns are his allies and
VII! Dc his faves. Thefe are the advantages
winch he has obtained by the treaty of Pref.
ourg' but they Till come far Mort Of our pre-.
vious expectations Of his rep ute d ambition.
IL is not impoifhle however that there NAV be
!ft,et treaty, which may fecure much greater
advantages to Bonaparte.
10 what caufe then are we to afcribe the
apparent moderation which he has thus unex
psetedy difplaycd? Three folutions only pre-
Tent the m{;Ives before ue:
ut. Either that Bonapartc did NOT po(Iefs
p'N OVCT tue allies,
~HNch the French Bulletins and his apparent
fucceGes had announced.
81. Or that Bonaparte is not in reality that
ambitions coaqueror, which his enemies have
conceived.
81. Or that in fpite of the decided preponde-
lance which he poGcntd, he has abandoned
lone OF his fayourite lchcmes he has fuffercd
the emperor OF Autria to retain his throne and
inoh OF his refour es only to crafty more
compleatly his inordihate ambition. May he
not have Formed fome new and more favorite
icheme of asgrandiZement, in the execution Of
which he is to fnd the emperor of Auftria a
uirflil auxiliary, or a fcheme, which would call
FOR all the troops which would be neceaary
to govern Auftria as a conquered province Is
there in fast any fcheme too van, for the ambi-
tion OF Bonaparte to plan or his genius to ac-
compiig
As to;he Era fo'ution, we may aR, what
force had Bonaparte TO fear? Alexander Of
RAiIia hid retired & with all his troops inmedi-
ate'y after the armiitce of Auterlitz PruGia
! you'd fcarcely have departed from her neutrali-
tY at that period of the Campaign when fhe faw
al the allies driven from The field Pruffia, who
fno doubt has been fectetly plotting with Bona.
oarte, and may expect to receive Hanover or
Pomerania as the reward Of his neutrality. Ths
oi!y army 10 & which was left 10 oppofc the
French was that of the Arch-Duke Charles,
| wAich Is Rated to- contain 90, 900 men, and to