Berkeley and Jefferson intelligencer. [volume] (Martinsburg, Va.) 1802-1810, 1805-03-29

lfthe sedition law should be considered
a. unconstitutional, the whole indict
ment, including this twelfth charge, mus,
fal! to the ground, whether the word, ir
question were proved to be true or not.
If the law should be considered q. con.
stitutional, then the traverAer, whether
the words in the twelfth charge were pro-
we'd to be true or not, must be convicted
on the other nineteen charges, against
which no defence was offered. 1hi.
conviction on nineteen charges, would
put the trAverssr Is completely in the
power Of the court, by which the amount
OF the hne and the term of the imprison.
ment were to be fixed, as a conviction
upon all the twenty charges. The i'm
Prisonmcnt could not exceed two wears.
nor the fine be more than two thousand
dollars. If then this respondent were
deslrou' of procuring the conviction OF
the traverser, he was sure Of his object.
without re Getting the testimony of John
TAYLOR. If his temper towards the ira,
vcrser were so vindiCtive, az to make
him feel anxious to obtain an opportuni-
ty and excuse tor inflict,ng on him the
whole extent Of punishment; permitted Ov
the law, G:ill a conviction on nineteen
charges afforded this opportunity ard e1-
Cuse, a. fully asa conviction on twenty
charges. One SANDER more or less, in
sucha publication as the Prospect BE-
fore U.s." could surely Ft ofnO moment.
10 attain this object, therefore, it was
not necessary to reject the testimony of
John Taylor.
That the court did MT feel this vindic-
tive spirit, iS clearly evinced by the mo-
derAtlon of the punisa meA,, which actu-
ally was inflicted on he traverstr, after
he was convicted Of the whole twenty
charges. Instead 1f two thousand dol
lars, he was fined only two hundred, and
was sentenced 70 only nine months i'm
Prlsonment, instead of two years. And
this respondent ayers, that he never felt
or expressed a wish to 60 further; but
tn%> IN this decision, as we'll as in every
other ven in the course of the trial, he
fui'v and freely concurred with his COL
league, Judge Griffin.
A' further proof that his rejection of
this testimony did not proceed from any
improper motive, but from a tonvit,tion
in his mind that it was legally nadmissi-
tie, and that it was, therefore, his duty
to reject it, he begs leave to state, that
he intertered, in order to prevail on the
district attorney to withdraw his objecti-
on to those questions, and consent'o
their being put; which that officer refu'-
ed to do, on the ground "that he did net
feel himself at liberty to consent to sucn
departure from legal principles"
Hence appears the utter futility of
charge, which attribute. to this respon.
dent a purpose as absurd as it was wick.
eds and without the slightest proof, i'm
pute' to the wors, motives in him the
same action, which in his colleague i.
considered as lree from blame. Brt
this respondent will not content himself
with showing, that his conduct in con-
curing with his colleague N the rr;ect;-
on OF John Ia} ;or. X stitnony, could
not have proceeded frrm ;hv motives as
cribed to him; Lut lie will show that
this rejection, if MT strictly legal and
proper, as he believes and insists that it
Is, rests on legal reasons Of sufficient
force to satisfy every mini, that d Judge
might have sincerely considered it a.
correct.
The verbs stated as the ground Of the
twelfth charge above mentioned, are
stated in the indictment as,onr entire and
nd!vi'lble paragraph, continuing one
entire offence. Ihi, respondent consi-
dered them at the trial, and still consi-
ders them, as constituting one entire
charge, and one entire offence andthat
they must be taken together in order to
explain and support each other. Iii.
clear that no words are indictable a. Ii
beIlou', except sUch as expressly, or bv
plain implication, charge the person 4
ga'nst whom they are published viii.
some offence either legal or moral. 10