The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1805-11-19

writers who, for purpofes belt known to them
ielVes, daily m,ireprctcIt the fate OF France
france is neither poor nor miferab,c. Bona
pa'te is, doubtlefs, the mott hateful of all tn,
uinrpers who have ever tlifgraced the pare O
hiftory; but he is poileiied OF too NUT h ability
and too well knows the nature OF his tenure, tt
opprets and impoveriih his empire. The III
mott power of France is unequal 10 the condueG
OF England, but let US not be deceived by the
taite reports of our travellers into the belief tina,
france lies at our mercy, that fhe is at the eve
or bankruptcy, and we have only to wait "a
behold her ruin. She is not mileratle, nor are
her people as yet Garving.
III iuch are the pecuniary refourccS OF France,
her military ettab.ilirent is equally fu 5ieet of
terror. In this point of view Ruffia is her only
equal antagonift. Let us compare their pow
era.
The population of France has ever been eff
mated at thirty rli:cnse-We may reaioaably
add twelve millions for Holland, Switzerland
and the conquered part of Germany, to fav no.
thing OF italy. This will compete FUN OF for
ty-two millions. Her preftnt armies are eftima-
ted at 100000 men.
he population of Runia is cn;rnated at FORTY
millions, but it has this disadvantage i'm a com
PARTON with France, that the forty millions of
kuiiia are tpread over the irnmenGe foace of
nearly one-hfth of the whole globe, Whit that
OF france occupies nparatve.y very mfg
nihcant territory. The natural conieuuence of
this is, that Rufiia cannot fpart Il proportion of
Fer population for her arGDes equal to that OF
France: In iome parts Of her empire The could
not rtffe an hundred men without depopuiating
province.
4 population thus widely icattered, may
make good militia. but it would be ahfi,fd To
alert that it is iu'ted TO raie numerous army.
1t might be brought into uie if attacked IN their
own country, but it is not available as an Often
FIVE force.
The military force Of Ruaia, therefore, can
not be eqliI tn that of France. Ii Ru9ia can
tpa'e two armies of eighty tho.if,nd men each.
the one, after a Gated nteryai, to follow and
that can be expected of her.
The armies OF Rufiia mutt enter By the way
either at Germany or Italy.
lbey cannot enter, or at iela efftGtually en-
ter, by the way of Germany without the con-
currence Of Pruiia.-3 II there Is every reafou
10 imagine that Prpfiil will not favour this de-
ilGn.-ipth the fff place, whatever nav be Caid
to the contrary, it is her evident ntcrelt not 10
permit 1t. Pruiiii has every thing to fear from
Nnifa. She is already iurrounieG by circu ~
valuation OF the Rufiian power. Ruilia, upon
the decline of the houie Of Ar:tra, has becorue
the natural enemy of pru!iia.--Pruflia looks 70
~
OF tie hou'e of An!tria, by the aid of Frauce
Ru'iia is her only check TO this defigu. pruGia
knows that it is the intereh and inten-
ton or France 10 increafe the Prufiian power az
a iIita0e check to Ruilia on the f9e Of Eureras-
The intcre.ts of France and Pruiiia therefore
Concur! and TINS there IS every reaiou 10 sp.
prenend that Pruilia will be an ally of France,
Or, w''a' is etIe6tuay the fame, will BE neutral,
and PreietVe an armed frontier a5anft the Ruff
fans.
If iuch be the argument from the interefts and
relations of Pfua, it is Fill further confirmed,
to us, at leaf, from wha. has lately occurred
the million and fudden recall of Novozl5zof.
We are much mifaSen if Eovoxil; zoii W As fent
to Berlin 70 Hegociate with Bonaparte at Paris.
1T appears To us as more probable, time and Cit
cnuitances con6dercd, that his milton was 10
Berlin and 10 Berlin ony-that his real pugpoie
was 10 procure the accefiio1 of Pruglia to TIE
Contederacy, and that, failing in this Object e
his million, nc had only 10 return as ne casae.
This return was evidence of his faiIuge--thc
mediation with Bonaparte pretext.
Rufiia therefore mutt march her armies into
haiy. If any part Of the French frontier is i'm.
penetrabie 1t is that which is guarded by the
mountains OF Switzerland. Should the RulIiaDs,
therefore, after may battles, for il will not be
the etfect of one CT two, iucceed in driving the
French back upon the mountains, they can drive
them no further. Another very f.rious conf
dcration here occurs: the French in this CAT.
are within their own buIwsrk, ard the armies in
rcierVe of France and Switzerland at hand TO
recruit them. The Rufians cannot procure A
man. The waite OF war and difeale is ilrepara-
bic. The probable event will be, as il was
once before, that the Ruf1ians will return as
they came they will forget that they are fight
ing with nation of Europe, and not with
imkiih army; they will think every thing done
by one victory, ard enable the French to rcco-
yer by the iuperiority of military knowledge.
what they ioie perhaps on the 6rt oUtftt. in
4 Jingle battle the French folders perhaps are
not equal to thofe OF many other nations in Eu-
rope; in campaign their fuperiority to every
o;hcr has been too often manifea. The ardour
ot their national character is fingusrly contraa-
ed with the coolneis Of their military practice.
They receive an cneniy's fire---form again, when
broken by the attack of the bayonct-yicld to
hyperion force, and recover their ground as they
fee opportunity--and this, not in battle only,
but throughout whole campaign.
1t has been remarked OF Suwarrow, that in
Perlonal powers and deTesnor, together with
his conduct III battle and victory, he united the
character Of an ancient hero with the fuperftifi-
on, t!ercenets, and ignorance of an Alfalfa or a
Brennrs. III: wept and prayed, fought battle,
gained i Victory, and Thought every thing doo,