Berkeley and Jefferson intelligencer. [volume] (Martinsburg, Va.) 1802-1810, 1805-05-17

mensc physical force of the achInr pla-
ced in his hands, but also OF his own
. thorough command over all its move
ments, than to any deficiency Of political
skill, or, indeed, of political prudence.
Where has he vet failed of success in anv
measures, the planning OF which and the
means of executing it were submitted
entire y to himself, or were altogether
under his own controul. To signalizc
the present war he has conceived one
mighty project; aproject, which must
either end in the disgrace Of his arms,
or in the absolute ruin OF his enemy, and
the consequent uncomfortable command
! over all Europe. Su,h a project once
MANFRED in the mind OF BonApartc, VIC
know enough OF that mind to authcrisr
us to discrcdIt any idea, that, while there
Is the slightest shadow OF probability to
justify hopes Of success, it wlllnrver ~
abandoned. Even though peace shouh
tor the present put its execution aSid.
it has been too long cherished, TO he a.
once rehnqulshed. Long before his +,
gvptian expedition, he had submitted t"
the directory Il plan for the invasion and
conquest Of England; on his accession
to the consulate, the idea was restored
to his hopes but at both these periods
the nation was too weak, too muyh cx-
hausted, to afford the mean Of carry ing
into operation plan so expt nsivc, re-
/ curing SO great an appropriation both Of
men and OF treasure. The first object
that engaged his attention, at the COM
mencemcnt OF the pre- sent war, was this
mu h wished for conqut st. AL! his re,
sources have been devoted to the per-
teCtlng OF the means by which it was to
be accomplished, with a zeal and indus.
try un'e xampled ; and in less th.!n two
! years We behold those means lulreA>eI,
not merely bc\ ond any thing which, tL:
| fcars ct the enemy could have >IES, seed,
but even to that point, bcl onI which It
is probable his ON" hopes or intentions
did not mean to carry them.
After expcnding SO much time, 50
much money, IN bringing the mean, of
invading England, to that state which
was requisite, to enable him to make the
attempt, ii is not to be expected that
he Will at once tor,gp the object OF
these preparations, and proclaim
to the world hi, own uofruitful prodi-
galitv.-Dnubtles the desire Of sub
DUNG England is not less ardent this day
than IT was two years ago, when, in thu
presence Of Lord Whitworth, he issurC
his indecent fulmnAtiopsj when in hi,
official communications he menaced he
with the fate Of Carthage. That thi !
darling object has not been abandoned,
the late and present occurrences prove to
demonstration.
About the end Of November the pre-
Parations for the invasion of England VS.
supposed to be complete d and no soon
er was that the case, than the idea Of rtn-
PloNlng those preparations seemed to
have been dropped and the design Of
crossing the channel was spoken of in
such 4 manner, as to Induce the brlret
that the emperor hid no longer anv sucn
scheme in conte III DiatIon, without posi-
lively SAYING that he h I'd resolvod against
it. The same idea i, seemingly held
out BY FatEevrant, when h. tells the
French senate, ;hat France may, as at
present, continue for ten wears 4 dangr-
rous war OF mcnaces against England,
which must gradually waste the strength
Of the latter, and render her in the end
the prey OF intrrnal discord or foreign
hostility. Tint This procrlstinating con.
duct is neither Consistent with the tenn
per, with the into nor with the AZ.
tuAl determination" Of Bontparte, no man
OF observation need be told. The offer
OF Peac:, at the same time that the pre-
partitions for invasion were apparently
relaxed, Can only be considered as
bait, to catch those Of the continental
powers for whom the emperor has been
so long angtng.-It may succeed in de-
/, tA@hlng them from their own true In,c-
rest, and in facilitating the execution of