The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1805-04-16
ENQGIiR FIR.
RICHMOND, arm lG, 1905.

EURoPEfa IFr1ffRs.-Lord Mu'yravc's an
fwer to Mons: Taleyrand, does not hold out
the idea that England will enter into 70 negoci-
alton with France for peace, but that ii.e will de-
cline fnch negotiation until lhe has under food
the fentimcnts of fome of the continental DOW
ers, particularly of Ruiiia. England profencs
to have other views in carrying ON this war,
than her own glory, iecurity and power. The
quenion is not whether lhc i!,a retain or fur
render the iiand of Malta: whether the eletto-
raj dominion OF Hanover 10 TO be given back TO
her monarch, or transferred forever 10 France
but by what fyitem the general affairsof tie con-
tinent are to DC 70 fixed and guaranteed, rs to
reltore inc formef Balance Of Power, and pre-.
fcrve its future tranquility. What has been the
refult of this communication with RuiIia s. her
Other continental allies, We nave not vet heard,
md Il is queltion perhaps, which has not yet
been fcttled in the cabinets Of Europe. But the
probability is, that this negotiation about peace
has already terminated with Lord Mugrave's
aniwer, and that fomc time mutt elapte before
Europe can be delivered from the miieries of
war.
Does the Englifh cabinet ftill maintain the
idea, that the tranquility Of Europe depends
upon a compliance with the conditions of Lord
, Whitworth's ultimatuTl, previous to the COM
mencement of hotilities. In that cafe, France
NUT withdraw her troops from Holland. She
NUT make Italy and Holland independent of her
power. She mutt content to leave Malta in the
hands Of the Englilh for certain term of wears,
and fuffer her to have permanent poileiiion of
the illand of Lampedofa. But will the new
! Emperor ofFrance, with growing navy, an ar
my the beft difciplined in Europe, with inan-
ces, not exacted from his own people, but from
the neghbouring ttates, and with long luftre
f,Fr fh
pacifcation, which he formerly rejeGted, when
he was mere Firf Coninl of France, invefted
with very limited powers
| Rut all conie6tures on this fnhiea are render
ed unnecefary by the exprefs declaration of
the French government. The Eepo6 lately
| pusliHed, avowstheir determination 10 makethe
provilions of the treaty of Amiens the BATS of a
peace, while it at the fame time declares their
refolution to preferv etheirinhuence undiminilh-
ed over their dependant allies. England would
thus have TO furrender the ifand of Malta with
out receiving any Indemnity, Whit France
might fill continue to regulate the defines of
Batavia, Holland and the Italian republics. But
England will fcarcely lubn-it to fuch terms, 10
long fhe adheres to the different ohiets, which,
engaged her in the war.
Z Peace cannot then be the lot of Europe, I'M
/ til England !hall either limit the terms of the
peace to her own iDteref without extending her
views to the general balance of power, or until
circumstances may arife, which fha compel
France TO conEne her ambition within the efab-
lifhed limits of her empire. Beiides can any
one imagine, that Bonaparte was really defirous
ofconcludiug peace, at the very moment when
he was difpatching feet to the Weft-Indes ?
Bonaparte's letter to the king is dated on the
9Th of January; Lord Mulgrave's anfwer on
the 18th, and it was during this interval, on the
/ 18th of the month, that the French feet failed
from Rochfort. Had the French Emperor
| been even ferrous and hnrfef in his win,es for
peace, the probable iEue of the negotiation, by
exafperat'ng his mind, and demonstrating the
impofiibility of obtaining it, will have no other
effect than 70 remove this event to a greater
diftance. What Talleyrand has truly faid OF
the ordinary refut of n! complicated negoc:a-
tons" is equally applicable 10 all fruitful over
lures, that "they throw the fates again into
war, become more violent by the difappont-
ment ofnot having fucceeded in bringing about
4 reconciliation"
Europe, therefore, prefents at this time two
important problems for confederation. Isaco-
/ aliticn to be formed by any of the continental
powers and England TO carry on the war? And
what is to be the refut of Bonaparte's gigantic
projects ?
The firit will depend upon innumerable cir
cumhances, which are continually changing.
nc iaIt rtltS Ohly upon one nmpIe 1prlDP the
gigantic ambition of Bonaparte, aided and en-
couraged by prosperous courfe of events.
In his Expofe, he difclaimed the idea oe ex-
tending the domnons of France, Whit he at
the fame time declared, that he would never re-
linquih his influence over his dependant allies.
How then can Bonaparte extend his influence
over thefe countries: without formally annexing
them to the throne of France' The plot is ex
trcmely obvious: and the laf Englifh papers
allure us, that the representation of the drama
has already commenced. They fay that he is
! once more TO crofs the Alps, TO place his bro
| Their Jofeph on the throne of Lombardy (late
the Cifalpine Republic.) From thence he may
gradually extend his fceptre over Etruria, per-
haps over the tates of the Church; perhaps to
| the extremity of Italy. Jofeph, it will be re-
collected, is the brother, on whom, according 70
the Organic Senatus Confultum, the Imperial
dignity is to devove, " in default of a natural
or legitimate heir, or adobted hair, of NAPOLEON
Bonaparte." Whit Napoleon lives, he, and
not Jofeph, will be the real fovereign of Lom-
hardy at bis death. the thrones of Lombardy
| and France will be united under one head, and
that head will be branch of he Bonapartes.
What too can prevent him from appointing
his imperial highnefs Louis Bonaparte the Sta1-
thoder of Holland? What can srreR his ilent
ADAPTATIONS over the Swifs Cartons, already
bound 10 him by reluctant allegiance. How
eaiy will II he 20 excite fome little disturbance