The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1804-11-10

partments, agan, perceive thele two forces no o.
perating fePately but mixing together in theic IN
duence. IL - .eTce that We perceive in the fede-,l
government not ieis tan three different plans o the
organization Of three braacss which do not eaiate
from each other fuoh the judiciary, b,,t wnich
ariie At once from the government or the peopie O.
each fate. In the Eoule of Representatives. for
initlnce, the Representative principle acts entire
Each itate rcPrelented proportion to It's num-
bers. For every $500 inhabtautsit lends one men,
Der. And hence the larget ftate as Virginia, ha. as
many more votes and as much more influence than De-
laware the falleh ftate the amount of its cenl,
divided by certain number comes out 10 be greater
aud II that Genius be extended its approximations il,
vote Its influence becomes proportionably greater
but IN the ienate the federal principle dpays its per-
tecs operation In that body Delaware ihows as many
members, g; gives many votes as Virginia Inc-eale
the number OF its inhabitants, and the influence Of the
Rate fill remains the fame Its overeiyry the meta
phylical functions of fcf-government would not be
more perfect than they were before iuch an augren-
tation 1t is in the election of TIE federal executive
thatweee the curious combination OF thee pruc
pies, ioremarkaby different their tendency. In saee-
lection ofthe PRECEDENT &; -PreGient Delaware has
not wary votes Virginia, nor has Virginia rs ma
ry votes than Delaware, he has more inhahi-
tarts. The number of electors which each Of them
and TO which each rate, is entitled by the contut
OH, is equal to the whole number OF Senators and
representatives to which it may DC entitled in con-
grefs"
This fumnary view of the ftru6ure of shefe oriei-
nal departments alone flfcient to few the inau-
enc. OF theie two principles, their diainetive Rruc-
ture where they exit by them!cycs and their mutual
modification where they ae together 1t viii ferve to
dpay the different enoroachnents which hare been
made by the iederatve principle upon that great max
i'm OF republican government 70 much eulogiied by
liberal politicians, and 10 generally practled in our
fate Administration that meafures ihculd fow from
, the will of the majority.
Perhaps it may be of ue to illurate ill fartherby
particular nitance the OF this acr;ece nthe
articular cafe which is now before In other word.
let trace It's effect in the mechann of theie Ele6to-
raj Colleges, and in the Election OF the federal execu-
tive.-The PreiiderJ and Vice-Prefdent are elected
then not by nrajor;y of the 3sole, but majority Of
the electors, who are proportional the number
OF the people in the different States. If we ak in what
proportion is the number OF thef electors agned 70
each Gate, we ha find 5ha it is IS the conitant NUN
Ser added % he number OF their congrelional re-
preientstivcs Delaware has representative and
Virginia has %. Hence the frit has electors and
the lat Oh But for every representative, each nare
muit have had 1t leaf 900 inhabitants. Every
eicctor then in Delaware is appointed by only 10000
inhabitants, while every Virginia e!ector requires the
and Of 3025o inhabitants to en:te him 10 qualified
Every D. inhabitant may be fancifully iuppoied
torepreient the loOoOh part oone elector while each
Virrinian claim than the third part Of that
privilege. Here then fee this boated principle of
political equality completely neglected; and in the
fame manner, though in the fame degree Is this
deviation to be o5erved in the relation which iub-
tilis Between all the large and all the inaer ltates
What then is be inferred from this view of the
conititutional ratio of electors allowed each OF the
tates I, this to BE- inferred that the appont-
inent Of the executive partaes of the JtylI plnc-
PIE that all the larger n2te- have loft proportion
ate fhare of the influence, which they would have de-
rived from the r1arrtztiv. principle; and that this is
iacr.tCe which they have agreed cffr to the To-
vereignty Of the inaiirr Rates And does not hch
principe pave the way this consiufon, that each Of
the Gates houid be coaldered in its electoral College
as acting to certain dey-ee in les fovereign capacity
that each of them hou3 be enabled TO exert that a-
hze influence in the appointment Of the executive,
which the zv50ke Eb.r OF their electors has conferred
upon them and that it would De 5tsgliariy opprelve
upon the larger itates 7Iupt t.4; NJ 6 'ion
which ihould give the fnaer tses chance OF profit
ing completely by their ioycregn character, while
they thenlieives lhould give vote hot c1hibtin the
tui force Of its own sovereignty Were iuch flfern
a. this is introduced the larger taes 70 far from RECEIVE
ing any equivalent concentration would even fpitain
an additional injury. They had iesn in the Iil Place
that their electoral influence was inferior 70 what
the! population and real importance would have en-
titled them to- but they would uow fee, in the fecond
place, even this portion Of their electoral influence
trttered and mutlated by the manner of eyer;lg IT,
This then appears TO be q tandard By which
tAc uperiority OF the ditrlcng yitem and the Gene
raj Ticket fytem is be aicer;ained Irspeat it that
pan eens to be the mott equitable which fecures 70
each of the tatcs its full force of overeigr electoral
power, and which thus enables the argeh ftates to
preierve this coulttutonal influence, conpacted and
undimirilhed by any divion Of it into contrary and
costteracting votes BY tjs principle them let The
excellence OF theie two y Rens be impartialy ehi-
mated.
When the electors appo.ated by districts eve
ry voter in the state gives hIs TO one man in his
own district, .anA to other i'll anotler district
When he votes by general ticket he gives his vote 10
one man in each Of the districts. He has chance
therefore OF eecting greater number of candidates.
but he has lmaler chance OF electing any one than
what he had when his vote was confined to hi, OWE
district
When tic election then is made by general ticket,
the electors viii be coen BY e majority of the state:
* their opinions viii be the fame not only with thoi Of
each other bug with thoe OF the state ard that clp
ddlte and that fystem OF administrations to which die
state Is itielt attached, will thus receive is r.;r and
undivided upport. But when the ecc3ioris made BIZ
districts, the Electoral College will exhibit 1yerff-
cd and motley appearance iorue OF th electors will
think with the majority Of the state while others will
be oPPoicd 70 it. In giving their votes however they
do not proceed upon the principle Of iebcrativr bo-
dies, where every neaiire is carried By a vote Of the
majority, and the opporcn Of the n2cr part isrerg-
ed IN the triumphant viii OF that majority Had ,hi.
been che structure Of the Electoral Colleges the win Of
the majority Of the might have had conid4-