Berkeley and Jefferson intelligencer. [volume] (Martinsburg, Va.) 1802-1810, 1803-04-22

no longer hold the means Of supplying
the West-Inaia islands su6iecs % your.
single controul and because III The ex-
Portsfrom New Orlcans, being ofeourse,
n French bottoms, your navieation will
Be propoftionately diminished. Your
revenue win suffer g nnch o your COM
merce. Theextrnsive boundary Of more
ihan two thonsand mica win Be stocked
with goods for The purpose o. cousra6apd
trade. The inhahitants win natuialiy
take their supplies in dirt way. You.
must therefore multiply your revenue
officers and their assistants, and while
your receips diminishes, the expence Of
collection would Be Increased. As to
what regards your defence, il is evident
that the decrease of yonr navigation and
revenue must narrow your means Of de-
fence. Yea eannee provide die same
force eitherby and or SEA; butEtfie evil
does NOT stop there.-With this country
in your possession you have the means
ofdefenee more ample, more important,
more. easy tim any nation on earth In
. short time IN the Wesf-I India islands,,
fed from yoargTanaries, must depend on
yptT win. And in conseq0ense, IN
die powers az Europe who have colo
mics there, must court your friendship.
Those rich sources ofeommercial impor-
lance win BE as il were IN your hands
They win be pledges for. the amity Of
others in seasand dominions FAR remote.
IL . defence which, though Il cosys you,
nothing. = snperiortofleets and armies.
But let the resoarcesof America b divi.
lded. (which must happen when the
French are masters Of New Orleans and
al this power and inf0enes b gone.
One hail. yo0rresoorces win be in their
banda, and they win laugh a. your feeble
attempts uifh ihe other half lie Is the
interest &C this country thak the PossessiS
ons Of European powers IN the West In.
dies shouldb secured % them. And
IN this view Of the subject L Is irnpor-t
tantthakthe islandofS Sc. Domingo should
Be snhieeaed BY France, Il would there.
fore have been wise % have aided IN that
snbiugation. There II indeed special
reason for i beyond DE considerations
Of exterior policy. Tint event win give
10 your slhves the conviction that it H.
impossihle for them 10 become free.-
Menin their unhappy condition must be.
impelled BY fear Or discouraged BY des-.
pair. Yes. The impulsion offesr must
Be strengthened By the hand of despair.
Consldefs moreover, your copditiou IN
the vars uhichiars most ikelyt 70 happen.
These muse be elder with France or En-.
gland. Ifwith France your inferior is
Taineds ifsith England the commerce
ofthe Atlantie stanes win be distressed,
and that Of the western country TOO,
though not perhaps IN 20 great . degree.
Thus let The var Be with Whatsoever Of
these nations i may, one half Of the
United States must &c peculiarly iniur.
ed and II IN cases Il win Be difficult for
them 10 assist each other. The interior
has no seamen fqf6aval defence, the sea-
board can send few if any troops beyond
die mountains, This powerfulinRuence
Of one nasio1 On one great division Of our
country, and of another nation, Oh the
remainder, win tend 10 disanite Us. The
ridge Of mountains win mark the line Of
distinct Interests. The effect Of those
different Interests win Be felt IN your
councils. Il win Be eyidenced % this
aoor. This mnse be the case as long Is
man l. nan. Look, Ipray, 1t those ma
tons. The enmity Of France and En-
gland can terminate only BY the subiuga-
ton of one 70 the dominion Of the other.
II must b by the complete exertion Of
force and the utler impossibility Of re.
distance. They afe the Rome and Carr
<thAge of modern times. Their implaca-
bic spiris win stinnlate them 70 attempt
divisioA q this sountry By sentiments
az haired, deadly q their own. These
eifoIss win. ! hope be vain. but With
such powerful engines 70 operate on the
,intereat and the win, l. there not danger
70 thak 0nion % essential % our prosperii.
~! There win be ronstznt struggle in
| n -E.