Jenks's Portland gazette. [volume] (Portland [Me.]) 1799-1802, 1802-05-10
VOLUME VI.

X Is a fundamental maxim Of free govern.
fnent, that the three great deparf sn,s Of pow
er, Lsp71tDr, rxecutive and judiciary, nall Ne ef
ienEially diltind and independent ke one of the
other. This principle, very il flutntial in mot
Of our Rate contributions, has been particn arlv
attended to in the confttution If the U.i-ed
States which, in order to give efea ia II.
has adop'ed precaueion peculiar to tldlf, In
the ProyiGons that forbid the legi1 ture 70 va
~ IN any way The compensation Of the Pref1ezt
to diminih that of a Judge.
TITS principle equally found, that though
in a Government like hat of Great Britain.
having an hereditary chief with var preroga.
tives, the danger to Liberty, BY ,he,p, edom-
nan of ore department. over the other, is on
the fde Of the Executive yet in popular forms
OF government, this danger is chiefly to be aB
pretended fforn the Legislative anch.
The power Of Leeilaiion is in lis own nature
the mott comprehensive and potent of the three
great fubdiviiors Of fovereienty. r is the
will of the government; IL Prelcribs universally
the rule Of action, and the functions which are
TO enforce i. Ii creates and regulates the pub
lie force, and it commands the public purfe. If
depofte5 in an elective feprelentatIve IF liz
people, it has il moA cafes thebody OF the na-
ton for its auxiliary, and gererally ass " 4
al The nome tum Of popular favour. In every
fuch COVER ment il is consequently an organ Of
iurnenie ltreoght. But When there IS an hsred.
itary chief magiarate, clothed with dazzi ing
prerog atives and great patronage, there 4
powerful counterPoil7 VIII Oh in mof cafes.
is lufTicisnt TO Preierve the eq Iinbriun1 Of The
government in Tome cafes t. incline tie f,aIs
too much 10 IFS own fje.
r., -LoIIv
tatlve, there is no adequate counterecf. Con
fidence in the mof numerous, ar leg q !, i've de-
partmen', and iealoufy Of the Ekecutv5 Oh eE
form the genius Of every inch Cove nment.
That jealoufy, operating u the ConGi uton Of
the Executive, caufes this organ to be lntrinh
calIy feeble an1 with holding 10 the courfe of
adrnintraiion, accef1ry means Of force and IN
R1ence, is for the mott part vganr to continue
i II tate Of impotence The relult IS, that
the Legislative BODY 10 this fpecies Of govern
rnent. politics additional refources oi power
and wei lht; while the Executive Is rendered
much TOO weak for competition almolt too
weak for felf defence.
A third principle nor lefs well founded than
The other two, i that The Judiciary d partment
IS naturally the weaken Of the three. The
fourees of Grength to rhe Legislative branches
have been briefly dekneated. The Executive,
by means of it, fveral aeive powers ID he dr.
penlaton Of honors and emoluments. and in the
direction OF the public force is evijently the e.
cond in frength. The Judiciary on he other
hand can ordair nothing 4 comm 4nds meth
Ell the pes, nor the fword. Il has fcarcelys
any patronage. rs functions are not active bu5
deliberative. It's main prov nce IS to declare
the meaning Of the laws, aud 10 extraordinary
cafes, i NUT 10 K Up to the Executive aid, for
the exetu ions Otis deciiions. Its chief ifrengtn
is in tbe veneraton which il is able to nfprs by
the wildom aud re6tuude Of its judgments.
This chara6er Of the Judiciary clearly indi'
CAKES that it is not Only the weakea Of the ,hree
departments Of power but alla- a, it eg rds
the iecurity and PrefervSton Of civi liberty by
far The fafet- In conflict with the other de-
partrnen.s i, will Be happy if it can defend it.
iel--to annoy them is beyond its power. In
vain would it fingly attempt enterprifes againR
the rights Of the citizen. The other Depart
mehts could quickly srreR its arm and punilh
is temerity. Il can only then become an If
fe6aal nRru neot of oppredion, when * IS
combined with one Of The mo active and pow
erul organs and aganlt z combination OF
this fort the true and beaguard is compete
inde2en len on each AMI bath OF them. Its
dependence on either will imply ard involve q
EIbiei vency % The views of the departme' on
which it lai deperd. rs indePendecce ~
both will render it a powerful check upon he
Others. and precious thield 70 he rght' Of
perfon or pre- perty'--S fey, liberty, are there
fore inleparably conned-d with the real and
fubHantial independence e the Couts and
Judges.
Ii IS plainly 70 Be inferred from he inRru-
ntent ifrlf that thele wee governing principles
ia the formation Of our Contribution that they
were in facl e., will hereafter Be owed ~ he
contemporary expoGons Of perfons who muR be
fuppofed to have underaood The views vita
which il was framed, having been themiei7es
members Of the body that framed it Thofe
principles fuggeR the higeR moile' Of conlti
tutional policy sgaina that contraction. which
places the e1iaence Of the Judges AZ the msrey
If the Legifl ,tufe. They inarud u, that %
prevent concentration Of powers, tie a3Saes Of
di6otiln. 1t is edenial thar The departments a
mong whit thev ihall be attributed, ihould DC
efeaualy independent Of each ogher and lhae
. IL ,set 4