Jenks's Portland gazette. [volume] (Portland [Me.]) 1799-1802, 1802-05-03


peniations ought to be regarded as a rcdraint
nPon the Legislative Department. scanjs, to this
department belongs the power of resul ating
concentrations. The different members of the
caufs 'ght to be taken ditributiyey in con
formty win the diitibution Of power 10 The
reflective departments.
This is certainly the moi fpecous Of the ar
gnments which have been uled on thai Gde.
has received ieveral pertinent and forcible an
Iwers. But it's believed % De fufceptale Of
one fill more direct and iatistaa ny which Is
not recolllted q have been yet given.
If, IN the lheory Of the conllltptoo, there was
but one way OF defeating ne term Of off z, and
that exciailyeIy appertaiaing 10 .hcex- 1--WE
authority, L would be natural and carr-d in
terence that TINS authority va, foley cont4C1
plated IN a oonltituhosal provifon upon be too-
jet But the tad is clsarly orherwiie There
are two modes known 70 The con titution, il
which the tenure ofofice may be efe3eI-one,
the abolition Of the Office; The other, the re-
moval Of the officer. The frR is a lezi1 .tive
act, and operates by removing the ofFi,e from
the perlon-the lar is an executive at and op
eraies by removing the pe'fon from the Office
Bath equally caoie the tenure, enjoyment, Or
boldiag Of the Office to ceate.
This beng The cafe, The inference which
has been drawn, fails. There is no gr ind for
the preiumpion, thar the CO.. aiturion, in eaab.
lilhing the tenure Of an Office, had an executive
eye & one on Of the two modes in which it
might be affected. The more rational luppo-
ti.ion is, that It intended to reach and exclude
both becaule, this alone can iulfi the purpofe
which it appears 10 have in view. And it
o. sht neither 70 be underfood Ia am at le(s
than It's larguage imports, nor 70 employ mad.
cquate means for accomplishing the end which
i proiehss. Or, the betce to elu,idate the
idea by placing it in another form, it may be
fad, that Gace in the nature Il ,hiog, the le.
gill4tive, equally with Inc executive organ,
may by different notes 81 aEtioa aiFc1 TIE t.
nure Of oRice when The contribution undertakes
to pref ii { what the tenure haa be, It ought 10
be preiomed to intend TO gaurd thar which
have been preicribeI agant the Interference
OF either department.,
III an inarument aboundiag with examples
of iehrittions on the Legislative dilcre,ion there
IS no difficulty in luPpoGn2 that one was irten.
ded IN every cafe in which j, may be fairy in
ferrcI, either from the words uied or from The
objea 70 pe effected
While The reafon which has been A4tcd,
refers the ProvifOn reipe9ing the renure
Of judicial oficsrs as we'll to the executive,
to The legislative department.. were it nee
eaAry 70 examine % which, il to either ot
them, il ought 10 BE deemed mott apr pirate,
there could be NJ Il -ulty in leletiing he al.
ter, rather than he ioime The tenaye Of an
Office is one Of its efential qu7itisJ. A provt,
fon, therefore, which is defined to pr4lcribe ar
define his quality, m be luppoied % have a
more peculiar reference 70 that department
which is empowered TO conRilute the Office !;
either a. directory to It in the exercile of It's
power, or a. fixing what otherwife would be
ieft to its ddcretion.
1t conaantly 70 Be recolleaed that The
terms Of the proviGon do rot look particularly
to either department. They are general,
+" The Judges lh4ll hold there office during
good behaviour" 'Ts not from the terms,
therefore, that an ex lui~e applicability to the
executive organ can be inferred. On the con
trary, they mutt be narrowed to give them on
~ this efea.
Ii is different as 10 the proviGon concerning
compenf,Jions. Though equally general in the
terms, this can have no relation but to the le51
latve department becagis, as before oblervsd,
that department. alone would have had power
TO dminilh the computations. Bur this rcafan
for con6ning thar proviion 10 one department,
namely, the power Of affecting the compenia.
tons, 70 far from di6tA'ing finiil4r app, opria
ton Of the other Proviion, looks different
way, and requires by analogy that the latter
lhould be applied 70 both the departments,
each having q power Of affecting the tenure Of
Office, 10 A way peculiar tn iticlf Nor can II
be TOO often repeated, becaule it is a conhjera
ton of great force, thae the delgn 20 confpicu.
Gus in the former Of thefe two proviGons, TO e.
cure the independence Of the Judges aeainA L
gilative influence, is powerful re4Goa for un-
derlf4nding The latter il f:nfe calculated to
advance the Same important end, rather than
in one which mutt entirely fruRrars It.
A rule Of constitutional law opboied to our
combustion, is attempted 10 be derived from
the maxim, that the power Of legidaton is al
ways equal asd that A preceding can never
bind or controui fIcceedng tegi tatute by iss
ats, which the refore mutt Always be liable T.
repeal at the diltre,ion of the fucceaor.
The milaPpica;ion or too extentive applica- |
ton OF general mains or p opoGtoRs, true ia
theit genuine iente. is one Of rbe mott com non |
aud fruitful forces Of fate realaniug. This is |