The Massachusetts spy. [volume] (Boston [Mass.]) 1770-1772, 1772-01-30

he following paper from Cato's Letters,
rs recommended to the ferrous perulal of
CHRoNus, and Compay you are lheie.
fore deiired to pubhih it. q p.
lbe ener0aebirg nature Of b0,err, fvu to Be
sUaitbFd and eheckfd
InNL1 the checks put upon maeiarate,
~ make naIons free; and only the wan,
OF iuch checks makes them 1Aves. They
are free, where their mAgiltrates are conf
ned within certain bounos iet them BY the
people, and act by rules prelcribed them By
the people And they are Aaves, where
tnslr magifrales chute their own rules, and
follow then tufts and humeurs; than which
more dreadful cuife can befal no peopIe :;
nor did ever any maglfrate do what he plea
fed, but the people were undone by his
pleaiuie and therefore mott nations in the
world arc undone, and thofe nations only
who bride their Governors do not wear
cnalns.
Unlimited power is 70 wild and monllrous
a thing, that however natural it be to deine
II, IT Is as natural to oppoie it nor ought
1t to be truited with any mortal man, be his
intentions ever 70 upright: For, befdcs that
ne will never care to part with is, he will
rarely dare. In fplght OF himfelt he will make
MANY enemies, aganh whom he will be pro-
tected only by his power, or at leaf think
AtQielf belt protected by it. The frequent
ahSLNpforefeen neceiiities of his affairs, and
freq0ebt difficulties and oppoiition, will force
bNn;for his own preiervaton, or for the
Pfeiervation of his power, to try expedients,
to tempt dangers, and to do things which
ne dad not forciee, nor intend, and perhaps,
in the beginning abhored.
We know, by infinite examples and ex-
perience, that men poileaed OF power, rather
than part with it, will do any thing, even
the WORT and the blackef, to keep it and
fcaIce ever any man upon earth went out OF
II as long as he could carry every thing his
own way in It and when he could not, he
reiigned. doubt that there is not one ex-
cepuon in the world to this rule and tina;
DlocIeiian, Charles the Fifth, and even Sy.
la, laid down their power out of pque and
dllcontent, and from oppoiition and difap-
poIntment. his ieems certain, that the
good of the world, or of their people, was
not one OF their motives either for continu-
Ing in power, or for quitting it.
Ii is the nature of power to be ever en-.
croachng, aid converting every extraordi-
nary power, granted at particular times and
on particular locations, into an ex,raordina-
ry power, to be ufed at all times, and when
there is no occahon nor does il ever part
willingly with any advantage. From this
lpirit it is, that occa(ional commifIions have
grown fometimes perpetual that thee
years have been improved into feven, and
one into twenty and that when the people
have done with their Magiiirates, their ma
gilirates will not have done with the
people.
The Romans, who knew this evil, hav-
ing fufered BY it, provided wife remedies
aganlt il /; and when one ordinary power
grew to great, checked it with another.
Thus the Office and power of the Tribunes
was iet up to balance that of the Confuls,
and to protect the poPulace againf the info
lence, pride, and inuenchments of the nobi-
lily j: And when the authority of the Tri-
Dunes grew too formidable, a good expedi
emf was found out to refrain il for in any
turbulent or fa6tious dehgn of the Tribunes,
the protelf or dIAent Of any enc of them
made void the purPoies and proceedings of
all the reit. And both the Confuls and the
I'ribunes were ehOlsn only for year.