The Massachusetts spy. [volume] (Boston [Mass.]) 1770-1772, 1772-07-23


that any one fhould be compelled by the
Others to any act againft its judgment. III
ihoIld violate this freedom and indepen-
dencc Of the Council and Houfe OF Repre-
fen:ativss, | fhouId juftIy incur h's MajI-
tvs diipleaiurC. Is It not Teafonab'e that
the Cove nor fhould be intittd to the like
fhare cf freedom and independence, in the
exeyclie of his judgment, with the other
b anches That independence which can
not coniif with free government, and
which the Engiilh contribution abbors and
which may probably be termed deiPotiIm,
is freedom IN thoie who are vstted win
executive and judiciary powers, from the
reffraint of known eRab ifhed laws and Ii
berty of acting according TO their own will
and pleafure. This reitraint, in your oonitl-
tuition, will remain the fame whether the
Governor receives his falaY from the crown
or from the province. Thus by confound-
ing the fenie and meaning OF the words
check and dependence, you have given
plaufbIe appearance to your argument
This is an artihce which has often been
made ufe ofby writers in news papers with
deiign to give falfe notions OF government
and to fir up diicontent and diiorder, but |
am far from attIibutiug any iuch detign TO
the Spembsrs of the Houie of RepIslenta-
tlyesiA general.
txt)me add, thar the Engliih conftituti-
h1hSs1 founded upon thefe principles OF free.
dom. The King, Lords and Commons
have this mutual check upon each other,
Trey are, notwithstanding, altogether flee
and independe nt, and, that this freedom
may be prelerved intire in the crown, we
find that, ever fnce the hereditary reve-
nue. have csafed, revenue known by the
name OF the civil lift, has been ehablifhed
among the inf acts OF every reign, not
temporary, or from year TO year, but dur
ing the life or admlnlhration of the prince
upon the throne. have realon TO think,
that If the Governors of this colony may be
made equally iecuTe of an adequate provi-
iion for their fuPport the crown viii never
Intetpole.
You fiod the fame fpirit Of freedom run
through the leveTal Offices in the EngIih
government. The faIaries Of fuch perions
as are intruRed with the executive and ju-
dietary powers do not depend upon grams
made by the Houfe of Commons, in pro-
portion to their abilities, fation and merit,
as you lay it is eaential to free govern
ment that they fhould do, but certain fixed
falaries and emoluments are annexed TO
their Offices. Indeed nothing can be more
diionant than your fyifem from the ipirit OF
The Epglifh contribution.
You have made forced conffTu6ti-
on of clsuGe in your charter, and have
then made a very eHsntial change in your
contribution, that il may agree with this
contribution.
By your charter the legislative power
coniiRs of three branches, and the content
of the Governor is expressly declared to be
efential to every valid act of government.
You fay notwithstanding that he is confii
tutionally dependant upon the people for
his fupport and that this dedendancs is in
tended as a check. This check mutt be
by withholding his fuPport when, in fome
cafe or other be fhall act, or refufs to act
contrary, in your judgment, to the duty of
his ftation. If he gives up his own judg-
ment and conforms to yours, does nor the
act in fuch cafe ceafe TO BE- the act of the
Governor, and bscoms the at OF thsHoule
of Representatives., and will not this 10
far dsarOy one branch of the conttltu-
ton.
Let me add further, if a Governor de-
parts from his own judg nent and cOnici-
ence, is he not highly criminal, and will not
the Houfe of Representatives (which comPels
him to il, be at leaf equally guilty with HIM !
am fenGble, that when all other excep-
tons 70 this approximation Of your eoEttI&