The Massachusetts spy. [volume] (Boston [Mass.]) 1770-1772, 1772-02-13

it has been conveyed. But when the cauie
Of the fufpicion is JUN, they do neceiiAFy
dirty to thcmlelves and poasEity by making
all the violent efforts which are neceiiaFy 10
accomplish change. And of the jaitice oil
this cauic there is no common judge upon
earth. J,
But fuppofe prince or fenatc perluadsd
that there is no iult caufe of diftruttlng either
the plan of power or their administration !;
and yet neither any applications orfemon-
Frances of theirs, nor any arbitration can Ia
tsfy people, or a great majority OF Them
and remove their fears as a people IN con-
,nuaI fufpic.on ard fear canno; be happy,
and the public happlneis is The lole end OF al
civil power, therulers cannot have right 10
retain their power unlels they hnd ione means
to remove thefe fcals. No doubt men in
power may jua'y AID p;n3en'ly take tome
Aeps contrary to the ptelent general incina-
ton or appreciation Of III. people, when they
cannot fafcly Communicate The reaions OF
their cordua 70 all. They may jaHiy Ell
tabliih plan which a Aupid people fhali not
at fra approve; provided they have al mo-
raj alnancc that uoon The dilcoye,V OF TIE
realtors Ct iheie fcps, and upon IL tn2l OF
the pan ard its advantages, there iha'i DC
general Abstraction with both. A frlead MAJ,
in fone .insular cafes, take this power OF
coun;cra1inq the lpscial initruc.ions he has
received from friend who comm0ioaed him
in his bufinefs nav, may venture juitiy up
on io,nc a(efu feIviccs without any commit
lion at al, OF contrary TO what nc knows bis
pieiud;ced trcnd would al'o'V, not feeling Tie
nccedity % what is done, % the eminent
advantages to en.uc upon il. Bot al thete
muA be Gomc tranlitory matters nothing can
ioaify what viii location general perma
neht lli2icion and diItrua as this mutt dc
iroy all pubNck Happiness in any people, who
are not aI.caip ruined in their minds by their
layery, and have not Iof all rational fore
thought or regard 60 The future nteretts of
their country. Such iulpicion and con-
fant diRrpf mutt always remain at lealt
in fome degree under ab(olute hereditary
Monarchies and Ariaocracies, as these is no
appearance Of fecurity for the valuable nte-
refs ola people under them.
1heie forms of poIity alone are juf which
have natural tendency to promote the ge-
neral good. IF a form is coni}itnted which
is equally applicable 10 evil and good purpoi-
es, wihout any rational ifecu,ty about rs
application - good. fuch as are ali the fin
pie aofou;e Monarches, ard Rrifocrac.es,
Or other Oigarchiys: the perlons enuuAed
with the power have right to ufr il for the
pub c god while no other plan OF power
occurs to the iociety. But they can no Ion.
ger retain this plan when the majority will
content to a change, and any part of the peo-
die is diaatshed with the old plan, and in
fits upon for1e better fecurity for the gene
raj fafeti Nay as common fenie muf eaii-
ly fhew that in fuch plans no proper precau-
tons are taken aganf the greatelt milcbiefs ;
as foou as any one fees this, he is bound to
content TO any neced4ry limitations and pre-
cautions. | hat a people have ralhly
contracted upon an error in what is moa ef
fential in the nature of the conu9d, gives no
manner of right IL is the mott direct peril
d., and breach of the general i2cred truft
OF all civil power, in any ruler to oppofe fuch
Limitations and precautions as are necehay
10 prc;ent the moff extenGve mitchell. No
ablolutc hereditary rulers can bind their tub-
icas b. anyoaths againa all refifsnce ofihem
and their fuccel5rs; or prevent their right of
continuing, ohsa they can, iome proper me-
thods Of conuoul, in cafe of the f1cceii:on of
any monfrous tytan,s. They ihouId always
remember the lole end of their power, and
hat it is the buiine(s and interefs of the lub-
ie6es, that they are in;ruaed to manage.
Il is true, when an impEudsnt plan is tet-
a L. z r