Western Syria clashes (December 2024–present)

Following thefall of the Assad regimeafterseveral offensiveslaunched byopposition groupsbetween late November and early December 2024, several clashes betweenAssad loyalistsand incumbentSyrian transitional governmentforces have occurred primarily in hold-outs in theAlawite-majorityTartusandLatakia Governorates, as well as in westernHamaandHoms Governorates.
Government action was taken to comb through villages in Western Syria in order to find and arrest or take down officers and officials associated with war crimes of the Assad regime during theSyrian civil war. The clashes were triggered by the proliferation of videos on social media showing footage of an attack on the Abu Abdullah al-Hussein al-Khusseibi shrine in Aleppo, which occurred in November. The incitement of violence and civil unrest among Alawite communities byAssad loyalistelements has led to the formation of Alawite insurgent groups in Western Syria.
Following thecollapse of the Assad regime, there have also been reports of revenge attacks againstAlawitefigures associated with the Assad regime across parts of Western Syria.UK-basedSyrian Observatory for Human Rightsgroup also reported numerous attacks against mainly Alawite civilians and former security personnel in the region, carried out by unidentified gunmen, resulting in the deaths of more than 322 civilians, 138 of whom were confirmed to have been killed in sectarian violence.
On 29 December 2024, a pro-Assadist group named theSyrian Popular Resistanceannounced their opposition to theHTS-led government and threatened to attack HTS forces in response to the civil unrest since the toppling of the Assad regime.
In December 2024, a Turkish-backed surprise attack byHay'at Tahrir al-Sham(HTS) and other rebel forces overthrew the government ofSyrian PresidentBashar al-Assad,ending over five decadesofAssad family rulein Syria. The surprise offensive, originating in the country's northwestern region, supported by American and Israeli air cover on the East of the country, resulted in al-Assad and his family seeking asylum in Russia. HTSEmirand military commanderAhmed al-Sharaaemerged as Syria'sde factoleader following thefall of Damascus, with the majority ofSyrian Armed Forcestroops surrendering, fleeing the country, or defecting.
After thefall of the Assad regime, escalating tensions were reported in Western Syria, particularly in regions with significantAlawitepopulations, with riots and civil unrest emerging in multiple locations includingTartus,Latakia, and Bashar's birthplace ofQardaha. Sections of the Alawite population were afraid of revenge attacks driven by sectarian hate.
On 15 December 2024, TheSyrian Observatory of Human Rightsreported that pro-Assad insurgents were meeting with village elders inLatakia Governorate, instructing them to resist actions from the newly implemented Military Operations Administration in order to defend "the Alawite sect".
On 22 December 2024, civilian demonstrations erupted in theAl-Bahluliyahdistrict east ofLatakia, following allegations of misconduct by the Syrian government's security forces, demanding for the complete withdrawal of Syrian security forces from the village. The incident involved armed individuals claiming affiliation with the Syrian government forcibly entered the residence ofAl-Bahluliyah'sMukhtar. The intruders reportedly brandished weapons at young residents in the neighborhood and committed various acts of misconduct, includingverbalandphysical abuseagainst family members and a girl. Protesters chanted "Death rather than humiliation" in response.
On 23 December 2024, hundreds ofChristiansand their supporters marched through Damascus after foreign fighters set fire to aChristmas treeinSuqaylabiyah, a Christian town nearHama. Protestors urged the HTS authorities to protect minorities and for foreign fighters to leave Syria. HTS later said they had detained the arsonists.
Catholic News Agencyreported on 31 December 2024 that that some Muslim residents who were displaced from the town ofMaaloulaby the Assad regime, were threatening and harassing some Christian residents who were accused of collaborating with pro-Assad militant groups.
On 3 January 2025, theAlawite Islamic Forumin Syria released a statement on expressing its support for the HTS-ledSyrian transitional governmentbut argued that it has failed to deal with the sectarian violence in Western Syria.
On 25 December, tensions inflamed amongst segments of the Syrian Alawite population in response to online circulation of videos showing footage of an attack on the Alawite shrine ofAbu Abdullah al-Hussein al-KhusseibiinAleppo. Though the incident had occurred weeks earlier, disinformation campaigns spread the footage as recent, aiming to incite discord and violent riots.The footage depicted attackers killing five shrine attendants, mutilating their bodies, damaging the site, and setting fire to the structure.The video provoked outrage among sections of Syria's Alawite population.
The demonstrations erupted across multiple Alawite neighborhoods inHoms, includingAl-Khudari,Wadi Al-Dhahab,Al-Zahraa,Al-Sabil,Al-Abbasiya, andAl-Muhajireen. Protesters expressed outrage over the shrine attack through sectarian chants and public demonstrations, with religious and community leaders denouncing it as an attack on Alawite religious heritage and identity while calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice. Protesters also demanded greater security be granted to the community by the government, and for it to remove all of the extremist and foreign elements from its military. Several protesters were arrested in Homs,Tartus, andJableh.The SyrianGeneral Security Service, operating under the new government's Military Operations Department, opened fire to disperse the crowd in Homs, resulting in one protester's death and five others sustaining injuries from gunfire.
It was soon discovered that the attack had occurred weeks earlier during clashes between Syrian opposition and Assad regime forces in Aleppo, and that the Alawite religious site had only been partially damaged, contrary to numerous social media posts that claimed it had been demolished.Verify Syria, a fact-checking organization, reported that a co-ordinateddisinformation campaignwas launched to circulate misleading posts related to the shrine attack through social media networks of Assad loyalists, who aimed to exacerbate sectarian tensions and provide cover for Assad regime officials fleeing Syria.In response to rising tensions, the new government enhanced its security presence in Alawite-dominated regions. Public Security Forces implemented a curfew across Homs,Jableh, and Banias, while military reinforcements established security perimeters around the Akrama andAl-Nahdaneighborhoods to stop further unrest. They also establishedmilitary checkpointsfor civilians to hand over their weapons, and set up loudspeakers in mosques instructing them to do so within 24 hours. Many, especially commanders and officers associated with the Assad regime, refused to do so.
Since thefall of the Assad regimein December 2024, Syria has experienced a surge indisinformationon social media, targeting both Syrian and international audiences.DW Newsreported that the flood of online disinformation and inflammatory social media posts has had destabilizing consequences on the ground, such as triggering Alawite riots after the widespread online circulation of misleading posts of a shrine attack that occurred in November.
Fact-checking organizations, like Verify-Sy and Misbar, have attributed these campaigns to social media accounts associated with Assad loyalists, as well as statepropagandaoutlets of Russia and Iran.Ba'athist Syriahad maintained an extensive state propaganda apparatus, and its collapse created an information vacuum, leaving many Syrians vulnerable to false narratives. Researchers have noted thatRussianandIranian disinformationnetworks remain active in social media, deploying fake accounts to stoke tensions amongst minorities, particularly the Alawite community, and incite sectarian clashes. Accounts linked tofar-rightgroups in the West have also been amplifyingIslamophobicposts targetingSyrian revolutionaryactivists.
On 18 December, the Military Operations Administration conducted several raids in Hama and Homs Governorates and in several coastal areas to seek out Assad-associated figures and war criminals.After the fall of the Assad regime, Syrian transitional government also launched large-scale anti-narcotics crackdown campaigns against illicit weapons and drug trafficking networks affiliated with Assad loyalist elements in Western Syria.
Calls for violence by Assad loyalists in Western Syria have resulted in the formation of Alawite insurgent groups in the region. Iran has also been accused of sponsoring the insurgency against the Syrian transitional government.On 6 February 2025, theSyrian Popular Resistanceclaimed that it killed 9 fighters of the Syrian security forces, including a former HTS commander and an East Turkestan Movement commander.
On 25 December, unidentified armed groups conducted synchronized assaults on multiple security checkpoints in the western Hama countryside withRPG launchersandheavy machine guns, killing one Syrian government troop and injuring another.On the same day, a contingent of the General Security Service – a police unit loyal to the new government – made their way to theKhirbet al-Ma'zahvillage in the southern Tartus Governorate. They intended to arrest Major General Mohammad Kanjo Al-Hassan who had headed the Military Justice Administration and Field Court during the rule of the Assad regime; he was regarded as one of those responsible for the mass murders inSaydnaya Prison. Upon entering the village, the General Security Service were ambushed by militants, with 14 policemen and three attackers being killed. According toSOHR, loyalists of Mohammed Kanjo Hassan and another former Ba'athist officer,Suhayl al-Hasan, were responsible for the ambush.The militants were led by Mohammed Kanjo Hassan's brother and expelled the security forces from the village.The transitional government described the ambush as an attack by Assad loyalists. A curfew was declared at several cities.
The government'sMilitary Operations Commandsubsequently ordered the arrest of the attackers and sent reinforcements to secure Khirbet al-Ma'zah.By 26 December, the Military Operations Command was conducting a large-scale campaign across Tartus Governorate, searching homes and securing the countryside. Major General Mohammad Kanjo Al-Hassan was reportedly captured in Khirbet al-Ma'zah.Three gunmen associated with al-Hassan were also killed in the gunfight.On December 26, 2024, theSyrian Transitional Governmentannounced that it had arrested Mohammed Kanjo Hassan, former head of the military judiciary under theAssad regimeand a Ba'athist prison officer at theSednaya prison.
Other villages in the Tartus Governorate saw an "mass escape of former regime members".Two armed individuals from the village of Al-Zarqat, identified as regime loyalists or "shabiha," were killed after engaging in armed conflict with General Security Service. The security campaign prompted many former regime officials implicated in crimes against Syrian civilians to flee from several villages, including Al-Zuraiqat,Khirbet al-Ma'zah, and surrounding areas.In addition, four Syrian government troops were killed during a raid on a pro-Assad holdout containing trafficking ringleader Shujaa al-Ali in Balqsa,westernHoms Governorate.
On 16 January 2025, General Security Administration (GSA) busted an effort by pro-Iranian trafficking networks to smuggle weapons from Tartus region to Lebanon.
On 14 December, pro-Assad gunmen ambushedSham Legionfighters in al-Muzayri'a in the Latakia countryside, killing or wounding fifteen troops.
On 14 January, soldiers of theMilitary Operations Commandwere kidnapped and taken as hostages by theAssadistcommander Bassam Nasir al-Din in Latakia Governorate. Bassam demandedHay'at Tahrir al-Sham(HTS) forces in a video to withdraw from the area within 24 hours or else the soldiers taken hostage would be "slaughtered". Later that day, HTS located Bassam's location using a drone and sent reinforcements to the area to rescue the units taken hostage, and surrounded him in his hideout, ultimately leading to him ending his life by suicide bombing himself. Seven Assadist militants were killed in clashes following the incident, and all kidnapped units were rescued safely and unharmed without any casualties.
On 19 January, Syrian security forces captured and destroyed a massiveCaptagonshipment belonging to drug trafficking networks linked toMaher al-Assad. The Syrian Ministry of Interior announced that roughly 100 million Captagon pills were seized in warehouses near the port of Latakia.
On 22 January, pro-Assad gunmen targeted a checkpoint of theMilitary Operations Commandwith machine guns and grenades in the industrial area at the entrance ofJablehin the Latakia countryside. The attack left two members of the Military Operations Command dead and two other members injured.
On 24 January, a group of pro-Assad militants attacked a security checkpoint in al-Muzayri'a in the Latakia countryside. TheGeneral Security Servicerepelled the attack and confiscated a vehicle and several firearms from the gunmen who attacked the security checkpoint.
On 1 February, members of theMilitary Operations Commandwere ambushed by theSyrian Popular Resistanceon the Latakia-Aleppo highway near Al-Mukhtariyah in Latakia countryside. As a result, one member was killed, two others were injured and a fourth one went missing.
On 14 December, a raid onAl-Mazra’ain Hama Governorate, regarded as a significant Hezbollah stronghold, was launched by the Syrian Military Operations Administration, resulting in the arrests of "dozens of young men accused of committing previous violations against the people of the area".In an act of sectarian violence, on 1 February, Sunni gunmen killed 10 Alawites including a child and an elderly woman in the village of Arzah.
On 15 February 2025, a new group called "Saraya Ansar al Sunnah" emerged after it stated that it's fighters attacked the town of  Arzah and killed 12 Alawites and another 5 people it claimed were affiliated with the former Ba'athist government inTell Dahab.The group stated that it would continue their attacks until the Alawites and Shia were "eliminated" or displaced from the region, it also stated that the group is decentralized with no formal headquarters, It is not clear who formed Saraya Ansar al Sunnah. The group also opposes the interim government's efforts to pardon former Ba'athist Syrian members.
On 6 February 2025, Syrian border security forces launched a large-scale security operation in the Western region of Homs, along the Lebanese border to dismantle smuggling networks and armed groups linked to Hezbollah, resulting in violent clashes, arrests, and the rescue of two kidnapped Syrian soldiers.The crackdown was part of theSyrian transitional government's broader campaign to expel Hezbollah militants, dismantle trafficking activities in the Syrian border regions with Lebanon and eliminate Assadist insurgent groups.
By 10 February 2025, the Syrian military forces had established control over several border villages which were affected by the activities of smuggling networks linked to Hezbollah.
On January 18 2025, a commander in theMilitary Operations Commandwas killed during clashes with pro-Assad gunmen in the Talkalakh area in the western Homs countryside.
On 14 December, UK-basedSyrian Observatory of Human Rights(SOHR) NGO reported that the brother of theimamof the Great Prophet Mosque inMasyaf, Hama, was executed with three bullets by masked assailants who pursued and abducted him, after the imam was accused of being associated with Iranian and Shia militias and conducting funerals for regional civilians.Two civilians were kidnapped inAl-Zahraa, Homs. Their bodies were discovered in a cooling unit three days later.
On 15 December, SOHR reported that three civilians were killed in separate instances by unknown gunmen, one of whom was accused of being an Assad loyalist and tortured before being executed inHalfaya, Hama.
On 16 December, SOHR reported that a formerSyrian Arab Armysoldier and his brother were kidnapped by unknown assailants in a military vehicle as they were in line at a settlement center meant for resolving their security status in the new state. The two were killed, with their bodies disposed of in a forest Wa'er.Masked assailants kidnapped a civilian at gunpoint inAl-Shajar, and executed him near anal-Ghabagricultural research center northwest of Hama.
On 17 December, SOHR reported that one civilian was killed by gunmen inAl-Qusayr. Two more civilians were killed by unknown gunmen inAl-Suwaydah, Masyaf.An armed group attacked civilians inAl-Shajar, and kidnapped a farmer who was later found dead with signs of having been tortured beforehand.
On 18 December, SOHR reported that a man in al-Tuwaim in the western Hama countryside was killed by two unidentified gunmen after he had tried to stop them from stealing his sheep.On 21 December, SOHR reported that a young man was abducted from his home in Tartus by an unknown armed group after they promised to help him with resolving his security status in the new state, who executed him and mutilated his corpse.On 22 December, SOHR reported that a young man was kidnapped near Homs, taken toBaniyas, and executed in a field by unknown gunmen.
On 23 December, SOHR reported that a man and woman were killed inWadi Al-Nasaraby unknown perpetrators.A Yahmour, Homs resident was killed by unknown gunmen after being accused of loyalty to the Assad regime.An unidentified man was found killed by a "field execution" near the Ras Al-Shamra roundabout in Latakia. After one group of unknown gunmen raided and leftHadidah, a second group entered and killed two civilians for unknown reasons.
On 24 December, three Alawite judges were executed by unknown gunmen while travelling in the western Hama countryside.The judges, who handled administrative cases related to land ownership, had traveled for discussions with officials of the new government. Photographs of their bodies were circulated online. Their widows stated that the judges were optimistic about their professional prospects and had been in talks about continuing their work under the new administration.According to SOHR, several gunmen attacked and looted the residents of seven houses in the Alawite-majority village ofJidrin.
On 25 December, SOHR reported that a medical student was shot dead by an unknown gunman in Latakia.One civilian was found dead on theM4 MotorwayinAriha,Idlib, having been killed by a "field execution". Three more were killed by unknown gunmen inTal Sarin, Hama.Aninformation engineeringuniversity student was executed in the countryside ofJablehby unknown gunmen.
On 26 December, SOHR reported that an armed group raided the westernHama Governoratevillage of al-Aziziyah located in theGhab Plain, and executed a civilian before arresting eight others and taking them to an unknown location.
On 5 January 2025, it was reported that six bodies of workers belonging to theSayyida Zeinab Shrinewere found. The pro-AssadSyrian Popular Resistanceaccused the HTS-led government of killing the workers.
On 8 January 2025, SOHR reported that three civilians of one family were killed in a field execution by unidentified gunmen inLatakia. Another  civilian was shot dead by unidentified gunmen in his agricultural land inHama. Four more people, including three brothers from Tasnin Village nearTalbisehwere shot dead by gunmen, while working on the field. It was also reported that the bodies of six civilians were found, two of which were fromKhirbet al-Hamamand four from al-Ghazila, where they were reported missing a few days ago in mysterious circumstances while heading to their work and visiting their relatives inHomscountryside.
On 10 January 2025, UK-based SOHR reported that a young man fromQardahainLatakiacountryside was killed by unknown gunmen inHama, where his body was moved to Hama National Hospital. Additionally, a young man, who a student at the College of Engineering, was killed with several gunshots to the head by unknown gunmen, after which his body was thrown into an irrigation canal and later moved to the hospital in Al-Zahra’a neighborhood inHoms.
On 13 January 2025, SOHR alleged that two gunmen claiming to belong to theMilitary Operations Commandkidnapped a young man in al-Samiya Village inLatakiacountryside, whose body was later found with gunshot wounds, showing signs of a field execution. Meanwhile, the body of another young man, who had been kidnapped from al-Mazra’a Village in the Homs countryside four days earlier, was discovered with gunshot wounds.
On 14 January 2025, SOHR asserted that Alawite civilians ofTasninVillage inHomscountryside were assaulted by gunmen who presented themselves as members of theMilitary Operations Command. According to SOHR, an arrest campaign was launched in the village, which lasted from the early hours of morning to the afternoon of January 16, during which suspects showed resistance. Moreover, the attackers set fire to seven houses and killed six civilians from the village. Residents and elders of Tasnin Village and other neighbouring villages attempted to communicate with security and political officials and police command in Homs, but received no responses regarding the violations.
On 16 January 2025, SOHR reported that a young man was killed in indiscriminate gunfire inJablehinLatakiacountryside, while he was celebrating his release from the grip of a group of gunmen.Additionally, two civilians from Al-Majdal village in Mahradah area in the north-western countryside ofHamawere kidnapped and shot dead by unidentified gunmen.On 21 January, SOHR asserted that four civilians were killed by local gunmen in a town in the north-western countryside of Homs, during a security operation initiated by the Syrian transitional government. Residents of the town confirmed that troops of the transitional government treated them fairly and were not involved in the killing.
On 23 January 2025, SOHR reported that a large-scale security campaign was launched by theMilitary Operations Commandwith the participation of local gunmen in the villages of al-Ghozaylah, al-Gharbiyah and al-Hamam in the western countryside ofHoms, during which four civilians were extrajudicially executed, ten civilians were injured, and five others were arrested. Several additional assaults and abuses against civilians, such as forcing them to bray and bark, as well as the destruction of tombstones were also documented.
On 30 January 2025, SOHR reported that 10 civilians were executed by unknown gunmen in Arzah village in the north-western countryside ofHoms.  The gunmen knocked on the doors of several houses in the village and opened fire on civilians, using guns with silencers, and then fled.