Myanmar civil war (2021–present)

TheMyanmar civil war(Burmese: မြန်မာ့ပြည်တွင်းစစ်),also known as theBurmese civil war, is an ongoingcivil warsince 2021. It began followingMyanmar's long-running insurgencies, which escalated significantly in response to the2021 coup d'étatand the subsequent violent crackdown onanti-coup protests.TheexiledNational Unity Governmentand majorethnic armed organisationsrepudiated the2008 Constitutionand called instead for a democraticfederal state.Besides engaging this alliance, the ruling government of theState Administration Council(SAC), also contends with other anti-SAC forces in areas under its control.Hannah BeechofThe New York Timesobserved that the insurgents are apportioned into hundreds of armed groups scattered across the country.
As of March 2023 theUnited Nationsestimated that since the coup in February 2021, 17.6 million people in Myanmar required humanitarian assistance, while 1.6 million were internally displaced, and over 55,000 civilian buildings had been destroyed.theUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(UNOCHA) said that over 40,000 people had fled into neighboring countries, such asBangladesh,IndiaandThailand.
As of October 2023, Myanmar's military, theTatmadaw, controlled under 40% of the country, although they maintained that they controlled around two-thirds of the country's 330 townships.In the second half of 2023,Chinland Defense ForcesinChin Statehad captured a majority of the state, with a few holdouts in urban areas and along the India–Myanmar border remaining. In October 2023, the Tatmadaw began facing manpower issues, with desertions and low morale being extremely common. This coincided with amajor offensiveby thePeople's Defense ForceandThree Brotherhood Alliancein the west of the country, which was successful in taking 80 bases, 220 SAC positions and several towns by 28 November 2023.
October and November 2023 saw a series of concurrent anti-SAC offensives, includingOperation 1111besieging the state capital ofLoikawand renewed conflict by anti-SAC forces in northernRakhineandChinstates.In Operation 1027, anti-SAC forces seizedLaukkai, the capital ofKokang Self-Administered Zone, in early January 2024.Northern Shan State fighting stopped with the Haigeng ceasefire after the fall of Laukkai. The Rakhine offensive, however, continued in northern Rakhine state withMrauk U, among others, falling to theArakan Armyin February 2024.As of February 2024, thousands of the SAC's soldiers have surrendered without a fight, including six generals of the Tatmadaw.The SAC has usedterror tacticsagainst the population, includingburnings,beheadings,mutilations,war rape,torching villages, and a massiveaerial bombingcampaign that has displaced nearly 3 million people.TheMyanmar Air Forcehas dropped more bombs per capita than have been dropped in theRussian invasion of Ukraine.A group of observers write that the SAC's forces remain "formidable and well-equipped", with "external allies and economic resources".
In late March 2024 anti-SAC forces in southeastern Myanmar capturedDemosoandPapun,bringing the number ofdistrict-level towns captured by anti-SAC forces up to eight. The ninth district-level town,Matupi, was captured by Chin resistance in mid June 2024.In late June 2024 the Three Brotherhood Alliance restarted Operation 1027 after claiming that Tatmadaw forces had broken the ceasefire, capturing the tenth district level town,Kyaukme, by the end of the month.On 17 July, two more district level towns were captured by theBrotherhood Alliance,ThandweandMongmit, bringing the number up to twelve.On 3 August, the MNDAA as part of a wider effort from the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other resistance groups capturedLashio, the largest town in northern Shan State, as well as the headquarters of the SAC'sNortheastern Command.On 20 December 2024, the Arakan Army (AA) claimed to have captured the Myanmar military'sWestern Commandheadquarters in Ann, Rakhine State, marking the second regional command to fall to ethnic rebels in five months.
Insurgencieshave been ongoing in Myanmar since 1948 and have largely been ethnic-based.Communist insurgenciesand theKaren National Unionwere the primary opposition actors to the central government.Over the 20th century, several prominentethnic armed organizations(EAOs) rose and fell in influence and control. Larger rebel factions such as theKachin Independence Army(KIA) formed in response toNe Win's1962 coup d'étatand its increased political repression.The8888 Uprising, in response to the one party dominated rule of Ne Win, resulted in some of the first modernBamarmilitias forming from protestors heading to areas under ethnic rebel control.
In the aftermath of the 8888 Uprising theState Law and Order Restoration Council(SLORC), later known as theState Peace and Development Council(SPDC), formed a Tatmadaw-led council. Myanmar's military, better known as theTatmadaw, severely weakened ethnic insurgent groups, destroying most of their bases and strongholds through the 1990s.By the time of the2011–2015 Myanmar political reforms, the Tatmadaw had regained control of many long-time rebel strongholds includingKokangandKaren State.
The2008 Constitutioncreatedself-administered zoneswith increased autonomy as part of its reforms. In 2015, theNationwide Ceasefire Agreement(NCA) was signed between eight EAOs and the central government.However, by 2018 the NCA began to fall apart, due to alleged violations of the agreement by Tatmadaw soldiers entering EAO territories to build roads.Many non-signatories continued the conflict. In late 2016, four non-signatories of the NCA formed theNorthern Alliance, including the KIA andArakan Army, engaged in war with the central government and other EAOs.
On the morning of 1 February 2021, theTatmadawsuccessfully deposed the elected Myanmar government in a coup, forming aState Administration Council. Former presidentWin Myint, state chancellorAung San Suu Kyi, and several other members of theNational League for Democracywere detained during the early morning of February 1st.Min Aung Hlaingwas installed as theCommander-in-Chief of Defense Servicesandde factoruler of the nation.
The established motives behind the coup are unclear. In the leadup to the coup, the Tatmadaw claimed that the2020 general electionshad 8.6 million voter irregularities, but presented no evidence. The coup may have been a way to re-establish the military'slong-reigning power over the countrywhich ended ten years prior.
The bloody repression of anti-coup demonstrations led to the creation of armed groups to fight theState Administration Council(SAC). Gathered under the name of thePeople's Defense Force(PDF) and the orders of theNational Unity Government(NUG), formed by parliamentarians in office before the coup d'état, the PDF and the NUG officially declared a "defensive war" against the SAC rule in September 2021.TheACLEDestimated that as of 29 July 2022, around 23,521 people in total had been killed in the violence following the 2021 coup.
In the months following the coup, the opposition began to coalesce around theNational Unity Government, which launched an offensive against the SAC. By 2022, the opposition controlled substantial, though sparsely populated, territory.In many villages and towns, the SAC's attacks drove out tens of thousands of people. On the second anniversary of the coup, in February 2023, the chairman of the SAC,Min Aung Hlaing, admitted to losing stable control over "more than a third" of townships. Independent observers note the real number is likely far higher, with as few as 72 out of 330 townships remaining under the control of the Tatmadaw, the military forces aligned with the junta. However, the townships under the control of the SAC still included all major population centres.
By late March 2021, dozens of protesters had travelled to Myanmar's border areas to enlist in and train under one of the country's many insurgent groups,elevating the risk of a countrywide civil war.TheCommittee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw(CRPH) also proposed the formation of a "Federal Armed Force" to combat the military,and in late March theArakan Army(AA) threatened to end its ceasefire with the military should the latter "persist inmassacringcivilians".
During late March, protesters increasingly began arming themselves with homemade weapons in an attempt to defend themselves against attacks by the military. Clashes with soldiers andIEDattacks against administrative buildings and police stations became more common and protesters slowly became armed resistance.
After about thirty years of dormancy, thePeople's Liberation Army(PLA), the armed wing of theCommunist Party of Burma(CPB), became active again on 15 March 2021 when communist fighters crossed from China intoKachin Statewhere the Kachin Independence Army would provide them weapons.and by August 2021, the CPB established a new armed wing to fight against the SAC.Over the next two years, the PLA would grow its presence inTanintharyi Region, where they fight alongside the PDF, claiming to have 1,000 active troops in December 2023.
The unrest across the nation and the increased need for SAC troops in previously peaceful urban areas strengthened EAOs. The Kachin Independence Army had already been on the offensive since February andseized the military's base of Alaw Bumnear the town ofLaizaon 25 March 2021.The next day, theKaren National Liberation Army(KNLA) attacked a military base, killing 10 SAC soldiers and taking others hostage in their first attack since the protests began.The following day saw the2021 Kalay clasheswhere protestors openly used homemade weapons against soldiers for the first time, targeting security forces attacking a protest camp.
SAC declared that it would cease all military operations on 29 March 2021 and hold bilateral negotiations with ethnic armed groups. However, the Kachin Independence Army continued its offensives, stating that the Myanmar Army had not in fact ceased operations.Seven insurgent groups who were signatories to theNationwide Ceasefire Agreementaligned themselves with theNational Unity Government(NUG), including theAll Burma Student Democratic Front(ABSDF) and theKaren National Union(KNU).TheNorthern Alliance, comprising theArakan Army, theTa'ang National Liberation Armyand theMyanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, attacked a police station inNaungmon, Shan State, killing at least 10 police officers and indicating their disregard of the SAC's call for a ceasefire.In response, on 11 April 2021, the junta military launcheda counter-attack to recapture the Alaw Bum baseusing airstrikes and ground troops, but had to retreat amidst heavy casualties.
On 26 April, theBattle of Mindatbecame one of the first large-scale conflicts arising from the 2021 coup. TheChinland Defense Force(CDF) began armed resistance inMindat, Chin Stateand the SAC declaredmartial law.After a soldier allegedly fired at protestors, fighting between the two sides erupted.The battle lasted four days, killing 30 SAC soldiers and left Mindat abandoned as more than 10,000 people fled the area.
On 16 April 2021, pro-democracy politicianMin Ko Naingannounced the formation of theNational Unity Government, with members of ethnic minority groups in senior roles. As part of the announcement he said that ousted leadersAung San Suu KyiandWin Myintwould retain their positions and asked the international community to recognize their government over the SAC.Throughout April, informal clashes with protestors intensified, such as inTazewhen protesters fought back against soldiers with hunting rifles and firebombs on 8 April.
The National Unity Government then declared the formation of an armed wing, thePeople's Defence Force(PDF) – on 5 May 2021, a date that is often cited as the start of the civil war. The PDF was formed to protect its supporters from SAC attacks and as a first step towards a Federal Union Army.The PDF clashed with the Tatmadaw in the town ofMuseon 23 May, killing at least 13 members of Myanmar's security forces.
In early June, fighting erupted inMyawaddy Districtwhere the military and KarenBorder Guard Forcesbattled against a combined Karen and PDF force, leaving dozens of SAC troops killed.Members of the Karenni PDF inKayah Statealso captured and destroyed several Tatmadaw outposts near the state capital,Loikaw.Towards the end of May, the Tatmadaw used artillery and helicopters to strike PDF positions in Loikaw andDemoso.On 30 May, the KIA joined the PDF in a battle against SAC troops inKatha Township, killing eight SAC soldiers. Fighting also sprouted up in other Kachin State townships, including Putao, Hpakant and Momauk.
While there were fewer conflict deaths between May and September, there were still many armed clashes and a spike in early June.Two dozen local officials appointed by the military were assassinated throughout the month of June with hundreds of bombings at police stations, banks and government offices.On 22 June, SAC forces using armoured vehicles raided a safehouse of the PDF in Mandalay, detaining several fighters.Myanmar security forces killed at least 25 people in another raid inTabayin.These attacks occurred in Central Myanmar, also known as Anya, an area that had rarely seen armed violence in recent times.On 2 July, troops assaulted several villages inSagaing Regionand reportedly killed 41 civilians.The Washington Postdescribed how Myanmar was sliding toward "bloody anarchy".
On 7 September 2021, the NUG declared astate of emergencyacross the nation and launched what they called the "people's defensive war" against the SAC.The declaration of war increased the number of skirmishes and clashes between PDF militias, EAOs and the SAC across the country.According to the NUG in September 2021, over 1,700 SAC soldiers had been killed and 630 wounded in fighting during the preceding three months.Several major clashes took place from September to October inChin State,Sagaing Region,Magwe Region,Kayah StateandShan State.
On 18 September, thePa-O National Army, a pro-SAC militia active in thePa-O Self-Administered Zone, aided the SAC in capturing a resistance base nearAungban.
By late September 2021, 8,000 residents ofThantlangtown, Chin state, fled toMizoram, India after their houses were set ablaze by the SAC army.Ambushes by anti-SAC forces inShan Statealso killed at least 20 soldiers.On 16 November 2021, SAC forces overran and captured the base camp of Kalay PDF in southwesternSagaing Region, killing 2 fighters and capturing 9 Kalay PDFmedics.
In October, SAC-controlled media reported that at least 406 junta informants had been killed and 285 wounded since 1 February in targeted attacks by resistance forces.
According to analyst Matthew Arnold, the civil war's momentum passed critical threshold by the end of the 2022 dry season where the revolutionary sentiment had grown into a broader social and armed resistance that the SAC could no longer suppress.Towards the end of 2021, direct armed clashes gave way to more bombings,explosive devicesand landmines. The PDF, with strong ground support from local communities, attacked soft government targets likepolicestations, outposts and military-owned businesses. Through these, the resistance became more organised as they seized weapons, underwent training and communicated between units through the help of the NUG and allied EAOs.According to theKaren National Union, roughly 2,200 SAC soldiers and militiamen were killed in the first half of 2022.
On 17 November 2021, dozens of SAC soldiers ambushed an outpost of theMoebyePDF inPekon Township, Shan State, forcing the outnumbered PDF soldiers to retreat.At least four SAC soldiers were killed during a four-day clash inHpruso Townshipwith the KNDF andKarenni Army.
On 14 December, around 200Tatmadawtroops searched theKaren National Union(KNU)-controlled town ofLay Kay Kaw Myothitnear theThai border, arresting people suspected to be activists or members of the PDF.On 20 December, SAC forces burned down nineteen houses in Kunnar,Loikaw Townshipafter taking it from the KNDF the week before.
On 24 December, more than35 people were massacredwhen they were ambushed by SAC troops outside the village ofMo SoinKayah State.Two staff members of the aid groupSave the Childrenwere among those killed.TheUnited Nations Security Councilcondemned the attack and called for a "thorough and transparent investigation" into the incident.
Throughout February and March 2022, the SAC carried out repeated air strikes against civilian targets in villages inShan,KayinandKayah States. On 17 February alone, around 20 SAC soldiers and 20 resistance fighters were killed in clashes inMobye, southernShan State.Witnesses described soldiers systematically looting jewelry, cash, vehicles, and other valuables.Amnesty Internationalreported these actions ascollective punishmentagainst the country's ethnic minorities.
Fighting broke out in parts ofLoikawon 14 April.The number of refugees on the Thai border increased after increased combat inKayin State.On 15 April, SAC soldiers suffered at least 30 casualties after being pushed back by the KNLA at the battle forLay Kay Kaw.
TheDry Zonehistorical heartland of Myanmar had rarely seen armed violence in themodern conflict in Myanmar since 1948as a predominantly Buddhist andBamarfarming region. The fighting in theAnya theaterof Central Myanmar starting in 2021 changed this trajectory. Without the presence of EAOs, the Bamar PDF groups are characterized as local cells acting autonomously towards simple and directed towards the 2021 coup. In the 2021–2022 dry season, the PDFs began to work more closely together and coordinate towards larger goals.In early 2022, resistance forces were fighting inMonywa, the capital ofSagaing Region.Resistance attacks on the SAC saw the SAC retaliate on civiliansTargeted personnel attacks increased, killing various SAC personnel and destroying equipment.The PDF also suffered losses, with 12 fighters killed in a battle inKhin-U Township.Many cities saw violent clashes during 2022'sUnion Day.Mandalayalso saw fighting, with casualties on both sides.
Throughout the 2021–2022 dry season, various groups inNorthern Myanmarcarried out ambushes against military outposts and convoys. TheKachin Independence Army(KIA) and the PDF attacked convoys inMohnyinandHpakanttownships.In October, they also partially shut down gold mining operations run by SAC allies.After an ambush nearShwegu, the Tatmadaw responded with airstrikes and ground attacks against KIA bases inHpakantandMohnyinTownships.In early February, the KIA assaulted several military bases in Kachin and Shan States, reportedly burning one in Hpakant Township down. The SAC responded by increasing airstrikes and send reinforcements to the area.
TheChinland Defense Force(CDF) and theChin National Army(CNA) raided and ambushed outposts and convoys inMatupiandMindatTownships.In December, the Tatmadaw recaptured the town ofThantlangfrom the CDF in an offensive that destroyed over a quarter of the town's buildings.
On 14 January 2022, units of the CNA moved into Senam village, south ofTamu, in neighboringSagaing Regionto attack a base run by the Indian-basedPeople's Liberation Army of Manipur. After several hours of fighting, between 10 and 20 Manipuri rebels and 1 CNA fighter were killed.
During this time, there were several cases ofguerilla warfareacross Myanmar using homemade explosives, including several accidents killing resistance fighters. On 17 June 2021, an army vehicle exploded inTamwe Township, Yangon, allegedly killing several military personnel.On 14 December, Tatmadaw troops captured 12 suspected resistance fighters after several bombs accidentally exploded inHlaing Thar Yar Township, Yangon.Urban warfarebecame less practical, so resistance forces began targeting SAC-aligned officials. According to SAC-aligned sources, 367 SAC-appointed officials were assassinated in targeted attacks between February 2021 and February 2022.Resistance forces also began targeting the homes of SAC pilots inYangonin response to airstrikes on civilians.
Fighting also occurred in otherBamar-majority regions. On 31 January 2022, at least 36 SAC soldiers were reportedly killed in ambushes over three days in Magwe, Sagaing andTanintharyi regionsand Chin, Shan and Kayah states.
The intensity of fighting decreased during themonsoonseason.Resistance forces were advantaged by the rainfall as the SAC could not carry out air strikes as easily.In June, resistance groups achieved control of 40–50% of the country.Arakan Armyclaimed to administer most ofRakhine Statewith an independent government.Chin National FrontandCDFmade plans to establish a new government. The KIA and theWa State, a neutral de-facto independent region of Myanmar, consolidated expanded territories.However, theMyanmar Armyretained tight control of almost every city in Myanmar and most of the country's natural resources, including important jade mines.During this time, the PDF were also unable to move beyond rural guerilla tactics.Duwa Lashi La, acting president of the NUG, cited the lack of weaponry and international support as reasons for the prolonged conflict.
On 31 May 2022, abombingkilled one person and injured nine others near theSule PagodainYangon, the largest city in Myanmar. State media accused thePeople's Defence Forceof being responsible for the attack, which the PDF denied.A July clash inPekon Township, Shan State also killed around 40 SAC soldiers and 11 PDF fighters.
The military deployed its time-tested counterinsurgency methods in what has been called a "hammer approach" of bombing and burning villages and massacring civilians to flush out rebel groups. However, the approach was ineffective because they were unable to consolidate power or deter the resistance.
Myanmar military forces executed at least 37 villagers in theMon Taing Pin massacrein May 2022 after shelling the village ofMondaingbin, Sagaing Region with heavy artillery.The SAC forces entered the localBuddhist monastery, conscripted young male villagers briefly before executing them and other captives by astupa.
On 23 July 2022, theState Administration Councilannounced that it had executed four political prisoners, includingZayar ThawandKyaw Min Yu, which was the first use ofcapital punishment in Myanmarsince the late 1980s.The men had been accused of helping the resistance movement.The event was widely seen as a provocation to escalate the ongoing conflict by the Tatmadaw.The international community, including United Nations Secretary-General, the G7 nations and the European Union strongly condemned the executions.
According to a special report fromRadio Free Asia, SAC soldiers following a raid in Kachin state's Se Zin village in August 2022, set fire to more than 400 homes with at least 15 people killed on the spot, detained some 400 people in and around Se Zin, and about 100 of them have been killed (includingextrajudicial massacre) by security forces between August 2022 and January 2023 while others died due to horrific prison conditions.
On 16 September 2022, the Burmese military killed 11 children and wounded another 17 in theLet Yet Kone massacre, as part of an airborne strike conducted against a school inLet Yet Kone, Sagaing Region.The military claimed that the village was harbouring resistance fighters from the KIA and PDF.The attack was widely condemned by theinternational community, including the United Nations and European Union.
Later in September 2022, retired Brigadier GeneralOhn Thwin, mentor toState Administration Councilvice-chairman Senior GeneralSoe Win, was assassinated by anti-SAC guerilla groups inYangon. This assassination caused an increase in security on high-ranking SAC personnel.
In early 2022, theArakan Armyand the junta clashed again in northernRakhine State. On 8 February, Arakan Army and junta forces clashed on at least two occasions inMaungdawin Rakhine State. Fighting broke out on 4 February when junta troops carried out a sneak attack on an AA outpost near the Letpan Mountains northeast of Mee Taik Village, killing an AAsentry, according to AA spokesman Khaing Thukha. Three hours of clashes were also reported on 6 February. The clashes raised fears of a breakdown of the informal ceasefire between the AA and the military which had been in place since November 2020.Further clashes in northern Maungdaw on the night of 7 February killed two civilians.Several junta troops, including a major, were also killed in the attack.
Between June and August 2022, the informal ceasefire reached in late 2020 between theArakan Army(AA) and the junta broke down. The AA had consolidated control during this period, avoided the initial violence of the war, and introduced many public services and local administrators in northernRakhine state. With the military's attention diverted to the increasing resistance elsewhere and increasing popular support for an alliance with the NUG, the AA sought to expand its influence into southern Rakhine.Rhetoric from AA leaderTwan Mrat Naingin June grew more provocative with military spokespeople stating that the AA was inviting conflict.Armed clashes resumed in July after the junta launched an airstrike against an AA base inKayin State, killing 6 AA soldiers. AA retaliated inMaungdaw Townshipand westernChin Statein late July and early August. By late August, land travel to northern Rakhine required passing a series of checkpoints and all public transport ships ceased operation due to river and land blockades.
On 16 August 2022, two mortar shells fired by theMyanmar Armylanded in aRohingyarefugee camp inBangladesh, killing one man and injuring five others.Myanmar Armyhelicopters allegedly entered Bangladeshi air space to attack theArakan Armyand fired a shell within Bangladeshi air space. Two days later,Bangladeshsummoned Myanmar ambassador Aung Kyaw Moe to strongly protest the land and airspace violations.In October 2022, Bangladeshi Foreign MinisterAK Abdul Momenmade a statement that border bombings by Myanmar stopped after he met with theChinese ambassador to Bangladesh, Li Jiming.
In mid-October 2022,NUGissued a statement calling for the victory of theSpring Revolutionby the end of 2023. This call to action was followed by increased fighting by the resistance forces in urban areas and in Southeastern Myanmar.This development took place in the wake of the junta torching at least 20 villages in theSagaingandMagway Regionsas part of a "four cuts" strategy of attacking civilians to weaken anti-regime movements. According to Sagaing-based resistance spokespeople, many victims of arson then joined the resistance.The urgency of the resistance was likely prompted by the looming elections planned by theState Administration Council.The fragmentated nature of the grassroots elements of the PDF became more organized in 2022 through the command of the NUG and from cooperation with various EAOs- especially theKachin Independence Army(KIA).
TheKarenni Nationalities Defense Force(KNDF) claimed in January 2023 that 1,692 regime troops and 211 resistance fighters were killed since the 2021 coup, 293 civilians had been killed by the regime, and 126 displaced civilians died while fleeing their homes in Kayah and Shan states in 2022.
TheKaren National Liberation Armystepped up fighting, besieging the major town ofKawkareikon the Thai border in the 21 October 2022Battle of Kawkareik.The battle began with surprise attacks on theAsia Highwayand at government offices within the town. Resistance forces looked poised to take the town, but ultimately withdrew two days later after facing junta air strikes and strategically drawing junta troops away from nearby positions.Four days later, undeterred KNLA-led forces seized a junta Light Infantry Battalion base inKyain Seikgyi Township.
InShan State, clashes between PDF forces nearInle Lakeand thePa-O National Organisation(PNO) broke out after the PNO coerced villages for speedboats and militia recruits.
In late 2022,Chin Stateresistance forces used drones in a week-long siege of an outpost inFalam Township, killing 74% of the junta forces stationed, but failing to take the outpost against aerial bombardments.In February 2023,CNAcapturedThantlangpolice station and took control of the town.InKachin State, theShanni Nationalities Army(SNA) became more actively allied with the junta as conflict between SNA and the KIA grew. In August, the SNA and theMyanmar Armyset fire to hundreds of homes in Kachin state forcing KIA withdrawal from the area.
Chin forces also targeted convoys on roads within the state. In March 2023, combined Chin resistance consisting ofCNA,CNDF, andCDFsconducted multiple ambushes on a regime convoy betweenKalay,FalamandHakhacapturing and destroyed multiple armoured vehicles.The NUG awarded the combined Chin forces 400 millionkyatfor seizing two armoured vehicles.The following day, the groups attacked another junta convoy carrying 80 troops on the road betweenMatupiandPaletwa, killing over 30 junta soldiers.In April, CNDF attacked a junta base on the Kalay-Falam road near Varr,Falam Township, killing eleven regime soldiers and capturing fourteen.
In November 2022, resistance inBago Regionincreased. InMonyo Township, western Bago Region, the PDF attacked a police building usingcluster bombs.In eastern Bago, 15 junta soldiers were killed in a Bago PDF raid on a police station inYedashe Township.Thousands of civilians also fledShwegyin Townshipas joint KNLA and NUG-led resistance forces seized three military outposts.
In early December, a video ofPDFforces beating and shooting a woman dead emerged on social media. The NUG Ministry of Defence said that the incident happened in June inTamu, Sagaing and that they were investigating the incident after detaining the perpetrators involved.
In early January 2023, PDF groups inKani Township, Sagaing Region attacked junta supply ships, killing at least 25 soldiers. The junta increasingly used waterways for supplies, avoiding roadways in resistance-held areas.In April 2023, a combined PDF force from nearby townships seized the Tower Taing hill base Kani Township, killing 30 junta soldiers and seizing weapons.
In early 2023, the Mandalay PDF announced their intentions to ramp up military operations.Alongside the TNLA, they engaged in a series of intense clashes with the junta forces inNawnghkio Townshipnear theShan-Mandalayborder, killing at least 75 junta soldiers and wounding 60 others.A combined force of at least 900 junta and pro-junta militia troops attacked resistance positions with the help of artillery attacks and airstrikes during the clashes but were forced to retreat.
In 2023, the number of attacks in urban areas increased. In March 2023, theurban guerillagroup Urban Owls assassinated Minn Tayzar Nyunt Tin, a legal and money-laundering aide to the junta with links to former Air Force commander GeneralMyat Hein, inThanlyin, Yangon. Minn Tayzar Nyunt Tin helped draft the repressive Cyber Security Law, which was seen as violating digital rights, privacy and freedom of expression.
In October 2022, battles and skirmishes increased, as the junta committed several civilian atrocities. On 21 October, junta forcesdecapitated Saw Tun Moe, a high school teacher fromThit Nyi Naung, and impaled his head on aNUG-administered school's spiked gate after burning and lootingTaung Myintvillage inMagway Region.
Two days later, on 23 October, over 80 people were killed byan airstrikeinHpakant Township, Northern Myanmar, during an anniversary celebration for theKachin Independence Organisation(KIO). At least 80 civilians were killed, making it the single deadliest attack on civilians since the start of the renewed civil war.The junta denied civilian casualties while the United Nations condemned the attack.
In November 2022, the junta continued burning villages inSagaing Region, including the home village ofCardinalCharles Maung Bo, the head of theCatholic Church in Myanmar.Junta soldiers also hid in civilian trucks impersonating workers to ambush local defence forces inShwebo Township.
On 2 February 2023,Min Aung Hlaingimposed martial law in 37 townships with resistance activity, affecting millions of residents.
In November 2022, thedry seasonallowed the greater use of theMyanmar Air Forceto weaken resistance forces' ability to maintain strategic positions and outposts. Aerial bombardment, helicopter raids and artillery strikes typically followed skirmishes once junta ground forces sustained substantial losses and retreated. Once the entrapped forces were relieved by aerial support, they would engage inscorched earthtactics. World War Two veterans described the destruction as worse than that of theBurma campaignofWorld War IIdue to the deliberate targeting of civilian villages.The heavy use of air forces came alongside a decrease in junta's ability to fight on the ground. During the week of 21 November, repeated junta air attacks along theSagaing-Kachinborder killed 80 and disrupted supply chains between the two resistance regions.The junta'sscorched earthcampaign stretched across northern Myanmar, burning bases and villages they could no longer defend.Thousands of residents fled during the campaign as hundreds of homes were destroyed.In early 2023, one scorched earth push by the junta aimed to resecure theLetpadaung Copper MineinSalingyi Townshipfor Chinese foreign workers planning to leave for their holidays.
On 23 February 2023, army troops launched a new military offensive in Sagaing, raiding and pillaging villages at the confluence of theIrrawaddyandMu Rivers. During the offensive, troops from the 99th Light Infantry Division executed at least 17 villagers during theTar Taing massacre.
On 26 November 2022, theArakan Armyand the junta agreed to a temporary ceasefire starting on 27 November. The ceasefire was brokered byYōhei Sasakawaof theNippon Foundation. Arakan Army spokespeople maintained that they agreed to the ceasefire for humanitarian reasons, as opposed to international pressure. The Arakan Army did not withdraw from fortifications held at the time of the ceasefire.Junta spokespeople said that this was the first step towards a permanent ceasefire with the Arakan Army.As of mid-December, tensions remained high with forces from both sides remaining in deployment within northernRakhine State.
On 30 November, the military launched a major assault on theKokangMyanmar National Democratic Alliance Armyusing heavy weapons on a base nearChinshwehawby theChinese border. This assault continued into 2 December, reportedly sending 500 junta soldiers.
The military continued its campaign in northern Shan State against theTa'ang National Liberation Army(TNLA). On 7 December 2022, the junta launched a ground offensive on the TNLA in the Battle ofNamhsanusing aerial bombs.After six days of fighting, the TNLA captured four villages from junta control, killing 70 soldiers and capturing 28. On 17 December, the junta retreated, claiming that they reached an agreement with TNLA, and that they intended to target the PDF forces and attacked the TNLA in mistake. The TNLA rejected the statement.Continued clashes in late December forced over a thousand civilians to flee toMogok.
According to analysts in early 2023, the civil war was in a state of stalemate. Despite several successful engagements, there was still a significant disparity in power between the joint resistance forces and the junta. The PDF and EAOs faced resource constraints as they primarily relied on donations for funding and underground channels to acquire arms.The resistance also increasingly used coordinated drone attacks, such as on 27 August 2023, when 11 resistance groups jointly conducted drone strikes inSagaing Township, killing 17 soldiers.
In early April, theKawthoolei Army(KTLA) launched an offensive on the Karen StateBorder Guard Force(BGF)-heldShwe Kokkoin retaliation for the imprisonment and killing of the group's spokesperson by the BGF. After the reported capture of 5 BGF bases,by 8 April, the offensive began to stall. After junta/BGF counterattacks, the KTLA was forced to retreat, receiving heavy losses. Afterwards, the KNU stated that they did not approve these attacks, nor that they would accept the KTLA in their territory.
In early June 2023, NUG announced the formation of the PDF's first battalion inYangon Region– Battalion 5101.On 19 June 2023, the Urban Owls guerilla group assassinated Ye Khaing, the operations director and head of security ofYangon International Airport, and a former air force major, outside his house atMingaladon Township, Yangon. Ye Khaing was allegedly providing information to the junta and detaining anti-junta activists at Myanmar's primary international airport.Urban Owls also claimed that Ye Khaing was a confidante ofSteven Law, the owner ofAsia World Company, which operates the airport, and is a major supporter of the regime together with the second-in-command, Senior GeneralSoe Win.
In late June 2023, a combined resistance force of PDF and KNLA took control of theNational Highway 8inMon State, installing checkpoints and arresting junta personnel.Also in June, theYe Township-based resistance group Ye Belu launched successive guerrilla attacks on the junta in June 2023. On 22 June, they attacked a junta security checkpoint at Chaung Taung bridge, killing four soldiers and one official working for the junta'sMinistry of Immigration and PopulationinLamaing.On 26 June, the group assassinated aPyusawhti militialeader inDuya, Ye Township.Two days later, they ambushed an army convoy from the junta's No. 19 Military Operations Command, killing five soldiers and injuring others.The attacks caused a breakdown in junta administration in Ye Township. All administration offices in three towns – namely, Lamaing,KhawzarandYe– closed down.
On 10 August 2023, junta forces clashed with a coalition of several rebel groups atThandaung, nearNay Pyi Taw. The rebel forces aimed to capture the 606th Light Infantry Division Headquarters.On 15 September 2023, members of the Northern Thandaung Defence Force, along with the Lethal Prop drone unit, attacked the Aye Lar military base near theNay Pyi Taw International Airportwith 2 makeshift bombs. It was the first documented drone attack by resistance forces against an airbase.
On 31 August and 9 September, theZomi Revolutionary Army(ZRA) raided 2Chinland Defense Force(CDF) outposts inTonzang Township, killing 2 CDF soldiers. These attacks were not the first between the ZRA and Chin resistance, which have been clashing since 2021, and came despite the ZRA issuing a public statement of support for anti-junta resistance in 2021.
In August 2023, the NUG claimed that 3,012 junta troops were killed between January and July 2023.In Kayah state alone, 667 military junta troops and 99 resistance members were killed.In a September interview,Duwa Lashi Laclaimed that resistance forces had taken effective control of about 60% of Myanmar's territory.
In early June 2023, a coalition force ofKNLAand other resistance forces ambushed junta forces at Don Tha Mi bridge checkpoints on the border ofKarenandMon States, inflicting heavy casualties.The next day, resistance groups raided the police station and junta offices inKyain Seikgyi Township, Karen State, killing 10 junta soldiers and injuring 15. The junta retaliated with artillery fire and deployed attack helicopters, killing two local civilians and a monk.
InKayah Stateon 13 June 2023, theKarenni National People's Liberation Front(KNPLF), who had previously been in a ceasefire with the junta and became aBorder Guard Forcein 2009, openly defected to anti-junta forces. The KNPLF began attacking Burmese military positions, joining forces withKA,KNDF, KNLA, and PDF,and seizing junta outposts in theBattle of Mese. The combined forces took overMese Townshipin EasternKayah State.430 soldiers of the Light Infantry Battalion, including theirlieutenant colonelcommander, surrendered to the resistance.Later in July, KNLA forces and allies captured the Lat Khat Taung hill junta base. During an attempt to recapture the hill, 20 junta soldiers were killed and 34 wounded.
From July to September 2023, theTa'ang National Liberation Armyand theMandalay People's Defence Forcejointly conductedOperation Kanaungagainst junta forces in theMandalay Region. Over that period, 76 junta soldiers were killed, 19 were wounded, and a large amount of weapons and ammunition were seized.
On 27 October 2023, theThree Brotherhood Allianceinitiated an offensive they calledOperation 1027, targeting the junta's checkpoints and bases nearLashioand the Phaung Seik border trade post nearChinshwehaw.Chinshwehaw fell into ethnic armies' hands.Lashio Airportand two important China-Myanmar border crossings nearLaukkaiwere closed.Over the next three days, the coalition forces captured 57 bases to which the junta responded with aerial bombardments.Simultaneously, the AA engaged junta forces inHtigyaing Township, Sagaing Region.
On 30 October,Nawnghkiofell under limited TNLA and MandalayPDFcontroland 41 junta combatants inKunlongsurrendered to the MNDAA.The next day, combined AA and KIA forces captured Gangdau Yang base on theMyitkyina-Bhamoroad.A junta convoy came the next day to reinforce Nawnghkio but TNLA and PDF forces blew up an armored car, took weapons andPOWs. The convoy retreated and established a camp in southwestNawnghkio Township, which was assaulted by the rebel forces the following morning.The junta acknowledged having lost control of three towns in NorthernShan State, includingPang Hseng.TNLA, MNDAA, and AA declared control over four towns, includingHsenwi.
On 6 November, TNLA forces seized bridges and road gates nearNamhkam, Shan State, and took the town after a three-day assault.Kawlinalso fell to the coalition, marking the firstdistrict-levelcapital seized during the operation.Over the next three days, the coalition tookKhampat,KunlongandMonekoeacross northern Myanmar, re-establishing local government functions after securing towns.They also took Panlong base inKunlong Township, killing Brigadier General Aung Kyaw Lwin in the battle,and the strategic Goktwin bridge near theGoteik viaducton the mainMandalay-China highway.
On 17 November, the TNLA captured the Sakhan Thit Kone base inNamhkam Township, but lost it to a junta offensive the following day. The TNLA accused the junta of usingchemical weaponbombs during the counter-siege.Through December, the TNLA seizedNamhsanandMantongtaking over thePa Laung Self-Administered Zonefrom junta control.
On 29 November, theShan State Progress Party(SSPP) and theRestoration Council of Shan State(RCSS) declared a truce between their respective armies in response to the Operation, with the SSPP stating that the 2 armies "[intended] to unite as one in the future."
In early December, the Tatmadaw allegedly reached out to China for it to assert pressure on theThree Brotherhood Allianceto stop Operation 1027.On 11 December, China helped to hold peace talks between the Tatmadaw and various rebel groups, including the Brotherhood Alliance.The Brotherhood Alliance announced later on 13 December that these peace talks "lasted only 10 minutes" and vowed to continue fighting.
In late January 2024,BBC Newssaid that the "bloody two-year stalemate" of the civil war appears to "have been broken" with the success of the offense of the three ethnic armies in the Operation 1027 offense.
On the morning of 13 November 2023, as part ofOperation 1027, theArakan Army(AA) attacked twoBorder Guard Policestations inRathedaung Township, breaking the Rakhine State Ceasefire Agreement between the junta and the Arakan Army. Dong Paik camp was captured by 6:30 am.On 14 November, the junta had already abandoned around 40 outposts inRakhine stateafter attacks by the Arakan Army, but few came under their immediate control.Dozens of Myanmar security officers surrendered to the Arakan Army the following day.
On 14 November, the Arakan Army launched an offensive inPaletwa Townshipin neighbouringChin State. The Arakan Army accused the Tatmadaw of using chemical weapons during the ensuing battles.
The following night, the Arakan Army launched an attack onPauktaw, seizing thetownshippolice station. By the next morning, the Arakan Army had taken control of the town. The junta sent twohelicopter gunshipsalongside naval support to fire back, including at civilian housing, with heavy machine gun fire. Pauktaw's proximity to the Rakhine state capital,Sittwe, posed a threat to the junta.Junta forces detained about 100 residents who were unable to flee, and positioned themselves to surround the town, using two navy ships to blockade the harbour.
On 6 December, the Arakan Army would capture a major military base in the township.
In late November and December, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) closed in onLaukkai, the capital of theKokang Self-Administered Zone. They seized several strategic positions from junta forces during the ensuingBattle of Laukkai.MNDAA forces attacked junta bases around the city in early December.On 26 December, ninety junta soldiers surrendered to the MNDAA.and, two days later, the artillery shelling of Laukkai would stop as the city mostly fell under MNDAA control.On 5 January 2024, the MNDAA seized control of the junta battalion headquarters in Laukkai and gained full control of the city.
A few days later, the Three Brotherhood Alliance claimed it had captured the towns ofKutkaiandTheinnion 8 January after seizing junta military posts in the towns, including the headquarters of the16th Military Operations Commandin Theinni.On 23 January, the Tatmadaw sentenced three of the brigadier generals who surrendered at Laukkai to death and the other three tolife imprisonment, undermilitary law.
In the wake of these gains and the fall of Laukkai, on 12 January, China announced that it had negotiated anotherceasefirebetween the junta and the 3BA, known as the "Haigeng Agreement".The two sides agreed to disengage personnel and to not compromise the safety of Chinese border residents.However, the following day, the TNLA reported that the junta had broken their agreement with airstrikes inLashio TownshipandKyaukme Township.
The Irrawaddyreported on 22 November 2023 that the Tatmadaw was preparing 14,000 soldiers for the defence ofNaypyitaw, including by moving troops from other regions to the capital and mobilizing civil servants into the military. These preparations started soon after Operation 1027 was launched against the Tatmadaw. In addition, the Tatmadaw was preparing 10,000 troops for the defence ofMandalay,BagoandYangon. There were also fortification works beginning, with Naypyitaw police stations "also preparing concrete blocks, sandbags and other materials needed to transform into defensive bases in just a few days".
Ronan Lee, a professor atLoughborough University, stated that the recent strategic reversals, nationwide territorial losses and economic decline meant momentum had strongly shifted away from Myanmar's junta, and the junta "may now be in a death spiral".
Operation 1027 was supported by several concurrent operations by other anti-junta groups elsewhere in the country, including in the eastern regionsShan StateandKayah State. In northern Shan State, the KNLA andPDFclashed with the Tatmadaw around the town ofKawkareikin late October 2023.InMese Township(part of Kayah State), the KNPLF, KA and KNDF launched a joint military operation calledOperation 1107that captured several border posts starting on November 7.Four days later, they launched the majorOperation 1111againstLoikaw, the capital of Kayah State.The military operations in Kayah displaced tens of thousands of civilians, especially from Loikaw.After over a month of heavy fighting, rebel forces had won control of 85% of the capital.Nonetheless, fighting has continued into January.By late January, however, the offensive on Loikaw had mostly stalled.
Other anti-junta forces launchedOperation TaungthamaninMadaya Township, Mandalay Region. On 13 November, fighting erupted in Kinn Village, eastern Madaya Township between the TNLA and the junta, who responded with air and artillery strikes and later burning the village down.By 28 November, PDF and TNLA forces captured a junta base in the township.The TNLA additionally supported the operations with attacks inNawnghkioandKyaukmeTownships in southernShan Stateto cut off junta reinforcements.
On the morning of 13 November 2023, after two days of fighting, theChin National Army(CNA) and localChinland Defense Force(CDF) units, captured the town ofRikhawdaron theIndia–Myanmar border.This marked the first town captured by resistance forces in Chin State since the coup. At least 40 junta soldiers and police officers fled to the Indian state ofMizoram, where they surrendered and were eventually repatriated.TheChin National Defence Force(CNDF), took a junta camp on the Mizoram border two days later.The following week on 21 November, local Zoland PDF units seized a military base onKennedy Peak, the second highest mountain in Chin State.Over the next week, CNA and its allies captured LailenpiandRezuainMatupi Township.
On 6 December 2023, theChin National Frontratified the Chinland Constitution, proclaiming the state ofChinland.
On 17 January 2024, the Taingen camp on theFalamroad to the Indian border was captured, with Chin resistance forces seizing arms and ammunition.On 20 January 2024, after more than 600 junta soldiers and refugees crossed theIndia–Myanmar border, theGovernment of Indiaannounced a plan to fence the entire border.
Following the fall ofLaukkaiand the junta facing serious threats by theThree Brotherhood Alliance, the war has turned into a more multipolar landscape with borderlands being seized by powerful anti-junta groups with significant implications for theforeign relations of Myanmar. Groups not a part of the alliance took advantage of the situation, but remained constrained by both tense relations and limited coordination.
On 8 January 2024, theArakan Armycontinued their offensive and captured the Taung Shey Taung base and its 200 junta soldiers inKyauktaw Township, Rakhine State. On 15 January, the Arakan Army seizedPaletwa, a strategic town for Indo-Myanmar infrastructure projects, and the entire township in Chin State.A week later, the Arakan Army captured the town ofPauktawin Rakhine State concluding a three-month battle.
On 3 February 2024, as the clashes between Arakan Army and Tatmadaw increased in Rakhine, mortar shells and several bullets reportedly landed in Bangladesh territory, which injured some local residents nearUkhia, Cox's Bazar.At least 229 MyanmarBorder Guard Police(BGP) personnel entered Bangladesh seeking refuge from AA, where theBorder Guard Bangladesh(BGB) disarmed them.
Between 4 February and 6 February, the Arakan Army launched attacks on Rakhine BGP outposts in Maungdaw Township, later alleging without providing evidence that theArakan Rohingya Salvation ArmyandRohingya Solidarity Organisation(RSO) fought alongside the Rakhine BGP.The RSO denounced AA's accusations and the AA labeling them as "Bengalis" among other issues.Later in February when the junta began conscripting largely non-citizendisplacedRohingyasliving inKyaukphyu, the AA urged Rohingya people to flee into AA-controlled areas.
The Arakan Army captured most of the remaining Tatmadaw bases inMinbya Townshipby 6 February.The Arakan Army capturedKyauktawthe next day and continued fighting inMrauk UandRamree.The Tatmadaw abandonedMyebonto reinforceKyaukphyuon 9 February, leaving ammunition behind in their rush and abandoning the southern township ofMrauk-U District.
On 10 February, AA took the district capital town of Mrauk U completing their control over the township. During the battle, threeMyanmar Navylanding craft were reportedly sunk.
Over the next week, the Arakan Army consolidated control over the district capturingMyebonon 15 Februaryand capturing the remainder ofMinbya Townshipon 28 February.
Early 2024 also saw a new theatre re-emerge in southernShan statewhen, the Tatamadaw and thePa-O National Army(PNA) attempted to confiscate thePa-O National Liberation Army(PNLA)'s weapons on 20 January.The PNLA, supported by KNDF and PDF forces, attackedHsi Hsengeventually capturing the town on 26 January 2024.The PNLA's political wing formally revoked their participation in theNationwide Ceasefire Agreement, pledged to help the NUG replace the Junta with afederal systemand urged thePNA's political wingto defect.
Between 21 January and 24 February, junta shelling killed 40 civilians in thePa-O Self-Administered Zone, according local activists.Towards the end of February, clashes between junta/PNA forces and PNLA forces broke out east ofHopongand along theTaunggyi-Loilemroad.The junta regained control of Hsi Hseng by late March,amid accusations of usingchemical bombsaccording to the PNLA.
Between 26 and 27 March the MNDAA and theShan State Army (SSPP)clashed inHseni Townshipafter the alleged MNDAA bombing of SSPP camps.On 3 May, theShan State Progress Partyannounced that its armed forces would join revolutionary forces before retracting the statement two days later.On 27 May, after a month of warnings, the TNLA began blockading several villages inNamhkam Townshipand detaining SSPP soldiers stationed in those villages. In response, the SSPP withdrew from camps inHsenwi,Kutkai, andPang Hseng.
TheUnited Nationsvoiced deep concern over renewed fighting in eastern Myanmar and allegations that the Myanmar armed forces employed heavy weapons against civilians, as well as abducted and forcibly recruited children in its ranks. ItsSpecial Adviser on Prevention of Genocideand theSpecial Adviser on Responsibility to Protectalso highlighted the responsibility of the military to protect all people.
Tatmadaw forces recaptured the district capital ofKawlinon 10 February after almost 10 days of fighting.Junta forcesrazedthe town, destroying the majority of homes in Kawlin and surrounding villages.On 22 February, junta forces attempted to recapture the town ofMaw Luufrom theKIAandABSDF.On 14 March, junta forces took the village of Kampani,Kalay Townshipto weaken anti-junta attacks onKalay.Despite this campaign, on 16 March resistance forces captured thePyusawhti-controlled village of Kyaung Taik north of Kalay.
While the junta launched its counteroffensives, allied resistance launched an offensive to captureKani, capturing around 80% of the town by 7 March.After almost 10 days of fighting, by 15 March, rebels were forced retreat after overwhelming junta resistance.
On 4 April 2024, the PDF launched an unprecedented drone attack against Aye Lar airbase, the main Tatmadaw headquarters, and Min Aung Hlaing's residence in the capital,Naypyidaw. Almost 30 drones were deployed; junta forces claimed 7 were shot downwhileMyawaddy TVsaid 13 fixed-wing drones were shot down and there were no casualties or damage to property. NUG claimed the attack was "a success".On 12 April, local People's Defense Forces claimed that they killed over a dozen junta soldiers in another attack on Aye Lar Airbase.
On 19 April junta forces launched a counteroffensive to retake Shwe Pyi Aye,Homalin Township, after it was captured in November 2023.
After Operation 1027 and theBattle of Kawkareikin October 2023, the KNLA continued to make gains throughoutKaren State,Mon State,Bago Region, andTanintharyi Region.On 29 January 2024, KNLA and PDF forces shot down a TatmadawEurocopter AS365, killing Brigadier General Aye Min Naung of the 44th Light Infantry Division.In late February, PDF and KNLA forces took most ofMyitta, Tanintharyi Region.By 29 February, KNLA and aligned forces captured half ofKawkareik township, gaining fire control over theMyawaddy-Kawkareik highway.The KNLA continued gaining pushing east on the highway,capturing the Hpu Lu Gyi camp, south of Myawaddy, after a "five minute fight". This camp held both strategic and moral significance as the historic staging point for attacks onManerplawandKawmooraafter the junta captured it in 1990.The next day, KNLA forces captured a junta base inKyaikdon.Fighting also broke out in KNLA 7th Brigade territory near Methawaw, forcing a junta retreat.
Tensions also rose between the junta and the Karen StateBorder Guard Force(BGF), who refused orders to engage in battle and withdrew from their bases inPapun.On 23 January, deputy commander-in-chiefSoe Winmet with Karen BGF leader ColonelSaw Chit ThuThe Karen BGF announced they would no longer accept salaries from the junta, and would remain "neutral" in the conflict. Later, on 6 March, the Karen BGF announced it would rename itself to the "Karen National Army".
While theKIAis a very close military and political partners with the Three Brotherhood Alliance, being part of theNorthern Alliance, it was not affected by theChinese-brokered ceasefire. Combined forces of the KIA, ABSDF, and Kachin PDF captured the town ofMongmiton 19 January and neighboringMabeinon the 20th. The next day, they captured the strategically significant Man Wein Gyi base nearRuili.However, the junta would recapture Mongmit on 25 January.
The KIA also intensified attacks in Hpakant Township,capturing a camp southwest of Hpakant on 20 January andthreatening the Myitkyina-Hpakant road with the capture of Namtein outpost on 2 February.There were also attacks inMansi Township, including the capture of the Si Kham Gyi base, which had continually been held by the junta for 30 years.
On 7 March the KIA simultaneously launched attacks on over ten junta outposts in eastern Kachin. Fighting primarily took place along the highway betweenBhamoand the Kachin State capital, Myitkyina, as well as aroundLaiza. The attacks were the beginning of a wider offensive in Kachin State- colloquially termedOperation 0307.Over 8 March, the KIA seized three major junta bases and several outposts, including Hpyun Pyen Bum, the junta's closest forward base to KIA headquarters in Laiza.The KIA and AA defending Laiza alleged that junta airstrikes had landed on theChinese side of the border, east of Laiza.During the fighting, the leader of the junta-alignedLisu"Wuyang People's Militia", U Shwe Min, was killed.By 22 March, the KIA claimed to have captured over 50 military outposts and 13 strategically significant junta bases around the Myitkyina-BhamoRoad.
In April, the KIA had captured the key Chinese border trade hub ofLweje,cut off a major road toHpakant,and captured Sezin.andHsinbo. Within Hsinbo, they cut off the Bhamo-Myitkyina road and encircledBhamo.The KIA then launched simultaneous offensives throughoutWaingmaw Townshipand aroundSumprabum, capturing several junta bases, camps and command centers.By 8 May, they had captured 11 battalion headquarters throughout the stateand capturedSumprabum Township.
Through the rest of May, the KIA capturedMomaukafter junta soldiers retreated,attacked a bridge at the entrance of the state capitalMyitkyina.and made gains inMansiandTanaiThe KIA took an additional dozen junta bases in Waingmaw Township starting in 20 May, securing their positions.
At the same time, the Rakhine offensive continued through March. On 5 March, the Arakan Army capturedPonnagyunand threatening the regional capitalSittwe, only 33 kilometres away.On 17 March, continued Arakan Army assaults took Rathedaung andits township, cutting off Sittwe from the rest of Rakhine by land.
On 12 March, after an 85-day battle, the Arakan Army captured the town ofRamree. The capture of Ramree brought nearly all of Ramree Island under the Arakan Army's control except for the port city ofKyaukphyu.
On 24 March, the Arakan Army began an offensive in central Rakhine concurrently with their offensive on Sittwe, launching attacks onAnn, the headquarters of the junta'sWestern Command. North of Ann, the Arakan Army launched attacks on neighbouringNgape TownshipinMagway Region. Ann's location is strategically important as the link between Rakhine and Magway via the Minbu-Ann road through theArakan Mountainsand as a gateway preventing AA from attacking southern Rakhine State.Through April, the Arakan Army captured a portion of the Ann-MinbuHighway, cutting off Ann from neighboring Padein,and captured bases in the hilltops of Ann township.
Northern Rakhine offensives saw little territory change until 3 May when the Arakan Army captured the headquarters of theBorder Guard PoliceinMaungdaw Townshipat Kyee Kan Pyin,forcing at least 128 junta soldiers to cross the border into Bangladesh.Buthidaungand its surroundingtownshipfell to the Arakha Army on 18 May.After its capture,Rohingyaactivists accused the Arakan Army ofburning and targeting Rohingya homes in the town, a claim which the Arakan Army denied.
On 29 May, junta and alliedArakan Liberation Armysoldierskilled over 70 villagers in Byian Phyunear Sittwe due to suspected Arakan Army sympathies in the village.
From late May to early June, the Arakan Army launched attacks on the remainder ofMaungdaw Township. On 16 June, the AA urged the residents of Maungdaw to evacuate the town, claiming that all junta bases in the township had either been captured or encircled, and that they would attack the town.In response, theBangladesh Navydeployed warships to the disputedSt. Martin's Island, which hadbeen shot at several timesby junta forces.On 4 July, the AA entered Maungdaw, attacking the last junta holdout in the town.
On 20 March, theKaren National Liberation Armyand its PDF allies began to besiege the town ofPapun, the capital ofHpapun District, Karen State. Eight days later, the town was captured, with fighting moving to the hills outside the town.
After a prolongedsiegeand several days of negotiations, on 5 April over 600 junta soldiers and their families inMyawaddysurrendered to the KNU and withdrew across the border toMae Sot,leaving only the 275th Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) near the western entrance to defend the town. By 10 April, KNLA and PDF troops captured the LIB base with the 200 LIB soldiers withdrawing to the 2nd Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge on the border. This prompted Thailand to deploy the3rd Armyalong the border.The junta sent reinforcements to retake the town, but they were stalled inKyondoe.On 12 April, Thai officials and the KNU confirmed the capture of Myawaddy.The junta retaliated with airstrikes although locals reported no KNLA presence in the streets.
Despite the KNLA's major role in the battle, they ceded control of the town to theKaren National Army(KNA) to ensure securityand reportedly due to the KNA's role in negotiations for the initial surrender.
On 19 April the KNLA attacked the remaining LIB 275th soldiers who were stillholding outunder the 2nd Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge. The junta responded with airstrikes, killing several civilians and forcing the KNLA to delay further attacks.
After Myawaddy's capture the junta launched Operation Aung Zeya, a counteroffensive to retake the town led by Light Infantry Division (LID) 55, numbering around 1,000 and reportedly led by the junta'ssecond-in-commandSoe Win. On 16 April, the LID 55 began attempting to cross theDawna Rangebut was continually intercepted by the KNLA and allies, being forced to retreat and reportedly experiencing heavy losses.
Early in the counteroffensive KNLA forces withdrew from most ofKawkareik.On 21 April, a junta convoy wasroutedinKawkareik Township,but junta forces successfully recaptured Kawkareik the next day despite losing vehicles to the KNLA.
On 23 April, the KNA helped the LIB 275th soldiers sheltering under the 2nd Friendship Bridge to retake their base west of Myawaddy.The following day, KNU spokesman stated that they would "temporarily withdraw" from Myawaddy, but vowed to continue guerrilla attacks along theAH1.
The stalled LID 55 advancement moving through the Dawna Range reached the Taw Naw waterfall by 29 April.However, the counteroffensive was stalled again, without any major gains the following month. Residents reported that the KNA had helped "hundreds" of junta soldiers to reach Myawaddy through forested paths.
Karenni resistance continued withOperation 1111aiming to captureKayah Stateand its capitalLoikaw. On 12 January, joint Karenni forces capturedPekonin neighboring Shan State.On 29 January, theKarenni Nationalities Defence Force(KNDF) captured the town ofMawchi.On 14 February, combined forces of theKarenni Army(KA) and KNDF captured the town ofShadawafter almost a month-long battle, marking the second township to be completely captured in the state.Karenni forces capturedHpasawngand most ofHpasawng Townshipon 14 March.In a joint statement on 23 March, the KNDF and allies announced that they were in control of nearly 90% of Kayah State, having captured 65 junta positions throughout the state, and six out of nine towns in Kayah(excluding Moebye in Southern Shan State).
On 20 January 2024, local resistance forces inYe Township, Mon State intensified attacks, announcing their intent to captureYe.On 14 February, theNew Mon State Party (Anti-Military Dictatorship)(MNLA-AMD) split from theMon National Liberation Army(a signatory of theNationwide Ceasefire Agreement) and effectively declared war on the junta.Around 22 March, Mon State resistance groups began vehicle inspections nearKaleinaung, prompting the junta close roads.On 25 March, the MNLA-AMD and allies, captured theKawt BeinPolice Station inKawkareik Township, Karen State.In response, junta forces shelled the Kawt Bein areaand eventually recaptured the area after a battle on 25 April.
On 8 April, Mon PDF forces launched drone attacks on the Southeastern Command headquarters inMawlamyinewhile junta deputy commander-in-chiefSoe Winwas present. Whether Soe Win was affected remains unknown.
On 29 May, junta forces launched an offensive to resecureLoikawfrom Karenni resistance – which had controlled around 80% of the city since November 2023. Junta colums advanced on Loikaw,reaching Kayan Tha Yar village 10 kilometres north of Loikaw the next dayand then the Loikaw-Mobye-Hsi Hsengintersection by 3 June before stalling.On 25 June, Karenni resistance captured Maesalawng Hill, nearBawlakhe, after a six day offensive.
From 8 May to 20 May, junta forces also conducted an offensive throughoutThayetchaung Township, the longest of such offensives inTanintharyi Regionsince the 2021 coup. The offensive displaced 5,000 civilians from 8 villages.In late May, junta forces captured Pedak outpost on the road betweenDaweiandMyeik.In early June, around 600 junta soldiers were sent to recapture areas of theYe - Dawei highwayfrom Karen, Mon, and PDF forces who had captured the highway in March, The junta used heavy artillery and the resistance warned civilians to avoid the road, accusing the junta of usinghuman shieldsand reinforcements disguised as civilians.On 1 July, junta forces launched an offensive on the Zardi Village Tract ofYebyu Township, attempting to recapture areas surrounding theDawei Special Economic Zone.
In June 2024, theThree Brotherhood Alliance's Haigeng ceasefire with the junta broke down seeing junta battalions destroyed and multiple towns in Shan state and beyond fall to the resistance, culminating in the capture of the NorthernShan Statecapital and headquarders of the Northeast Command,Lashio, in August 2024.Outside Shan State, the Myanmar military faced significant losses in Rakhine State where the Arakan Army gained almost full control by August 2024. In Mandalay, the Brotherhood Alliance and other armed groups escalated attacks, getting close toMandalay. Despite these setbacks, the military continued efforts to reassert control, including forming new militias and intensifying conscription across the country.Although 1027 began in Shan State, widespread escalation dramatically shifted the balance of power, leading to EAOs in other areas making dominant gains and crippling the military junta with personnel attritions and historic levels of defections.
While it took until June for the Haigeng ceasefire to fully breakdown, tensions began as early as March. The ceasefire was formalised on 1 March at a meeting inKunming, with the junta reportedly agreeing to recognise the MNDAA's authority overKokang.But as early as 26 March, junta forces attempted to invade MNDAA territory nearLashiobut was repelled militarily.In response, the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar met with the junta foreign minister to discuss ending the clashes.
Tensions began to grow again in Northern Shan State on 9 June after the junta launched airstrikes on TNLA positions inMongmit Township. TNLA would accuse the junta of violating the ceasefire.Through mid-June, junta forces amassed near 3BA-terriotries and destroyed roads in the area
On 23 June, the junta clashed withMyanmar National Democratic Alliance Army(MNDAA) near Lashio.and with the TNLA aroundKyaukme,Nawnghkio Township, andMogok Townshipon 24 June.On 25 June, the TNLA announced that it had restartedOperation 1027in Northern Shan State,and encircled Kyaukme.
On 26 June, most ofNawnghkiowas captured by PDF and TNLA forces.By 28 June, the TNLA had captured most of the district capital town Kyaukme and continued attacking the junta bases around the town.
Concurrently in early June, theArakan Armymade significant gains in southernRakhine state. On 2 June, clashes erupted on the Thandwe-Taungup highway and near the resort beach of Ngapali,Thandwe Township,trapping resort goers.Over the next week, the fighting moved closer toThandwe, forcing theThandwe Airportto close.
On 15 June, the Arakan Army clashed with junta forces near neighbouringTaungupand on the Taungup-Pandaungroad.After months of relative peace in the area, heavy clashes broke out outside ofKyaukphyuon 17 June as junta forces left Danyawaddy naval base.
On 23 June, AA forces captured Thandwe Airport, the first airport to be captured by resistance forces since the 2021 coup.The airport's capture was not confirmed for another week, with AA claiming that 400 junta soldiers had died in the battle.The AA began attacking the beach itself on 26 June.On 17 July, AA forces captured Thandwe itself after three weeks of fighting.
Various Chin actors continued the war against the junta in early 2024, with resistance efforts picking up in May. However, in June, the Chin resistance began to engage in conflict with each other as infighting increased in June. Signs of infighting began as early as January when CDFs and CNA clashed with the Maraland Defence Force (MDF), a CBA member.The infighting in Chin State became broadly split along those aligned with theChin Brotherhood Alliance(CBA) and theChinland Council, which is dominated by theChin National Army(CNA). LocalChinland Defense Forces(CDFs) are generally aligned with the CBA, though some like the CDF-Mara are aligned with the CNA.
On 2 May 2024, CBA aligned groups captured the strategic town of Kyindwe,Kanpetlet Townshipwith the aid of theArakan Armyduring the conclusion of the four-month longBattle of Kyindwe.The CC would then attempt to takeTonzangfrom the junta and its ally theZomi Revolutionary Armycapturing the town and neighbouringCikhaby 21 May.
The following week, the CBA moved on neighbouringTedim,By mid-June, the Junta pushing back from Tedim, recaptured positions along the Tedim-Kalayroad and took back Kennedy Peak.Junta forces pushed as far as to recapture the strategic Tainngen villagebefore losing both Kennedy Peak and Taingen toChinland Council-led counteroffensives and retreating to Khaing Kham by 27 June.On 27 July, the CNA and ZRA met inAizawlfor peace negotiations.
On 30 May, CDF-Matupi captured the district administrative office on the Matupi-Hakharoad inMatupi Township.On 24 June, CDFs clashed with junta forces outside of the Chin State capitalHakha. The junta retaliated by setting fires to homes in the town.On 20 July, as part of "Operation Rung", the CDF-Hakha captured the Hakha Main Police Station, releasing 62 detainees.
On 9 June, the CBA, Arakan Army andMagway-based Yaw Army began "Operation Chin Brotherhood" attackingMatupi.Shortly after the announcement, theChinland Councilissued a statement asking the Arakan Army to refrain from military and administrative operations inChinland.This came days after Global Khumi Organisation urged the Arakha Army against committinghuman rights violationsagainst theKhumi Chinpeople ofPaletwa Township.
Operation Chin Brotherhood continued with CBA aligned forces capturing one of the two junta battalion bases outside Matupi on 17 June.Clashes between the CBA and CBA broke out during the push towards the final base, leading to 2 CBA deaths.The CNA/Chinland Council was forced to retreat from the Matupi area by 24 JuneOn 29 June, the CBA captured the remaining junta base near Matupi and took over the town.
Infighting continued with CNA detaining other Yaw Defense Force soldiersand MDF and AA taking Lailenpi,Matupi Townshipfrom the CDF-Mara and CNA.
On 4 June renewed clashes broke out outside ofMomeik.A week later, KIA forces captured the Waingmaw-Sadung-Kanpaiktiroad, cutting off the state capitalMyitkyinafrom the border.
On 15 July, junta forces launched an offensive to recapture areas near Momauk.A month later, on 19 August, KIA forces captured the last junta base in Momauk, completing their capture of the township.Shortly after, junta forces launched another counteroffensive to retake the town, but were stalled at Aung Myay village.
On 1 July, junta forces began attacking KNDF positions south ofPinlaung, attempting to relieve the Karenni siege onPekon.
In early July, fighting further intensified in Loikaw as Karenni resistance attempted to recapture areas of the town they had earlier been forced to withdraw from.The Irrawaddy reported on 8 July that fighting is intensifying after reinforcements of 500 troops had arrived to help the already stationed 1,500 Tatmadaw troops.
By mid July inHpasawng Township, there has been reports of fresh intense fighting, incl. Karenni claims of poisoned gas use by Tatmadaw against the resistance fighters.Meanwhile, in Loikaw, pro-Tatmadaw sources confirm fighting in Loikaw,Pekhonand Mobye. In addition it claims Tatmadaw progress in the direction of Loikaw University.
On 2 July, the MNDAA began theBattle of Lashioagainst the heavily defended capital and largest town of northernShan State. The TNLA joined the offensive the next day with the 2 armies attacking 4 junta bases surrounding Lashio. Pro-juntaTelegramchannels accused theShan State Progress Party(SSPP) of joining the offensive.On 5 July, TNLA forces entered Lashio proper from the south.The next day, the MNDAA captured Nampawng village south of Lashio, encircling the town,and began launching attacks into Lashio.
Concurrently MNDAA forces clashed with junta forces inMongyai Townshipand TNLA began launching attacks intoMomeik.
Tensions and disputes rose between TNLA and theShan State Army (SSPP), with both sides asking theUnited Wa State Army(UWSA) for mediation.On 10 July, the TNLA attacked junta positions nearTangyan.Following an agreement with the Tatmadaw, the neutral UWSA deployed thousands of soldiers around Tangyan to prevent clashes from spreading to the area.On 13 July, SSPP forces occupiedMongyai, with residents claiming that clashes might break out in the town due to the apparent SSPP-junta agreement.
On 25 July, in a "historic victory", the MNDAA claimed to have captured theNortheastern Commandheadquarters of Lashio, the first regional command headquarters to ever be captured by resistance forces.On 30 July, MNDAA forces ambushed junta reinforcements attempting to reach Lashio, inflicting heavy casualties.On 3 August, the capture of Lashio and the Northeastern Command headquarters was confirmed, with hundreds of Burmese soldiers surrendering.The Northeastern Command had exiled their leadership toMuse, which remained the last junta stronghold in the area due to its proximity with the Chinese border.
On 14 July, the MNDAA instituted a tenuous 4-day ceasefire after meeting with theChinese Communist Party. Despite the ceasefire, clashes continued.TNLA and SSPP leaders also met inPanghsang, Wa State, to discuss an end to clashes.On 16 July, TNLA captured most ofMongmitand began launching attacks on the junta headquarters south of the town.
At the same time as the renewed 1027 offensive, theNUGannounced that it had joined in the offensive through itsPeople's Defense ForcesinMandalay Region, calling the attacks a "Shan Man" operation.As part of Operation Shan-Man, the Mandalay People's Defence Force (MDY-PDF) captured 36 junta positions in late June and early July throughout northern Mandalay Region.The MDY-PDF and TNLA also captured Nawnghkio on 10 JulyandSingu Townshipby 12 July, further cutting off junta forces in Northern Shan State.
On 20 July, the 3BA, reportedly under pressure from China, agreed to extend the ceasefire to 31 July.Despite the agreements, junta reinforcements launched renewed attacks on Kyaukme on the same day.On 24 July, TNLA and PDF forces completely capturedMogok, Mandalay Region.
The TNLA captured the Shan state towns ofMomeikon 31 JulyandKyaukmeon 6 August.On 10 August, TNLA forces launched an offensive againstHsipaw, capturing the town's prisonand then nearby Nawngkawgyi village by 13 August.
On 12 August, MDY-PDF capturedTagaung, the first historical capital of theBurmese monarchy, after a one-day battle.The following week, Mandalay-PDF capturedThabeikkyin, capturing the town and its surroundings. The entirety ofThabeikkyin Districtcame under rebel control.
After the fall of Lashio, the junta launched counter offensives, but facing an inability to make progress, changed its tactics to favouraerial bombardmentto destroy towns they could not take, like Lashio.The rebels, too, have failed to make as much progress due to diplomatic pressures and supply issues. Analyst Yun Sun from theStimson Centernoted Chinese Foreign MinisterWang Yi's visit in mid-August as indicative of a shift in China's stance from greenlighting Operation 1027 in November 2023 to endorsing theState Administration Counciland criticising theNorthern Allianceand theUnited Wa State Army(UWSA) for not standing down.There are signs that China is accelerating weapons transfers to the junta and restricting key ammunition supplies to the TNLA, affecting the resistance's realistic prospects of takingMandalaydespite the junta being in its weakest position since 2021.However, this recent alignment with the military regime has strained its influence over border groups like the 3BA, diminishing China's sway and ability to mediate in this new landscape.China's support temporarily slowed the rebels' momentum but failed to reverse the trend of humiliating losses, including the fall of a second Regional Military Command inAnn, Rakhine State. Instead, China finds its interests threatened as the Arakan Army surroundKyaukphyuand Kachin groups seize control of rare earth mineral mines.
In January 2025,The New York Timesreported that the rebels were opening colleges and universities in the territory they controlled.
In late August, the Tatmadaw began preparing an offensive to recapture key towns in northern Shan State, terming it as “Operation Hsin Phyu Shin” (after the Burmese kingHsinbyushin).Throughout September and October, the Tatmadaw began massing forces in the final towns it controlled in Northern Shan State (Namlan, Mongyai, and Tangyan) in preparation for the counteroffensive to retake Lashio.
This came in the context of strained China-3BA relations. On 29 August, theRuili CitySecurity Commission issued a statement demanding the TNLA to end all offensive operations against the junta, threatening "more deterrent and disciplinary measures" if it did not.4 days later, the junta designated theThree Brotherhood Allianceand its members as "terrorist groups".On 19 September, the MNDAA announced that it would end its offensive operations, further stating it would refuse to ever work with theNational Unity Government of Myanmar.Despite the Chinese threat, the TNLA captured the last junta base in Hsipaw on 13 October.
On 19 October, Tatmadaw forces launched a counteroffensive, aimed at retaking Nawnghkio instead of Lashio.
On 18 November, it was confirmed that MNDAA leaderPeng Daxunhad been detained inYunnanby Chinese authorities since late October, further pressuring MNDAA forces to relinquish Lashio to the junta.
In early December, the MNDAA declared a unilateral ceasefire and expressed willingness to engage in peace talks with the junta, with China acting as a mediator.The MNDAA announced its readiness to send a high-level delegation for dialogue to resolve conflicts through political means.However, despite this announcement, airstrikes on TNLA-held areas continued.On 20 January 2025, the MNDAA and the junta agreed to a Chinese-brokered ceasefire, with several sources claiming that a withdraw of the former from Lashio was a condition for the deal. However, at the time neither the junta nor the MNDAA revealed any details of the deal.
In early August, the PNLA launched a renewed assault on the outskirts of Hsi Hseng after junta forces in the town bombed the PNLA headquarters inMawkmai Township.At the same time, the junta-allied PNO intensified military preparations by training 10,000 militia members in Pinlaung Township, in southern Shan State, aimed at bolstering the defense of Naypyitaw.On 10 September, the PNLO split after disputes surrounding a ceasefire with the junta, with pro-ceasefire leaders breaking off to form the "PNLO-NCA-S."
On 19 September, the Tatmadaw and allied Lahu military attacked aShan State Army (RCSS)base in Yanghkam,Mong Ping Township.
The People's Defence Forces also continued fighting outside of the Shan-Man context. On 11 June the Union Liberation Front and Sagaing Region People's Defence Organisation captured a junta base near the Sagaing capitalMonywa.On 27 June, a coalition of several PDFs attackedBudalin.
On 17 July, People's Defense Forces launched 2 rockets atNay Pyi Taw International Airport, causing no casualties.
On 10 August, PDFs inMyingyan District, central Mandalay Region, launched an offensive againstTaungthaandNatogyi.Natogyi was briefly captured before being recaptured by the junta soon after. On 15 August, PDF launched an offensive onTabayin, Sagaing Region, again capturing the town by 18 August briefly before withdrawing shortly after due to junta counter attacks.In mid-August, the KIA and PDF launched joint offensives onIndaw,Pinlebu, andHtigyaing, Sagain Region.Resistance forces captured Pinlebu on 8 October, defeating almost 800 junta soldiers.
On 11 November, theBurma National Revolutionary Armyand several other PDF's launched attacks onPalebefore being forced to retreat due to junta counter attacks.
On 7 September, KIA forces began attacking Singtawn -outside Hpakant- after junta forces raided a hotel in the area, capturing the village one month later.In late September, it was reported that junta forces were preparing an offensive to retake Sumprabum and Tiyangzug.
On 29 September, the KIA launched an offensive onChipwiandHsawlaw, capturing both towns by 2 October. Shortly after, the KIA asked theKachin Border Guard Forcesto defect, but were denied.In response, the KIA launched an offensive on Kachin BGF battalions 1002 and 1003, capturing both by 22 October.
The KIA then captured the Kachin BGF's headquarters in the town ofPang Waron 20 October with Kachin BGF leader Zahkung Ting Ying fled to China.On 1 November, the KIA launched an attack on the final BGF 1001 bases at Nuzaungbaung and Phimaw, capturing both by the next day. Border Guard Forces fled to Kangfang (Ganfai), which the KIA captured days later.On 10 November, KIA forces completed the capture of Kachin Special Region 1 and all of the Kachin BGF territory when they took Lanse village.On 20 November, despite Chinese pressure not to, the KIA capturedKanpaikti, the final Kachin BGF base.
In December, the KIA and allies attacked Myanmar junta targets inBhamoand Mansi townships.
In early August, theChin National Armyand allies took inThantlangafter about a week of fighting.
On 9 November, theChin Brotherhood Alliancerelaunched Operation Chin Brotherhood, launching simultaneous offensives onFalamandMindat, capturing most of the former.
In December 2024, the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (CBA) achieved significant victories in Chin State. On 15 December, 123 junta troops and police officers from Mindat district and township police compounds, together with their families, surrendered to the CBA.On 21 December, the CBA declared Mindat a junta-free zone following the rescue of 13 political prisoners.These victories further consolidated the CBA's control in the region and demonstrated the strength of Operation Chin Brotherhood.
After the capture of Thandwe,Arakan Armyforces launched an offensive south towardsGwa, capturingKyeintaliby 14 August.On 5 September, the AA captured Maung Shwe LayNaval Base, the first naval base to be captured by resistance forces.On 25 September, the AA launched an offensive on the remaining bases in Ann. By 25 October, the AA captured the remaining Mae Taung bases, encircled Ann, and captured the town'sairport.On 7 November, the AA launched an offensive on neighboringTaungup.The Arakan Army captured Maungdaw in the first half of December, after securing the Junta's last remaining position there. The AA captured General Thurein Tun during the operation.
In December 2024, the AA achieved significant victories in Rakhine State. On December 8, the AA captured Maungdaw Township, securing full control over the 271-kilometer border with Bangladesh.This strategic gain was followed by the seizure of theWestern Regional Command headquartersin Ann Township on December 20, marking the second regional command center to fall to ethnic armed groups within five months.On December 29, the AA extended its campaign by seizing full control of Gwa Township, the southernmost town in Rakhine State, after junta troops retreated from the area.This victory further consolidated the AA's dominance in the region, leaving only a few townships under junta control.The AA's leadership has since expressed readiness to engage in political dialogue to seek resolution to the ongoing conflict.
In January 2025, Arakan Army and joint PDF forces pushed intoShwethaungyan Subtownship, northwestAyeyarwaddy Regiontaking the village of Magyizin.Battle with the junta intensified in the area as theMyanmar Navyincreased bombardments to the Bawmi coastline area near Magyizin by 20 January 2025.
After the Karen National Army set a five-month deadline in May 2024 for Chinese scamming operatives to leave Myawaddy, many have migrated to theThree Pagodas Pass, controlled by theDemocratic Karen Benevolent Army.Throughout May, the KNLA, aided by allies, captured all but three of the remaining junta bases inHpapun Township.
On 1 June clashes erupted between KNLA-led forces and joint Karen National Army/junta forces near Tonetatdar. A source close to the junta claimed thatKaren National Army(KNA) soldiers were coordinating to join with junta soldiers from Operation Aung Zeya to retake Myawaddy, Thingannyinaung and to attack theAsian Highway 1(AH1).However, after being stalled for months by ambushes on the AH1, the Aung Zeya column was forced to retreat toKawkareik.
On 9 August, KNLA forces clashed with junta reinforcements near Zayatkyi,Htantabin Township.
In December 2024, the KNLA achieved significant victories in Kayin State. On December 17, the KNLA attacked the Swe Taw Kone junta camp near Lay Kay Kaw village, capturing prisoners and seizing weapons.Additionally, the KNLA recaptured its former headquarters, Manerplaw, on the Thai border, further consolidating its control in the region.
In early August it was Tatmadaw and civilian sources reported that Tatmadaw had securedLoikawand much ofthe surrounding township.On 5 September, the KNDF attempted to assassinate Tatmadaw leaderMin Aung Hlaingwhile he was visiting Loikaw.
As of September 20, 2024, the Myanmar junta only had control of Loikaw and Bawlakhe Townships.
During October, fighting shifted to North Kayah State, after the flooding ofTyphoon Yagi. Tatmadaw troops and Pa-O militia attacked several Karenni Resistance-held settlements including Pinlaung, Mobye and Pekon.Pekon was taken in a military counter-offensive taking advantage of the flooding caused by Yagi.However, Karenni leadership believes that the Tatmadaw does not aim to hold the territory, only to shore up its supply linesas the Tatmadaw has to use helicopters to maintain some supply lines.While fighting was reported early December along Pekon-Moebye-Loikaw road.
On 29 October, it was announced that several Karenni resistance groups united to form theKayan National Army.
In January 2025,El Paísreported thatDemosohas become a major center for refugees, housing some 150,000 displaced civilians.
Tatmadaw has succeeded in taking Mobye, the town, during its offensive in December. Now as of early February the KNDF launches an advance to retake the town.
The human rights situation in Myanmar has deteriorated substantially since the beginning of the civil conflict. The Burmese military has escalated its use ofwar crimes, including murder, mass killings, sexual violence, torture, arbitrary detention, attacks on religious buildings, and the targeting of civilians.The junta has also seized the properties of political opponents as part of an intimidation strategy, impacting hundreds of families.BBCNews reports that the pro-junta paramilitaryPyusawhti militiashave been accused of more than one atrocity against civilians.
Since the onset of the civil conflict, both the Burmese military and resistance forces alike have used educational facilities as bases and detention sites.In 2021, over 190 violent attacks on schools were reported in 13 of Myanmar's states and regions.As of June 2022, 7.8 million children remained out of school.
Myanmar's public health system has effectively collapsed,and the civil war has worsened the country's food security crisis, with one in four people experiencing food insecurity.Poverty and food insecurity have disproportionately affected Myanmar'sDry Zoneand the Irrawaddy delta regions, which account for over 80% of the country's agricultural area and are home to a third of the country's population.
As of September 2022, 1.3 million people had been internally displaced, and over 13,000 children had been killed.By March 2023, the UN estimated that since the coup, 17.6 million people in Myanmar required humanitarian assistance, while 1.6 million were internally displaced, and 55,000 civilian buildings had been destroyed.
In March 2023Volker Türk, theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, reported that armed conflict had continued to grow. He stated that they were investigating hundreds of incidents of houses being burnt and civilians, including children, being killed. Overall, 15.2 million people facedfood insecurity.
In March 2024Tom Andrews, theUnited Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar, stated that 18.6 million people were in need of humanitarian aid.
On 27 November 2024, theInternational Criminal CourtprosecutorKarim A.A. Khan KCfiled an application for international arrest warrant of Senior General and Acting PresidentMin Aung Hlaing.As the acting president and commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Defence Services, Min Aung Hlaing "bears criminal responsibility for thecrimes against humanityof deportation and persecution of theRohingya, committed in Myanmar, and in part in Bangladesh," the prosecutor's statement said, noting that it "is the first application for an arrest warrant against a high-level Myanmar government official that my Office is filing. More will follow".The legal procedure is "a strong warning to Myanmar’s abusive military leaders that they’re not beyond the reach of the law,” said theHuman Rights Watchsenior international justice counsel Maria Elena Vignoli.
Economic conditions in Myanmar have substantially worsened due to the ongoing war and to economic mismanagement by the SAC.In 2021, Myanmar's GDP declined by 5.9%.In an interview, Christian Lechervy, the French ambassador to Myanmar, highlighted the impact of the coup on the country's economy: "In 2021, Myanmar's economic growth has contracted by more than 18%, poverty has doubled, the number of people in need of humanitarian aid has multiplied by seven and more than 450,000 people have been forced to flee their homes".Between March and June 2022, almost 10,000 people per month left the country through official channels, worsening the country'sbrain drainand mirroring the civilian exodus that followed the1962and1988 military coups.The local job market has collapsed.
In September 2022 the G7-ledFinancial Action Task Forceannounced plans to blacklist Myanmar for failing to stem money laundering and terrorist financing.At that time, only Iran and North Korea were on theFinancial Action Task Force blacklist.In October 2022, Myanmar was blacklisted by the task force, which increased volatility in the value of the Burmese kyat.
The war disrupted transport and stunted the export of agricultural goods like rice and corn, and theillegal cultivationofpoppybecame an economic pillar for many Burmese. Myanmar became the world's biggestopiumproducer, producing about 1,080 metric tons in 2023.
During the war there has been a "mass refusal" among Myanmar's people to pay taxes and other charges to the junta, leading to a 33% drop in state revenue according to an analysis by theSpecial Advisory Council for Myanmar(SAC-M). According to the SAC-M, "69% of businesses reported not paying tax to the junta in the first three months of 2022". The cessation of payments of electricity bills by large portions of the population has also significantly cut off the junta's revenue sources.
The conflict also facilitated the conditions for the proliferation ofhuman traffickingintofraud factoriesin Myanmar. In these facilities, foreign nationals are trafficked into the country and forced to commitonline scams.
In August 2024CNNpublished its year-long investigation concluding that approximately half of Myanmar's 54 million inhabitants live below the poverty line. This dire economic situation compels many individuals to resort to extreme measures, including participating in the illicit trade of human organs online. Such transactions can yield an amount equivalent to two years' worth of salary. Individuals often publicize their intent to sell organs on social media platforms, creating a relentless cycle in which families repeatedly turn to these transactions as their financial resources deplete.
By September 2022 the value of theBurmese kyathad depreciated by over 60%,while basic commodity prices increased by up to 57%.TheWorld Bankestimated Myanmar's economy contracted by 18% in 2022.Since April 2022, the country has experienced foreign currency shortages, which have acutely impacted importers, resulting in shortages of basic products like medicines and fertilisers.The military regime has imposed foreign currency controls, which has worsened the shortage of US dollars among international firms operating in the country.Many foreign and multinational companies, including Telenor, Ooredoo, Chevron,British American Tobacco, andWoodside Petroleumhave exited the Burmese market as the conflict has intensified.
At the end of July 2023 the SAC announced that it would issue a limited number of new 20,000 kyat banknotes. The announcement led to an increase in the price of gold, as well as in foreign currency exchange rates.In March 2024, it was reported that the civil war hadsignificantly increased pricesof every day goods, such as rice (160–220%), fuel (520%), and palm oil (75%) from pre-war levels. Also, the US dollar to Kyat exchange rate had increased by 160%.
In April 2024 the price of gold was around 4.5 million kyat perkyattha(aBurmese unitof mass) compared to 1 million perkyatthain February 2021. By May 2024 it was 5.8 million kyat per tical, and by September 2024 it was 7.2 million kyat per tical.The SAC regularly accuses goldsmiths of price manipulation when gold prices rise. An arrest of five traders and closure of seven shops, caused the price to drop in early April 2024 as traders were fearful of doing business.By May 2024, the U.S. dollar to kyat exchange rate had increased from 1300 before the coup to 5000 on the black market, with the junta reportedly abandoning the fixed exchange rate of 2100.
TheNational Unity Government of Myanmarestablished an Interim Central Bank (ICB) led by their Planning, Finance and Investment minister, Tin Tun Naing. The goal of establishing this bank is to contest foreign reserves and assets held by the Central Bank inNaypitaw.It was also reported that the ICB seized 44 billion Kyats from other banks.Radio Free Asiaexplained in regards to Central Banks raising funds for their government; "The NUG has acknowledged raising over $150 million since the coup" and that while "it dwarfs in comparison to the revenue of the junta, which gave itself a raise of 51 percent in FY2023 to $2.7 billion—it's not insignificant either."
Under the direction of the ICB there is a newly established for-profit bank called Spring Development Bank, with an intent to establish its own cryptocurrency.
The deterioration in law and order in many parts of Myanmar has caused "a surge in illegal mining activities" in rural parts of the country. Environmental activists in Myanmar have accused the junta of supporting illegal mining ofrare-earth elementswhich have "devastating and unpredictable consequences for the region’s ecosystem and inhabitants". Rivers have been contaminated, causing the destruction of local ecosystems, decreasing community access to clean water and disrupting agricultural activities of local farmers. The junta has cracked down on environmental activists who have criticized the government.The conflict has also seen a significant rise indeforestation in Myanmar.
A February 2022 report byUnited Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in MyanmarTom Andrewsstated that China, Russia, India,Belarus,Ukraine, Israel,Serbia,PakistanandSouth Koreawere selling weapons to the Tatmadaw.TheKaren National Uniondocumented the use of North Korean weaponry by the SAC in November 2023.
Anti-SAC forces have claimed that the Tatmadaw has severely struggled with recruitment and morale.The Tatmadaw has adopteddronesin response to rebel groups using drones.
On 31 January 2023 theMinistry of Home Affairsissued a directive enabling organisations and citizens deemed "loyal to the state," including civilians, civil servants, and army personnel, to obtainfirearms licenses.The regulatory shift has enabled the SAC to arm pro-militaryPyusawhti militiasand to suppress pro-democracy forces in light of waning military recruitment and their challenges with concurrently operating in multiplewar theatresthroughout the country.On 12 February 2023, a leaked document purportedly from theMinistry of Home Affairsdetailed the SAC issuing firearms licenses to pro-military civilians for the operation of counter-insurgency paramilitaries based on the new firearm licensing directive.
SAC-aligned Pyusawhti militias have reportedly used force to recruit local men, but have been less than effective in building up grassroots enforcement on behalf of the junta, and have "taken root only in the small number of communities where the military's own party is traditionally strong."
In early December 2023 the Tatmadaw-led government appealed fordesertersto return, promising the deserters exoneration. TheNational Unity Governmentclaims some 20,000 soldiers had deserted and joined its ranks.By 7 December, the junta began freeing soldiers who had been jailed fordesertionto ease apparent manpower shortages as a result of battlefield pressures from recent operations.
On 10 February 2024 the Tatmadaw announced thePeople's Military Service Law, requiring all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to complete up to two years ofmandatory military service, amid its territorial losses. Those who fail to enlist face imprisonment for up to five years during a national emergency.This announcement has been interpreted by some as a sign of increasing desperation in the face of steadily advancing resistance forces.In the wake of the announcement,Deutsche Wellealso reported that "thousands" of young people were fleeing across the border toThailandtoevade conscriptionbefore it came into effect.Local Myanmar government officials are reportedlyextortingbribes from those seeking toavoid being conscripted.21 administrators in Rakhine'sThandweannounced their resignation in response to the military recruitment.Rebel groups killed at least 37 local officials carrying out the junta's conscription efforts.
ActivistThinzar Shunlei Yithought the military's historic "indoctrination techniques are deeply rooted in nationalism and religious ideologies" leaving "soldiers and their families feeling disoriented amidst shifting societal paradigms".
The limited possession of guns by ethnic insurgent movements along with the lack of international support and formal means of acquiring military material has presented the anti-junta forces with a challenging situation for the confrontation of the military regime. Faced with this difficulty since the early stages of armed insurgency, the resistance movement sought ways to manufacture the necessary weapons and equipment for the conflict. Initially, the rebels expanded the production of a traditionally made,single-shotrifle known asTumi, especially in theChin state. Nonetheless, this kind of rifle is severely limited for battleground action. For this reason, the fighters have developed alternative models which are more advanced, while still calling themTumi.Since then, the resistance movement has developed many kinds ofcarbines,landminesand bomb drones, to be manufactured within the technological and material means of liberated territories and underground cells.
Commercially available drones rigged to carry bombs were used to attack military positions. PDF groups reportedly produced naval bombs to target government logistics in rivers. Meanwhile, defected soldiers developed 60 mm long-rangemortars. The use of3D printingwas also reported, both to salvage weapons taken from the junta and for the improvised production of semiautomatic carbines.An arms trafficker in possession ofnuclear materialswas found working with an unnamed insurgent ethnic armed group in Myanmar.The success ofOperation 1027enabled the Brotherhood Alliance to seize enormous caches of arms and ammunition from the Tatmadaw, making it better equipped than before it launched Operation 1027.
In June 2021 theUnited Nations General Assemblypassed a non-binding resolution asking member states to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar.Two hundred international organisations, includingAmnesty InternationalandHuman Rights Watchhave continued to press the UN and its member states to adopt a global arms embargo.The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union have, in response to the ongoing violence, sanctioned individuals and organisations associated with the Burmese military.However, the effectiveness of these sanctions has been undermined by poor coordination among governments and the lack of sanctions against high-impact targets.
ASEANblocked Myanmar from participating in regional summits after the 2021 coup.but this was reversed after New Zealand invited the junta to twoASEAN Summitshosted inWellingtonin April 2024.ASEAN member states have not taken a consistent, coordinated approach with respect to the ongoing civil war, due to internal divisions. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore are strongly opposed to the military junta,butThailandwas a key ally of the junta until the election ofSrettha Thavisinas prime minister.
India, which represents Myanmar's fourth-largest export market and fifth-largest import partner, has continued a business-as-usual approach to cross-border relations and continues to recognize the military junta.State-owned and private Indian companies supply arms and raw materials to the junta.On the other hand,India has hostile relations with China, which in part may have contributed to India's ongoing support for the junta as a balance attempt to prevent Chinese encroachment, which is met with criticism.
Bangladeshrecognizes the military junta, but does not support its actions, in part because theRohingya genocidehas led to around 1 millionRohingya refugees fleeing to Bangladesh.Its position in the conflict has been informed by repeatedspillover of the conflictinto its territory.
As of December 2023East Timorremains the only government to have openly expressed sympathies to the anti-regime forces in Myanmar.In August 2023, theState Administration Councilexpelled the East Timorese ambassador in retaliation for the East Timorese government meeting with the NUG.
Since the coup d'état, China and Russia have supported the military junta and have been its main arms suppliers. China is Myanmar's largest trading partner.The two countries have blocked any substantive action against Myanmar's military at the United Nations Security Council, while Myanmar's security forces have reportedly used Chinese and Russian-supplied weapons to perpetrate human rights violations.Chinese support for the junta has led to a rise in popularanti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar.However, the fact that the Three Brotherhood Alliance'sOperation 1027in late 2023 was carried out near theChina–Myanmar bordermay indicate a shift in China's stance,which was attributed by analysts to concerns about cyber-scam centers, the pursuit of favorable concessions from the junta on theChina-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the opportunity to influence the PDF in light of evolving dynamics between NUG and EAO groups.
Russia has embraced deeper ties with the Burmese military junta as the civil war has progressed. Russia has providedmateriel, military training for over 50Myanmar Air Forcepilots, and diplomatic backing to the regime.Min Aung Hlaing has visited Russia several times, personally meeting with Russian presidentVladimir Putinin September 2022. The military junta backed theRussian invasion of Ukraine.Russia was among the few countriesto send a congratulatory message to the junta on Myanmar'sIndependence Day.In March 2024, Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews saw Russia still being the number one source of weapons for the junta.
Although small in number, foreign volunteers serving with anti-junta forces have been documented. One such volunteer, going under thenom de guerreAzad, formed theAnti-fascist Internationalist Frontto assist fighters in theChin theater. Azad gained prior military experience while fighting in the SyrianRojava conflict.