Rhodesian Bush War

TheRhodesian Bush War, also known as theRhodesian Civil War,SecondChimurengaas well as theZimbabwe War of Independence,was a civil conflict from July 1964 to December 1979in theunrecognised countryofRhodesia(laterZimbabwe-Rhodesiaand nowZimbabwe).
The conflict pitted three forces against one another: the Rhodesian white minority-led government ofIan Smith(later the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government of BishopAbel Muzorewa); and militant African guerillas organisations such asZimbabwe African National Liberation Army, the military wing ofRobert Mugabe'sZimbabwe African National Union; and theZimbabwe People's Revolutionary ArmyofJoshua Nkomo'sZimbabwe African People's Union.
The war and its subsequentInternal Settlement, signed in 1978 by Smith and Muzorewa, led to the implementation ofuniversal suffragein June 1979 and the end ofwhite minority rulein Rhodesia, which was renamedZimbabwe Rhodesiaunder a black majority government. However, this new order failed to win international recognition and the war continued. Neither side achieved a military victory and a compromise was later reached.
Negotiations between the government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the government of the United Kingdom, and Mugabe and Nkomo's united "Patriotic Front" took place atLancaster House, London in December 1979, and theLancaster House Agreementwas signed. The country returned temporarily to British control andnew electionswere held under British andCommonwealthsupervision in March 1980. ZANU won the election and Mugabe became the firstPrime Minister of Zimbabweon 18 April 1980, when the country achieved internationally recognised independence.
The origin of the war inRhodesiacan be traced to the conquest of the region by theBritish South Africa Companyin the late 19th century, and the dissent of native leaders who opposed foreign rule.Britons began settling in Southern Rhodesia in the 1890s, and while it was never accorded fulldominionstatus, these settlers effectively governed the country after 1923.
In his famous "Wind of Change" speech,UK Prime MinisterHarold Macmillanrevealed Britain's new policy to only permit independence to its African colonies under majorityrule.But many white Rhodesians were concerned that such immediate change would cause chaosas had resultedin the formerBelgian Congoafter its independence in 1960.
Britain's unwillingness to compromise led to Rhodesia'sunilateral declaration of independence(UDI) on 11 November 1965. Although Rhodesia had the private support of neighbouring South Africa andPortugal, which still ownedMozambique, it never gained diplomatic recognition from any country.
Although the vote in Rhodesia was constitutionally open regardless of race, property requirements left many Black Africans unable to participate.The new 1969 constitution reserved eight seats in the66 seat parliamentfor "Non-Europeans" only, with a further eight reserved for tribal chiefs.
Amidst this backdrop,African nationalistsadvocated armed struggle to bring about black rule, primarily denouncing the wealth disparity between the races. Two rival nationalist organisations emerged in August 1963: theZimbabwe African People's Union(ZAPU) and theZimbabwe African National Union(ZANU), after disagreements about tactics, as well as tribalism and personality clashes.ZANU and its military wingZANLAwere headed byRobert Mugabeand consisted primarily ofShonatribes. ZAPU and its military wingZIPRAconsisted mainly ofNdebeleunderJoshua Nkomo.
Cold Warpolitics played into the conflict. TheSoviet Unionsupported ZIPRA and China supported ZANLA. Each group fought a separate war against the Rhodesian security forces, and the two groups sometimes fought against each other as well.In June 1979, the governments ofCubaandMozambiqueoffered direct military help to thePatriotic Front, but Mugabe and Nkomo declined.Other foreign contributions included military officials fromNorth Korea, who taught Zimbabwean militants to use explosives and arms in a camp nearPyongyang.By April 1979, 12,000 ZANLA guerrillas were training in Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Libya while 9,500 of its 13,500 extant cadres operated in Rhodesia.South Africa clandestinely gave material and military support to the Rhodesian government.
TheRhodesian Front(RF)—the ruling party—took an uncompromising position against the communist ideology of the ZIPRA and ZANLA.Ian Smithfurther expounded this by portraying the conflict as primarily anti-communist in nature.The Rhodesian whites viewed the British demand for majority rule as a direct attack on their way of life.Having previously witnessed theMau Mau Rebellion, Rhodesians refused to allow the majority-rule policy to come into effect. Much of the Rhodesian economy as well as the land was controlled by white Rhodesians, and, fearing total confiscation by either the ZIPRA or ZANLA, the RF elected to hold onto unofficial minority-rule. In ignoring other contributing factors to the conflict, Smith and the RF were able to strengthen ties with the West, but Britain remained neutral. The division between the communists and anti-communists caused the fighting to spill over the Rhodesian borders. Neighbouring African nations, supported primarily by North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union, used communist material support to begin launching guerrilla attacks on theRSFand on Rhodesian civilians and infrastructure.
The United States took the official position that it would not recognise Rhodesia as an independent state, but some American soldiers who had seen combat in Vietnam joined theRhodesian Security Forces. The Rhodesian government created advertising campaigns in order to attract soldiers from Western countries, and the security forces amassed a force of nearly 1,400 soldiers who were highly trained in special forces and guerrilla warfare, bringing the total of the Rhodesian  military force to over 10,000 men.
The Soviet Union became involved in the Rhodesian Bush War to combat the push from the anti-communist West and to challenge the Chinese presence in the region.Soviet military technology quickly appeared in the Zimbabwean countryside and by 1979 ZIPRA were utilizing SAM weaponry to target Rhodesian civilian assets and Viscount aircraft.Just as they had done in various other African countries and conflicts, the Soviets supported opposition forces with weapons and training. Moscow also launched a propaganda campaign exaggerating British involvement in the conflict in order to boost support for intervention. The Soviets were large suppliers of munitions and training, but refused to directly enter the conflict. The Chinese, on the other hand, were limited in their abilities to offer tangible aid to the ZANLA. Chinese influence throughout the conflict was primarily focused on small scale sabotage efforts and anti-western propaganda.
Inevitably, the Bush War occurred within the context of regional Cold War in Africa, and became embroiled in conflicts in several neighbouring countries. Such conflicts included theAngolan War of Independence(1961–1975) andAngolan Civil War(1975–2002), theMozambican War of Independence(1964–1974) andMozambican Civil War(1977–1992), theSouth African Border War(1966–1989), and theShaba I(1977) andShaba II(1978) conflicts.
The conflict was seen by the nationalist groups and the UK government of the time as a war of national and racial liberation. The Rhodesian government saw the conflict as a fight between one part of the country's population (the Whites) on behalf of the whole population (including the Black majority) against several externally financed parties made up of predominantly Blackradicalsand communists. The Nationalists considered their country occupied and dominated by a foreign power, namely Britain, since 1890.
The British government, in the person of thegovernor, had indirectly ruled the country from 1923, when it took over from theBritish South Africa Companyand grantedself-governing statusto a locally elected government, made up predominantly of Whites. Ian Smith'sRhodesian Frontparty was elected to power in 1962 andunilaterally declared independenceon 11 November 1965 to preserve what it saw as the self-government it had possessed since 1923.
The Rhodesian government contended that it was defending Western values, Christianity, therule of law, and democracy by fighting Communists, but it was unwilling to compromise on most political, economic and social inequalities. White Rhodesians typically believed that black grievances were not organic and endogenous in origin but were externally fomented by foreign agitators.The Smith administration claimed that the legitimate voice of the black Shona and Ndebele population were the traditional chiefs, not the ZANU and ZAPU nationalists, whom it regarded as dangerous, violent usurpers.
In 1978–1979, the Smith administration tried to blunt the power of the nationalist cause by acceding to an "Internal Settlement" which ended minority rule, changed the name of the country toZimbabwe-Rhodesia, and arranged multiracial elections, which wereheld in 1979and won by BishopAbel Muzorewa, who became the country's first Black head of government. Unsatisfied with this and spurred on by Britain's refusal to recognise the new order, the nationalist forces persisted.
The war ended when, at the behest of both South Africa (its major supporter) and the United States, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government ceded power to Britain in theLancaster House Agreementin December 1979. The UK Government heldanother election in 1980to form a new government. The election was won by ZANU. The new government, headed byRobert Mugabe, was recognised internationally, and the country was renamedZimbabwe.
Despite the effect of economic and diplomatic sanctions, Rhodesia developed and maintained a powerful and professional military.In June 1977,Timemagazine reported that "man for man, the Rhodesian army ranks among the world's finest fighting units."
The army was always relatively small, just 3,400 regular troops in 1970.By 1978–79 it had grown to some 10,800 regulars nominally supported by about 40,000 reservists – although by the last year of the war, perhaps as few as 15,000 were available for active service. While the regular army consisted of a professional core of white soldiers (and some units, such as theRhodesian SASand theRhodesian Light Infantry, were all-white), by 1978–1979 the rest was majority black.
By contrast, army reserves were largely white, and toward the end of the war were increasingly called up to deal with the growing insurgency. The regular army was supported by the paramilitaryBritish South Africa Policeof about 8,000 to 11,000 men (the majority of whom were black) and 19,000 to 35,000 police reservists (which, like their army counterparts, were largely white). The police reserves acted as a type of home guard.
The war saw the extensive operation of Rhodesian regulars as well asspecial forcesunits such as theSelous Scoutsand theRhodesian SAS. TheRhodesian Armyfought bitterly against the black nationalist guerrillas. The Rhodesian Army also comprised mostly black regiments such as theRhodesian African Rifles. As the war went on, the frequent call-up of reservists was increasingly used to supplement the professional soldiers and the manyvolunteers from overseas.
By 1978, all white men up to the age of 60 were subject to periodic call-up to the army; younger men up to 35 might expect to spend alternating blocks of six weeks in the army and at home. Many of the overseas volunteers came from Britain, Ireland, South Africa, Portugal, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States with the latter three being held in high regard for their recentVietnam Warexperience.
Considering thearms embargo, the Rhodesian Army was well-equipped. The standard infantry weapon was the BelgianFN FALrifle as produced in South Africa under license as the R1 rifle and supplemented by theH&K G3rifle that came from Portuguese forces. However, other weapons such as the British L1A1 ('SLR') variant of the FAL and the older BritishLee–Enfieldbolt-actionrifle were used by reservists and theBritish South Africa Police. Other weapons included theBrenLMG in both .303" and 7.62mm NATO,StenSMG,Uzi,Browning Hi-Powerpistol, ColtM16 rifle(very late in the war),FN MAG(FN MAG58) general-purpose machine-gun,81 mm mortar, andClaymoremines. AfterUDI, Rhodesia was heavily reliant on South African and domestically produced weapons and equipment, as well as international smuggling operations, commonly referred to as "sanction-busting".South Africa provided extensive support to Rhodesia in the form of a Lend / Lease program and both the official and unofficial support of many branches of the South African armed forces.
TheRhodesian Air Force(RhAF) operated a variety of equipment and carried out numerous roles, with air power providing the Rhodesians with a significant advantage over their guerrilla enemy.The fleet consisted mainly of British aircraft and largely obsolete aircraft, such as theWorld War IIvintageDouglas Dakotatransport aircraft and the Britishde Havilland Vampire. The arms embargo caused a lack of spare parts from external suppliers and RhAF had to find alternative means to keep its aircraft flying. The larger South African Air Force provided extensive training, aircraft and aircrews in support of RhAF operations from 1966. The Rhodesians also used more modern types of aircraft like theHawker HunterandCanberrabombers, theCessna Skymasteras well asAérospatiale Alouette III(SA316) helicopters until they were supplemented by theAgusta Bell 205.Very late in the war, the Rhodesian forces were able to smuggle and use a few Agusta BellUH-1 Iroquoishelicopters.
At the beginning of the first war, much of Rhodesia's military hardware was of British andCommonwealthorigin, but during the course of the conflict, new equipment such asEland armoured carswere procured from South Africa. Several Polish-madeT-55tanks destined forIdi Amin's regime in Uganda were diverted to Rhodesia by the South Africans, in the last year of the war.The Rhodesians also produced a wide range of wheeledmine-proofed armoured vehicles, often using MercedesUnimog,Land RoverandBedfordtruck components, including unlicensed copies of theMercedes-BenzUR-416.
During the course of the war, most white citizens carried personal weapons, and it was not unusual to see white housewives carryingsubmachine guns. Asiege mentalityset in and all civilian transport had to be escorted in convoys for safety against ambushes. Farms and villages in rural areas were frequently attacked by guerrillas.
The Rhodesian government divided the country into eight geographical operational areas: North West Border (Operation Ranger), Eastern Border (Operation Thrasher), North East Border (Operation Hurricane), South East Border (Operation Repulse), Midlands (Operation Grapple), Kariba (Operation Splinter), Matabeleland (Operation Tangent),Salisburyand District ("SALOPS").
The two major armed groups campaigning againstIan Smith's government were theZimbabwe African National Liberation Army(ZANLA), the armed wing of theZimbabwe African National Union(ZANU), and theZimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army(ZIPRA), the armed wing of theZimbabwe African People's Union(ZAPU). The fighting was largely rural, as the two rival movements tried to win peasant support and to recruit fighters while attacking the local government administration and white civilians. To ensure local domination, ZANLA and ZIPRA sometimes fought against each other as well as against the security forces.
ZANLA was the armed wing of ZANU.The organisation also had strong links withMozambique's independence movement,FRELIMO. ZANLA, in the end, was present on a more or less permanent basis in over half the country, as evidenced by the location of the demobilisation bases at the end of the war, which were in every province exceptMatabeleland North.They were also fighting a civil war against ZIPRA, despite the formation of a joint front by their political parties after 1978.It was ZANLA's intention to occupy the ground, supplant the administration in rural areas, and then mount the final conventional campaign. ZANLA concentrated on the politicisation of the rural areas using force, persuasion, ties of kinship and collaboration with spirit mediums.
ZANLA tried to paralyse the Rhodesian effort and economy by planting Soviet anti-tankland mineson the roads. From 1972 to 1980 there were 2,504 vehicle detonations of land mines (mainly Soviet TM46s), killing 632 people and injuring 4,410. Mining of roads increased 133.7% from 1978 (894 mines or 2.44 mines were detonated or recovered per day) to 1979 (2,089 mines or 5.72 mines a day).
In response, the Rhodesians co-operated with the South Africans to develop a range of mine protected vehicles. They began by replacing air in tyres with water which absorbed some of the blast and reduced the heat of the explosion. Initially, they protected the bodies with steel deflector plates, sandbags and mine conveyor belting. Later, purpose built vehicles with V-shaped blast hulls dispersed the blast and deaths in such vehicles became unusual events.
ZIPRA was the anti-government force based around theNdebeleethnicity, led byJoshua Nkomo, and the ZAPU political organisation. In contrast to ZANLA'sMozambiquelinks, Nkomo's ZIPRA was more oriented towardsZambiafor local bases. However, this was not always with full Zambian government support: by 1979, the combined forces based in Zambia of ZIPRA,Umkhonto we Sizwe(the armed wing of theAfrican National Congressof South Africa) and South-West AfricanSWAPOfighters were a major threat to Zambia's internal security. BecauseZAPU's political strategy relied more heavily on negotiations than armed force, ZIPRA grew slower and less elaborately than ZANLA, but by 1979 it had an estimated 20,000 combatants, almost all based in camps aroundLusaka, Zambia.
ZIPRA was responsible for two attacks on civilianAir RhodesiaViscount aeroplanes,on 3 September 1978and12 February 1979. UsingSA-7surface-to-air missiles, the guerrillas shot down each plane during its ascent from Kariba Airport.ZIPRA took advice from its Soviet instructors in formulating its vision and strategy of popular revolution. About 1,400 Soviet, 700 East German and 500 Cuban instructors were deployed to the area.
On the advice of the Soviets, ZIPRA built up its conventional forces, and motorised with Soviet armoured vehicles and small aeroplanes,in Zambia. ZIPRA's (i.e. ZAPU's) intention was to allow ZANLA to bring the Rhodesian forces to the point of defeat, and then take the victory from the much lighter forces of ZANLA and the essentially defeated Rhodesians. ZIPRA kept a light presence within Rhodesia, reconnoitring, keeping contact with the peasants and sometimes skirmishing with ZANLA.
ZIPRA's conventional threat partly distracted Rhodesian forces from fighting ZANLA. By the late 1970s, ZIPRA had developed a strategy known asStorming the Heavensto launch a conventional invasion from Zambia, supported by a few armoured vehicles and light aircraft. An operation by the Rhodesian armed forces to destroy a ZIPRA base near Livingstone in Zambia was never launched.
The ZAPU/ZIPRA strategy for taking over Zimbabwe proved unsuccessful. In any event, the transfer of power to black nationalists took place not by the military take-over expected by ZAPU/ZIPRA, but by a peaceful and internationally supervised election. Rhodesia reverted to British rule as the colony ofSouthern Rhodesia(the UK had never recognised Rhodesia's declaration of independence) and a general election took place in early 1980, supervised by British and other international forces.
Robert Mugabe (of ZANLA/ZANU) won this election, because he was the only major competitor of the majority ethnicity, Shona. Once in power, Mugabe was internationally recognised as Zimbabwe's leader and was installed as head of government, and had the backing of the overwhelming majority ethnic group. He was therefore able to quickly and irreversibly consolidate his power, forcing ZAPU, and therefore ZIPRA which was ZAPU's army, to give up hope of taking over the country in the place of ZANU/ZANLA.
Both sides of the Cold War were involved in the Rhodesian Bush War.
TheSoviet UnionsupportedZIPRAandChinasupportedZANLA. Each group fought a separate war against theRhodesian security forces, and the two groups sometimes fought against each other as well.
The Soviet Union became involved in the Rhodesian Bush War to combat the push from the anti-communist West and to challenge the Chinese presence in the region. Soviet military technology quickly appeared in the Zimbabwean countryside and by 1979 ZIPRA were utilizing SAM weaponry to target Rhodesian civilian assets and Viscount aircraft. Just as they had done in various other African countries and conflicts, the Soviets supported opposition forces with weapons and training. Moscow also launched a propaganda campaign exaggerating British involvement in the conflict in order to boost support for intervention. The Soviets were large suppliers of munitions and training, but refused to directly enter the conflict.
Notebooks taken from political officers attached to insurgent groups, as well as uniforms and weaponry from the Eastern bloc confirmed Russian and Chinese sponsorship and ideology. This was further substantiated by the apprehension of a KGB general by Rhodesian troops during the pre-emptive strike to the ZANLA operated base at “New Farm” atChimoio, Mozambique in November 1977.
ZAPU’s strategy shifted to plans for conventional warfare in 1977–79, backed by Soviet logistical guidance and Cuban training of 6,000 ZIPRA in batches of 2,000 from 1977 onwards atBomaandLupea(formerly Vila Luso) in eastern Angola.
Concurrently, the ZANU army, based principally inMozambique, relied increasingly upon the People’s Republic of China, and Maoist strategies of mobilization and revolutionary warfare. By 1976, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Rumania were also offering more training facilities to ZANU.
During the war,Israel's government declared its support for Rhodesia and cultivated material ties.Israel gave Rhodesia the right to produce its own Uzis alongside material shipments. This resulted in the Uzi becoming standard in the Rhodesian army, police, and its white citizens.Helicopters provided by Israel to Rhodesia were also used in counter-insurgency operations.These counter-insurgency operations were based on Israeli tactics, as Israeli companies were used to construct a 500-mile belt of landmines along the border of Mozambique and Zambia.
In the United States, a political alliance of segregationists and the nascentReligious Rightspread propaganda supporting Rhodesia, helped to recruit Americans to join and fight in Rhodesia's military through magazines such asSoldier of Fortune, and unsuccessfully lobbied the United States government to officially recognise Rhodesia's sovereignty.
In September 1956, bus fares inSalisburywere raised so high that workers were spending 18% to 30% of their earnings on transportation.In response, theCity Youth Leagueboycotted the United Transport Company's buses and succeeded in preventing the price change. On 12 September 1957 members of the Youth League and the defunct ANC formed theSouthern Rhodesia African National Congress, led by Joshua Nkomo. TheWhitehead administrationbanned the SRANC in 1959 and arrested 307 leaders, excluding Nkomo who was out of the country, on 29 February in Operation Sunrise.
Nkomo, Mugabe,Herbert Chitepo, andNdabaningi Sitholeestablished the National Democratic Party in January 1960. Nkomo became its leader in October. An NDP delegation headed by Nkomo attended the constitutional conference in January 1961. Nkomo initially supported the constitution, but reversed his position after other NDP leaders disagreed. The government banned the NDP in December 1961 and arrested NDP leaders, excluding Nkomo who, again, was out of the country. Nkomo formed theZimbabwe African People's Unionwhich the Whitehead administration banned in September 1962.
TheUnited Federal Party(UFP) had been in power since 1934, earning it the nickname of "the establishment", and roughly represented Southern Rhodesian commercial and major agricultural interests.The UFP contested the1962 general electionon a ticket of racial "partnership", whereby blacks and whites would work together.All ethnically discriminatory legislation would be immediately repealed, including the Land Apportionment Act, which defined certain areas of the land as eligible for purchase only by blacks, others as exclusively for whites, and others as open for all races.
About 45% of the country was split in this way; another 45% comprised reserved Tribal Trust Lands (TTL), which housed tribesmen, and gave local chiefs and headmen a degree of self-government in a similar manner to AmericanIndian reservations. The remainder was national land. The country had originally been split up in this way during the early days of white immigration to prevent the new arrivals from using their superior finances to buy all of the land in the country.
The UFP proposed to repeal the black and white purchase areas, but keep the Tribal Trust and national lands.It also committed to general black advancement. These proposals proved largely repugnant to the mostly white electorate, which feared that premature black ascendancy would threaten Rhodesia's economic prosperity and security, as well as their own personal affairs.
Most turned away from the ruling UFP party, causing it to lose in the 1962 election to the newly formedRhodesian Front(RF), a conservative party opposed to any immediate shift to black rule.Winston FieldandIan Smithbecame prime minister and Deputy Prime Minister, respectively.Nkomo, legally barred from forming a new party, moved ZAPU's headquarters toDar es Salaam, Tanzania.
In July 1963, Nkomo suspendedNdabaningi Sithole,Robert Mugabe,Leopold Takawira, andWashington Maliangafor their opposition to his continued leadership of ZAPU.On 8 August, they announced the establishment of theZimbabwe African National Union. ZANU members formed a militant wing, theZimbabwe African National Liberation Army, and sent ZANLA members to the People's Republic of China for training.
On 4 July 1964, ZANU insurgents ambushed and murdered a white foreman from Silverstreams Wattle Company, Pieter Johan Andries (Andrew) Oberholzer. The killing had a lasting effect on the small, close-knit white community.The Smith administration detained ZANU and ZAPU leaders in August 1964. The major leaders imprisoned wereNdabaningi Sithole,Leopold Takawira,Edgar Tekere,Enos NkalaandMaurice Nyagumbo. The remaining military leaders of the ZANLA Dare ReChimurenga wereJosiah Tongogaraand the barristerHerbert Chitepo. Operating from bases inZambiaand later fromMozambique, militants began launching attacks against Rhodesia.
The conflict intensified after Rhodesia'sUnilateral Declaration of Independence(UDI) from Britain on 11 November 1965.Sanctions(embargo) were imposed by Britain and endorsed by member states of the United Nations. The embargo meant that Rhodesia was hampered by a lack of modern equipment but it used other means to receive vital war supplies such asoil, munitions, and arms via theapartheidgovernment of South Africa and Portugal. War material was also obtained through elaborate international smuggling schemes through Portuguese Mozambique, domestic production, and captured infiltrating enemy combatants.
Five months later, on 28 April 1966, the Rhodesian Security Forces engaged militants inSinoia, during thefirst major engagement of the war.Seven ZANLA men were killed, and in retaliation the survivors killed two civilians at their farm near Hartley three weeks later.
During Portuguese rule of Mozambique, until 1974–1975, Rhodesia was able to defend its border with Zambia relatively easily and prevent many guerrilla incursions. It set up a strong defence along theZambezi Riverrunning fromLake Karibato the Mozambique border. Here 30-man camps were established at 8-kilometre intervals supported by mobile rapid reaction units. From 1966 to 1970, these defences accounted for 175 insurgents killed for the loss of 14 defenders.The conflict continued at a low level until 21 December 1972 when ZANLA conducted theattack on Altena Farmin north-east Rhodesia. In response, the Rhodesians moved to attack nationalists in their foreign camps and staging areas before they could infiltrate into Rhodesia.
Secret cross-border operations by theSpecial Air Servicebegan in the mid-1960s, with Rhodesian Security Forces already engaging inhot pursuitsinto Mozambique. However, three weeks after the attack on Altena Farm, ZANLA killed two civilians and abducted a third into Mozambique and then Tanzania. In response, SAS troops were inserted into Mozambique with the approval of the Portuguese administration, in the first officially sanctioned external operation. The Rhodesian government began authorising more external operations.
In the first phase of the conflict (until the end of 1972), Rhodesia's political and military position was strong. Nationalist guerrillas did not make serious inroads. In the early 1970s, the two main nationalist groups faced serious internal divisions, aid from theOrganisation of African Unitywas temporarily suspended in 1971, and 129 nationalists were expelled from Zambia after they were alleged to have plotted against PresidentKenneth Kaunda.
Britain's efforts to isolate Rhodesia economically had not produced major compromises by the Smith Government. Indeed, late in 1971 the British and Rhodesian Governments had negotiated a compromise political settlement which would have bowed to the Smith Government's agenda of postponing majority rule into the indefinite future. When it was found that such a delayed approach to majority rule was unacceptable to most of Rhodesia's African population, the deal fell apart.
In 1971, Rhodesia joinedAlcora Exercise, a secret defensive alliance for Southern Africa, formalised in 1970 by Portugal and South Africa. Alcora deepened the political and military co-operation between the three countries against the revolutionary insurgency in Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique andSouth West Africaand against the hostile neighbouring countries.
However, the end of Portuguese rule in Mozambique created new military and political pressures on the Rhodesian Government to accept the principle of immediate majority rule.
The black nationalists continued to operate from secluded bases in neighbouringZambiaand fromFRELIMO-controlled areas in the Portuguese colony ofMozambique, making periodic raids intoRhodesia. By 1973, guerrilla activity was increasing in the aftermath of the Altena Farm raid, particularly in the northeast part of the country where portions of the African population were evacuated from border areas, and compulsory military service for whites was extended to one year.As the war intensified, conscription was raised to men between the ages of 38 and 50, though this was modified in 1977. No white male 17-year-olds were allowed to leave the country.
In April 1974, the left-wingCarnation Revolutionin Portugal heralded the coming end of colonial rule in Mozambique. A transitional government was formed within months and Mozambique became independent under FRELIMO rule on 25 June 1975. Such events proved beneficial to ZANLA and disastrous for the Rhodesians, adding 1,300 kilometres (800 mi) of hostile border.Indeed, with the demise of thePortuguese Empire, Ian Smith realised Rhodesia was surrounded on three sides by hostile nations and declared a formal state of emergency. Soon Mozambique closed its border, however Rhodesian forces continued to cross the border in "hot pursuit" raids, attacking the nationalists and their training camps, and engaged in skirmishes with Mozambican security forces.
By 1975–1976, it was clear that an indefinite postponement of majority rule, which had been the cornerstone of the Smith Government's strategy since UDI, was no longer viable. Even overt South African support for Rhodesia was waning. South Africa began scaling back economic assistance to Rhodesia, placed limits on the amount of fuel and munitions being supplied to the Rhodesian military, and withdrew the personnel and equipment they had previously provided to aid the war effort, including a border police unit that had been helping guard the Rhodesia-Zambia border.
In 1976, the length of active military service was extended to 18 months; this took effect immediately, with soldiers about to end their one-year service finding their active service extended. Even after discharge from regular service, white men entered the reserve forces, and were often called up for duty and subjected to long military service. Rhodesia recruited more black men to volunteer for military service. Although some raised questions about their loyalty, the Rhodesian government stated that it had no doubts about their loyalty, and planned to train black officers. Legislation to conscript blacks was introduced and came in effect in 1979, but the response to call-ups was poor. Rhodesia also recruited foreign volunteers for service, with groups of foreigners who served in Rhodesia including theCrippled Eaglesand7 Independent Company.
Late in 1976, Ian Smith accepted the basic elements of the compromise proposals made by US Secretary of StateHenry Kissingerto introduce majority rule within two years.The Smith Government then sought to negotiate an acceptable settlement with moderate black leaders, while retaining strong white influence in key areas. The Rhodesian military, in turn, aimed to erode the rising military strength of the ZANLA and ZIPRA to the greatest extent possible in order to "buy time" for an acceptable political settlement to be reached.
As the war continued to intensify, the Rhodesian Security Forces initiated a Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) programme to kill guerrillas both inside Rhodesia and in external camps in Zambia and Mozambique. The effort had three fronts.First, it aimed to eliminate guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia through contaminated supplies either provided by contact men, recovered from hidden caches, or stolen from rural stores.
Secondly, it aimed to contaminate water supplies along guerrilla infiltration routes into Rhodesia, forcing the guerrillas to either travel through arid regions to carry more water and less ammunition or travel through areas patrolled by the security forces.Finally, the Rhodesians sought to hit the guerrillas in their camps in Mozambique by poisoning food, beverages, and medicines.
The chemicals most used in the Rhodesian programme wereparathion(an organophosphate insecticide) andthallium(a heavy metal commonly found in rodenticide).Biological agents the Rhodesians selected for use also includedVibrio cholerae(causative agent ofcholera) andBacillus anthracis(causative agent ofanthrax). They also looked at usingRickettsia prowazekii(causative agent ofepidemic typhus), andSalmonella typhi(causative agent oftyphoid fever), and toxins—such as ricin andbotulinum toxin.
Between 1976 and 1979, the Rhodesian Army laid extensive minefields along the country's eastern and northern borders to prevent infiltration and resupply of fighters based in Zambia and Mozambique. The mines were laid in dense patterns, one of which was known as the "Cordon Sanitaire"in six main districts and were estimated at independence to cover 511 sq km, later revised down to 310 sq km. The Zimbabwe Government estimated that the minefields contained 2.6 million anti-personnel landmines.
The Rhodesian Security Forces called up part-time soldiers on 2 May 1976 in preparation for a major counter-offensive.On 9 August 1976, RhodesianSelous Scoutsaided by former ZANLA commander Morrison Nyathi attacked a ZANLA camp at Nyadzonya in Mozambique containing over 5,000 guerrillas and several hundred refugees. The Selous Scouts, who numbered 72, dressed in FRELIMO uniforms and disguised their vehicles, attaching FRELIMO licence plates and painting them in FRELIMO colours. White soldiers wore black ski masks. They crossed the unmanned border into Mozambique at 0005 hours on 9 August and drove through the early morning to the camp, passing several FRELIMO sentries who saluted them as they went by.
When they reached the ZANLA camp at 0825 hours the six ZANLA soldiers on duty allowed them to enter, and the Rhodesian vehicles moved in and took up prearranged positions around the edge of the parade ground, on which stood about 4,000 guerrillas. When all was ready a Rhodesian soldier took his vehicle loudspeaker and announced, in Shona, "Zimbabwe tatora", meaning "we have taken Zimbabwe", and Nyathi blew a whistle signalling the cadres to muster. The cadres began cheering and ran towards the vehicles, packing around them as more ran onto the parade ground from other areas of the camp.
The Rhodesians then opened fire and continued shooting until there was no movement on the parade ground, then they returned to Rhodesia. More than 300 ZANLA insurgents were reported killed by the Rhodesians, with four Selous Scouts lightly wounded. This figure is corroborated by ZANLA's official report,though publicly both ZANLA and ZIPRA claimed that Nyadzonya had been a refugee camp.
Later, on 7 October 1976, militants bombed a railroad bridge over Matetsi River when a train carrying ore passed over.Black nationalist guerrillas attacked a tea plantation and killed 27 black workers near the Mozambican border on 21 December 1976.
By 1977, the war had spread throughout Rhodesia. ZANLA continued to operate from Mozambique and remained dominant among the Mashona peoples in eastern and central Rhodesia. Meanwhile, ZIPRA remained active in the north and west, using bases in Zambia and Botswana, and were mainly supported by the Ndebele tribes.With this escalation came sophistication, organisation and modern weapons for the guerrillas, and although many were still untrained, an increasing number were trained in Communist bloc and other sympathetic countries.
Weapons fielded includedTT pistols,PPSh-41submachine guns,AK-47andAKMassault rifles,SKSsemi-automatic carbines,RPDandRPKlight machine guns, as well asRPG-2andRPG-7rocket propelled grenade launchers and various Sovietgrenades. The Rhodesians only discovered how well equipped the nationalists had become when raids on guerrilla base areas towards the end of the war revealed mortars, 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm heavy machine guns and even heavier calibre weapons such as 122 mm multiple rocket launchers.
On 3 April 1977, GeneralPeter Wallsannounced that the government would launch a campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of Rhodesia's black citizens.In May, Walls received reports ofZANLAforces massing in the city ofMapaiinGaza Province, Mozambique. Prime Minister Smith gave Walls permission to destroy the base. Walls told the media the Rhodesian forces were changing tactics from contain and hold tosearch and destroy, "adopting hot pursuit when necessary".
On 30 May 1977, duringOperation Aztec, 500 troops crossed the Mozambican border and travelled 100 km (60 mi) to Mapai, engaging theZANLAforces with air cover from the Rhodesian Air Force and paratroopers inC-47 Dakotas. The Rhodesian government said the military killed 32 ZANLA fighters and lost one Rhodesian pilot. The Mozambican government disputed the number of casualties, saying it shot down three Rhodesian planes and a helicopter and took several thousand troops prisoner, all of which was denied by Minister of Combined Operations, Roger Hawkins.
Kurt Waldheim, theSecretary-General of the United Nations, condemned the incident on 1 June, and Walls announced a day later that the Rhodesian military would occupyMapaiuntil they had eliminated ZANLA's presence. But the American, British, and Soviet governments also condemned the raidand Rhodesian forces later withdrew from the area. TheUnited Nations Security Councildenounced the incursion of the "illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia" inResolution 411, on 30 June 1977.
Militantsbombed a Woolworths department storeinSalisburyon 6 August 1977, killing 11 and injuring 70.Militants from Mozambiquekilled 16 black civiliansin eastern Rhodesia on 21 August, burning the farmworkers' homes on a white-owned farm.In November 1977, in response to the buildup of ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique, Rhodesian forces launchedOperation Dingo, a pre-emptive combined arms surprise attack on guerrilla camps at Chimoio and Tembue in Mozambique. The attack was carried out over three days, from 23 to 25 November 1977. These operations reportedly inflicted thousands of casualties on Robert Mugabe's ZANLA cadres, probably blunting guerrilla incursions in the months that followed, but a steady intensification of the insurgency continued through 1978.
To disrupt FRELIMO's hold on Mozambique, the RhodesianCentral Intelligence Organisationhelped to create and support an insurgency movement within Mozambique. This guerrilla group, known asRENAMO, battled with FRELIMO even as Rhodesian forces fought the ZANLA within Mozambique.
In May 1978, 50 civilians were killed in crossfire between Marxist militants and the Rhodesian military, the most civilians killed in an engagement until then.In July, Patriotic Front members killed 39 black civilians and the Rhodesian government killed 106 militants.By mid-1978, black nationalist guerrillas had killed nearly 40 Christian missionaries.Seven white Catholic missionaries were killed by guerrillas atSt. Paul's Mission, Musamion 6 February 1977.In the single worst attack on missionaries, 12 British missionaries and their children were killed in theVumba massacreon 23 June 1978.
On 4 November 1978, Walls said 2,000 Patriotic Front militants had been persuaded to defect and fight for theRhodesian Security Forces. In December 1978, a ZANLA unit penetrated the outskirts of Salisbury and fired a volley of rockets and incendiary device rounds into the main oil storage depot. The storage tanks burned for five days, giving off a column of smoke that could be seen 130 km (80 mi) away. Half a million barrels of petroleum product—a quarter of Rhodesia's fuel—was destroyed.
In 1978, 450 ZANLA militants entered from Mozambique and attacked the town ofUmtali. At the time, ZANU said the militants were women, an unusual characteristic, but in 1996Joyce Mujurusaid the vast majority involved were men and ZANU concocted the story to make Western organisations believe women were involved in the fighting.In retaliation for these acts, the Rhodesian Air Force bombed guerrilla camps 200 kilometres (125 mi) inside Mozambique, usingCanberra B2aircraft andHawker Hunters—actively, but clandestinely, supported by several of the more capable Canberra B(I)12 aircraft of theSouth African Air Force. Joint-force bomber raids on guerrilla encampments and assembly areas in Mozambique and Zambia were mounted in 1978, and extensive air reconnaissance and surveillance of guerrilla encampments and logistical build-up was carried out by theSouth African Air Forceon behalf of the RhAF.
Rhodesian external operations extended into Zambia after Nkomo's ZIPRA nationalists shot down two unarmedVickers Viscountcivilian airliners with Soviet-suppliedSA-7heat-seeking missiles. Encamped beneath the path of ascent towards Salisbury from Kariba Airport, the ZIPRA cadres downedAir Rhodesia Flight 825on 3 September 1978 andAir Rhodesia Flight 827on 12 February 1979. In the first incident, eighteen civilians on board survived, and five of these went away to find water. Half an hour later nine ZIPRA fighters arrived, promising help; three of the thirteen survivors hid when they saw them. In the words ofTimemagazine, the ZIPRA cadres "herded together the ten people at the wreckage, robbed them of their valuables, and finally cut them down with automatic weapons fire". Nkomo claimed responsibility for the attack and spoke of it to theBBCin a way Rhodesians considered gloating.In the second attack all 59 people on board were killed in the crash.
In retaliation for the shooting down of Flight 825 in September 1978, Rhodesian Air Force Canberra bombers, Hunter fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships attacked the ZIPRA guerrilla base at Westlands farm near Lusaka in October 1978, warning Zambian forces by radio not to interfere.
The increased effectiveness of the bombing and follow-up 'air mobile' strikes usingDakota-dropped parachutists and helicopter 'air cav' techniques had a significant effect on the development of the conflict. As late as September 1979, despite the increased sophistication of guerrilla forces in Mozambique, a raid by Selous Scouts, with artillery and air support, on "New Chimoio" still reportedly resulted in heavy ZANLA casualties.However, a successful raid on the Rhodesian strategic fuel reserves inSalisburyalso underscored the importance of concluding a negotiated settlement and achieving international recognition before the war expanded further.
The larger problem was that by 1979, combined ZIPRA and ZANLA strength inside Rhodesia totalled at least 12,500 guerrillas and it was evident that insurgents were entering the country at a faster rate than the Rhodesian forces could kill or capture; 22,000 ZIPRA and 16,000 ZANLA fighters remained uncommitted outside the country.Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA forces were preparing their forces in Zambia with the intent of confronting the Rhodesians through a conventional invasion. Whether such an invasion could have been successful in the short term against the well trained Rhodesian army and air force is questionable. However, what was clear was that the insurgency was growing in strength daily and the ability of the security forces to continue to control the entire country was coming under serious challenge.
By putting the civilian population at risk, ZIPRA and the ZANLA had been particularly effective in creating conditions that accelerated white emigration. This not only seriously undermined the morale of the white population, it was also gradually reducing the availability of trained reserves for the army and the police.The economy was also suffering badly from the war; the Rhodesian GDP consistently declined in the late 1970s.
Politically, the Rhodesians were therefore pinning all their hopes on the"internal" political settlementthat had been negotiated with moderate black nationalist leaders in 1978 and its ability to achieve external recognition and support. This internal settlement led to the creation ofZimbabwe-Rhodesiaunder a new constitution in 1979.
Under the agreement of March 1978, the country was renamedZimbabwe-Rhodesia, and in thegeneral election of 24 April 1979, BishopAbel Muzorewabecame the country's first black prime minister. On 1 June 1979,Josiah Zion Gumedebecame president. The internal settlement left control of the military, police, civil service, and judiciary in white hands, and assured whites about one-third of the seats in parliament. It was essentially a power-sharing arrangement between whites and blacks.The factions led by Nkomo and Mugabe denounced the new government as a puppet of white Rhodesians and fighting continued. The hopes for recognition of the internal settlement, and of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, by the newly electedConservativegovernment ofMargaret Thatcherdid not materialise after thelatter's electionin May 1979. Likewise, although the US Senate voted to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, theCarter administrationalso refused to recognise the internal settlement.
Thatcher sympathised with the internal settlement and thought of the ZANLA and ZIPRA leaders as terrorists, but was prepared to support a push for further compromise if it could end the fighting.Britain was also reluctant to recognise the internal settlement for fear of fracturing the unity of theCommonwealth. Thus later in 1979, the Thatcher government called a peace conference in London to which all nationalist leaders were invited.
The outcome of this conference would become known as theLancaster House Agreement. During the conference, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Government accepted a watering down of the 1978 internal settlement while Mugabe and Nkomo agreed to end the war in exchange for new elections in which they could participate. The economic sanctions imposed on Rhodesia were lifted in late 1979, and the country reverted to temporary British rule until elections could be held. Under the Constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Amendment) (No. 4) Act 1979 of 11 December 1979, the country formally reverted to its colonial status as Southern Rhodesia. The Zimbabwe-Rhodesian parliament voted itself out of power, andLord Soameswas appointed by the British government to rule the country as Governor-Designate, arriving in Salisbury on 12 December to take over from President Gumede.On 21 December 1979, a cease-fire was announced.An election was scheduled for early 1980. The British Commonwealth deployed an observer force, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, to the country for the transitional period. Britain contributed 800 soldiers and 300Royal Air Forcepersonnel, along with small naval and marine contingents. Australia,Fiji,Kenya, andNew Zealandalso contributed smaller numbers of troops. A nine-man British advance party arrived on 8 December to begin establishing a logistics base, and this was followed by the arrival of the main force shortly after.
The war would end in a military stalemate.However, the political compromise which was reached after combat ceased would work to the advantage of the black nationalists, especially those aligned withZANUleaderRobert Mugabe.Mugabe himself stated in an interview published in the 28 April 1980 edition of theNew York Times"We did not win a military victory ... We reached a political settlement ... A compromise."
During theelection of 1980, there were accusations of voter intimidation by Mugabe's guerrilla cadres, sections of which were accused of not having assembled in the designated guerrilla assembly points as required under the Lancaster House Agreement, and the international observers as well as Lord Soames were accused of looking the other way. The Rhodesian military may have seriously considered a coup d'état in March 1980.This alleged coup was to consist of two stages:Operation Quartz, coordinated attacks on guerrilla assembly points within the country, and Operation Hectic, the assassination of Mugabe and his key aides.
However, even in the context of alleged voter intimidation by ZANLA elements, widespread support for Mugabe from large sections of the black population (in particular from theShonalanguage group which made up the overwhelming majority of the country's population) could not be seriously disputed. Moreover, the clear absence of any external support for such a coup, and the inevitable conflagration that would have engulfed the country thereafter, scuttled the plan.
The election of early 1980 was won by Mugabe, who became prime minister afterZANU-PFreceived 63% of the vote. By 16 March 1980, all Commonwealth forces had departed, save for 40 infantry instructors who temporarily stayed behind to train the new nation's army.On 18 April 1980, interim British rule ended and the country was internationally recognised as independent. The colony of Southern Rhodesia was formally renamed Zimbabwe, and on 18 April 1982, the government changed the name of the country's capital from Salisbury toHarare.
According to Rhodesian government statistics, more than 20,000 were killed during the second war. From December 1972 to December 1979, 1,120 members of the Rhodesian security forces were killed, along with 10,050 guerrillas who were killed in Rhodesia, and an unknown number in Mozambique and Zambia, 7,790 black civilians, and 468 white civilians.
After he assumed power,Robert Mugabeacted incrementally to consolidate his power, forming a coalition government with his ZAPU rivals and the white minority. The Rhodesian Army was merged with guerrilla forces to form theZimbabwe Defence Forces, and the Rhodesian security forces were merged with ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. Joshua Nkomo was given a series of cabinet positions. The South African government recruited white Rhodesian Security Forces personnel in what was designatedOperation Winterand around 5,000 took this up.
However, Mugabe was torn between keeping his coalition stable and pressures to meet the expectations of his followers for social change. Clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces took place in 1980 and 1981. In February 1982, Mugabe fired Nkomo and two other ZAPU ministers from his cabinet, triggering bitter fighting between ZAPU supporters inNdebele-speaking region of the country and the ruling ZANU. Between 1982 and 1985, the military crushed armed resistance from Ndebele groups inMatabelelandand theMidlandsin a military crackdown known asGukurahundi, a Shona term which translates roughly to mean "the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains". TheGukurahundicampaigns were also known as the Matabeleland Massacres.
The Zimbabwean military's North Korean-trainedFifth Brigadewas deployed to Matabeleland to crush resistance. German journalist Shari Eppel estimates approximately 20,000 Matabele were murdered in these first years after the war;most of those killed were victims of public executions.
Violence between ZANLA and ZIPRA continued until 1987. In December 1987, the two groups reached an accord which saw them merge into one party known asZANU PF, headed by Mugabe. Mugabe then became President and gained additional powers, as the office of prime minister was abolished.
Beyond Zimbabwe's borders, as a result of Rhodesian aid and support forRENAMO, the Rhodesian Bush War also helped influence the outbreak of theMozambique Civil War, which lasted from 1977 until 1992 and claimed a million lives.
Unlike many post-colonial African conflicts, the Second Rhodesian Bush War spawned an extensive written military historiography.Though the territory at the center of the conflict was known by four different names throughout the time of the war, historiographic works tend to call the country "Rhodesia" or "Zimbabwe". Histories that use the former term often focus on the actions of white soldiers without much account of the conflict's political context, while many works that use the latter term frame the event as a victorious guerrilla liberation war.
Many Rhodesian veterans wrote memoirs about their service after the second Bush War, most of them emanating from soldiers who served in the RLI or Selous Scouts. These works were either self-published, published with vanity presses, or with specialized publishing houses.The memoirs published without editorial oversight often suffered from spelling errors and other mistakes, but tended to focus more on unit culture and non-military activities such as poaching,or "taming" captured African insurgents into domestic servants.Most of these books were released in Africa; few became commercial successes in the United Kingdom or the United States.Grouped together with fictional novels about the war, the memoirs are sometimes placed in a genre of "neo-Rhodesian" literature.Claims involving use of biological and chemical weapons by Rhodesian forces appeared only in post-war literature.
The first major Rhodesian memoir to be released was Reid-Daly's account of the Selous Scouts,Selous Scouts Top Secret War, published by Galago—a publishing house run byPeter Stiff—in 1982. Galago continued to be a major publisher of these works.Publishing of these memoirs accelerated during Zimbabwe's economic decline in the 1990s.These works increasingly incorporated material from other memoirs and some secondary works, though they generally displayed little knowledge of ZANLA's or ZIPRA's version of events. Many also featured direct and indirect criticism of other soldiers and memoirists.Some of these disputes led to lawsuits.Seizures of white-owned farmsin the 2000s led to a massive growth in the literature.Revised editions of previous memoirs were also common.Chris Cocks'Fireforcewas re-released by Galago and edited by Stiff. Stiff removed all references to drug use in the new edition, since he wanted to portray the RLI as heroes.
Early literature on nationalist guerrillas in Rhodesia tended to focus on ZANLA and ignore ZIPRA.Several autobiographies and memoirs were published by Zimbabwean nationalists in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Masipule Sithole, the younger brother of Ndabaningi, wroteZimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle, which described conflicts between ZANU and ZAPU with an emphasis on ethnic disagreements. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson publishedThe Struggle for Zimbabwein 1981, which chronicled the formation and development of nationalist movements. It was printed with a favourable foreword by Mugabe and was wielded by the post-independent Zimbabwean government as evidence of the courage and sacrifices of ZANU and ZANLA, including incorporation into secondary school curriculum.The first major academic work covering the nationalist guerrilla perspective of the war was Terence Ranger'sPeasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, published in 1985. It focused on eastern Rhodesia and constituted a largely uncritical account of ZANLA activities in that area. The book did not address violence inflicted by ZANLA on African TTL residents and concluded that rural blacks were "united" in supporting the guerrilla movement. Ranger later reflected that his work duplicated ZANU's nationalist rhetoric.Romanticised interpretations of the Zimbwabwean nationalist endeavor fell out of scholarly favour in the mid-1990s.Since then, more critical works of the nationalist movement have predominated, highlighting complexities in the war.More works focusing on ZIPRA have also been published, though the nature of differences between ZANLA
and ZIPRA as well as the geographical spread of the two guerrilla forces remains debated.
In her 1992 book,Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War, political scientist Norma J. Kriger rejected "the existing portrait of ZANU's successful politicisation of the Zimbabwean countryside during the liberation war" and concluded that relations between nationalist guerrillas and TTL villagers in Mutoko District were predominantly characterized by violence and coercion.She also wrote that insofar as peasants voluntarily collaborated with ZANLA, it was often in the hopes of using them to settle petty personal scores and protect their local interests.Historian Luise White wrote that the white Rhodesian war accounts did not present a unified and agreed telling of the conflict, and instead "struggled over what being a white Rhodesian meant, and what pasts and futures soldiers brought to the war".Reflecting on their truthfulness, White stated, "Many of the stories and events in these memoirs are not true, or at least not wholly accurate."Reid-Daly later testified during a lawsuit involving an authorship dispute that he had "exaggerated or embellished the true story" several times inSelous Scouts Top Secret War.Many of these works maintained that the Rhodesian Army "won every battle but lost at the negotiating table" at Lancaster House.White criticised this view, writing, "First, there weren't really any battles, and second, while Rhodesian soldiers were not routed anywhere, they did not win any decisive victories either, especially during the mid-1970s when guerrilla forces were in disarray. In terms of strategy in the middle and late 1970s, it is not altogether clear that the Rhodesian state wanted victory more than it wanted a strong position from which to negotiate some kind of transition to majority rule."Academic M. T. Howard wrote that the portrayal of the Rhodesian Army as a nearly-invincible institution served both white Rhodesian and black Zimbabwean nationalist discourses; the former benefitted from showing a capable force which was never defeated in the field, and the latter argued that their ultimate success was made more impressive.