Contras

In the history ofNicaragua, theContras(Spanish:La contrarrevolución, thecounter-revolution) were theright-wingmilitias who waged anti-communist guerilla warfare (1979–1990) against theMarxistgovernments of theSandinista National Liberation Frontand theJunta of National Reconstruction, which came to power after theNicaraguan Revolutionin 1979.
Months after the political dynasty (1936–1979) of theSomoza familylost the Nicaraguan Revolution to theSandinistas, the US government sponsored the remainingnational-guard soldiersandSomocistapoliticians of the losing side asla Contra, the right-wing counter-revolution. The Americanmilitary assistance and financial aidgranted the Contras a measure of political credibility and military utility as anti-communist militias useful to U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. In 1986, consequent to complaints of the Contras' regular violation of the human rights of Nicaraguan civilians, theBoland Amendment(1982–1986) ended U.S. financing of the Contras; yet the Reagan government illegally continued financing the anti-communist secret war of the Contras against Sandinista Nicaragua, known in the US as theIran–Contra affair. By 1987, the CIA had organized most of the Contra militias into the anti-communistNicaraguan Resistance, within which theNicaraguan Democratic Force(FDN) was the greatest militia.
For eleven years, the Contras' counter-revolutionary war against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua featuredterrorismandhuman rights violationsagainst the civilian population of Nicaragua.In defense of the Contras, the Reagan government said that the anti-communist strategy of the US in Latin America did not include attacks upon civilian populations.The CIA said that the Contras' terrorism against Nicaraguan civilians resulted from "the poor discipline characteristic of irregular forces", and that terrorism was not official military doctrine of the Contras,and that the responsible Contra leader was put to death because of the excessive brutality of his Contra guerrillas against Nicaraguan civilians.TheGlobal Terrorism Databasereports that Contras carried out more than 1,300 terrorist attacks.
The Contras were not a monolithic group, but a combination of three distinct elements of Nicaraguan society:
TheCIAandArgentine intelligence, seeking to unify the anti-Sandinista cause before initiating large-scale aid, persuaded 15 September Legion, the UDN and several former smaller groups to merge in September 1981 as theNicaraguan Democratic Force(Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, FDN).Although the FDN had its roots in two groups made up of former National Guardsmen (of the Somoza regime), its joint political directorate was led by businessman and former anti-Somoza activistAdolfo Calero Portocarrero.Édgar Chamorrolater stated that there was strong opposition within the UDN against working with the Guardsmen and that the merging only took place because of insistence by the CIA.
Based inHonduras, Nicaragua's northern neighbor, under the command of formerNational GuardColonelEnrique Bermúdez, the new FDN commenced to draw in other smaller insurgent forces in the north.Largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized by the U.S.,it emerged as the largest and most active contra group.
In April 1982,Edén Pastora(Comandante Cero), one of the heroes in the fight against Somoza, organized the Sandinista Revolutionary Front (FRS) – embedded in theDemocratic Revolutionary Alliance(ARDE)– and declared war on the Sandinista government.Himself a former Sandinista who had held several high posts in the government, he had resigned abruptly in 1981 and defected,believing that the newly found power had corrupted the Sandinistas' original ideas.A popular and charismatic leader, Pastora initially saw his group develop quickly.He confined himself to operate in the southern part of Nicaragua;after a press conference he was holding on30 May 1984 was bombed, he "voluntarily withdrew" from the contra struggle.
A third force, Misurasata, appeared among theMiskito,Sumoand RamaAmerindianpeoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following the government's efforts to nationalizeIndianland. In the course of this conflict, forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians to relocation centers in the interior of the country and subsequent burning of some villages took place.The Misurasata movement split in 1983, with the breakaway Misura group ofStedman Fagoth Mullerallying itself more closely with the FDN, and the rest accommodating themselves with the Sandinistas: on 8 December 1984 a ceasefire agreement known as the Bogota Accord was signed by Misurasata and the Nicaraguan government.A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance.
U.S. officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups. In June 1985 most of the groups reorganized as theUnited Nicaraguan Opposition(UNO), under the leadership ofAdolfo Calero,Arturo CruzandAlfonso Robelo, all originally supporters of the anti-Somoza revolution. After UNO's dissolution early in 1987, theNicaraguan Resistance(RN) was organized along similar lines in May.
In front of theInternational Court of Justice, the Nicaraguan government claimed that the Contras were altogether a creation of the U.S.This claim was rejectedbut the evidence of a very close relationship between the Contras and the United States was considered overwhelming and incontrovertible.The U.S. played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the Contras over a long period, and it is unlikely that the Contras would have been capable of carrying out significant military operations without this support, given the large amount of training and weapons shipments that the Sandinistas had received fromCubaand theSoviet Union.
The US government viewed the leftist Sandinistas as a threat to economic interests of American corporations in Nicaragua and to national security. US President Ronald Reagan stated in 1983 that "The defense of [the USA's] southern frontier" was at stake."In spite of the Sandinista victory being declared fair, the United States continued to oppose the left-wing Nicaraguan government."and opposed its ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union.Ronald Reagan, who had assumed the American presidency in January 1981, accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style socialism and aidingleftist guerrillasin El Salvador.The Reagan administration continued to view the Sandinistas as undemocratic despite the 1984 Nicaraguan elections being generally declared fair by foreign observers.Throughout the 1980s the Sandinista government was regarded as "Partly Free" byFreedom House, an organization financed by the U.S. government.
On 4 January 1982, Reagan signed thetop secretNational Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17),giving theCIAthe authority to recruit and support the Contras with $19 million in military aid. The effort to support the Contras was one component of theReagan Doctrine, which called for providing military support to movements opposingSoviet-supported, communistgovernments.
By December 1981, the United States had already begun to support armed opponents of the Sandinista government. From the beginning, the CIA was in charge.The arming, clothing, feeding and supervision of the Contrasbecame the most ambitious paramilitary and political action operation mounted by the agency in nearly a decade.
In the fiscal year 1984, the U.S. Congress approved $24 million in aid to the Contras.After this, since the Contras failed to win widespread popular support or military victories within Nicaragua,opinion polls indicated that a majority of the U.S. public was not supportive of the Contras,the Reagan administration lost much of its support regarding its Contra policy within Congress after disclosure of CIA mining of Nicaraguan ports,and a report of theBureau of Intelligence and Researchcommissioned by theState Departmentfound Reagan's allegations about Soviet influence in Nicaragua "exaggerated",Congress cut off all funds for the contras in 1985 by the thirdBoland Amendment.The Boland Amendment had first been passed by Congress in December 1982. At this time, it only outlawed U.S. assistance to the contras "for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government", while allowing assistance for other purposes.In October 1984, it was amended to forbid action by not only the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency but all U.S. government agencies.
Nevertheless, the case for support of the Contras continued to be made in Washington, D.C., by both the Reagan administration andthe Heritage Foundation, which argued that support for the Contras would counter Soviet influence in Nicaragua.
On 1 May 1985 President Reagan announced that his administration perceived Nicaragua to be "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States", and declared a "national emergency" and atrade embargoagainst Nicaragua to "deal with that threat".It "is now a given; it is true", the Washington Post declared in 1986, "the Sandinistas are communists of the Cuban or Soviet school"; that "The Reagan administration is right to take Nicaragua as a serious menace—to civil peace and democracy in Nicaragua and to the stability and security of the region"; that we must "fit Nicaragua back into a Central American mode" and "turn Nicaragua back toward democracy", and with the "Latin American democracies" "demand reasonable conduct by regional standard."
Soon after the embargo was established,Managuare-declared "a policy of nonalignment" and sought the aid of Western Europe, who were opposed to U.S. policy, to escape dependency on the Soviet Union.Since 1981 U.S. pressures had curtailed Western credit to and trade with Nicaragua, forcing the government to rely almost totally on the Eastern bloc for credit, other aid, and trade by 1985.In his 1997 study on U.S. low intensity warfare, Kermit D. Johnson, a former Chief of the U.S. Army Chaplains, contends that U.S. hostility toward the revolutionary government was motivated not by any concern for "national security", but rather by what the world relief organization Oxfam termed "the threat of a good example":
The government's program included increased wages, subsidizedfood prices, and expanded health, welfare, and education services. And though it nationalized Somoza's former properties, it preserved a private sector that accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of GDP.
The United States began to support Contra activities against the Sandinista government by December 1981, with the CIA at the forefront of operations. The CIA supplied the funds and the equipment, coordinated training programs, and provided intelligence and target lists. While the Contras had little military successes, they did prove adept at carrying out CIA guerrilla warfare strategies from training manuals which advised them to incite mob violence, "neutralize" civilian leaders and government officials and attack "soft targets" — including schools, health clinics and cooperatives. The agency added to the Contras' sabotage efforts by blowing up refineries and pipelines, and mining ports.Finally, according to former Contra leaderEdgar Chamorro, CIA trainers also gave Contra soldiers large knives. "A commando knife [was given], and our people, everybody wanted to have a knife like that, to kill people, to cut their throats".In 1985Newsweekpublished a series of photos taken by Frank Wohl, a conservative student admirer traveling with the Contras, entitled "Execution in the Jungle":
The CIA officer in charge of the covert war,Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, admitted to the House Intelligence Committee staff in a secret briefing in 1984 that the Contras were routinely murdering "civilians and Sandinista officials in the provinces, as well as heads of cooperatives, nurses, doctors and judges". But he claimed that this did not violate President Reagan's executive order prohibiting assassinations because the agency defined it as just 'killing'. "After all, this is war—a paramilitary operation", Clarridge said in conclusion.Edgar Chamorro explained the rationale behind this to a U.S. reporter. "Sometimes terror is very productive. This is the policy, to keep putting pressure until the people cry 'uncle'".The CIA manual for the Contras,Tayacan, states that the Contras should gather the local population for a public tribunal to "shame, ridicule and humiliate" Sandinista officials to "reduce their influence". It also recommends gathering the local population to witness and take part in public executions.These types of activities continued throughout the war. After the signing of the Central American Peace Accord in August 1987, the year war related deaths and economic destruction reached its peak, the Contras eventually entered negotiations with the Sandinista government (1988), and the war began to deescalate.
By 1989 the U.S.-backed Contra war and economic isolation had inflicted severe economic suffering on Nicaraguans. The US government knew that the Nicaraguans had been exhausted from the war, which had cost 30,865 lives, and that voters usually vote the incumbents out during economic decline. By the late 1980s Nicaragua's internal conditions had changed so radically that the US approach to the 1990 elections differed greatly from 1984. A united opposition of fourteen political parties organized into theNational Opposition Union(Unión Nacional Oppositora, UNO) with the support of the United StatesNational Endowment for Democracy. UNO presidential nomineeVioleta Chamorrowas received by President Bush at the White House.
The Contra war escalated over the year before the election. The US promised to end the economic embargo should Chamorro win.
The UNO scored a decisive victory on 25 February 1990. Chamorro won with 55 percent of the presidential vote as compared to Ortega's 41 percent. Of 92 seats in the National Assembly, UNO gained 51, and the FSLN won 39. On 25 April 1990, Chamorro assumed presidency from Daniel Ortega.
With Congress blocking further aid to the Contras, the Reagan administration sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third countries and private sources.Between 1984 and 1986, $34 million from third countries and $2.7 million from private sources were raised this way.The secret contra assistance was run by theNational Security Council, with officerLt. Col.Oliver Northin charge.With the third-party funds, North created an organization calledThe Enterprise, which served as the secret arm of the NSC staff and had its own airplanes, pilots, airfield, ship, operatives, and secret Swiss bank accounts.It also received assistance from personnel from other government agencies, especially from CIA personnel in Central America.This operation functioned, however, without any of the accountability required of U.S. government activities.The Enterprise's efforts culminated in theIran–Contra Affair of 1986–1987, which facilitated contra funding through the proceeds of arms sales to Iran.
According to the London Spectator, U.S. journalists in Central America had long known that the CIA was flying in supplies to the Contras inside Nicaragua before the scandal broke. No journalist paid it any attention until the alleged CIA supply man,Eugene Hasenfus, was shot down and captured by the Nicaraguan army. Similarly, reporters neglected to investigate many leads indicating that Oliver North was running the Contra operation from his office in the National Security Council.
According to theNational Security Archive, Oliver North had been in contact withManuel Noriega, the military leader ofPanamalater convicted on drug charges, whom he personally met. The issue of drug money and its importance in funding the Nicaraguan conflict was the subject of various reports and publications. The contras were funded by drug trafficking, of which the United States was aware.SenatorJohn Kerry's 1988Committee on Foreign Relationsreport on Contra drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems".
The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996,San Jose Mercury NewsreporterGary Webbpublished a series titledDark Alliance, alleging that the contras contributed to the rise ofcrack cocainein California.
Gary Webb's career as a journalist was subsequently discredited by the leading U.S. papers,The New York Times, the Washington Post, and theLos Angeles Times. An internal CIA report, entitled, "Managing a Nightmare", shows the agency used "a ground base of already productive relations with journalists" to help counter what it called "a genuine public relations crisis."In the 1980s, Douglas Farah worked as a journalist, covering the civil wars in Central America for the Washington Post. According to Farah, while it was common knowledge that the Contras were involved in cocaine trafficking, the editors of the Washington Post refused to take it seriously:
An investigation by theUnited States Department of Justicealso stated that their "review did not substantiate the main allegations stated and implied in theMercury Newsarticles." Regarding the specific charges towards the CIA, the DOJ wrote "the implication that the drug trafficking by the individuals discussed in theMercury Newsarticles was connected to the CIA was also not supported by the facts."The CIA also investigated and rejected the allegations.
During the time the US Congress blocked funding for the contras, the Reagan government engaged in a campaign to alter public opinion and change the vote in Congress on contra aid.For this purpose, theNSCestablished an interagency working group, which in turn coordinated theOffice of Public Diplomacyfor Latin America and the Caribbean (managed byOtto Reich), which conducted the campaign.The S/LPD produced and widely disseminated a variety of pro-contra publications, arranged speeches and press conferences.It also disseminated "white propaganda"—pro-contra newspaper articles by paid consultants who did not disclose their connection to the Reagan administration.
On top of that, Oliver North helpedCarl Channell's tax-exempt organization, theNational Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, to raise $10 million, by arranging numerous briefings for groups of potential contributors at the premises of the White House and by facilitating private visits and photo sessions with President Reagan for major contributors.Channell in turn, used part of that money to run a series of television advertisements directed at home districts ofCongressmenconsidered swing votes on contra aid.Out of the $10 million raised, more than $1 million was spent on pro-contra publicity.
In 1984 the Sandinista government filed a suit in theInternational Court of Justice(ICJ) against the United States (Nicaragua v. United States), which resulted in a 1986 judgment against the United States. The ICJ held that the U.S. had violatedinternational lawby supporting the contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and byminingNicaragua's harbors. Regarding the alleged human rights violations by the contras, however, the ICJ took the view that the United States could be held accountable for them only if it would have been proven that the U.S. had effective control of the contra operations resulting in these alleged violations.Nevertheless, the ICJ found that the U.S. encouraged acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law by producing the manualPsychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare(Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas) and disseminating it to the contras.The manual, amongst other things, advised on how to rationalize killings of civiliansand recommended to hire professional killers for specific selective tasks.
The United States, which did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings, maintained that the ICJ's power did not supersede theConstitution of the United Statesand argued that the court did not seriously consider the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador, while it accused Nicaragua of actively supporting armed groups there, specifically in the form of supply of arms.The ICJ had found that evidence of a responsibility of the Nicaraguan government in this matter was insufficient.The U.S. argument was affirmed, however, by the dissenting opinion of ICJ member U.S. Judge Schwebel,who concluded that in supporting the contras, the United States acted lawfully in collective self-defence in El Salvador's support.The U.S. blocked enforcement of the ICJ judgment by theUnited Nations Security Counciland thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation.The Nicaraguan government finally withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 (under the later, post-FSLN, government ofVioleta Chamorro), following a repeal of the law requiring the country to seek compensation.
Americas Watch, which subsequently became part ofHuman Rights Watch, accused the Contras of:
Human Rights Watch released a report on the situation in 1989, which stated: "[The] contras were major and systematic violators of the most basic standards of the laws of armed conflict, including by launchingindiscriminate attackson civilians, selectively murdering non-combatants, and mistreating prisoners."
In his affidavit to the World Court, former contraEdgar Chamorrotestified that "The CIA did not discourage such tactics. To the contrary, the Agency severely criticized me when I admitted to the press that the FDN had regularly kidnapped and executed agrarian reform workers and civilians. We were told that the only way to defeat the Sandinistas was to ...kill, kidnap, rob and torture".
Contra leaderAdolfo Calerodenied that his forces deliberately targeted civilians:  "What they call a cooperative is also a troop concentration full of armed people. We are not killing civilians. We are fighting armed people and returning fire when fire is directed at us."
Several articles were published by U.S. press, including byThe Wall Street JournalandThe New Republic, accusing Americas Watch and other bodies of ideological bias and unreliable reporting. The articles alleged that Americas Watch gave too much credence to alleged Contra abuses and systematically tried to discredit Nicaraguan human rights groups such as thePermanent Commission on Human Rights, which blamed the most human rights abuses on the Sandinistas.
In 1985,The Wall Street Journalreported:
Human Rights Watch, the umbrella organization of Americas Watch, replied to these allegations: "Almost invariably, U.S. pronouncements on human rights exaggerated and distorted the real human rights violations of the Sandinista regime, and exculpated those of the U.S.-supported insurgents, known as the contras ... The Bush administration is responsible for these abuses, not only because the contras are, for all practical purposes, a U.S. force, but also because the Bush administration has continued to minimize and deny these violations, and has refused to investigate them seriously."
By 1986 the contras were besieged by charges of corruption, human-rights abuses, and military ineptitude.A much-vaunted early 1986 offensive never materialized, and Contra forces were largely reduced to isolated acts of terrorism.In October 1987, however, the contras staged a successful attack in southern Nicaragua.Then on 21 December 1987, the FDN launched attacks atBonanza,Siuna, andRositainZelaya province, resulting in heavy fighting.ARDE Frente Sur attacked atEl Almendroand along the Rama road.These large-scale raids mainly became possible as the contras were able to use U.S.-providedRedeye missilesagainst SandinistaMi-24helicopter gunships, which had been supplied by the Soviets.Nevertheless, the Contras remained tenuously encamped within Honduras and were not able to hold Nicaraguan territory.
There were isolated protests among the population against the draft implemented by the Sandinista government, which even resulted in full-blown street clashes in Masaya in 1988.However, a June 1988 survey in Managua showed the Sandinista government still enjoyed strong support but that support had declined since 1984. Three times as many people identified with the Sandinistas (28%) than with all the opposition parties put together (9%); 59% did not identify with any political party. Of those polled, 85% opposed any further US aid to the Contras; 40% believed the Sandinista government to be democratic, while 48% believed it to be not democratic. People identified the war as the largest problem but were less likely to blame it for economic problems compared to a December 1986 poll; 19% blamed the war and US blockade as the main cause of economic problems while 10% blamed the government.Political opposition groups were splintered and the Contras began to experience defections, although United States aid maintained them as a viable military force.
After a cutoff in U.S. military support, and with both sides facing international pressure to bring an end to the conflict, the contras agreed to negotiations with the FSLN. With the help of five Central American presidents, including Ortega, the sides agreed that a voluntary demobilization of the contras should start in early December 1989. They chose this date to facilitate free and fair elections in Nicaragua in February 1990 (even though theReagan administrationhad pushed for a delay of contra disbandment).
In the resultingFebruary 1990 elections,Violeta Chamorroand her party theUNOwon an upset victory of 55% to 41% overDaniel Ortega.Opinion polls leading up to the elections divided along partisan lines, with 10 of 17 polls analyzed in a contemporary study predicting an UNO victory while seven predicted the Sandinistas would retain power.
Possible explanations include that the Nicaraguan people were disenchanted with the Ortega government as well as the fact that already in November 1989, the White House had announced that the economic embargo against Nicaragua would continue unlessVioleta Chamorrowon.Also, there had been reports of intimidation from the side of the contras,with a Canadian observer mission claiming that 42 people were killed by the contras in "election violence" in October 1989.Sandinistas were also accused of intimidation and abuses during the election campaign. According to the Puebla Institute, by mid-December 1989, seven opposition leaders had been murdered, 12 had disappeared, 20 had been arrested, and 30 others assaulted. In late January 1990, the OAS observer team reported that "a convoy of troops attacked four truckloads of UNO sympathizers with bayonets and rifle butts, threatening to kill them."This led many commentators to conclude that Nicaraguans voted against the Sandinistas out of fear of a continuation of the contra war and economic deprivation.