Kazakh famine of 1930–1933

TheKazakh famine of 1930–1933, also known as theAsharshylyk,was afamineduring which approximately 1.5 million people died in theKazakh Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, then part of theRussian Socialist Federative Soviet Republicin theSoviet Union, of whom 1.3 million were ethnicKazakhs.An estimated 38to 42percent of all Kazakhs died, the highest percentage of any ethnic group killed by theSoviet famine of 1930–1933. Other research estimates that as many as 2.3 million died.A committee created by the Kazakhstan parliamentchaired by Historian Manash Kozybayev concluded that the famine was "a manifestation of the politics of genocide", with 1.75 million victims.
The famine began in the winter of 1930, a full year before the famine in Ukraine, termed theHolodomor, which was at its worst in the years 1931–1933. The famine made Kazakhs a minority in theKazakh ASSR; it caused the deaths or migration of large numbers of people, and it was not until the 1990s, after thedissolution of the Soviet Union, that the Kazakhs became the largest ethnicity group in Kazakhstan again. Before the famine, around 60% of the republic's residents were ethnic Kazakhs, a proportion greatly reduced to around 38% of the population after the famine. The famine is seen by some scholars to belong to the wider history of forcedcollectivization in the Soviet Unionand part of the Soviet famine of 1932–1933. Soviet authorities engaged in repressive policies during the famine such asblacklistingentire districts from trading with other areas and shooting thousands of Kazakhs dead during attempts to flee across the border to China.
Some historians describe the famine as legally recognizable as agenocideperpetrated by the Soviet state, under the definition outlined by theUnited Nations; however, some argue otherwise. In Kazakhstan, it is sometimes termed as Goloshchyokin's genocide (Kazakh:Голощёкин геноциді,romanized:Goloşekin genotsidı,Kazakh pronunciation:[ɡɐləˌʂʲokʲinɡʲinɐˈt͡sɪdɪ̞̃]) afterFilipp Goloshchyokin,who was the First Secretary of the Communist Party in the Kazakh ASSR, to emphasize itsman-madenature.
The famine is commonly known as the Asharshylyk.It comes fromKazakh: Ашаршылық,[ɑʃɑrʃɯˈɫɯq], meaning 'famine' or 'hunger'.
In the years leading up to the famine, several interconnected factors played a crucial role in exacerbating the dire situation. The historical context was shaped by a complex interplay of demographic changes and traditionalnomadic pastoralismpractices inCentral Asia, particularly centered around a meat and dairy based diet. The nomadic lifestyle of Kazakhs involved the seasonal movement of herds across vast expanses of steppe as a response to the unpredictable availability of grazing resources, driven by the region's harsh climate and varied terrain. As a result, the reliance on meat from livestock, especially during the long and harsh winters, became a fundamental aspect of survival in the Kazakh steppe.
The demographic landscape also played a crucial role, as the population in the region was marked by a substantial number of nomadic Kazakh herders, contributing to the reliance on livestock for sustenance. The traditional practices of raising animals and consuming their meat were intricately linked to cultural norms and historical traditions of Kazakhstan.
However, the destruction of nomadic pastoralism had its roots in the 19th century with theRussian conquest of Central Asia, which marked a significant turning point. Russian authorities introduced changes that included the auctioning fertile land as an effort to lure Russian peasants in the region with a focus on agriculture, aiming to transform the traditional nomadic lifestyle.This alteration in land use and economic activities disrupted the delicate equilibrium that had been maintained by Kazakh pastoralists for millennia, resulting in decreased nomadic mobility and increased consumption of grain.These changes set the stage for further disruptions in the early 20th century, as the region grappled with the aftermath of theRussian Revolutionand the subsequentRussian Civil War. The situation was exacerbated by the policy ofProdrazvyorstkaadopted by the Bolshevik government, coupled with the already challenging effects of severe intermittent drought, involved requisitioning grain from rural areas to support urban populations and export which led to theKazakh famine of 1919–1922, with an estimated 400,000 to 2 million people dying in the event.
With the establishment of theSoviet Unionin 1922, Kazakhstan was drawn into the sphere of Soviet authority. This transition placed the region under the influence of policies enacted by the Soviet government, particularly thefirst five-year planimplemented under the leadership ofJoseph Stalin. At the heart of these policies was the drive forcollectivizationof agriculture, a practice which involved in integrating private landholdings and labour intocollective farming.
Signs of the Kazakh famine began emerging in the late 1920s, with the factor being thejutfrom 1927 to 1928, which was a period of extreme cold in which cattle were starved and were unable to graze.
In 1928, the Soviet authorities started a collectivization campaign to confiscate cattle from richer Kazakhs, who were called bai, known as Little October. The confiscation campaign was carried out by Kazakhs against other Kazakhs, and it was up to those Kazakhs to decide who was a bai and how much to confiscate from them.While nomadic Kazakhs, involved in pasturing, were forcefully placed in collective farms which resulted in decline of adequate grazing.This engagement was intended to make Kazakhs active participants in the transformation of Kazakh society.More than 10,000 bais may have been deported due to the campaign against them.The campaign corresponded to arrests of former members of theAlash movementand repression of religious authorities and practices.Kazakhstan's livestock and grain were largely acquired between 1929 and 1932, with one-third of the republic's cereals being requisitioned and more than 1 million tons confiscated in 1930 to provide food for the cities.
One third of Kazakh livestock was confiscated between 1930 and 1931.The livestock was transferred over to Moscow and Leningrad which in the opinion of Niccolò Pianciola shows that Kazakhs were consciously sacrificed to the imperial hierarchy of consumption.Some Kazakhs were expelled from their land to make room for 200,000 "special settlers" and Gulag prisoners,and some of the inadequate food supply in Kazakhstan went to such prisoners and settlers as well.Food aid to the Kazakhs was selectively distributed to eliminate class enemies. Many Kazakhs were denied food aid as local officials considered them unproductive, and food aid was provided to European workers in the country instead.Despite this, the Kazakhs received some measure of emergency food assistance from the state,though much of it did not arrive or was heavily delayed.Soviet officials sent medical personnel into Kazakhstan to inoculate 200,000 Kazakhs from smallpox.
However, Kazakh victims of the famine were widely discriminated against and expelled from virtually every sector of Kazakhstan's society.Soviet authorities referred to Kazakhs in private memos as "two-legged wolves".As famine raged Soviet authorities continued to procure grain from the Kazakhs, withStalinexplicitly advocating for a "repressive track" in the collection process due to procurements having "undergone sharp declines."In this vein within 1932, 32 out of the less than 200 districts in Kazakhstan that did not meet grain production quotas wereblacklisted, meaning that they were prohibited from trading with other villages.As Historian Sarah Cameron describes it in an interview withHarvard University'sDavis Center, "[in] a strategy explicitly modeled upon a technique that was used against starving Ukrainians, several regions of Kazakhstan were blacklisted. That essentially entraps starving Kazakhs in zones of death where no food could be found."In 1933,Filipp Goloshchyokinwas replaced withLevon Mirzoyanfrom Armenia,who was repressive particularly toward famine refugees and denied food aid to areas run by cadres who asked for more food for their regions using, in the words of Cameron, "teary telegrams"; in one instance under Mirzoyan's rule, a plenipotentiary shoved food aid documents into his pocket and had a wedding celebration instead of transferring them for a whole month while hundreds of Kazakhs starved.Shortly after his arrival, Mirzoyan announced that those who fled or stole grain were 'enemies' of the Soviet Union, and that the republic would take 'severe measures' against them. However, as Cameron notes, this definition could be extended to every starving refugee in the country.With this campaign, Mirzoyan pushed for the use of brutal punishment such as shootings.
Thousands of Kazakhs violently resisted the collectivization campaign with weapons left over by the white army with 8 rebellions occurring in 1930 alone.In theMangyshlak Peninsula15,000 rebels resisted between 1929 and 1931.In one rebellion Kazakh took over the city ofSuzakinIrgizreturning confiscated property and destroying grain depots.Rebels also decapitated and cut the ears off of party members upon their takeover of said city.Other Kazakhs in the rebellions fought to reopen previous closed down mosques and free religious leaders.OGPUofficials are reported to have drunk the blood of Kazakhs shot during the repression of the rebellions.Lower level cadres often disaffected and joined the rebellions to help fight against Red Army forces.
Prominent Kazakh writerGabit Musirepovreported finding corpses "stacked like firewood" by the roadside in the Turgai district of Kazakhstan. Another first account testified that "It is not rare to meet a Kazakh family, fleeing from who knows where and dragging behind them a sled, on top of which lies the corpse of a child, who died along the way."
Though he didn't witness it firsthand Welshman Gareth Jones was probably the first journalist to report on the Kazakhstan famine.He was told in March 1933 by a 'German from Central Asia' that "one million at least out of 5 million... have died of hunger" and also wrote in his diary of "corpses in Kazakhstan. Terrible conditions."
In scholar James Richter'sFamine, Memory, and Politics in the Post-Soviet Space: Contrasting Echoes of Collectivization in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, published byCambridge University Press, many testimonies from survivors are documented:
Kazakhstan included some of the regions affected severely by famine, percentage-wise, although more people died in famine inSoviet Ukraine, which began a year later.In addition to theKazakh famine of 1919–1922, Kazakhstan lost more than half of its population in 10–15 years due to the actions of theSoviet state.The two Soviet censuses indicated that the number ofKazakhsin Kazakhstan dropped from 3,637,612 in 1926 to 2,181,520 in1937.Ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan were also significantly affected. The Ukrainian population in Kazakhstan decreased from 859,396 to 549,859(a reduction of almost 36% of their population) while other ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan lost 12% and 30% of their populations.Ukrainians who died in Kazakhstan are sometimes considered victims of theHolodomor.
Due to starvation, between 665,000 and 1.1 millionKazakhs fled the famine with their cattle outside Kazakhstan to China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Russia in search of food and employment in the new industrialization sites of Western Siberia. These refugees took an estimated 900,000 head of cattle with them.
Kazakhs who tried to escape were classified as class enemies and shot.The Soviet government also worked to repatriate them back to Soviet territory.This repatriation process could be brutal, as Kazakhs homes were broken into with both refugee and non-refugee Kazakhs being forcibly expelled onto train cars without food, heating, or water.30% of the refugees died due to epidemics and hunger.Refugees that were repatriated were integrated into collective farms where many were too weak to work, and in a factory within Semipalatinsk half the refugees were fired within a few days with the other half being denied food rations.
Professor K.M. Abzhanov, Director of the Institute of History and Ethnologyof theKazakhstan Academy of Sciencesstated that "One-sixth of the indigenous population left their historical homeland forever."
As the refugees fled the famine, the Soviet government made violent attempts to stop them.In one case, relief dealers placed food in the back of a truck to attract refugees, and then locked the refugees inside the truck and dumped them in the middle of the mountains; the fate of these refugees is unknown.Starting from 1930 onward thousands of Kazakhs were shot dead as they attempted to flee to China,such as in one infamous killing of 18 to 19 Kazakhs by state border guards called the Karatal Affair which not only had killings but also the rape of several women and children occurring in the incident as noted by a doctor who analyzed the event.The flight of refugees was framed by authorities as a progressive occurrence of nomads moving away from their 'primitive' lifestyle.Famine refugees were suspected byOGPUofficials of maintaining counterrevolutionary, bai, and kulak 'tendencies', due to some refugees engaging in crime in the republics they arrived in.
Swiss reporterElla Maillart, who traveled through Soviet Central Asia and China in the early 1930s, witnessed and wrote of viewing the firsthand effects of the repatriation campaign:
One report from an officer in Siberia reads: "When one thinks of the extreme distress in which Kazakhs live here with us, one can easily imagine that things in Kazakhstan are much worse."
Some of the starving became so desperate that they resorted tocannibalism. This ranged from consuming corpses to acts of murder in order to eat.Similar acts occurred during the parallelfamine in Ukraine, as Ukrainians and Kazakhs were starved under the same tactics.AsTimothy Snyderwrote of the Soviet-imposed famines:
Two thirds of the Kazakh survivors of the famine were successfullysedentarizeddue to the 80% reduction of their herds, the impossibility of resuming pastoral activity in the immediate post-famine environment, and the repatriation and resettlement program undertaken by Soviet authorities.Despite this, Niccolò Pianciola says that the Soviet campaign to destroy nomadism was quickly rejected after the famine, and that nomadism even experienced a resurgence during World War II after the transfer of livestock from Nazi-occupied territories.
Ibragim Khisamutdinov, who lived through the famine as a young boy, saw starving Kazakhs dying in the streets on his way to school. More than 50 years later, he noted, "To this day, I can hear the desperate cries of the dying and their calls for help."
A monument for the famine's victims was constructed in 2017.TheTurkic Councilhas described the famine as a "criminal Stalinist ethnic policy".A genocide remembrance day is commenced on 31 May for the victims of the famine.
Like theHolodomor,there isheated debateas to whether or not the famine fits in with thelegal definition of genocide, as defined by the UN.In November 1991, the Kazakhstan parliament created a committee,chaired by Historian Manash Kozybayev,to investigate the famine and its causes. A year later, the commission reported out that "the magnitude of the tragedy was so monstrous that we can, with full moral authority, designate it as a manifestation of the politics of genocide."
Europeans in Kazakhstan had disproportionate power in the party, which has been argued as a cause of why indigenous nomads suffered the worst part of the collectivization process rather than the European sections of the country.Notably, many scholars have compared the internal colonization of Kazakhs as similar to American policies towards Native Americanssuch asthe Sioux,who were similarlynomads. Niccolò Pianciola argues that the Soviet authorities undertook a campaign of persecution against the nomads in the Kazakhs, believing that the destruction of the 'class' was a worthy sacrifice for the collectivization of Kazakhstan,and that fromLemkin's point of view on genocide all nomads of the Soviet Union were victims of the crime, not just the Kazakhs.However, other nomads within Soviet territory were also IndigenousTurkicorMongolicCentral and North Asian peoples, had similar treatment by the Soviet Union,and discrimination that continues to this day.Kazakhs and other Central Asians are still referred to in Russian sometimes asaziaty,or asChurkaorChurki(Russian: Чурка), a racial slur that means "darkie" or "block of wood".
A historian of the revolution and authorVladimir Burtsev, who knewFilipp Goloshchyokin, characterized him in his writing:
HistorianStephen G. Wheatcroftbelieves that the high expectations of central planners were sufficient to demonstrate their ignorance of the ultimate consequences of their actions. Wheatcroft views the state's policies during the famine as "criminal acts of negligence", though not as intentional murder or genocide.However Historian Sarah Cameron, author ofThe Hungry Steppe: Famine, Violence, and the Making of Soviet Kazakhstan, stated in an interview withHarvard University'sDavis Centerthat "Moscow's sweeping program of state-led transformation clearly anticipates the cultural disruption of Kazakh society. And there's evidence to indicate that the Kazakh famine fits an expanded definition of genocide." She also says:
Regarding the legal definition of genocide as determined by theUN,Michael Ellmanstates that it "seems to be an example of 'negligent genocide' which falls outside the scope of the UN Convention".Historian Isabelle Ohayon stated she found "no evidence nor motive for the deliberate starvation" of the Kazakh population, and concludes that the famine did not constitute a genocide under international juridical standards, and therefore labelling it was an "empty exercise".Maya Mehra concludes that the famine was caused by intentional act of violence on part of Stalin and the Soviet state, but it was not in the legal sense agenocide.InRed Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine, Pulitzer Prize winnerAnne Applebaumsays that the UNdefinition of genocideis overly narrow due to the Soviet influenceon theGenocide Convention, as extensively documented by scholars such as Anton Weiss-Wendt in his bookThe Soviet Union and the Gutting of the UN Genocide Convention.Instead of a broad definition that would have included Soviet crimes, Applebaum writes that genocide "came to mean the physical elimination of an entire ethnic group, in a manner similar to the Holocaust. The Holodomor does not meet that criterion... This is hardly surprising, given that the Soviet Union itself helped shape the language precisely in order to prevent Soviet crimes, including the Holodomor, from being classified as 'genocide'."
Historian Robert Kindler disagrees with calling the famine a genocide, commenting that doing so masks the culpability of lower-level cadres who were locally rooted among the Kazakhs themselves.Kindler goes as far as to say that speaking in terms of genocide with the Holodomor and the famine eclipses "how the nations themselves were responsible for catastrophes"rather than the Soviet Union. However, Sarah Cameron stated that the Soviet decision to have Kazakhs serve as lower-level cadres was "a strategy purposefully designed to shatter old allegiances and sow violent conflict in the Kazakh Awul"
While serving as a Kluge Fellow at theLibrary of Congressfor her research on the famine,Sarah Cameron identified the lack of a strong Kazakh diaspora as part of the reason why there's been no international recognition of the genocide:
InFamine, Memory, and Politics in the Post-Soviet Space: Contrasting Echoes of Collectivization in Ukraine and Kazakhstan,James Richter highlights:
Historian Isabelle Ohayon, among other scholars, noted the importance oforal historiesin Kazakh culture,and wrote of disappearing famine accounts and lack of public narrative and awareness:
It is also important to note that Kazakhstan's government maintains close relations with Russia today,which contributes to its official documentation and statements on the famine as genocide.This connection is based on lasting Soviet ties, intimidation,and the dependence of Kazakhstan's economy on Russian imports, especially basic items such as food and clothing, and 40% of Kazakhstan's market needs are covered by Russia.AsAnne Applebaumexplains current denialism, "Putinismis an oligarchic autocracy that would be in trouble if there was complete freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the rule of law."Only recently with theinvasion of Ukraine in 2022has there been notable disconnect between the allies.
Former PresidentNursultan Nazarbayevof Kazakhstan was noted as careful while speaking of the famine.However, an official inscription at the monument for the famine victims quoted him stating "the hunger that put an entire nation on the brink of disappearing, will never be forgotten",which lends credence to the common speculation that he was trying to appease Moscow in fear of retributionfor recognizing the famine as genocide.