Islamic Emirate of Yemen

TheIslamic Emirate of Yemen(Arabic:إِمَارَةُ ٱلْيَمَنُ ٱلْإِسْلَامِيَّةْ) was a short-lived unrecognised Islamic state established byAl-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsulaafter the2015 Battle of Mukalla, as part of their goal to establish an IslamicemirateinHadhramaut.Mukallawas the headquarters of AQAP, and the capital of the Islamic Emirate of Yemen.
In September 2014, theSaada-based Houthistook controlof Sana'a aftera brief battlewith government forces, ending in an agreement with the government. Though AQAP had previously "declared war" on the Houthis in 2011, significant fighting never occurred as the Houthis were active predominantly in northern Yemen until then.When the Houthis moved into al-Bayda and other neighbouring governorates in October 2014 to purportedly counter the presence of theIslamic State, AQAP allied with the local, predominantly Sunni tribes to mount a fierce resistance against them, claiming 149 attacks against the Houthis by December 2014.By March 2015 the Houthis had captured most of al-Bayda, with AQAP's strongholds remaining in the northeast Qayfa region and the southeast region of the Hamiqan tribe.
In January 2015, AQAP demonstrated their ability to conduct overseas operations whenthey attackedthe headquarters of French magazineCharlie HebdoinParis,France.In February 2015, the Houthis dissolved parliament and set uptheir own governmentafter Hadi resigned as president in protest.Escaping house arrest in Sana'a and moving the government to Aden, Hadi denounced the Houthis and maintained that he still had authority over the government, prompting a split in the military between forces loyal to him and those loyal to former president Saleh, who endorsed the Houthis.In March 2015, aSaudi Arabia-led coalitionmobilized to support the internationally recognized government as the Houthisattempted to push into Aden.AQAP wasn't a priority to the government or coalition, who regarded them as a "bulwark" and ally against the Houthis in the central and southern governorates, effectively placing them on the same side as pro-government forces operating in the regions.Their resistance to the Houthis was especially important in Aden, al-Bayda andTaiz, where they allied with local tribesman and Salafi fighters.AQAP's integration into anti-Houthi fronts allowed them to stretch their influence far beyond their traditional base in the south, with them operating in 82 of Yemen's 333 districts between 2015 and 2016.
Taking davantage of the situation, AQAP andAnsar al-Shariawould begin conquering land across the country and significantly expand their power. In April 2015, AQAP seizedMukalla, the capital of Hadhramaut and the fifth-largest city in Yemen, aftera brief battlewith local tribesman, who were unassisted by the government as the military had fled the city.During the battle, the group looted the local bank, freed hundreds of imprisoned AQAP members (including future emirKhalid Batarfi) and seized military equipment. From there on, Mukalla would serve as the capital of AQAP's Islamic Emirate in the country as they captured large portions of Hadhramaut's southern coast by July 2015.In July 2015, AQAP leaderNasir al-Wuhayshiwas killed in a US drone strike. Despite being labeled significant by the American government, his death did not cause large changes to AQAP's operations in Yemen.AQAP established a significant presenceAdenduring 2015, taking part in its defense against the Houthi offensive alongside pro-government forces before turning on the government and establishing a presence inTawahi,Crater,Khormaksar, andMansouradistricts by August 2015, and openly flying their flag in Tawahi by October 2015.In December 2015, after the Houthis were pushed out of Abyan and Shabwah by pro-government Popular Committees in August, AQAPcaptured Zinjibar, Jaʽār and their surrounding areas.
AQAP continued their territorial expansions into early 2016 by capturingal-Houta, the capital of Lahij governorate, in January.In February 2016, AQAP launchedan offensivein Abyan and Shabwah in a bid to connect their territory from Aden to Hadhramaut. Through the offensive, the group captured much of the regions coast, including major cities such as Azzan, al-Mahfad,Habban, Shuqrah andAhwar.Despite their gains early on, AQAP would go in the defensive for the rest of the year as focus from the government and coalition shifted to them. In February 2016, theUnited Arab Emirates, in cooperation with the government and the Saudi-led coalition, led a campaign against AQAP presence from Aden.By this time, AQAP developed strongholds in the Mansoura andSheikh Othmandistricts. After UAE-backed forcescaptured Mansourain March 2016, AQAP was forced to retreat from their controlled areas in Aden.In April 2016, the UAE and theSouthern Transitional Councilled an operation to recapture Mukalla from AQAP. TheSecond Battle of Mukallalasted for only a day, as AQAP had strategically withdrew from the city and other parts of Hadhramaut to relocate in Abyan and Shabwah and avoid large casualties.Most AQAP forces remaining in Hadhramaut relocated toDaw'an district. In August 2016, pro-government forces drove out AQAP from Zinjibar.Despite losing Mukalla and Zinjibar, AQAP continued to operate in a significant capacity throughout the year, with the capability to conduct large attacks and hold territory.
After witnessing an unprecedented amount of success, The Islamic Emirate would suffer several internal and external challenges which would have its power and territory significantly diminish.
Under newly inaugurated presidentDonald Trump, the United States significantly increased support and cooperation with the Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition against AQAP.in January 2017 when US special forces conducted araid on Yakla, a region in southeastern al-Bayda, with the goal of killing AQAP leaderQasim al-Raymi. The raid failed and ended with al-Raymi surviving and multiple civilians dying, as well as an American soldier.The U.S. declared Abyan, al-Bayda and Shabwa governorates “areas of active hostilities” in March 2017, allowing them to conduct a record series of 27 drone strikes during the month.American special forces participated in several UAE-led offensives during the year through providing support and intelligence.TheUS Air Forcealso provided the coalition with aerial targeting assistance,intelligence sharing, andmid-flight aerial refueling.Altogether, US drone strikes increased from 32 in 2016 to 131 in 2017; the overwhelming approach inflicting numerous losses within AQAP which have been described as "crippling" by late 2017.After an extremely active year in 2017, US operations subsequently decreased significantly in 2018 and 2019.Several military offensives waged by the Yemeni government and its various allies significantly weakened and shrunk AQAP's territory in the southern governorates.The UAE heavily utilized itsproxy groupsin Yemen in order to conduct counterterrorism operations against AQAP. These included theSecurity Belt Forces, which operated in Abyan, Aden and Lahij, the Hadhrami Elite Forces, which operated in Hadhramaut, and the Shabwani Elite Forces, which operated in Shabwah.These forces not only maintained security in their governorates of operation, but were composed solely of locals, providing a source of employment for people in the region and denying AQAP a large recruiting source.In August 2017, the Yemeni military, in conjunction with UAE and Shabwani Elite Forces as well as with American support, launched a major operation to reverse AQAP gains in Shabwah. Through the offensive, the military recaptured Azzan and all major cities in the governorate by the end of August, marking the first time in several years that the government controlled all districts in the governorate.In November 2017, government forces captured al-Mahfad in Abyan, AQAP's last stronghold in the governorate.Despite the offensives, AQAP activities reached a guerilla peak by the end of 2017, their primary target in the year not being from the offensive but the Houthis, with 44 percent of their attacks targeting them.In 2018, the UAE along with its proxy forces launched several operations which cleared AQAP from large swathes of the southern governorates. In February 2018,Operation al-FaisalandOperation Decisive Swordcleared AQAP from a major operations room west of Mukalla and the southern portion of Shabwah respectively.In March 2018,Operation Sweeping Torrentcleared AQAP from portions of Abyan.In April 2018, UAE-led forces launchedOperation Black Mountainsto capture Daw'an district from AQAP, which was achieved in May 2018.In December 2018,Operation Crushing Revengecleared AQAP fromMudyiah districtin Abyan.The operations lead to AQAP dedicating most of their activities towards the Security Belt and Elite groups, rather than the Houthis.They also lead to a decline in AQAP's operations in Hadhramautand Abyansince 2018, and AQAP's overall activates since early 2017.Due to their diminished capability and loss of safe havens in the south, AQAP was pushed further north in Abyan, al-Bayda and Marib governorates.
The intense pressure extorted upon AQAP during this period of time lead to a significant breakdown in the groups cohesion.Group leadership and chain of command was severely crippled due to drone strikes, prompting AQAP to prioritize the maintenance of internal security to prevent spying and further targeted killings.An AQAP-produceddocumentaryseries titled "Demolishing Espionage" revealed that through an investigation the group had exposed a large Saudi intelligence infiltration within their ranks in mid-2018 and accusing them of causing the deaths of many leaders since 2015.After the spy cell was uncovered, AQAP significantly reduced internal communication, leading to isolation and breakdown in collaboration between local cells and senior leadership in planning and conducting attacks.The groups leader figures went into hiding, with members being forbidden to discuss their movements.AQAP also banned the usage of mobile phones and the internet among their members.In late 2019, AQAP announced that they would grantamnestyandanonymityto any spies who confessed and repented to them.
The goal of the Islamic Emirate of Yemen was to establish an Islamic government through law and order alongside a strictsalafiinterpretation ofIslamic law, upon the entire land of Yemen. Abuses were frequently and violently enforced by thereligious police.
AQAP was employed by tribal sheikhs to provide them food and water in exchange for new recruits.The group's members have also married into tribes and established kinships within them, such as with Anwar al-Awlaki marrying into the al-Dhahab tribe.
in January 2016 AQAP launchedal-Masra, a newspaper which ran a total of 57 issues.The newspaper, both distributed in hard copy across their territory and published online through Telegram, covered community worked conducted by AQAP, updates on the entire al-Qaeda network, as well as standard coverage of various world events such as theshooting of Alton Sterlingand theassassination of Jamal Khashoggi.The newspaper was an attempt to position AQAP as a broad international movement amid the rise and dominance of the Islamic State, with interviews and messages from leaders in al-Qaeda core,al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinentandal-Shabaabbeing featured.
The Islamic Emirate's propaganda network began experiencing strain from mid 2017 onwards due to frequent U.S. drone strikes.Though the newspaper was initially supposed to be released multiple times per month, pressure on AQAP led toal-Masranot releasing an issue since July 2017.By 2018, AQAP's media started focusing frequently on spying and internal security. These releases were designed to gain sympathy and deter further spying, such as the film "Secrets, Dangers, and the Departure of the Best", and the video series "Demolishing Espionage."In May 2018, al-Badr Media Foundation, a pro-AQAP media outlet, announced its presence online, with its first release being aPDFdetailing how to avoid detection and assassination from drone strikes.
In November 2014, theIslamic Stateannounced the formation ofits regional branch in Yemen.Despite conducting numerous high-profile attacks during 2015, ISIS-Y found itself isolated due to its brutal tactics, and by late 2016 the group was mostly confined to al-Bayda governorate.Despite conducting some notable attacks in Aden during the year, the group was in decline by late 2017 due in part to US drone strikes and sanctions.By mid-2018, ISIS-Y was eventually pushed into the Qayfa region of al-Bayda, an AQAP stronghold in the governorate.Around this same time, AQAP forces were coincidentally redeploying to al-Bayda due to their losses in the south.According to a deputy governor of al-Bayda, a 'disagreement on properties, interests and positions' in July 2018 lead to a conflict between the two groups which would consume the majority of their media and military activates for multiple years.During the peak of fighting in 2019, more than 50% of AQAP's operations would be conducted against ISIS-Y, and resulted in the deaths of at least a hundred fighters.By late 2019, AQAP was above in the conflict due to tribal distaste of ISIS-Y.
During the time of their rule, the AQAP-led Islamic Emirate leviedincome taxeson individuals ranging from 10 percent to 20 percent, and oncorporationswith a flat 20 percent. In the initial battle for Zinjibar in 2011, AQAP looted the provincial bank in the city, gaining a sum reported to be in the low millions.
The Islamic Emirate was able to gain money through bank robbing and seaport control for smuggling routes.The highlight of their financial gain was through theirde factocapital of Mukalla from 2015 to 2016, which a UAE official described as 'al-Qaeda's lungs' as well as being called the equivalent to the Islamic State's former Syrian capital,Raqqa.During the initial battle in April 2015, AQAP looted the central bank in the city, seizing an estimated $100 million; enough money to fund their operations for ten years according to a Yemeni official.Theport of Mukallaprovided AQAP with a significant source of income in the form of fuel smuggling, where hundreds of oil trucks would arrive at the port to pick up and transport fuel across the country.Through imposing taxes and custom tariffs on shippers and traders, AQAP reportedly earned up to $2 million to $5 million through Mukalla daily.Attempting to legitimize their endeavors as ade factoquasi-state, in October 2015 AQAP attempted to sign a deal with the Yemeni government allowing them toexportoil through the port while receiving a quarter of the profit, though it was immediately rejected.AQAP utilized extortion against state firms during their occupation, such as in January 2016 when they demanded $4.7 million from Yemen's national oil company, receiving $1.4 million.The loss of Mukalla in April 2016 constituted a significant blow to AQAP's funding, though AQAP was allowed to keep their loot from the city in a deal with the government.Altogether, AQAP was estimated to have gained more than $750 million from their brief rule of Mukalla.