South East Asia Command

South East Asia Command(SEAC) was the body set up to be in overall charge ofAlliedoperations in theSouth-East Asian Theatreduring theSecond World War.
The initial supreme commander of the theatre wasGeneralSir Archibald Wavellwhile head of the short-livedAmerican-British-Dutch-Australian Command(ABDACOM) which was dissolved after thefall of Singaporeand theDutch East Indies. On 30 March 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued instructions naming GeneralDouglas MacArthuras commander-in-chief of theSouth West Pacific Area, which was made responsible for the water areas of the South China Sea, Borneo, and Java.
In August 1943, theAlliescreated the combined South East Asian Command, to assume overall command of air, sea and land operations in the theatre. In August 1943, with the agreement of theCombined Chiefs of Staff,Winston ChurchillappointedAdmiralLord Louis Mountbattenas Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia. US ArmyGeneralJoseph Stilwellwas appointed deputy supreme commander. Stilwell was also, officially, deputy toChiang Kai Shek, as Allied commander in China, and commanded all US forces across both theatres (which were known in the US as theChina Burma India (CBI) Theater). Meanwhile the British Army commander in India, Auchinleck asCommander-in-Chief, India, provided vital base support.
Mountbatten arrived in India on 7 Octoberand SEAC came formally into being in Delhi at midnight on 15/16 November.
SEAC headquarters moved in April 1944 toKandyinCeylon.
From the outset, Western Allied forces available for the widerwar against Japanwere limited – by an overall Allied commitment towards defeatingNazi Germany, before theEmpire of Japan. This was especially the case for the UK, and major advances were not anticipated in Asia until mid-late 1944 at least – that is, not until the defeat of Germany had become inevitable.
A strategic focus by the Western Allies on theCentral Pacific(i.e. the "Pacific Ocean Areas" in contemporaneous Allied terminology) and theSouth-West Pacific, resulted from compromises reached at theCasablanca Conference. UK participants were focused on Nazi Germany, and saw the war against Japan being limited "to the defense of a fixed line in front of those positions that must be held".However, because such an approach was unacceptable to the United States, it was agreed that there would be offensive actions in Burma, operations in support of China, and other activity beyond holding a defensive line in South East Asia, as a result of US demands that the Japanese be kept off-balance, throughout any areas in which they might encounter Allied forces.Nevertheless, for the Western Allies, the South East Asia theatre,China, and theNorth Pacific(including Alaska),were destined to become secondary theatres, relative to efforts in the Pacific Ocean Areas, in which the supreme commander was US AdmiralChester Nimitz. Some saw SEAC as an organization for recapturing colonial possessions. The British also sometimes appeared to be more interested in liberating their own Asian possessions than the Americans did. This led Washington to try to distance itself from SEAC politically.
On 2 December 1943, theCombined Chiefs of Staffofficially approved in principle a plan designating the Pacific Ocean Areas as the focus of the main effort against Japan. Their reasoning was that advances in the Central Pacific were the most rapid route towards sustained, direct attacks on the JapaneseHome Islands– e.g. subjectingTokyoand other major cities toattacks by strategic bombers. A secondary line of advance – by US andAustralian forces– "along the New Guinea-N.E.I.-Philippine axis", was to be controlled by the separateSouth West Pacific Areacommand underDouglas MacArthur(US Army).
The initial land forces operational area for SEAC wasIndia,Burma,Ceylon,Malaya, northern islands ofSumatra, and, for offensive operations,Siam(Thailand). On 15 August 1945 (VJ-Day) this was expanded to include the rest parts ofDutch East Indiesand southern part ofFrench Indochina.
Command arrangements in SEAC were always complicated. Ideally there should have been under the Supreme Commander a Commander in Chief for each of the land sea and air forces. This was implemented for the naval and air forces (including the establishment ofAir Command, South East Asia) but the British11th Army Group, under SEAC itself, controlled only British land forces. US and Chinese forces serving in the South East Asian theatre, organised as theNorthern Combat Area Commandor NCAC commanded by Stilwell, answered directly to the Supreme Commander because Stilwell refused to serve under the 11th Army Group commanderGeorge Giffard.The Eleventh Army Group had theFourteenth Armyon the Burma front, and theBritish garrisonin Ceylon under its direct command. Stilwell also served as Chief of Staff toChiang Kai-shek, who was officially the Supreme Allied Commander in China. Air Chief Marshal SirRichard Peirsewas appointed the Air Commander in Chief under Mountbatten. Air units taking part in the Burma Campaign were, at first, part of either theRAF Third Tactical Air Forceor theUSAAFTenth Air Force. Tenth Air Force came under SEAC only through Stilwell as commanding General CBI Theater. To avoid a potentially cumbersomechain of commandand overlapping effort Mountbatten gave orders in December for the two air forces to be integrated under the name Eastern Air Command. The USFourteenth Air Force, which was based in China and the USTwentieth Air Force– strategic bomber units based in India – were never controlled by SEAC but their operations were coordinated with SEAC. At sea, the command structure was relatively simple, since theRoyal Navywas providing almost all naval forces in the area. Admiral SirJames Somerville, Commander-in-Chief,Eastern Fleet, became the naval commander under Mountbatten.
It was not until late 1944 that the land forces chain of command was clarified, after Stilwell was recalled to Washington. His overall role, and the CBI command were then split among three people: Lt Gen.Raymond Wheelerbecame Deputy Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia; Maj. Gen.Albert Wedemeyerbecame Chief of Staff to Chiang, and commander of US Forces, China Theater (USFCT). Lt Gen.Daniel Sultanwas promoted, from deputy commander of CBI to commander of US Forces, India-Burma Theater (USFIBT) and commander of the NCAC. The 11th Army Group was redesignatedAllied Land Forces South East Asia(ALFSEA) under a new commander Lieutenant-GeneralOliver Leesewho had relinquished command of theEighth Armyin Italy, and NCAC (which by this time included Chinese, American and British units) was placed under ALFSEA.As the drive to liberate Burma began in earnest however, Chiang Kai-shek and Wedemeyer made increasing demands for NCAC's formations to be moved to the China Theatre to meet the threat of Japanese attacks from the north. Once theBurma Roadfrom Mandalay to Chungking was secured NCAC became passive and in March 1945 Mountbatten agreed to the US and Chinese troops in NCAC being gradually withdrawn to the China.
RAF aircraft destined for SEAC had the word "SNAKE" applied after theserialduringferryingto prevent them being appropriated by other commands along the route.
In February 1945 Air MarshalKeith Parkwas appointed Allied Air Commander of South-East Asia Command [SEAC] where he served until the end of the war.
Once most of Burma was re-captured by Fourteenth Army, the command turned its attention towards its next major operational objective: Malaya. However, the use of atomic bombs on the Japanese mainland brought the war to an abrupt end.
The borders of SEAC were adjusted in the aftermath of the war, and its emphasis shifted from combat operations to military government. French Indochina was added, along withBorneo– most of which had already been captured by Australian forces, under theSouth West Pacific Command– andJava. The command became responsible for over 128 million people, with at least 120,000 of them still under Japanese custody.This added immensely to its problems. At the same time, Western governments expected SEAC to re-establish colonial regimes in territories lost to Japan in 1941–45 where nationalist, anti-colonial forces had gained strength.
After Japan's surrender, Lt. GeneralItagaki Seishiro, who commanded theJapanese Seventh Area Armyin Southeast Asia, were sent to Tokyo to stand trial for war crime. His soldiers who guarded the Jurong and Changi prisons in Singapore became captives of their former Allied prisoners. The British soon put these captives to work filling bomb craters, cleaning toilets, and cutting grass. They marched to their work sites each morning and back to their prisons at night. There were bouts of violence targeting former Japanese soldiers, but there were also offers of help to those Japanese civilians that were still waiting to be repatriated.
Food shortages were everywhere. Requisitions by the Japanese military during the war had encouraged the hoarding but discouraged the growing of rice. Migrations to urban areas, where rations were rumored to be more available, worsened the situation. In Kuala Lumpur, Pahang, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Singapore, over 20 per cent of children were undersized or malnourished for their age. The British tried to bring in as much food as they could, but the system of rationing soon broke down. Prices soared, and a black market for British military ration flourished. Rising inflation was made worse after the British demonetized the Japanese occupation currency. A wave of strikes swept Singapore, led by Communist leaning labour unions and hundreds of thousands their members.
British Commonwealthtroops were landed in theDutch East Indies(Indonesia) andFrench Indochinato facilitate the return of forces from the pre-war colonial powers. The formation deployed to the East Indies was theIndian XV Corpsunder command of Lieutenant GeneralSir Philip Christison, which included5th Indian Infantry Division,23rd Indian Infantry Divisionand5th Parachute Brigade.Military government was soon established in Burma, Malaya, Singapore andBritish Borneo.Sarawakand Sumatra did not prove to be major headaches for the British, except that one Japanese unit in Borneo refused to surrender until November 1945.
Thailand, although it had officially been an ally of Japan, quickly resumed both its independence and its ties with the western powers.
Because of shortages of personnel, some use was made ofJapanese Surrendered Personnel(JSP) in these areas. The Allies found that their war-time allies in theViet Minhin Indochina, and Indonesian nationalist forces in the East Indies, were well armed, well-organised and determined. It was intended that British forces would temporarily enforce military government over a small section of Indochina, because of local resistance, logistics and French sensibilities. However, in the end the commander of British forces declaredde factomilitary government, to make it possible for French forces to return.
Aided by armed militias formed by the Japanese during the occupation, Indonesian nationalists in Java declared the Dutch East Indies a republic, and independent from theNetherlands. The British intended that the Dutch colonial administration should return, and assisted a small military contingent, theNetherlands Indies Civil Administration(NICA). However they initially avoided significant conflict with the nationalists. It was only possible for British forces to establish military government in parts of Indonesia, and they found that the location of Allied prisoners of war – and civilians interned by Japanese forces – were sometimes used by nationalists in bargaining for political ends.
British troops found themselves in increasing conflict with the nationalists. The nationalists attacked JSP garrisons awaiting repatriation, to seize their arms. A British Brigadier,A. W. S. Mallaby, was killed, as he pushed for the nationalists to surrender their weapons.  As a result, on 10 November 1945, Surabaya was attacked by British forces, leading to the bloodyBattle of Surabaya. The city was secured later that month. The battle for Surabaya was the bloodiest single engagement of theIndonesian National Revolution(1945–49). However, the British were reluctant to devote their scarce resources to a defence of Dutch interests, and withdrew from Indonesia.
As 1946 drew on, under its second and final commander, Lieutenant-GeneralMontagu Stopford(June to November 1946), SEAC discharged its final tasks and was disbanded. It was no longer felt that a joint command was needed in the area.
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