Soviet–Afghan War

TheSoviet–Afghan Warwas anarmed conflictthat took place in theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistanfrom December 1979 to February 1989. Marking the beginning of the 46-year-longAfghan conflict, it saw theSoviet Unionand theAfghan militaryfight against the rebellingAfghan mujahideen. While they were backed by various countries and organizations, the majority of the mujahideen's support came fromPakistan, theUnited States(as part ofOperation Cyclone), theUnited Kingdom,China,Iran, and theArab states of the Persian Gulf, in addition to a large influx of foreign fighters known as theAfghan Arabs. American and British involvement on the side of the mujahideen escalated theCold War, ending a short period of relaxedSoviet Union–United States relations. Combat took place throughout the 1980s, mostly in the Afghan countryside, as most of the country's cities remained under Soviet control. The conflict resulted in the deaths of one to three million Afghans, while millions morefled from the country as refugees; most externally displaced Afghans sought refugein Pakistanandin Iran. Between 6.5 and 11.5%of Afghanistan's erstwhile population of 13.5 million people (per the 1979 census) is estimated to have been killed over the course of the Soviet–Afghan War. The decade-long confrontation between the mujahideen and the Soviet and Afghan militaries inflicted grave destruction throughout Afghanistan and has also been cited by scholars as a significant factor that contributed to thedissolution of the Soviet Unionin 1991; it is for this reason that the conflict is sometimes referred to as "the Soviet Union'sVietnam" in retrospective analyses.
In March 1979, there had been aviolent uprising in Herat, wherein a number of Soviet military advisers were executed. The rulingPeople's Democratic Party of Afghanistan(PDPA), which had determined that it could not subdue the uprising by itself, asked for urgent Soviet military assistance; in 1979, over 20 requests were sent. Soviet premierAlexei Kosygin, declining to send troops, advised in one call to Afghan prime ministerNur Muhammad Tarakito use local industrial workers in the province. This was apparently on the belief that these workers would be supporters of the Afghan government. This was discussed further in the Soviet Union with a wide range of views, mainly split between those who wanted to ensure that Afghanistan remained asocialist stateand those who were concerned that the unrest would escalate. Eventually, a compromise was reached to send military aid, but not troops.
The conflict began when theSoviet military, under the command ofLeonid Brezhnev, moved into Afghanistan to support the Afghan administration that had been installed duringOperation Storm-333.Debate over their presence in the country soon ensued in international channels, with theMuslim worldand theWestern Blocclassifying it as an invasion, while theEastern Blocasserted that it was a legal intervention. Nevertheless, numerous sanctions and embargoes were imposed on the Soviet Union by the international community shortly after the beginning of the conflict. Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan's major cities and all main arteries of communication, whereas the mujahideen waged guerrilla warfare in small groups across the 80% of the country that was not subject to uncontested Soviet control—almost exclusively comprising the rugged, mountainous terrain of the countryside. In addition to laying millions of landmines across Afghanistan, the Soviets used their aerial power to deal harshly with both Afghan resistance and civilians, levelling villages to deny safe haven to the mujahideen, destroying vital irrigation ditches and other infrastructure through tactics ofscorched earth.
The Soviet government had initially planned to swiftly secure Afghanistan's towns and road networks, stabilize the PDPA, and withdraw all of their military forces in a span of six months to one year. However, they were met with fierce resistance from Afghan guerrillas and experienced great operational difficulties on the rugged mountainous terrain. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan had increased to approximately 115,000 troops and fighting across the country intensified; the complication of the war effort gradually inflicted a high cost on the Soviet Union as military, economic, and political resources became increasingly exhausted. By mid-1987, reformist Soviet leaderMikhail Gorbachevannounced that the Soviet military would begin acomplete withdrawal from Afghanistan. The final wave of disengagement was initiated on 15 May 1988, and on 15 February 1989, the last Soviet military column occupying Afghanistan crossed into theUzbek SSR. With continued external Soviet backing, the PDPA government pursued a solo war effort against the mujahideen, and the conflict evolved into theAfghan Civil War. However, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, all support to the Democratic Republic was pulled, leading to the toppling of the government at the hands of the mujahideen in 1992 and the start of a secondAfghan Civil Warshortly thereafter.
In Afghanistan, the war is usually called theSoviet war in Afghanistan(Pashto:په افغانستان کې شوروی جګړه,romanized:Pah Afghanistan ke Shuravi Jagera;Dari:جنگ شوروی در افغانستان,romanized:Jang-eShuravidar Afghanestan). In Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, it is usually called theAfghan war(Russian:Афганская война;Ukrainian:Війна в Афганістані;Belarusian:Афганская вайна;Uzbek:Afgʻon urushi); it is sometimes simply referred to as "Afgan" (Russian:Афган), with the understanding that this refers to the war (just as theVietnam Waris often called "Vietnam" or just"'Nam" in theUnited States).It is also known as theAfghan jihad, especially by the non-Afghan volunteers of the Mujahideen.
In the 19th century, theBritish Empirewas fearful that theRussian Empirewould invade Afghanistan and use it to threaten the largeBritish colonies in India. This regional rivalry was called the "Great Game". In 1885, Russian forces seized a disputed oasis south of theOxus Riverfrom Afghan forces, which became known as thePanjdeh Incident. The border was agreed by the joint Anglo-RussianAfghan Boundary Commissionof 1885–1887. TheRussian interest in Afghanistancontinued through the Soviet era, with billions in economic and military aid sent to Afghanistan between 1955 and 1978.
FollowingAmanullah Khan's ascent to the throne in 1919 and the subsequentThird Anglo-Afghan War, the British conceded Afghanistan's full independence. King Amanullah afterwards wrote toRussia(now underBolshevikcontrol) desiring for permanent friendly relations.Vladimir Leninreplied by congratulating the Afghans for their defence against the British, and a treaty of friendship between Afghanistan and Russia was finalized in 1921. The Soviets saw possibilities in an alliance with Afghanistan against the United Kingdom, such as using it as a base for a revolutionary advance towardsBritish-controlled India.
TheRed Armyintervened in Afghanistan to suppress the IslamicBasmachi movementin1929and1930, supporting the ousted king Amanullah, as part of theAfghan Civil War(1928–1929).The Basmachi movement had originated ina 1916 revoltagainst Russian conscription duringWorld War I, bolstered by Turkish generalEnver Pashaduring theCaucasus campaign. Afterwards, the Soviet Army deployed around 120,000–160,000 troops in Central Asia, a force similar to the peak strength of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in size.By 1926–1928, the Basmachis were mostly defeated by the Soviets, and Central Asia was incorporated into the Soviet Union.In 1929, the Basmachi rebellion reignited, associated with anti-forced collectivizationriots.Basmachis crossed over into Afghanistan underIbrahim Bek, which gave a pretext for the Red Army interventions in 1929 and 1930.
TheSoviet Union(USSR) had been a major power broker and influential mentor inAfghan politics, its involvement ranging from civil-military infrastructure to Afghan society.Since 1947, Afghanistan had been under the influence of the Soviet government and received large amounts of aid, economic assistance, military equipment training and military hardware from the Soviet Union. Economic assistance and aid had been provided to Afghanistan as early as 1919, shortly after theRussian Revolutionand when the regime was facing theRussian Civil War. Provisions were given in the form ofsmall arms, ammunition, a few aircraft, and (according to debated Soviet sources) a million goldrublesto support the resistance during theThird Anglo-Afghan Warin 1919. In 1942, the USSR again moved to strengthen theAfghan Armed Forcesby providing small arms and aircraft and establishing training centers inTashkent,Uzbek SSR. Soviet-Afghan military cooperation began on a regular basis in 1956, and further agreements were made in the 1970s, which saw the USSR send advisers and specialists. The Soviets also had interests in the energy resources of Afghanistan, including oil and natural gas exploration from the 1950s and 1960s.The USSR began to import Afghan gas from 1968 onwards.Between 1954 and 1977, the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan with economic aid worth of about 1 billion rubles.
In the 19th century, with the Czarist Russian forces moving closer to thePamir Mountains, near the border with British India, civil servantMortimer Durandwas sent to outline a border, likely in order to control theKhyber Pass. The demarcation of the mountainous region resulted in an agreement, signed with the Afghan Emir,Abdur Rahman Khan, in 1893. It became known as theDurand Line.
In 1947, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Afghanistan,Mohammad Daoud Khan, rejected the Durand Line, which had been accepted as an international border by successive Afghan governments for over half a century.
TheBritish Rajalso came to an end, and theDominion of Pakistangained independence from British India and inherited the Durand Line as its frontier with Afghanistan.
Under the regime of Daoud Khan, Afghanistan had hostile relations with both Pakistan and Iran.Like all previous Afghan rulers since 1901, Daoud Khan also wanted to emulate EmirAbdur Rahman Khanand unite his divided country.
To do that, he needed a popular cause to unite the Afghan people divided along tribal lines, and a modern, well equipped Afghan army which would be used to suppress anyone who would oppose the Afghan government. HisPashtunistanpolicy was to annex Pashtun areas of Pakistan, and he used this policy for his own benefit.
Daoud Khan'sirredentistforeign policy to reunite thePashtunhomeland caused much tension with Pakistan, a state that allied itself with the United States.The policy had also angered the non-Pashtun population of Afghanistan,and similarly, the Pashtun population in Pakistan were also not interested in having their areas being annexed by Afghanistan.In 1951, the U.S. State Department urged Afghanistan to drop its claim against Pakistan and accept the Durand Line.
In 1954, the United States began selling arms to its ally Pakistan, while refusing an Afghan request to buy arms, out of fear that the Afghans would use the weapons against Pakistan.As a consequence, Afghanistan, though officially neutral in the Cold War, drew closer to India and the Soviet Union, which were willing to sell them weapons.In 1962, China defeated India in aborder war, and as a result, China formed an alliance with Pakistan against their common enemy, India, pushing Afghanistan even closer to India and the Soviet Union.
In 1960 and 1961, the Afghan Army, on the orders of Daoud Khan following his policy ofPashtun irredentism, made two unsuccessful incursions into Pakistan'sBajaur District. In both cases, the Afghan army wasrouted, suffering heavy casualties.In response, Pakistan closed its consulate in Afghanistan and blocked all trade routes through the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. This damaged Afghanistan's economy and Daoud's regime was pushed towards closer alliance with the Soviet Union for trade. However, these stopgap measures were not enough to compensate the loss suffered by Afghanistan's economy because of the border closure. As a result of continued resentment against Daoud's autocratic rule, close ties with the Soviet Union and economic downturn, Daoud Khan was forced to resign by the King of Afghanistan,Mohammed Zahir Shah. Following his resignation, the crisis between Pakistan and Afghanistan was resolved and Pakistan re-opened the trade routes.After the removal of Daoud Khan, the King installed a new prime minister and started creating a balance in Afghanistan's relation with the West and the Soviet Union,which angered the Soviet Union.
In 1973, Daoud Khan, supported by Soviet-trained Afghan Army officers and a large base of theAfghan Commando Forces, seized power from the King in abloodless coup, and established the first Afghanrepublic.Following his return to power, Daoud revived his Pashtunistan policy and for the first time startedproxy warringagainst Pakistanby supporting anti-Pakistani groups and providing them with arms, training and sanctuaries.The Pakistani government of prime ministerZulfikar Ali Bhuttowas alarmed by this.The Soviet Union also supported Daoud Khan's militancy against Pakistanas they wanted to weaken Pakistan, which was an ally of both the United States and China. However, it did not openly try to create problems for Pakistan as that would damage the Soviet Union's relations with other Islamic countries, hence it relied on Daoud Khan to weaken Pakistan. They had the same thought regarding Iran, another major U.S. ally. The Soviet Union also believed that the hostile behaviour of Afghanistan against Pakistan and Iran could alienate Afghanistan from the west, and Afghanistan would be forced into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union.The pro-Soviet Afghans (such as thePeople's Democratic Party of Afghanistan(PDPA)) also supported Daoud Khan's hostility towards Pakistan, as they believed that a conflict with Pakistan would induce Afghanistan to seek aid from the Soviet Union. As a result, the pro-Soviet Afghans would be able to establish their influence over Afghanistan.
In response to Afghanistan's proxy war, Pakistan started supporting Afghans who were critical of Daoud Khan's policies. Bhutto authorized a covert operation underMI'sMajor-GeneralNaseerullah Babar.In 1974, Bhutto authorized another secret operation inKabulwhere theInter-Services Intelligence(ISI) and theAir Intelligence of Pakistan(AI) extraditedBurhanuddin Rabbani,Gulbuddin HekmatyarandAhmad Shah MassoudtoPeshawar, amid fear that Rabbani, Hekmatyar and Massoud might be assassinated by Daoud.According to Baber, Bhutto's operation was an excellent idea and it had hard-hitting impact on Daoud and his government, which forced Daoud to increase his desire to make peace with Bhutto.Pakistan's goal was to overthrow Daoud's regime and establish an Islamist theocracy in its place.The first ever ISI operation in Afghanistan took place in 1975,supporting militants from theJamiat-e Islamiparty, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, attempting to overthrow the government. They started their rebellion in thePanjshir valley, but lack of support along with government forces easily defeating them made it a failure, and a sizable portion of the insurgents soughtrefugein Pakistan where they enjoyed the support of Bhutto's government.
The 1975 rebellion, though unsuccessful, shook President Daoud Khan and made him realize that a friendly Pakistan was in his best interests.He started improving relations with Pakistan and made state visits there in 1976 and 1978. During the 1978 visit, he agreed to stop supporting anti-Pakistan militants and to expel any remaining militants in Afghanistan. In 1975, Daoud Khan established his own party, theNational Revolutionary Party of Afghanistanand outlawed all other parties. He then started removing members of itsParchamwing from government positions, including the ones who had supported his coup, and started replacing them with familiar faces from Kabul's traditional government elites. Daoud also started reducing his dependence on the Soviet Union. As a consequence of Daoud's actions, Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated.In 1978, after witnessing India's nuclear test,Smiling Buddha, Daoud Khan initiated a military buildup to counter Pakistan'sarmed forcesand Iranianmilitary influencein Afghan politics.
TheMarxistPeople's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's strength grew considerably after its foundation. In 1967, the PDPA split into two rival factions, theKhalq(Masses) faction headed byNur Muhammad Tarakiand theParcham(Flag) faction led byBabrak Karmal.Symbolic of the different backgrounds of the two factions were the fact that Taraki's father was a poor Pashtun herdsman while Karmal's father was a Tajik general in the Royal Afghan Army.More importantly, the radical Khalq faction believed in rapidly transforming Afghanistan, if necessary even using violence, from afeudal systeminto a Communist society, while the moderate Parcham faction favored a more gradualist and gentler approach, arguing that Afghanistan was simply not ready for Communism and would not be for some time.The Parcham faction favored building up the PDPA as a mass party in support of the Daoud Khan government, while the Khalq faction were organized in the Leninist style as a small, tightly organized elite group, allowing the latter to enjoy ascendancy over the former.In 1971, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul reported that there had been increasing leftist activity in the country, attributed to disillusionment of social and economic conditions, and the poor response from the Kingdom's leadership. It added that the PDPA was "perhaps the most disgruntled and organized of the country's leftist groups."
Intense opposition from factions of the PDPA was sparked by the repression imposed on them by Daoud's regime and the death of a leading PDPA member,Mir Akbar Khyber.The mysterious circumstances of Khyber's death sparked massive anti-Daoud demonstrations inKabul, which resulted in the arrest of several prominent PDPA leaders.On 27 April 1978, theAfghan Army, which had been sympathetic to the PDPA cause, overthrew and executed Daoud along with members of his family.The Finnish scholar Raimo Väyrynen wrote about the so-called "Saur Revolution": "There is a multitude of speculations on the real nature of this coup. The reality appears to be that it was inspired first of all by domestic economic and political concerns and that the Soviet Union did not play any role in the Saur Revolution".After this theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan(DRA) was formed. Nur Muhammad Taraki, General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, became Chairman of theRevolutionary CouncilandChairman of the Council of Ministersof the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. On 5 December 1978, a treaty of friendship was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.
After the revolution, Taraki assumed the leadership, prime ministership and general secretaryship of the PDPA. As before in the party, the government never referred to itself as "communist".The government was divided along factional lines, with Taraki and Deputy Prime MinisterHafizullah Aminof the Khalq faction pitted against Parcham leaders such as Babrak Karmal. Though the new regime promptly allied itself to the Soviet Union, many Soviet diplomats believed that the Khalqi plans to transform Afghanistan would provoke a rebellion from the general population, which was socially and religiously conservative.Immediately after coming to power, the Khalqis began to persecute the Parchamis, not the least because the Soviet Union favored the Parchami faction whose "go slow" plans were felt to be better suited for Afghanistan, thereby leading the Khalqis to eliminate their rivals so the Soviets would have no other choice but to back them.Within the PDPA, conflicts resulted inexiles,purgesand executions of Parcham members.The Khalq state executed between 10,000 and 27,000 people, mostly atPul-e-Charkhi prison, prior to the Soviet intervention.Political scientistOlivier Royestimated between 50,000 and 100,000 people disappeared during the Taraki–Amin period:
During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA applied a Soviet-style program of modernizing reforms, many of which were viewed by conservatives as opposing Islam.Decrees setting forth changes in marriage customs andland reformwere not received well by a population deeply immersed in tradition and Islam, particularly by the powerful landowners harmed economically by the abolition ofusury(although usury is prohibited in Islam) and the cancellation of farmers' debts. The new government also enhanced women's rights, sought a rapid eradication ofilliteracyand promoted Afghanistan's ethnic minorities, although these programs appear to have had an effect only in the urban areas.By mid-1978, a rebellion started, with rebels attacking the local militarygarrisonin theNuristanregion of eastern Afghanistan and soon civil war spread throughout the country. In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin seized power, arresting and killing Taraki. More than two months of instability overwhelmed Amin's regime as he moved against his opponents in the PDPA and the growing rebellion.
Even before the revolutionaries came to power, Afghanistan was "a militarily and politically neutral nation, effectively dependent on the Soviet Union."A treaty, signed in December 1978, allowed the Democratic Republic to call upon the Soviet Union for military support.
Following theHerat uprising, the first major sign of anti-regime resistance, General Secretary TarakicontactedAlexei Kosygin,chairmanof theUSSR Council of Ministersand asked for "practical and technical assistance with men and armament". Kosygin was unfavorable to the proposal on the basis of the negative political repercussions such an action would have for his country, and he rejected all further attempts by Taraki to solicit Soviet military aid in Afghanistan.Following Kosygin's rejection, Taraki requested aid fromLeonid Brezhnev, thegeneral secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet UnionandSoviet head of state, who warned Taraki that full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies – both yours and ours". Brezhnev also advised Taraki to ease up on the drastic social reforms and to seek broader support for his regime.
In 1979, Taraki attended a conference of theNon-Aligned MovementinHavana, Cuba. On his way back, he stopped in Moscow on 20 March and met with Brezhnev,Soviet Foreign MinisterAndrei Gromykoand other Soviet officials. It was rumoured that Karmal was present at the meeting in an attempt to reconcile Taraki's Khalq faction and the Parcham against Amin and his followers. At the meeting, Taraki was successful in negotiating some Soviet support, including the redeployment of two Soviet armed divisions at the Soviet-Afghan border, the sending of 500 military and civilian advisers and specialists and the immediate delivery of Soviet armed equipment sold at 25 percent below the original price; however, the Soviets were not pleased about the developments in Afghanistan and Brezhnev impressed upon Taraki the need for party unity. Despite reaching this agreement with Taraki, the Soviets continued to be reluctant to intervene further in Afghanistan and repeatedly refused Soviet military intervention within Afghan borders during Taraki's rule as well as later during Amin's short rule.
Taraki and Amin's regime even attempted to eliminate Parcham's leader Babrak Karmal. After being relieved of his duties as ambassador, he remained inCzechoslovakiain exile, fearing for his life if he returned as the regime requested. He and his family were protected by the CzechoslovakStB; files from January 1979 revealed information that Afghanistan sentAGSAspies to Czechoslovakia to find and assassinate Karmal.
In 1978, the Taraki government initiated a series of reforms, including a radical modernization of the traditional Islamic civil law, especially marriage law, aimed at "uprootingfeudalism" in Afghan society.The government brooked no opposition to the reformsand responded with violence to unrest. Between April 1978 and the Soviet Intervention of December 1979, thousands of prisoners, perhaps as many as 27,000, were executed at the notoriousPul-e-Charkhi prison, including many villagemullahsand headmen.Other members of the traditional elite, the religious establishment andintelligentsiafled the country.
Large parts of the country went into open rebellion. The Parcham Government claimed that 11,000 were executed during the Amin/Taraki period in response to the revolts.The revolt began in October among theNuristanitribes of theKunar Valleyin the northeastern part of the country near the border with Pakistan, and rapidly spread among the other ethnic groups. By the spring of 1979, 24 of the 28 provinces had suffered outbreaks of violence.The rebellion began to take hold in the cities: in March 1979 inHerat, rebels led byIsmail Khanrevolted. Between 3,000 and 5,000 people were killed and wounded during the Herat revolt. Some 100 Soviet citizens and their families were killed.By August 1979, up to 165,000 Afghans had fled across the border to Pakistan.The main reason the revolt spread so widely was the disintegration of the Afghan army in a series of insurrections.The numbers of the Afghan army fell from 110,000 men in 1978 to 25,000 by 1980.The U.S. embassy in Kabul cabled to Washington the army was melting away "like an ice floe in a tropical sea".According to scholar Gilles Dorronsoro, it was the violence of the state rather than its reforms that caused the uprisings.
Pakistani intelligence officials began privately lobbying the U.S. and its allies to send materiel assistance to the Islamist rebels. Pakistani PresidentMuhammad Zia-ul-Haq's ties with the U.S. had been strained duringJimmy Carter'spresidencydue to Pakistan's nuclear program and the execution ofZulfikar Ali Bhuttoin April 1979, but Carter told National Security AdviserZbigniew Brzezinskiand Secretary of StateCyrus Vanceas early as January 1979 that it was vital to "repair our relationships with Pakistan" in light of theunrest in Iran.According to formerCentral Intelligence Agency(CIA) officialRobert Gates, "the Carter administration turned to CIA ... to counter Soviet and Cuban aggression in the Third World, particularly beginning in mid-1979." In March 1979, "CIA sent several covert action options relating to Afghanistan to the SCC [Special Coordination Committee]" of theUnited States National Security Council. At a 30 March meeting, U.S.Department of DefenserepresentativeWalter B. Slocombe"asked if there was value in keeping the Afghan insurgency going, 'sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire?'"When asked to clarify this remark, Slocombe explained: "Well, the whole idea was that if the Soviets decided to strike at this tar baby [Afghanistan] we had every interest in making sure that they got stuck."Yet a 5 April memo fromNational Intelligence OfficerArnold Horelick warned: "Covert action would raise the costs to the Soviets and inflame Moslem opinion against them in many countries. The risk was that a substantial U.S. covert aid program could raise the stakes and induce the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously than otherwise intended."
In May 1979, U.S. officials secretly began meeting with rebel leaders through Pakistani government contacts.After additional meetings Carter signed two presidential findings in July 1979 permitting the CIA to spend $695,000 on non-military assistance (e.g., "cash, medical equipment, and radio transmitters") and on a propaganda campaign targeting the Soviet-backed leadership of the DRA, which (in the words ofSteve Coll) "seemed at the time a small beginning."
The Amin government, having secured a treaty in December 1978 that allowed them to call on Soviet forces, repeatedly requested the introduction of troops in Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 1979. They requested Soviet troops to provide security and to assist in the fight against the mujahideen ("Those engaged injihad") rebels. After thekilling of Soviet technicians in Heratby rioting mobs, the Soviet government sold severalMi-24 helicoptersto the Afghan military. On 14 April 1979, the Afghan government requested that the USSR send 15 to 20 helicopters with their crews to Afghanistan, and on 16 June, the Soviet government responded and sent a detachment of tanks,BMPs, and crews to guard the government in Kabul and to secure theBagramandShindandair bases. In response to this request, an airborne battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Lomakin, arrived at Bagram on 7 July. They arrived without their combat gear, disguised as technical specialists. They were the personal bodyguards for General Secretary Taraki. The paratroopers were directly subordinate to the senior Soviet military advisor and did not interfere in Afghan politics. Several leading politicians at the time such asAlexei KosyginandAndrei Gromykowere against intervention.
After a month, the Afghan requests were no longer for individual crews and subunits, but for regiments and larger units. In July, the Afghan government requested that two motorized rifle divisions be sent to Afghanistan. The following day, they requested an airborne division in addition to the earlier requests. They repeated these requests and variants to these requests over the following months right up to December 1979. However, the Soviet government was in no hurry to grant them.
Based on information from theKGB, Soviet leaders felt that Prime MinisterHafizullah Amin's actions had destabilized the situation in Afghanistan. Following his initial coup against and killing ofTaraki, the KGB station in Kabul warned Moscow that Amin's leadership would lead to "harsh repressions, and as a result, the activation and consolidation of the opposition."
The Soviets established a special commission on Afghanistan, comprising theKGB chairmanYuri Andropov,Boris Ponomarevfrom theCentral CommitteeandDmitry Ustinov, theMinister of Defence. In late April 1979, the committee reported that Amin was purging his opponents, including Soviet loyalists, that his loyalty to Moscow was in question and that he was seeking diplomatic links with Pakistan and possibly the People's Republic of China (which at the time hadpoor relations with the Soviet Union). Of specific concern were Amin's supposed meetings with the U.S. chargé d'affaires,J. Bruce Amstutz, which were used as a justification for the invasion by theKremlin.
Information forged by the KGB from its agents in Kabul provided the last arguments to eliminate Amin. Supposedly, two of Amin's guards killed the former General Secretary Nur Muhammad Taraki with a pillow, and Amin himself was portrayed as a CIA agent. The latter is widely discredited, with Amin repeatedly demonstrating friendliness toward the various delegates of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and maintaining the pro-Soviet line.Soviet GeneralVasily Zaplatin, a political advisor ofPremierBrezhnev at the time, claimed that four of General Secretary Taraki's ministers were responsible for the destabilization. However, Zaplatin failed to emphasize this in discussions and was not heard.
During meetings between General Secretary Taraki and Soviet leaders in March 1979, the Soviets promised political support and to send military equipment and technical specialists, but upon repeated requests by Taraki for direct Soviet intervention, the leadership adamantly opposed him; reasons included that they would be met with "bitter resentment" from the Afghan people, that intervening in another country's civil war would hand a propaganda victory to their opponents, and Afghanistan's overall inconsequential weight in international affairs, in essence realizing they had little to gain by taking over a country with a poor economy, unstable government, and population hostile to outsiders. However, as the situation continued to deteriorate from May–December 1979, Moscow changed its mind on dispatching Soviet troops. The reasons for this complete turnabout are not entirely clear, and several speculative arguments include: the grave internal situation and inability for the Afghan government to retain power much longer; the effects of theIranian Revolutionthat brought an Islamic theocracy into power, leading to fears that religious fanaticism would spread through Afghanistan and into Soviet Muslim Central Asian republics; Taraki's murder and replacement by Amin, who the Soviet leadership believed had secret contacts within theAmerican embassy in Kabuland "was capable of reaching an agreement with theUnited States";however, allegations of Amin colluding with the Americans have been widely discredited and it was revealed in the 1990s that theKGBactually planted the story;and the deteriorating ties with the United States afterNATO's two-track missile deployment decisionin response to Soviet nuclear presence in Eastern Europe and the failure of Congress to ratify theSALT IItreaty, creating the impression thatdétentewas "already effectively dead."
The British journalist Patrick Brogan wrote in 1989: "The simplest explanation is probably the best. They got sucked into Afghanistan much as the United States got sucked into Vietnam, without clearly thinking through the consequences, and wildly underestimating the hostility they would arouse".By the fall of 1979, the Amin regime was collapsing with morale in the Afghan Army having fallen to rock-bottom levels, while the mujahideen had taken control of much of the countryside. The general consensus amongst Afghan experts at the time was that it was not a question of if, but when the mujahideen would take Kabul.
In October 1979, a KGB Spetsnaz forceZenithcovertly dispatched a group of specialists to determine the potential reaction from local Afghans to a presence of Soviet troops there. They concluded that deploying troops would be unwise and could lead to war, but this was reportedly ignored by the KGB chairmanYuri Andropov. A Spetsnazbattalion of Central Asian troops, dressed in Afghan Army uniforms, was covertly deployed to Kabul between 9 and 12 November 1979. They moved a few days later to theTajbeg Palace, where Amin was moving to.
In Moscow,Leonid Brezhnevwas indecisive and waffled as he usually did when faced with a difficult decision.The three decision-makers in Moscow who pressed the hardest for an invasion in the fall of 1979 were the troika consisting of Foreign MinisterAndrei Gromyko; the Chairman of KGB,Yuri Andropov, and the Defense Minister MarshalDmitry Ustinov.The principal reasons for the invasion were the belief in Moscow that Amin was a leader both incompetent and fanatical who had lost control of the situation, together with the belief that it was the United States via Pakistan who was sponsoring the Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan.Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov all argued that if a radical Islamist regime came to power in Kabul, it would attempt to sponsor radical Islam inSoviet Central Asia, thereby requiring a preemptive strike.What was envisioned in the fall of 1979 was a short intervention under which Moscow would replace radical Khalqi Communist Amin with the moderate Parchami CommunistBabrak Karmalto stabilize the situation.Contrary to the contemporary view of Brzezinski and the regional powers, access to the Persian Gulf played no role in the decision to intervene on the Soviet side.
The concerns raised by the Chief of the Soviet Army General Staff, MarshalNikolai Ogarkovwho warned about the possibility of a protracted guerrilla war, were dismissed by the troika who insisted that any occupation of Afghanistan would be short and relatively painless.Most notably, though the diplomats of theNarkomindelat the Embassy in Kabul and the KGB officers stationed in Afghanistan were well informed about the developments in that country, such information rarely filtered through to the decision-makers in Moscow who viewed Afghanistan more in the context of the Cold War rather than understanding Afghanistan as a subject in its own right.The viewpoint that it was the United States that was fomenting the Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan with the aim of destabilizing Soviet-dominated Central Asia tended to downplay the effects of an unpopular Communist government pursuing policies that the majority of Afghans violently disliked as a generator of the insurgency and strengthened those who argued some sort of Soviet response was required to a supposed "outrageous American provocation."It was assumed in Moscow that because Pakistan (an ally of both the United States and China) was supporting themujahideenthat therefore it was ultimately the United States and China who were behind the rebellion in Afghanistan.
Amin's revolutionary government had lost credibility with virtually all of the Afghan population. A combination of chaotic administration, excessive brutality from the secret police, unpopular domestic reforms, and a deteriorating economy, along with public perceptions that the state was atheistic and anti-Islamic, all added to the government's unpopularity. After 20 months of Khalqist rule, the country deteriorated in almost every facet of life. The Soviet Union believed that without intervention, Amin's government would have been disintegrated by the resistance and the country would have been "lost" to a regime most likely hostile to the USSR.
On 31 October 1979, Soviet informants under orders from the inner circle of advisors aroundSoviet General SecretaryLeonid Brezhnevrelayed information to theAfghan Armed Forcesfor them to undergo maintenance cycles for their tanks and other crucial equipment. Meanwhile, telecommunications links to areas outside of Kabul were severed, isolating the capital.
The Soviet40th Armylaunched its initial incursion into Afghanistan on 25 December under the pretext of extending "international aid" to its puppetDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan. On 25 December,Soviet Defence MinisterDmitry Ustinovissued an official order, stating that "[t]he state frontier of theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistanis to be crossed on the ground and in the air by forces of the 40th Army and the Air Force at 15:00 hrs on 25 December". This was the formal beginning of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.Subsequently, on 27 December, Soviet troops arrived atKabul International Airport, causing a stir among the city's residents.
Simultaneously, Amin moved the offices of the General Secretary to theTajbeg Palace, believing this location to be more secure from possible threats. According to Colonel General Tukharinov and Merimsky, Amin was fully informed of the military movements, having requested Soviet military assistance to northern Afghanistan on 17 December.His brother and General Dmitry Chiangov met with the commander of the 40th Army before Soviet troops entered the country, to work out initial routes and locations for Soviet troops.
On 27 December 1979, 700 Soviet troops dressed in Afghan uniforms, includingKGBandGRUspecial forcesofficers from theAlpha GroupandZenith Group, occupied major governmental, military and media buildings in Kabul, including their primary target, theTajbeg Palace. The operation began at 19:00, when the KGB-led SovietZenith Groupdestroyed Kabul's communications hub, paralyzing Afghan military command. At 19:15,the assault on Tajbeg Palacebegan; as planned, General Secretary Hafizullah Amin was assassinated. Simultaneously, other key buildings were occupied (e.g., theMinistry of Interior Affairsat 19:15). The operation was fully complete by the morning of 28 December 1979.
The Soviet military command atTermez,Uzbek SSR, announced onRadio Kabulthat Afghanistan had been "liberated" from Amin's rule. According to theSoviet Politburo, they were complying with the 1978Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness, and Amin had been "executed by a tribunal for his crimes" by the Afghan Revolutionary Central Committee. That committee then installed former Deputy Prime MinisterBabrak Karmalas head of government, who had been demoted to the relatively insignificant post of ambassador to Czechoslovakia following the Khalq takeover and announced that it had requested Soviet military assistance.
Soviet ground forces, under the command of MarshalSergey Sokolov, entered Afghanistan from the north on 27 December. In the morning, the103rd Guards 'Vitebsk' Airborne Divisionlanded at the airport at Bagram and the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was underway. The force that entered Afghanistan, in addition to the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, was under command of the40th Armyand consisted of the108thand5th Guards Motor Rifle Divisions, the 860th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment, the56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, and the 36th Mixed Air Corps. Later on, the201stand68th Motor Rifle Divisionsalso entered the country, along with other smaller units.In all, the initial Soviet force was around 1,800tanks, 80,000 soldiers and 2,000AFVs. In the second week alone, Soviet aircraft had made a total of 4,000 flights into Kabul.With the arrival of the two later divisions, the total Soviet force rose to over 100,000 personnel.
As part of Baikal-79, a larger operation aimed at taking 20 key strongholds in and aroundKabul, the Soviet 105th Airborne Division secured the city and disarmed Afghan Army units without facing opposition. On 1 January 1980,Soviet paratroopersordered the 26th Airborne Regiment inBala Hissarto disarm, only for them to refuse and fire upon theSovietsas a firefight ensued.The Soviet paratroopers annihilated most of the regiment, with 700 Afghan paratroopers being killed or captured. In the aftermath of the battle, 26th Airborne Regiment was disbanded and later reorganized into the 37th Commando Brigade, led by Col.Shahnawaz Tanai, being the largest commando formation at a strength of three battalions.As a result of the battle with the 26th Airborne Regiment, the Soviet 357th Guards Airborne Regiment were permanently stationed inBala Hissarfortress, meaning this new brigade was stationed asRishkhorGarrison In the same year, the 81st Artillery Brigade was given airborne training and converted into the 38th Commando Brigade, stationed in Mahtab Qala (lit. Moonlit Fortress) garrison southwest ofKabulunder the command of Brig. Tawab Khan.
The Christmas-time invasion of a practically defenseless country was shocking for the international community, and caused a sense of alarm for its neighbor Pakistan.On 2 January 1980 President Carter withdrew theSALT-II treatyfrom consideration before the Senate,and on 3 January he recalled US AmbassadorThomas J. Watsonfrom Moscow.On 9 January theUnited Nations Security CouncilpassedResolution 462. Following the resolution, theSixth emergency special session of the United Nations General Assemblytook place. Soviet military activities were met with strong criticism internationally, including some of its allies at theUN General Assembly(UNGA),but the Soviet machine scored a victory when, in the words of political scientistWilliam Maley, "the General Assembly accepted the credentials of the delegation of the Soviet-installed puppet regime in Kabul which duly voted against the resolution."The UNGA passed a resolution on 15 January by a vote of 104–18 protesting the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.On 29 January foreign ministers from 34 Muslim-majority countries adopted at theOrganisation of Islamic Cooperationa resolution which condemned the Soviet intervention and demanded "the immediate, urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops" from the Muslim nation of Afghanistan.According to political scientistGilles Kepel, the Soviet intervention or invasion was viewed with "horror" in the West, considered to be a fresh twist on the geo-political "Great Game" of the 19th century in which Britain feared that Russia sought access to the Indian Ocean, and posed a threat to Western security, explicitly violating the world balance of power agreed upon atYaltain 1945.
The general feeling in the United States was that inaction against the Soviet Union could encourage Moscow to go further in its international ambitions.President Carter placed a trade embargo against the Soviet Union onshipments of commodities such as grain,while also leading a 66-nationboycottof the1980 Summer Olympicsin Moscow.Carter later suspended high-technology exports to the Soviet Union.The invasion, along with other concurrent events such as theIranian Revolutionand thehostage stand-offthat accompanied it showed the volatility of the wider region for U.S. foreign policy. This was identified on 4 January during President Carter's Address to the Nation:
China condemned the Soviet coup and its military buildup, calling it a threat to Chinese security (both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan shared borders with China), that it marked the worst escalation of Soviet expansionism in over a decade, and that it was a warning to other Third World leaders with close relations to the Soviet Union. Vice PremierDeng Xiaopingwarmly praised the "heroic resistance" of the Afghan people. Beijing also stated that the lacklustre worldwide reaction against Vietnam (in theSino-Vietnamese Warearlier in 1979) encouraged the Soviets to feel free invading Afghanistan.
Ba'athist Syria, led byHafez al-Assad, was one of the few states outside theWarsaw Pactthat publicly favoured the invasion. Soviet Union expanded its military support to the Syrian government in return.TheWarsaw PactSoviet satellites (excluding Romania) publicly supported the intervention; however, a press account in June 1980 showed thatPoland,Hungaryand Romania privately informed the Soviet Union that the invasion was a damaging mistake.
In his 2009 book, Maley excoriated "the West", which "allowed the issues for these negotiations to be determined substantially by the USSR—a
classic weakness of Western negotiating style. On 14 May 1980, the Kabul regime issued at Moscow's behest a statement directed at Iran and Pakistan, outlining a program for a 'political solution' to the 'tension that has come about in this region'. Its program was to be precisely mirrored in the agenda of the
subsequent negotiations conducted under UN auspices, which dealt with the withdrawal of the foreign troops, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, international guarantees, and the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes. This was a notable victory for the Soviet Union: the issue of self-determination
for the Afghan people, also mentioned by the General Assembly, of course did not figure in Kabul's program, and its exclusion effectively subordinated the General
Assembly's conditions for an acceptable settlement to those specified by the Soviet leadership."
Weapons supplies were made available through numerous countries. Before the Soviet intervention, the insurgents received support from the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya and Kuwait, albeit on a limited scale.After the intervention, aid was substantially increased. The US clandestinely purchased all of Israel's captured Soviet weapons, and then funnelled the weapons to the Mujahideen, while Egypt upgraded its army's weapons and sent the older weapons to the militants. Turkey sold theirWorld War IIstockpiles to the warlords, and the British and Swiss providedBlowpipe missilesandOerlikonanti-aircraft guns respectively, after they were found to be poor models for their own forces.China provided the most relevant weapons, likely due to their own experience withguerrilla warfare, and kept meticulous record of all the shipments.The US, Saudi and Chinese aid combined totaled between $6 billion and $12 billion.
In the widerCold War, drastic changes were taking place inSouthwestern Asiaconcurrent with the 1978–1979 upheavals in Afghanistan that changed the nature of the two superpowers. In February 1979, theIranian Revolutionousted the American-backedShahfrom Iran, losing the United States as one of its most powerful allies.The United States then deployed twenty ships in thePersian Gulfand theArabian Seaincluding two aircraft carriers, and there were constant threats of war between theU.S. and Iran.
American observers argued that the global balance of power had shifted to the Soviet Union following the emergence of several pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World in the latter half of the 1970s (such as in Nicaragua and Ethiopia), and the action in Afghanistan demonstrated the Soviet Union's expansionism.
March 1979 marked the signing of the U.S.-backedpeace agreement between Israel and Egypt. The Soviet leadership saw the agreement as giving a major advantage to the United States. A Soviet newspaper stated that Egypt and Israel were now "gendarmesofthe Pentagon". The Soviets viewed the treaty not only as a peace agreement between their erstwhile allies in Egypt and the US-supported Israelis but also as a military pact.In addition, the US sold more than 5,000missilestoSaudi Arabia, and the USSR's previously strong relations withIraqhad recently soured, as in June 1978 it began entering into friendlier relations with the Western world and buying French and Italian-made weapons, though the vast majority still came from the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact satellites, and China.
The Soviet invasion has also been analyzed with the model of theresource curse. The 1979Islamic Revolutionin Iran saw a massive increase in the scarcity and price of oil, adding tens of billions of dollars to the Soviet economy, as it was the major source of revenue for the USSR that spent 40–60% of its entire federal budget (15% of the GDP) on the military.The oil boom may have overinflated national confidence, serving as a catalyst for the invasion. ThePolitburowas temporarily relieved of financial constraints and sought to fulfill a long-term geopolitical goal of seizing the lead in the region between Central Asia and the Gulf.
The first phase of the war began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and first battles with various opposition groups.Soviet troops entered Afghanistan along two ground routes and oneair corridor, quickly taking control of the major urban centers, military bases and strategic installations. However, the presence of Soviet troops did not have the desired effect of pacifying the country. On the contrary, it exacerbatednationalisticsentiment, causing the rebellion to spread further.Babrak Karmal, Afghanistan's new leader, charged the Soviets with causing an increase in the unrest, and demanded that the 40th Army step in and quell the rebellion, as his own army had proved untrustworthy.Thus, Soviet troops found themselves drawn into fighting against urban uprisings, tribal armies (calledlashkar), and sometimes against mutinying Afghan Army units. These forces mostly fought in the open, and Soviet airpower and artillery made short work of them.
The Soviet occupation provoked a great deal of fear and unrest amongst a wide spectrum of the Afghan populace. The Soviets held the view that their presence would be accepted after having rid Afghanistan of the "tyrannical" Khalq regime, but this was not to be. In the first week of January 1980, attacks against Soviet soldiers in Kabul became common, with roaming soldiers often assassinated in the city in broad daylight by civilians. In the summer of that year, numerous members of the ruling party would be assassinated in individual attacks. The Soviet Army quit patrolling Kabul in January 1981 after their losses due to terrorism, handing the responsibility over to the Afghan army. Tensions in Kabul peaked during the3 Hoot uprisingon 22 February 1980, when the Soviet soldiers murdered hundreds of protesters.The city uprising took a dangerous turn once again during thestudent demonstrationsof April and May 1980, in which scores of students were killed by soldiers and PDPA sympathizers.
The opposition to the Soviet presence was great nationally, crossing regional, ethnic, and linguistic lines. Never before in Afghan history had this many people been united in opposition against an invading foreign power. InKandahara few days after the invasion, civilians rose up against Soviet soldiers, killing a number of them, causing the soldiers to withdraw to their garrison. In this city, 130 Khalqists were murdered between January and February 1980.
According to theMitrokhin Archive, the Soviet Union deployed numerousactive measuresat the beginning of the intervention, spreading disinformation relating to both diplomatic status and military intelligence. These efforts focused on most countries bordering Afghanistan, on several international powers, the Soviet's main adversary, the United States, and neutral countries.The disinformation was deployed primarily by "leaking" forged documents, distributing leaflets, publishing nominally independent articles in Soviet-aligned press, and conveying reports to embassies through KGB residencies.Among the active measures pursued in 1980–1982 were both pro- and anti-separatist documents disseminated in Pakistan, a forged letter implying a Pakistani-Iranian alliance, alleged reports of U.S. bases on the Iranian border, information regarding Pakistan's military intentions filtered through thePakistan embassyinBangkokto theCarter Administration, and various disinformation about armed interference by India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia, Jordan, Italy, and France, among others.
The war now developed into a new pattern: the Soviets occupied the cities and main axis of communication, while theAfghan mujahideen, which the Soviet Army soldiers called 'Dushman,' meaning 'enemy',divided into small groups and waged a guerrilla war in the mountains. Almost 80 percent of the country was outside government control.Soviet troops were deployed in strategic areas in the northeast, especially along the road fromTermezto Kabul. In the west, a strong Soviet presence was maintained to counter Iranian influence. Incidentally, special Soviet units would havealso performed secret attacks on Iranian territory to destroy suspected Mujahideen bases, and their helicopters then got engaged in shootings with Iranian jets.Conversely, some regions such asNuristan, in the northeast, andHazarajat, in the central mountains of Afghanistan, were virtually untouched by the fighting, and lived in almost complete independence.Bashgal, in Nuristan, was additionally a Salafi quasi-state known as theIslamic Revolutionary State of Afghanistan. Parts ofKunar,LaghmanandNangarharwere also incorporated into the short-livedIslamic Emirate of Kunarafter theSoviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Periodically the Soviet Army undertook multi-divisionaloffensives into Mujahideen-controlled areas. Between 1980 and 1985, nineoffensiveswere launched into the strategically importantPanjshir Valley, but government control in the area did not improve.Heavy fighting also occurred in the provinces neighbouring Pakistan, where cities and government outposts were constantly besieged by the Mujahideen. Massive Soviet operations would regularly break these sieges, but the Mujahideen would return as soon as the Soviets left.In the west and south, fighting was more sporadic, except in the cities ofHeratandKandahar, which were always partly controlled by the resistance.
The Soviets did not initially foresee taking on such an active role in fighting the rebels and attempted to play down their role there as giving light assistance to the Afghan army. However, the arrival of the Soviets had the opposite effect as it incensed instead of pacified the people, causing the Mujahideen to gain in strength and numbers.Originally the Soviets thought that their forces would strengthen the backbone of the Afghan army and provide assistance by securing major cities, lines of communication and transportation.The Afghan army forces had a high desertion rate and were loath to fight, especially since the Soviet forces pushed them into infantry roles while they manned the armored vehicles and artillery. The main reason that the Afghan soldiers were so ineffective, though, was their lack of morale, as many of them were not truly loyal to the communist government but simply wanting a paycheck.Once it became apparent that the Soviets would have to get their hands dirty, they followed three main strategies aimed at quelling the uprising.Intimidation was the first strategy, in which the Soviets would use airborne attacks and armored ground attacks to destroy villages, livestock and crops in trouble areas. The Soviets would bomb villages that were near sites of guerrilla attacks on Soviet convoys or known to support resistance groups. Local peoples were forced to either flee their homes or die as daily Soviet attacks made it impossible to live in these areas. By forcing the people of Afghanistan to flee their homes, the Soviets hoped to deprive the guerrillas of resources and safe havens. The second strategy consisted of subversion, which entailed sending spies to join resistance groups and report information, as well as bribing local tribes or guerrilla leaders into ceasing operations. Finally, the Soviets used military forays into contested territories in an effort to root out the guerrillas and limit their options. Classic search and destroy operations were implemented usingMil Mi-24helicopter gunships that would provide cover for ground forces in armored vehicles. Once the villages were occupied by Soviet forces, inhabitants who remained were frequently interrogated and tortured for information or killed.
To complement their brute force approach to weeding out the insurgency, the Soviets usedKHAD(Afghan secret police) to gather intelligence, infiltrate the Mujahideen, spread false information, bribe tribal militias into fighting and organize a government militia. While it is impossible to know exactly how successful KHAD was in infiltrating Mujahideen groups, it is thought that they succeeded in penetrating a good many resistance groups based in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.KHAD is thought to have had particular success in igniting internal rivalries and political divisions amongst the resistance groups, rendering some of them completely useless because of infighting.KHAD had some success in securing tribal loyalties but many of these relationships were fickle and temporary. Often KHAD secured neutrality agreements rather than committed political alignment.
TheSarandoywere a centrally-commanded government paramilitary group placed under the control of theMinistry of Interior Affairs, before being placed under the control of the unified Ministry of State Security (WAD) in 1986.They had mixed success in the war, asOsama bin Ladenand theArab mujahideenfought the Sarandoy's 7th Operative Regiment, only to fail and sustain massive casualties. The label “Sarandoy” additionally included traffic police, provincial officers and corrections/labor facility officers.Large salaries and proper weapons attracted a good number of recruits to the cause, even if they were not necessarily "pro-communist". The problem was that many of the recruits they attracted were in fact Mujahideen who would join up to procure arms, ammunition and money while also gathering information about forthcoming military operations.By the end of 1981, there were reports ofBulgarian Armed Forcespresent inMazar-i-Sharif, theWarsaw Pactand theCuban Revolutionary Armed Forcesall operating inAfghanistan. A fighter of theMujahideen, describing theCubansin combat, said they were "big and black and shout very loudly when they fight. Unlike theRussiansthey were not afraid to attack us in the open".
In 1985, the size of the LCOSF (Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces) was increased to 108,800 and fighting increased throughout the country, making 1985 the bloodiest year of the war. However, despite suffering heavily, the Mujahideen were able to remain in the field, mostly because they received thousands of new volunteers daily, and continued resisting the Soviets
Babrak Karmal, after the invasion, promised reforms to win support from the population alienated by his ousted predecessors. A temporary constitution, the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, was adopted in April 1980. On paper, it was ademocraticconstitution including "right of free expression" and disallowing "torture, persecution, and punishment, contrary to human dignity". Karmal's government was formed of his fellow Parchamites along with (pro-Taraki) Khalqists, and a number of known non-communists/leftists in various ministries.
Karmal called his regime "a new evolutionary phase of the glorious April Revolution", but he failed at uniting the PDPA. In the eyes of many Afghans, he was still seen as a "puppet" of the Soviet Union.
In the mid-1980s, the Afghan resistance movement, assisted by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Egypt, the People's Republic of China and others, contributed to Moscow's high military costs and strained international relations. The U.S. viewed the conflict in Afghanistan as an integral Cold War struggle, and the CIA provided assistance to anti-Soviet forces through thePakistani intelligence services, in a program calledOperation Cyclone.
Pakistan'sNorth-West Frontier Provincebecame a base for the Afghan resistance fighters and theDeobandiulama of that province played a significant role in the Afghan 'jihad', withDarul Uloom Haqqaniabecoming a prominent organisational and networking base for the anti-Soviet Afghan fighters.As well as money, Muslim countries provided thousands of volunteer fighters known as "Afghan Arabs", who wished to wagejihadagainst theatheistcommunists. Notable among them was a young Saudi namedOsama bin Laden, whoseArabgroup eventually evolved intoal-Qaeda.Despite their numbers,the contribution has been called a "curious sideshow to the real fighting,"with only an estimated 2000 of them fighting "at any one time", compared with about 250,000 Afghan fighters and 125,000 Soviet troops.
Their efforts were also sometimes counterproductive, as in the March 1989battle for Jalalabad, when they showed the enemy the fate awaiting infidels in the form of  a truck filled with dismembered bodies of their comrades chopped to pieces after surrendering to radical non-Afghan salafists.Though demoralized by the abandonment of them by the Soviets, the Afghan Communist government forces rallied to break the siege of Jalalabad and to win the first major government victory in years. "This success reversed the government's demoralization from the withdrawal of Soviet forces, renewed its determination to fight on, and allowed it to survive three more years."
Maoistguerrilla groups were also active, to a lesser extent compared to the religious Mujahideen. A notable Maoist group was theLiberation Organization of the People of Afghanistan(SAMA), whose founder and leader Abdul Majid Kalakani was reportedly arrested in 1980.
Afghanistan's resistance movement was born in chaos, spread and triumphed chaotically, and did not find a way to govern differently. Virtually all of its war was waged locally by regional warlords. As warfare became more sophisticated, outside support and regional coordination grew. Even so, the basic units of Mujahideen organization and action continued to reflect the highly segmented nature of Afghan society.
Olivier Royestimates that after four years of war, there were at least 4,000 bases from which Mujahideen units operated. Most of these were affiliated with the seven expatriate parties headquartered in Pakistan, which served as sources of supply and varying degrees of supervision. Significant commanders typically led 300 or more men, controlled several bases and dominated a district or a sub-division of a province. Hierarchies of organization above the bases were attempted. Their operations varied greatly in scope, the most ambitious being achieved byAhmad Shah Massoudof thePanjshir valleynorth ofKabul. He led at least 10,000 trained troopers at the end of the Soviet war and had expanded his political control ofTajik-dominated areas to Afghanistan's northeastern provinces under the Supervisory Council of the North.
Roy also describes regional, ethnic and sectarian variations in Mujahideen organization. In thePashtunareas of the east, south and southwest, tribal structure, with its many rival sub-divisions, provided the basis for military organization and leadership. Mobilization could be readily linked to traditional fighting allegiances of the triballashkar(fighting force). In favorable circumstances such formations could quickly reach more than 10,000, as happened when large Soviet assaults were launched in the eastern provinces, or when the Mujahideen besieged towns, such asKhostinPaktiaprovince in July 1983.But in campaigns of the latter type the traditional explosions of manpower—customarily common immediately after the completion of harvest—proved obsolete when confronted by well dug-in defenders with modern weapons. Lashkar durability was notoriously short; few sieges succeeded.
Mujahideen mobilization in non-Pashtun regions faced very different obstacles. Prior to the intervention, few non-Pashtuns possessed firearms. Early in the war they were most readily available from army troops orgendarmeriewho defected or were ambushed. The international arms market and foreign military support tended to reach the minority areas last. In the northern regions, little military tradition had survived upon which to build an armed resistance. Mobilization mostly came from political leadership closely tied to Islam. Roy contrasts the social leadership of religious figures in thePersian- andTurkic-speaking regions of Afghanistan with that of the Pashtuns. Lacking a strong political representation in a state dominated by Pashtuns, minority communities commonly looked to pious learned or charismatically reveredpirs(saints) for leadership. ExtensiveSufiandmarabouticnetworks were spread through the minority communities, readily available as foundations for leadership, organization, communication and indoctrination. These networks also provided for political mobilization, which led to some of the most effective of the resistance operations during the war.
The Mujahideen favouredsabotageoperations. The more common types of sabotage included damagingpower lines, knocking outpipelinesand radio stations, blowing up governmentoffice buildings,air terminals, hotels, cinemas, and so on. In the border region with Pakistan, the Mujahideen would often launch 800rocketsper day. Between April 1985 and January 1987, they carried out over 23,500shellingattacks on government targets. The Mujahideen surveyed firing positions that they normally located near villages within the range of Soviet artillery posts, putting the villagers in danger of death from Soviet retaliation. The Mujahideen usedland minesheavily. Often, they would enlist the services of the local inhabitants, even children.
They concentrated on both civilian and military targets, knocking out bridges, closing major roads, attackingconvoys, disrupting the electric power system and industrial production, and attacking police stations and Soviet military installations and air bases. They assassinated government officials and PDPA members, and laid siege to small rural outposts. In March 1982, a bomb exploded at theMinistryof Education, damaging several buildings. In the same month, a widespreadpower failuredarkened Kabul when a pylon on the transmission line from the Naghlu power station was blown up. In June 1982 a column of about 1,000 youngcommunist partymembers sent out to work in the Panjshir valley were ambushed within 30 km of Kabul, with heavy loss of life. On 4 September 1985, insurgents shot down a domestic Bakhtar Airlines plane as it took off from Kandahar airport, killing all 52 people aboard.
Mujahideen groups used for assassination had three to five men in each. After they received their mission to kill certain government officials, they busied themselves with studying his pattern of life and its details and then selecting the method of fulfilling their established mission. They practiced shooting at automobiles,shooting out of automobiles, laying mines in government accommodation or houses, using poison, and rigging explosive charges in transport.
In May 1985, the seven principal rebel organizations formed theSeven Party Mujahideen Allianceto coordinate their military operations against the Soviet Army. Late in 1985, the groups were active in and around Kabul, unleashing rocket attacks and conducting operations against the communist government.
In an effort to foment unrest and rebellion by the Islamic populations of the Soviet Union, starting in late 1984Director of CIAWilliam Caseyencouraged Mujahideen militants to mount sabotage raids inside the Soviet Union, according toRobert Gates, Casey's executive assistant and Mohammed Yousef, the PakistaniISIbrigadier general who was the chief for Afghan operations. The rebels began cross-border raids into the Soviet Union in spring 1985.In April 1987, three separate teams of Afghan rebels were directed by the ISI to launch coordinated raids on multiple targets across the Soviet border and extending, in the case of an attack on anUzbekfactory, as deep as over 16 kilometres (10 mi) into Soviet territory. In response, the Soviets issued a thinly-veiled threat to invade Pakistan to stop the cross-border attacks, and no further attacks were reported.
International journalistic perception of the war varied. Major American television journalists were sympathetic to the Mujahideen. Most visible was CBS News correspondent Dan Rather, who in 1982 accused the Soviet Union of genocide, comparing them to Hitler.Rather wasembeddedwith the Mujahideen for a60 Minutesreport.In 1987, CBS produced a full documentary special on the war.
Reader's Digesttook a highly positive view of the Mujahideen, a reversal of their usual view of Islamic fighters. The publication praised their martyrdom and their role in entrapping the Soviets in a Vietnam War-style disaster.
Leftist journalistAlexander Cockburnwas unsympathetic, criticizing Afghanistan as "an unspeakable country filled with unspeakable people, sheepshaggers and smugglers, who have furnished in their leisure hours some of the worst arts and crafts ever to penetrate the occidental world. I yield to none in my sympathy to those prostrate beneath the Russian jackboot, but if ever a country deserved rape it's Afghanistan."Robert D. Kaplanon the other hand, thought any perception of Mujahideen as "barbaric" was unfair: "Documented accounts of mujahidin savagery were relatively rare and involved enemy troops only. Their cruelty toward civilians was unheard of during the war, while Soviet cruelty toward civilians was common."Lack of interest in the Mujahideen cause, Kaplan believed, was not the lack of intrinsic interest to be found in a war between a small, poor country and a superpower where a million civilians were killed, but the result of the great difficulty and unprofitability of media coverage. Kaplan noted that "none of the American TV networks had a bureau for a war",and television cameramen venturing to follow the Mujahideen "trekked for weeks on little food, only to return ill and half starved".In October 1984, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan, Vitaly Smirnov, toldAgence France Presse"that journalists traveling with the mujahidin 'will be killed. And our units in Afghanistan will help the Afghan forces to do it.'"Unlike Vietnam and Lebanon, Afghanistan had "absolutely no clash between the strange and the familiar", no "rock-video quality" of "zonked-out GIs in headbands" or "rifle-wielding Shiite terrorists wearing Michael Jackson T-shirts" that provided interesting "visual materials" for newscasts.
As early as 1983, Pakistan'sForeign Ministrybegan working with the Soviet Union to provide them an exit fromAfghanistan, initiatives led byForeign MinisterYaqub Ali KhanandKhurshid Kasuri. Despite an active support forinsurgent groups, Pakistanis remained sympathetic to the challenges faced by the Soviets in restoring the peace, eventually exploring the possibility of setting up an interimsystem of governmentunder formermonarchZahir Shah, but this was not authorized by PresidentZia-ul-Haqdue to his stance on the issue of theDurand Line.In 1984–85, Foreign MinisterYaqub Ali Khanpaid state visits to China,Saudi Arabia, Soviet Union, France, United States and the United Kingdom in order to develop a framework. On 20 July 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced.
The first step of the Soviet Union's exit strategy was to transfer the burden of fighting the Mujahideen to the Afghan armed forces, with the aim of preparing them to operate without Soviet help. During this phase, the Soviet contingent was restricted to supporting the DRA forces by providingartillery, air support and technical assistance, though some large-scale operations were still carried out by Soviet troops.
Under Soviet guidance, the DRA armed forces were built up to an official strength of 302,000 in 1986. To minimize the risk of a coup d'état, they were divided into different branches, each modeled on its Soviet counterpart. The ministry of defence forces numbered 132,000, the ministry of interior 70,000 and the ministry of state security (KHAD) 80,000. However, these were theoretical figures: in reality each service was plagued withdesertions, the army alone suffering over 10% annual losses, or 32,000 per year.
The decision to engage primarily Afghan forces was taken by the Soviets, but was resented by the PDPA, who viewed the departure of their protectors without enthusiasm. In May 1987 a DRA forceattacked well-entrenched Mujahideen positionsin theArghandab District, but the Mujahideen managed to hold their ground, and the attackers suffered heavy casualties.Meanwhile, the Mujahideen benefited from expanded foreign military support from the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other Muslim-majority countries. TwoHeritage Foundationforeign policy analysts, Michael Johns and James A. Phillips, championedAhmad Shah Massoudas the Afghan resistance leader most worthy of US support under theReagan Doctrine.
The government of President Karmal, apuppet state, was largely ineffective. It was weakened by divisions within the PDPA and the Parcham faction, and the regime's efforts to expand its base of support proved futile. Moscow came to regard Karmal as a failure and blamed him for the problems. Years later, when Karmal's inability to consolidate his government had become obvious, Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of theSoviet Communist Party, said, "The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help."Karmal's consolidation plan only involved those who had not raised arms against the regime, and even demanded Soviet troops to seal the border with Pakistan before any negotiations with Mujahideen. Eventually, the Soviet Union decided to dispose of Karmal from the leadership of Afghanistan.
In May 1986,Mohammad Najibullah, former chief of the Afghansecret police(KHAD), was elected General Secretary and later as President of the Revolutionary Council. The relatively young new leader wasn't known that well to the Afghan population at the time, but he made swift reforms to change the country's situation and win support as devised by experts of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union. An eloquent speaker in both the Pashto and Dari languages, Najibullah engaged with elders and presented both himself and the state as Islamic, sometimes backing his speeches with excerpts from theQur'an. A number of prisoners were released, while the night curfew in Kabul that had been in place since 1980 was finally lifted. He also moved against pro-Karmal Parchamites, who were expelled from the Revolutionary Council and the Politburo.
President Najibullah launched the "National Reconciliation" program at the start of 1987, the goal of which was to unite the nation and end the war that had enveloped the nation for seven years. He expressed willingness to negotiate with the Mujahideen resistance, allow parties other than the PDPA to be active, and indicated that exiled KingZahir Shahcould be part of the process. A six-month ceasefire also began in December 1986. His administration was also more open to foreign visitors outside the Soviet bloc.In November 1987, Najibullah convened aloya jirgaselected by the authorities which successfully passed a new constitution for Afghanistan, creating a presidential system with an elective bicameral parliament. The constitution declared "the sacred religion of Islam" the official religion, guaranteed the democratic rights of the individual, made it legal to form "political parties", and promoted equality between the various tribes and nationalities.Despite high expectations, the new policy only had limited impact in regaining support from the population and the resistance, partly because of the high distrust and unpopularity of the PDPA and KHAD, as well as Najibullah's loyalty to Moscow.
As part of the new structure, nationalparliamentary electionswere held in 1988 to elect members of the new National Assembly, the first such elections in Afghanistan in 19 years.
Ex-king Zahir Shah remained a popular figure to most Afghans. Diego Cordovez of the UN also recognized the king as a potential key to a political settlement to the war after the Soviet troops would leave. Polls in 1987 showed that he was a favored figure to lead a potential coalition between the DRA regime and Mujahideen factions, as well as an opposition to the unpopular but powerful guerrilla leaderGulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was strongly against the King's return. Pakistan however was against this and refused to grant the ex-king a visa for potential negotiations with Mujahideen. Pakistan's PresidentZia-ul-Haqand his supporters in the military were determined to put a conservative Islamic ally in power in Kabul.
Negotiations continued and in 1988 through 1989, The Interim Afghan Government was formed inPekhawaras an alliance of various Mujahadeen groups includingHezbi IslamiandJamiat, and would be involved inOperation Arrowand thesiege of Khost.
Following lengthy negotiations, theGeneva Accordswas signed in 1988 between Afghanistan and Pakistan.Supported by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, the two Asian countries agreed to refrain from any form of interference in each other's territory. They also agreed to allow Afghan refugees in Pakistan to voluntarily return. The two superpowers agreed to halt their interference in Afghanistan, which included a Soviet withdrawal.
The United Nations set up a specialmissionto oversee the process. In this way, President Najibullah had stabilized his political position enough to begin matching Moscow's moves toward withdrawal. Among other things the Geneva Accords identified the US and Soviet non-intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan and a timetable for full Soviet withdrawal. The agreement on withdrawal held, and on 15 February 1989, the last Soviet troops departed on schedule from Afghanistan.
The promotion ofMikhail Gorbachevto General Secretary in 1985 and his 'new thinking' on foreign and domestic policy was likely an important factor in the Soviets' decision to withdraw. Gorbachev had been attempting to remove the Soviet Union from the economic stagnation that had set in under the leadership of Brezhnev, and to reform the Soviet Union's economy and image with theGlasnostandPerestroikapolicies. Gorbachev had also been attempting to ease cold war tensions by signing theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treatywith the U.S. in 1987 and withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan, whose presence had garnered so much international condemnation.  Beijing had stipulated that a normalization of relations would have to wait until Moscow withdrew its army from Afghanistan (among other things), and in 1989 the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years took place.At the same time, Gorbachev pressured his Cuban allies in Angola to scale down activities and withdraw even though Soviet allies were faring somewhat better there.The Soviets also pulled many of their troops out ofMongoliain 1987, where they were also having a far easier time than in Afghanistan, and restrained theVietnamese invasion of Kampucheato the point of an all-out withdrawal in 1988.This massive withdrawal of Soviet forces from such highly contested areas shows that the Soviet government's decision to leave Afghanistan was based upon a general change in Soviet foreign policy – from one of confrontation to avoidance of conflict wherever possible.
In the last phase, Soviet troops prepared and executed their withdrawal from Afghanistan, whilst limiting the launching of offensive operations by those who had not withdrawn yet.
By mid-1987 the Soviet Union announced that it would start withdrawing its forces.Sibghatullah Mojaddediwas selected as the head of the Interim Islamic State of Afghanistan, in an attempt to reassert its legitimacy against the Moscow-sponsored Kabul regime. Mojaddedi, as head of the Interim Afghan Government, met with then-Vice President of the United StatesGeorge H. W. Bush, achieving a critical diplomatic victory for the Afghan resistance. Defeat of the Kabul government was their solution for peace. This confidence, sharpened by their distrust of the United Nations, virtually guaranteed their refusal to accept a political compromise.
In September 1988, Soviet MiG-23 fighters shot down two IranianAH-1J Cobrahelicopters which had intruded into Afghan airspace.
Operation Magistralwas one of the final offensive operations undertaken by the Soviets, a successful sweep operation that cleared the road between the towns ofGardezandKhost. This operation did not have any lasting effect on the outcome of the conflict nor on the soiled political and military status of the Soviets in the eyes of the West but was a symbolic gesture that marked the end of their widely condemned presence in the country with a victory.
The first half of the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from 15 May to 16 August 1988, and the second from 15 November to 15 February 1989. In order to ensure a safe passage, the Soviets had negotiated ceasefires with local Mujahideen commanders. The withdrawal was generally executed peacefullyexcept for the operation "Typhoon".
General Yazov, theDefense Minister of Soviet Union, ordered the 40th Army to violate the agreement withAhmad Shah Massoud, who commanded a large force in the Panjshir Valley, and attack his relaxed and exposed forces. The Soviet attack was initiated to protect Najibullah, who did not have a ceasefire in effect with Massoud, and who rightly feared an offensive by Massoud's forces after the Soviet withdrawal.General Gromov, the 40th Army Commander, objected to the operation, but reluctantly obeyed the order. "Typhoon" began on 23 January and continued for three days. To minimize their own losses, the Soviets abstained from close-range fighting. Instead, they used long-range artillery, surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles. Numerous civilian casualties were reported. Massoud had not threatened the withdrawal to this point and did not attack Soviet forces after they breached the agreement.Overall, the Soviet attack represented a defeat for Massoud's forces, who lost 600 fighters killed and wounded.
After the withdrawal of the Soviets, theDRA forceswere left fighting alone and had to abandon some provincial capitals, as well as disbanding theirair assault brigadesa year prior.It was widely believed that they would not be able to resist the Mujahideen for long. However, in the spring of 1989, DRA forces inflicted a major defeat on the Mujahideen during theBattle of Jalalabad, as well launching successful assaults on fortified complexes inPaghmanin 1990.The United States, having achieved its goal of forcing the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, gradually disengaged itself from the country.
Some of the causes of the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan leading to the Afghanistan regime's eventual defeat include
After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the government ofMohammad Najibullahremained in power until 15 April 1992. Najibullah stepped down that day as Mujahideen guerrilla forces moved into Kabul. He attempted to fly to India under the protection of the U.N. but was blocked from leaving at the airport. He then took refuge at a United Nations compound in Kabul. After a bloody, four-year power struggle between different factions of the victorious anti-Najibullah forces, theTalibantook Kabul. They stormed the U.N. compound on September 26, 1996. They eventually tortured and killed Najibullah.
During the conflict, Pakistan Air Force F-16 had shot down ten aircraft, belonging to Soviet Union, which had intruded into Pakistani territory. However, the Soviet record only confirmed five kills (three Su-22s, one Su-25 and one An-26). Some sources show that PAF had shot down at least a dozen more aircraft during the war. However, those kills were not officially acknowledged because they took place in Afghanistan's airspace and acknowledging those kills would mean that Afghan airspace was violated by PAF.In all, Pakistan Air Force F-16s had downed several MiG-23s, Su-22s, a Su-25, and an An-24 while losing only one F-16.
Whether the introduction of the personal, portable, infrared-homing "Stinger"surface-to-air missilein September 1986 was a turning point in the war is disputed.
Many Western military analysts credit the Stinger with akill ratioof about 70% and with responsibility for most of the over 350 Soviet or Afghan government aircraft and helicopters downed in the last two years of the war.Some military analysts considered it a "game changer" and coined the term "Stinger effect" to describe it.CongressmanCharlie Wilsonclaimed that before the Stinger the Mujahideen never won aset piece battlewith the Soviets, but after it was introduced, the Mujahideen never again lost one.
However, these statistics are based on Mujahideen self-reporting, which is of unknown reliability. A Russian general claimed the United States "greatly exaggerated" Soviet and Afghan aircraft losses during the war. According to Soviet figures, in 1987–1988, only 35 aircraft and 63 helicopters were destroyed by all causes.ThePakistan Armyfired twenty-eight Stingers at Soviet aircraft near the border without a single kill.
Many Russian military analysts tend to be dismissive of the impact of the Stinger.Soviet General SecretaryMikhail Gorbachevdecided to withdraw from Afghanistan a year before the Mujahideen fired their first Stinger missiles; Gorbachev was motivated by U.S. sanctions, not military losses. The Stingers did make an impact at first but within a few months flares, beacons, and exhaust baffles were installed to disorient the missiles, while night operation and terrain-hugging tactics tended to prevent the rebels from getting a clear shot. By 1988 the Mujahideen had all but stopped firing them.Stingers also forced Soviet helicopters and ground attack planes to bomb from higher altitudes with less accuracy but did not bring down many more aircraft than Chinese heavy machine guns and other less sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry.Gorbachev stated in an interview in 2010 that the Stinger did not influence his decision-making process.
The Soviet Union committed war crimes during the war to the point some have characterized their scale and systematicity as being agenocide of Afghans during the Soviet-Afghan War.
TheAfghan mujahideenwere backed primarily byPakistan, theUnited States,Saudi Arabia,and theUnited Kingdommaking it aCold Warproxy war.Out of the countries that supported the Mujahideen, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia offered the greatest financial support.However, private donors and religious charities throughout theMuslim world—particularly in the Persian Gulf—raised considerably more funds for the Afghan rebels than any foreign government;Jason Burkerecounts that "as little as 25 per cent of the money for the Afghan jihad was actually supplied directly by states."Saudi Arabia was heavily involved in the war effort and matched the United States' contributions dollar-for-dollar in public funds. Saudi Arabia also gathered an enormous amount of money for the Afghan mujahideen in private donations that amounted to about $20 million per month at their peak.
Other countries that supported the Mujahideen wereEgypt,China, andIsrael.Iranon the other hand only supported the Shia Mujahideen, namely the Persian speaking ShiiteHazarasin a limited way. One of these groups was theTehran Eight, a political union of Afghan Shi'a.They were supplied predominantly by theIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but Iran's support for the Hazaras nevertheless frustrated efforts for a united Mujahideen front.
The Mujahideen launched multiple raids into the Soviet Union in an effort to foment unrest and rebellion by the Islamic populations of the Soviet Union, starting in late 1984Director of CIAWilliam Caseyencouraged Mujahideen militants to mount sabotage raids inside the Soviet Union, according toRobert Gates, Casey's executive assistant and Mohammed Yousef, the PakistaniISIbrigadier general who was the chief for Afghan operations. The rebels began cross-border raids into the Soviet Union in Spring 1985.
During the conflict, Soviet aircraft intruded into Pakistani airspace multiple times and Pakistan Air Force F-16 had shot down ten aircraft, belonging to Soviet Union, which had intruded into Pakistani territory. However, the Soviet record only confirmed five plane kills (three Su-22s, one Su-25 and one An-26) and 4 helicopter (Mi-8) kills. Some sources show that PAF had shot down at least a dozen more aircraft during the war. However, those kills were not officially acknowledged because they took place in Afghanistan's airspace and acknowledging those kills would mean that Afghan airspace was violated by PAF.In all, Pakistan Air Force F-16s had downed 3Su-22,1Su-25,2Mig-23,2An-26, and SeveralMi-8while 1Mig-23was damaged while losing only oneF-16.
TheKhAD-KGB campaign in Pakistanwas a joint campaign in which theAfghanKhAD’s foreign "Tenth Directorate"and the SovietKGBtargeted Pakistan using prostitution spy rings, terror attacks, hijackings, serial killings, assassinations and the dissemination of propaganda to dissuadePakistanfrom supporting the Afghan Mujahideen.
On 2 April 1986, the 38th commando brigade ofDemocratic Republic of Afghanistanaccidentally landed inside Pakistan territory during theSecond Battle of Zhawar. The strike force, in the darkness of night, accidentally landed nearMiram Shahin Pakistan instead ofZhawar. The force was surrounded and 120 soldiers were taken prisoner and 6Mi-8helicopters were captured.
In between 26 and 27 April 1985, inBadaber,Pakistan, an armed rebellion was instigated bySovietandAfghanprisoners of warwho were being held at the Badaber fortress nearPeshawar,Pakistan. The prisoners fought theAfghan Mujahideenof theJamiat-e Islamiparty and the PakistaniXI Corpssupported by American CIA advisors in an attempt to escape but the rebellion was squashed and all POWs were killed.
On 5 April 1982, Soviet forces accidentally infiltrated Iranian territory, in which Soviet forces strayed from the target of a Mujahideen base in southernAfghanistanand accidentally destroyed an asphalt factory inIran.Iranian security forces attacked this strike force by using tanks and aircraft destroying two SovietMi-8helicopters and damaging many more.
Between 25 December 1979, and 15 February 1989, a total of 620,000 soldiers served with the forces in Afghanistan (though there were only 80,000–104,000 serving at one time): 525,000 in the Army, 90,000 with border troops and otherKGBsub-units, 5,000 in independent formations ofMVDInternal Troops, and police forces.A further 21,000 personnel were with the Soviet troop contingent over the same period doing various white collar and blue-collar jobs.
The total official fatalities of the Soviet Armed Forces, frontier, and internal security troops came to 14,453.Other estimates give a figure of 26,000 killed Soviet soldiers.Soviet Army formations, units, and HQ elements lost 13,833, KGB sub-units lost 572, MVD formations lost 28, and other ministries and departments lost 20 men. During this period 312 servicemen were missing in action or taken prisoner; 119 were later freed, of whom 97 returned to the USSR and 22 went to other countries.
Of the troops deployed, 53,753 were wounded, injured, or sustained concussion and 415,932 fell sick. A high proportion of casualties were those who fell ill. This was because of local climatic and sanitary conditions, which were such that acute infections spread rapidly among the troops. There were 115,308 cases of infectioushepatitis, 31,080 oftyphoidfever, and 140,665 of other diseases. Of the 11,654 who were discharged from the army after being wounded, maimed, or contracting serious diseases, 10,751 men, were left disabled.
Material losses were as follows:
In early 1987 a CIA report estimated that, from 1979 to 1986, the Soviet military spent 18 billion rubles on the war in Afghanistan (not counting other costs incurred to the Soviet state such as economic and military aid to the DRA). The CIA noted that this was the equivalent of US$50 billion($115 billion in 2019 USD).The report credited the relatively low cost to the small size of the Soviet deployment and the fact that the supply lines to Afghanistan were very short (in some cases, easier and cheaper than internal USSR lines). Military aid to the DRA's armed forces totaled 9.124 billion rubles from 1980 to 1989 (peaking at 3.972 billion rubles in 1989).Financial and economic aid were also significant; by 1990, 75% of the Afghan state's income came from Soviet aid.
The war resulted in the deaths of approximately 3,000,000 Afghans,Civilian death and destruction from the war was massive and detrimental. Estimates of Afghan civilian deaths vary from 562,000to 2,000,000.
TheGeneva Accords of 1988, which ultimately led to the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in early 1989, left the Afghan government in ruins. The accords had failed to address adequately the issue of the post-occupation period and the future governance of Afghanistan. The assumption among most Western diplomats was that the Soviet-backed government in Kabul would soon collapse; however, this was not to happen for another three years. During this time the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan (IIGA) was established in exile. The exclusion of key groups such as refugees andShias, combined with major disagreements between the different Mujahideen factions, meant that the IIGA never succeeded in acting as a functional government.
Before the war, Afghanistan was already one of the world's poorest countries. The prolonged conflict left Afghanistan ranked 170 out of 174 in the UNDP'sHuman Development Index, making Afghanistan one of the least developed countries in the world.
Once the Soviets withdrew, US interest in Afghanistan slowly decreased over the following four years, much of it administered through the DoD Office of Humanitarian Assistance, under the then Director of HA, George M. Dykes III. With the first years of the Clinton Administration in Washington, DC, all aid ceased. The US decided not to help with reconstruction of the country, instead handing the interests of the country over to US allies Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Pakistan quickly took advantage of this opportunity and forged relations withwarlordsand later theTaliban, to secure trade interests and routes. The ten years following the war saw much ecological and agrarian destruction—from wiping out the country's trees through logging practices, which has destroyed all but 2% of forest cover country-wide, to substantial uprooting of wildpistachiotrees for the exportation of their roots for therapeutic uses, toopiumagriculture.
Captain Tarlan Eyvazov, a soldier in the Soviet forces during the war, stated that the Afghan children's future is destined for war. Eyvazov said, "Children born in Afghanistan at the start of the war... have been brought up in war conditions, this is their way of life." Eyvazov's theory was later strengthened when the Taliban movement developed and formed from orphans or refugee children who were forced by the Soviets to flee their homes and relocate their lives in Pakistan. The swift rise to power, from the young Taliban in 1996, was the result of the disorder and civil war that had warlords running wild because of the complete breakdown of law and order in Afghanistan after the departure of the Soviets.
TheCIA World Fact Bookreported that as of 2004, Afghanistan still owed $8 billion in bilateral debt, mostly to Russia,however, in 2007 Russia agreed to cancel most of the debt.
5.5 million Afghans were made refugees by the war—a full one third of the country's pre-war population—fleeing the country to Pakistan or Iran.Another estimate states 6.2 million refugees.By the end of 1981, theUN High Commission for Refugeesreported that Afghans represented the largest group of refugees in the world.
A total of 3.3 million Afghanrefugeeswere housed in Pakistan by 1988, some of whom continue to live in the country up until today. Of this total, about 100,000 were based in the city ofPeshawar, while more than 2 million were located in other parts of the northwestern province ofKhyber Pakhtunkhwa(then known as the North-West Frontier Province).At the same time, close to two millionAfghans were living in Iran. Over the years Pakistan andIranhave imposed tighter controls on refugees which have resulted in numerous returnees.In 2012 Pakistan banned extensions of visas to foreigners.Afghan refugees have also settled in India and became Indian citizens over time.Some also made their way into North America, theEuropean Union, Australia, and other parts of the world.The photo ofSharbat Gulaplaced onNational Geographiccover in 1985 became a symbol both of the 1980s Afghan conflict and of the refugee situation.
The legacy of the war introduced a culture of guns, drugs and terrorism in Afghanistan. The traditional power structure was also changed in favor of the powerful Mujahideen militias:
Themilitarizationtransformed the society in the country, leading to heavily armed police, private bodyguards, and openly armed civil defense groups becoming the norm in Afghanistan both during the war and decades thereafter.
The war also altered the ethnic balance of power in the country. WhilePashtunswere historically politically dominant since the modern foundation of theDurrani Empirein 1747, many of the well-organized pro-Mujahideen or pro-government groups consisted ofTajiks,UzbeksandHazaras. With Pashtuns increasingly politically fragmented, their influence on the state was challenged.
Within Afghanistan,war rugswere a popular form of carpet designs woven by victims of the war.