Balangiga massacre

The Balangiga massacre was an incident in which the residents of the town of Balangiga on the island of Samar conducted a surprise attack on an occupying unit of the US 9th Infantry, killing 54. The incident is also known as the Balangiga encounter, Balangiga incident, or Balangiga conflict. The incident occurred on September 28, 1901, over five months after the April 19 publication of a "Peace Manifesto" by Emilio Aguinaldo acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the Philippines. Some Filipino historians have asserted that the term Balangiga Massacre more appropriately refers to actions ordered in retaliation by American General Jacob H. Smith during the pacification of Samar that resulted in an estimated 2,000 Filipino civilians killed and over 200 homes burned.
The battle was a military operation planned by Captain Eugenio Daza (an area commander of Captain General Vicente Lukbán's forces in southeastern Samar) and transpired in Balangiga in 1901 during the Philippine–American War. The attack was led by Valeriano Abanador, who was the Jefe de la Policía (Chief of Police).
Samar was a major center for the production of Manila hemp, the trade of which was financing Philippine forces on the island. At the same time United States interests were eager to secure control of the hemp trade, which was a vital material both for the United States Navy and American agro-industries such as cotton.
Filipino forces in the area were under the command of Captain General Vicente Lukbán who had been sent there in December 1898 to govern the island on behalf of the First Philippine Republic under Emilio Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo had been captured by American forces on March 23, 1901. On April 1, he had sworn allegiance to the US and told his followers to lay down their arms and give up the fight.
On May 30, 1901, prior to the stationing of any Americans in Balangiga, town mayor Pedro Abayan had written to Lukban pledging to "observe a deceptive policy with [Americans] doing whatever they may like, and when a favorable opportunity arises, the people will strategically rise against them."
In the summer of 1901, Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, who commanded the Department of the Visayas and was responsible for Samar, instigated an aggressive policy of food deprivation and property destruction on the island. The objective was to force the end of Philippine resistance. Part of his strategy was to close three key ports on the southern coast, Basey, Balangiga and Guiuan prevent supplies from reaching Lukban's forces in the interior. Company C was to close the port at Balangiga.
On August 11, 1901, Company C of the 9th US Infantry Regiment, arrived in Balangiga—the third largest town on the southern coast of Samar island—to close its port and prevent supplies reaching Philippine forces in the interior, Abaya's letter to Lukban had been among papers captured by American troops on August 18; it read, in translation:
However, this information never reached the American troops in Balangiga.
Relations between the soldiers and the townspeople seemed amicable for the first month of the American presence in the town; indeed it was marked by extensive fraternization between the two parties. This took the form of tuba (palm wine) drinking among the soldiers and male villagers, baseball games, and arnis demonstrations. However, tensions rose due to several reasons: Captain Thomas W. Connell, commanding officer of the American unit in Balangiga, ordered the town cleaned up in preparation for a visit by the US Army's inspector-general. However, in complying with his directive, the townspeople inadvertently cut down vegetation with food value, in violation of Lukbán's policies regarding food security. As a consequence, on September 18, 1901, around 400 guerrillas sent by Lukbán appeared in the vicinity of Balangiga. They were to mete sanctions upon the town officials and local residents for violating Lukbán's orders regarding food security and for fraternizing with the Americans. The threat was probably defused by Captain Eugenio Daza, a member of Lukbán's staff, and by the parish priest, Father Donato Guimbaolibot.
A few days later, Connell had the town's male residents rounded up and detained for the purpose of hastening his clean-up operations. Around 80 men were kept in two Sibley tents unfed overnight. In addition, Connell had the men's bolos and the stored rice for their tables confiscated. These events sufficiently insulted and angered the townspeople, and they planned revenge against the Americans.
A few days before the attack, Valeriano Abanador, the town's police chief, and Captain Daza met to plan the attack on the American unit. To address the issue of sufficient manpower to offset the Americans' advantage in firepower, Abanador and Daza disguised the congregation of men as a work force aimed at preparing the town for a local fiesta which, incidentally, also served to address Connell's preparations for his superior's visit. Abanador also brought in a group of "tax evaders" to bolster their numbers. Much palm wine was brought in to ensure that the American soldiers would be drunk the day after the fiesta. Hours before the attack, women and children were sent away to safety. To mask the disappearance of the women from the dawn service in the church, 34 men from Barrio Lawaan cross-dressed as women worshippers. These "women", carrying small coffins, were challenged by Sergeant Scharer of the sentry post about the town plaza near the church. Opening one of the coffins with his bayonet, he saw the body of a dead child who, he was told, was a victim of a cholera epidemic. Abashed, he let the women pass on. Unbeknownst to the sentries, the other coffins hid the bolos and other weapons of the attackers.
There is much conflict between accounts by members of Company C. That day, the 27th, was the 52nd anniversary of the founding of the parish, an occasion on which an image of a recumbent Christ known as a Santo Entierro would have been carried around the parish. In modern times these Santo Entierros are enclosed in a glass case but at the time were commonly enclosed in a wooden box.
Between 6:20 and 6:45 in the morning of September 28, 1901, the villagers made their move. Abanador, who had been supervising the prisoners' communal labor in the town plaza, grabbed the rifle of Private Adolph Gamlin, one of the American sentries, and stunned him with a blow to the head. This served as the signal for the rest of the communal laborers in the plaza to rush the other sentries and soldiers of Company C, who were mostly having breakfast in the mess area. Abanador then gave a shout, signaling the other Philippine men to the attack and fired Gamlin's rifle at the mess tent, hitting one of the soldiers. The pealing of the church bells and the sounds from conch shells being blown followed seconds later. Some of the Company C troopers were attacked and hacked to death before they could grab their rifles; the few who survived the initial onslaught fought almost bare-handed, using kitchen utensils, steak knives, and chairs. One private used a baseball bat to fend off the attackers before being overwhelmed.
The men detained in the Sibley tents broke out and made their way to the municipal hall. Simultaneously, the attackers hidden in the church broke into the parish house and killed the three American officers there. An unarmed Company C soldier was ignored, as was Captain Connell's Philippine houseboy. The attackers initially occupied the parish house and the municipal hall; however, the attack at the mess tents and the barracks failed, with Pvt. Gamlin, recovering consciousness and managing to secure another rifle, caused considerable casualties among the Philippine forces. With the initial surprise wearing off and the attack degrading, Abanador called for the attackers to break off and retreat. The surviving Company C soldiers, led by Sergeant Frank Betron, escaped by sea to Basey and Tanauan, Leyte. The townspeople buried their dead and abandoned the town.
Of the 74 men in Company C, 36 were killed in action, including all its commissioned officers: Captain Thomas W. Connell, First Lieutenant Edward A. Bumpus and Major Richard S. Griswold. Twenty-two were wounded in action and four were missing in action. Eight died later of wounds received in combat; only four escaped unscathed. The villagers captured about 100 rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition and suffered 28 dead and 22 wounded.
This was described as the "worst defeat of United States Army soldiers since the Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876".
The attack and subsequent actions on Samar have been some of the longest-running and most controversial issues between the Philippines and the United States. Conflicting interpretations by American and Philippine historians have confused the issue. The attack has been termed Balangiga Massacre in many English language sources. However, Philippine historian Teodoro Agoncillo has asserted that the term Balangiga massacre properly refers to the burning of the town by US forces following the attack and to retaliatory acts during the March across Samar. Other Philippine sources also employ this usage. In US sources, however, the term massacre is used to refer to this attack.
Mutilation of the bodies of the Americans who were killed was reported in testimony before the US Senate Committee on the Philippines the and information about that has appeared elsewhere. The asserted mutilations have been disputed by historiat George Borrinaga with a counter-assertion to the effect that Filipinos have respect for the dead, he says, and would do no such thing.
Several asserted factual inaccuracies in early published accounts have surfaced over the years as historians continue to re-investigate the Balangiga incident. These include: