Actor–observer asymmetry

Actor–observer asymmetry (also actor–observer bias or actor–observer difference) is a bias one exhibits when forming attributions about the behavior of others or themselves. When explaining their own behavior, people are more likely to attribute their actions to the particular situation rather than their personality, also known as a situational attribution. However, when an observer is explaining the behavior of another person, they are more likely to attribute this behavior to the actors' personality rather than situational factors, also known as dispositional attribution. For example, a politician explaining why they voted against war may say it is because war is not needed, a situational factor. On the other hand, a person judging why the politician voted in this way may say it is because the politician is too liberal, a personality trait.
Sometimes, the actor–observer asymmetry is defined as the fundamental attribution error, defined as when people tend to explain behavior using internal, personal characteristics rather than the external factors or situational influences.However, Malle (2006) highlights that these two phenomena should be distinguished because the fundamental attribution error refers to inferring stable internal traits from behaviour, whereas actor-observer asymmetry specifically refers to explanations of behaviour.
Actor-observer asymmetry is often explained using perspectives and salience. When forming attributions, perspective highlights the situation, and what is occurring around the perceiver is most salient. As a result, perceivers may be more likely to make attributions based on these salient situational factors. However, when judging someone else, their behaviour is more salient than the situation. This may explain the greater chance of making dispositional attributions. Furthermore, when making judgements on one's own behaviour, much more information regarding the self is available, including knowledge of past behaviour. On the other hand, when judging others' behaviour, much less information is available. This lack of quality information likely also contributes to differences in attributions made.
The specific hypothesis of an actor–observer asymmetry in attribution was originally proposed by Edward Jones and Richard Nisbett, who stated that "actors tend to attribute the causes of their behavior to stimuli inherent in the situation, while observers tend to attribute behavior to stable dispositions of the actor". Supported by initial evidence, the hypothesis was long held as firmly established. However, a meta-analysis of all the published tests of the hypothesis between 1971 and 2004 found that there was no actor–observer asymmetry of the sort that had been previously proposed. The author of the study interpreted this result not so much as proof that actors and observers explained behavior exactly the same way but as evidence that the original hypothesis was fundamentally flawed in the way it framed people's explanations of behavior as either stable dispositional attributions or situational attributions.
Considerations of actor–observer differences can be found in other disciplines as well, such as philosophy (e.g. privileged access, incorrigibility), management studies, artificial intelligence, semiotics, anthropology, and political science.
The background of the actor-observer asymmetry was established in the 1960s, with social psychology's increasing interest in the cognitive mechanisms by which people make sense of their own and other people's behavior. This interest was instigated by Fritz Heider's book, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, and the research in its wake has become known as "attribution research" or "attribution theory."
The specific hypothesis of an "actor–observer asymmetry" was first proposed by social psychologists Jones and Nisbett in 1971. Jones and Nisbett hypothesized that these two roles (actors and observers) produce asymmetric explanations.Their research findings were that "there is pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions". By this theory, a student who studies hard for an exam is likely to explain her own (the actor's) intensive studying by referring to the upcoming difficult exam (a situational factor), whereas other people (the observers) are likely to explain her studying by referring to her dispositions, such as being hardworking or ambitious.
Soon after the publication of the actor–observer hypothesis, numerous research studies tested its validity, most notably the first such test in 1973 by Nisbett et al. The authors found initial evidence for the hypothesis, and so did Storms,who also examined one possible explanation of the hypothesis: actors explain their behaviors because they attend to the situation (not to their own behaviors) whereas observers attend to the actor's behavior (not to the situation). Based largely on this initial supporting evidence, the confidence in the hypothesis became uniformly high.
In the Nisbett et al. (1973) study, actor-observer asymmetry was tested by having participants select between two traits (such as energetic and relaxed), choosing which trait best matched the personality of the target, or if the trait that best matched them depended on the situation. They had participants chose between traits many times to see if participants mainly chose a specific trait or said it depended on the situation. Participants repeated the task saying what trait best matched for different people: their best friend, father, a famous news anchor, and themselves. The results showed that participants more frequently stated that the trait depended on the situation for themselves whereas for others' they often chose one trait that best described them. This provided evidence for actor-observer asymmetry because participants viewed other's personality traits as stable whereas their own as dependent on the situation.
Functional neuroimaging studies have also demonstrated differential activation of brain regions when making self-focused vs. other-focused judgments. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and posterior cingulate were involved in both self-related and other-related judgments. However, self-related judgments more often activated the ventral mPFC (vmPFC), left ventrolateral PFC, and left insula. In contrast, other-related judgments more frequently activated the dorsal mPFC (dmPFC), bilateral TPJ, and cuneus. These findings provide neurological depth to support the actor-observer asymmetry, with fundamentally different cognitive and neural processes involved in different types of attribution. Such work highlights how differential attribution is not only a cognitive bias but a biological one, too.
Over 100 studies have been published since 1971 in which the hypothesis was put to further tests (often in the context of testing another hypothesis about causal attributions). Bertram Malle examined this entire literature in a meta-analysis, finding that, across 170 individual tests, the asymmetry practically did not exist. Under circumscribed conditions (i.e. if the actor was portrayed as highly idiosyncratic, or in negative events), it could sometimes be found, but under other conditions, the opposite was found. The conclusion was that the widely held assumption of an actor–observer asymmetry was false.
External influences on the actor-observer effect are largely underemphasized. Research has shown that the actor-observer asymmetry is more likely to occur when an outcome is uncertain, partially controllable, and important. These findings suggest that the actor-observer asymmetry is not a fixed bias but rather a context-dependent phenomenon, challenging the idea that it universally governs attribution patterns.
A significant body of literature exists to support the idea that there are cross-cultural differences in the attribution process. When considering the fundamental attribution error, it has been extended to be known as the "ultimate attribution error" instead, for initially in its discovery it was assumed to be a universal, or a fundamental, phenomenon. It has since been demonstrated that Western cultures are more susceptible to making the fundamental attribution error in comparison to Eastern cultures. Today, the ultimate attribution error is understood to occur when members of an in-group attribute negative behaviours of an out-group to their disposition, while attributing positive behaviours to situational factors. The opposite is true for when members of their own in-group engage in positive or negative behaviours.
In general, studies have shown that collectivist cultures lean towards making situational attributions for the behaviour of others, whereas individualistic cultures lean towards making dispositional attributions. More specifically, in an 1985 study by Cha & Nam, it was found that Korean individuals used more situationally-relevant information than Americans when making causal attributions. Notably, Choi & Nisbett conducted an experiment where participants witnessed an individual writing an essay maintaining a certain view, and both Americans and Koreans believed that the essay reflected the true views of the writer. However, when put in the same position and asked to write an essay about a particular topic themselves, only the Americans continued to believe that the essay was reflective of the writer's attitudes, whereas the Korean participants took into account the situational restraints, and acknowledged that the content of the essay may not truly represent the views held by the writer. Even in regards to interpreting one's own behaviour, individualistic cultures possess the tendency to make situational attributions for their own behaviours. This variation may arise out of one's need to protect their self-esteem or confidence, but also illustrates the differences in cognition and perception between actors and observers.
Findings on the actor-observer asymmetry extend beyond social perception, influencing how individuals internalize judgments from others. Others’ attributions can influence one’s self-view. When someone is frequently exposed to a critical observer who attributes mistakes to personal flaws or enduring character traits, they may begin to adopt this perspective, interpreting their own actions through the same lens. Internalizing such criticism can lead to a belief that their abilities are severely lacking and that their character is fundamentally flawed. Conversely, if a person regularly hears a supportive observer acknowledge their competence while recognizing that certain tasks are inherently challenging, they are more likely to develop a balanced approach to interpreting both their successes and setbacks.
In attribution, the actor–observer asymmetry is often confused with the concept of self-serving bias — the claim that people attribute positive outcomes of their behaviour to dispositional factors, while attributing negative outcomes to situational factors. The difference between the two hypotheses is that the actor–observer asymmetry requires a specific comparison between actor explanations and observer explanations, while the self-serving bias refers only to actor explanations. Furthermore, actor-observer asymmetry is expected to hold for all events and behaviors (whether they are positive or negative), while the self-serving bias is often formulated as a complete reversal in actors' and observers' explanation tendencies as a function of positive or negative events. For example, the self-serving bias holds that for positive events, actors will select explanations that refer to their own dispositions, (e.g., "I am smart"); however, for negative events, actors will select explanations that refer to the situation, (e.g., "the test was hard").
The correspondence bias is similar to actor-observer asymmetry in that both involve systematic differences in how people attribute behavior. However, the correspondence bias specifically focuses on disposition-congruent judgements of others based on their behaviours, even if these behaviours originate due to the situation. It states that observers believe they know an individual’s underlying disposition solely based on their actions. Actor-observer asymmetry, on the other hand, more closely aligns with a self-serving bias.
Much like actor-observer asymmetry, correspondence bias is supported by several cognitive and environmental factors that contribute to its prevalence. There are four key mechanisms that each produce different forms of this bias: lack of awareness, unrealistic expectations, inflated categorizations, and incomplete corrections.
A lack of awareness is constituted by ignorance of the situation in forming attributions. This often occurs due to naive realism, the tendency to believe that one’s own perception of reality is objective and unbiased. Such beliefs may cause observers to think the actor shares their interpretation of the situation, preventing further deliberation to consider situational factors.
Unrealistic expectations include underestimating the power of the situation in various contexts. Interestingly, situational influence can also be overestimated, although this condition does not result in the correspondence bias.
Inflated categorization refers to how ambiguous behaviors can be “inflated” due to the situation in which they occurred. If a perciever uses contextual cues to infer the nature, strength, etc. of behaviours, any disparities between their inference and reality will become especially striking. These disparities then prompt strong dispositional attributions.
Incomplete corrections are the inability to properly correct for one’s immediate assessment of the situation. Observers may judge based on disposition at first, then consider situational factors, but the adjustment between these cognitive mechanisms is not always optimal. Thus, disposition is still largely overrepresented in cognitive appraisals.
Despite the specific mechanism that produces correspondence bias, all forms highlight the pervasive tendency to overattribute behavior to dispositional factors while neglecting situational influences. This process gives rise to various positive and negative implications. For example, while correspondence bias gives observers control of their social world by predicting others, it can also lead to false interpretations of the situation. In some cases, the benefits outweigh the costs by saving the observer valuable time and cognitive effort, but nevertheless, this heuristic must be used with caution.
Additionally, the correspondence bias has a forward thinking component. Observers tend to attribute the actions of others to their future behavior. When someone witnesses another person's actions, they are likely to attribute those same actions to that person's future behavior, which is why first impressions are so important. Once an action is observed, it can be difficult for the observer to imagine the actor behaving differently. On the other hand, actors may find it difficult to attribute a single action to their own overall behavior. They view themselves as more responsive and in control of situational matters. While actors can attribute their past actions, observers can only attribute the one action they have witnessed to the actor, leading them to attribute dispositional rather than situational factors to the actor's behavior.
The concept of trait ascription bias provides an alternative explanation for actor-observer asymmetry. Trait ascription bias refers to the tendency to perceive one's own personality, beliefs, and behaviors as dynamic and adaptable while viewing others as more fixed and predictable. This leads people to oversimplify and categorize others based on their actions, attributing behavior to inherent traits, whereas they see their own actions as influenced by context and circumstance.