Russian invasion of Ukraine order of battle

This is the order of battle for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It should not be considered complete; up-to-date; nor fully accurate, being based on open-source press reporting.
An updated order of battle estimate for 23 April 2023, by the Institute for the Study of War is accessible at:
Another ISW-relevant publication, published in October 2023:
Commanders of the various MOD armed services and branches do not have operational control over the forces. They are responsible for force development and generation. The Chiefs of the ground forces, aerospace forces, navy, strategic missile forces, and airborne forces also hold the appointments of Deputy Ministers of Defence, junior to the Chief of the General Staff, who is the First Deputy Minister of Defence.
The General Staff commands and controls forces through the National Defence Management Centre (NDMC). Operational control of the forces was carried out by the five Operational-Strategic Commands—the Western, Southern, Central, and Eastern Military Districts and the OSK Northern Fleet, which is their equal. The Western and Southern Military Districts share borders with Ukraine and are directly involved in command and control of operations.
Pre-2022 Russian military doctrine had specified that on the outbreak of war, armed forces from non-MOD services (like Rosgvardiya) would be placed under the General Staff.
Ukrainian military commentator Yuri Butusov listed the following initial March 2022 deployment of Russian/allied forces:
Despite evolving Russian doctrine, which specified all troops and forces operating from one Operational-Strategic Command (OSK) be placed under one commander, multiple repeated sources (Rochan Consulting, Center for Naval Analysis, British Ministry of Defence) reported that separate groupings of forces drawn from each of the four military districts, under the leadership of senior personnel from that military district, took part in the initial invasion. President Vladimir Putin was repeatedly reported to be very involved, sometimes giving orders to field formations.
In April 2022, the invasion began to run into setbacks; Russian forces were forced to withdraw from their attempt to take Kyiv. Therefore, a single senior coordinating officer was appointed to handle the more protracted war.
Since 12 January 2023, Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov was appointed as commander of military operations in Ukraine, with Surovikin as his deputy.
The actual operational chain of command of the Russian military effort in Ukraine is not public, changes, and is a mix of state and non-state bodies. Personal rivalries are evident. President Vladimir Putin, however, remains firmly in control, sometimes micromanaging. The loose connection of various mercenary bodies and Ramzan Kadyrov's Chechens to the official command chain has been represented by placing them under headers separate to the Russian Armed Forces.
It is unclear how tactical fighter, ground attack, and strategic bomber "sorties" (one flight of one aircraft) are scheduled and controlled.
On 18 April 2023, Russian official sources said that President Putin had held meetings in the Kherson area with several commanders. The President "..received reports from the commander of the Dnepr forces grouping, General Lieutenant Oleg Makarevich, the commander of the Vostok [Eastern] forces grouping, General Lieutenant Andrey Kuzmenko, and the deputy commander of the combined grouping, General Colonel Mikhail Teplinsky." The meetings likely took place before 16 April.
Direct Forces under President
Clear evidence as to which Grouping of Forces these brigades belong to is not readily available.
Units returned to Russia: