Private military company

A private military company (PMC) or private military and security company (PMSC) is a private company providing armed combat or security services for financial gain. PMCs refer to their personnel as "security contractors" or "private military contractors".
The services and expertise offered by PMCs are typically similar to those of governmental security, military, or police but most often on a smaller scale. PMCs often provide services to train or supplement official armed forces in service of governments, but they can also be employed by private companies to provide bodyguards for key staff or protection of company premises, especially in hostile territories. However, contractors that use armed force in a war zone may be considered unlawful combatants in reference to a concept that is outlined in the Geneva Conventions and explicitly stated by the 2006 American Military Commissions Act.
Private military companies carry out many missions and jobs. Some examples have included military aviation repair in East Africa, close protection for Afghan President Hamid Karzai and piloting reconnaissance airplanes and helicopters as a part of Plan Colombia. According to a 2003 study, the industry was then earning over $100 billion a year.
According to a 2008 study by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, private contractors make up 29% of the workforce in the United States Intelligence Community and cost the equivalent of 49% of their personnel budgets.
Modern PMCs trace their origins back to a group of ex-SAS veterans in 1965 who, under the leadership of the founder of the SAS, David Stirling and John Woodhouse, founded WatchGuard International (formerly with offices in Sloane Street before moving to South Audley Street in Mayfair) as a private company that could be contracted out for security and military purposes.
The company's first assignment was to go to Yemen to report on the state of the royalist forces when a ceasefire was declared. At the same time, Stirling was cultivating his contacts in the Iranian government and exploring the chances of obtaining work in Africa. The company eventually operated in Zambia and in Sierra Leone, providing training teams and advising on security matters. Stirling also organised deals to sell weapons and military personnel to other countries for various privatised foreign policy operations. Contracts were mainly with the Gulf States and involved weapons supply and training. The company was also linked with a failed attempt to overthrow Colonel Muammar Gaddafi from power in Libya in 1971. Woodhouse resigned as Director of Operations after a series of disagreements and Stirling himself ceased to take an active part in 1972.
Stirling also founded KAS International (aka KAS Enterprises) and was involved in a collaboration with the World Wide Fund for Nature to forcibly reduce the illegal poaching and smuggling of elephant tusks in various countries of Southern Africa. Other groups formed by ex-SAS servicemen were established in the 1970s and '80s, including Control Risks Group and Defence Systems, providing military consultation and training.
In 1989, the United Nations Mercenary Convention banning the use of mercenaries was initiated and entered into force on 20 October 2001. As of August 2021, the convention had been ratified by 37 states, and signed but not ratified by 9 states.
Dramatic growth in the number and size of PMCs occurred at the end of the Cold War. The exodus of over 6 million military personnel from Western militaries in the 1990s expanded the recruiting pool for PMCs. Some of the larger corporations included Vinnell and Military Professional Resources Inc. in the United States; G4S and Keeni-Meeny Services in the United Kingdom; and Lordan-Levdan in Israel and Executive Outcomes in South Africa.
Some commentators have argued that there was an exodus from many special operations forces across the globe towards these private military corporations. Units that were allegedly severely affected included the British Special Air Service, the US Special Operations Forces and the Canadian Joint Task Force 2.
The Center for Public Integrity reported that since 1994, the Defense Department entered into 3,601 contracts worth $300 billion with twelve US-based PMCs, specifically during the initial response after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.
Domestic operations are generally under the auspice of state or federal agencies such as the Department of Energy or the Department of Homeland Security rather than the Department of Defense. Driven by increasing fears of domestic terror attacks and civil unrest and disruption in the wake of disasters, more conventional security companies are moving into operations arenas that would fall within the definition of a PMC. The United States State Department also employs several companies to provide support in danger zones that would be difficult for conventional US forces.
The October 2000 USS Cole bombing proved a pivotal moment for private military companies at sea and directly led to the first contract between Blackwater and the US military. Blackwater, and private military contractors in general, became notorious in the 21st century after their usage by the United States government in the American occupation of Iraq.
Since the late 2000s, PMCs have become increasingly involved in anti-piracy measures in Somalia and other regions. PMCs remain active in this region, mainly providing security for private shipping through the Gulf of Aden and at times contracting to aid UN efforts. PMCs were hired to deter pirates from attacking vessels and taking the shipping crew and their transport hostage. While a large variety of international naval missions with the same goals such as the EU's Atalanta, NATO's Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force 150 are and were active in this region, it is still necessary for the shipping companies to have security personnel on deck. Due to their decentralized nature, it can be difficult for the UN or other international organizations to provide effective oversight over what happens on the seas. Whereas the UN showed that, between 2010 and 2015, there were over fifty encounters between the national sovereign navies that participated in the missions, resulting in over 1,200 detained pirates, only one PMC published information over this period. Since the PMCs are so much more active in this area, covering a larger part of it through activities on board trading ships, this could be a low estimate. PMC presence in Somalia is an example of two violent non-state actors at sea engaged in combat with each other.
On April 5, 2005, Jamie Smith, CEO of SCG International Risk announced the expansion of services from the traditional roles of PMCs of protection and intelligence to military aviation support. SCG International Air would provide air support, medevac (medical evacuation), rotary and fixed-wing transportation, heavy-lift cargo, armed escort, and executive air travel to "any location on earth." That marked an expansion of services to rival the capabilities of some countries' armies and air forces.
In 2007, the American Uniform Code of Military Justice was amended to allow for prosecution of military contractors deployed in a "declared war or a contingency operation."
In 2008, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Swiss government, and contributors from private security companies and the civil society/NGO sector developed and proposed the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, detailing international legal obligations and specific recommendations related to PSC services procurement practices and operational oversight, as well as clarifying the obligations of states pertaining to the hiring of such entities during armed conflicts. As of December 2018, fifty-four states had signed the Montreux Document.
As revealed in 2009 by Stoddard et al., the use of private security contractors by NGOs in dangerous regions is a highly sensitive subject. Quite often, the contractors hired are local companies and mostly are unarmed personnel guarding facilities; only rarely are international contractors or mobile armed security personnel used. Many NGOs have sought the services of private security contractors in dangerous areas of operation, such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan, due to lack of knowledge, skills, and time to adequately meet the challenges of deteriorating security environments; and administrative costs of managing security in-house and potential to outsource the liability.
However, it has been argued that outsourcing security leaves NGOs reliant on contractors and unable to develop their own security thinking and make their own decisions. Perceived association of PSPs with state security, police or military services in turn compromises the ability of NGOs to claim neutrality, leading to increased risk. Moreover, outsourcing may not necessarily lead to lower costs, and the cost of middlemen may result in more poorly paid and poorly trained personnel, who turn over frequently and cannot adequately perform the job. Finally, NGOs have obligations beyond strictly legal liability that include political, ethical and reputational implications: If the organisation's responsibility to prevent and mitigate any possible negative outcomes is better achieved through in-house security, it is argued, this should be their choice.
The result is that many NGOs are not open about their use of PSPs and researchers at the Overseas Development Institute have found that sometimes statements at NGOs central headquarters contradict those given by local staff. This prevents informative knowledge sharing and debate on the subject needed to improve NGO decisions regarding this issue, though there have been some notable exceptions; namely, the Afghanistan NGO Security Office and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq.
The private security contractor fulfills many different needs in the private and public sectors. While some nations rely heavily on the input of governments of such nations as the United States, other countries do not trust the US, so they tend to look for private contractors who will have a fiduciary obligation to them.
In 2012, were published the ISO/PAS 28007:2012 Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies.
In December 2006, there were estimated to be at least 100,000 contractors working directly for the United States Department of Defense in Iraq which was a tenfold increase in the use of private contractors for military operations since the Persian Gulf War, just over a decade earlier. The prevalence of PMCs led to the foundation of trade group the Private Security Company Association of Iraq. In Iraq, the issue of accountability, especially in the case of contractors carrying weapons, was a sensitive one. Iraqi laws do not hold over contractors.
On 5 December 2005, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld justified the use of PMCs in Iraq on the basis that they were cost effective and useful on the ground. He also affirmed that they were not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Two days before he left Iraq, L. Paul Bremer signed "Order 17" giving all Americans associated with the CPA and the American government immunity from Iraqi law. A July 2007 report from the American Congressional Research Service indicates that the Iraqi government still had no authority over private security firms contracted by the US government.
In 2007, the Uniform Code of Military Justice was amended to allow for prosecution of military contractors who are deployed in a "declared war or a contingency operation."
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, the US State Department is reportedly planning to more than double the number of its private security guards, up to as many as 7,000. Defending five fortified compounds across the country, the security contractors would operate radars to warn of enemy rocket attacks, search for roadside bombs, fly reconnaissance drones and even staff quick reaction forces to aid civilians in distress. Its helicopter fleet, which will be piloted by contractors, will grow from 17 to 29.
PMCs supplied support to US military bases throughout the Persian Gulf, from operating mess halls to providing security. They supplied armed guards at a US Army base in Qatar, and they used live ammunition to train soldiers at Camp Doha in Kuwait. They maintained an array of weapons systems vital to the invasion of Iraq. They also provided bodyguards for VIPs, guard installations, and escort supply convoys from Kuwait. All these resources were called upon constantly.
In 2010, several Blackwater PMC employees "were indicted on unlawful killing charges in connection with their work as US government contractors during the Iraq War"; founder Erik Prince sold the company and departed soon thereafter.
The Russian Wagner Group has been deployed in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, fighting alongside the Russian Armed Forces since early 2022. In February 2023 it was reported that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree which allowed Gazprom to launch "a mercenary army". Several other mercenary groups have been in evidence, such as Redut, the ministerial-affiliated Patriot group, as well as dozens of other formations. According to one Dutch study, it was estimated that no more than approximately 35,000 operators of private military and security companies ever participated in combat in the Russo-Ukrainian War as of 2024.
The Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted by national referendum on 12 December 1993, and entered into force on 25 December 1993. Article 13.5 reads: "The establishment and activities of public associations whose goals and activities are aimed at the forcible changing of the basis of the constitutional order and at violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, at undermining its security, at creating armed units, and at instigating social, racial, national and religious strife shall be prohibited." In addition, it has been illegal since at least the 1996 edition under Article 359 of the Russian criminal code to recruit, train or finance a mercenary. Also the use of him in an armed conflict or hostilities shall be punished.
Eeben Barlow apparently brought the idea of PMCs to Russia in 2010; there he gave an invited talk to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, as well as presented the PMC concept to representatives of the General Staff of the AFRF. At the time he proposed forming PMCs from retired military personnel and contractors.
The existence of Russian PMCs seems to go as far back as 2011, when the Syrian Civil War kicked off and violent unrest was felt in Libya before Muammar Gaddafi was eliminated in October. Russians had big investments in both of these countries. State-owned enterprise Rostec and its subsidiaries Rosboronexport and Technopromexport, as well as privately owned StroyTransGaz (STG) and Tatneft have billions of dollars invested in international affairs and like to hire from the Russian PMC sector.
In 2012, Vladimir Putin suggested to the State Duma to consider the legalization of PMCs, although owners of Russian PMCs have claimed that because Russia inherited its legal system from the Byzantine Empire, anything that is not explicitly prohibited is allowed.
The Syrian gains of ISIS in 2012 caused the Russian contingent to hire PMCs from the Moran Security Group (MSG) headed by Alexey Badikov, Slavonic Corps, Patriot PMC and Vega PMC. The MSG crew aboard the Myre Seadiver was arrested in October 2012 while in Nigeria.
Oleg Krinitsyn heads the RSB-Group, reportedly in 2013 Russia's largest PMC. The Moscovite MSG was the focus of attention in 2013 for its failed and bloody Syrian involvement. It contracted employees through the Slavonic Corps shell company owned by Vadim Gusev and based in Hong Kong to work for the régime of Bashar al-Assad, but the latter failed "to fulfill their financial obligations, which caused problems with the housing and feeding of the fighters from Slavonic Corps." Meanwhile, 100 of the 267 men hired in spring 2013 by Slavonic Corps perished in October 2013 in a firefight with ISIS. Out of the ashes of the Slavonic Corps was born the Wagner Group.
Two recruiters for the Slavonic Corps were ultimately jailed in October 2014 for their violation of Article 359. They faced up to eight years imprisonment but were convicted for three. Regular squad members were reportedly unpaid and faced no prosecution in Russia.
Not long after the Slavonic Corps fiasco, the Wagner Group PMC made its appearance on the scene. Near the end of 2014, Wagner was given the instructional role of local Basharite militias. Prior to September 2015, the PMCs were Russia's only pseudo-military presence in Syria.
Wagner and Moran both contributed in 2014 to the Russian War in Donbas; Wagner is known to have fought in Syria since late 2015. One manner of payment to the group is from 25% of the proceeds from captured and secured oil and gas infrastructure in Syria.
In January 2018, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said of PMC employees that legislation was needed to "protect these people", while Duma member Mikhail Yemelyanov authored a bill to do just that "because private military companies are legal in many countries"; continuing: "We wrote in the bill that the defence ministry would coordinate and that participation in armed conflicts would only be with their permission."
In February 2023, it was reported that Gazprom would form a PMC of its own called Fakel. The law "On the Security of Fuel and Energy Facilities" appears now to state that companies in this field "may be granted the right to establish a private security organisation".
The organisation Molfar has investigated 37 private military companies in Russia, and found that all of them are or have been connected to Kremlin. Most of them are also funded by Kremlin. More than half of them are participating in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. In total, they have activities in 34 different countries. Russian PMCs are involved in oil and mining operations in 19 countries in Africa.
By the end of 2012, the number of contractors who had died in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait had reached 3,000.
Scholars have studied whether contractor deaths have an effect on the public's "casualty sensitivity" when substituted for military fatalities. Casualty sensitivity refers to the inverse relationship between military deaths and public support for a sustained military engagement. Contractor deaths may account for nearly 30% of total US battlefield losses since the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In October 2007, the United Nations released a two-year study that reported that, although hired as "security guards", private contractors performed military duties. A spokesman for the American mission to the UN office in Geneva (UNOG) said that "Accusations that US government-contracted security guards, of whatever nationality, are mercenaries is inaccurate." An observer noted that the difficulty in separating private from public troops means that legal proceedings against these violent non-state actors can be complicated, and stated that contracted combatants carry the legitimacy of the state that hires them.
Demands for specific PSC services have grown to record levels in recent decades, and private firms' capabilities now include an array of services that are vital to the success of on-the-ground war fighting as well as other more traditional stability operations and contingency contracting. While past calls for corporate responsibility have heralded successes such as the Kimberley Process and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in widespread international operations, there has also been a move within the PSC and contingency contracting industries to call for accountability and to implement a code of ethics for the retention of services and operations of such service providers. Existing credible accountability initiatives form a skeleton for governing the conduct of contractors, but much remains to be fleshed out to form a coherent and standardized framework from which to oversee such organizations and activities. Over the last decade there have been a number of initiatives to regulate the private security industry. These include the ISO/PAS 28007:2012 Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies and the ANSI/ASIS PSC.1 and PSC.4 standards.
Founded in 1955, American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) is a society of individual security professionals dedicated to increasing the effectiveness and productivity of security professionals by developing educational programs and materials. ASIS is an ANSI-accredited Standards Developing Organization, and within ASIS, the ASIS Commission on Standards and Guidelines works with national and international standards-setting organizations and industry representatives to develop voluntary standards and guidelines for security professionals. With funding from the US Department of Defense, the ASIS Commission on Standards is currently promulgating four sets of standards for private security companies.