States and federal territories of Malaysia

Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states and three federal territories, which form the primary administrative divisions of the country. Eleven states and two territories are part of Peninsular Malaysia, while two states and one territory make up East Malaysia. Nine of the Peninsular states have monarchies, with the other four having appointed governors. State governments are led by chief ministers, who are appointed by the monarch or governor, provided they have the support of a majority in the state legislative assembly. The federal territories are governed directly by the national government.
Malaysia was formed through the union of various territories ruled by the United Kingdom. The federal system was created to maintain the status of the Malay sultans, who were the rulers of British protectorates in the Malay Peninsula. The Federation of Malaya was created in 1948, uniting these protectorates with two directly ruled British colonies. Malaya became independent in 1957. In 1963, Sabah and Sarawak, along with Singapore, joined with Malaya to form Malaysia. Singapore was expelled in 1965. The three federal territories were created later, from land separated from existing states.
The national government wields unusually extensive powers for a federation. The national constitution grants it wide powers, including over economic development and internal security. Decades of uninterrupted rule by the Barisan Nasional coalition led to a further centralisation of power. State law must align with federal law, and the national government has various ways to exert formal and informal control over state governments. With limited means to generate revenue, states remain heavily dependent on federal funding. Federal institutions with overlapping mandates allow the national government to influence areas constitutionally reserved for the states, and the national government controls the civil services of most state governments.
Sabah and Sarawak differ significantly from the other states, being geographically separate and having very distinct demographics, economies, and politics. Both have more extensive autonomy than other states, which was negotiated as part of the federation process and set out in the Malaysia Agreement. Both states maintain control over a number of competencies assumed by the federal government in other states. They also have greater fiscal powers, independent legal and judicial systems, and their own immigration regimes.
Eleven states and two federal territories are located on the Malay Peninsula, collectively called Peninsular Malaysia or West Malaysia. Two states and one federal territory lie on the island of Borneo; they are collectively referred to as East Malaysia. Of the 13 states in Malaysia, 9 are monarchies.
While the population of Malaysia is ethnically and religiously diverse, such diversity is spread throughout the country and not inherently reflected by the borders of the states. (However, there is a significant distinction between the peninsular states and Sabah and Sarawak, which have large indigenous populations.) Instead, the establishment of a federal system preserved the identity of the pre-existing Malay sultanates, and maintained the Sultans. In practice, the central government exercises the vast majority of power. This is not only due to the Constitution of Malaysia providing significant powers to the centre, but also to its power in practice exceeding constitutional expectations. The power of the national government compared to the states, especially during the decades of BN rule, has seen the political system sometimes described as unitary with "federal features", "quasi-federal", or "minimalist" federalism. One former state chief minister opined that states in Malaysia have less power than the local governments of other federations. Prominent differences between the states are mostly limited to the governance of Islam, and in the functioning of their particular monarchy. (In states without Sultans, the King fills the usual role of a Sultan for Islam.)
While states have no power over the federal constitution, the central government can amend state constitutions. Where laws conflict, federal law takes precedence, although the constitution does contain provisions for judicial review upon a conflict arising between state and federal government, or between states. The Federal Court of Malaysia adjudicates such conflicts. Both the Prime Minister and the Conference of Rulers (made up of the heads of all states) advise the King on the appointment of judges.
The approval of the Conference of Rulers is needed for any changes affecting royalty, state borders (although not the admittance of new states), freedom of expression, citizenship, privileges given to federal and state parliaments, and federal guarantees regarding state constitutions. Aside from that, their role, and that of the King, is mostly symbolic and ceremonial. It is through their role in the states, and their representation in the Conference of Rulers, that the Sultans are able to wield informal influence. The legislature of each state selects two individuals to represent the state in the national Senate. The federal territories are altogether represented by four senators, who are appointed by the King on the advice of the federal government, along with the other 40 senators.
The federal parliament can make state law, and state rights can be suspended by the central government through the use of an Emergency Ordinance. The state of emergency created by such an ordinance gives the federal parliament sweeping powers under which even most federal constitutional constraints do not apply. The only limits are that changes cannot be made to the "sensitive issues", or to religion, citizenship, or language. In some past federal-state disputes, such as in the 1966 Sarawak constitutional crisis and the 1977 Kelantan Emergency, the national government has seized control of state administration. The Internal Security Act 1960 and its replacement, the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, provide broad power to the national government to make detentions in the name of security, which has been used to target political opponents.
While the formal powers of states have remained mostly the same since independence, and while states retain similar administrative bodies, their power and capacity has been informally curtailed through various direct efforts of the national government, as well as being practically constrained by fiscal limitations. During the period of BN dominance, state branches of UMNO were often controlled by the central government, effectively meaning states could be controlled through party management. Many of the central government's powers are directly under the control of the Prime Minister's Department (PMD), which controls the Election Commission of Malaysia, the state-owned oil company Petronas, and the Federal Land Development Authority, among other departments. In multiple administrations, the Prime Minister has also held the position as Minister of Finance, further strengthening their fiscal control.
State electoral boundaries do not cross national parliamentary boundaries, creating a direct geographical hierarchy between state and national parliament. Historically, most state elections (Sarawak being a notable consistent exception) have occurred alongside national elections, strengthening the electoral influence of the national government campaign. Beginning in 2020, many state electoral calendars began to diverge from the national one, meaning state issues were more widely discussed and state political leaders have gained larger public profiles. The diminishment of state power reflected similar losses of power elsewhere, such as in the national legislature, the judiciary, the media, and civil society, as the power of the executive government grew.
The Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of Malaysia divides powers into three lists: exclusively federal competencies, exclusively state competencies, and a concurrent list where both have input. The federal list includes trade, industry and development, foreign affairs, law, internal security and policing, and education. The state list includes Islamic law, native administration, local government, and land and natural resource use. The concurrent list includes welfare, water and irrigation, planning, culture, sports, and health. Per the constitution, laws affecting the concurrent list do not take effect for four weeks (unless the matter is declared urgent), theoretically to allow time for federal-state consultation on their implementation.
Administration of the law and courts is a federal matter. However, an exception is made for Islamic law, for which a separate Syariah Court system exists in each state. Since 1988, Syariah rulings cannot be appealed in the federal courts, and as there are no courts higher than the state courts, Malaysia has 14 (one for each state and one for all federal territories) distinct Syariah law systems. In Peninsular Malaysia, Syariah courts also rule on Malay customary law (adat), a pragmatic merger of these systems resulting from the constitutional association of Malay ethnicity and the Islamic religion. In Sabah and Sarawak, there are separate customary court systems for Malay customary law and for the customary law of other bumiputera. The central government does apply pressure on states to adopt similar Syariah laws, often through the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, however differences remain in areas such as polygamy and female-initiated divorce. Kelantan has implemented strong hudud laws mandating punishments under Islamic law, but as Syariah courts may only enforce civil law and punishments are considered criminal law, such rulings are unenforceable.
Theoretically, any matter not set out in the Ninth Schedule can be legislated on by the individual states. However, legal scholars generally view this as a "pauper's bequest" because of the large scope of the matters listed in the Ninth Schedule. The courts themselves have generally favoured a broad interpretation of the language of the Ninth Schedule, thus limiting the number of possible subjects not covered. The Parliament of Malaysia is permitted to legislate on issues of land, Islamic religion, and local government to provide for a uniform law between different states, or on the request of the state assembly concerned. The law in question must also be passed by the state assembly as well, except in the case of certain land law-related subjects. Issues that fall under the purview of the state may also be legislated on at the federal level for the purpose of conforming with international treaty obligations. While states must be consulted before laws are introduced for this purpose, they have no right to veto, and resulting law becomes both federal and state law. However, the "sensitive issues" of Islamic law, Malay customs, and native laws and customs in Sabah and Sarawak cannot be modified for international treaty purposes.
The Tenth Schedule of the constitution sets out federal and state financing. States have very limited revenue generating powers, and thus limited funding. With most taxes, customs, and licensing controlled by the federal government, states mostly rely on natural resource revenue, and returns from entertainment and religious institutions. The management of land and its resources is the primary generator of state funding. These funding streams are highly dependent on geography, creating significant inter-state inequality, although even rich states remain limited. All states combined raised a tenth of what the federal government raised in 2016, and state expenditures amount to perhaps only 7% of overall government expenditure (another 3% comes from local government). This leaves states unable to provide many services. (The federally funded Universiti Sains Malaysia, based in Penang, has double the budget of the entire Penang government.)
Federal grants are distributed to states to provide funding, usually tied to very specific purposes that have been approved by the federal government. Federal approval is also needed for state governments to borrow money, which is only allowed for capital expenditure. As the national government has control over economic development, this in combination with being able to deny borrowing means it is able to control the large infrastructure projects. Some state funding is provided by the central government from revenues, allocated according to a constitutionally-mandated formula related to state population. Other grants are ad hoc. From 2013-2022, transfers to state governments fluctuated around 2.5% of total federal expenditure. Overall, states fund about 80% of their activities. Insufficient funds to meet their needs means many states take on debt from the central government. Existing imbalances between state contributions to GDP and fiscal transfers to states have led to calls for increased funding from states contributing relatively more than they receive in grants.
In some states, especially smaller ones, state government composition is influenced by the composition of the national government. This may help secure funding for the state. Many states have ceded some authority in order to balance their budgets, and the provision of subsidies as decided by the National Finance Council provides another method for the national government to influence state policy. While states appoint one representative each to the council, the federal government appoints others to the council, and council decisions are not binding on the Prime Minister.
While the civil services of the former Unfederated Malay States (Johor, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu) are controlled by those states, those of other states are led by central government appointees. (Johor also uniquely possesses its own military forces.) Despite civil servant salaries being paid for by state governments, states lacking control over their civil service have no veto over appointments, and civil service activities can be directed by the federal government. This has led to state civil services at times being uncooperative with opposition governments. The federal government can establish joint services to manage matters relating to both the federal government and one or more states, or to two or more states. The federal government appoints local council mayors, and can directly fund local activities, thus bypassing state governments.
The creation of the overlapping institutions duplicated state government services, providing the federal government mechanisms for formal control over what are constitutionally state competencies. The constitutional mechanism whereby state parliaments can request the national parliament to legislate for them was used to create the National Land Code 1966 and the Local Government Act 1976, which were requested by all states (although they do not apply to Sabah and Sarawak). These laws provide uniformity across Peninsular Malaysia for what are constitutionally state competencies. Their operative institutions, the National Land Council and the National Council for Local Government (NCLG), create national-level policies that must be implemented by federal and state governments, thus facilitating national government control. (Forestry outside of Sabah and Sarawak has also become uniform, as the National Land Council created the National Forestry Council in 1971, leading to the National Forestry Act 1984.) Sabah and Sarawak have distinct local government systems, although both send non-voting representatives to the NCLG. The National Finance Council acts as a third overlapping institution, which increases central government control over state budgets.
State control over oil and natural gas has been appropriated through law by the federal government. The federal government also has direct control over six local authorities designated as "development authorities". While some were turned into federal territory (Labuan and Putrajaya), two remain in Johor, one in Pahang, and one in Kedah. Similar to its creation of overlapping institutions, the federal government also creates national economic corridors, which create mechanisms for federal control of land competencies formally assigned to states.
Outside of the three overlapping bodies and the Conference of Rulers, there is little coordination between state governments. The national government can request that a state government exercise executive or administrative powers constitutionally assigned to the federal government. Federalism is thus often a cooperative exercise between the central and state governments. If the federal government requests such actions, it must provide funding to the state for this purpose.
The East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak have greater autonomy that those on the peninsula, with lists of state power supplemental to those that apply to all states. This includes greater control of their land, development, immigration, native customs, religious affairs, historical sites, and ports and harbours. Water remains a state competency in Sabah and Sarawak, despite being shifted to the concurrent list for other states. Some federal laws, such as those relating to land and local government, do not apply in these states. Both also have greater fiscal powers, their own legal systems, and vetos on constitutional changes. They are not required to have Islam as an official religion, and can determine their own official language. Safeguards protect the appointment of judges in those states, and the provision of citizenship. Both states have a greater ability to borrow money, introduce tax (although this was not used until 1998), and apply export duties to natural resources. Sabah also has control over railways. Their Governors have vetos over constitutional changes that affect their states, namely changes to the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak, to their state legislation, and to the rights of their indigenous people. Lawyers require a connection to either state to practice in its courts, unless given an exception by the state government. The greater autonomy of Sabah and Sarawak compared to other states means that Malaysian federalism is asymmetric.
Sabah and Sarawak did not have strong historical, cultural, or demographic links to Malaya at the time of federation. They also had vastly different economic needs. Their admittance to the federation came with agreements that they would retain a larger ability to managed their own affairs to reflect this. While both merged with the existing states of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore pursuant to the Malaysia Agreement in 1963, this was done by amendment to the Malayan constitution rather than creating a new legal basis for federation. Sabah and Sarawak still retained a higher degree of autonomy than the peninsular states in areas such as immigration, state revenue, and legislative power over land and local government. However, federal influence over their politics increased over time, including direct interference in the state assemblies.
Sabah and Sarawak control immigration themselves, as laid out in the Immigration Act 1959/63. This was intended to prevent West Malaysian immigration, but has at times been used to reduce federal government scrutiny. Malaysians of Sabahan and Sarawakian origin have unique residency rights and benefits. Peninsular Malaysians generally require passports to enter Sabah or Sarawak, or if using their biometric MyKad ID card or other approved identity document can obtain a special document upon arrival to Sabah or Sarawak. Both methods usually limit stays to a maximum of 90 days. A special document is required for longer stays.
Political relations between the Bornean states and the central government are often fraught, with the state governments fearing West Malaysian dominance, while the national government fears separatism. The historical erosion of autonomy has been linked to occasional calls for secession in both East Malaysian states, where such discussion is more common than it is in West Malaysian states. This is linked to the demographic and cultural differences already distinguishing these states from the others. While this discontent has sometimes been used by leaders in both states to extract concessions from the federal government, concessions have often been directly associated with particular East Malaysian politicians, rather than producing structural improvements.
The governance of the states is divided between the federal government and the state governments, while the federal territories are directly administered by the federal government. The nine peninsular states which joined the country as sultanates are known as the Malay states, and all have a monarch as their head of state. The rulers of Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Pahang, Perak, Selangor and Terengganu are styled Sultans. Negeri Sembilan's elective ruler holds the title of Yang di-Pertuan Besar, whereas the ruler of Perlis is titled King. The federal head of state, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (commonly referred to as "King" in English), is elected (de facto rotated) among the nine hereditary rulers to serve a 5-year term. Despite being constitutional monarchs, the rulers have significant informal influence, and are symbols of both the Malay ethnicity and Islam. The four states without monarchies (Malacca, Penang, Sabah, and Sarawak) instead have Governors (styled Yang di-Pertua Negeri) appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
Each state has its own constitution, which must conform with the principles of the national constitution. Each state also has a Westminster-style unicameral legislature called the Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN), which vary in size between states from 15 members (Perlis) to 82 members (Sarawak). As with the federal parliament, members of DUN are elected through first-past-the-post voting in single-member constituencies. The average population represented within each state constituency differs between states. State constituencies are divisions of national constituencies. Thus, like the national constituencies, they are generally based population, albeit with rural constituencies sometimes deliberately smaller. This urban-rural disparity is largest in Sabah and Sarawak. The term of DUN members is five years unless the assembly is dissolved earlier by the Ruler or Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. Rulers and Governors hold discretionary powers in withholding consent to dissolve the DUN. While historically state elections mostly aligned with national elections, electoral calendars began to significantly diverge around 2020. Each state sends two senators elected by the DUN to the Dewan Negara (Senate), the upper house of the federal parliament. While the main court system is national, each state has its own Syariah Court system.
States have an executive chief minister as politically responsible head of government. (In the Malay states chief ministers are known as menteri besar, while in Malacca, Penang, and Sabah they are referred to as ketua menteri. In Sarawak, the title "premier" has been used since 2022). These are appointed by the relevant ruler or governor from the DUN if they have the support of the majority of the state legislature. The chief minister heads an executive council (known as the Council of State in Peninsular Malaysia, Supreme Council in Sarawak, and Cabinet in Sabah). State departments either report to the state government, or to the state government and the federal government. The latter includes the chief ministers department, except for those of Sabah and Sarawak (other historically state-run departments in those two states have become more similar to those of the Peninsular states).
Each peninsular state is divided into districts, which are in turn divided into sub-districts (mukim). The lowest level is the village (kampung), whose chief receives and allowance but is not considered a public servant. In Sabah and Sarawak, districts are grouped into "Divisions" (also called a "Residency" in Sabah), and these states have their own local government systems.
The 3 federal territories were formed for different purposes: Kuala Lumpur was separated from Selangor to have an independent national capital, Putrajaya from Selangor as the administrative centre of the federal government, and Labuan from Sabah to serve as an offshore financial centre. The territories fall under the purview of the Ministry of Federal Territories, and the Parliament of Malaysia legislates on all matters concerning the territories. Each federal territory elects representatives from single-member constituencies to the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) of the Parliament: 11 for Kuala Lumpur, and 1 each for Labuan and Putrajaya. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong appoints senators to represent the territories in the Dewan Negara: two for Kuala Lumpur, and one each for Labuan and Putrajaya.
The federal government has jurisdiction over what would be state competencies in federal territories. There are no subnational elections in the federal territories, even in Kuala Lumpur, whose governmental budget exceeds that of most states. A joint Syariah legal system applies to all three territories. The local governments for the territories varies: Kuala Lumpur is administered by the Kuala Lumpur City Hall (Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur), headed by an appointed mayor (Datuk Bandar), while Putrajaya is administered by the Putrajaya Corporation (Perbadanan Putrajaya), headed by an appointed president, and Labuan by the Labuan Corporation (Perbadanan Labuan), headed by an appointed chief executive officer.
Malaysia's federal system arose due the preservation of sultanates on the Malay Peninsula who came under British control. The initial British possessions in the region, Penang in 1786, Singapore in 1819, and Malacca in 1825, were directly controlled by the UK. However, later expansion was carried out through the establishment of protectorates. The 1826 Burney Treaty between Siam and the United Kingdom saw Thailand relinquish its claims over Pahang, Perak, and all territory to their south, although the United Kingdom did not claim this territory. In 1873, policy changes under John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley, led to British intervention in the Larut Wars in Perak, the Klang War in Selangor, and in Sungei Ujong (now part of Negeri Sembilan). Beginning in 1874, Andrew Clarke forced the rulers of these sultanates to accept British oversight, establishing the residency system and creating the first formal protectorates.
Influence over the other small states that would form Negeri Sembilan, considered too small to host Residents themselves, was initially exercised through Abu Bakar of Johor, who British authorities in Singapore viewed as an amenable ally. By 1878, he had an official role in all these states except Sungei Ujong. However, continued disputes in the region, and concerns about whether heirs of Abu Bakar would be able to exercise the same role led to a slow process of increasing British influence beginning in 1881. British Officers sent to these states played similar roles to Residents, but informally. In 1889, several small states formally united into Negeri Sembilan. In 1898 a Resident was appointing, and in 1895 Sungei Ujong and Jelubu became part of the confederacy. A resident was installed in Pahang in 1888, while the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 brought Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu under British control. A protectorate over Johor was established in 1914, bringing all territory south of Siam under British control. The sultans who had moved from Thai to British sovereignty, along with Johor, resisted a full Resident, instead accepting less powerful Advisors. The establishment of such residents and advisors brought the sultans under indirect British rule, however it also strengthened their domestic strength, as British influence led to the development of new administrative structures that were headed by these sultans.
In 1895, the Federated Malay States was created, bringing Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, and Selangor into a shared governmental structure. The power of this new body over the individual sultanates was kept limited, to ensure the United Kingdom remained on good terms with the sultans. This set a precedent for later attempts at unification. The remaining five sultanates became known as the Unfederated Malay States, while the directly ruled Penang, Malacca, and Singapore became known as the Straits Settlements. The demographics and economies of these groups diverged, with the Straits Settlements turning into cosmopolitan cities, while the Federated Malay States saw Chinese and Indian immigration to urban areas. In rural areas, and among the Unfederated Malay States, the population remained mostly Malay, and economies grew more slowly. The civil services of each of the Federated Malay States were merged with those of Penang and Malacca. Other services, including police, health, education, and law, also saw consolidation across borders.
Movement towards bringing these disparately ruled territories together was resisted until the Second World War led to a Japanese invasion in 1942. In 1946, shortly following the end of Japanese occupation, the nine sultanates under British protection were joined together with Malacca and Penang to form the Malayan Union. This had a strong central government, removing most power from the sultans. This, alongside other issues, made the union greatly unpopular. The hopes in the UK that Malay loyalties would shift from the sultans to the newly proposed nation were not met, instead the removal of power from the sultans was seen as a threat to Malay sovereignty, and became entangled with the Union's offer of citizenship to non-Malays. Opposition coalesced under the ethnic Malay UMNO party. In some cases, Malay anger even affected the sultans, who were blamed for signing the treaty that founded the Union.
In 1948 the Union was replaced with the 11-state Federation of Malaya, which was more closely modelled on the Federated Malay States, meaning sovereignty lay with the sultans. This federation was structured to preserve the identity of the component states, and included consultation mechanisms for when there was disagreement between state and central government. The agreement of the sultans (who formed the Conference of Rulers) was needed for any constitutional change, forcing the ruling Alliance Party to negotiate with the sultans as it established governmental structures. However, it also reduced the offer to non-Malays. Resulting discord led to a State of Emergency being declared in June 1948, which would last until 1960. This mostly ethnic Chinese communist rebellion for independence was not supported by Malay leaders, but did provide pressure to move Malaya towards independence.
Malaya became independent with a new constitution drafted by the Reid Commission in 1957, with its federal system inspired by the Constitution of India, overcoming independence movements in Johor, in Kelantan, and in Penang. This constitution gave the central government significant power, in part influenced by a desire to grow the economy and to combat the ongoing rebellion. While the governing coalition was led by the Malay UMNO, it incorporated Chinese and Indian parties whose members were less concerned with preserving the power of the sultans. Alliance convincingly won the first post-independence election in 1959, winning 9 of the then-11 states.
On the island of Borneo, Brunei, North Borneo, and Sarawak became British protectorates in 1888. This was initially a loose arrangement, with the territories not receiving Residents. Following occupation during the Second World War, North Borneo and Sarawak came under direct British control as crown colonies in 1946. These territories had little shared history with Malaya, and were demographically and economically dissimilar. They were different from each other as well, Sarawak having had developed a political identity since the mid-19th century, while Sabah was very loosely governed. British officials did not feel either would be able to survive as independent states, being relatively undeveloped and vulnerable to neighbouring states, and so hoped to create a larger union to facilitate decolonisation. However, they also did not feel able to force the issue, and thus the British worked to ensure they had some buy-in from urban North Bornean and Sarawakian elites. British authorities were also unwilling for Singapore to become independent on its own, while not wanting to alienate Singaporean leadership. Thus, while unable to force the issue, Britain sought to facilitate negotiations between all parties towards some sort of union. Malayan politicians, led by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, were reluctant to unite Malaya with the ethnically-Chinese dominated Singapore. The potential inclusion of North Borneo and Sarawak, both with large non-Chinese populations, helped assuage Malayan concerns about incorporating Singapore. Singaporean leaders also acted to show acceptance of special position for Malays, including adopting Malay as its official language and adopting a Malay-language national anthem in 1959.
Serious discussion began in the 1960s. In January 1960, UK prime minister Harold Macmillan gave his "winds of change" speech, envisioning more British colonies becoming independent. The already independent Malaya was seen as an economic success. Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew, under which Singapore become self-governing in 1959, saw union with Malaya as crucial not only for Singapore's economic interests, but for its security. Although the Malayan Emergency had been brought to an end, the presence of the Cold War and continuing insurgencies in the region meant fears of communist takeovers remained. Indonesia was also seen as a threat, with its leader Sukarno viewing Malaya a neo-colonial project, and believing Malaya supported the 1958 PRRI/Permesta rebellion in Indonesia. In July 1960 Indonesia began dedicated efforts to annex Western New Guinea, which it achieved in August 1962. Its relations to China grew closer, and there were concerns it would seek further territorial expansion.
Tunku first publicly raised the idea of a greater union in May 1961, as his fear of a belligerent communist Singapore overcame his reluctance to incorporate it into Malaya. This fear was strengthened by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The question of federation became seen as urgent in 1962 as defections from those opposed to union brought Lee close to losing power in Singapore. The December 1962 Brunei revolt accelerated the process. In Singapore, security countermeasures included the detaining of political opposition. In Sarawak, which bordered Brunei, the result sharpened public perception of the threat of Indonesia. This was especially significant among the Dayak people, many of whom resigned from the then-anti-federation Sarawak United Peoples' Party. With the political interests of leaders in Malaya and Singapore having converged with British strategic interests, the federation of Malaya with Brunei, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore moved forward. North Borneo and Sarawak were offered various safeguards and areas of additional autonomy to secure their buy-in. The offer to North Borneo became known as the 20-point agreement. Elections in North Borneo and in Sarawak confirmed support for federation. Negotiations with Brunei foundered, and Brunei pulled out in June 1963.
In September 1963, Malaya was joined with three new states: Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore, becoming Malaysia. This expansion, sometimes also described as the creation of a new federation, was confirmed with the Malaysia Agreement, under which the new states had greater autonomy than the 11 existing states. Sabah and Sarawak were given outsize electoral influence in the national parliament, compared to their populations. This was partially an enticement to join the federation, and partially to reduce the electoral influence of the mostly-Chinese Singapore (although the expulsion of Singapore from the federation did not affect Sabah and Sarawak's seats). The two states were also not included in the periodic review of electoral constituencies that covered the other states, instead being granted separate processes. Initially planned to occur on 31 August (the date of Malaya's independence), federation was delayed until 16 September due to the Cobbold Commission having not yet finished ascertaining if there was support in North Borneo and Sarawak for joining the federation.
The Malaysia Agreement saw the original Constitution of Malaya amended, rather than the creation of a new constitution. It is not known if the Conference of Rulers gave its approval for the expansion of the country, indicating the early dominance of the central government. Objections to the expansion by Kelantan, which argued the expansion effectively abolished the previous federation and thus that it should not bind Kelantan, were dismissed by the courts. Singapore became independent in 1965, leaving the current 13 states. The departure of Singapore caused tension with Sabah and Sarawak. In the immediate years following, the chief ministers of both states (Fuad Stephens in Sabah and Stephen Kalong Ningkan in Sarawak) were forced out after seeking renegotiations. Local parties in Sabah and Sarawak later closely aligned themselves with Alliance.
What is now the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, led by the UMNO party, controlled the national government from independence until 2018. In particular, control of government gradually consolidated under UMNO party leadership and the Prime Minister's Department (PMD). The continuous rule of BN facilitated the shift of power towards the central government. Party loyalists were appointed to federal and state positions. Institutional checks, such as the veto power of the Senate, were weakened. New national laws and institutions circumvented the formal powers of the states. This control could allow for quite granular interventions: the Commercial Vehicles Licensing Board, for example, can be used by the federal government to manage local-level bus routes. The National Council for Local Government was created in 1960, formalising federal influence at the local level. Local council elections were suspended in 1965. In 1964, the Senate was expanded to include 32 appointees of the central government, increasing from 22 and meaning central government appointees outnumbered senators appointed by states (two from each state).
Following independence, two main opposition groups arose. The Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) gained support in the northeast, especially in Kelantan and Terengganu, while opposition non-Malay parties gained support in parts of the west coast. PAS won in Kelantan and Terengganu in 1959, although in 1961 defections in the Terengganu parliament gave control to UMNO. The national government arrested some PAS leaders, charging them with supporting Indonesia in the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation. However, it was unable to win Kelantan in the 1964 or 1969 elections. The popularity of PAS was seen as a rejection by Malay voters of the racial compromises made by Alliance, while at the same time Alliance faced growing opposition in non-Malay constituencies. The 1969 Malaysian general election also saw UMNO lose Penang to Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, and hung parliaments emerge in Perak and Selangor. While PAS did not win another state, it won almost 24% of the popular vote nationally. These disruptive political results were followed by race riots. In response, the national government suspended the constitution and parliament. While emergency rule was ended after 20 months, BN gained a consistent two-thirds parliamentary majority afterwards. Gerakan, PAS, and other opposition parties made agreements with UMNO, and Alliance was reformed into the broader Barisan Nasional (BN). The constitution was amended to remove control of electoral constituencies, including the number allocated to each state, from the Electoral Commission. Instead, it became determined by the constitution, and thus could be amended by BN through their parliamentary supermajority. The relative allocation of seats within Peninsular Malaysia remained roughly proportional to population, although Malay-majority states received a slight advantage.
Control over the economy was centralised through the 1971 New Economic Policy. The Petroleum Development Act 1974 shifted control of oil and natural gas production in Sabah, Sarawak, and Teregganu to the national government, with states instead receiving 5% of the national government's profit. The Local Government Act 1976 conferred some powers over local government to the national government. 1976 also saw the national constitution amended to symbolically list Sabah and Sarawak as equivalent to the other states. State Economic Development Corporations became effectively controlled by the federal government in the mid-1970s, despite being initially established by states. Privitisation efforts in the 1980s and 1990s saw control of public services removed from states in favour of private companies. The central government imposed bureaucratic barriers to give it control over some state decisions, and withheld funding from state governments that disagreed with it, such as halting general subsidies to Kelantan during periods when it was governed by the opposition, and halting oil proceeds to Terengganu in a similar situation.
The constitution was amended to make tourism a federal responsibility in 1994 without consulting the states, although in practice states still promote their own tourism. It was also amended to make water management a concurrent responsibility rather than a state one in 2006. Over time, the Senate has slowly become more dominated by appointments by the central government, reducing the power of those appointed by states. National government control of Islam has also grown. The creation of Malaysia Economic Corridors, which operate under the PMD, brought three quarters of land under a parallel structure of government control to that of the states.
The proportion of revenue that went to the national government became even more lopsided, increasing from 80.5% after the formation of Malaysia to 90.7% in the late 2000s. The national government began to fund states more through loans than through grants. With state funding dependent not only on their own revenue but on federal government favour, there was unequal development, with the public sector growing in some states and decreasing in others. Relative to GDP, the public sector was consistently small in Sabah and Sarawak. Kedah saw relatively high growth in the late 20th century, coinciding with the long rule of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who was from that state.
Due to the many mechanisms of federal control, state governments were heavily influenced by the national government, reducing the theoretical impact of the federal system. The national government was effectively able to select the Chief Ministers of each state. Until 2008, UMNO also led almost all of the state governments, never losing control of more than 2 at a time. In Sabah and Sarawak, local parties often aligned themselves with BN, and the central government intervened to shape the development of the politics of its new states. The expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 was an early example of central government power. The Chief Ministers of Sabah and Sarawak, Fuad Stephens and Stephen Kalong Ningkan respectively, were not consulted on the expulsion. In 1966, the federal government engineered the removal of Stephen Kalong Ningkan as Chief Minister of Sarawak, eventually declaring a state of emergency to resolve the constitutional crisis that had emerged in its favour. Both the federal and Sarawak constitutions were amended to enable the dismissals of chief ministers. In 1970, an UMNO-friendly government was elected in Sarawak.
The autonomy of Sabah and Sarawak gradually diminished in practice, despite the assurances of the Malaysia Agreement, although their indigenous populations were granted bumiputera status in 1971. Upon forming Malaysia the constitution was changed to list the new states separately from the existing ones, however a later amendment combined this into one list. The federal government facilitated the spread of Islam in the new states, and it became the official religion of Sabah in 1973. The civil service in Sabah and Sarawak is dominated by individuals from West Malaysia, and both states received only 5% of the royalties derived from natural resource exploitation in their territory. The national Electoral Commission controlled state constituency boundaries. The independence of East Pakistan led to the use of "Peninsular Malaysia" becoming officially preferred to "West Malaysia", and "Sabah and Sarawak" replacing "East Malaysia", to reduce links between the two Bornean states.
Overall, the federal government clashed more with the Sabahan government than the Sarawakian one. Sarawakian politics was heavily influenced by Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu, an UMNO-aligned party that included large numbers of Malays and other Muslim bumiputera. It and other parties have maintained a stable and dominant coalition that kept on good relations with the federal government while maintaining autonomy. Sabahan politics has been more fractious. Sabah saw Malayisation and Islamisation under Datu Mustapha Datu Harun, but he was removed after seeking greater autonomy. The successor Sabah People's United Front-led government initially continued such policies, but after a breakaway group defeated the original party in 1985, Kadazan-Dusun identity was more heavily promoted. Development grants allocated to both states lessened over time. While they were higher per capita than those given to other states, the relative underdevelopment of those two states has persisted since federation, with a net transfer of wealth away from the two states. The percentage of seats in the national parliament allocated to both states was reduced, although they retained a larger share than their proportion of the population.
In 1993, the constitution was amended to strip royalty of full legal immunity, following the central government stripping all support from the monarchies it legally could and engaging in a public relations campaign in order to obtain royal consent for the amendment. The 1997 Asian financial crisis led to the national government to take on further control of public services. Some companies that had taken over utilities from states were nationalised under the federal government. Some that were not became supervised by federal commissions, which lacked state representatives.
After independence, the country's capital city, Kuala Lumpur, grew significantly. At this time, the city was part of Selangor, limiting the ability of the federal government to develop the capital and meaning the federal capital was controlled by a single state. The 1974 Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur Agreement saw the city separated from Selangor to become a separate territory directly controlled by the federal government. This was partly a response to the a race riot that occurred in the city in 1969. The removal of Kuala Lumpur, with its large ethnic Chinese population, from Selangor secured BN's control of that state. Labuan, a British territory since 1847 that was joined to North Borneo in 1946, was split from Sabah in 1984 to become an offshore financial centre. A third territory, Putrajaya, was split from Selangor in 2001 to serve as the administrative capital. The cession of Labuan was seen as a symbol of decreasing Sabahan autonomy.
Kelantan elected the opposition Malaysian Islamic Party in 1959, and they governed until 1978. That year, the chief minister was effectively removed by the federal government. This crisis, precipitated by a split in PAS between those who supported and opposed an alliance with the federal government, led to UMNO expelling PAS from BN. A February 1978 snap election in which campaigning was banned saw PAS lose the state to UMNO and its allies, being reduced to two of the 36 seats in the Kelantan parliament. PAS recovered only in 1988, when a member of the Kelantan royal family left UMNO after losing a leadership election, and formed an electoral alliance with PAS which won the state's 1990 election, returning the state to opposition control. In 1991, when two Kelantan lawmakers defected to UMNO, Kelantan amended its constitution to require by-elections following defections. This change would remove the ability of UMNO to entice defectors, which it had done in several states before this point. The amendment was however struck down by the Supreme Court.
Outside of Kelantan, opposition parties did not see much electoral success. Notable periods of opposition rule occurred in Sabah (1985-1994) and Terengganu (1999-2004). When the opposition held Sabah, development funding was shifted to other states, and timber exports, which were a source of state funding, were banned. The central government worked directly with local authorities, bypassing the state government, and encouraged voting for BN as a way to receive investments. In the 1990s some Sabahan politicians calling for autonomy were accused of fostering secession and detained. The 1990s also saw UMNO officially start operating in Sabah. Its activities there sought to undermine local parties, and its Sabahan branch even accepted non-Muslims as party members. After taking control in 1994, UMNO instituted a system of rotating chief ministers, meaning none served a full term. The rise of UMNO ended Sabah's autonomy in practice, and its relations with the national government became similar to those of the Peninsular states.
From 1990, development funding to Kelantan was also reduced, with the state receiving the second-smallest allocation. The federal government also stopped providing oil royalties to the state. In 2000, the national government shifted petroleum royalties paid by Petronas from Terengganu to the federal government, replacing it with a smaller direct transfer from the federal to state government. (Royalties were restored upon the return of UMNO to power in 2004, but in 2015 Petronas ceased all payments to the state government.) The tensions created by these changes exacerbated existing inequality, with Kelantan and Terengganu being relatively poor states. The general strength of the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) in these northeastern states and their neighbours was a result of both rising political Islam and continued poverty.
Ahead of the 2008 Malaysian general election, the opposition formed the broad Pakatan Rakyat alliance, united primarily by opposition to BN rather than by ideology. The election saw BN lose its two-thirds majority in the national parliament. Concurrent state elections saw Penang, Perak, Kedah, and Selangor elect opposition governments, while the government of the opposition-led Kelantan increased its majority. The opposition wins in the relatively wealthier west coast states limited the leverage of tools BN had previously used in poorer states. In Perak, the BN induced three state legislators to defect, creating a constitutional crisis when the Sultan then appointed an UMNO-led government. While this was initially reversed by the Malaya High court, it was endorsed by the Court of Appeal.
Nonetheless, continued control of other economically important states provided a new political platform for the opposition, and created a visible alternative to BN rule. The national government responded to the loss of these states by further strengthening central power. The budget of the PMD was expanded, and by 2012 was by itself 10 times larger than the budget of Selangor, and 15 times the budget of Penang. New agencies within the PMD gained increased control over economic planning, with the PMD controlling 25% of economic planning by 2015. The Ministry of Tourism ended cooperation with opposition-led states, and shifted Tourist Action Councils in those states under federal control. Civil servants and workers for federal ministries in opposition-run states were instructed not to attend state government functions, and Village Development and Safety Committees and Residents' Representation Committees began reporting directly to the federal government, as opposed to BN-run states where they reported to state governments. The 2011 Tenth Malaysia Plan dropped all mention of cooperating with the states regarding economic development, contrasting with previous plans. The federally-run State development offices of Penang and Selangor began operating from outside of those states, and stopped sending reports to the state governments. New economic growth corridors were set up, extending federal control over the 76% of the country they covered. In 2014, the federal government softened its longstanding opposition to the introduction of Hudud punishments in Kelantan. This may have been politically influenced, to split the Islamist Malaysian Islamic Party from others in Pakatan Rakyat, and to shore up support among rural Malays. Pakatan Rakyat dissolved in 2015.
Penang and Selangor went on to join Kelantan in becoming opposition strongholds. In 2010, Selangor and Penang appealed to the Electoral Commission for the reinstatement of local elections. This was denied, with the Commission stating that approval was needed from the NCLG. In 2012, Penang tried again to reintroduce local elections, however this was ignored by the Electoral Commission and blocked by the courts. Selangor unsuccessfully tried to regain control of water infrastructure privatised by the previous state government, and both states tried to regain control of waste management. Selangor also sought to amend its constitution to gain control of its civil service, which did not reach the required two-thirds majority required. Pakatan Rakyat used its ability to dissolve state legislatures to apply pressure on the national election timetable. The persistence of such opposition governments influenced changes in BN rule. UMNO committed to running more female candidates following opposition commitments to do so. Efforts by the Selangor government to improve bus services and subsidise housing were imitated by the federal government.
Disputes with the national government also emerged in BN-led states. Oil revenue distribution was raised by Kelantan, Sabah, Sarawak, and Terengganu. Sarawak used its importance to the small BN majority in parliament to extract concessions from Petronas, and set up its own oil company. It also declared English an official language, and sought to increase the percentage of teachers hired locally. In 2016 Mukhriz Mahathir was removed from his position as Chief Minister of Kedah after criticising the Prime Minister, despite Mahathir being an UMNO member. In 2017 the Minister of the Federal Territories proposed converting Penang, Langkawi (part of Kedah), and parts of Malacca into federal territories, a symbolic assertion of national government power. The rise of the opposition, and thus the weakening of BN, also provided political space for the Sultans to reassert their influence. In 2015 the Crown Prince of Johor asserted Johor had the right to secede if its autonomy was infringed upon.
The Pakatan Harapan (PH) opposition alliance was formed to contest the 2018 Malaysian general election. Its election manifesto explicitly called for a revival of "the true spirit of federalism", as well as the promise to restore the autonomy of Sabah and Sarawak. The 2018 election saw BN lose power at the national level for the first time, and it further lost power in 8 of the 10 states it governed. State governments entered a period of shifting coalitions and much more complex party politics, and discussions about state power, including the status of Sabah and Sarawak, became active political topics. Sabah returned to opposition control, while in Sarawak the dominant political parties, until that point part of BN, withdrew and established themselves as an independent coalition. The PH government formed a Parliamentary Special Select Committee to discuss Federal-State relations which met until the end their government.
In conjunction with the celebration of Malaysia Day in 2018 under the new PH government, prime minister Mahathir Mohamad promised the government "will restore the status of equal partners to Sabah and Sarawak". However, the proposed amendment failed to reach the required two-thirds majority (148 votes). While 138 parliamentarians voted in support, 59 abstained. Nevertheless, the Malaysian federal government agreed to review the 1963 Malaysia Agreement to remedy breaches of the treaty with the "Special Cabinet Committee To Review the Malaysia Agreement" and directed a Special Task Force Team (Taskforce MA63) to prepare a final report on the 1963 agreement before 31 August 2019. In 2019 Sarawak took its claim for oil sales tax payments to court. This case was won in 2020, and in 2022 an agreement was also reached for Sabah to receive this sales tax revenue.
The Sheraton Move in February 2020, in which the PH government was unseated by a change in parliamentary coalitions and replaced by the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, was followed by similar coalition shifts changing governments in four states. Resulting instability meant that for the first time outside of Sarawak, state electoral calendars fell out of alignment with national elections. The national committee on Federal-State relations was not re-established by the 2020 government, however discussion continued on the relationship with Sabah and Sarawak. Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob agreed to increase parliamentary representation for Sabah and Sarawak to 35% (up from 25%), however this did not occur before the next national election. (The combined population of both states was 17.4% of the national population.) The political instability saw the importance of the King and other rulers increase, as they took active roles in resolving political disputes.
On 16 September 2021, two years after the failed attempt to amend the constitution to distinguish Sabah and Sarawak, prime minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob pledged to look into issues relating to Sabah and Sarawak via the Special Council on Malaysia Agreement 1963. Negotiations were chaired by the prime minister, joined by the chief ministers of Sabah and Sarawak, as well as eight federal ministers. On 19 October 2021, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Sabah and Sarawak Affairs) Maximus Ongkili announced a Bill to be tabled in the coming Parliament sitting after the Special Council on Malaysia Agreement 1963 agreed to Articles 1(2) and 160(2) of the Federal Constitution to restore Sabah and Sarawak as equal partners to Peninsular Malaysia. The proposed law differed from the 2019 proposal, being tabled by Minister in the Prime Minister's Department (Law and Parliament) Wan Junaidi. The same meeting also saw the council agree to empower both the Sabah and Sarawah governments to issue deep fishing licences, previously issued by the federal government.
Four constitutional amendments were tabled on 3 November 2021: describing Sabah and Sarawak as "territories" rather than states, defining Malaysia Day as the day when Sabah and Sarawak joined, defining "Federation" as the formation of Malaysia rather than Malaya, and changes to the inheritance of Sarawak native status. On 14 December 2021, the proposed amendment was passed in the Parliament unanimously with 199 votes in favour, and 21 MPs absent from the 6-hour long debate. On 6 January 2022, Minister Ongkili announced the setting up of a joint technical committee to study Sabah's proposal for increased annual grants in addition to a counteroffer from the Federal Government. While there is some cooperation between Sabah and Sarawak post-2018 towards seeking enhanced autonomy, cooperation has been limited, in part because of Sarawakian parties being unwilling to work too closely with what are seen as federally-influenced Sabahan parties. Both states have been pushing for increased control over their continental shelf, greater representation in the national parliament, and increased revenue collection. Sarawak's bid to obtain MASwings, which is part of an ambition to establish a state airline, was approved by the federal government. However, new state laws asserting state control over oil and gas resources have led to legal disagreements with the federal government, which asserts Petronas maintains national authority.
After the 2022 Malaysian general election led to the formation of a national coalition between PH and BN, many state governments led by PH or BN adopted this national alliance and brought the other into government at the state level. In Johor, the concept of an official opposition was replaced by the idea of a "balancing force", and the PH-affiliated former opposition adopted this role instead of joining the UMNO government. In Terengganu, PN won all seats, leading to there being no opposition. Many states did not dissolve their assemblies to align with the national election.
Neither BN or PH campaigned on federal issues in general, although both had specific promises for Sabah and Sarawak. Continuing the trend of prior governments, a government body was established to facilitate discussions about Sabah and Sarawak. Through this body it has been agreed, among other things, that gas regulation will come under the control of both states, and that some federal land previously appropriated from the state governments will be returned. The national government also included significant numbers of East Malaysian ministers, including the first East Malaysian deputy prime minister. The PH-BN government set up a parallel system of village governance, mostly but not entirely in opposition-led states. These often relied on BN appointees from the pre-2018 period. During this administration, Penang, Johor, Terengganu, Sabah, and Sarawak all sought larger fiscal transfers. Oil revenue came under further dispute, with Sabah and Sarawak seeking control of all oil produced from the continental shelf extending from their states. Terengganu has also sought such control, although Terengganu lacks the same legal basis, and its claim was rejected by the federal government. Sarawak has even had limited success in pursuing autonomy over education, which is a federal competency. The Regent of Johor called in June 2024 for his state to be treated as an equal to the federal government. One area where the PH-BN administration has given greater grants that previous administrations is Ecological Fiscal Transfers, which are given to states to ensure the conservation of natural forest areas.
After the Second World War the United Kingdom sought to integrate Brunei with North Borneo and Sarawak, as an interim step to unifying the Borneo territories with Malaya and Singapore, but the Bruneian sultan was reluctant to cede political control or share oil revenues. Nonetheless, British authorities continued to envision Brunei as part of the eventual federation of its territories in the region. In March 1956, with the independence of Malaya imminent, Brunei's sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III publicly rejected federation. Brunei's first political party, the Brunei People's Party (PRB), was formed in August 1956 by A. M. Azahari. Azahari had a range of views, but was generally anti-British and did not wish for Brunei to be in a Malayan-dominated federation. His political party was popular, and he had a complicated relationship with the sultan. When the British rejected proposed moves towards greater autonomy, the sultan turned to Malaya in 1958, building political and economic ties. In 1959, Brunei gained domestic autonomy, and in February 1960 Azahari courted politicians in North Borneo and Sarawak, proposing the idea of a North Bornean federation. After Tunku proposed federation in 1961 without consulting Brunei, the PRB leveraged these ties to foster opposition across all three territories. While the PRB proposed independence, Malayan authorities assumed the sultan was in favour of merger. A joint currency already existed, and the sultan's sons studied in Malaya. A palace for the Sultan of Brunei was constructed in Kuala Lumpur in preparation for federation, to match those of the Malayan sultans.
On 5 December 1961, the Bruneian sultan made a public statement that spoke positively about federation, and Brunei began to participate in meetings of the Malaysian Solidarity Consultative Committee. Despite a public inquiry, participated in by Azahari, coming out against federation in January 1962, the sultan signed a preliminary memorandum at a committee meeting in February. Azahari sought support for his alternative North Bornean federation proposal in the legislative council, but was unsuccessful and resigned in April. In June, the sultan announced his acceptance of federation to the legislative council, subject to the guarantee of Bruneian interests. Azahari began a public campaign of opposition, and PRB won all but one seat in the August election. Azahari courted the support of Indonesia and the Philippines, while the sultan sought the return of Limbang from Sarawak to generate domestic support for federation. In December, political opposition to union culminated in the Brunei revolt. While this revolt was suppressed with the assistance of Malayan police and British military forces, it demonstrated wide-ranging opposition in Bruneian society towards federation. It is unknown to what extent the revolt or its leaders may have had the passive acquiescence of Brunei's sultan, especially in its early stages.
Nonetheless, the sultan publicly stated he did not support the revolt, declared an emergency, and suspended the constitution. A new constitution in May strengthened the Sultan's power, and negotiations with Malaya resumed. By June 1963, there were four outstanding points of disagreement: oil revenues, financial contributions, oil taxation, and Brunei's expected position at the end of the order of precedence for all Malaysian sultans (due to it being the last to join). Tunku issued an ultimatum on these issues during a meeting in Kuala Lumpur; the sultan rejected the terms, and left the city on 21 June. Following the creation of Malaysia, border posts were established with Brunei in October 1963, and in 1964 Malaysia recalled its officials working in Brunei, and shifted teacher training slots allocated to Bruneians to Singapore and the UK. Relations between Brunei and Malaysia began to improve in April 1965, after Brunei backed Malaysia in the North Borneo dispute.
Singapore was a Malaysian state from the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 until it was expelled from the Federation on 9 August 1965. During its time as a state of Malaysia, Singapore had autonomy in the areas of education and labour and was the smallest state in Malaysia by land area, but the largest by population. It received fewer seats in the national parliament than its relative population size (conversely to Sabah and Sarawak). Singaporeans were not allowed to run for or vote in elections elsewhere in Malaysia (in turn, outsiders could not do so in Singapore). Following Singapore's independence, it established a close relationship with Brunei.