Xi'an Incident

The Xi'an Incident was a Chinese political crisis that lasted from 12 to 26 December 1936. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Nationalist government of China, was arrested in Xi'an by soldiers of the Northeastern Army under the command of General Zhang Xueliang. Zhang demanded that Chiang agree to a ceasefire in the Chinese Civil War so that the Nationalist government could ally with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against Japanese expansionism. Negotiations were held between Chiang and the CCP, resulting in verbal agreement on the broad outlines of an alliance. After Chiang was released, he publicly renounced the terms he had agreed to in captivity, but secretly continued the negotiations that would result in the Second United Front.
The Xi'an Incident followed months of secret negotiations between the CCP and the Nationalists. Only minor progress had been made by December 1936. However, the CCP had also been negotiating directly with the Nationalist armies that surrounded it, including the Northeastern Army. These negotiations had been much more successful. The CCP formed a secret alliance with Zhang's Northeastern Army and Yang Hucheng's Northwestern Army that aimed to see the civil war ended and a war of national liberation begun against Japan. With encouragement from the CCP, Zhang repeatedly but unsuccessfully pressured Chiang to agree to a ceasefire with the CCP. After Chiang gave Zhang an ultimatum to either attack the Communists or be reassigned, Zhang decided to take Chiang hostage and force a settlement.
Chiang Kai-shek's sudden capture was shocking news. The CCP was ecstatic, believing that an agreement with Chiang was no longer necessary now that he was in the custody of their ally, and they recommended he be put on trial and executed. Joseph Stalin, however, was worried that executing Chiang would make an alliance with the Nationalist government impossible, and ordered the CCP to bring the incident to a peaceful resolution. The CCP accepted this directive and instructed Zhou Enlai to begin negotiations. The Nationalist government was thrown into disarray and was at first unsure at how to react. A full military assault on Xi'an was nearly carried out by General He Yingqin before Soong Mei-ling (Chiang's wife) and other leaders of the "peace faction" prevailed. Soong and other close advisors to Chiang flew to Xi'an and convinced him to begin negotiations with the Communists. After a few weeks of slow progress, Chiang had agreed in principle to a ceasefire and a united front against Japan.
On December 26, Zhang agreed to release Chiang and accompany him back to Nanjing. Upon arrival, Chiang immediately had Zhang arrested—he would remain under house arrest for the next 50 years. Chiang publicly reneged on his agreements, but in private he invited Zhou Enlai to come to Nanjing. Negotiations on the specifics of an alliance continued until shortly after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, at which point the two sides were able to finalize their terms.
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in November 1931 posed a clear threat to both sides of the Chinese Civil War (as well as to the Soviet Union), but it did not lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities. The failure of the First United Front four years previously had created deep, lasting distrust. Chiang Kai-shek articulated his policy as "first internal pacification, then external resistance." The CCP called for simultaneously "Resisting Japan and Opposing Chiang".
The first subtle changes in this mutual policy of non-cooperation was initiated by the Communists in Manchuria. There, guerilla groups found it impossible to fight against the Japanese while also fighting the Nationalists. Starting in late 1932 the Comintern authorized the Communist guerillas in Manchuria to cooperate with all anti-Japanese forces. That same year, the USSR restored diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government. The events in Europe—including Hitler's rise to power—were a major influence on the move towards a united front. The 7th World Congress of the Comintern encouraged Communist parties everywhere to form a united front with moderate forces to resist the Fascists. Wang Ming, head of the CCP delegation, published the "1 August Declaration" in October, which publicly called on all parties in China to form a united front against Japanese Imperialism. They proposed creating a anti-Japanese defense government to coordinate resistance. Importantly, though, the offer did not extend to Chiang himself; the CCP's delegation still considered him and his central government the "running dog" of the Japanese.
The CCP itself (cut off from radio communication with Moscow) learned of the 1 August Declaration in November 1935. Party leaders held a conference at Wayaobu in December to discuss the implications of this new policy. Their Wayaobu Manifesto marked an important retreat from the hardline positions they had held during the early civil war. It called for "the most broad national united front" to resist Japan, and announced that the CCP would suspend class conflict in the interests of cross-class collaboration. However, it also made clear that they did not want to give up their military strength. As a basis from which to resist the Japanese, the Manifesto called for the Red Army to be expanded to 1 million men and for the Chinese Soviet to dramatically increase its land area.
In late 1935 Japan stepped up its expansionist policies in north China, severely worsening relations between Nanjing and Tokyo. Negotiations had reached an apparent impasse by October. China reached out to Nazi Germany for mediation, but afraid of offending Japan, the Germans declined to get involved. Chiang Kai-shek was concerned that war was imminent, and wanted to secure the material and diplomatic support of the Soviet Union. He also faced growing public pressure to actively resist Japan: on December 9, 1935, for example, a major student protest broke out in Beiping.
In January, Chiang Kai-shek sent emissaries to Moscow to negotiate a military mutual assistance treaty. However, as a precondition for a treaty, Chiang wanted the Soviet Union to order the CCP to submit to the Nationalist Government. The Soviet ambassador told Chiang that while the USSR hoped the CCP would agree to a unified command under the Nationalists, Chiang would have to negotiate directly with the CCP. This upset Chiang, who worried that if the USSR was unwilling to order the CCP to stop, they might be willing to support further revolutionary actions by the CCP if a ceasefire broke down. Progress halted, and after news leaked to the press that Chiang was contemplating a treaty with the USSR, he called off negotiations. These maneuvers left Stalin wary of Chiang's intentions.
Nevertheless, Chiang still sought contacts with the CCP inside China. Soong Ching-ling and Chen Lifu managed to recruit two members of the Communist underground, Dong Jianwu and Zhang Zihua [zh], to cross the front lines and bring the CCP the message that Chiang was interested in ending the civil war. They arrived on February 27. The CCP Central Committee told them that the CCP was interested in a united anti-Japanese army under a government of national defense. Given the wide gap between the CCP and KMT's conditions, further negotiations did not take place during the first half of 1936.
The Nationalist forces besieging the Communists were composed of two armies: the 130,000-strong Northeastern Army led by Zhang Xueliang and the 40,000-strong Northwestern Army led by Yang Hucheng. Both Yang and Zhang were former warlords who had pledged their armies to the Nationalist Government. Zhang had governed Manchuria before it was overrun by the Japanese, and strongly wished to retake his homeland. He opposed the concessions that Chiang had made to Japan, and was frustrated by his orders to fight the Communists rather than the Japanese. Yang had likewise become skeptical of Chiang's anti-Japanese commitment after the public demonstrations in December 1935. Zhang and Yang had been promised an easy victory against the Communists. They were surprised and dismayed when the Red Army defeated them in several major engagements. The Red Army treated their POWs well and gave them a political education, sending them back to spread the word that the Communists wanted to form an anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese alliance. This effectively destroyed morale in the Nationalist armies, and the soldiers began pressing for a truce with the Communists. With his officer Nan Hanchen acting as intermediary, Yang Hucheng was able to conclude a ceasefire quickly. They formalized a non-aggression pact in May 1936.
Negotiations with Zhang Xueliang took longer because the CCP had no established contacts in the Northeastern Army. But after Dong Jianwu requested passage to CCP territory on a mission from the central government, Zhang realized that the central government was negotiating with the CCP and was encouraged to do so himself. A ceasefire was agreed on February 25. On April 9, Zhang Xueliang met with Zhou Enlai. Zhou, an experienced negotiator, was able to solidify the ceasefire and secure supplies for the Red Army. In this and subsequent meetings, Zhang Xueliang would argue that resisting Japan would only be possible if the CCP gave up its opposition to Chiang. Zhou said that the CCP would discuss the point, but refused to commit to changing the policy. As negotiations between Zhang and the CCP continued, the Communists infiltrated the Northeastern Army. They spread communist ideas among the soldiers and recruited officers into secret societies. In June they set up an officer training camp that celebrated the united front. This support from within the army helped them to persuade Zhang to form an alliance. They concluded a formal agreement on September 22.
Yan Xishan also moved towards a united front with the CCP. Illegally imported Japanese products were undermining the Shanxi economy and the Japanese puppet Mongol Military Government was encroaching on Yan's rule over Suiyuan. Out of fear of the Japanese, Yan accepted Mao's overtures and agreed to a truce in June 1936. In September, he created the "League for Sacrifice and Salvation" to agitate the Shanxi public against the Japanese. CCP leaders Bo Yibo and Feng Xuefeng began working closely with Yan.
The members of this northwestern alliance were united by their desire to resist Japan, but they differed over the details of how this could best be accomplished. The Communists supported a plan to use Soviet support to take over Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang and turn northwest China into a base under Zhang's command to resist Japan and oppose Chiang. Zhang, Yang, and Yan were still committed to convincing Chiang to lead the anti-Japanese resistance. As they continued to negotiate, they kept their alliance secret and even staged fake military battles to deceive the Nanjing government.
Over the course of the year, the Soviets had become more convinced that the united front should include Chiang. This created a problem when, in late June, the CCP re-established radio communications with Moscow. They transmitted the Wayaobu Manifesto and informed the Comintern of their alliance with Zhang. They asked for assistance in carrying out their plan to form an anti-Japan, anti-Chiang base. The Comintern responded with a telegram on August 15 admonishing the CCP for continuing to oppose Chiang. The Comintern did approve the other provisions of the Wayaobu Manifesto, agreeing that neither soviet power nor the independence of the Red Army should be sacrificed. But they absolutely vetoed the CCP's plan to form a base in the northwest, knowing that such a move would scuttle any chance for a united front with the KMT. The CCP accepted the new directive from the Comintern. They adopted the new slogan "compelling Chiang to resist Japan," and Pan Hannian was sent to Nanjing to begin negotiating a truce with Chen Lifu.
Chiang continued to try to resolve the civil war militarily. He had always considered negotiations with the CCP to be a last resort, and after bringing the Liangguang Incident to a peaceful conclusion in September, he could bring all his force to bear on wiping out the Communists entirely. He was encouraged by the results of the Ningxia campaign in mid-to-late October. The Second and Fourth Corps of the Red Army marched north to pick up supplies dropped in Mongolia by the Soviet Union, but found themselves trapped on the wrong side of the Yellow River. They were cut to pieces by the Hui cavalry allied with the Nationalists. Chiang began making preparations for a sixth encirclement campaign, and instructed Zhang and Yang to participate. In early November, Chen Lifu presented Pan Hannian with a set of extremely harsh conditions for a deal. Pan balked, calling them "conditions for surrender". In late November, Chiang ordered the Northeastern Army and forces from the central Nationalist Army, Hu Zongnan's Right Route Army, to attack towards the Communist capital at Bao'an. At the resulting Battle of Shanchengbao, the Northeastern Army withheld most of its forces from the attack. This allowed the Red Army to ambush and nearly wipe out Hu's 78th regiment. This reversed the diplomatic situation: Chen Lifu moderated his conditions, but the CCP recalled Pan Hannian from Nanjing on December 10.
The tensions between Zhang and Chiang were reaching a breaking point. During Chiang's birthday celebrations on October 31, Zhang Xueliang attempted to convince Chiang to give up the bandit suppression campaign and focus on Japan instead. Zhang was supported by Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang, but Chiang angrily refused. He gave a speech the following day where he proclaimed that "the Communists are our greatest traitors". When Zhang returned to Xi'an and recounted the incident to Yang Hucheng, the latter suggested the idea of a bingjian (Chinese: 兵谏; pinyin: bīngjiàn; trans. "military remonstrance"). In an episode in ancient Chinese history, a military officer had arrested the Emperor to force him to change a bad policy. The officer had been rewarded for his conduct rather than punished. Zhang, who historian Alexander Pantsov calls a "gallant cavalier", was intrigued by the nobility of the idea. On November 23, Chiang ordered the arrest of seven leaders of the National Salvation Association. The move created an outcry across China. Zhang flew to Luoyang on December 3 and tried to convince Chiang to release the seven prisoners and to form a united front with the CCP against Japan, to no avail. Chiang declared "You are the only one in the whole country who sees things as you do. I am the revolutionary government; what I do is revolution!" When news arrived that day that Japanese marines had landed at Qingdao, Chiang decided to redouble his efforts to defeat the Communists.
Chiang and his entourage drove from Luoyang to Xi'an on December 4, 1936 in order to make preparations for another assault on the Communists. By this time he was aware through intelligence reports that Zhang had been collaborating with the Communists, but he did not realize that he was in any actual danger. Chiang believed that he could convince Zhang to join his sixth encirclement campaign in earnest. He stayed at the Huaqing Pool complex, an ancient resort located in the town of Lintong, about 10 miles outside Xi'an. Chiang's associates were staying in the city of Xi'an itself, in the newly built Western Capital Hotel. Once again, Zhang, Yang, and Chiang met to discuss policy. Once again, they reached an impasse. Chiang shouted at Zhang that "I am the Generalissimo; I do not err; I am China; and China cannot do well without me!" On December 9, Chiang threatened Zhang and Yang that if they did not attack the Communists, he would remove them from command and have their forces reassigned to distant provinces. Historian Rana Mitter suggests that the risk of losing his command may have been the final straw for Zhang. The meeting was interrupted by the arrival in Lintong of tens of thousands of students demonstrating for a united front. Chiang demanded that Zhang disperse the crowd or he would have his guards open fire on them. Zhang promised the students "a definite reply in action within one week."
Chiang was scheduled to leave on December 12. At 10 PM on Friday, December 11 Zhang Xueliang ordered Sun Mingjiu (孫銘九), the captain of his personal guard, to arrest Chiang Kai-shek. According to Sun's later account, his orders were to bring Chiang to Xi'an unharmed. As Sun prepared, Zhang gathered the top officers of the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies to inform them of his decision. He also sent a telegram to the CCP Central Committee. Mao and the other Central Committee members were surprised but elated by the news. At 5 AM, December 12, Sun Mingjiu led a few hundred soldiers on an assault of the Huaqing Pool complex. They reached the gate at 6 AM, where they were asked for the password. Unable to give it, they began a firefight with Chiang's guards. This alerted Chiang to the attack, and in panic he fled out of his window. He jumped over the wall surrounding the compound, injuring his back in the process. Without his false teeth or one of his shoes, he fled up the side of a snow-covered mountain. He was discovered a few hours later, shivering and exhausted. Sun carried Chiang down the mountain on his back. Chiang was brought to Yang Hucheng's headquarters in Xi'an, where Zhang explained that he had kidnapped him in order to force him to change his policies. Chiang was indignant, and after an initial exchange, he refused to speak.
Beginning at 5:30 AM that same day, Yang's Northwestern Army seized important locations around Xi'an: the government headquarters, the airport, the police station, and the Western Capital Hotel where Chiang's associates were staying. Those taken prisoner included governor of Shaanxi Shao Lizi [zh], the Shaanxi commmissioner of education Zhou Xuechang, and Generals Chen Cheng, Jiang Dingwen, Wei Lihuang, and Zhu Shaoliang. Shao Yuanchong, one of the authors of the National Anthem of the Republic of China, was shot while trying to escape from the hotel. He died in the hospital two days later. The Northwestern Army had poor discipline, and for three days after the coup, its soldiers carried out widespread looting of Xi'an. Only the areas controlled by Zhang's Northeastern Army were unaffected.
Zhang and Yang attempted to secure their strategic situation. Zhang sent telegrams to the Northeastern Army's 51st Army in Lanzhou and to the commander of some artillery brigades he had stationed in Luoyang. While the 51st Army successfully took control of Lanzhou, the commander in Luoyang immediately handed Zhang's telegram to the Nationalist garrison commander, Zhu Shaozhou [zh]. Zhu reacted quickly. He informed Minister of War He Yingqin, who ordered the a loyal division to occupy Tong Pass, a critical chokepoint on the route from east from Xi'an. They arrived only four hours before Feng Qinzai's 42nd Division, sent by Yang Hucheng for the same purpose. Zhu also attempted an aerial mission to rescue Chiang, but it arrived too late and the pilot was taken prisoner.
Zhang and Yang sent telegrams to Nanjing and all across China, explaining what they had done and listing eight demands for the government:
In Bao'an, the CCP was ecstatic. News had spread overnight through the city. At a mass meeting of all party members and soldiers, Mao proposed that Chiang be put on public trial as a traitor. The measure was approved. The CCP radioed Zhang to tell him that Zhou would go to Xi'an to discuss the matter. They also advised him to prepare for attacks by the Nationalist central government, and promised that the Red Army would not take advantage of the situation to occupy Northeastern Army territory. They also notified the Comintern of what had occurred and asked permission to form a "revolutionary government of national defense" with Zhang, Yang, and other dissent Nationalists. A meeting of the CCP Central Committee was held on December 13 to discuss the situation in more detail. The vast majority approved the plan to force Chiang to step down and stand trial, and to sentence him to death. They also planned to make Xi'an the center of a national resistance government. On December 15, the CCP sent a telegram to Nanjing urging them to comply with the Eight Demands, force Chiang to step down, and allow him to be tried.
Nanjing received word of Chiang's arrest by 1 pm on December 12. An emergency meeting of the Central Standing Committee was convened that night. The committee members were uncertain over whether Chiang was dead or alive. According to some historians, He Yingqin was either convinced that Chiang was dead or was not particularly concerned for his safety, and argued for an immediate military attack on Xi'an. He Yingqin's biographer, Peter Worthing, dismisses this story as an unfounded rumor. In any event, the Committee did not decide on any specifics, but placed He Yingqin in charge of handling the military response. The following day, H.H. Kung and Soong Mei-ling arrived in the capital and began lobbying hard for a negotiated settlement. They had received a personal telegram from Zhang assuring them that Chiang was alive. As the Generalissmo's relatives, they feared that they would lose their influence if he were killed. Soong Mei-ling even argued that Zhang Xueliang's demands were worth hearing out. In contrast, the mood in the army was sanguine. Hundreds of officers signed a letter to He requesting permission to attack Xi'an. Hundreds more sent a threatening telegram to Zhang demanding that he stand down. In the end, He decided to put military pressure on the mutineers rather than attack or negotiate right away. On December 16, he received a mandate from the Central Standing Committee to begin a punitive expedition. The Central Army took up positions surrounding Xi'an. The Nationalist government attempted (unsuccessfully) to induce defections from the mutinous armies and pressure Zhang to surrender. Bombing raids were conducted on Weinan and Huaxian and the Training Division of the Central Army launched an unsanctioned attack that ended in defeat.
Most warlords chose to stay neutral in the conflict, unsure of which way the winds were blowing. Yan Xishan's decision was of particular importance. Like Yang and Zhang, he had signed a secret ceasefire with CCP. Zhang had expected his support. But Yan was afraid that a civil war would break out between Xi'an and Nanjing. He urged Zhang to let Chiang go—although simultaneously expressing his desire for Chinese unity against Japan and converting his anti-Communist militias into anti-Japanese militias. Most other warlords reassured the central government of their loyalty but offered no practical assistance against the rebels. Many, such as Liu Xiang of Sichuan, Han Fuju of Shandong, and Song Zheyuan of Hebei, were privately sympathetic to the coup. They generally voiced support for a negotiated settlement, sometimes including a reorganized national government. The Guangxi Clique went by far the furthest, openly denouncing the military campaign against the Xi'an rebels and demanding that the central government accede to many of their demands.
The Chinese public reacted with shock at the news of Chiang's arrest. There was widespread concern for Chiang's safety. Even members of the National Salvation Association, who also wanted a ceasefire with the Communists and war against Japan, feared that Chiang's captivity could give Japan an opening to conquer China. Groups across the political spectrum advocated for Chiang's release. This was paralleled by a surge of reproach directed at Zhang Xueliang, who was viewed by many as a traitor.
New Zealand journalist James Bertram, who managed to enter Xi'an shortly after the incident began, reported on the mood of the city. He observed fleets of government aircraft flying low over the roofs, and hearing H. H. Kung's declare over radio that there would be "no dealings with armed rebellion, no truce with the 'Communist bandits.'" The city's population remained strongly supportive of the rebels and their cause.
Moscow received news of Chiang's arrest on December 13. The head of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov, was delighted. He was preparing to authorize Chiang's execution until he read the articles in Pravda and Izvestia the next morning, which condemned the Xi'an Incident as a plot by "pro-Japanese elements". In a subsequent meeting, Stalin made it clear to Dimitrov that he viewed Chiang as indispensable.
Stalin feared that in Chiang's absence, a figure like Wang Jingwei, perhaps assisted by He Yingqin (who had already contacted Wang in Italy after Chiang's arrest), would take control of the Nationalists and create a pro-Japanese Chinese regime, placing the Soviet Union in extreme danger of a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union. His anxieties were confirmed when Chiang's rival Wang Jingwei met with Adolf Hitler to discuss the prospect of China enlisting in the anti-Communist Axis in exchange for greater German aid to China. Following Chiang's abduction, Pan Hannian had advised Stalin that without Chiang, "China would be without a leader to fight the Japanese and this would not benefit the Soviet Union."
Following Stalin's orders, the Comintern sent a telegram on December 16 instructing the CCP to bring the Xi'an incident to a peaceful conclusion. The telegram was not received until the 17th, and would not be fully decrypted for several days. However, by the 17th the CCP's leadership had already learned of Moscow's stance from public news sources and decided to change course. On that day, the CCP announced that they desired a peaceful settlement. On December 18, they recanted their former call for a public trial of Chiang as "inappropriate".
The Xi'an mutineers never expected Chiang to agree to all eight of their demands, but Zhang made it clear to Chiang that he would have to accept some of them before he would be released. Chiang at first refused to talk. The situation improved when William Donald arrived on December 14. Donald knew both men, as a former advisor to Zhang and current advisor to Chiang. He convinced Chiang to accept the offer of better lodgings at the house of Gao Guizi. He also explained to the leaders of the mutiny that the Chinese public was strongly opposed to Chiang's arrest.
Zhou Enlai, who had departed Bao'an on December 15, arrived in Xi'an late on the 17th in the middle of an extremely delicate situation. A faction of the army led by Yang Hucheng and the radical young officers of the "Anti-Japanese Comrade Society" wanted to execute Chiang, in line with the CCP's earlier pronouncements. But Zhang was gravely concerned with the Central Government's military response, the lukewarm support he had received from fellow warlords, and the unexpected opposition of the Chinese public. He wanted to negotiate Chiang's release, and was anxious to know if Moscow was going to be providing the material support for an anti-Japanese war that he had counted on. Zhou, aware at this point that Moscow had condemned the coup, had to carefully walk back the CCP's radical stance and break the bad news to Zhang without jeopardizing the northwest alliance. Their talks lasted all night. Zhou managed to convince the Xi'an leaders that they should negotiate for Chiang's safe release, so long as the Central Government did not start a civil war. Yet he also emphasized that Chiang was still extremely powerful, and so they also agreed that Chiang would not be let go unless he accepted some minimal conditions.
On December 24, Chiang received Zhou for a meeting, the first time the two had seen each other since Zhou had left Whampoa Military Academy over ten years earlier. Zhou began the conversation by saying: "In the ten years since we have met, you seem to have aged very little." Chiang nodded and said: "Enlai, you were my subordinate. You should do what I say." Zhou replied that if Chiang would halt the civil war and resist the Japanese instead, the Red Army would willingly accept Chiang's command. In their meeting, Chiang and Zhou finalized the secret agreements that had been in tentative form since summer of 1936, where the Communists would accept orders from Chiang in a national unity coalition, and Chiang would allow the Communists to field their own independent army. To the public, it seemed as if Chiang had been compelled into an alliance against the Japanese, but in reality the terms of the arrangement were almost identical to those agreed upon in secret before the kidnapping took place.
At the end of the meeting, Chiang invited Zhou to Nanjing for further talks. Chiang was released on 26 December and returned to Nanjing with Zhang Xueliang.
When Chiang was released, public opinion was decisively in his favor. His arrival to Nanjing was greeted by cheering crowds of over 400,000 people. Edgar Snow declared that Chiang had returned with a national standing "higher than that of any leader in modern Chinese history." The event served to further consolidate power within the Nationalist government into Chiang's hands.
Historian Jay Taylor writes how Xi'an turned Chiang from a "popular leader" into a "national hero." American ambassador Nelson T. Johnson wrote how "Whereas the outstanding developments during the first half of 1936 increased the precariousness of China's position, the significant events of the second half, in their larger aspects, have had the opposite effect." He observed that the Xi'an crisis "fostered another spontaneous outburst of nationalism throughout the country and caused universal rejoicing when the Generalissimo was released on Christmas Day."
After Chiang returned to Nanjing, he announced a cease fire in the civil war. However, he also repudiated any promises that he had made in Xi'an. He had Zhang imprisoned and charged with treason. Chiang then sent 37 army divisions north to surround the Northeastern Army and force them to stand down. The army was deeply divided on the appropriate response. Yang Hucheng and the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society wanted to stand and fight if the KMT army attacked, and refuse to negotiate until Zhang was released. The Communist representatives strongly disagreed and cautioned that civil war would, in the words of Zhou Enlai, "make China into another Spain".
Further negotiations between the CCP and Nanjing continued. However, when a conference of Northeastern officers in January 1937 overwhelmingly resolved not to surrender peacefully, the CCP reluctantly decided that they could not abandon their allies and pledged to fight alongside them if the KMT attacked. The situation was again reversed when the five most senior Northeastern generals met separately and decided to surrender. The radical officers were enraged and assassinated one of the generals on 2 February, but this only turned the majority of the soldiers against the plan to stand and fight. The Northeastern Army peacefully surrendered to advancing KMT forces and was divided into new units, which were sent to Hebei, Hunan, and Anhui. Yang Hucheng, however, was arrested and eventually executed, while the leaders of the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society defected to the Red Army. Zhang was kept under house arrest for over 50 years before emigrating to Hawaii in 1993.
The rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists outraged the Japanese, and eventually helped lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War. This in turn hastened the two Chinese factions into formalizing their alliance as the Second United Front.
The Xi'an Incident was a turning point for the CCP. Chiang's leadership over political and military affairs in China was affirmed, while the CCP was able to expand its own strength under the new united front, which played a role in the Chinese Communist Revolution.
Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists believed that had the Xi'an Incident not occurred, they would have been able to destroy the CCP. In China, the story of Chiang's capture is frequently retold as "illustration of the cowardice and duplicity of Chiang Kai-shek", according to historian Michael Dillon.
Historians have tended to downplay the event's significance in comparison with its public perception. Parks Coble writes that "the basic concepts" determining Nationalist policy remained the same, and that Chiang had already decided on a course of confrontation with Japan. Rana Mitter points out that the terms agreed to at Xi'an differed little from the outline of a deal that had been in the works for months. Even Tien-wei Wu, who calls the Xi'an Incident "the pivotal in modern Chinese history", also acknowledges that "there was no guarantee the KMT or Chiang Kai-shek would not resume the campaign" against the Communists after he had been released. Hans van de Ven states that the main importance of the Xi'an Incident was that both the CCP and Chiang survived, given how close both got to destruction.