Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: d30902f6-7e81-411f-8b15-243b3ce9db93
Document Type: srp
Title: SPENT FUEL POOL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052350558.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.4.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
fects of both flooding and missiles, is acceptable. c. The total system has the capability to detect and control leakage of radioactive contamination from the system. It is acceptable if the following conditions are met: (1) The capability for isolating nonessential portions of the SFPAVS by two automatically actuated dampers in series is shown in the P&IDs. (2) The SFPAVS has provisions to filter radioactive contaminants from the spent fuel area by automatically isolating the normal ventilation system and actuating the emergency exhaust system before the first contaminated airborne particles and gases reach the normal ventilation exhaust ducts. d. Components and subsystems necessary for preventing the release of radioactive contaminants can function as required in the event of loss of offsite power. The system design will be acceptable if the SFPAVS meets minimum system requirements as stated in the SAR assuming a failure of a single active component, within the system itself or in the auxiliary electric power source which supplies the system. The SAR is reviewed to see that for each SFPAVS component or subsystem 9.4.2-5 Rev. 2 - July 1981 affected by the loss of offsite power, the resulting system flow capacity will not cause the loss of air flow from areas of low potential radioactivity to areas of higher potential radioactivity. Statements in the SAR and the resul-ts of failure modes and effects analyses are considered in verifying that the system meets these requirements. This will be an acceptable verification of system functional reliability. 4. The descriptive information, P&IDs, SFPAVS drawings, and failure modes and effects analyses in the SAR are reviewed to assure that essential portions of the system can function following design basis accidents assuming a concurrent single active failure. The reviewer evaluates the analyses presented in the SAR to assure function of required components, traces the availability of these components on system drawings,