Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 03aed7b8-74fc-467b-b928-b25d9eb89a13
Document Type: srp
Title: PHYSICAL SECURITY — REVIEW OF PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1301/ML13010A109.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 13
Section ID: 13.6.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ical security review should include and confirm how the proposed designs and specifications meet the applicable physical security performance and prescriptive regulatory requirements. 4. The following topical or subject areas establish the review interfaces: A. NUREG-0800, SRP 1.0, Introduction and Interfaces (all review organizations are assigned secondary review responsibilities) B. NUREG-0800, SRP 2.0, Sites Characteristics and Site Parameters C. NUREG-0800, SRP 8.1, Electrical Power—Introduction D. NUREG-0800, SRP 8.3.1, A-C Power System (Onsite) E. NUREG-0800, SRP 8.3.2, D-C Power System (Onsite) F. NUREG-0800, SRP 9.5.2, Communications Systems G. NUREG-0800, SRP 9.5.3, Lighting Systems H. NUREG-0800, SRP 13.6.1, Physical Security—Combined License and Operating Reactors I. NUREG-0800, SRP 14.3.12, Physical Security Hardware—Inspection, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria The referenced SRP sections contain the specific acceptance criteria and review procedures. 13.6.2-10 Draft Revision 2 – September 2013 . II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Requirements The NRC bases the acceptance criteria on meeting the relevant requirements of the following Commission regulations: 1. 10 CFR Part 52, Subpart B, “Standard Design Certification,” as it relates to certification requirements for a standard design. 2. 10 CFR 73.2, “Definitions,” as it relates to physical security systems (e.g., bullet/resisting, physical barriers, intrusion alarm, lock, protected area, vital area, vital equipment, isolation zone). 3. 10 CFR 73.55(b), as it relates to the protection against the DBT of radiological sabotage; the design and capability of physical security systems to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize the DBT of radiological sabotage; the defense-in-depth protection criteria through the integration of systems and technologies; and the requirement to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material (SNM) are not inimical to the common defense