Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 8e45dce1-e1e7-4415-b1dd-7e2a610e545b
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants (Rev. 4)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2023/ML20231A835.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.189
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
fire will not prevent the necessary safe-shutdown functions from being performed and that radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a fire will be minimized. The overall maturity of fire protection regulations, the many years of nuclear plant operating experience, the improvement of analysis methodologies, and the opportunity to incorporate these benefits in the original plant design provide the bases for enhanced fire protection in new reactor designs. Revision 3 of this RG provides a detailed history of the fire protection issues at nuclear power plants and associated development of NRC regulations and guidance (Ref. 31) and is not repeated here. Licensing and Design Basis The fire protection licensing and design bases for individual plants depend on several factors that may differ considerably. In particular, the fire protection regulations in 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 establish the applicability of certain fire protection requirements based on whether the licensing date for a given plant is before or after January 1, 1979. The fire protection licensing basis is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant and a licensee’s written commitments for ensuring compliance with and operation within applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis (including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the license) that are docketed and in effect. “Design basis” means that information identifying the specific functions to be performed by an SSC, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters that bound the design, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, “Definitions.” These values may be (1) restraints derived from generally accepted “state-of-the-art” practices for achieving functional goals, or (2) requirements derived from analysis (based on calculations, experiments, or both) of the effects of a postulated event or accident for which an SSC must meet