Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 1add33e8-ea1c-46d8-9e11-29944f57ca8a
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 6 – August 2016
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1601/ML16019A184.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
requirements stated in IEEE Std 279-1971, “Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” IEEE Std 603-1991, Clause 5.6, “Independence,” states in part, “No credible failure on the nonsafety side of an isolation device shall prevent any portion of a safety system from meeting its minimum performance requirements during and following any design basis event requiring that safety function.” IEEE Std 279-1971, Clause 4.7.2, “Isolation Devices,” states in part, “No credible failure at the output of an isolation device shall prevent the associated protection system channel from meeting the minimum performance requirements specified in the design basis.” 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” General Design Criterion (GDC) 1, “Quality Standards and Records,” requires in part that “structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed.” GDC 1 also requires that “where generally recognized codes and standards are used, they shall be identified and evaluated to determine their applicability, adequacy, and sufficiency and shall be supplemented or modified as necessary to assure a quality product in keeping with the required safety function.” GDC 21, “Protection System Reliability and Testability,” requires in part that “redundancy and independence designed into the protection system shall be sufficient to assure that no single failure results in a loss of the protection function.” BTP 7-11-3 Revision 6 – August 2016 GDC 22, “Protection System Independence,” requires that “the effects of natural phenomena, and of normal operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels do not result in loss of the protection