Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 32179098-f78d-4852-9c29-1e5e3abb2705
Document Type: srp
Title: RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING:  TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0703/ML070380228.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 16
Section ID: 16.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
t the relevant requirements of the NRC’s regulations identified in SRP Section 16.0 are as follows for review described in Subsection I of this SRP section. The SRP is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide acceptable methods of compliance with the NRC regulations. 1. Traditional Engineering Guidelines A. Defense in Depth. The licensee’s engineering evaluation should state whether the impact of the proposed TS change is consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy. The intent is to maintain the philosophy of defense in depth, not to prevent changes in achieving defense in depth. The defense-in-depth philosophy traditionally has been applied in reactor design and operation for multiple means of performing safety functions and preventing the release of radioactive material. It continues to be effective in accounting for uncertainties in equipment and human performance. When a comprehensive risk analysis can be done, it can help determine the appropriate extent of defense in depth (e.g., balance among core damage prevention, containment failure, and consequence mitigation) to protect public health and safety. When a comprehensive risk analysis is not done, traditional defense-in-depth considerations should account for uncertainties. The evaluation should consider intent of the general design criteria (GDCs), national standards, such engineering principles as the single-failure criterion, the impact of the proposed TS change on barriers (both preventive and mitigative) to core damage, containment failure or bypass, and the balance among defense-in-depth attributes. The licensee should select the engineering analysis techniques, whether quantitative