Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 0698b3f7-427d-4477-8d06-7b4cb5c20c5b
Document Type: srp
Title: INFORMATION SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1602/ML16020A088.pdf
Revision Date: 2024-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7.5
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Content:
4 or use the criteria of Revision 4 when performing modifications that do not involve a conversion. The guidance contained in Regulatory Position 1 of RG 1.97, Revision 4, should be followed in these cases. Plants that obtained an operating license after June 2006 should reference the guidance of RG 1.97, Revision 4. SRP BTP 7-10, “Guidance on Application of RG 1.97,” provides guidance on the application of RG 1.97. III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The reviewer will select material from the procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case. Typical reasons for a non-uniform emphasis are the introduction of new design features or the utilization in the design of features previously reviewed and found acceptable. These review procedures are based on the identified SRP acceptance criteria. For deviations from these specific acceptance criteria, the staff should review the applicant’s evaluation of how the proposed alternatives to the SRP criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the relevant NRC requirements identified in Subsection II. SRP Section 7.1 describes the general procedures to be followed in reviewing any I&C system. SRP Section 7.5 highlights specific topics that should be emphasized in the review of information systems important to safety. The systems addressed below may be implemented 7.5-8 Revision 6 - August 2016 either as stand-alone systems or integrated as part of other systems. If the information systems are not isolated from the protection systems, they should also be evaluated according to the criteria in SRP Section 7.2, “Reactor Trip System,” or 7.3, “Engineered Safety Features 7.5-9 Revision 6 - August 2016 Systems,” as appropriate. Other information systems (e.g., plant computer and severe accident monitoring) may be included in the review. The acceptance criteria for such systems depend on the function of the system and the applicable design criteria. Any exceptions or deviations to accident monitoring