Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: b10297dd-9822-4243-8665-c41d92699ea5
Document Type: srp
Title: RISK-INFORMED, PERFORMANCE-BASED FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0925/ML092590527.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
Transition 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(ii) states that Chapter 2 analyses shall be completed and the fire protection plan modified before changing the FPP and the plant as permitted by NFPA 805. The staff will ensure that the licensee has adequately performed applicable engineering analyses in NFPA 805, Section 2.4, including fire modeling, nuclear safety capability assessment, and fire risk evaluations. The staff will ensure that the licensee completed a systematic approach to transition the FPP to the new requirements in NFPA 805. To the extent endorsed in RG 1.205, Section 4.3.2 and Section B.2 of Appendix B to NEI 04-02 describe one acceptable approach to documenting the comparison of an existing FPP with the requirements of NFPA 805 and industry guidance document NEI 00-01. RG 1.205 endorses the deterministic post-fire safe shutdown analysis methodology provided in Chapter 3 of NEI 00-01. The staff will review the LAR to determine whether the nuclear safety performance criteria have been met consistent with the requirements in NFPA 805. One acceptable means of demonstrating compliance is the guidance in NEI 04-02, to the extent endorsed by RG 1.205. The staff will ensure licensee compliance with the following requirements: 9.5.1.2-12 Rev. 0 – December 2009 III.3.1.1 Feed-and-Bleed 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(iii) specifically notes that use of feed-and-bleed as the sole fire-protected safe-shutdown path for maintaining reactor coolant inventory, pressure control, and decay heat removal capability is not permitted for pressurized-water reactors (PWRs). The staff will determine if the LAR includes a statement to this effect as well as a description of any dependence on feed-and-bleed in the FPP. III.3.1.2 Fire-Induced Multiple Spurious Operations (MSOs) Section 2.4.2.2 of NFPA 805 requires the applicant to evaluate fire-induced failure modes resulting from spurious operations and signals, as a part of its safe shutdown circuit analysis. NEI 00-01, Revision 1, “Guidance for