Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 11a2be5f-50e6-47c7-beee-25b5049ab4bb
Document Type: srp
Title: REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052350474.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
. 1.118. The bypassed and inoperable status indication-conforms to the guidelines of R.G. 1.47. The RTS conforms to the guidelines on the application of the single failure criterion in IEEE Std 379 as supplemented by R.G. 1.53. Based on our review we conclude that the RTS satisfies thetrequirement of IEEE Std 279 with regards to the system jeliability and testability. Therefore we find that the RTS satisfies the requirement of GDC 21. The RTS conforms to the guidelines in IEE'Std'384 as supplemented by R.G. 1.75 for the protection system independence. Based on our review we conclude that the RTS satisfies the requirement of IEEE Std 279 with regards to the systems independence. Therefore, we find that the RTS -satisfies the requirement of GDC 22. Based on our review of the failure modes and effects analysis for the RTS we conclude that the system is designed to fail into a safe mode if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy, post- ulated adverse environment are experienced. Therefore, we find that the RTS satisfies the requirements of GDC 23. 7.'2-7 Rev, 2 - July 1981 Based on our review of the interfaces between the RTS and plant operating control systems we conclude that the system satisfies the requirements of IEEE Std 279 with regards to control and protection system interactions. Our conclusions noted above are based upon the requirements of IEEE Std 279 with respect to the design of the RTS. Therefore, we find that the RTS satisfies the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, §50.55a(h) with regards to IEEE Std 279. -OR- The RTS is completely independent of any plant operating control system. -AND- Therefore, we find that the RTS satisfies the requirement of GDC 24. Based on our review of the reactor protection system, we conclude that the system satisfies the protection system requirements for malfunctions of the reactivity control system such as accidental withdrawal of control rods. Section 15 of the SAR addresses the capability of the