Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 96cbc2a1-0072-44c5-ae86-aadfa416183c
Document Type: srp
Title: RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MAIN STEAM LINE FAILURES
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052350118.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.1.5
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
fety evaluation report at the operating license stage: The staff concludes that the distances to the exclusion area and to the low population zone outer boundaries for the (insert PLANT NAME) site, in conjunction with the operation of the dose mitigating ESF systems, are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the calculated radiological consequences of a postulated main steam line failure outside the contai nment do not exceed: (a) the exposure guidelines as set forth in 10 CFR Part 100 §100.11 for an MSLB with an assumed preaccident iodine spike or for an MSLB with the highest worth control rod stuck out of the core and (b) 10 percent of these exposure guidelines, for an MSLB with an equilibrium iodine concentration in combination with an assumed accident-generated iodine spike. The results of the staff's calculations are listed in Table 15. The staff's conclusion is based on (1) the staff review of the applicant's analysis of the radiological consequences, (2) the independent dose calcu- lation by the staff using conservative assumptions including atmospheric dispersion factors as discussed in Chapter 2 of this report, and (3) the (INSERT NSSS VENDOR) Standard Technical Specifications for the iodine con- centration in the primary and secondary coolant system, and for the primary- to-secondary leakage in the steam generators. The staff will review the (PLANT NAME) specific technical specifications to assure that the dose guidelines stated above are not exceeded. At the construction permit stage, the following paragraph is included in the staff's "safety evaluation report: On the basis of our experience with the evaluation of steam line and steam generator tube failure accidents for PWR plants of similar design, we have concluded that the consequences of these accidents can be controlled by limiting the permissible primary and secondary coolant system radioactivity concentrations and/or primary-to-second- ary leak rates so that potential offsite doses are