Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 666e1303-0170-4974-a7d6-af27eb586524
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants (Rev. 2)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2104/ML21048A448.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-05
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.205
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
3 to NEI 04-02 provides detailed guidance on one acceptable approach for addressing recovery actions. When using the performance-based methods in NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4, the licensee must demonstrate the feasibility and reliability of the recovery actions. NUREG-1852, “Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire,” issued October 2007 (Ref. 20), provides information and discussion concerning demonstrating the feasibility and reliability of operator manual actions. NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.1, identifies recovery actions for which the additional risk must be evaluated, as required by NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4. These “success path” recovery actions are operator actions that, if not successful, would lead to the fire-induced failure of the “one success path of required cables and equipment to achieve and maintain the nuclear safety performance criteria.” Other operator actions that do not involve the success path and may be credited in plant procedures or the fire PRA to overcome a combination of fire-induced and random failures or to maintain adequate fire protection defense in depth may also be recovery actions, but licensees do not need to evaluate the additional risk of their use. RG 1.205, Revision 2, Page 16 The staff has identified two cases in which operator actions taken outside the main control room may be considered as taking place at a primary control station and are therefore not recovery actions based on the definition in NFPA 805, Section 1.6.52. These two cases involve dedicated shutdown or alternative shutdown controls that the NRC has reviewed and approved. In either case, the location or locations become primary when command and control is shifted from the main control room to these other locations.6 For these two cases, the operator actions are not considered recovery actions, even if they are necessary to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria. Activities to achieve the nuclear