Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a650b8f2-b0fa-4f0f-bc8f-55bb3f6ec603
Document Type: srp
Title: INADVERTENT OPENING OF A PWR PRESSURIZER PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0708/ML070820094.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.6.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
tical model, and the predicted consequences of the transient. A. The sequence of events described in the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR) is reviewed by the organization responsible for review of reactor systems. The reviewer focuses on the need for the reactor protection system, the engineered safety systems, and operator action to secure and maintain the reactor in a safe condition. B. The analytical methods are reviewed for whether the mathematical modeling and computer codes have been previously reviewed and accepted by the staff. If a referenced method has not been reviewed, the reviewer initiates a generic evaluation. The values of all parameters in the new analytical model, including the initial conditions of the core and system, are reviewed. The predicted results of the transient are reviewed for whether the consequences meet the acceptance criteria of SRP section 15.0 and subsection II of this SRP section. The analysis results are reviewed for whether pertinent system parameter values are within ranges expected for the type and class of reactor under review. C. Reactor protection system functions (e.g., automatic reactor trips) that are identified as available protection for this event, other than the credited function, are evaluated to ascertain whether the specified functions would be effective (i.e., setpoints and response times would lead to timely action, to satisfy the acceptance criteria). For example, the credited protection function might be the low pressurizer pressure reactor trips, and an available protection function might be the overtemperature delta-T trip. The reviewer would verify that the overtemperature delta-T trip would be executed in time to meet the relevant acceptance criteria (e.g., prevention of departure from nucleate boiling (DNB). D. The reviewer verifies whether the applicant’s core physics data are appropriate. 2. COL Action Items and Certification Requirements and Restrictions. For a DC application, the review will