Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 2200e046-1749-4aa1-a474-997b369b63b2
Document Type: srp
Title: REACTOR AUXILIARY COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070513.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.2.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
SRP Section 17.017.3.30 For those areas of review identified as part of the primary responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria and methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section. II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Acceptability of the designs of cooling water systems as described in the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR), including related sections of Chapters 2 and 3 of the SAR, is based on specific general design criteria and regulatory guides, and on independent calculations and staff judgments with respect to system functions and component selection. The design of a CWS is acceptable if the integrated system design is in accordance with the following requirements and recommendations: 1. General Design Criterion 2 (GDC 2), as related to structures housing the system and the 31 system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of earthquakes. Acceptance is based on meeting the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C.1 for safety-related portions and Position C.2 for nonsafety-related portions. 2. General Design Criterion 4 (GDC 4), as related to effects of missiles inside and outside 32 of containment, effects of pipe whip, jets and environmental conditions resulting from high and moderate energy line breaks and dynamic effects associated with flow instabilities and attendant loads (i.e., water hammer) during normal plant operation as well as during upset or accident conditions. 3. General Design Criterion 5 (GDC 5), as related to shared systems and components 33 important to safety being capable of performing required safety functions. 4. General Design Criterion 44 GDC 44), as it relates to: 34 a. The capability to transfer heat leads from safety-related structures, systems, and components to a heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions. b. Component redundancy so that safety functions can be performed assuming a single active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power. c. The