Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: ff5838f8-986a-4d8b-a039-fb26df280426
Document Type: srp
Title: – 15.5.2
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070725.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ed technical specifications. The applicant's description of events leading to an increase in reactor coolant inventory is reviewed by RSBSRXB regarding the occurrences leading to the initiating event. The 47 sequence of events, from initiation until a stabilized condition is reached, is reviewed to ascertain: 1. The extent to which normally operating plant instrumentation and controls are assumed to function. 2. The extent to which plant and reactor protection systems are required to function. 3. The credit taken for the functioning of normally operating plant systems. 4. The operation of engineered safety systems that is required. 5. The extent to which operator actions are required. 6. That appropriate margin for malfunctions, such as stuck rods (see II.3.b), areis48 accounted for. The applicant should present a quantitative analysis in the SAR of the event leading to an increase in reactor coolant inventory which is the most limiting. For this event, the RSBSRXB49 reviewer, with the aid of the ICSBHICB reviewer, reviews the timing of the initiation of those 50 protection, engineered safety, and other systems needed to limit the consequences of the event to acceptable levels. The RSBSRXB reviewer compares the predicted variation of system 51 parameters with various trip and system initiation setpoints. The ICSBHICB review of 52 DRAFT Rev. 2 - April 1996 15.5.1-8 Chapter 7 of the SAR confirms that the instrumentation and control systems design is consistent with the requirements for safety system actions for these events. To the extent deemed necessary, the RSBSRXB reviewer evaluates the effects of single active 53 failures of systems and components which may affect the course of the transient. For new applications, loss of offsite power (LOOP) should not be considered a single failure; each increase of inventory transient should be analyzed with and without a LOOP in combination with a single active failure. (This position is based upon interpretation of GDC 17,