Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 8dd882f4-a34f-4415-acd1-ebb441c72786
Document Type: srp
Title: PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND SEVERE ACCIDENT
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1213/ML12132A481.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 19
Section ID: 19.0
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
., earthquakes, high winds, external fires, external flooding), hazards related to human activities (e.g., transportation and local industry) and in-plant area hazards (internal fire and flooding) may need to support the PRA staff in reviewing these hazards. The PRA staff may also request support from the organizations that review the systems and thermal-hydraulic (T-H) analyses to ensure that the applicant’s PRA properly considers and addresses important issues (e.g., failure mechanisms, system interactions, and T-H modeling and uncertainties). The organizations responsible for the review of severe accident issues, including severe accident management alternatives, in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 of the Environmental Report (ER) need to maintain coordination with the PRA staff to assure consistency in the review of severe accident information given in the ER and the review of severe accident evaluations in hapter 19 of the FSAR. 19.0-5 Draft Revision 3 – September 2012 The NRC technical branch responsible for PRA reviews the acceptability of the applicant’s methodology for identifying risk-important human actions. The human factors engineering staff is responsible for ensuring that risk-important human actions (HAs) included in HFE design process are the same as those identified in Chapter 19. The NRC reviewers should be aware that risk-important HAs may be distributed throughout multiple Chapter 19 tables, a practice that has caused delay in completing reviews. The NRC technical branch responsibe for the review of information Chapter 19 of a DC or COL application obtains support from reviewers responsible for the review of instrumentation and control (I&C) described in Chapter 7 of a DC or COL application, as necessary, to confirm that the analysis adequately accounts for the I&C systems relied upon and that there is reasonable assurance that the I&C systems needed for mitigation of events beyond the design basis (including severe accidents) are designed to perform