Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 889e380e-bdb0-4af7-8056-db56551e3a1b
Document Type: srp
Title: UNCONTROLLED CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLY WITHDRAWAL FROM A
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070711.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.4.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
SUBCRITICAL OR LOW POWER STARTUP CONDITION REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Core Performance Branch (CPB)Reactor Systems Branch (SRXB)1 Secondary - None I. AREAS OF REVIEW The CPBSRXB evaluates the effects and consequences of an uncontrolled control rod assembly 2 withdrawal (a bank for a pressurized water reactor; and a single rod, with current control modes, for a boiling water reactor ) from a subcritical or low-power (e.g., startup-range) condition to * assure conformance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 10, 17, 20, and 25 under 3 this SRP section. The review under this SRP section covers the description of the causes of the transient and the transient itself, the initial conditions, the reactor parameters used in the analysis, the analytical methods and computer codes used, and the consequences of the transient as compared with the acceptance criteria. Review Interfaces4 The SRXB also reviews Tthe reactivity coefficients and control rod worths utilized in this 5 review are also evaluated by the CPB under SRP Section 4.3. II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 1. The following General Design Criteria (Ref. 1) apply: 6 a. Criterion 10, which requires that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not to be exceeded during normal operation, including the effects of anticipated operational occurrences. DRAFT Rev. 3 - April 1996 15.4.1-2 b. Criterion 17, which requires provision of an onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety.7 cb. Criterion 20, which requires that the protection system initiate automatically appropriate systems to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences. dc. Criterion 25, which requires that the reactor protection system be designed to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded in the event of a single malfunction of the reactivity