Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 1877a6e5-f5a2-4394-bd63-c323831e96d0
Document Type: srp
Title: INTRODUCTION - TRANSIENT AND ACCIDENT ANALYSES
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2231/ML22319A149.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-07
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.0
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CFR Title: 

Content:
6(b) shall be satisfied. 3 Typical SAFDLs for demonstrating fuel integrity include limits on the departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) or critical power ratio (CPR) to prevent overheating, fuel centerline temperature to prevent melting, and transient cladding strain to avoid cladding failure. 4 For operating plants, examples of similar regulatory requirements include 10 CFR Part 100 and 10 CFR 50.67. See SRP 15.0.3 as an example of appropriate dose criteria for postulated accidents where the acceptance criteria for a given event are provided as fractions of the regulatory criteria. 15.0-7 Draft Revision 4 – July 2023 Escalation Criteria An AOO must not generate a postulated accident without other faults occurring independently or result in a loss of function of the RCS or reactor containment barriers. A postulated accident must not, by itself, cause a loss of credited functions of systems needed to cope with the fault, including those of the RCS and the reactor containment system. Consistent with the policies and resolution of key technical issues for passive reactor designs (Refs. 10-13), the reviewer must confirm that advanced reactors that rely on passive safety-related systems and equipment for AOO and accident mitigation are designed with sufficient capability and capacity to reach and maintain safe and stable conditions without operator action and without non-safety-related onsite or offsite power for at least 72 hours. Further, the site must be capable of sustaining all design- basis events with onsite equipment and supplies for 7 days. The reviewer should ensure the applicant’s or licensee’s analysis demonstrates the above acceptable criteria are satisfied for the first 72 hours following the event and the reactor remains subcritical beyond the short-term.5 Additionally, the events should be evaluated into the long term to demonstrate the reactor will remain in a safe and stable condition beyond 72 hours. The reviewer should ensure there remain