Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 4b0fa4a0-ce32-4f59-9360-9426826a668c
Document Type: srp
Title: Rev. 4 — June 1997
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0525/ML052500496.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ewed to confirm that the design includes the qualification of equipment for the conditions identified in the design bases. Failures may not be credited to protect the integrity of other equipment. The review should confirm that tests have been conducted on protection system equipment components and the system racks and panels as a whole to demonstrate the functional performance requirements of the protection system over the range of transient and steady-state conditions of both the energy supply and the environment. Where tests have not been conducted, the applicant should confirm that the protection system components are conservatively designed to operate over the range of service conditions. Auxiliary features necessary to support safety system performance should meet all of the requirements of IEEE Std 279. Other auxiliary features that are part of the safety system, but not isolated from the safety system, should be designed to meet the criteria of IEEE Std 279 as necessary to assure that these components and systems do not degrade the safety systems below an acceptable level. BTP HICB-9 provides specific guidance for the review of anticipatory trips that are auxiliary features of a reactor protection system. The sharing of structures, systems, and components between units in multi-unit stations is permissible provided that the ability to simultaneously perform required safety functions in all units is not impaired. The review of shared displays and controls should be coordinated with the Human Factors Assessment Branch (HHFB) to confirm that shared user interfaces are sufficient to support the operator needs for each of the shared units. The EELB and Plant Systems Branch (SPLB) review power source requirements. HICB reviewers should coordinate with these branches to confirm that I&C safety system power sources are adequate. The review of channel integrity should confirm that the design provides for protection systems to fail in a safe state, or into a state