Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a8dee0cd-6529-4ac9-b659-26bda40aba48
Document Type: srp
Title: INFORMATION SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1515/ML15159B138.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7.5
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ormance with RG 1.47, “Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems.” H. Independence - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B, Subsection 4.7, “Control and Protection System Interaction,” and SRP Appendix 7.1-C, Subsection 5.6, “Independence,” and Subsections 6.3, “Interaction Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems.” The indication system should be designed and installed in a manner that precludes the possibility of adverse effects on plant safety systems. Failure or bypass of a protective function should not be a credible consequence of failures occurring in the indication equipment, and the bypass indication should not reduce the required independence between redundant safety systems. I. Use of digital systems - See SRP Appendix 7.0-A and Appendix 7.1-D. Recommended review emphasis for annunciator systems J. Reliability - The applicant or licensee should justify that the degree of redundancy, diversity, testability, and quality provided in annunciator systems is adequate to support normal and emergency operations. SRP Appendix 7.1-C, Subsection 5.15, “Reliability,” provides guidance on the evaluation of safety system reliability that may be used in evaluating the reliability of annunciator systems. K. Use of digital systems - See SRP Appendix 7.0-A and Appendix 7.1-D. L. Independence (isolation between safety systems and other systems) - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B, Subsection 4.7, “Control and Protection System Interaction,” and SRP Appendix 7.1-C, Subsections 5.6, “Independence,” and Subsection 6.3, “Interaction Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems.” 7.5-10 Draft Revision 6 – August 2015 Additional items for emphasis for ALWR annunciator systems M. Redundancy - Redundant alarm systems should be provided. These redundant systems need not comply with the single failure criterion, but independence between the redundant systems should be equivalent to that provided between