Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: acab976c-e936-49be-8c59-865767973599
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive Content of Application Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light-Water Reactors (Rev. 1)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2319/ML23194A194.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-09
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.253
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
equence is expressed as the dose calculated at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) for the 30-day period following the onset of the release. 2. Three cumulative risk metrics: a. The total mean frequency of exceeding a site boundary dose of 100 mrem from all licensing basis events (LBEs). b. The average individual risk of early fatality within 1 mile of the EAB from all LBEs. c. The average individual risk of latent cancer fatalities within 10 miles of the EAB from all LBEs. DG-1404, Revision 1, App. B, Page 5 B.3.2 Consistent with NEI 21-07, Revision 1, Section 2.1.1, as clarified in Staff Position C.3.d in the main body of this regulatory guidance, and RG 1.247 (for trial use), Staff Position C.1.1, the CP PRA scope should address all radiological sources, all hazards, and all POSs. An approach for establishing an acceptable PRA scope should: 1. Identify all radiological sources, POSs, and hazards by performing a comprehensive and systematic search. 2. Disposition the search results by a combination of PRA logic modeling, acceptable screening methods, risk-informed supplemental evaluations, and crediting design-basis hazard levels (DBHLs). B.3.3 As a minimum, the scope of the PRA supporting the CP application should include the internal events hazard group for the reactor in the at-power POS to demonstrate the applicant’s ability to develop an acceptable PRA and to establish an acceptable foundation for upgrading the PRA as the design progresses. The staff notes that a minimally acceptable PRA would not support full implementation of the LMP methodology at the CP stage because it may not address non-core radiological sources, low power and shutdown POSs, and all internal and external hazards groups. B.3.4 The high-level requirements3 (HLRs) and associated supporting requirements (SRs) provided in the ASME/ANS non-LWR PRA standard, as endorsed in RG 1.247 (for trial use) with clarifications and qualifications, provide an acceptable approach for developing PRA logic