Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 106978f1-fb10-4fa9-ad95-601f3c16bd36
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 5 - March 2007
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550072.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
teria address confirmation that anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accidents are mitigated in the presence of common-cause failure, D3 analyses focus on the protection systems. Other systems important to safety become involved only to the extent that they are credited as providing diverse functions to protect against common-cause failures in the protection systems. 1. For each anticipated operational occurrence in the design basis occurring in conjunction with each single postulated common-cause failure, the plant response calculated using best-estimate (realistic assumptions) analyses should not result in radiation release exceeding 10 percent of the 10 CFR 100 guideline value or violation of the integrity of the primary coolant pressure boundary. The applicant/licensee should (1) demonstrate that sufficient diversity exists to achieve these goals, (2) identify the vulnerabilities discovered and the corrective actions taken, or (3) identify the vulnerabilities discovered and provide a documented basis that justifies taking no action. 2. For each postulated accident in the design basis occurring in conjunction with each single postulated common-cause failure, the plant response calculated using best-estimate (realistic assumptions) analyses should not result in radiation release exceeding the 10 CFR 100 guideline values, violation of the integrity of the primary coolant pressure boundary, or violation of the integrity of the containment (i.e., exceeding coolant system or containment design limits). The applicant/licensee should (1) demonstrate that sufficient diversity exists to achieve these goals, (2) identify the vulnerabilities discovered and the corrective actions taken, or (3) identify the vulnerabilities discovered and provide a documented basis that justifies taking no action. BTP 7-19-6 Revision 5 - March 2007 3. When a failure of a common element or signal source shared by the control system and RTS is postulated and the common-cause