Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 00471f3b-36d9-4ce3-af70-d4dac9bb0e67
Document Type: srp
Title: Draft Revision 6 – August 2015
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1515/ML15159A809.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
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CFR Title: 

Content:
minimum performance requirements including response times and accuracies, Clause 4.9 for the capability for sensor checks, and Clause 4.10 for the capability for test and calibration. 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” Appendix A, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” General Design Criterion (GDC) 13, “Instrumentation and Control,” requires in part that instrumentation be provided to monitor variables and systems, and that controls be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges. GDC 20, “Protection System Functions,” requires in part that the protection system be designed to initiate operation of appropriate systems to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded. GDC 21, “Protection System Reliability and Testability,” requires in part that the protection system be designed for high functional reliability and in-service testability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed. GDC 24, “Separation of Protection and Control Systems,” requires in part that the protection system be separated from the control systems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or channel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel that is common to the protection system, leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, redundancy, and independence requirements of the protection system. BTP 7-13-3 Draft Revision 6 – August 2015 GDC 29, “Protection against Anticipated Operational Occurrences,” requires in part that protection and reactivity control systems be designed to ensure an extremely high probability of accomplishing their safety function in the event of an anticipated operational occurrence. 2. Relevant Guidance IEEE Std 603-1991 requires in part that the safety system design basis include the following: • The