Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: b4686ee0-9e2d-4fc8-8566-59099525a933
Document Type: srp
Title: - 15.3.4-8
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550012.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.3.3
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
Revision 3 - March 2007 NRC-approved source terms and methodologies such as those contained in NUREG-1465. Meeting this requirement provides a level of assurance that, in the event of a transient initiated by a reactor coolant pump rotor seizure or shaft break, radiation exposures at the site boundary will not exceed a small fraction of the reference values specified in 10 CFR Part 100. III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The reviewer will select material from the procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case. These review procedures are based on the identified SRP acceptance criteria. For deviations from these acceptance criteria, the staff should review the applicant’s evaluation of how the proposed alternatives provide an acceptable method of complying with the relevant NRC requirements identified in Subsection II. The procedures below are used for the design certification (DC) application review, the construction permit (CP), operating license (OL), and combined license (COL)reviews. During the CP review, the values of system parameters and set-points used in the analysis will be preliminary in nature and subject to change. At the OL or COL review stage, final values should be used in the analysis, and the reviewer should compare these to the limiting safety system settings included in the proposed technical specifications. The applicant's analyses of the rotor seizure and shaft break events are reviewed by the staff regarding the occurrences leading to the initiating event. The sequence of events, from initiation until a stabilized condition is reached, is reviewed to ascertain: 1. The extent to which normally operating plant instrumentation and controls are assumed to function. 2. The extent to which plant and reactor protection systems are required to function. 3. The extent to which credit is taken for the functioning of normally operating plant systems. 4. The extent to which the operation of engineered safety systems is required. 5. The