Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 667d1b37-702c-4e8d-93da-886dbb7a679f
Document Type: srp
Title: d.
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070304.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3.2.2.30
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
The Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch (SPSB) coordinates and performs the review of an applicant's plant- and/or site-specific probabilistic risk assessment, including a flooding analysis during plant shutdown conditions, as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Chapter 19.1 (proposed).31 For those areas of review identified above as being reviewed as part of the primary review responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria necessary for the review and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section of the corresponding primary branch.32 II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Acceptability of the flood protection measures described in the SAR is based on meeting specific general design criteria and regulatory guides. The plant design for protection of SSCs from the effects of flooding, including internal flooding, is acceptable if it meets the relevant 33 requirements of General Design Criterion GDC 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, "Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for 34 Nuclear Power Plants," Sections IV.C IV(c), V(c), and VI(c) as related to protecting SSCs 35 important to safety from the effects of floods, tsunamis, and seiches. Acceptance is based on the design meeting the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.59 with regard to the methods utilized for 36 establishing the probable maximum flood (PMF), probable maximum precipitation (PMP), seiche, and other pertinent hydrologic considerations and on the guidelines of Regulatory 37 Guide 1.102 regarding the means utilized for protection of SSCs important to safety from the effects of the PMF and PMP. If safety-related structures are protected from below-grade groundwater seepage by means of a permanent dewatering system, then the system should be designed as a safety-related system and meet the single failure criterion requirements.38 DRAFT Rev. 3 - April 1996 3.4.1-4 Technical Rationale The technical rationale for