Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 96afb1d6-6ce9-41e4-b4ec-1fc7747bc0b2
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 8 – January 2021
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2033/ML20339A647.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-05
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
he reviewer should determine whether the application includes an analysis reflecting the guidance of NUREG/CR-6303 and NUREG/CR-7007 to demonstrate that the diversity of these independent divisions is sufficient to eliminate a CCF from further consideration. Acceptance Criteria If the acceptance criteria below are met, the reviewer should conclude that the application provides adequate information on the use of diversity within the system or component to eliminate CCFs from further consideration. The acceptance criteria are as follows: a. Each safety function to be achieved by the proposed design is shown to be independently achievable by each diverse portion in the system or component. b. Diversity between the different portions of the system or component is sufficient to account for potential spurious operation. c. The different portions of the system or component are sufficiently diverse to perform the safety function without relying on the performance of common components, and the SSCs and software of the different portions are not vulnerable to the same CCFs. d. The diverse portions of the system or component do not have common or shared resources, such as power supplies, memory, bus, or communications modules, whose failure could affect both or all portions. Also, the diverse portions of the system or component do not share engineering or maintenance tools whose failure could affect both or all portions. e. Each diverse portion used to perform the credited safety functions is shown to be reliable and available in the plant conditions during which the associated event needs to be prevented or mitigated. f. Periodic surveillance criteria are used to verify the continuing functionality of each diverse portion. 3.1.2 Use of Testing to Eliminate Potential Common-Cause Failure from Further Consideration CCF vulnerabilities in DI&C systems or components have two general causes: (1) errors BTP 7-19-21 Revision 8 – January 2021 introduced by the system hardware or