Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: dc63e8aa-2a74-4078-9e19-9a26ed1b4d8c
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 6 – July 2012
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1105/ML110550791.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ressure boundary. (4) When a CCF results in a plant response for which the safety analysis credits ESF actuation and also impairs the ESF function, then a diverse means not subject to or failed by the postulated failure should be provided to perform the ESF function. The diverse means should assure that the plant response calculated using realistic assumptions and analyses does not result in radiation release exceeding 10 percent of the applicable siting dose guideline values or violation of the integrity of the primary coolant pressure boundary. (5) No failure of monitoring or display systems should influence the functioning of the RTS or ESF. If a plant monitoring system failure induces operators to attempt to operate the plant outside safety limits or in violation of the limiting conditions of operation, the analysis should demonstrate that such operator-induced transients will be compensated by protection system function. Revision 6 – July 2012 BTP 7-19-15 (6) For safety systems to satisfy IEEE Std. 603-1991 Clauses 6.2 and 7.2, a safety-related means shall be provided in the control room to implement manual initiation of the automatically initiated protective actions at the system level or division level (depending on the design) of the RTS and ESF functions. This safety-related manual means shall minimize the number of discrete operator manual manipulations and shall depend on operation of a minimum of equipment. If a D3 analysis indicates that the safety-related manual initiation would be subject to the same potential CCF affecting the automatically initiated protective action, then under Point 3 of the NRC position on D3, a diverse manual means of initiating protective action(s) would be needed, (i.e. two manual initiation means would be needed). If the safety-related system/division level manual initiation required by IEEE Std. 603-1991 is sufficiently diverse, the diverse (second) manual means would not be necessary (see Section B.1.5, “Manual