Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 8dd882f4-a34f-4415-acd1-ebb441c72786
Document Type: srp
Title: PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND SEVERE ACCIDENT
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1213/ML12132A481.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 19
Section ID: 19.0
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
luations. Design-Specific PRA (Specific Areas of Review) 1. The staff reviews the process used by the applicant to develop its design-specific or plant-specific PRA, including supporting or associated analyses (e.g., T-H analyses, human reliability analyses). 2. The staff reviews the applicant’s process for maintaining and upgrading the PRA, as necessary, to ensure that (1) it reasonably reflects the plant design, operation, and 19.0-20 Draft Revision 3 – September 2012 experience and (2) its scope, level of detail, and technical adequacy are appropriate for its uses and risk-informed applications. The staff reviews the applicant’s uses and risk-informed applications (or proposed uses and applications)3 of the PRA for each phase (i.e., design, licensing, construction operations). Specifically, the PRA staff should interface with the primary review branch in the evaluation of licensee programs that use the PRA results and insights (e.g., human factors program, maintenance rule implementation,Reliability Assurance Program (RAP). Likewise, the PRA staff should interface with the primary review branch in the evaluation of specific risk-informed applications (e.g., 10 CFR 50.69 implementation, risk-informed performance-based fire protection implementation, risk- informed inservice inspection, risk-informed inservice testing). When the applicant enters a new phase, the staff may review any changes to the uses and applications. 4. The staff reviews the description of the applicant’s PRA in Chapter 19 of the FSAR and its associated results and insights, addressing the full scope of information outlined in RG 1.206, Section C.I.19. In particular, the staff should review the applicant’s identification of significant plant features (including non-safety-related systems) and operator actions that are important to reduce risk and confirm that the plant will meet the expectation identified above that reactors will reflect an extremely low probability for accidents that