Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a59a01e7-d1e2-4946-bebf-a5fff5731c47
Document Type: srp
Title: of the SAR.
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0525/ML052500493.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7.3
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
TS, ESFAS, information systems important to safety, safety interlock systems, and supporting data communication systems. Review Methods — Reg. Guide 1.47 provides bases for evaluating conformance to GDC 21 and ANSI/IEEE Std 279, Sections 4.13 and 4.20 for protection systems. The regulatory guide also provides bases for evaluating the adequacy of bypass and inoperable status indication for I&C systems important to safety as addressed in the review of Section 7.5 of the SAR. Rev. 4 — June 1997 SRP 7.1-A-22 c. Regulatory Guide 1.53, "Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems," (Endorses ANSI/IEEE Std 379, Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems") Applicability — All I&C safety systems and supporting data communication systems. Review Methods — Reg. Guide 1.53 provides a basis for evaluating conformance to GDC 21 and ANSI/IEEE Std 279, Section 4.2. d. Regulatory Guide 1.62, "Manual Initiation of Protection Action" Applicability — RTS, ESFAS, and diverse instrumentation and control systems. Review Methods — Reg. Guide 1.62 provides a basis for evaluating conformance to ANSI/IEEE Std 279, Section 4.17. Reg. Guide 1.62 also provides guidance that should be considered in the review of manual initiation of ATWS mitigation and diverse actuation system functions. e. Regulatory Guide 1.75, "Physical Independence of Electrical Systems," (Endorses IEEE Std 384, "Criteria for Separation of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits") Applicability — All I&C systems. Review Methods — Reg. Guide 1.75 provides a basis for evaluating conformance to GDC 21 and ANSI/IEEE Std 279, Sections 4.6 and 4.22 for protection systems and for evaluating the adequacy of I&C systems important to safety that incorporate redundant or diverse features to satisfy the single-failure criterion. The HICB evaluation is limited to the review of components and electrical wiring inside racks,