Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 92d817ac-3ce3-4cf7-8d1a-627e8242fbf2
Document Type: srp
Title: PLANT DESIGN FOR PROTECTION AGAINST POSTULATED PIPING FAILURES
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070312.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3.6.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
nt on the basis of the analyses made and measures taken by applicants and licensees in response to the December 1972 letter from A. Giambusso, and the staff review and acceptance of these analyses and measures. For plants in this category for which the staff review and acceptance of protection against the effects of piping failures outside containment is not substantially complete as of February 1, 1975, a commitment by the applicant to carry out analyses according to Section B.3 of this position, to submit them for staff review, and to carry out any system modifications found necessary before extended operation of the plant at power levels above one-half the license power level, should provide an acceptable basis for issuance of the operating license.32 C. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases." 2. Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification." 3. Letter from A. Giambusso, Deputy Director for Reactor Projects, Directorate of Licensing, to applicants and licensees, December 1972, and attachment entitled "General Information Required for Consideration of the Effects of a Piping System Break Outside Containment." The corrected attachment is Appendix B to this position. 3.6.1-17 DRAFT Rev. 3 - April 1996 4. Letter from J. F. O'Leary, Director of Licensing, to applicants, reactor vendors, and architect-engineers, July 12, 1972, and attachment entitled "Criteria for Determination of Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in High and Moderate Energy Fluid Piping Systems Outside of Containment Structures." The letter and attachment is Appendix C to this position. DRAFT Rev. 3 - April 1996 3.6.1-18 APPENDIX A BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION SPLB 3-1 DEFINITIONS Essential Systems and Components. Systems and components required to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power. Fluid Systems. High and moderate energy fluid systems that