Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 96afb1d6-6ce9-41e4-b4ec-1fc7747bc0b2
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 8 – January 2021
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2033/ML20339A647.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-05
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
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mains consistent with assumptions in the licensing basis. A qualitative assessment should consider the following factors: • the design attributes and features of the DI&C system or component • the quality of the design process for the DI&C system or component • any applicable operating experience for the DI&C system or component Second, the reviewer should consider any failure analysis used in the qualitative assessment, including information from engineering design work, such as FMEAs and FTAs. The reviewer should consider whether the failure analysis supports the factors above—whether it demonstrates, for example, that identified potential CCFs exhibit a low likelihood of occurrence. Acceptance Criteria If the acceptance criteria below are met, the reviewer should conclude that the application includes a qualitative assessment (consistent with the methodology described in RIS 2002-22, Supplement 1) that demonstrates that for SSCs of low safety significance, the likelihood of CCF is sufficiently low. The acceptance criteria are as follows: a. The proposed system or component has design attributes and features that reduce the likelihood of CCFs. BTP 7-19-24 Revision 8 – January 2021 b. The quality of the design process for the proposed system or component reduces the likelihood of CCFs, including CCFs potentially resulting in spurious operations. c. The applicable operating experience collectively supports the conclusion that the proposed system or component will operate with high reliability for the intended application. In some cases, operating experience can compensate for weakness in addressing criteria (a) and (b). d. The proposed system or component will not cause a failure or spurious operation that could invalidate the plant licensing basis (e.g., the maintenance of diverse systems for reactivity control). e. The application documents failure analyses (e.g., FMEAs) that demonstrate how failure effects, including spurious operations, are bounded or