Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: bb233b69-c637-41e8-9774-95be0cc8b117
Document Type: srp
Title: STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550056.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.2.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ment necessary for safe shutdown, are acceptable. 4. The SAR descriptive information, P&IDs, SWS drawings, and failure modes and effects analyses are reviewed for whether essential system portions can function following design-basis accidents, assuming a concurrent, single, active component failure. The reviewer evaluates the SAR failure mode and effects analysis for assured function of required components, traces the availability of these components on system drawings, and checks that the SAR verifies that minimum system flow and heat transfer requirements are met for each accident situation for the required time spans. For each case the design is acceptable if it meets minimum system requirements. 5. The SAR is reviewed for applicant commitments for venting and filling of open loop systems to address the potential for water hammer, for operating procedures for avoidance of water hammer, and for system design to maintain functions following an inadvertent water hammer occurrence. Guidance for water hammer prevention and mitigation is in NUREG-0927 (Reference 14). 6. To address concerns about SWS fouling, the reviewer verifies whether the applicant addresses the following SWS design provisions and inspection activities consistently with Generic Letter (GL) 89-13 (Reference 8) and GL 89-13, Supplement 1 (Reference 9): 9.2.1-10 Revision 5 - March 2007 A. A program of surveillance and control techniques to reduce significantly the incidence of flow blockage problems from biofouling. B. A test program, consisting of an initial test program and a periodic retest program, to verify the heat transfer capability of all safety-related heat exchangers cooled by service water. C. A routine inspection and maintenance program for SWS piping and components for assurance that corrosion, erosion, protective coating failure, silting, and biofouling cannot degrade the performance of the safety-related systems supplied by service water. 7. For multi-unit sites with SWS cross-tie