Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 615ce987-401a-49b0-a317-08e4662db9df
Document Type: srp
Title: AUXILIARY AND RADWASTE AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550039.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.4.3
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
rationale for application of these acceptance criteria to the areas of review addressed by this SRP section is discussed in the following paragraphs: 1. GDC 2 as related to the system being capable of withstanding the effects of earthquakes, requires that SSCs important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of a design basis earthquake without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The function of the ARAVS is to maintain ventilation, to permit personnel access, and to control airborne radioactivity in the auxiliary and radwaste areas during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences and during and after postulated accidents, including loss of offsite power. This requirement ensures that in the event of a design-basis earthquake, essential portions of the ARAVS will remain functional and the failure of any nonessential portion of the system or of other systems not designed to seismic Category I standards will not result in offsite doses in excess of 5 mSv (0.5 rem) to the whole body or an equivalent dose to any part of the body. Meeting the GDC 2 requirements provides assurance that the ARAVS will operate as designed, thus protecting against release of radioactivity in excess of regulatory limits. 2. GDC 5 requires that SSCs important to safety shall not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform safety functions, including, in the event of an accident in one unit, an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining units. 9.4.3-5 Revision 3 - March 2007 For the ARAVS, GDC 5 requires that the component parts be essentially independent to ensure that an accident in one unit of a multiple-unit facility will not propagate to other units. Therefore, the ARAVS for each unit should be designed to accommodate the load resulting from accident conditions. At the same time, the operating environment of equipment associated with unaffected units must be