Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 6d6e43af-f998-40fc-9062-1277b9cebd60
Document Type: srp
Title: REACTOR AUXILIARY COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052350544.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.2.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
mena such as the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), the probable maximum flood (PMF), and tornado missiles as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.5.3, 3.7.1, 3.7.4, 3.8.4 and 3.8.5. The mechanical engineering reviewer of EB determines that the components, piping and structures are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Sections 3.9.1 and 3.9.3. The mechanical engineering reviewer also determines the acceptability of the seismic and qual- ity group classifications for system components as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. The mechanical engineering reviewer also reviews the adequacy of the inservice testing program of pumps and valves as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 3.9.6. The material engineering reviewer of EB verifies that inservice inspection requirements are met for system components as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 6.6 and, upon request, verifies the compatibility of the materials of construction with service conditions. The instrumentation and control systems reviewer and power systems reviewer of the Electrical and Instrumentation Contol Systems Branch (EICSB) will determine the adequacy of the design, installation, inspection, and testing of all essential electrical components, system controls, and instrumentation required for proper operation as part of their primary review responsibilities for SRP Sections 7.1 and 8.1, respectively. The EICSB will review the signals used to isolate safety-related portions of the reactor auxiliary cooling water system from nonsafety-related portions in the event of postulated accidents with special emphasis paid to proper isolation of interconnected trains in the event of unusual conditions such as low pressures in the reactor auxiliary cooling water system or drawing low current for safety-related pumps. The review for