Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 4e771d51-141e-46e6-8ec9-fd098a4b1db7
Document Type: srp
Title: STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS TO BE PROTECTED FROM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0704/ML070460362.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3.5.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
are considered adequately protected. The reviewer concentrates attention on safety-related SSCs outside such structures and on penetrations and access openings in them. Essential service water piping and components, storage tanks, and ultimate heat sink components are examples of SSCs typically outside missile-resistant structures. Such site-specific systems as the ultimate heat sink may be excepted from the DC scope. Detailed review of the site-specific systems for a standardized design to be protected from missiles is therefore typically deferred until review of applications referring to the site specific systems. Depending on the nature and source of the externally-generated missiles, protection may be by missile barriers for individual components, by location of independent redundant subsystems in compartments in missile-protected structures, or by subgrade location at sufficient depth. Physical separation alone is not normally an acceptable method of missile protection for redundant safety-related systems and components. 3.5.2-6 Revision 3 - March 2007 3. The reviewer determines whether the failure of nonsafety-related SSCs as result of a missile could prevent a safety-related SSCs identified as requiring protection from externally-generated missiles from completing its safety function. The reviewer also verifies for applicants referring to certified designs whether SSCs outside the design scope might generate external missiles that would prevent safety-related SSCs from performing their intended safety function. 4. For review of a DC application, the reviewer should follow the above procedures to verify that the design, including requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters), set forth in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) meets the acceptance criteria. DCs have referred to the FSAR as the design control document (DCD). The reviewer should also consider the appropriateness of identified COL action items. The reviewer