Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 0b529a75-fd6e-4e39-9791-94f199dfcf56
Document Type: srp
Title: CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (PWR) (INCLUDING BORON
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0701/ML070160660.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.3.4
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
des pump-to-pump interaction during miniflow operation that could result in dead-heading one or more of the pumps. The miniflow should be sufficient to prevent damage to the pump(s) under minimum flow operating conditions conditions. ii. In cases where only the miniflow return line is available for pump testing, flow instrumentation must be installed on the miniflow return line. This instrumentation should provide flow rate measurements during pump testing so this data can be evaluated with the measured pump differential pressure to monitor for pump hydraulic degradation. 2. The reviewer verifies that the safety function of the system will be maintained as required in the event of adverse environmental phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, or in the event of certain pipe breaks or loss of offsite 9.3.4-12 Revision 3 - March 2007 power. The reviewer uses engineering judgment, failure modes and effects analyses, and the results of reviews performed under other SRP sections, as applicable, to determine the following: A. The system description and drawings are reviewed in conjunction with the reactor coolant system to determine whether the CVCS has sufficient pumping capacity to maintain the RCS water inventory within the allowable pressurizer level range for all normal modes of operation, including startup from cold shutdown, full power operation, and plant cooldown. If the plant design relies on the CVCS to perform the safety function of emergency safety injection as part of ECCS, verify that CVCS can supply reactor coolant makeup in the event of small pipe breaks and can function as part of the ECCS, assuming a single active failure coincident with the loss of offsite power. It is further ascertained from a review of the P&IDs whether makeup to the RCS can be accomplished via two redundant appropriately designed flow paths. B. Essential components and subsystems (i.e., those necessary for safe shutdown) can function as required in the