Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 2779d8da-7e49-4277-9495-bf9ec444636f
Document Type: srp
Title: STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM (PWR)
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070602.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 10
Section ID: 10.4.8
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
EMCB determines that the design parameters 38 are reasonable. If the proposed system includes processes which are heat-sensitive (e.g., demineralization or reverse osmosis), CMEBEMCB verifies that the design includes 39 instrumentation and controls to protect the temperature-sensitive elements. CMEBEMCB ensures that instrumentation and process controls are provided to control 40 flashing, liquid levels, and process flow through the proper components for the radioactivity levels expected. b. CMEBEMCB reviews the proposed piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) 41 and process flow diagrams, the method of operation, the processing to be provided, and the interfaces between the blowdown system and other plant systems to determine: (1) whether unusual design conditions exist which could lead to safety problems, and (2) that the system is capable of performing its intended functions. c. CMEBEMCB reviews the secondary coolant chemistry program for steam generator 42 blowdown samples in SRP Section 5.4.2.1, BTP MTEB 5-3 (Monitoring of Secondary Side Water Chemistry in PWR Steam Generators). d. CMEBEMCB coordinates its review with MEBEMEB to verify that the assigned 43 44 classifications at the boundary interfaces between systems and/or system components are in accordance with the importance of the safety function to be performed and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.26, 1.29, and 1.143. DRAFT Rev. 3 - April 1996 10.4.8-6 2. SEBECGB determines the seismic design, and MEBEMEB determines the quality 45 46 group and seismic design classification for the SGBS components as indicated above in subsection I, Areas of Review. 3. ETSBSPLB determines the capability to treat liquid and gaseous wastes associated with 47 the SGBS as part of its review under SRP Sections 11.2 and 11.3. 4. ASBSPLB reviews the effect of SGBS high- and moderate-energy piping failures under 48 SRP Section 3.6.1 to assure ensure that other safety-related systems are not rendered inoperable. For