Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 9b1d30d6-5422-403a-bfae-ffa674dbbb75
Document Type: srp
Title: B-6
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1601/ML16019A091.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
de adequate protection. This aspect of redundancy is dealt with in coordination with the organization responsible for the review of reactor systems to establish redundancy requirements. Components and systems not qualified for seismic events or accident environments and nonsafety-grade components and systems are assumed to fail to function if failure adversely affects protection system performance. Conversely, these components and systems are assumed to function if functioning adversely affects protection system performance. All failures in the protection system that can be predicted as a result of an event for which the protection system is designed to provide a protective function are assumed to occur if the failure adversely affects the protection system performance. In general, the lack of equipment qualification may serve as a basis for the assumption of certain failures. After assuming the failures of nonsafety-grade, nonqualified equipment and those failures caused by a specific event, a random single failure is arbitrarily assumed. With these failures assumed, the protection system must be capable of performing the protective functions required to mitigate the consequences of the specific event. 4.3. Quality of Components and Modules (IEEE Std 279-1971, Clause 4.3) The applicant or licensee should confirm that quality assurance provisions of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” are applicable to the protection system. The evaluation of the adequacy of the quality assurance program is addressed in the review of Chapter 17 of the SAR.