Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 42f941d3-4815-4bc5-bf81-f2dab04a7aa7
Document Type: srp
Title: SECONDARY CONTAINMENT FUNCTIONAL DESIGN
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070459.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 6
Section ID: 6.2.3
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ines that the analyses conservatively predict 38 the secondary containment pressure response. In so doing, SCSB compares the analyses to the 39 guidelines in subsection II of this SRP section. For new applications, the reviewer verifies that analyses of ability to draw a negative pressure on the secondary containment volume following a LOCA assume that all lines that do not receive an isolation signal are open and that the worst- case secondary containment isolation valve fails to close.40 If considered necessary, SCSB performs confirmatory analyses of the pressure and temperature 41 response of the secondary containment for loss-of-coolant accidents within the primary containment and for high energy line (e.g., steam line and feedwater line) ruptures occurring within the annular region formed by the secondary containment. The analyses are done using the CONTEMPT-LT computer code (Ref.erences 48 and 9) . It should be noted that, for the 42 analysis of the pressure and temperature response in the secondary containment for loss-of-coolant accidents within the primary containment, the present version of the CONTEMPT-LT only has the capability of calculating the pressure in the secondary containment up to the time the depressurization systems are actuated. The code is being improved to permit the calculation of the pressure response for the entire course of an accident. 43 The analysis will be based on the guidelines given in subsection II of this SRP section, and code input data obtained from the SAR. SCSB determines that the secondary containment design 44 pressure is not exceeded and that the depressurization time is consistent with that assumed in the AEBPERB analysis of the radiological consequences of the accident. In addition, SCSB 45 46 determines that the primary containment external design pressure is not exceeded. SCSB determines that all direct leakage paths have been properly identified, and from a review 47 of the proposed leakage testing program that