Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: f4b8f0c1-9a14-46be-88c9-a6cb74d64dff
Document Type: srp
Title: Rev. 4 — June 1997
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0525/ML052500499.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
uidance on identification is provided in Reg. Guide 1.75, which endorses IEEE Std 384. The preferred identification method is color coding of components, cables, and cabinets. Configuration management is generally sufficient for maintaining the identification of computer software. BTP HICB-14 discusses the review of software configuration management. 17. Section 5.12 — Auxiliary Features BTP HICB-9 provides specific guidance for the review of anticipatory trips that are auxiliary features of a reactor protection system. Rev. 4 — June 1997 SRP 7.1-C-11 18. Section 5.13 — Multi-Unit Stations The review of shared displays and controls should be coordinated with the Human Factors Assessment Branch (HHFB) to confirm that shared user interfaces are sufficient to support the operator needs for each of the shared units. 19. Section 5.14 — Human Factors Considerations Safety system human factors design should be consistent with the applicant/licensee's commitments documented in Chapter 18 of the SAR. The review of human-factors considerations should be coordinated with HHFB. 20. Section 5.15 — Reliability The applicant/licensee should justify that the degree of redundancy, diversity, testability, and quality provided in the safety system design is adequate to achieve functional reliability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed. For computer systems, both hardware and software reliability should be analyzed. Reg. Guide 1.152 describes the Staff position on software reliability determination. BTP HICB-14 provides guidance for software development processes that are expected to produce reliable software. Software that complies with the quality criteria of item 8 above and that is used in safety systems that provide measures for defense against common mode failures as described in item 6 above are considered by the staff to comply with the fundamental reliability requirements of GDC 21, IEEE Std 279, and IEEE Std 603. The assessment of reliability