Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 5810150e-ee20-4cd1-b72f-6e918a603f73
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (Rev. 1)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1523/ML15233A056.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.206
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ry authority over some preconstruction activities, such as the requirement to verify such activities by ITAAC (e.g., procurement of components). It should also be noted that, while the preconstruction activities do not require prior NRC approval, various local, State, or other Federal permits may be required. Circulating Water System As a general matter, the NRC staff considers the circulating water system (CWS), on a system level, to be within the scope of construction because 10 CFR 50.10(a)(1)(iv) includes equipment that can cause a reactor trip. Although the system and active equipment such as pumps and valves can cause a plant trip, an applicant could exclude certain portions of the CWS from construction as discussed below. Buried Circulating Water System Piping up to the Turbine Building Depending on the plant design, it is possible for an applicant to demonstrate that plausible failures (leakage) associated with the CWS piping (intake and discharge) would not result in a reactor trip. It is reasonable to exclude the piping from the scope of construction for certain designs, given that the reactor trip or safety system actuation criterion is the only reason to consider it within scope. This finding remains consistent with the NRC’s decision to use the maintenance rule and related guidance to define the scope of SSCs within the definition of construction. RG 1.160 provides the following guidance for systems to include under this criterion: (1) SSCs whose failure has caused a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system at their site (2) SSCs whose failure has caused a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system at a site with a similar configuration (3) SSCs identified in the licensee’s analysis (e.g., final .SAR (FSAR), individual plant evaluation) whose failure would cause a reactor scram or the actuation of a safety-related system A review of the licensee event reports for currently operating reactors did not identify occurrences of