Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: e47fd320-f3af-41cd-883e-a51e0949005d
Document Type: srp
Title: to verify that the AAC source (or sources) will not adversely affect the
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1007/ML100740424.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 8
Section ID: 8.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
keup flow from the CST to the steam generator/nuclear boiler and identify 8.4-18 Revision 1- May 2010 backup sources to the CST in order of intended use. In addition, plant operating procedures should specify clear criteria for transferring to the next preferred source of water. I. The procedure should identify individual loads that need to be stripped from the plant dc buses (both Class 1E and non-Class 1E) to conserve dc power. J. Plant operating procedures should specify actions to permit appropriate containment isolation and safe-shutdown valve operations while ac power is unavailable. K. Plant operating procedures should identify the portable lighting necessary for ingress and egress to plant areas containing shutdown or AAC equipment requiring manual operation. L. Plant operating procedures should consider the effects of ac power loss on area access, as well as the need to gain entry to other locked areas where remote equipment operation is necessary. M. Plant operating procedures should consider the effects of a loss of ac power on communications capabilities, including the potential for a loss of communications with offsite agencies. N. Plant operating procedures should consider the loss of heat tracing effects for equipment necessary to cope with an SBO. O. To provide assurance that the NPP operator will be kept aware of changes in the plant switchyard and offsite power grid, plant or site procedures should establish appropriate communication protocols between the NPP and its transmission system operator (Ref. 15). With regard to SBO, these protocols should aid the operator in determining the following: i. The performance of grid-risk-sensitive maintenance activities (such as surveillances, postmaintenance testing, and preventive and corrective maintenance) that could increase the likelihood of an SBO or impact the plant=s ability to cope with an SBO, such as out-of-service risk-significant equipment (e.g., an EDG, a battery, a steam-driven pump, an AAC