Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: dd8f36ba-bf50-446f-97d9-20e92cbdee8a
Document Type: srp
Title: CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0703/ML070380221.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 10
Section ID: 10.4.7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
nd procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide acceptable methods of compliance with the NRC regulations. 1. Seismic Events. The requirements of GDC 2 are met by demonstrating that structures, systems, and components important to safety will be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes. Acceptance is based on meeting the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C.1 for safety-related portions and Position C.2 for nonsafety-related portions. 2. Fluid Instabilitites. The requirements of GDC 4 as related to protecting structures, systems and components against the dynamic effects associated with possible fluid flow instabilities (e.g., water hammers) during normal plant operation as well as during upset or accident conditions are met by: A. Meeting the guidance contained in the Branch Technical Position 10-2, "Design Guidelines for Avoiding Water Hammers in Steam Generators," for reducing the potential for water hammers in steam generators; and 10.4.7-6 Revision 4 - March 2007 B. Meeting the guidance related to feedwater-control-induced water hammer. Guidance for water hammer prevention and mitigation is found in NUREG-0927, Revision 1. 3. Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components. The requirements of GDC 5 are met by demonstrating the capability of important to safety components in the CFS which are shared by multiple units to perform their required safety functions. 4. Heat Removal Capability. The requirements of GDC 44, as related to the capability to transfer heat from structures, systems and components important to safety to an ultimate heat sink are met by demonstrating that the CFS is capable of providing heat removal under both normal operating and accident conditions. Sufficient redundancy of components is demonstrated so that under accident conditions the safety function can be performed assuming a single