Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 8e45dce1-e1e7-4415-b1dd-7e2a610e545b
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants (Rev. 4)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2023/ML20231A835.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.189
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ional options are not available for safe-shutdown success path equipment without prior NRC approval (Position 5.3.1.1). The approach outlined in Chapter 4 of NEI 00-01, Revision 4, which relies on the Expert Panel Process and the Generic List of Multiple Spurious Operations contained in Appendices F and G of that document, provides an acceptable methodology for the analysis of MSOs for protection of components important to safe shutdown, when applied in conjunction with this RG. 5.3.1.3 Operator Manual Actions When one of the redundant safe-shutdown trains in a fire area is maintained free of fire damage by one of the means specified in Regulatory Position 5.3.1.1, then the use of operator manual actions may be credited with mitigating fire-induced operation or maloperation of components that are not part of the protected success path. The crediting of operator manual actions should be in accordance with the licensee’s FPP and license condition. Operator manual actions may also be credited when an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability is provided as described in Position 5.4. All post-fire operator manual actions should be feasible and reliable. NUREG-1852 provides the technical bases in the form of criteria and technical guidance that may be used to demonstrate that operator manual actions are feasible and can be performed reliably under the wide range of plant conditions that an operator might encounter during a fire. The use of feasible and reliable manual actions alone may not be sufficient to address all levels of defense in depth. Therefore, fire prevention, detection, and suppression should be considered, in addition to the feasibility and reliability of operator manual actions. Because the fire protection requirements, including the protection of safe-shutdown capability and the prevention of radiological release, can be integrated in the planning and design phase, a new DG-1359, Page 81 reactor plant should have minimal reliance on operator manual