Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: fc586342-92f7-4c77-ae76-79e3674cf288
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Criteria for Programmable Digital Devices in Safety-Related Systems of  Nuclear Power Plants + HISTORY –HISTORY 02/2023 – DG-1374, Proposed Revision 4 Prior to issuance of DG-1374, RG 1.152 was entitled, “Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety-Systems of Nuclear Power Plants” 06/2010 – DG-1249, Proposed Revision 3 – Revise 12/2004 – DG-1130, Proposed Revision 2 – Revise 05/1995 – DG-1039, Proposed Revision 1 03/1983 – DG-1130, Proposed Revision 2 – Revise (Rev. 4)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2301/ML23012A242.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-05
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.152
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
l Reprocessing Plants,” Criterion III, “Design Control,” requires, in part, that licensees specify quality standards and provide design control measures for verifying or checking the adequacy of safety system designs. • 10 CFR Part 52 governs the issuance of early site permits, standard design certifications, combined licenses, standard design approvals, and manufacturing licenses for nuclear power facilities. Part 52 specifies, among other things, that the contents of some applications must satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A and Appendix B thereto, and other specified regulations. . Related Guidance • Item 18 of the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-93-087, “SECY-93-087—Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light-Water Reactor (ALWR) Design,” dated July 21, 1993 (Ref. 7), provides the Commission’s policy for addressing common-cause failures (CCFs) in digital instrumentation and controls (DI&C) systems. • NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition,” Chapter 7, “Instrumentation and Controls,” Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Revision 8, “Guidance for Evaluation of Defense in Depth and Diversity to Address Common-Cause Failure due to Latent Design Defects in Digital Safety Systems,” issued January 2021 (Ref. 8), provides guidance for evaluating an applicant’s assessment of the adequacy of defense in depth for a proposed DI&C system. The assessment includes identifying and assessing vulnerabilities to potential CCFs in a proposed DI&C system and evaluating the effects on plant safety of any CCFs that are not prevented or mitigated. DG-1374, Page 3 • RG 5.71, “Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities” (Ref. 9), provides an acceptable approach for complying with the Commission’s regulations on the protection of digital computers, communications systems, and networks from a malicious