Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: fe8ec6c2-e960-404c-854f-55c77bde1672
Document Type: srp
Title: NUREG-0800
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2400/ML24005A077.pdf
Revision Date: 2024-05
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
) 22, “Protection system independence,” of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 states the following: The protection system shall be designed to assure that the effects of natural phenomena, and of normal operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels do not result in loss of the protection function, or shall be demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis. Design techniques, such as functional diversity or diversity in component design and principles of operation, shall be used to the extent practical to prevent loss of the protection function.  GDC 24, “Separation of protection and control systems,” of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 states in part that “interconnection of the protection and control systems shall be limited so as to assure that safety is not significantly impaired.”  GDC 25, “Protection system requirements for reactivity control malfunctions,” of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 states, “The protection system shall be designed to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity control systems, such as accidental withdrawal (not ejection or dropout) of control rods.”  GDC 26, “Reactivity control system redundancy and capability,” of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 states the following: Two independent reactivity control systems of different design principles shall be provided. One of the systems shall use control rods, preferably including a positive means for inserting the rods, and shall be capable of reliably controlling reactivity changes to assure that under conditions of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences, and with appropriate margin for malfunctions such as stuck rods, specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded. The second reactivity control system shall be capable of reliably controlling the rate of reactivity changes resulting from planned, normal power changes