Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 0cfc3978-32da-4370-9f31-8a3547d82846
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors (Rev. 0)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0833/ML083300022.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.25
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data that the staff needs in reviewing applications for permits and licenses. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions that differ from those set forth in regulatory guides will be deemed acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings required for the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. This guide was issued after consideration of comments received from the public. Regulatory guides are issued in 10 broad divisions: 1, Power Reactors; 2, Research and Test Reactors; 3, Fuels and Materials Facilities; 4, Environmental and Siting; 5, Materials and Plant Protection; 6, Products; 7, Transportation; 8, Occupational Health; 9, Antitrust and Financial Review; and 10, General. Electronic copies of this guide and other recently issued guides are available through the NRC’s public Web site under the Regulatory Guides document collection of the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ and through the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under Accession No. MLXXXXXXXXX. RG-1.25, Page 2 the volatile fission gases from the damaged fuel rods, absorption of water soluble gases in and transport of soluble and insoluble gases through the water, air filtration (if provided) prior to release into the environment, and dispersion of the released fission products into the atmosphere. The number and exposure histories of fuel assemblies assumed to be damaged determine the total amount of radioactive material available for immediate release into the water during a fuel handling accident. Although the design of the fuel, the fuel transfer equipment, the fuel pool, and the methods used to handle discharged fuel should all be considered in arriving at the number of fuel assemblies or rods assumed to be damaged, this