Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 04c894f5-e3ab-479e-8bca-0722777c79a7
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 4 – January 2016
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1502/ML15027A401.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 11
Section ID: 11
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ticulate the bases for the staff’s conclusions and for acceptance of the results and supporting information. The reviewers will verify that the applicant has provided sufficient information and that the review and calculations (if applicable) support the conclusions of the reviewers. The reviewers may state that certain information provided by the applicant was not considered to be essential to the staff’s review and was not reviewed by the staff, or that the staff used alternative information or parameters in performing its independent evaluation. The following are examples of conclusions that will be included in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER), based on the approach and methods used by the applicant in demonstrating consistency with NRC guidance and acceptance criteria of SRP Section 11.2 and BTP 11-6. 1. The review confirmed the postulated radionuclide concentrations in the applicable failed components based on the default PWR fuel failure rate or BWR fuel release rate, and the effect of site hydrologic characteristics for those systems that have not been BTP 11-6-17 Revision 4 – January 2016 equipped with design features to mitigate the effect of tank and component failures. The selection of the failed tank and tank volume, radionuclide distributions and concentrations, total radioactive inventory, and assumed failure scenarios were found to be acceptable. The acceptance is based on the staff’s review and independent evaluations confirming that the applicant has considered the appropriate plant systems, tanks and components assumed to fail, locations of tanks and components in the plant, appropriate credit for design features applied in mitigating the consequences of a tank and component failures, and the assumed mechanism for the radioactivity to enter a surface water body or groundwater beyond the physical boundary of the building housing such systems. 2. For cases where design features were incorporated in mitigating the consequences of a