Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 8e45dce1-e1e7-4415-b1dd-7e2a610e545b
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants (Rev. 4)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2023/ML20231A835.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.189
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
s 8.1 General Many of the current fire protection requirements and guidelines for operating reactors were issued after Commission approval of construction permits or operating licenses. The imposition of these requirements and guidelines on existing plant designs created the need for considerable flexibility in the application of the regulations on a plant-by-plant basis. New reactor designs should integrate fire protection requirements, including the protection of safe-shutdown capability and the prevention of radiological release, into the planning and design phase for the plant. In addition, new reactor designs should minimize or eliminate the use of alternative or dedicated shutdown systems and should rely on such systems only when it is not feasible to provide the required protection for redundant safe-shutdown systems, such as in the main control room. Similarly, when practical, reliance on operator manual actions should be avoided. Unless specifically noted otherwise, the guidance in this RG applies to the FPP for new reactor plants. RG 1.206, “Applications for Nuclear Power Plants” (Ref. 120), provides guidance on the scope and content of the COL application for new reactors. 8.2 Enhanced Fire Protection Criteria New reactor designs should ensure that safe shutdown can be achieved by assuming that all equipment in any one fire area will be rendered inoperable by fire and that reentry into the fire area for repairs and operator actions is not possible. Because of its physical configuration, the control room is excluded from this approach, provided that the design includes an independent alternative shutdown capability that is physically and electrically independent of the control room. The control room should be DG-1359, Page 102 evaluated to ensure that the effects of fire do not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. Designs incorporating reactor containment buildings should provide fire protection for redundant shutdown