Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 042bc5c0-5de0-44b4-9599-6c131e20eb7a
Document Type: srp
Title: FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070413.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 4
Section ID: 4.6
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
on with their responsibilities in SRP Sections 7.4, 62 3.9.4, and 9.3.4 or 9.3.5, respectively. 6. For BWR plants that have a scram discharge volume (SDV), the SRXB reviews the system capabilities and controls to verify that the design of the SDV and its associated systems satisfy the guidance and criteria contained in the NRC BWR Scram Discharge Safety Evaluation Report (References 10, 11 and 12). For BWR plants without an SDV, the guidance and criteria specific to the SDV portions of the system would not apply, however, one of the issues addressed within the SER is the response of the CRD system 4.6-9 DRAFT Rev. 2 - April 1996 to a slow loss of control air pressure in the scram system. For BWR plants without an SDV, the reviewer should verify that the design incorporates features to prevent the loss or impairment of the scram function due to a slow loss of control air pressure in the system.63 7. For BWRs the alternate rod injection systems are evaluated in regard to the rod control drive systems to verify the systems have the capability for automatic insertion of all rods by an independent and diverse method (from the reactor protection system) as necessary for mitigation of an ATWS. The evaluation of the alternate rod injection systems includes verification of the use of redundant scram air header exhaust valves.64 Upon request from the primary reviewer, the coordinated review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in subsection I. The primary reviewer obtains and uses such input as required to assure that this review procedure is complete. For standard design certification reviews under 10 CFR Part 52, the procedures above should be followed, as modified by the procedures in SRP Section 14.3 (proposed), to verify that the design set forth in the standard safety analysis report, including inspections, tests, analysis, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC), site interface requirements and combined license action items, meet the acceptance criteria