Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 03aed7b8-74fc-467b-b928-b25d9eb89a13
Document Type: srp
Title: PHYSICAL SECURITY — REVIEW OF PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1301/ML13010A109.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 13
Section ID: 13.6.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
nd emergency exits to unoccupied vital areas are locked and alarmed (10 CFR 73.55(e)(9)(iii)). (iv) More than one vital area may be located within a single protected area (10 CFR 73.55(e)(9)(iv)); the reactor control room, spent fuel pool, central alarm station, and secondary alarm station are designated as vital areas (10 CFR 73.55(e)(9)(v)); and the secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciation equipment and nonportable communication equipment are located within the vital area (10 CFR 73.55(e)(9)(vi)). 3. 10 CFR 73.55(e)(10): As it relates to the design of vehicle control measures required to protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage vehicle bomb assault. The design descriptions should provide sufficient detail of how the following criteria are met: A. Land-based vehicle barrier system (passive and active barriers) is at a standoff distance adequate to protect personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel pool sabotage against the effects of the DBT of radiological sabotage land vehicle bomb assault (10 CFR 73.55(e)(10)(i)(A)). B. A secondary power source or a means of mechanical or manual operation in the event of a power failure performs the intended function to deny unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance (10 CFR 73.55(e)(10)(i)(B)). C. Install train derailer, remove a section of track, or restrict access to railroad sidings where a site has rail access into the protected area (10 CFR 73.55(e)(10)(i)(D)). D. Waterborne vehicle barrier system restricts waterway approaches, and, where possible, deploy buoys, markers or other equipment (10 CFR 73.55(e)(10)(ii)(A)). 4. 10 CFR 73.55(g): As it relates to the design of access control measures required to protect against the threats up to and including the DBT of radiological sabotage. The design descriptions provide sufficient detail of how the following criteria are met: A. Locate access control portals outside of, or concurrent