Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 04c894f5-e3ab-479e-8bca-0722777c79a7
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 4 – January 2016
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1502/ML15027A401.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 11
Section ID: 11
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
dioactivity Releases The health physics staff will verify the identification of the liquid waste tank and components outside of containment or outdoors that could release the most radioactivity to the environment in the event of a failure. The components selected for the analysis should reflect the specific design features of the plant, as described in COL applications (e.g., Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, and 12). For ESP and construction permit applications, applicants may not have sufficiently detailed descriptions of structures, systems, and components and design features that would contain or mitigate releases of radioactivity following the postulated failure of a tank or components containing radioactive materials. In such instances, the applicants should describe the approach and assumptions used in the analysis, identify which elements of the analysis are based on preliminary design information, and describe the reasonableness of the assumptions applied in the analysis and degree of conservatism used in modeling the failure scenario and selection of model parameters. If necessary, applicants may consider assigning an appropriate COL action item for the purpose of revising the analysis once more definitive information on design features becomes available at the OL and COL stage. Applicants should provide sufficient details for the staff to conduct an independent evaluation. The health physics staff will evaluate the assumed failure and release mechanisms to ensure that the proposed failure scenario is consistent with plant design features and that the applicant has applied reasonably conservative assumptions. For example, the staff will assess whether the applicant has considered the following: • technical justification for defining the limiting event for the consequence analysis, given known plant process systems that are expected to contain radioactive materials • all systems with potential sources of radioactivity contained