Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 5d997769-3bfb-4f92-89d6-191eb84038b3
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 5 - March 2007
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550094.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
lear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Reproduction and Distribution Services Section, or by fax to (301) 415-2289; or by email to DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov. Electronic copies of this section are available through the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0800/, or in the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under Accession # ML070550094. NUREG-0800 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STANDARD REVIEW PLAN BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION 7-5 GUIDANCE ON SPURIOUS WITHDRAWALS OF SINGLE CONTROL RODS IN PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Organization responsible for the review of instrumentation and controls Secondary - None A. Background Operating experience with pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and subsequent reviews of PWR designs with regard to the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 20 and 25 have shown that single failures can cause inadvertent single-rod withdrawals. The intent of this branch technical position is to provide specific guidance toward an acceptable interpretation and application of GDC 20 and 25. 1Reactivity control systems include interlocks within the system that limit the consequences of control system failures. BTP 7-5-2 Revision 5 - March 2007 B. Branch Technical Position GDC 20 requires that the protection system shall be designed to initiate automatically the operation of appropriate systems, including the reactivity control systems, to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences. GDC 25 requires that these limits shall not be exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity control systems, such as accidental withdrawal (not ejection) of control rods. Within the context of GDC 20 the staff considers operator error to be an anticipated operational occurrence, in addition to