Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a28650b3-fa03-428d-a2bd-4a27f583710b
Document Type: srp
Title: NUREG-0800
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070484.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 6
Section ID: 6
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
R 50.34(f)(2)(xvii) (for those applicants subject to 10 CFR 50.34(f)), instrumentation 56 capable of operating in the post-accident environment should be provided to monitor the containment atmosphere pressure and temperature and the suppression pool water level and temperature following an accident. The instrumentation should have adequate range, accuracy, and response to assure that the above parameters can be tracked and recorded throughout the course of an accident. Item II.F.1 of NUREG-0737 and NUREG-0718 (References 11 and 12) , and Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water 57 Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following An Accident," should be followed. k. In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(A)(1), applicants subject to this article should evaluate an accident that releases hydrogen generated from a 100% fuel clad metal-water reaction. The evaluation should demonstrate that the appropriate articles for service level C limits (considering pressure and dead load only), for either concrete or steel containments, from ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, are met. In addition to the containment pressurization caused directly by this accident, the increase in pressure from either hydrogen burning in containment or initiation of the post-accident inerting system, if installed, should be analyzed. Unless specifically known, the post-accident inerting gas should be assumed to be carbon dioxide. 58 l. In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(3)(v)(B)(1), applicants subject to this article should evaluate the containment design's capability to withstand inadvertent full actuation of the post-accident inerting system, if installed. The peak pressure caused by inadvertent actuation of the post-accident inerting system should be less than the containment design pressure.59 Technical Rationale:60 The technical rationale for application of the above acceptance criteria to pressure-suppression type