Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: f2ddec6c-0cce-4223-b813-233678ee07d0
Document Type: srp
Title: DIVERSE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1515/ML15159B171.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7.8
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
y Systems of Nuclear Power Plants,” which endorses IEEE Std 7-4.3.2, “IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” 7.8-6 Draft Revision 6 – August 2015 III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The reviewer will select material from the procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case. Typical reasons for a non-uniform emphasis are the introduction of new design features or the use in the design of features previously reviewed and found acceptable. These review procedures are based on the identified SRP acceptance criteria. For deviations from these acceptance criteria, the staff should review the applicant‘s evaluation of how the proposed alternatives provide an acceptable method of complying with the relevant NRC requirements identified in Subsection II. SRP Section 7.1 describes the general procedures to be followed in reviewing any I&C system. This part of SRP Section 7.8 highlights specific topics that should be emphasized in the diverse I&C systems review. The diverse I&C systems review should address the applicable topics identified in SRP Table 7-1. SRP Appendix 7.1-A describes review methods for each topic. Major design considerations that should be emphasized in the review of the diverse I&C systems are identified below. • Design basis - Design bases should be described in the SAR for each diverse I&C system. The design bases should, as a minimum, address the following topics: - The specific design requirements identified in 10 CFR 50.62, as applicable, and any other applicable design requirements. - Identification of conditions that require protective action by the diverse I&C systems. For DAS, these events are identified in the applicant or licensee’s D3 analysis. For ATWS mitigation systems, these events are limited to anticipated operational occurrences, defined in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, “Definitions and Explanations,” as conditions of normal operation that are expected