Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 69433f0d-1a24-4cf6-b8b9-31109f9f51c5
Document Type: srp
Title: FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0631/ML063190014.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
n of safe-shutdown capability and the prevention of radiological release, can be readily integrated in the planning and design phase for the plant. For applications submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 52, design elements of the FPP are addressed in the DC process. During the DC process, action items are identified that should be addressed by the COL applicant. These commitments include action items to establish the FPP for protection of SSCs important to safety as well as the procedures, equipment, and personnel necessary to implement the program. These commitments include, but are not limited to, updating the fire hazards analysis to address final plant design and administrative program elements (e.g., licensee fire protection staffing and organization, quality assurance, procedures, fire prevention programs, and training); fire brigade and emergency response capability; the final design of fire protection systems and features; and the design and analysis of post-fire safe-shutdown capability. The review of COL applications should also consider the guidance to applicants provided in RG 1.206, “Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition).” 1. Enhanced Fire Protection Criteria Based on operational experience with existing reactors and insights from examination of internal fire events, the staff determined that fire protection for safe-shutdown capability should be enhanced for new reactor designs. The enhanced fire protection criteria were initially proposed to the Commission in SECY-90-016. This criteria was extended to the review of passive LWR designs in SECY-93-087. These criteria are as follows: Evolutionary advanced light water reactor (ALWR) designers must ensure that safe shutdown can be achieved assuming that all equipment in any one fire area (excluding the control room and reactor containment) will be rendered inoperable by fire and that re-entry into the fire area for repairs and operator actions is not possible. Because