Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 67e3fd64-e6a4-4522-b90f-4184c2f5b357
Document Type: srp
Title: FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070540139.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 4
Section ID: 4.6
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria." The staff recognizes that the review of ITAAC cannot be completed until after the rest of this portion of the application has been reviewed against acceptance criteria contained in this SRP section. Furthermore, the staff reviews the ITAAC to ensure that all SSCs in this area of review are identified and addressed as appropriate in accordance with SRP Section 14.3. 4. COL Action Items and Certification Requirements and Restrictions. For a DC application, the review will also address COL action items and requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters). For a COL application referencing a DC, a COL applicant must address COL action items (referred to as COL license information in certain DCs) included in the referenced DC. Additionally, a COL applicant must address requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters) included in the referenced DC. Review Interfaces Other SRP sections interface with this section as follows: 1. The review encompasses all transients and accidents in Chapter 15 of the safety analysis report (SAR) that require reactivity control systems to function. The reviewer ascertains that the reactivity and response characteristics of the reactivity control system are conservative with respect to the parameters assumed in the Chapter 15 analyses. The Chapter 15 review verifies that no credit has been taken for the recirculation flow control system (RFCS) (in boiling-water reactors (BWRs)) to mitigate any accident. (Although the RFCS controls reactor power level over a limited range, it is not required for shutdown.) In addition, the reviewer examines the operation of the RFCS to confirm that a malfunction or failure of the system will not degrade the capabilities of plant safety systems or lead to plant conditions more severe than those considered in the accident analyses (e.g., by determining the effects of a failure of the system following a