Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 2cb61281-91f4-400a-8eda-41e187e51d77
Document Type: srp
Title: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (PWR)
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070570007.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 10
Section ID: 10.4.9
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
temperature and the system design conforming to the guidance of BTP 10-1 as it relates to AFW pump drive and power supply diversity. In addition, the recommendations of NUREG-0611 and NUREG-0635 shall also be met. TMI Action Plan item II.E.1.1 of NUREG 0737 and 10 CFR 50.34(f)(1)(ii) for applicants subject to 10 CFR 50.34(f) require an AFWS reliability analysis. An acceptable AFWS should have an unreliability in the range of 10-4 to 10-5 per demand exclusive of station blackout scenarios. Compensating factors (e.g., other methods of accomplishing AFWS safety functions of the AFWS or other reliable methods for cooling the reactor core during abnormal conditions) may be considered to justify a larger AFWS unavailability. 6. Acceptance of GDC 45 is based on provision of information describing how the design of the AFW system permits inservice inspection of safety-related components and equipment. 7. Acceptance of GDC 46 is based on provision of information describing how the design of the AFW system, including instrumentation, permits periodic operational functional testing of safety-related components and equipment. 8. Acceptance of 10 CFR 50.62 is based on design provisions for automatic initiation of the AFW system in an ATWS. 9. Acceptance of 10 CFR 50.63 is based on conformance with the guidance of RG 1.155 as related to the AFWS design. Technical Rationale 10.4.9-8 Revision 3 - March 2007 The technical rationale for application of these acceptance criteria to the areas of review addressed by this SRP section is discussed in the following paragraphs: 1. GDC 2 requires that the design of structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety withstand the effects of earthquakes. RG 1.29 position C.1 identifies those SSCs that should be designed as seismic Category I to remain functional following a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). RG 1.29 position C.2 states criteria for systems with continued functions not required following an SSE but the failure of which