Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 307194c1-0b51-4a4d-bd65-440bb260c4bb
Document Type: srp
Title: PROCESS AND POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEMS
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052350552.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.3.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
tion valves in the PSS and PAS are designed to close on a containment isolation signal (CIS) or safety injection signal (SIS). Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB), under SRP Section 7.3, verifies that an override capability exists for the containment isolation valves which will be used for post- accident sampling of the reactor coolant, containment sump water, and con- tainment atmosphere without clearing the CIS or SIS. Power Systems Branch (PSB), under SRP Section 8.3.1, ensures that power supplies shall be avail- able to all remotely operated valves in the PAS, after detection of an accident which requires containment isolation, assuming a concurrent loss of offsite power. Equipment Qualification Branch (EQB), under SRP Section 3.11, verifies that those valves which are inaccessible during an accident are environmentally qualified to ensure operability under accident conditions. Auxiliary System Branch (ASB), under SRP Section 3.6.1, reviews the design with respect to the effects of externally or internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with postulated pipe breaks in high energy fluid systems or leakage cracks in moderate energy fluid systems. For those areas of review identified above as being reviewed as part of the primary review responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria necessary for the review and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section of the corresponding primary branch. II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA CMEB acceptance criteria are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following regulations: A. 10 CFR Part 20, § 20.1(c) as it relates to making every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable. B. General Design Criterion 1 as it relates to the design of the PSS and PAS and components to standards commensurate with the importance of their safety functions. C. General Design Criterion 2 as it relates to the PSS