Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: d0e1f2cb-f296-449d-9f9a-85a571917a44
Document Type: srp
Title: EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052340709.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 6
Section ID: 6.3
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
stems, the reviewer confirms that instrumentation and controls are available to provide sufficient information in the control room to determine that adequate core cooling is being provided. c. Confirm that automatic actuation and remote-manual valve controls are capable of performing the functions required, that suitable interlocks are provided, which do not impair separation of power trains or inhibit the required valve motions, and that instrumenta- tion and controls have sufficient redundancy to satisfy the single failure criterion. 22. Analyses are provided by the applicant in Chapter 15 of the SAR to assess the capability of the ECCS to meet functional requirements. These analyses are reviewed by the RSB, as described in SRP Section 15.6.5, to determine conformance to the acceptance criteria for ECCS. However, the following portions of the review of ECCS response in loss-of-coolant accidents are performed by the RSB reviewer under this SRP section: a. The lower limit of break size for which ECCS operation is required is established; i.e., the maximum break size for which normal reactor coolant makeup systems can maintain reactor pressure and coolant level is determined. The capability of the ECCS to actuate and perform at this lower limit of break size is confirmed. b. The reviewer confirms that the analyses take into account a variety of potential locations for postulated pipe breaks, including ECCS injection lines. c. The reviewer confirms that the analyses take into account a variety of single active failures. The reviewer should keep in mind that different single failures may be limiting, depending on the particular break location and break size postulated. d. The ECCS component response times (e.g., for valves, pumps, power supply) are reviewed to confirm that they are within the delay times used in the accident analyses. e. The ECCS design adequacy for all modes of reactor operation (e.g., full power, low power, hot standby, cold shutdown, partial loop