Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: c3be7591-d074-48a8-bb9c-4dcdfccd0ddf
Document Type: srp
Title: Draft Revision 6 – August 2015
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1515/ML15159A959.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
nts and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” General Design Criterion (GDC) 21, “Protection System Reliability and Testability,” requires in part that the protection system be designed for high functional reliability and in-service testability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed. It also requires a design that permits periodic testing of its functioning when the reactor is in operation, including the capability to test channels independently to determine failures and losses of redundancy that may have occurred. GDC 22, “Protection System Independence,” requires in part that the protection system be designed to assure that the effects of natural phenomena and of normal operating, maintenance and testing do not result in loss of protection function. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” Criterion XII, “Control of Measuring and Test Equipment,” requires in part that measures be established to assure that measuring and testing devices used in activities affecting quality are properly controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified periods to maintain accuracy within necessary limits. BTP 7-17-3 Draft Revision 6 – August 2015 2. Relevant Guidance RG 1.22, “Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions,” describes acceptable methods of including actuation devices in the periodic tests of the protection system during reactor operations. RG 1.47, “Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems,” describes an acceptable method of complying with the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971 with regard to indicating the inoperable status of a portion of the protection system, systems actuated or controlled by the safety system, or auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features. IEEE Std 603-1991, Clause 5.8.3, gives the equivalent requirements for safety systems. RG 1.53, “Application of the Single-Failure