Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: fde45fa1-e4ca-4005-b5f6-d1bbefc60c73
Document Type: srp
Title: RELIABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070754.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 17
Section ID: 17.4
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
n expert panel). The D-RAP should specify the following: (1) A process for identifying and prioritizing SSCs that is based on risk significance; (2) The list of SSCs designated as risk significant for the standard design certification; and (3) A process for determining dominant failure modes that is based on industry experience, analytical models, and applicable requirements. c. The manner in which those portions of the D-RAP that apply to the standard design certification will be implemented. The staff will limit its review of a standard design certification application to: (1) developing and implementing the D-RAP within the scope of standard design certification, (2) developing and implementing the D-RAP to be used in a COL application, and (3) providing the information necessary for a COL applicant to develop operational reliability assurance activities for integration into the maintenance and quality assurance programs. 2. Combined Operating License (COL) Application D-RAP Requirements - A COL applicant referencing a standard design certification will be responsible for augmenting and completing the remainder of the D-RAP for the standard design certification to include site-specific information and to identify and prioritize the risk-significant SSCs. The D-RAP for a COL application that references a standard design certification should include the following: a. The scope, purpose, objectives, and essential elements of the D-RAP. b. The remainder of the D-RAP, including site-specific design information and those aspects of reliability assurance that will be accomplished prior to fuel load (i.e., procurement, fabrication, construction, and preoperational testing phases). c. Identification and prioritization of risk-significant SSCs, including anticipated operations, maintenance, and surveillance activities. This process should be based on probabilistic or deterministic considerations, as well as other possible sources of information (e.g., standard design