Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 081a217e-3707-4233-964d-398c43368dd2
Document Type: srp
Title: MAINTENANCE RULE
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0708/ML070810004.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 17
Section ID: 17.6
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
., EOPs) after the license is issued. The description of the MR scoping procedure should address: I. The criteria in accordance with paragraph 50.65(b)(1) for including Safety-related SSCs relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events to: (a) Protect the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; or (b) Provide the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or (c) Provide the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposure comparable to 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. ii. The criteria in accordance with paragraph 50.65(b)(2) for including non-safety-related SSCs: (a) That are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR); (b) That are used in Emergency Operating Procedures, meaning those that are directly used to mitigate the accident or transient (explicitly mentioned in the EOPs or in steps of referenced procedures needed to accomplish the EOP step) and those whose use is implied and that provide a significant portion of the mitigating function. In addition, the applicant should describe the 17.6-5 March 2007 process and procedures for identifying SSCs explicitly mentioned in the EOPs (including those mentioned in referenced procedures), but that are proposed not to be included in the MR scope. The process for exclusion certain SSCs from scope should address the bases for their inclusion in the EOPs to begin with, the portion of any and all mitigating functions they provide, the expectation of their reliability in EOP application(s), and the means by which operators are alerted (e.g., procedural warnings, cautions, disclaimers, signs, etc.) to reduced assurance or expectation of those SSCs’ reliability. (c) Whose failure could prevent safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their safety-related functions. Systems and system interdependencies should be discussed, including the