Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 1e026b4f-5a81-43c8-9dd3-fef9bb4f9c3d
Document Type: srp
Title: INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES (INSIDE CONTAINMENT)
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070372.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3.5.1.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
striking equipment important to safety.32 The reviewer determines that controls are provided to ensure that unsecured maintenance equipment, including equipment required for maintenance and equipment undergoing maintenance, will be removed from containment prior to operation, moved to a location where it is not a potential hazard to SSC important to safety, or seismically restrained to prevent it from becoming a missile.33 The following review procedures are applicable to new applications: 1. The reviewer determines that the statistical significance of an identified missile can be evaluated utilizing a probability analysis. Once a potential missile is identified, its statistical significance is determined by calculating the probability of missile occurrence. If this probability is less than 10 per year, the missile is not considered significant. If -7 the probability of occurrence is greater than 10 per year, the probability that it will -7 impact a significant target is determined. If the product of these two probabilities is less than 10 per year, the missile is not considered significant. If the above product is -7 greater than 10 per year, the probability of significant damage is determined. If the -7 combined probability (product of all three) is less than 10 per year, the missile is not -7 considered significant. If the combined probability is greater than 10 per year, missile -7 protection of SSC important to safety should be provided by one or more of the six methods listed above.34 2. The reviewer determines if the separation analysis can be used to demonstrate adequate protection for SSC important to safety from missiles which may be generated inside containment. The reviewer should utilize the results of any high-energy line separation analysis review performed by EMEB for use in this evaluation. If an applicant uses spatial separation to justify adequate protection from missiles inside containment, then that evaluation should be consistent with that