Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 825fe003-d78e-433f-8e46-8e2cb989ac88
Document Type: srp
Title: FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052340589.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 4
Section ID: 4.6
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
4. In coordination with the MEB, the ASB reviews the functional tests of the CRDS as related to rod insertion and withdrawal and scram operation and time. The reviewers check the elements of the test program to ensure that all required thermal-hydraulic conditions have been included for all postulated operating conditions. Experimental verification of system operation where a single failure has been assumed should be included in the test program, e.g., accumulator leakage for hydraulic CRDS and stuck rod operation. 5. The reactivity control systems are evaluated to verify that redundant reactivity control systems are not vulnerable to common mode failures. The ASB identifies the common mode failures and the ICSB, MEB, and CMEB assist the ASB reviewer in connection with their responsibilities in SRP Sections 7.4, 3.9.4, and 9.3.4 or 9.3.5, respectively. Upon request from the primary reviewer, the coordinated review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in subsection I. The primary reviewer obtains and uses such input as required to assure that this review procedure is complete. IV. EVALUATIONS FINDINGS The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided and that his evaluation supports conclusions of the following type, to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report: The functional design of the control rod drive system has been reviewed to confirm that the system has the capability to shut down the reactor with appropriate margin during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. For PWRs, the CVCS augments the CRDS to maintain safe shutdown. The scope of review included process flow diagrams, layout drawings, piping and instrumentation diagrams, and descriptive information for the systems and for the supporting systems, that are essential for operation of the system. 4.6-4 4Rev 1 - July 1981 The review has determined the adequacy of the applicant's proposed design criteria, design basis and safety classification of the