Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 1dbfaffa-d13d-47e0-9536-f667eb85f6b8
Document Type: srp
Title: CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052350091.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 10
Section ID: 10.4.7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ary review responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria necessary for the review and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP sections of the corresponding primary branches. II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Acceptability of the condensate and feedwater system, as described in the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR), is based on the specific requirements of General DesigntCriteria and the positions of regulatory guides. Listed below are the specific criteria as they relate to the CFS. 1. General Design Criterion 2, as related to the system being capable of withstanding the effects of earthquakes. Acceptance is based on meeting the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C.1 for safety-related portions, and Position C.2 for nonsafety-related portions. 2. General Design Criterion 4, as related to the dynamic effects associated with possible fluid flow instabilities (e.g., water hammers) during normal plant operation as well as during upset or accident conditions. Acceptance is based on meeting the guidance contained in the attached Branch Technical Position ASB 10-2 for reducing the potential for water hammers in steam generators and on meeting the guidance related to feedwater control induced water hammer. 3. General Design Criterion 5, as related to the capability of shared systems and components important to safety to perform required safety functions. 4. General Design Criterion 44, as it relates to: a. The capability to transfer heat loads from the reactor system to a heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions. 10.4.7-3 Rev. 3 - April 1984 b. Redundancy of components so that under accident conditions the safety function can be performed assuming a single active component failure. (This may be coincident with the loss of offsite power for certain events.) c. The capability to isolate components, subsystems, or piping if required so that the system safety function will be maintained. 5. General Design Criterion