Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 92d817ac-3ce3-4cf7-8d1a-627e8242fbf2
Document Type: srp
Title: PLANT DESIGN FOR PROTECTION AGAINST POSTULATED PIPING FAILURES
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070312.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3.6.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
(diesels and batteries) will remain operable throughout the event. 14. Design diagrams and drawings of the steam and feedwater lines, including branch lines showing the routing from containment to the turbine building should be provided. The drawings should show elevations and include the location relative to the piping runs of safety-related equipment, including ventilation equipment, intakes, and ducts. 15. A discussion should be provided of the potential for flooding of safety-related equipment in the event of failure of a feedwater line or any other line carrying high energy fluid. 16. A description should be provided of the quality control and inspection programs that will be required or have been utilized for piping systems outside containment. 17. If leak detection equipment is to be used in the proposed modifications, a discussion of its capabilities should be provided. 18. A summary should be provided of the emergency procedures that would be followed after a pipe break accident, including the automatic and manual operations required to place the reactor unit(s) in a cold shutdown condition. The estimated times following the accident for all equipment and personnel operational actions should be included in the procedure summary. 19. A description should be provided of the seismic and quality classification of the high energy fluid piping systems, including the steam and feedwater piping that runs near structures, systems, or components important to safety. 20. A description should be provided of the assumptions, methods, and results of analyses, including steam generator blowdown, used to calculate the pressure and temperature transients in compartments, pipe tunnels, intermediate buildings, and the turbine building following a pipe rupture in these areas. The equipment assumed to function in the analyses should be identified and the capability of systems required to function to meet a single active component failure should be described. DRAFT Rev. 3 -