Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 05a851a6-07ff-41b4-8528-a032ba433e04
Document Type: srp
Title: FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0327/ML032740044.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
egrity is maintained (i.e., fuel design limits are not exceeded). For alternative or dedicated shutdown, reactor coolant system process variables should be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal ac power, and fission product boundary integrity should not be affected. Safe shutdown goals and objectives for advanced reactor designs are essentially the same as those for operating reactors except as modified in Appendix B of this BTP. 2.2 Safe Shutdown Systems For operating reactors, systems and components necessary for safe shutdown are identified in Regulatory Guide 1.189. Structures, systems, and components necessary for safe shutdown of advanced reactor designs may differ somewhat in their design and operation; however, the basic shutdown functions are the same. The applicant or licensee fire protection program should be reviewed to determine if the structures, systems, and components identified in the safe shutdown analysis are adequate to accomplish the safe shutdown objectives. Specific capabilities to be evaluated include reactivity control, control of reactor coolant level and pressure, and decay heat removal. Inherent in this capability is the necessary supporting systems (e.g., cooling water, makeup water, and electrical power) as well as the instrumentation and monitoring capability to verify proper system operation and to verify that shutdown conditions are achieved and maintained. 2.3 Safe Shutdown Analysis The fire protection program should include an analysis that demonstrates the structures, systems and components identified in Section C.2.2 above can accomplish their respective post- Revision 4 - October 2003 17 fire safe shutdown function. The safe shutdown analysis should demonstrate that redundant safe shutdown systems and components are adequately separated such that one success path of safe shutdown capability will be available post-fire. Fire barriers or automatic suppression, or both, may be used to protect redundant systems or