Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: b5ea3f55-f54e-45cf-b921-3944d12b4ce2
Document Type: srp
Title: REACTOR AUXILIARY COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052350545.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.2.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ntified above as being reviewed as part of the primary review responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria neces- sary for the review and their methods of application are contained in the referenced SRP section of the corresponding primary branch. II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Acceptability of the designs of cooling water systems as described in the applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR), including related sections of Chapters 2 and 3 of the SAR, is based on specific general design criteria and regulatory guides, and on independent calculations and staff judgments with respect to system functions and component selection. The design of a CWS is acceptable if the integrated system design is in accordance with the following requirements and recommendations: 1. General Design Criterion 2, as related to structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of earth- quakes. Acceptance is based on meeting the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C.1 for safety-related portions and Position C.2 for non- safety-related portions. 9.2.2-3 Rev. 2 - April 1984 2. General Design Criterion 4, as related to dynamic effects associated with flow instabilities and attendant loads (i.e., water hammer) during normal plant operation as well as during upset or accident conditions. 3. General Design Criterion 5, as related to shared systems and components important to safety being capable of performing required safety functions. 4. General Design Criterion 44, as its relates to: a. The capability to transfer heat loads from safety-related structures, systems, and components to a heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions. b. Component redundancy so that safety functions can be performed assum- ing a single active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power. c. The capability to isolate components, systems, or piping, if required, so that the system safety function will not be compromised. d. Task