Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: d0743544-9964-4f40-acba-386523f70c7f
Document Type: srp
Title: SPENT FUEL POOL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550038.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.4.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
le regulatory position is C.2. For RG 1.52 rev 3, the applicable regulatory position is C.3. For RG 1.140 rev 1, the applicable regulatory positions are C.1 and C.2. For RG 1.140 rev 2, the applicable regulatory positions are C.2 and C.3. 4. For GDC 61, acceptance is based on the guidance of RG 1.13 as to the design of the ventilation system for the spent fuel storage facility, Position C.4. Technical Rationale The technical rationale for application of these acceptance criteria to the areas of review addressed by this SRP section is discussed in the following paragraphs: 1. GDC 2, as related to the system being capable of withstanding the effects of earthquakes, requires that SSCs important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of a design-basis earthquake without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The function of the SFPAVS is to provide ventilation, to permit personnel access, and to control the concentration of airborne radioactive material in the spent fuel pool equipment areas during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences and after postulated fuel handling accidents. The requirement specified in GDC 2 ensures that, during and after a design basis earthquake, the SFPAVS will remain functional so that any fuel damage will not result in potential offsite doses in excess of 5 mSv (0.5 rem) to the whole body or an equivalent dose to any part of the body. 9.4.2-5 Revision 3 - March 2007 Meeting the GDC 2 requirement provides assurance that the SFPAVS will not fail to operate as designed, thus protecting against the uncontrolled release of airborne radioactive materials in the event of a design-basis earthquake. 2. GDC 5 requires that SSCs important to safety shall not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform safety functions, including, in the event of an accident in one unit, an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining