Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: c7a40fcc-fc9d-4eb2-ad86-f9f5b0f04c82
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking:  Technical Specifications (Rev. 2)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1920/ML19206A489.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.177
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ing with current TS requirements based on the operating history of the plant or industry in general. For example, in specific instances, the repair time needed may be longer than the CT defined in the TS. The required surveillance may lead to plant transients, result in unnecessary equipment wear, result in excessive radiation exposure to plant personnel, or place unnecessary administrative burdens on plant personnel that are not justified by the safety significance of the surveillance requirement. In some cases, the change may provide operational flexibility; in those cases, the change might allow an increased allocation of the plant personnel’s time to more safety-significant aspects. In some cases, licensees may determine that there is a common need for a TS change among several licensees and that it is beneficial to request the changes as a group rather than individually. Group submittals can be advantageous when the equipment being considered in the change is similar across all plants in the group. The submittal must still provide plant-specific information with regard to the engineering evaluations described in Staff Regulatory Position C.2. However, the group may be able to draw generic conclusions from a compilation of the plant-specific data. In addition, there will be benefits from cross comparison of the results of the plant-specific evaluations. 2. Element 2: Perform Engineering Analysis As part of the second element, the licensee should evaluate the proposed TS change with regard to the key principles that (1) current regulations are met, (2) adequate defense in depth is maintained, (3) sufficient safety margins are maintained, and (4) proposed increases in risk are small and are consistent with the intent of the Commission’s policy statement on safety goals for the operation of nuclear power plants. The staff expects licensees to provide strong technical bases for any TS change. The technical bases should be rooted in deterministic engineering and