Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 97b395a8-6e49-47d5-a249-28113b429fe3
Document Type: srp
Title: MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE ANALYSIS FOR POSTULATED SECONDARY
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0706/ML070620010.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 6
Section ID: 6.2.1.4
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
omputer codes that the responsible reviewing organization for the subject application finds acceptable may be used to compute mass and energy releases from steam and feedwater line break accidents. 3. Single-Failure Analyses. Steam and feedwater line break analyses should assume a single active failure in the steam or feedwater line isolation provisions or feedwater pumps to maximize the containment peak pressure and temperature. For the assumed failure of a safety-grade steam or feedwater line isolation valve, operation of nonsafety- grade equipment may be relied upon as a backup to the safety-grade equipment. In this event, the reviewer will confer with the responsible organizations for SRP Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.6.2, and 10.4.9 to ensure a consistent staff position regarding the acceptability of the design criteria for the nonsafety-grade equipment. 6.2.1.4-5 Revision 2 - March 2007 Technical Rationale The technical rationale for application of these acceptance criteria to the areas of review addressed by this SRP section is discussed in the following paragraphs: 1. GDC 50 requires the containment structure and associated heat removal systems be designed to accommodate, without exceeding the design leakage rate and with sufficient margin, the calculated pressure and temperature conditions resulting from any loss of coolant. SRP Section 6.2.1.4 applies the requirements of this GDC to postulated PWR secondary system pipe ruptures to assure that mass and energy inputs are appropriately conservative. A secondary system pipe rupture releases a significant amount of energy which potentially could damage the containment structure or associated systems. Containment, therefore, must be designed to definitively withstand this accident. Meeting the requirements of GDC 50 will ensure that containment integrity is maintained under the most severe secondary system pipe rupture, thus precluding the release of radioactivity to the environment. III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The