Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: b10297dd-9822-4243-8665-c41d92699ea5
Document Type: srp
Title: RISK-INFORMED, PERFORMANCE-BASED FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0925/ML092590527.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
05 requires the applicant to evaluate fire-induced failure modes resulting from spurious operations and signals, as a part of its safe shutdown circuit analysis. NEI 00-01, Revision 1, “Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis,” and RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 3.3 provide one acceptable approach to circuit analysis for a plant implementing an FPP under 10 CFR 50.48(c). NEI 04-02, Section B.2.1, provides one acceptable approach for identifying MSOs when analyzing the post-fire safe-shutdown circuits. The description of the MSO analysis should contain sufficient information concerning methods, tools, and acceptance criteria used to enable the staff to determine the acceptability of the licensee’s methodology. The analysis should generally be performed and arranged by fire area, although in some cases an alternative spatial approach may prove to be more practical. If an expert panel process is used, it should be documented with results clearly presented. The staff will verify that the applicant has evaluated MSOs in conformance with Regulatory Position 3.3 of RG 1.205 and the referenced NEI 00-01 and NEI 04-02 sections. III.3.1.3 Transition of Operator Manual Actions to Recovery Actions (RAs) Use of RAs, as defined in NFPA 805, Section 1.6.52, to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria, does not meet the deterministic requirements in Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. The staff has provided a definition of “primary control station” in Regulatory Position 2.4 of RG 1.205, which will result in some OMAs being classified as RAs and other OMAs not being so classified. OMAs that transition to RAs that are used to demonstrate the availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria, whether or not currently allowed or previously approved in the plant’s existing licensing basis, automatically shall imply use of the PB approach as outlined in NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4. The staff will