Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 1d43f435-1e75-4f07-b818-d3b35d75812d
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Qualification of Safety-Related Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power Plants
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0825/ML082530205.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.211
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
Management and Budget (OMB) approved under OMB control number 3150-0011. RG 1.211, Page 2 The NRC may neither conduct nor sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, an information collection request or requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number. B. DISCUSSION The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Standard 383-2003, “IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Electric Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” was published June 10, 2004 (Ref. 2). The standard was developed by the Working group on Cables (Subcommittee (SC 2.4)) of the Nuclear Power Engineering Committee of the IEEE and was approved by the IEEE Standards Association on December 12, 2003 (Reaffirmed in 2008). It provides general requirements, direction, and methods for qualifying safety-related cables, field splices, factory splices, and factory rework for service in nuclear power plants. Categories of cables covered include those used for power, control, and instrumentation services, including signal and communication cables. Most importantly, IEEE Standard 383-2003 requires that the safety-related cables and field splices must meet or exceed specified performance requirements throughout their installed life and be subjected to a quality assurance program that includes design, qualification, and production quality control. The objectives of equipment qualification are to ensure that safety-related cables (single, multiconductor, and multiplex, as well as coaxial, triaxial, and twinaxial) and field splices can be demonstrated to perform their safety functions under postulated DBEs, and that no failure mechanism exists that could lead to common-cause failures under postulated service conditions. It is the degradation over time, followed by exposure to the environmental extremes of temperature, pressure, humidity, radiation, mechanical stress, or chemical spray (or a combination thereof) resulting