Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: e89cc26c-d19a-42b8-818a-fb598c05ccee
Document Type: srp
Title: PLANT DESIGN FOR PROTECTION AGAINST POSTULATED PIPING FAILURES IN FLUID
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052340548.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3.6.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
hip restraints and a summary of number and location of all restraints in each system. 6. The procedures that will be used to evaluate the structural adequacy of Category I structures and to design new seismic Category I structures should be provided including: 3.6.1-18 Rev. 2 - October 1990 (a) The method of evaluating stresses, e.g., the working stress method and/or the ultimate strength method that will be used; (b) The allowable design stresses and/or strains; and (c) The load factors and the load combinations. 7. The structural design loads, including the pressure and temperature transients, the dead, live and equipment loads and the pipe and equipment static, thermal, and dynamic reactions should be provided. 8. Seismic Category I structural elements such as floors, interior walls, exterior walls, building penetrations and the buildings as a whole should be analyzed for eventual reversal of loads due to the postulated accident. 9. If new openings are to be provided in existing structures, the capabilities of the modified structures to carry the design loads should be demonstrated. 10. Verification that failure of any structure, including non-seismic Category I structures, caused by the accident, will not cause failure of any other structure in a manner to adversely affect: (a) Mitigation of the consequences of the accidents; and (b) Capability to bring the unit(s) to a cold shutdown condition. 11. Verification that rupture of a pipe carrying high energy fluid will not directly or indirectly result in: (a) Loss of required redundancy in any portion of the protection system (as defined in IEEE-279), Class IE electric system (as defined in IEEE-308), engineered safety feature equipment, cable penetrations, or their interconnecting cables required to mitigate the consequences of that accident and place. the reactor(s) in a cold shutdown condition; or (b) Environmentally induced failures caused by a leak or rupture of the pipe which would not of itself result in