Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 05a851a6-07ff-41b4-8528-a032ba433e04
Document Type: srp
Title: FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0327/ML032740044.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
the large uncertainty associated with its estimation, it is generally not acceptable for a licensee to base a change that results in a relaxation to the fire protection program solely on the predicted low likelihood of a fire occurring, unless the area impacted by the change is inerted (e.g. BWR drywell). Fire frequency is considered when assessing the significance of an inspection finding through the Significance Determination Process (See Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix F). Concerning item (b), if for example, in the original plant configuration and licensing basis a fire pump was originally credited as rated for 3000 GPM at 120 psi, however the hydraulically most demanding plant area that is important to safety only requires 2500 GPM at 100 psi, the change to the lower flow and pressure rating would be acceptable, or if a barrier separating fire areas is credited in the licensing basis as having a rating of three hours, however consistent with the guidance provided in GL 86-10, the licensee has a valid analysis that provides reasonable assurance that a two hour rating is adequate to withstand the hazards in the area, it would be considered an acceptable change. Considering barriers that separate redundant shutdown trains in the same fire area a change in the rating from three hours to one hour would typically not be acceptable unless automatic suppression was provided in the area under consideration. Concerning item (c) replacement of fire protection systems or features with operator actions is typically not acceptable where redundant divisions required for safe shutdown are located in the same fire area unless alternative/dedicated shutdown capability is provided. The use of manual operator actions for alternative/dedicated shutdown capability should ensure that the additional burden placed on the operations personnel is small and the time period to perform the manual actions is not critical to plant safety. The substitution of repairs in lieu of