Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 96afb1d6-6ce9-41e4-b4ec-1fc7747bc0b2
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 8 – January 2021
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2033/ML20339A647.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-05
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
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CFR Title: 

Content:
e FSAR or the LAR for the limiting events applicable to the proposed system or component. d. Common resources shared by proposed system(s), other systems, and manual operator actions are controlled by prioritization of commands consistent with the guidance in DI&C-ISG-04. The basis for the prioritization should be documented. BTP 7-19-29 Revision 8 – January 2021 3.3 Consequences of a Common-Cause Failure May Be Acceptable If the applicant has not been eliminated from further consideration using the process in Section B.3.1 of this BTP and has not credited a diverse means to accomplish the vulnerabilities using the methods in Section B.3.2, then the reviewer should verify the application demonstrates that consequences of residual identified CCF remain acceptable. In this case, the reviewer should consider the applicant’s analysis demonstrates that, should the CCF occur, the facility will remain within the acceptance criteria defined in the FSAR or the LAR for the limiting events applicable to the proposed DI&C system or component. For each event analyzed in the accident analysis, the applicant may perform the D3 assessment using either best estimate methods (i.e., using realistic assumptions to analyze the plant’s response to DBEs) or conservative methods (i.e., design-basis analysis). The reviewer should consider whether the D3 assessment shows that the consequences of potential CCFs of the proposed system, or of portions of the proposed system, are acceptable. Acceptance Criteria If the acceptance criteria below are met, the reviewer should conclude that the application shows that the consequences of potential CCFs of the proposed system or of portions of the proposed system are acceptable. The acceptance criteria are as follows: a. For those postulated spurious operations that have not been fully mitigated or eliminated from further consideration, the consequences of spurious operation of safety-related or NSR components are bounded by the acceptance