Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 23a67737-6e7e-4dfc-9090-dca6a186a7dc
Document Type: srp
Title: RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MAIN STEAM LINE FAILURES
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070679.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.1.5
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
tem 4 above. The breathing rates and dose conversion factors are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.4 (Ref. 8).37 10. Review of dose calculations. The whole-body and thyroid doses calculated by the staff and by the applicant are compared with the acceptance criteria stated in subsection II of this appendix. If the doses calculated by the staff are not within the exposure guidelines, then the staff will reduce, as necessary, any of the following plant-specific technical specifications: the primary and/or secondary equilibrium iodine concentrations, maximum primary coolant iodine activity (preaccident spike), or primary-to-secondary system leak rate. For standard design certification reviews under 10 CFR Part 52, the procedures above should be followed, as modified by the procedures in SRP Section 14.3 (proposed), to verify that the design set forth in the standard safety analysis report, including inspections, tests, analysis, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC), site interface requirements and combined license action items, meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II. SRP Section 14.3 (proposed) contains procedures for the review of certified design material (CDM) for the standard design, including the site parameters, interface criteria, and ITAAC.38 IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided by the applicant and that the applicant's analysis and the staff's independent calculations support conclusions of the following type, to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report at the operating license OL or COL39 stage: The staff concludes that the distances to the exclusion area and to the low population zone outer boundaries for the (insert PLANT NAME) site, in conjunction with the operation of the dose- mitigating ESF engineered safety feature systems, are sufficient to provide reasonable 40 assurance that the calculated radiological consequences of a postulated main steam line failure outside the