Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 9c20ec9e-fd1b-4e50-a8af-e8785949754b
Document Type: srp
Title: PHYSICAL SECURITY — REVIEW OF PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM DESIGNS –
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1414/ML14140A210.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 13
Section ID: 13.6.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ide the scope of the standard design certification. 2. Identify interfaces to ensure that the review (i.e., as secondary reviewer) includes information addressed under other sections of NUREG 0800 for the design descriptions 13.6.2-3 Revision 2 – June 2015 for plant SSCs that are credited to perform security functions (e.g., physical barrier, plant lighting, communications, primary and backup electrical power, uninterruptable power supply (UPS) and any early site permit (ESP) design parameters that must be addressed in the design of physical security systems. Scope of the Technical Review for Physical Security 1. As stated in SECY-11-0024, “Use of Risk Insights to Enhance the Safety Focus of Small Modular Reactor Reviews,” dated February 18, 2011, the level of review for a particular SSC is derived from both the SSC’s safety importance (i.e., safety-related or nonsafety- related) and risk significance. The introduction to NUREG-0800, Part II, describes the licensing review philosophy and framework the NRC staff applies for new reactor DC and COL applications under 10 CFR Part 52. The introduction states that the risk-informed review framework is applicable to the review of all SSCs, but it may not apply to the review of programmatic, procedural, organizational, or other topics, which, because of their safety or risk significance, are reviewed at the appropriate level determined by the technical branches performing the reviews. For example, the program or topical area may address regulatory requirements not amenable to a risk-informed approach (i.e., conditional risk with a probability equal to one). In the case of physical security, the review framework involves performance and prescriptive regulatory requirements that do not incorporate risk significance and address protection against deliberate acts, such as the design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage. 2. At a minimum, the DC application must provide sufficiently detailed design information to