Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: dea154bb-ecd2-4961-baa9-045870b8088e
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 5 - March 2007
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550084.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
lear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Reproduction and Distribution Services Section, or by fax to (301) 415-2289; or by email to DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov. Electronic copies of this section are available through the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0800/, or in the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under Accession # ML070550084. NUREG-0800 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STANDARD REVIEW PLAN BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION 7-9 GUIDANCE ON REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ANTICIPATORY TRIPS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Organization responsible for the review of instrumentation and controls Secondary - None A. Background Several reactor designs have incorporated a number of anticipatory or "back-up" trips for which no credit was taken in the accident analyses. These trips, as a rule, were not designed to the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," or IEEE Std 603-1991, “IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” and therefore introduced non-safety-grade equipment into the reactor protection system. It was determined by the staff that this was not an acceptable practice, because of possible degradation of the reactor protection system. BTP 7-9-2 Revision 5 - March 2007 B. Branch Technical Position All reactor trips incorporated in the reactor protection system should be designed to meet the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971, or IEEE Std 603-1991. This position applies to the entire trip function, from the sensor to the final actuated device. For sensors located in non-seismic areas, the installation (including circuit routing) and design should be such that the effects of credible faults (i.e., grounding, shorting, application of high voltage, or electromagnetic interference) or failures in these areas