Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 7f6b0af0-d79e-4704-9eac-aa03109a7731
Document Type: srp
Title: RISK-INFORMED DECISIONMAKING: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0425/ML042520260.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 16
Section ID: 16.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
uated. This will ensure that the conclusions that have been drawn from the evaluation remain valid. Section III.C provides a description of the review process for Element 3. Element 4: Submit Proposed Change The final element involves documenting the analyses and submitting the license amendment request. Section 1Il.D provides a description of the documentation guidelines for Element 4. Rev. 0 - August 1998 SRP 16.1-6 II. ACCEPTANCE GUIDELINES For each TS application, the reviewers should ensure that each of the five key principles of the staff's philosophy of risk-informned decision making is met. These principles are described in Section B, "Discussion," of Regulatory Guide 1.177 (Ref. 8). General acceptance guidelines for meeting these principles for all risk-informed regulatory applications can be found in SRP Chapter 19, Section II. Additional guidance as to how these acceptance guidelines relate to TS change requests is provided here. A. Traditional Engineering Guidelines 1. Defense-in-_Depth The engineering evaluation conducted by the licensee should evaluate whether the impact of the proposed TS change is consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy. The intent is to ensure that the philosophy of defense in depth is maintained, not to prevent changes in the way defense- in-depth is achieved. The defense-in-depth philosophy has traditionally been applied in reactor design and operation to provide multiple means to accomplish safety functions and prevent the release of radioactive material. It has been and continues to be an effective way to account for uncertainties in equipment and human performance. When a comprehensive risk analysis can be done, it can be used to help determine the appropriate extent of defense in depth (e.g., balance among core damage prevention, containment failure, and consequence mitigation) to ensure protection of public health and safety. When a comprehensive risk analysis is not or cannot be done, traditional defense-in-depth