Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 757b676a-0f71-4094-8677-ca3a50743281
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 7 – August 2016
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1601/ML16019A344.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
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Content:
the application of the single-failure criterion (GDC 21) and endorses IEEE Std 379, “IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems,” providing supplements and an interpretation. IEEE Std 379, Clause 5.5, establishes the relationship between CCF and single failures by defining criteria for CCF’s that are not subject to single-failure analysis. This clause also identifies D3 as a technique for addressing CCF. RG 1.152, “Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants,” which endorses IEEE Std 7-4.3.2, “IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” with a few noted exceptions, provides guidance for complying with requirements for safety systems that use digital computers. Additional guidance on the application of IEEE Std 7-4.3.2 is provided in SRP, Chapter 7, Appendix 7.1-D. RG 1.62, “Manual Initiation of Protective Actions,” includes information on diverse manual initiation of protective action. NUREG/CR-6303, “Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Analyses of Reactor Protection Systems,” summarizes several D3 analyses performed after 1990 and presents a method for performing such analyses. The SRM on SECY-93-087 describes the NRC position on D3 in Item 18, II.Q. Generic Letter (GL) 85-06, “Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment that is not Safety-Related,” April 16, 1985, provides quality assurance guidance for nonsafety-related ATWS equipment. NUREG-0800, SRP Chapter 18, Appendix 18-A, “Crediting Manual Operator Actions in Diversity and Defense-in-Depth (D3) Analyses,” defines a methodology, applicable to both existing and new reactors, for evaluating manual operator actions as a diverse means of coping with AOOs BTP 7-19-5 Revision 7 – August 2016 and postulated accidents that are concurrent with a software CCF of the DI&C protection system. NUREG-0800, SRP Section 7.8,