Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: efac696f-0049-4b65-b562-4a813c1d817c
Document Type: srp
Title: STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (BWR)
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070538.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.3.5
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
based on meeting the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C-1. 2. General Design Criterion 26, as related to the requirement that two independent reactivity control systems of different design principles be provided, and the requirement that one of the systems shall be capable of holding the reactor subcritical in the cold condition. 9.3.5-5 DRAFT Rev. 3 - April 1996 3. General Design Criterion 27, as related to the requirement that the reactivity control systems have a combined capability in conjunction with poison addition by the emergency core cooling system, of reliably controlling reactivity changes under postulated accident conditions. To meet GDC 27, the system should have suitable redundancy in components and features to assure system safety function assuming a single failure. 4. 10 CFR Part 50, §50.62(c)(4), as related to the SLCS being capable of reliably injecting a borated water solution into the reactor pressure vessel at a boron concentration, boron enrichment, and flow rate that provides sufficient reactivity control and as related to the system having automatic initiation, where required under the rule, to satisfy anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) risk reduction requirements.28 Technical Rationale:29 The technical rationale for application of the above acceptance criteria to the SLCS is discussed in the following paragraphs. 1. Compliance with GDC 2 requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of seismic events and other natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The subject structures, systems and components are those necessary to ensure (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures