Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: d0e1f2cb-f296-449d-9f9a-85a571917a44
Document Type: srp
Title: EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052340709.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 6
Section ID: 6.3
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
, "Seismic Design Classification," Revision 1. 11. Regulatory Guide 1.47, "Bypass and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems." 12. Regulatory Guide 1.52, "Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Atmospheric Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants." 13. Regulatory Guide 1.68, "Preoperational and Initial Startup Test Programs for Water-Cooled Power Reactors." 14. Branch Technical Position RSB 6-1, "Piping From the RWST (or BWST) and Containment Sump(s) to the Safety Injection Pumps," attached to SRP Section 6.3. 15. NUREG-0718, "Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for Construction Permits and Manufacturing Licenses." 16. NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements." 17. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, "Environmental and Missile Design Basis." 6.3-13 Rev. 2 - April 1984 BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION RSB 6-1 PIPING FROM THE RWST (OR BWST) AND CONTAINMENT SUMP(S) TO THE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS A. Background Current PWRs utilize the refueling water storage tank (RWST) or the borated water storage tank (BWST) as the sole source of water for the safety injection pumps during the first 20 to 40 minutes of any accident that trips a safety Injection signal. Since acceptable results of safety analyses of the accidents are based on the operation of a minimum number of these pumps, interruption of this water supply for even a short period of time could result in unacceptably high fuel and cladding temperatures if the safety injection pumps fail because of cavitation or overheating. General Design Criteria 35 requires that the emergency core cooling system have suitable redundancy in components and features .and suitable interconnections to assure the system safety function can be accomplished assuming a single failure. The principal problem appears to be a definition of single failure. A recent draft of ANSI N658, "Single Failure Criteria for PWR