Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 5cdeed4a-6cd5-4840-90c0-5159fbf2c9f0
Document Type: srp
Title: CHILLED WATER
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1409/ML14093A350.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.2.7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
canes, tsunami, seiches and floods without loss of capability to perform their safety functions (as it relates to containment isolation function only). Note: RTNSS B SSCs are designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without loss of function. RTNSS C SSCs are evaluated, utilizing the “graded approach philosophy,” against the effects of the most probable hazards (e.g., floods, winds, missiles, seismic events). As a result of this evaluation, RTNSS C SSCs maybe designed against the effects of natural phenomena. SRP Section 19.3 provides further guidance related to the reliability and availability missions of RTNSS B and C SSCs. 3. GDC 4, as to SSCs important to safety being appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, pipe whipping and discharging fluids that may result from equipment failures and from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit. Note: RTNSS B SSCs are analyzed and designed to withstand adverse effects associated with internal hazards, i.e., those created from conditions inside the plant (e.g., turbine missiles, pipe whip, and flooding). 4. GDC 5, as to SSCs important to safety which shall be designed not to be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions. 9.2.7-9 Draft Revision 0 – July 2014 5. GDC 44, as to: A. The capability to transfer heat loads from safety-related SSCs to a heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions. B. Component redundancy for performance of safety functions assuming a single, active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power (LOOP). C. The capability to isolate components, systems, or piping, if required, so system safety functions are not compromised. D. Whether a single VWS failure results in fuel damage or reactor coolant leakage in excess of normal coolant-makeup capability. Sources of single failure include, but are