Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a397b98f-e122-4d15-8471-5259fb45b58b
Document Type: srp
Title: and BTP 11-6 since the use of durable and passive design features would provide
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1305/ML13051A458.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 11
Section ID: 11.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
cribed in the application provide reasonable assurance that the assumed release will not result in radionuclide concentrations in surface water or groundwater exceeding the SRP acceptance criterion of a total dose of 100 mrem (1 mSv) when used in unrestricted areas. For applicants that have used alternate methods and assumptions, other than that described in this BTP, the staff concludes, after conducting an independent evaluation, that the supporting information and results of the consequence analysis are acceptable and the staff finds that the dose results are consistent with the acceptance criteria. 5. For an ESP or a CP application in which the results of the consequence analyses and comparisons to BTP 11-6 acceptance criteria rely on preliminary design information, the staff confirm that the applicant has proposed appropriate COL action items for the purpose of revising the analysis once more definitive information on design features becomes available at the OL and COL stage. In the review of the information provided in the ESP or CP, the staff confirms that the applicant has met BTP 11-6 acceptance criteria based on the approach and model assumptions described in the analysis, including the reasonableness of the assumptions applied in the analysis and degree of conservatism in modeling the failure scenario and doses to a receptor located in unrestricted areas. BTP 11-6-18 Draft Revision 4 – August 2014 6. The staff concludes that the applicant’s proposed TS limiting the total amounts of radioactivity in tanks and components, as described in the application, are adequate based on the results of the staff’s review and evaluation. The basis of the staff's acceptance of the TS is based on the evaluation of the selected system and failed tank and components, assumed inventory of radioactive materials in the failed tank and components, assumed failure scenario, methods and assumptions used in modeling the transport of radioactivity into unrestricted areas, and