Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 16c1145e-ffe2-48c4-bd44-0ccaeb83dc99
Document Type: srp
Title: FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070563.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
modes of operation.32 Technical Rationale:33 The technical rationale for application of the above acceptance criteria to the fire protection program is discussed in the following paragraphs. 1. GDC 3 requires that structures, systems, and components (SSC) important to safety be designed and located to minimize the probability and effects of fires and explosions. The design of the plant to consider the hazards from fires and explosions is essential in reducing the probability of core damage resulting from a consequential loss of safety- related systems. Compliance with GDC 3 provides assurance that the plant is designed to minimize the probability of fires occurring, and in the event that a fire does occur, provides assurance that the capability exists to detect and suppress the fire and minimize the impact to SSCs important to safety. The protection of SSCs important to safety from the effects of a fire provides assurance that the plant can be placed in a safe condition without adverse impacts on public health and safety. 2. 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection" further defines and codifies the elements of a fire protection program necessary to meet the requirements of GDC 3, including the capability to safely shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. An unmitigated fire at a nuclear power plant can result in damage to systems necessary to accomplish safe shutdown of the reactor. Affected systems may include those necessary for reactivity control, reactor coolant inventory control, and decay heat removal as well as other critical functions. A fire induced failure of safe shutdown systems could lead to core damage and subsequent radiological release. As evidence of this potential, on March 22, 1975, a fire occurring in the cable spreading room of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant resulted in the loss of control capability for several systems necessary for shutdown of the reactor under normal and emergency conditions. Although the Browns Ferry