Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 6958f90f-4bf5-4fe1-9ae7-49439fd2deca
Document Type: srp
Title: PHYSICAL SECURITY HARDWARE - INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1603/ML16032A050.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 14
Section ID: 14.3.12
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
location of the last access control function for access to the protected area will be performed. 6. A report exists and concludes that the walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the main control room, central alarm station, secondary alarm station, and the last access control function for access to the protected area are bullet-resistant to Underwriters Laboratories Ballistic Standard 752, or National Institute of Justice Standard 0108.01, or other NRC-approved standard; and comply with the corresponding level or type of protection associated with that standard which meets or exceeds the characteristics of the design basis threat projectile as described in 10 CFR 73.1 and applicable NRC Order EA-03-086, Dated April 29, 2003. Criterion Guideline The control room, central alarm station, secondary alarm station and the final access control location are constructed in accordance with the design specifications that demonstrate bullet-resistant capabilities. Additional guidance is provided in RG 5.76, “Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear Power Reactors,” July 2009 (not publicly available), and Underwriters Laboratory UL 752, “Ballistic Standards.” PS-ITAAC No. 7, Vehicle Control Measures Requirements 10 CFR 73.55(e)(10). “Vehicle control measures. Consistent with the physical protection program design requirements of § 73.55(b), and in accordance with the site-specific analysis, the licensee shall establish and maintain vehicle control measures, as necessary, to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage vehicle bomb assault.” 10 CFR 73.55(e)(10)(i). “Land vehicles. Licensees shall: (A) Design, construct, install, and maintain a vehicle barrier system, to include passive and active barriers, at a stand-off distance 14.3.12-36 Draft Revision 2 – June 2016 adequate to protect personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage against the effects of the design basis threat of