Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: e1c5261f-4ef6-4478-8cf0-015611057574
Document Type: srp
Title: and 9.3.2, “Process and Post-accident Sampling Systems.”  The review addresses
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1502/ML15029A039.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 11
Section ID: 11.5
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
erminating releases or isolating process flows when deviations exceed preset limits. Other considerations may include determining whether system logic demands that a valve or damper should fail in the closed position in protecting the system from further contamination, terminating releases to the environment, or diverting process streams or effluents to appropriate treatment systems. Acceptable guidance is discussed in SRP Section 11.5 and ANS N42.18-2004. 7. For the GRS portion of the GWMS, the staff should evaluate the system assuming potential releases of radioactive materials (noble gases and radioiodines, as necessary) as a result of postulated leakage or failure of a waste gas storage tank or charcoal delay tank, and assess radiation exposures at the EAB. The radiological consequence assumes short-term atmospheric dispersion (X/Q) parameters in the limiting EAB sector, as addressed in SRP Section 2.3. Acceptable guidance and dose criteria are discussed in this SRP section, with reference to BTP 11-5 in conducting the consequence analysis and assessing dose results. 8. The review of design provisions of the GWMS to sample radioactive materials in gaseous processes and effluent streams should consider the guidance of ANSI/HPS N13.1-2011 for the placement of sample probes in stacks and ductwork, and in establishing sampling flow rates for the purpose of obtaining representative samples. The sampling system should minimize sample losses and distortion of the sample's chemical and physical properties. 9. If the potential for explosive mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen exists, the GRS portion of the GWMS should either be designed to withstand the effects of a hydrogen explosion or be provided with dual gas analyzers with automatic control functions to preclude the formation or buildup of explosive gas mixtures. The GRS is normally the only portion of the system that is vulnerable to potential hydrogen explosion. A. For a system designed to withstand the effects of a