Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a650b8f2-b0fa-4f0f-bc8f-55bb3f6ec603
Document Type: srp
Title: INADVERTENT OPENING OF A PWR PRESSURIZER PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0708/ML070820094.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.6.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
to which plant and reactor protection systems are required to function. 3. The credit taken for the functioning of normally operating plant systems. 4. The extent to which the operation of engineered safety systems is required. 5. The extent to which operator actions are required. 6. The following TMI Action Plan items are reviewed for compliance with the acceptance criteria: A. II.K.3.16 (10 CFR 50.34(f)(1)(vi)): For BWR designs, the reviewer confirms whether the results of the applicant's feasibility study and, if required, system modifications to reduce the numbers of challenges to and failures of relief valves are included properly in the evaluation of the event. B. II.K.3.25 (10 CFR 50.34(f)(1)(iii)) and II.K.3.40: If containment isolation is indicated as a result of the transient or of loss of alternating current power, the reactor coolant pump component cooling water may be lost. The reviewer evaluates the applicant's submission for whether the reactor coolant pump seal integrity is lost. If seal integrity cannot be ensured, the reviewer verifies whether the evaluation of this event correctly accounts for seal failure. 7. If the SAR states that the inadvertent pressure relief valve opening transient is not as limiting as some other similar transient, the reviewer evaluates the applicant’s justification. If the SAR presents a quantitative analysis of the transient, the timing of the initiation of those protection, engineered safety, and other systems needed to limit transient consequence to acceptable levels is reviewed. The reviewer compares the predicted variation of system parameters to various trip and system initiation setpoints. To the extent deemed necessary, the reviewer evaluates the effects of system and component single, active failures which may alter the course of the transient. In this phase of the review the system reviews are as described in the SRP sections for SAR Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. The reviewer considers possible single failures in