Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: fde45fa1-e4ca-4005-b5f6-d1bbefc60c73
Document Type: srp
Title: RELIABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070754.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 17
Section ID: 17.4
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
non-safety-related, risk-significant SSCs. The COL holder should be given maximum flexibility in seeking the best approach to implement this RAP requirement. The following is one acceptable approach; however, other methods may also be acceptable.4 Reliability assurance activities during the operations phase may include the following: a. The COL holder incorporates reliability assurance activities related to safety related SSCs into the program required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. b. The COL holder incorporates reliability assurance activities into the program that implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65. This includes corrective actions to mitigate maintenance-preventable failures to safety related and risk-significant non-safety-related SSCs. c. The COL holder's administrative processes and procedures provide cause determinations and corrective actions for design and operational errors that degrade non-safety-related, risk-significant SSCs. The NRC will inspect and audit implementation of the operational phase of reliability assurance activities for the duration of the license using maintenance and quality assurance regulations (e.g., 10 CFR 50.65 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B). Review Interfaces5 1. SPSB will provide an evaluation of the adequacy and appropriateness of the following information to HQMB on the basis of its review of the standard design certification or site-specific PRA as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 19.1 (proposed): a. The applicant's process for identifying and prioritizing SSCs that is based on risk significance. b. The applicant's list of SSCs designated as risk significant for the standard design certification. DRAFT Rev. 0 - April 1996 17.4-6 c. The applicant's process for determining dominant failure modes that is based on industry experience, analytical models, and applicable requirements. II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA6 The D-RAP is described in the standard design certification applicant's standard safety