Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a59a01e7-d1e2-4946-bebf-a5fff5731c47
Document Type: srp
Title: of the SAR.
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0525/ML052500493.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7.3
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
portant to safety that incorporate redundant or diverse features to satisfy the single-failure criterion. The HICB evaluation is limited to the review of components and electrical wiring inside racks, panels, and control boards for systems important to safety. The evaluation of the physical separation of electrical cables is addressed in the review of Chapter 8 of the SAR. f. Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident" Applicability — Information systems important to safety. Review Methods — Reg. Guide 1.97 provides a basis for evaluating conformance to GDC 13. The HICB evaluation is limited to the review of instrumentation for monitoring plant conditions. The evaluation of instrumentation for monitoring environs conditions and radiation monitoring systems are addressed in the review of other sections of the SAR. Section 7.5 and BTP HICB-10 describe the review of post-accident monitoring systems. g. Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1045, proposed revision 3 to Reg. Guide 1.105, "Instrument Setpoints for Safety Systems," (Endorses ISA-S67.04, "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation Used in Nuclear Power Plants") Applicability — All I&C systems. Rev. 4 — June 1997 SRP 7.1-A-23 Review Methods — Draft Reg. Guide DG-1045 provides a basis for evaluating conformance to GDC 13 and ANSI/IEEE Std 279, Section 3. BTP HICB-12 provides guidance for establishing and maintaining instrument set points. Draft Reg. Guide DG-1045 and ISA-S67.04 are specifically directed at establishing setpoints for trip functions. Nevertheless, their guidance is equally relevant to accounting for measurement uncertainties when determining the indicated plant conditions at which emergency procedures will require operator action, determining the setpoint for interlock functions, and determining setpoints for control functions provided to maintain plant variables and systems