Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: f4b8f0c1-9a14-46be-88c9-a6cb74d64dff
Document Type: srp
Title: Rev. 4 — June 1997
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0525/ML052500499.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
on of the precision of the protection system should be addressed to the Rev. 4 — June 1997 SRP 7.1-C-12 extent that setpoints, margins, errors, and response times are factored into the analysis. BTP HICB-12 discusses considerations for the review of the process for establishing safety system setpoints. For digital computer-based systems, the evaluation should confirm that the general functional requirements have been appropriately allocated into hardware and software requirements. The evaluation should also confirm that the system's real-time performance is deterministic and known. BTP HICB-21 provides guidance for this evaluation. 23. Sections 6.2 and 7.2 — Manual Control Features for manual initiation of protective action should conform with Reg. Guide 1.62, "Manual Initiation of Protection Action." The review of manual controls should be coordinated with the HHFB to confirm that the functions controlled and the characteristics of the controls (e.g., location, range, type, and resolution) allow plant operators to take appropriate manual actions. The review of manual controls should include confirmation that the controls will be functional (e.g., power will be available and command equipment is appropriately qualified) during plant conditions under which manual actions may be necessary. 24. Section 6.3 — Interaction Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems The reviewer should confirm that non-safety system interactions with protection systems are limited such that the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, GDC 24 are met. Where the event of concern is simple failure of a sensing channel shared between control and protection functions, previously accepted approaches have included: • Isolating the protection system from channel failure by providing additional redundancy. • Isolating the control system from channel failure by using data validation techniques to select a valid control input. 25. Section 7.3 — Completion of Protective Action