Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 9697248b-d015-42be-8808-2202db24977a
Document Type: srp
Title: STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (BWR)
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0706/ML070680186.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.3.5
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
system, structures, and pump rooms (cubicles) are reviewed to determine that the degree of protection provided is adequate. A statement to the effect that the system is located in a seismic Category I structure that is tornado missile and flood protected, or that components of the system will be located in individual cubicles or rooms that will withstand the effects of both flooding and missiles, is acceptable. C. Essential components and subsystems (i.e., those necessary for safe shutdown) can function as required in the event of a loss of offsite power. The system design is acceptable if the SLCS meets minimum system requirements, as stated in the SAR, assuming a failure of a single active component within the system or in the auxiliary electric power source which supplies the system. Statements in the SAR and the results of failure modes and effects analyses are considered in assuring that the system meets these requirements. This will be an acceptable verification of system functional reliability. 3. The descriptive information, P&IDs, layout drawings, and failure modes and effects analyses in the SAR are reviewed to assure that essential portions of the system will function following design-basis accidents, assuming a single active component failure. The reviewer evaluates the information in the SAR to assure function of required components, traces the availability of these components on system drawings, and 9.3.5-10 Revision 3 - March 2007 checks that the SAR contains verification that minimum system flow requirements are met for each accident situation for the required time spans. The reviewer also evaluates the information contained in the SAR to determine that the SLCS and CRD systems are located in different parts of the reactor building and at different elevations to ensure that these systems are not vulnerable to common mode failures. For each case, the design will be acceptable if minimum system requirements are met. 4. Some SLCS (e.g., ABWR) designs no