Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 757b676a-0f71-4094-8677-ca3a50743281
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 7 – August 2016
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1601/ML16019A344.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
D3 described above. To reach a conclusion of acceptability, the following conclusions should be reached and supported by summation of the results of the analyses and the diverse means provided. Since the acceptance criteria address confirmation that AOOs and postulated accidents are mitigated in the presence of CCF, the focus of the D3 analyses should be on the protection systems. Other systems important to safety become involved only to the extent that they are credited as providing diverse functions to protect against CCF in the protection systems. (1) For each anticipated operational occurrence in the design basis occurring in conjunction with each single postulated CCF, the plant response calculated using realistic assumptions should not result in radiation release exceeding 10 percent of the applicable siting dose guideline values or violation of the integrity of the primary coolant pressure boundary. The applicant should: (1) demonstrate that sufficient diversity exists to achieve these goals, (2) identify the vulnerabilities discovered and the corrective actions taken, or (3) identify the vulnerabilities discovered and provide a documented basis that justifies taking no action. (2) For each postulated accident in the design basis occurring in conjunction with each single postulated CCF, the plant response calculated using realistic assumptions should not result in radiation release exceeding the applicable siting dose guideline values, violation of the integrity of the primary coolant pressure boundary, or violation of the integrity of the containment (i.e., exceeding coolant BTP 7-19-14 Revision 7 – August 2016 system or containment design limits). The applicant should (1) demonstrate that sufficient diversity exists to achieve these goals, (2) identify the vulnerabilities discovered and the corrective actions taken, or (3) identify the vulnerabilities discovered and provide a documented basis that justifies taking no action. (3) When a failure of a