Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 02f672d7-50e8-458f-90d4-e5eb19bd5a4d
Document Type: srp
Title: EMERGENCY DIESEL ENGINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550035.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.5
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
s compliance of the designs, design criteria, and bases with NRC regulations as set forth in the GDCs of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The staff concludes that the plant design is acceptable and meets the requirements of GDCs 5, 17, 44, 45, and 46. This conclusion is based on the following findings: 9.5.5-11 Revision 3 - March 2007 A. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," for the ability of structures housing the EDECWS and the EDECWS itself to withstand effects of natural phenomena like earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, and GDC 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases." The EDECWS is housed in a seismic Category I structure which protects against the effects of tornados, tornado missiles, turbine missiles, and floods. This protection meets the positions of RGs 1.115, "Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles," Position C.1, and 1.117 "Tornado Design Classification," Appendix Position 13. B. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 5, "Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components," for the capability of shared systems and components important to safety to perform required safety functions. Each unit of the plant has its own emergency diesel generators, each with an EDECWS not shared between other diesel generators. C. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 17, "Electric Power Systems," for the capability of the cooling system to meet independence and redundancy criteria and GDC 44 as to the following: i. The capability to transfer heat from systems and components to a heat sink under transient or accident conditions, ii. Redundancy of components for performance of safety functions under accident conditions, assuming a single active component failure, and iii. The capability to isolate components of the system or piping if required for system safety function. Each EDECWS is independent and physically separated from the other system serving the redundant