Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 77e928bd-5fcf-425f-b8c0-85215a64682f
Document Type: srp
Title: INTERNALLY-GENERATED MISSILES (INSIDE CONTAINMENT)
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0703/ML070380167.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3.5.1.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ted in their entirety, others have safety-related portions, and others are not needed for safety. To determine the safety category, the SSCs are evaluated for their functions in achieving safe reactor shutdown conditions, preventing significant uncontrolled release of radioactivity, preventing accidents, or mitigating their consequences. The reviewer evaluates such input as required for completion of this review. SSCs that perform safety functions (inside containment) or by their failure could have adverse effects on safety functions should be protected from the effects of internally-generated missiles. 2. A review is conducted of the information provided in the SAR related to SSCs design bases and criteria, the listing of plausible primary and secondary missiles, damage to or failure of SSCs important to safety as a result of missile impingement, and missile protection capability. The reviewer may use failure mode and effect analyses and the results of reviews by other branches in evaluating SSCs to identify those requiring protection from internally-generated missiles, the origins of possible missiles, and the adequacy of the protection. 3. The reviewer determines whether controls ensure that unsecured maintenance equipment, including that required for maintenance and that undergoing maintenance, will be removed from containment prior to operation, moved to a location where it is not a potential hazard to SSCs important to safety, or seismically restrained to prevent it from becoming a missile. 4. The reviewer determines whether the separation analysis can demonstrate adequate protection for SSCs important to safety from missiles which may be generated inside the containment. The reviewer should utilize the results of any high-energy line separation analysis review in this evaluation. If an applicant uses spatial separation as adequate protection from missiles inside the containment, that evaluation should be consistent with the applicant's use of spatial