Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 9c59dff8-9325-43e2-8e81-843a0f6b4b2f
Document Type: srp
Title: and Regulatory Guide 1.189.
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0327/ML032740044.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ons submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 52, design elements of the fire protection program are addressed in the design certification process. In addition a design specific fire risk assessment in accordance with §52.47(a)(v) shall be submitted. During the design certification process, action items are identified that must be addressed by the combined license applicant. These commitments include action items to establish the fire protection program for protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety and the procedures, equipment, and personnel required to implement the program. These commitments include, but are not limited to, updating the fire hazards analysis to address final plant design and those administrative program elements (e.g., licensee fire protection staffing and organization, quality assurance, procedures, fire prevention programs, and training); fire brigade and emergency response capability; the final design of fire protection systems and features; and the design and analysis of post-fire safe shutdown capability. 1. Enhanced Fire Protection Criteria Based on operational experience with existing reactors and insights from examination of internal fire events, the staff determined that fire protection for safe shutdown capability should be enhanced for advanced reactor designs. The enhanced fire protection criteria was initially proposed to the Commission in SECY-90-016. This criteria was extended to review of passive LWR design in SECY-93-087. This criteria is as follows: Evolutionary advanced light water reactor (ALWR) designers must ensure that safe shutdown can be achieved assuming that all equipment in any one fire area will be rendered inoperable by fire and that re-entry into the fire area for repairs and operator actions is not possible. Because of its physical configuration, the control room is excluded from this approach, provided an independent alternative shutdown capability that is physically and electrically