Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 05a851a6-07ff-41b4-8528-a032ba433e04
Document Type: srp
Title: FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0327/ML032740044.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
operators had to initiate emergency repairs in order to restore the systems needed to place the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. The investigations that followed the Browns Ferry fire identified significant deficiencies, both in the design of fire protection features and in licensee procedures for responding to a fire event. The investigators concluded that the occupant safety and property protection concerns of fire insurance underwriters did not sufficiently encompass nuclear safety issues, especially in terms of the potential for fire damage to cause the failure of redundant success paths of systems and components important for safe reactor shutdown. In its report (NUREG-0050, February 1976, “Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire”), the NRC Browns Ferry special review team recommended that the NRC (1) develop detailed guidance for implementing the general design criterion for fire protection and (2) conduct a detailed review of the fire protection program at each operating nuclear power plant, comparing it to the guidance developed. In May 1976, the NRC issued Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1, which incorporated the recommendations from the Browns Ferry fire special review team and provided technical guidelines to assist licensees in preparing their fire protection programs. As part of this action, the staff requested each licensee to provide an analysis that divided the plant into distinct fire areas and demonstrated that redundant success paths of equipment required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for the reactor were adequately protected from fire damage. However, the guidelines of APCSB 9.5-1 applied only to those licensees that filed for a construction permit after July 1, 1976. In September 1976, in an effort to establish defense-in-depth fire protection programs, without significantly affecting the design, construction, or operation of existing plants that were either already operating or well past the design