Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a28650b3-fa03-428d-a2bd-4a27f583710b
Document Type: srp
Title: NUREG-0800
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070484.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 6
Section ID: 6
CFR Part: 
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Content:
ants, NUREG-0808 for Mark II plants and NUREG-0978 for Mark III plants. The review of the dynamic loads associated with the actuation of one or more primary coolant system safety/relief valves hashave been concluded with the issuance of 80 NUREG-0661 for Mark I plants, NUREG-0802 for Mark II and Mark III plants. The review of dynamic loads for ABWR plants has been concluded with issuance of Appendix 3B of the ABWR SSAR.81 3. For Mark III and ABWR plants, the SCSB verifies from the safety analysis report that 82 high energy lines which pass through the containment outside the drywell are provided with guard pipes or enclosed in other types of protective structures. If guard pipes are used, the design must meet the acceptance criteria established in SRP Sections 3.6.2 and 3.8.3. For unguarded lines, the SCSB reviews analyses of the consequences of postulated ruptures in these lines. The SCSB bases its acceptance of the analyses on the 83 conservatism of the methods and assumptions and on the margin provided to assure against exceeding the design pressure of the containment. If leakage detection and isolation equipment are provided, the HICBICSB evaluates the effectiveness of the 84 detection instrumentation and isolation devices to mitigate the consequences of a pipe rupture and to meet the electrical design criteria for these systems under SRP Section 85 7.3. 4. The SCSB reviews the analyses of the suppression pool temperature for transients involving the actuation of reactor coolant system safety/relief valves in BWR pressure- suppressionMark I, II and III plants. The SCSB evaluates the assumptions and 86 87 conservatisms employed in the analyses to assure that the acceptance criteria set forth in NUREG-0783 are met. The SCSB also reviews the proposed reactor coolant system safety/relief valve in-plant 88 confirmatory test programs or the rationale for not performing such tests. 5. The SCSB evaluates analyses of bypass leakage capability. The SCSB determines the