Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: cf61f16a-4e82-42da-8333-e100f557fd60
Document Type: srp
Title: PLANT DESIGN FOR PROTECTION AGAINST POSTULATED PIPING FAILURES IN
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550032.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3.6.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
Acceptance is based on conformance to BTP 3-3. 3.6.1-5 Revision 3 - March 2007 1. High and moderate energy fluid systems are separated from essential systems and components, as described in Appendix B to BTP 3-3. 2. High and moderate energy fluid systems, or portions thereof, are enclosed as described in item B.1.b of BTP 3-3. 3. For cases where neither physical separation nor protective enclosures are considered practical by the applicant, the reviewer will verify the following: A. The reasons for which the applicant judged both physical separation and system enclosure to be impractical as means of protection are consistent with item B.1.c. of BTP 3-3. B. Redundant design features or additional protections (assuming a single active failure in any required system) have been provided such that failure modes and effects analyses for all failure situations ensure the performance of safety features. These analyses are done under the criteria and assumptions of item B.3. of BTP 3-3. 4. Design Features are in accordance with item B.2 of BTP 3-3. 5. The effects of postulated failures on essential equipment and the ability of the plant to be safely shut down are analyzed in accordance with item B.3. of BTP 3-3. Technical Rationale The technical rationale for application of these acceptance criteria to the areas of review addressed by this SRP section is discussed in the following paragraphs: 1. Compliance with GDC 2 requires that SSCs important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety function. Meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 2 is necessary to ensure that environmental effects due to failures of non-seismic piping do not affect the ability of the plant to shut down safely and remain in safe shutdown condition. The application of GDC 2 to this SRP Section is to ensure that consideration is given to