Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 05a851a6-07ff-41b4-8528-a032ba433e04
Document Type: srp
Title: FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0327/ML032740044.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
s analysis should address the effects of firefighting activities. GDC 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 states that "Fire-fighting systems shall be designed to assure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components." j. Availability of oxygen (e.g., inerted containment). k. Alternative, dedicated, or backup shutdown capability for those fire areas where adequate separation of redundant safe shutdown systems cannot be achieved. Revision 4 - October 2003 16 2. Safe Shutdown Capability The fire protection program, and specifically the fire hazard analysis or safety analysis report, must describe the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety such that post-fire safe shutdown of the plant can be achieved and maintained. Safe shutdown objectives and guidelines for operating reactors are described in detail in Regulatory Guide 1.189. For advanced reactor designs, the fire protection and safe shutdown design must also meet the enhanced fire protection criteria described in Appendix B. Licensees that submit applications for license renewal are expected to continue to meet the current plant fire protection licensing basis with the added provision that aging issues, as they apply to fire protection related structures, systems, and components, must be addressed. Requirements for safe shutdown do not apply to permanently shutdown or decommissioned reactors. Fire protection objectives for shutdown plants are addressed in Appendix A of this BTP 2.1 Safe Shutdown Objectives Safe shutdown goals and objectives for operating reactors are described in Regulatory Guide 1.189, Regulatory Position 5. The primary safe shutdown objective is to provide assurance that fuel integrity is maintained (i.e., fuel design limits are not exceeded). For alternative or dedicated shutdown, reactor coolant system process variables should be maintained within those predicted for a loss