Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: da2e0703-3488-44b0-b6d0-089aac7cae3d
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Format and Content of Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for Pressurized Water Reactors
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003740028.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.154
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
f l u x surveillance dosimetry. Use the weld locations and fluence values t o i d e n t i f y the c r i t i c a l welds. Show how the 1. , fluence varies along the length and depth o f the c r i t i c a l welds. Describe the basi s f o r these estimates and t h e i r uncertainty. These f 1 ucnce val ues should be benchmarked, f o r example, through use o f ENDF/B-IV or V 1;ross sections, t o quantify the error. Inservice Inspection Results To the extent pertinent t o the probabilistic analysis and proposed correc- t i v e actions, summarize: O Results - The number, size, depth, and location o f any flaws found should be we1 1 defined and described. O Methods used - The method used t o perform the inspection should be we1 1 described with documentation o f any val i d a t i on informati on. Note: Only those inservice inspections (ISIs) that have actually been per- - formed should be discussed i n t h i s section. Improved I S 1 programs as proposed by the licensee should be described under corrective measures i n Chapter 8, "Effect o f Corrective Actions on Vessel Through-Wall Crack Frequency." 2.5 P l ant Operati ng Experience Summarize overcool ing transients t h a t have occurred a t t h i s station and similar stations. A1 so, summarize lessons learned from these and other tran- s i ents, and indicate actions taken t o prevent recurrence or m i nimize severity o f overcooling transients. 2.6 Operating Procedures / This section provides procedural data, e.g., what the operator i s supposed to do and when. This section, for example, should present and describe the important operator actions as defined by existing procedures associated w i t h potential overcool i ng transients. A1 so emphasize how the procedures were evaluated and optimized i n light of any competing risks that might arise from events other than PTS events t o ensure that overall plant safety i s appropriately balanced. The conditions under which the operator takes each action, the expected time