Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 7f6b0af0-d79e-4704-9eac-aa03109a7731
Document Type: srp
Title: RISK-INFORMED DECISIONMAKING: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0425/ML042520260.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 16
Section ID: 16.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ous when the SSCs being considered in the change are similar across all plants in the group. Plant specific information with regard to the engineering evaluations described in Section III.B must still be provided. However, the group may be able to draw generic conclusions from a compilation of the plant-specific data. In addition, there will be benefits from cross-comparison of the results of the plant-specific evaluations. B. Perform Engineering Analysis 1. Traditional Engineering Evaluation a. Compliance with Current Regulations In evaluating proposed changes to TS, the licensee must ensure that the current regulations, orders, and license conditions are met, consistent with Principle I of risk-informed regulation. The NRC regulations specific to TS are stated in 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical Specifications." Additional information with regard to the NRC's policies on TS is contained in the "NRC Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (58 FR 39132), of July 22, 1993 (Ref. 10). These documents define the main elements of TS and provide criteria for items to be included in the TS. The final policy statement and the statement of considerations for 10 CFR 50.36 (60 FR 36953), of July 19, 1995 (Ref. I 1), also discuss use of probabilistic approaches to improve TS. Regulations regarding application for and issuance of license amendments are found in 10 CFR 50.90 (Ref. 17), 50.91 (Ref. 18), and 50.92 (Ref. 14). In addition, the licensee should ensure that any discrepancies between the proposed TS change and licensee commitments are identified and considered in the evaluation. b. Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Attributes & Safety Margins One aspect of the engineering evaluations is to show that the fundamental safety principles on which the plant design was based are not compromised. Design basis accidents (DBAs) play a central role in nuclear power plant design. DBAs are a combination of postulated challenges and failure