Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: da269da5-7390-4252-b08f-bdb7aeb8beaf
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Developing Principal Design Criteria for Non-Light Water Reactors + HISTORY - HISTORY 02/2017 – DG-1330 , Proposed Revision 0
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1630/ML16301A307.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.232
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
dix B to DG-1330, Page B-9 III. Reactivity Control Criterion SFR-DC Title and Content NRC Rationale for Adaption to GDC 20 Protection system functions. Same as GDC 21 Protection system reliability and testability. Same as GDC 22 Protection system independence. Same as GDC 23 Protection system failure modes. The protection system shall be designed to fail into a safe state or into a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis, if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy (e.g., electric power, instrument air), or postulated adverse environments (e.g., extreme heat or cold, fire, sodium and sodium reaction products, pressure, steam, water, and radiation) are experienced. In NUREG-1368, Table 3.3 (page 3-21) (Ref. 4), the NRC staff recommended adding the phrase “sodium and sodium reaction products” to the list of postulated adverse environments in the GDC. Therefore, “sodium and sodium reaction products” are added to the second list of examples in parentheses in SFR-DC 23. 24 Separation of protection and control systems. Same as GDC 25 Protection system requirements for reactivity control malfunctions. Same as ARDC The protection system shall be designed to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during any anticipated operational occurrence accounting for a single malfunction of the reactivity control systems. Text has been added to clarify that the protection system is designed to protect the specified acceptable fuel design limits for AOOs in combination with a single failure; the protection system does not have to protect the specified acceptable fuel design limits during a postulated accident in combination with a single failure. The example was deleted to make the SFR technology neutral. 26 Reactivity control systems. Same as ARDC Reactivity control systems shall include the following capabilities: (1) A means of shutting down the reactor shall be provided to ensure that, under