Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 5cdeed4a-6cd5-4840-90c0-5159fbf2c9f0
Document Type: srp
Title: CHILLED WATER
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1409/ML14093A350.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.2.7
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
risk-significant. Testing and in-service inspection are elements of the RAP. Also, surveillance testing is done for items in the Availability Controls Manual. Alternative criteria are addressed in SRP Section 19.3 on the programmatic requirements for RTNSS with respect to inspection and testing. F. Essential portions of the system are protection from the effects of high-energy and moderate-energy line breaks. The system description and layout drawings are reviewed (if available) for whether no high or moderate-energy piping systems are close to essential chilled water portions, or for protection from the effects of failure. The means for such protection are in SAR Section 3.6, and the procedures for reviewing this information are in the corresponding SRP sections. RTNSS B: applies for functions in the post-72 hour period. Replace paragraph 5.F with the following: The system may be evaluated for protection from the effects of high-energy and moderate-energy line breaks. The system description and layout drawings are reviewed (if available) for whether no high- or moderate-energy piping systems are close to RTNSS B VWS portions, or for protection from the effects of failure. The means for such protection are delineated in SAR Section 3.6, and the procedures for reviewing this information are in the corresponding SRP. RTNSS C: applies for defense-in-depth functions in order to meet NRC safety goal guidelines. Replace paragraph 5.F with the following: The design functions are reviewed against high energy line breaks. G. Essential components and subsystems (i.e., those necessary for safe shutdown) can function as required in a LOOP and instrument air systems. The system design is acceptable if essential chilled water system portions meet minimum system requirements as stated in the SAR, assuming a concurrent LOOP and failure of a single, active component, including a single failure of any auxiliary electric power source. The SAR is reviewed for whether, for each VWS