Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: e32f0820-4e33-476e-aa36-4ca8c2c64af0
Document Type: srp
Title: Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking:
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0119/ML011940192.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 19
Section ID: 19.0
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
C cannot find that the requested amendment provides adequate protection of public health and safety. Under unusual circumstances that could introduce significant and unanticipated risks, the NRC staff reviewers would assume the burden of demonstrating that the presumption of adequate protection is not supported by the bases for the existing staff positions despite the fact that currently specified regulatory requirements are met. Instances in which license amendment requests meet all regulatory requirements yet raise significant risk concerns are rare. The process used for identifying those situations in which risk implications are appropriate to consider and for deciding if undue risk exists is depicted in Figure 1. This process can be used in the review of both licensee-initiated, risk-informed license amendment requests, as well as license amendment requests in which the licensee chooses to not submit risk information (i.e., non-risk-informed requests). License amendment requests will be screened for potential risk implications as part of the license amendment review process. Office-level license amendment review procedures provide guidance on which license amendment requests should be examined at the level of the integrated risk model because of the potential for significant impacts on plant risk. In accordance with the guidance, the risk implications of a non-risk-informed submittal would be discussed with a risk analyst if the submittal - 9 significantly changes the allowed outage time (e.g., outside the range previously approved at similar plants), the probability of the initiating event, the probability of successful mitigative action, the functional recovery time, or the operator action requirement; * significantly changes functional requirements or redundancy; * significantly changes operations that affect the likelihood of undiscovered failures; SRP 19-Dl 0 significantly affects the basis for successful safety function; or * could create "special