Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 988a555f-fdfa-4452-829d-c06654bfbba5
Document Type: srp
Title: Initial Plant Test Program - Design Certification and New License Applicants
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0706/ML070660618.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 14
Section ID: 14.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the manual operation is performed, and the variables that should be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action. • Section 4.6 Identification of the minimum number and locations of sensors. The ITAAC should include analysis of the minimum number and locations of sensors that the safety systems require for protective purposes. • Section 4.7 Range of transient and steady-state conditions. The ITAAC should verify the range of transient and steady-state conditions, including both motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety system is required. • Section 4.8 Identification of conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety system performance. The ITAAC should include analysis of the conditions that have the potential to causing functional degradation of the safety systems (e.g., 14.3-39 March 2007 missiles, pipe breaks, fires, loss of ventilation, spurious operation of fire suppression systems, operator error, failure in non-safety-related systems). • Section 4.9 Identification of the methods used to assess the reliability of the safety system design. The ITAAC should verify that this analysis was performed correctly and accepted by the NRC. • Section 5.1 Single-Failure Criterion. The ITAAC should include analysis or demonstration to show that the safety systems can perform all safety functions required for a DBE in the presence of (1) any single detectable failure within the safety systems, concurrent with all identifiable but non-detectable failures; (2) all failures caused by the single failure; and (3) all failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the DBE requiring the safety functions. • Section 5.2 Completion of Protective Action. The ITAAC should include