Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: e89cc26c-d19a-42b8-818a-fb598c05ccee
Document Type: srp
Title: PLANT DESIGN FOR PROTECTION AGAINST POSTULATED PIPING FAILURES IN FLUID
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052340548.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3.6.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
is done by the Structural and Geosciences Branch (ESGB) and EMEB as follows: (1) ESGB reviews the design of protective structures in connection with the review of other Category I structures under SRP Section 3.8.4. (2) EMEB reviews the design of piping restraints and other protective measures in connection with the review of break locations and dynamic effects of piping failures under SRP Section 3.6.2. c. SPLB identifies portions of high and moderate energy fluid system piping between containment isolation valves that are subject to the recommendations of item B.2.c of BTP SPLB 3-1. EMEB reviews the design of these portions of piping in connection with the review of break locations and dynamic effects of piping failures under SRP Section 3.6.2. 3. SPLB reviews analyses of postulated piping failures with respect to the guidelines of Section B.3 of BTP SPLB 3-1. The locations and types of failures to be considered and the dynamic effects associated with the failures are reviewed by the EMEB under SRP Section 3.6.2. a. SPLB reviews analyses of piping failures in high and moderate energy fluid systems postulated according to the guidelines of B.3.a of BTP SPLB 3-1. SPLB reviews resulting environmental conditions resulting from postulated piping failures. b. SPLB reviews the assumptions made in the analyses with regard to: (1) The availability of offsite power. (2) The failure of a single active component in systems used to mitigate the consequences of the piping failure. (3) The special provisions applicable to certain dual purpose systems. (4) The use of available systems to mitigate the consequences of the piping failure. 3.6.1-2 Rev. 2 - October 1990 c. SPLB reviews the effects of postulated failures on the habita- bility of the control room and access to areas important to safe .control of post-accident operations. d. SPLB reviews the effects of piping failures in systems not designed to seismic Category I standards on essential systems and components. e. SPLB