Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 89a50aec-b387-4999-9c8e-3b8e4f289a55
Document Type: srp
Title: Revision 3 - March 2007
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0708/ML070800027.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 3
Section ID: 3
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
as specified in I.a) and enclosure in protective structures (as specified in I.b) are impracticable, systems containing high-energy fluids, or portions of the systems, are provided with restraints and protective measures such that the operability and integrity of structures, safety systems and components that are required to shut down condition are not impaired. d. Protective enclosures for the piping systems containing high-energy fluids are designed as Seismic Category I structures to withstand the combined effects of a postulated pipe break, the dynamic effects of pipe whipping, the jet impingement forces, and the compartment pressurization as a consequence of discharging fluids in combination with the specified seismic event of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and normal operating loads. e. Piping systems containing high-energy fluids are designed so that the effects of a single postulated pipe break cannot, in turn, cause failures of other pipes or components with unacceptable consequences. In addition, any systems, or portions of systems, that are designed to mitigate the consequences of a postulated pipe failure, and to place the reactor in the cold shutdown condition, are provided with design features that will assure the performance of their safety function, assuming a single active component failure. f. For a postulated pipe failure, the escape of steam, water, and heat from structures enclosing the high-energy fluid containing piping does not preclude: 1) the accessibility to surrounding areas important to the safe control of reactor operations, 2) the habitability of the control room, 3) the ability of instrumentation, electric power supplies, and components and controls to initiate, actuate and complete a safety action. In this regard, a loss of redundancy is permissible but not the loss of function. g. The criteria for determination of postulated break locations are contained in the attached Appendix A, "Criteria for Determination of Postulated Pipe Break