Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 39669ad0-0ad7-442d-8e1c-64c0e1607f1d
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Reporting of Operating Information -- Appendix A Technical Specifications (Rev. 2)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003739954.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.16
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ive function. (c) HPCI failure to start or failure to con tinue running once initiated. (6) Personnel error or procedural inadequacy which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfill ment of the functional requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the SAR. The follow ing are examples: (a) Failure to restore a safety system to operability following test or maintenance. (b) Improper procedure leading to in correct valve lineup which resulted in closure of one manual valve in each of two redundant safety injection subsystems and would have prevented injection on demand. Note: For items 2.a(5) and 2.a(6) reduced redundancy that does not result in loss of system function need not be reported under this section but may be reportable under items 2.b(2) and 2.b(3) below. (7) Conditions arising from natural or man made events that, as a direct result of the event, require plant shutdown, operation of safety systems, or other protective measures required by technical-specifications. The following are examples: (a) Threatened civil disturbances requiring plant shutdown. (b) Damage to the facility caused by fire, flood, earthquake, or other similar occurrences. (8) Errors discovered in the transient or accident analyses or in the methods used for such analyses as described in the safety analysis report or in the bases for the technical specifications that have or could have permitted reactor operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the analyses. The following are examples: (a) Loss of condenser vacuum resulting in reactor pressure and flux transients that peak at values higher than analyzed. 1.16-4 (b) Reactivity insertion delay times by reactor protection system longer than those used in the technical specification bases. (9) Performance of structures, systems, or com ponents that requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conserva tive than that assumed in the accident analyses in the