Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: ed948426-dd77-4047-be5e-2b7ab22de3f5
Document Type: srp
Title: FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPE BREAK INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (PWR)
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550009.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.2.8
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
March 2007 Any fuel damage calculated to occur must be of sufficiently limited extent that the core remains in place and intact with no loss of core cooling capability. 4. Calculated doses at the site boundary from any activity release must be a small fraction of the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. 5. The integrity of the RCPs should be maintained so loss of alternating current power and containment isolation do not result in seal damage. 6. The AFWS must be safety grade and automatically initiated when required. 7. Certain assumptions should be in the analysis of important parameters that describe initial plant conditions and postulated system failures: A. The power level assumed and number of loops operating at the initiation of the transient should correspond to the operating condition which maximizes accident consequences. These assumed initial conditions vary with the particular nuclear steam supply system and sensitivity studies are required to determine the most conservative combination of power level and plant operating mode. These sensitivity studies may be presented in a generic report as references if applicable. B. The assumptions as to whether offsite power is lost and the time of loss should be conservative. Offsite power may be lost simultaneously with the pipe break, the loss may occur during the accident, or offsite power may not be lost. A study should determine the most conservative assumption appropriate to the plant design reviewed. The study should take account of the effects that loss of offsite power (LOOP) has on reactor coolant and main feedwater pump trips and on the initiation of auxiliary feedwater and the consequent modification of the sequence of events. C. The effects (pipe whip, jet impingement, reaction forces, temperature, humidity, etc.) of the postulated feedwater line breaks on other systems should be considered consistently with the intent of Branch Technical Positions (BTP) 3-3 and BTP 3-4. D. The worst single active component