Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 817bb0ad-6fd7-433e-aa2b-b4b3e1166f9c
Document Type: srp
Title: PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND SEVERE ACCIDENT EVALUATION FOR
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0717/ML071700652.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 19
Section ID: 19.0
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
gn’s robustness, levels of defense-in-depth, and tolerance of severe accidents initiated by either internal or external events, and ii. The risk significance of specific human errors associated with the design, and characterize the significant human errors in preparation for better training and more refined procedures. C. Demonstrate how the risk associated with the design compares against the Commission’s goals2 of less than 1x10-4/year for core damage frequency and less than 1x10-6/year for large release frequency.3 In addition, compare the design against the Commission’s approved use of a containment performance goal, which includes (1) a deterministic goal that containment integrity be maintained for approximately 24 hours following the onset of core damage for the more likely severe accident challenges and (2) a probabilistic goal that the conditional containment failure probability be less than approximately 0.1 for the composite of all core damage sequences assessed in the PRA. D. Assess the balance of preventive and mitigative features of the design, including consistency with the Commission’s guidance in SECY-93-087 and the associated staff requirements memorandum (SRM). E. Demonstrate whether the plant design, including the impact of site-specific characteristics, represents a reduction in risk compared to existing operating plants. F. Demonstrate that the design addresses known issues related to the reliability of core and containment heat removal systems at some operating plants (i.e., the additional TMI-related requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(f)). 19.0-4 Revision 2 - June 2007 2. The results and insights of the PRA are used to support other programs as follows: A. Support the process used to demonstrate whether the regulatory treatment of nonsafety systems (RTNSS) is sufficient and, if appropriate, identify the SSCs included in RTNSS. B. Support, as a minimum, regulatory oversight processes (e.g., Mitigating Systems Performance Index, significance