Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 22df8787-ae92-4706-b796-d1b326c09e3c
Document Type: srp
Title: POTENTIAL DAM FAILURES
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0523/ML052340533.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 2
Section ID: 2.4.4
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ng: 1. Conservatism of modes of assumed dam failure and deposition of debris downstream. Rev. 2 - July 1981 USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. Not all sections of the Standard Format have a corresponding review plan. Published standard review plans will be revised periodically. as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new Informa- tion and experience. Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington. D.C. 25E. 2. Consideration of flood control reservoirs at full pool level. 3. Conservatism of coincident flow rates and levels depending on whether failure is postulated with an equivalent SSE coincident with a 25-year flood, or an OBE coincident with a standard project flood (SPF). An SPF is considered to be about forty percent of a PMF. 4. Flood wave attenuation to downstream dams, or to the site, whichever would be encountered first. 5. Potential for mutiple dam failures; flood wave effects and potential for failure of downstream dams. 6. Hydraulic failure as a result of overtopping for any reason. 7. Dynamic effects of possible bores on exposed plant facilities. 8. Conservative flow conditions for downstream dam failures that can influence safety-related water supplies. 9. Applicability and conservatism of models