Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 05a851a6-07ff-41b4-8528-a032ba433e04
Document Type: srp
Title: FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0327/ML032740044.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50.59, provided the changes did not adversely affect the plant’s ability to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown. The licensee, upon modification of the license to adopt the standard condition, could also amend the license to remove the fire protection technical specifications. Generic Letter 88-12, “Removal of Fire Protection Requirements from Technical Specifications” (August 2, 1988), gave licensees additional guidance for implementation of the standard license condition and removal of the technical specifications associated with fire detection and suppression, fire barriers, and fire brigade staffing. The technical specifications associated with safe shutdown equipment and the administrative controls related to fire protection audits were to be retained under the guidance of the generic letter. Generic Letter 88-20, “Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10 CFR Part 50.54(f),” was issued to licenses on November 23, 1988 requesting that licensees perform individual plant examinations to identify plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents and appropriate corrective actions, if any. Based on knowledge gained in the IPE process and concerns associated with the risk of external events, Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20 was issued in June of 1991 requesting, in part, that IPE for external events, or IPEEE, be performed for internal fires. The primary objectives of the IPEEE were for licensees to (1) develop an appreciation of severe accident behavior, (2) understand the most likely severe accident sequences that could occur at the plant under full power operating conditions, (3) gain a qualitative understanding of the overall likelihood of core damage and radioactive material release, and (4) if necessary, reduce the overall likelihood of core damage and radioactive material releases by modifying hardware and procedures that would help prevent or mitigate severe accidents. Revision