Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a2680f96-0e15-402d-89ab-688ff09806a8
Document Type: srp
Title: with respect to the specified station blackout event/duration.13
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070497.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 8
Section ID: 8.3.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
hnical specifications as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 16.0.30 10. The Containment Systems and Severe Accident Branch (SCSB) determines those 31 system components requiring electric power as a function of time for each mode of reactor operation and accident condition as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, and 6.2.5. 32 The Effluent Treatment Plant Systems Branch (ETSB) determines those system components requiring electric power as a function of time for each mode of reactor operation and accident condition as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 6.5.1.33 11. The Procedures and Test ReviewQuality Assurance and Maintenance Branch (PTRBHQMB ) determines the acceptability of the preoperational and initial startup and 34 testtests and programs as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 14.02.35 8.2-5 DRAFT Rev. 4 - April 1996 12. The HQMB reviews the adequacy of administrative, maintenance, testing, and operating procedure programs as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Sections 13.5.1.2 and 13.5.2.2. The reviews of design, construction, and operations phase quality assurance programs, including the general methods for addressing periodic testing, maintenance, and reliability assurance, are also coordinated and performed by the HQMB as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Chapter 17.36 The Chemical Engineering Branch (CMEB) examines the fire detection and fire fighting systems in the preferred power system areas to assure that adverse effects of fire are minimized as part of its primary review responsibility for SRP Section 9.5.1. This includes the adequacy of protection provided redundant power circuits to determine that a single design basis fire will not disable all onsite and offsite power supply circuits to the onsite distribution system.37 13. The Human Factors Assessment Branch (HHFB), as part of its primary review