Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: b694ca5b-4dcc-4098-be04-431e0137a936
Document Type: srp
Title: - 15.5.2
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0708/ML070820081.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 15
Section ID: 15.5.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
l design limits are not exceeded during any condition of normal operation, including AOOs. The requirements of GDC 10 apply to the CVCS malfunction events, since power level could conceivably increase as water is being added to the RCS, until a reactor trip condition is reached. Meeting this criterion provides reasonable assurance that AOOs will not result in fuel damage and subsequent fission product release. 2. Compliance with GDC 13 requires the provision of instrumentation that is capable of monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for AOOs, and for accident conditions as appropriate, to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems. Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges. GDC 13 applies to this section because the reviewer evaluates the sequence of events, including automatic actuations of protection systems, and manual actions, and determines whether the sequence of events is justified, based upon the expected values of the relevant monitored parameters and instrument indications. 3. Compliance with GDC 15 requires that the reactor coolant system and associated auxiliary, control, and protection systems be designed with sufficient margin to assure that the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded during any condition of normal operation, including AOOs. The requirements of GDC 15 apply to mass addition events since the additional RCS inventory could pressurize the RCS. Without a significant addition of heat to the RCS water, the RCS would not pressurize to levels exceeding the shutoff head of the ECCS pumps, and therefore would not be expected to violate the RCS pressure safety limits. Similarly, without power generation (i.e., after reactor