Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 5691df7d-390d-4ce8-953e-bbdb0a812705
Document Type: srp
Title: REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1515/ML15159B086.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” the design should provide for manual, system-level actuation of critical safety functions. SRP BTP 7-19 provides guidance for the review of diversity and defense-in-depth. F. System testing and inoperable surveillance - See Appendix SRP 7.1-B, Subsections 4.9 and 4.10 or SRP Appendix 7.1-C, Subsections 5.7, 5.8, and 6.5. G. Use of digital systems - See SRP Appendix 7.0-A and SRP Appendix 7.1-D. H. Setpoint determination - See RG 1.105, “Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation,” and SRP BTP 7-12. 2. For review of a DC application, the reviewer should follow the above procedures to verify that the design, including requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters), set forth in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) meets the acceptance criteria. DCs have referred to the FSAR as the design control document. The reviewer should also consider the appropriateness of identified COL action items. The reviewer may identify additional COL action items; however, to ensure these COL action items are addressed during a COL application, they should be added to the DC FSAR. For review of a COL application, the scope of the review is dependent on whether the COL applicant references a DC, an early site permit or other NRC approvals (e.g., manufacturing license, site suitability report or topical report). 3. For review of both DC and COL applications, SRP Section 14.3 should be followed for the review of ITAAC. The review of ITAAC cannot be completed until after the completion of this section. III. EVALUATION FINDINGS The reviewer verifies that the applicant has provided sufficient information and that the review and calculations (if applicable) support conclusions of the following type to be included in the staff’s safety evaluation report (SER). The reviewer also states the bases for those conclusions. 1. The NRC staff concludes that the design of the RTS and RTS initiation of