Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 9e785a38-4746-4e32-949d-a145ddb95511
Document Type: srp
Title: MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE ANALYSIS FOR POSTULATED
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0520/ML052070491.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 6
Section ID: 6.2.1.4
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
discussed in the following paragraph. GDC 50 requires the containment structure and associated heat removal system to be designed with margin to accommodate any loss-of-coolant accident such that the containment design leak rate is not exceeded. SRP Section 6.2.1.4 applies the requirements of this GDC to postulated PWR secondary system pipe ruptures to assure that mass and energy inputs are appropriately conservative. A secondary system pipe rupture releases a significant amount of energy which potentially could damage the containment structure or associated systems. Containment, therefore, must be designed to definitively withstand this accident. Meeting GDC 50 will ensure that containment integrity is maintained under the most severe secondary system pipe rupture, thus precluding the release of radioactivity to the environment. III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The procedures described below are followed for the review of the mass and energy release analysis of secondary coolant systems pipe breaks. The reviewer selects and emphasizes material from these procedures as may be appropriate for a particular case. Portions of the review may be carried out on a generic basis or by applying the results of previous reviews of similar plants. The SCSB reviews the secondary coolant system pipe breaks analysis assumptions to determine 21 whether the "worst" pipe break accident case has been identified by the applicant, and whether the analysis was done in a conservative manner from the standpoint of containment pressure and temperature. This review involves the proposed methods and models used for blowdown analyses. The acceptability of the approach used by the applicant is evaluated based on the acceptance criteria in subsection II of this SRP section. The SCSB also reviews analyses of postulated single 22 failures of active components in the secondary systems, such as steam and feedwater line isolation valves and feedwater pumps, to determine whether the single failure has been