Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 22ccfd5e-c5d8-4615-a02c-32369aa9f533
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Acceptability of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities (Rev. 3)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1930/ML19308B636.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.200
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
Tables 5-2.1-2(a) to 5-2.1-10(j) SHA-A1 thru SHA-A5 -------------------- No objection -------------------- SHA-B1 thru SHA-B3 -------------------- No objection -------------------- SHA-C1 thru SHA-C4 -------------------- No objection -------------------- SHA-D1 thru SHA-D4 -------------------- No objection -------------------- SHA-E1, SHA- E2 -------------------- No objection -------------------- SHA-F1 thru SHA-F3 -------------------- No objection -------------------- Table 5-2.1- 8(g) See issue for Table 5- 2.1-1, HLR-SHA-G Clarification For further use in the SPRA, the spectral shape SHALL be based on a site-specific evaluation taking into account the contributions of deaggregated magnitude-distance results of the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. Broad-band, smooth spectral shapes, ... that would challenge these uniform hazard spectral shapes. SHA-G1 Spectral shapes used to evaluate in-structure SSC’s must include the effects of amplification from both local site conditions and SSI. Based on IPEEE reviews, certain UHS shapes used for CEUS were not appropriate for the screening purpose. Clarification NOTE HA-G1: The issue of which spectral shape should be used in the screening of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and in quantification of SPRA results requires careful consideration. For screening purposes, the spectral shape used should have amplification factors, including effects from both local site conditions as well as soil- structure interaction, such that the demand resulting from the use of this shape is higher than that based on the design spectra. This will preclude premature screening of components and will avoid anomalies such as the screened components (e.g., surrogate elements) being the dominant significant risk contributing components. Additional discussion DG-1362, Appendix A, Page A-36 Table A-5. Staff Position on ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 Part 5, Technical and Peer Review Requirements for At-Power Seismic Events Index No Issue