Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: bb233b69-c637-41e8-9774-95be0cc8b117
Document Type: srp
Title: STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0705/ML070550056.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 9
Section ID: 9.2.1
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ifying the applicant’s conclusion is necessary for acceptance. D. There are provisions to detect and control leakage of radioactive contamination into and out of the system. The design is acceptable if the system P&IDs show radiation monitors located on the system discharge and at components susceptible to leakage, and these components can be isolated by one automatic and one manual valve in series. E. Essential system portions are protected from the effects of high- and moderate-energy line breaks. Layout drawings are reviewed for the absence of high- or moderate-energy piping systems close to essential SWS portions or for protection from the effects of failure. The means for such protection are in SAR Section 3.6, and the procedures for reviewing this information are in the corresponding SRP sections. F. Essential components and subsystems necessary for safe shutdown can function as required in a loss of offsite power. The system design is acceptable if the SWS meets minimum system requirements as stated in the SAR, assuming a concurrent failure of a single, active component, including a single failure of an auxiliary electric power source. The SAR is reviewed to determine whether each SWS component or subsystem affected by the loss of offsite power system flow and heat transfer capability meets or exceeds minimum requirements. The results of failure modes and effects analyses are considered for assurance that the system meets these requirements. This verification of system functional reliability is acceptable. G. The essential service water supply is protected from potential failures or malfunctions caused by freezing, icing, and other adverse environmental conditions. SAR statements that safety grade heating sources fulfill this purpose, considering the equipment necessary for safe shutdown, are acceptable. 4. The SAR descriptive information, P&IDs, SWS drawings, and failure modes and effects analyses are reviewed for whether essential system portions can