Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: 4b0fa4a0-ce32-4f59-9360-9426826a668c
Document Type: srp
Title: Rev. 4 — June 1997
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0525/ML052500496.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 7
Section ID: 7
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mation provided in the design basis should be analyzed to confirm its consistency with the plant safety analysis, including the design basis event analysis of Chapter 15 of the SAR; the mechanical and electrical system designs; and other plant system designs. The design bases should not contain contradictory requirements. • Correctness — The information provided for the design basis items should be technically accurate. • Traceability — It should be possible to trace the information in each design basis item back to the safety analyses, plant system design documents, regulatory requirements, applicant/licensee commitments, or other plant documents. Rev. 4 — June 1997 SRP 7.1-B-3 • Unambiguity — The information provided for the design basis items, taken alone and in combination, should have one and only one interpretation. • Verifiability — The information provided for the design basis items should be stated or provided in such a way as to facilitate the establishment of verification criteria, and the performance of analyses and reviews of the various safety systems. In addition to these characteristics, the following should be noted about the parts of ANSI/IEEE Std 279 Section 3. Section 3(1) requires in part the identification of conditions that require protective action. This information should be consistent with the analysis provided in Chapter 15 of the SAR. BTP HICB-4 provides specific guidance on the failures and malfunctions that should be considered in identification of design basis events for systems that initiate and control auxiliary feedwater systems. BTP HICB-5 provides specific guidance on the reactivity control malfunctions that should be considered in the identification of conditions requiring protective action. The malfunctions assumed should be consistent with the control system failure modes described in Section 7.7 of the SAR and the reactivity control interlock functions described in Section 7.6 of the SAR. Section 3(2)