Document: NUREG-0800
Document ID: a397b98f-e122-4d15-8471-5259fb45b58b
Document Type: srp
Title: and BTP 11-6 since the use of durable and passive design features would provide
Source: NUREG-0800
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1305/ML13051A458.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 11
Section ID: 11.2
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ewed by the staff, or that the staff used alternative information or parameters in performing its independent evaluation. The following are examples of conclusions that will be included in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER), based on the approach and methods used by the applicant in demonstrating consistency with NRC guidance and acceptance criteria of SRP Section 11.2 and BTP 11-6. 1. The review confirmed the postulated radionuclide concentrations in the applicable failed components based on the default PWR fuel failure rate or BWR fuel release rate, and the effect of site hydrologic characteristics for those systems that have not been equipped with design features to mitigate the effect of tank and component failures. The selection of the failed tank and tank volume, radionuclide distributions and concentrations, total radioactive inventory, and assumed failure scenarios were found to be acceptable. The acceptance is based on the staff’'s review and independent evaluations confirming that the applicant has considered the appropriate plant systems, tanks and components assumed to fail, locations of tanks and components in the plant, appropriate credit for design features applied in mitigating the consequences of a tank BTP 11-6-17 Draft Revision 4 – August 2014 and component failures, and the assumed mechanism for the radioactivity to enter a surface water body or groundwater beyond the physical boundary of the building housing such systems. 2. For cases where design features were incorporated in mitigating the consequences of a failure of a tank and components, the staff found such features acceptable. The design features that were evaluated include steel liners or walls or dikes surrounding the failed tanks and their components and tank overflow and sump/drain provisions. The basis for the staff's acceptance is the capability of design features (Note: Staff should list and describe specific features in SER) to prevent the release of radioactivity from