Document: NRC Regulatory Guide
Document ID: 8322a959-849d-4ec6-926e-1f30ed96d71f
Document Type: regulatory_guide
Title: Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions (Rev. 0)
Source: NRC Regulatory Guide Division 1
Source URL: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0833/ML083300530.pdf
Revision Date: 2023-06
Chapter: 
Section ID: RG-1.22
CFR Part: 
CFR Title: 

Content:
ingle test. RG-1.22, Page 3 bypassed. In this case, the design should include provisions that prevent a complete bypass of any protective function and indicate the status of the protection system. The second major disadvantage is that certain actuated equipment may not be tested during reactor operation. In this case, it should be shown that there are compelling reasons for not testing the actuated equipment and the probability that the protection system will fail to initiate their operation is acceptably low. D. REGULATORY POSITION 1. The protection system should be designed to permit periodic testing to extend to and include the actuation devices and actuated equipment. a. The periodic tests should duplicate, as closely as practicable, the performance that is required of the actuation devices in the event of an accident. b. The protection system and the systems whose operation it initiates should be designed to permit testing of the actuation devices during reactor operation. 2. Acceptable methods of including the actuation devices in the periodic tests of the protection system are: a. Testing simultaneously all actuation devices and actuated equipment associated with each redundant protection system output signal; b. Testing all actuation devices and actuated equipment individually or in judiciously selected groups; c. Preventing the operation of certain actuated equipment during a test of their actuation devices; d. Providing the actuated equipment with more than one actuation device and testing individually each actuation device. Method a. set forth above is the preferable method of including the actuation devices in the periodic tests of the protection system. It shall be noted that the acceptability of each of the four above methods is conditioned by the provisions of regulatory positions 3 and 4 below. 3. Where the ability of a system to respond to a bona fide accident signal is intentionally bypassed for the purpose of performing a test during reactor