6o. 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
and  that  its  future  opportunity  lay  solely  in 
the  barren  regions  of  hotel  gossip  and  news- 
paper rumors.  The  commissioners  would  have 
merited  no  further  historical  mention  had  they 
not  unexpectedly  secured  a  most  important 
ally  —  John  A.  Campbell,  an  Associate  Justice 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
appointed  from  Alabama,  and  therefore  in  the 
confidence  and,  as  it  soon  turned  out,  in  the 
secret  interest  of  the  South  and  the  rebell- 
ion. Justice  Campbell  now  made  himself  the 
voluntary  intermediary  between  the  commis- 
sioners and  the  Secretary  of  State.  Owing  to 
his  station  and  his  professions,  Seward  gave 
him  undue  intimacy  and  confidence,  enabling 
Campbell,  under  guise  of  promoting  peace,  to 
give  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemies  of  the 
United  States,  in  violation  of  his  oath  and 
duty.  The  details  of  the  intrigue  rest  entirely 
upon  rebel  statements,  and  mainly  upon  those 
of  Campbell  himself,  who  gave  both  a  confi- 
dential and  a  semi-official  version  to  Jeffer- 
son Davis;  the  latter  Davis  transmitted  in  a 
special  message  to  the  Confederate  Congress 
to  "  fire  the  Southern  heart."  Campbell  having 
thus  made  his  share  of  the  transaction  official, 
and  having  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  stood 
before  the  public  accusing  Seward  and  the 
Lincoln  administration  of  "equivocating  con- 
duct "  and  "  systematic  duplicity,"  history  must 
adjudge  the  question  as  well  as  it  may  with 
the  help  of  his  own  testimony. 
It  has  already  been  stated  that  Seward's 
official  refusal  to  receive  the  commissioners 
was  being  prepared  at  the  State  Department. 
The  Assistant  Secretary  had  promised  to  send 
it  to  the  commissioners'  hotel.  The  commis- 
sioners thus  relate  the  beginning  of  Campbell's 
intrigue  : 
The  interview  between  Colonel  Pickett  and  the  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  State  occurred  on  Friday  morning 
the  14th  *  inst.  Immediately  thereafter,  and  within 
a  brief  space  of  time  after  Colonel  Pickett's  statement 
to  us,  the  Hon.  John  A.  Campbell,  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  sought  an  interview  with 
Mr.  Crawford  of  thiscommission, and  after  stating  what 
he  knew  to  be  the  wish  and  desire  of  Mr.  Seward  to 
preserve  the  peace  between  the  two  Governments, 
asked  if  there  could  be  no  further  delay  for  an  answer 
to  our  note  to  the  Government,  stating  at  the  same 
time  that  he  had  no  doubt  if  it  were  pressed  that  a 
most  positive  though  polite  rejection  would  be  the 
result,  t 
Commissioner  Crawford's  official  reply  to 
this  overture  is  best  described  by  Toombs's 
formula  that  he  should  "pertinaciously  de- 
mand "  the  evacuation  of  Sumter  and  mainte- 
nance of  the  "  status  "  elsewhere  ;  the  alterna- 
tive and  confidential  reply  we  can  only  con- 
jecture. But  it  may  well  be  presumed  that 
Campbell  fully  revealed  to  Crawford  his  sym- 
pathy with  the  rebellion  and  his  purpose  to  aid 
it,  and  that  he  was  in  return  thoroughly  in- 
structed in  the  game,  which  was  "  to  encour- 
age the  peace  element  in  the  fight,  and  at  least 
blow  up  the  Cabinet  on  the  question." 
Thus  instructed  and  prepared,  Justice  Camp- 
bell on  the  same  day  (March  14th  or  15th) 
made  a  voluntary  call  on  Mr.  Seward,  and  in 
the  general  conversation  which  he  induced 
evidently  played  his  part  of  the  game  of 
peace  and  reconciliation  with  consummate 
ability.  He  probably  painted  the  "  dreams 
which  we  know  are  not  to  be  realized"  in  such 
rosy  colors  as  to  call  forth  from  Seward  the 
hopeful  observation  "  that  a  civil  war  might  be 
prevented  by  the  success  of  my  [Campbell's] 
mediation."!  The  impression  upon  Seward 
that  Campbell  was  laboring  honestly  for  the 
preservation  of  the  Union  was  also  strength- 
ened by  his  having  brought  Justice  Nelson 
with  him,  to  whom  the  slightest  suspicion  of 
disloyalty  has  never  attached.  It  seems  clear 
that  these  professions  of  patriotic  zeal  threw 
Mr.  Seward  off  his  guard  as  to  Campbell's 
motives,  and  that  he  accepted  his  interven- 
tion as  a  Union  peacemaker,  not  as  a  rebel 
emissary. 
Seward  replied  confidentially,  "  that  it  was 
impossible  to  receive  the  commissioners  in 
any  diplomatic  capacity  or  character,  or  even 
to  see  them  personally."  Campbell  adds  that 
he  said  "  it  was  not  desirable  to  deny  them  or 
to  answer  them."  §  As  part  of  a  general  policy 
of  delay  and  avoidance  of  conflict  he  may  have 
said  and  meant  it :  as  an  immediate  and  urgent 
diplomatic  step  he  certainly  did  not  mean  it, 
because  his  Assistant  Secretary  had  already 
promised  to  send  the  answer  to  the  commis- 
sioners' hotel,  when  for  mere  temporary  delay 
dozens  of  expedients  might  have  been  used. 
Continuing  his  conversation  and  unguardedly 
enlarging  his  confidence,  Seward,  in  answer  to 
Campbell's  direct  inquiry,  ventured  the  opin- 
ion that  Sumter  would  be  evacuated  and 
collision  avoided  at  Charleston.  The  idea 
was  not  new ;  the  rumor  had  been  openly 
and  half-officially  printed  in  the  newspapers 
nearly  a  whole  week ;  the  commissioners  had 
telegraphed  it  to  Montgomery.  Campbell, 
however,  caught  eagerly  at  the  suggestion, 
and  proposed  to  write  the  peaceful  news  to 
Jefferson  Davis;  and  Seward,  with  a  momen- 
tary excess  of  enthusiasm,  authorized  him  (so 
Campbell  relates)  to  write:  "  Before  this  letter 
"The   almanac   shows    that    Friday  was   the   15th.  t  Commissioners   to  Toombs,  March  22,  1861.    Un- 
There  is,  therefore,  an  error  either  in  the  day  of  the  published  MS. 
week  or  day  of  the  month.  §  Campbell  to  Jefferson  Davis,  April  3,  1861.    Un- 
X  Campbell  to  .Seward.    "  Rebellion  Record."  published  MS.
PREMIER    OR   PRESIDENT? 
reaches  you  Sumter  will  be  evacuated,  or  the 
orders  will  have  issued  for  that  purpose  —  and 
no  change  is  contemplated  at  present  in  re- 
spect to  Pickens."*  Campbell  rushed  off  in  a 
fever  of  delight  to  tell  the  commissioners,  and 
magnified  the  confidence  to  the  proportions  of 
a  pledge.  The  incident  began  to  grow  more 
rapidly  than  the  story  of  the  three  black  crows. 
The  commissioners,  on  their  part,  hurried  a 
telegram  to  Montgomery : 
By  pressing  we  can  get  an  answer  to  our  official 
note  to-morrow.  If  we  do,  we  believe  it  will  be  adverse 
to  recognition  and  peace.  We  are  sure  that  within  five 
days  Sumter  will  be  evacuated.  We  are  sure  that  no 
steps  will  be  taken  to  change  the  military  status.  With 
a  few  days'  delay  a  favorable  answer  may  be  had.  Our 
personal  interests  command  us  to  press.  Duty  to  our 
country  commands  us  to  wait.    What  shall  we  do  ?  t 
To  all  of  which  Toombs  answered  lacon- 
ically, "  Wait  a  reasonable  time  and  then  ask 
for  instructions." 
It  is  needless  to  point  out  the  absurd  vari- 
ance of  this  announcement  with  Seward's  al- 
leged statement,  which  was  simply  an  opinion 
that  orders  would  be  issued  to  evacuate  Sum- 
ter within  five  days.  He  undoubtedly  believed 
every  word  of  this  at  the  moment.  Seward  was 
then,  as  he  declared  to  Lincoln  in  writing,  in  fa- 
vor of  evacuation ;  \  and  Scott's  written  draft 
of  an  order  to  that  effect,  under  date  of  the  nth, 
was  in  the  President's  hands.  The  President 
had  as  yet  announced  no  decision.  On  the 
15  th,  for  the  first  time,  the  Cabinet  voted  —  five 
to  evacuate,  two  to  attempt  to  supply.  Sew- 
ard still  had  every  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
necessity,  the  Cabinet  majority,  General  Scott's 
influence,  and  Lincoln's  desire  to  avoid  war 
would,  acting  together,  verify  his  prediction. 
Presuming  that  he  was  talking  to  a  friend  and 
not  an  enemy,  to  a  judge  and  not  an  advocate, 
to  a  Unionist  and  not  a  rebel,  he  undoubtedly 
and  properly  thought  his  words  were  received 
as  a  prediction,  and  not  as  a  pledge. 
The  five  days  elapsed,  but  Lincoln  sent  no 
order  to  Anderson,  and  announced  no  decision 
to  the  Cabinet.  He  was  still  patiently  seeking, 
and  had  not  found  his  way  out  of  the  dilemma. 
He  had  not  yet  beheld  "  the  salvation  of  the 
Lord."  He  was  neither  optimist  nor  pessimist. 
He  wished  to  decide,  not  upon  impulse  or  even 
necessity,  but  upon  judgment  and  advantage. 
He  was  neither  stubbornly  headstrong  nor 
cravenly  submissive.  If,  like  the  farmer  in  his 
favorite  illustration,  he  could  not  plow  through 
the  log,  perhaps  he  might  plow  around  it.    He 
was  meditating  on  the  visit  of  Fox  to  Sumter, 
of  Lamon  and  Hurlbut  to  Charleston  ;  he  was 
deliberating  about  a  diversion  upon  the  Vir- 
ginia convention;  above  all,  he  was  waiting 
to  hear  from  his  order  to  reenforce  Pickens, 
dispatched  on  the  12th  of  March.  His  Cabi- 
net ministers  did  not  yet  understand  him. 
Seward  on  the  one  hand,  and  Blair  on  the 
other,  unused  to  men  of  his  fiber,  began  to  fear 
this  was  vacillation,  indecision,  executive  in- 
competence. The  atmosphere  of  Washington 
had  hitherto  largely  produced  two  classes  of 
men — those  who  bluster  and  domineer,  those 
who  protest  and  yield.  Lincoln  belonged  to 
neither  class;  and  his  persistent  non-commit- 
tal, his  silent  hopefulness,  his  patient  and  well- 
considered  inaction,  baffled  their  prophecy. 
Such  tenacity  of  purpose,  combined  with  such 
reticence  of  declaration,  was  an  anomaly  in 
recent  Federal  administration. 
The  hopes  of  the  rebels,  so  unexpectedly 
inflated,  began  once  more  to  collapse.  Gov- 
ernor Pickens  sent  inquiries  to  the  commis- 
sioners. Toombs  telegraphed  them,  "  We  can't 
hear  from  you."§  Campbell  was  summoned 
and  dispatched  post-haste  to  the  State  De- 
partment. He  had  interviews  on  March  21st 
and  2 2d.  But  in  reality  Seward  was  no  wiser 
than  he  had  been  in  the  previous  interviews, 
and  could  only  repeat  his  beliefs  and  his  pre- 
dictions, and  declare,  in  his  philosophic  vein, 
that  "  governments  could  not  move  with  bank 
accuracy."  || 
For  a  third  time  the  conspirators  grew 
impatient,  and  again  Campbell,  on  Saturday, 
March  30th,  and  Monday,  April  1st,  went  to 
the  State  Department  as  the  messenger  of  re- 
bellion.^ By  this  time  Seward  had  real  infor- 
mation. A  second  Cabinet  vote  had  been  taken, 
on  March  29th,  in  which  the  majority  was 
reversed.  The  President  had  ordered  the 
preparation  of  the  Sumter  expedition;  and 
Seward  himself,  though  still  advising  the  aban- 
donment of  Sumter,  was  personally  preparing 
an  expedition  to  reenforce  Fort  Pickens. 
Seward  at  this  point  must  have  realized  how 
injudicious  he  had  been  to  give  Campbell  any 
confidence  whatever,  since  to  preserve  secrecy 
for  his  own  project  he  must  abruptly  break 
off  the  intimacy.  Perhaps  he  had  by  this  time 
divined  that  he  was  dealing  with  a  public  en- 
emy. At  all  events,  whatever  may  have  been 
his  reasons,  he  took  occasion  to  correct  any 
misunderstanding  which  might  previously  have 
sprung  up  by  giving  Campbell  a  written  mem- 
*  Campbell  to  Jefferson  Davis,  April  3,  1861.   Un-  %  Toombs  to  commissioners,  March  20,  1861.    Un- 
published MS.  published  MS. 
t  Commissioners  to  Toombs,  March  15,  1861.   Un-  ||  Commissioners  to  Toombs,  March  22,  1S61.    Un- 
published MS.  published  MS. 
X  Seward  to  Lincoln,  March  15,  1861.    Opinion  on  ^  Campbell  to  Seward.    "Rebellion  Record.'' 
Sumter.
604 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
orandum  (April  ist),  as  follows:  "The  Presi- 
dent may  desire  to  supply  Sumter,  but  will 
not  do  so  without  giving  notice  to  Governor 
Pickens";  adding  verbally  (Campbell  says) 
that  he  still  did  not  believe  the  attempt  would 
be  made,  and  that  there  was  no  design  to  reen- 
force  Sumter.  Campbell  acknowledges  that 
he  took  notice  of  this  very  important  correc- 
tion and  definition.  "  There  was  a  departure 
here  from  the  pledges  of  the  previous  month," 
he  writes  ;  "  but  with  the  verbal  explanation  I 
did  not  consider  it  a  matter  then  to  complain 
of."* 
The  commissioners  and  their  game  here 
drop  into  the  background,  and  Mr.  Justice 
Campbell  takes  up  the  role  of  leading  conspir- 
ator. History  will  ask,  Of  what  had  this  high 
minister  of  the  law  any  right  to  complain  ? 
Two  days  afterward  we  find  him  making  a 
confidential  report  to  the  insurrectionary  chief 
at  Montgomery,  as  follows : 
I  do  not  doubt  that  Sumter  will  be  evacuated 
shortly,  without  any  effort  to  supply  it;  but  in  respect 
to  Pickens  I  do  not  think  there  is  any  settled  plan,  and 
it  will  not  be  abandoned  spontaneously,  and  under  any 
generous  policy,  though  perhaps  they  may  be  quite 
willing  to  let  it  be  beleaguered  and  reduced  to  extrem- 
ities. I  can  only  infer  as  to  this.  All  that  I  have  is  a 
promise  that  the  status  will  not  be  attempted  to  be 
changed  prejudicially  to  the  Confederate  States  with- 
out notice  to  me.  It  is  known  that  I  make  these  assur- 
ances on  my  own  responsibility.  I  have  no  right  to 
mention  any  name  or  to  pledge  any  person.  I  am  the 
only  responsible  person  to  you,  I  consenting  to  accept 
such  assurances  as  are  made  to  me  and  to  say,  "  I 
have  confidence  that  this  will  or  will  not  be  done." 
I  have  no  expectation  that  there  will  be  bad  faith  in 
the  dealings  with  me. 
Xow  I  do  not  see  that  I  can  do  more.  I  have  felt 
them  in  a  variety  of  forms  as  to  the  practicability  of 
some  armistice  or  truce  that  should  be  durable  and  would 
relieve  the  anxiety  of  the  country.  But  at  present  there 
can  be  no  compact,  treaty,  recognition  of  any  kind. 
There  will  be  no  objection  to  giving  the  commissioners 
their  answer  ;  but  if  the  answer  is  not  called  for  it  will 
not  be  sent,  and  it  is  intimated  that  it  would  be  more 
agreeable  to  withhold  it.  So  far  as  I  can  judge,  the 
present  desire  is  to  let  things  remain  as  they  are,  with- 
out action  of  any  kind.  There  is  a  strong  indisposition 
for  the  call  of  Congress,  and  it  will  not  be  done  except 
under  necessity.  The  radicals  of  the  Senate  went  off 
in  anger,  and  Trumbull's  coercion  resolution  was  of- 
fered after  a  contumelious  interview  with  the  President. 
My  own  notion  is  that  the  inactive  policy  is  as  favor- 
able to  you  as  any  that  this  Administration  could  adopt 
for  you,  and  that  I  would  not  interrupt  it. 
Here  the  learned  judge  might  have  stopped, 
and  perhaps  would  have  left  posterity  to  ques- 
tion his  method  rather  than  his  motives.  But 
inexorable  History  demanded  her  tribute  of 
truth  :  under  her  master-spell  he  went  on,  and 
in  the  concluding  paragraph  of  the  letter  his 
own  hand  recorded  a  confession  little  to  have 
*  Campbell  to  Seward.      "  Rebellion  Record." 
t  Campbell  to  Jefferson  Davis,  April  3,  1861.    Un- 
published MS. 
%  Jefferson  Davis  to  Campbell,  April  6,  1861.  Un- 
published MS. 
been  expected  from  an  officer  whose  duty  it 
was  to  expound  and  to  administer  the  law  of 
treason  as  written  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  and  the  acts  of  Congress. 
The  great  want  [he  continued]  of  the  Confederate 
States  is  peace.  I  shall  remain  here  some  ten  or  fifteen 
days.  My  own  future  course  is  in  some  manner  de- 
pending upon  circumstances  and  the  opinions  of  friends. 
At  present  I  have  access  to  the  Administration  I  could 
not  have  except  under  my  present  relations  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  I  do  not  know  who  could  have  the  same 
freedom.  I  have  therefore  deferred  any  settlement  on 
the  subject  until  the  chance  of  being  of  service  at  this 
critical  period  has  terminated.  This  letter  is  strictly 
confidential  and  private,  t 
There  is  no  need  of  comment  on  this  "  aid 
and  comfort "  to  the  enemies  of  his  Govern- 
ment by  a  member  of  the  highest  court  of  the 
United  States.  It  only  remains  to  note  the 
acknowledgment  and  estimate  of  it  by  Jef- 
ferson Davis,  replying  from  Montgomery  un- 
der date  of  April  6th : 
Accept  my  thanks  for  your  kind  and  valuable  serv- 
ices to  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy  and  of  peace 
between  those  who,  though  separated,  have  many  rea- 
sons to  feel  towards  each  other  more  than  the  friend- 
ships common  among  nations.  Our  policy  is,  as  you  say, 
peace.  ...  In  any  event  I  will  gratefully  remember 
your  zealous  labor  in  a  sacred  cause,  and  hope  your 
fellow-citizens  may  at  some  time  give  you  acceptable 
recognition  of  your  service,  and  appreciate  the  hero- 
ism with  which  you  have  encountered  a  hazard  from 
which  most  men  would  have  shrunk.  \ 
While  this  direct  correspondence  between 
Davis  and  Campbell  was  being  carried  on, 
the  commissioners,  to  whom  Mr.  A.  B.  Roman 
had  been  sent  as  a  reenforcement,  were,  partly 
as  a  matter  of  form,  partly  for  ulterior  purposes, 
kept  in  Washington  by  the  Montgomery  cab- 
inet to  "loiterin  the  ante-chambers  of  officials." 
The  occupation  seems  to  have  grown  irksome 
to  them  ;  for,  nowise  deceived  or  even  en- 
couraged by  Campbell's  pretended  "  pledges," 
they  asked,  under  date  of  March  26th, 
"  whether  we  shall  dally  longer  with  a  Gov- 
ernment hesitating  and  doubting  as  to  its  own 
course,  or  shall  we  demand  our  answer  at 
once  ?  "  §  On  April  2d,  Toombs  gave  them 
Jefferson  Davis's  views  at  length.  He  thought 
the  policy  of  Mr.  Seward  would  prevail.  He 
cared  nothing  for  Seward's  motives  or  calcu- 
lations. So  long  as  the  United  States  neither 
declare  war  nor  establish  peace,  "  it  affords 
the  Confederate  States  the  advantages  of  both 
conditions,  and  enables  them  to  make  all  the 
necessary  arrangements  for  the  public  defense, 
and  the  solidifying  of  their  Government,  more 
safely,  cheaply,  and  expeditiously  than  they 
could  were  the  attitude  of  the  United  States 
more  definite  and  decided."  ||  The  commis- 
si Commissioners  to  Toombs,  March  26,  1861.  Un- 
published MS. 
||  Toombs  to  commissioners,  April  2,  1861.  Un- 
published MS.
PREMIER    OR   PRESIDENT? 
A.  B.  ROMAN,  CONFEDERATE  COMMISSIONER. 
(FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  BY  BRADY.) 
sioners  were  therefore  to  make  no  demand  for 
their  answer,  but  maintain  their  present  posi- 
tion. In  view  of  this  confident  boast  of  the 
chief  of  the  rebellion  of  "  the  advantages  of 
both  conditions,"  his  subsequent  accusation 
of  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  the  Lincoln  admin- 
istration is  culminating  proof  of  the  insincerity 
and  tortuous  methods  of  the  rebel  game. 
VIRGINIA. 
Civil  war,  though  possible,  did  not  at  the 
moment  seem  imminent  or  necessary :  Lincoln 
had  declared  in  his  inaugural  that  he  would 
not  begin  it ;  Jefferson  Davis  had  written  in 
his  instructions  to  the  commissioners  that  he 
did  not  desire  it.  This  threw  the  immediate 
contest  back  upon  the  secondary  question  — 
the  control  and  adhesion  of  the  border  slave- 
States  ;  and  of  these  Virginia  was  the  chief  sub- 
ject of  solicitude.  The  condition  of  Virginia 
had  become  anomalous ;  it  was  little  under- 
stood by  the  North,  and  still  less  by  her  own 
citizens.  She  retained  all  the  ideal  sentiment 
growing  out  of  her  early  devotion  to  and  sac- 
rifices for  the  Union ;  but  it  was  warped  by 
her  coarser  and  stronger  material  interest  in 
slavery.  She  still  deemed  she  was  the  mother 
of  presidents ;  whereas  she  had  degenerated 
into  being,  like  other  border  States,  the  moth- 
er of  slave-breeders  and  of  an  annual  crop  of 
black-skinned  human  chattels  to  be  sold  to  the 
cotton,  rice,  and  sugar  planters  of  her  neighbor- 
ing commonwealths.  She  thought  herself  the 
leader  of  the  South ;  whereas  she  was  only  a 
dependent  of  the  Gulf  States.  She  yet  believed 
Vol.  XXXV.— 82. 
herself  the  teacher  of  original  statesmanship  ; 
whereas  she  had  become  the  unreasoning  fol 
lower  of  Calhoun's   disciples  —  the  Ruffins, 
the  Rhctts,  and  the  Yanceys  of  the  ultra 
South. 
The  political  demoralization  of  Virginia  was 
completed  by  the  John  Brown  raid.  From  that 
time  she  dragged  her  anchors  of  state ;  her 
faith  in  both  constitution  and  liberty  was  gone. 
The  true  lesson  of  that  affair  was  indeed 
the  very  reverse.  The  overwhelming  popular 
sentiment  of  the  North  denounced  the  outrage ; 
the  national  arms  defended  Virginia  and  sup- 
pressed the  invasion;  the  State  vindicated  her 
local  authority  by  hanging  the  captured  offend- 
ers. Thus  public  opinion,  Federal  power,  and 
State  right  united  in  a  precedent  amounting 
of  itself  to  an  absolute  guaranty,  but  which 
might  have  been  easily  crystallized  into  statute 
or  even  constitutional  law.  Sagacious  states- 
manship would  have  plucked  this  flower  of 
safety.  On  the  contrary,  her  blind  partisanship 
spurned  the  opportunity,  distrusted  govern- 
ment, and  sought  refuge  in  force.  Her  then 
governor  confesses  that  from  that  period 
we  began  to  prepare  for  the  worst.  We  looked  care- 
fully to  the  State  armory ;  and  whilst  we  had  the 
selection  of  the  State  quota  of  arms  we  were  particular 
to  take  field  ordnance  instead  of  altered  muskets  ;  and 
when  we  left  the  gubernatorial  chair,  there  were  in  the 
State  armory  at  Richmond  85,000  stand  of  infantry 
arms  and  130  field-pieces  of  artillery,  besides  $3o,oco 
worth  of  new  revolving  arms  purchased  from  Colt. 
Our  decided  opinion  was  that  a  preparation  of  the 
Southern  States  in  full  panoply  of  arms,  and  prompt  ac- 
tion, would  have  prevented  civil  war.* 
*  Wise,  "  Seven  Decades." 
JOHN    FORSYTH,    CONFEDERATE    COMMISSIONER. 
(FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    BY    BRADY.)
6o6 
ABRAHAM  LIXCOLX. 
'^m^m 
MARTIN  J.  CRAWFORD,  CONFEDERATE  COMMISSIONER. 
(FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  BY  BRADY.) 
Many  strong  external  signs  indicated  the 
persistent  adherence  of  Virginia  to  the  Union. 
Her  legislature  refused  the  proposition  of  South 
Carolina  for  a  conference  of  the  Southern 
States,  made  in  the  winter  of  1859-60.  In  the 
presidential  election  her  citizens  voted  over- 
whelmingly for  Bell  and  Everett  and  their 
platform  of"  The  Union,  the  Constitution,  and 
the  enforcement  of  the  laws."  Notwithstand- 
ing these  manifestations  of  allegiance,  public 
sentiment  took  on  a  tone  and  a  determination 
which,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  was  rebell- 
ion in  guise  of  loyalty.  It  is  perhaps  best  il- 
lustrated by  the  declaration  of  ex-Governor 
Wise  that  he  meant  to  fight  in  the  Union,* 
not  out  of  it.  To  the  nation  at  large  the  phrase 
had  a  pretty  and  patriotic  sound ;  but  when 
explained  to  be  a  determination  to  fight  the 
Federal  Government  "in  the  Union,"  it  be- 
comes as  rank  treason  as  secession  itself. 
However  counterfeit  logic  or  mental  reser- 
vations concealed  it,  the  underlying  feeling 
was  to  fight,  no  matter  whom,  and  little  mat- 
ter how,  for  the  protection  of  slavery  and  slave 
property.  In  this  spirit  Virginia  continued 
her  military  preparations.  To  this  end  half  a 
million  dollars  were  voted  in  the  winter  of 
1859-60,  and  a  million  more  in  that  of  1S60 
-61.  Commissioners  were  appointed  to  pur- 
chase arms;  companies  were  raised,  officers 
appointed,  regiments  organized,  camps  of  in- 
struction formed.  It  was  one  of  these  that 
Floyd  sent  Hardee  to  inspect  and  drill  in  No- 
vember, i860.  Before  the  end  of  January,  this 
appeal  to  military  strength  by  Virginia  was 
duly  paraded  in  the  United  States  Senate  as 
a  menace,  to  extort  a  compromise  and  consri- 
tutional  guarantees  for  slavery.  Nor  did  the 
threat  seem  an  empty  one.  The  State  professed 
to  have  an  actual  army  of  62  troops  of  cavalry, 
numbering  2547  men;  14  companies  of  artil- 
lery, numbering  820  men;  and  149  companies 
of  infantry,  numbering  7180  men.  All  these 
were  uniformed  and  armed ;  while  6000  men 
additional  were  formed  into  companies,  ready 
to  have  arms  put  into  their  hands,  f 
Governor  Letcher,  the  successor  of  Wise, 
had  begun  his  administration  with  the  an- 
nounced belief  that  disunion  was  "  not  only  a 
possible  but  a  highly  probable  event."  t  The 
defeat  of  his  favorite,  Douglas,  and  the  success 
of  Lincoln,  served  therefore  as  a  pretended 
justification  of  his  fears,  if  not  an  actual  stim- 
ulant of  his  hopes.  The  presidential  election 
was  scarcely  over  when  he  called  an  extra  ses- 
sion of  the  legislature,  to  "take  into  considera- 
tion the  condition  of  public  affairs  "  consequent 
on  the  excitement  produced  by  "  the  election 
of  sectional  candidates  for  President  and  Vice- 
President."!  |  That  body  met  January  7,  1861 ; 
the  doctrine  of  non-coercion,  South  Caro- 
lina secession,  and  the  Fort  Sumter  affair 
had  become  every-day  topics,  and  the  South 
generally  was  in  a  seething  ferment.  On  Fed- 
eral affairs  Governor  Letcher's  message  was  a 
medley  of  heterogeneous  and  contradictory  ar- 
guments and  recommendations.  He  declared 
a  disruption  of  the  Union  inevitable.  He 
desired  a  national  convention.  He  thought 
that  four  republics  might  be  formed.  He 
scolded  South  Carolina  for  her  precipitate  ac- 
tion. He  joined  a  correct  and  a  false  quota- 
tion of  Lincoln's  sentiments.  He  opposed  a 
State  convention.  He  recommended  sending 
commissioners  to  other  slave-States.  He  pro- 
posed terms  to  the  North,  and  thought  they 
•  As  to  parting  from  the  Union  in  my  affections,  I 
shall  never  do  that.  As  to  leaving  its  flag,  -whenever  I 
leave  this  confederacy,  this  north  star  confederacy, 
which  makes  the  needle  tremble  northward,  sir,  I  shall 
carry  the  old  flag  of  the  Union  out  with  me;  and  if 
ever  I  have  to  fight, —  so  help  me,  God  !  —  I  will  fight 
with  the  star-spangled  banner  still  in  one  hand  and  my 
mu-ket  in  the  other.  I  will  never  take  any  South- 
ern cross  or  any  palmetto  for  my  flag.  I  will  never 
admit  that  a  Yankee  can  drive  me  from  the  Union  and 
take  from  me  our  capital.  I  will  take  from  him  forts; 
I  will  take  from  him  flags ;  1  will  take  from  him  our 
capital ;  I  will  take  from  him,  if  I  can,  my  whole  country, 
and  save  the  whole.  Will  that  satisfy  the  gentleman  as 
to  fighting  in  the  Union  ?  *'  [Speech  of  H.  A.  Wise 
in  the  Virginia  Convention,  April  10,  1861.  "Rich- 
mond Enquirer."] 
f  Report  Adj. -General  of  Virginia,  Feb.  27,  1S61. 
+  Inaugural  message,  Jan.  7,  i860. 
||  Governor  Letcher,  proclamation,  Nov.  15,  i860.
PREMIER    OR   PRESIDENT? 
would  be  "  freely,  cheerfully,  and  promptly  as- 
sented to."  He  said,"  Let  the  New  England 
States  and  western  New  York  be  sloughed 
off."  He  wanted  railroads  to  Kansas  and  di- 
rect trade  to  Europe.  And  finally  he  summed 
up :  "  Events  crowd  upon  each  other  with  as- 
tonishing rapidity.  The  scenes  of  to-day  are 
dissolved  by  the  developments  of  to-morrow. 
The  opinions  now  entertained  may  be  totally 
revolutionized  by  unforeseen  and  unanticipated 
occurrences  that  an  hour  or  a  day  may  bring 
forth."  The  simple  truth  was,  that  in  Governor 
Letcher's  hands  the  "  Old  Dominion "  was 
adrift  towards  rebellion  without  rudder  or  com- 
pass. 
His  quarrel  with  South  Carolina  turned 
upon  an  important  point.  The  irascible  Pal- 
metto State  was  offended  that  Virginia  had  a 
year  before  rejected  her  proposal  for  a  South- 
ern conference.  In  retaliation  she  now  inti- 
mated that  she  would  help  to  destroy  Virginia's 
slave-market.  "The  introduction  of  slaves 
from  other  States,"  said  her  governor,  "  which 
may  not  become  members  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy,  and  particularly  the  border 
States,  should  be  prohibited  by  legislative 
enactment,  and  by  this  means  they  will  be 
brought  to  see  that  their  safety  depends  upon 
a  withdrawal  from  their  enemies,  and  a  union 
with  their  friends  and  natural  allies."  *  Missis- 
sippi made  a  similar  threat.  "  As  itis  more  than 
probable,"  said  her  executive,  "that  many  of 
the  citizens  of  the  border  States  may  seek  a 
market  for  their  slaves  in  the  cotton-States,  I 
recommend  the  passage  of  an  act  prohibiting 
the  introduction  of  slaves  into  this  State  unless 
their  owners  come  with  them  and  become  cit- 
izens, and  prohibiting  the  introduction  of  slaves 
for  sale  by  all  persons  whomsoever."  Gov- 
ernor Letcher  grew  very  indignant  over  these 
declarations.  "  These  references  to  the  border 
States,"  said  he,  "  are  pregnant  with  meaning, 
and  no  one  can  be  at  a  loss  to  understand  what 
that  meaning  is.  While  disavowing  any  un- 
kind feeling  towards  South  Carolina  and  Mis- 
sissippi, I  must  still  say  that  I  will  resist  the 
coercion  of  Virginia  into  the  adoption  of  a  line 
of  policy  whenever  the  attempt  is  made  by 
Northern  or  Southern  States."  f 
Incensed  against  the  North  and  distrustful 
of  the  South,  the  governor  pushed  forward  his 
military  preparations.  Especially  did  he  cast 
a  longing  eye  at  Fort  Monroe.  "As  far  back 
as  January  8th  "  (1861),  says  he,  "  I  consulted 
with  a  gentleman  whose  position  enabled 
him  to  know  the  strength  of  that  fortress, 
and  whose  experience  in  military  matters  en- 
abled him  to  form  an  opinion  as  to  the  number 
of  men  that  would  be  required  to  capture  it. 
He  represented  it  to  be  one  of  the  strongest 
fortifications  in  the  world,  and  expressed  his 
doubts  whether  it  could  be  taken  unless  as- 
sailed by  water  as  well  as  by  land,  and  simul- 
taneously."! Since  Governor  Letcher  had 
neither  a  fleet  nor  a  properly  equipped  army, 
he  did  not  follow  up  this  design.  The  discus- 
sion of  the  project,  however,  illustrates  the 
condition  of  his  allegiance  to  the  flag  of  his 
country  and  the  constitution  he  was  then  un- 
der oath  to  uphold. 
Like  the  governor,  the  legislature  at  once- 
put  itself  in  an  attitude  of  quasi-rebellion  by 
resolving,  on  the  second  day  of  the  session, 
that  it  would  resist  any  attempt  of  the  Federal 
Government  to  coerce  a  seceding  State.  It 
soon  passed  an  act  to  assemble  a  convention ; 
and  by  a  large  appropriation  for  defense,  al- 
ready mentioned,  by  issuing  treasury  notes, 
JOHN    LETCHER,    GOVERNOR    OF    VIRGINIA. 
(FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    BY   A.    A.    TURNER.) 
by  amending  the  militia  laws,  and  by  author- 
izing counties  to  borrow  money  to  purchase 
arms,  and  especially  by  its  debates,  further  fos- 
tered and  stimulated  the  prevailing  secession 
undertow  during  the  whole  of  its  extra  session, 
from  January  7th  to  April  4th. 
The  election  for  a  convention  was  held  Feb- 
ruary 4th,  and  provoked  a  stirring  contest.  Its 
result  was  apparently  for  union ;  the  Lnion 
members  claimed  a  majority  of  three  to  one. 
This  was,  however,  evidently  an  exaggerated 
estimate.  The  precise  result  could  not  be  well 
defined.  Politics  had  become  a  Babel.  Dis- 
cussion was   a  mere    confusion    of  tongues. 
*  Governor  Gist,  message. 
t  Governor  Letcher,  message,  Jan.  7,  1S61. 
X  Governor  Letcher,  message,  Dec.  2,  1S61.
6o8 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
Party  organization  was  swallowed  up  in  in- 
trigue ;  and  conspiracy,  not  constitutional 
majorities,  became  the  basis  and  impulse  of 
legislation. 
The  Virginia  convention  met  February 
13th,  and  its  proceedings  reflect  a  maze  of 
1  >ose  declamation  and  purposeless  resolves. 
It  had  no  fixed  mind,  and  could,  therefore, 
form  no  permanent  conclusion.  The  prevail- 
ing idea  of  the  majority  seemed  to  be  expressed 
in  a  single  phrase  of  one  of  its  members,  that 
"  he  would  neither  be  driven  by  the  North 
nor  dragged  by  the  cotton-States."  It  was 
virtually  a  mere  committee  of  observation,  wait- 
ing the  turn  of  political  winds  and  tides.  It 
gave,  however,  two  encouraging  though  neg- 
ative signs  of  promise ;  the  first,  that  it  had 
undoubtedly  been  chosen  by  a  majority  of 
voters  really  attached  to  the  Union  and  de- 
siring to  remain  in  it;  the  second,  that  during 
a  session  of  well-nigh  a  month  it  had  not  as 
yet  passed  an  ordinance  of  secession,  which 
had  so  far  been  a  quick  result  in  other  State 
conventions. 
As  said  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  the 
course  of  the  border  States,  and  especially  of 
Virginia,  was  on  all  hands  the  subject  of  chief 
solicitude.  Her  cooperation  was  absolutely 
essential  to  the  secession  government  at  Mont- 
gomery. This  point,  though  not  proclaimed 
was  understood  by  Jefferson  Davis,  and  to 
powerful  intrigues  from  that  quarter  many 
otherwise  unaccountable  movements  may 
doubtless  be  ascribed.  Neither  was  her  ad- 
herence to  the  Union  undervalued  by  Lincoln. 
Seward  was  deeply  impressed  both  with  the 
necessity  and  the  possibility  of  saving  her  from 
secession  "as  a  brand  from  the  burning."  He 
relied  (too  confidently,  as  the  event  proved) 
on  the  significance  of  the  late  popular  vote. 
He  sent  an  agent  to  Richmond,  who  brought 
him  hopeful  news.  He  had  already  proposed 
to  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  Virginia  Union- 
ists by  advising  Lincoln  to  nominate  George 
W.  Summers  to  fill  the  existing  vacancy  on 
the  bench  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court.* 
Under  his  prompting,  no  doubt,  Lincoln  now 
perhaps  thought  it  possible  to  bring  his  per- 
sonal influence  to  bear  on  the  Virginia  con- 
vention. He  authorized  Seward  to  invite 
Summers,  or  some  equally  influential  and  de- 
termined Union  leader,  to  come  to  Washington. 
It  is  not  likely  that  he  had  any  great  faith  in 
such  an  effort;  for  the  refusal  or  neglect  of 
Sr;ott,  Gilmer,  and  Hunt  to  accept  a  cabi- 
net appointment,  offered  each  of  them  with 
more  or  less  distinctness,  had  proved  that 
Southern  Unionism  of  this  type  was  mere  lip- 
service  and  not  a  living  principle.    It  so  turned 
*Sewardto  Lincoln,  March  9,  1861.  Unpublished 
MS. 
JOHN  MINOR  BOTTS. 
(FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  BY  BRADY.) 
out  in  this  instance.  Summers,  pleading  im- 
portant business  in  the  convention,  excused 
himself  from  coming.  It  would  appear,  how- 
ever, that  he  and  others  selected  one  John  B. 
Baldwin  as  a  proper  representative,  who  came 
to  Washington  and  had  an  interview  with  the 
President  on  the  morning  of  April  4,  1861. 
There  is  a  direct  conflict  of  evidence  as  to 
what  occurred  at  this  interview.  The  witnesses 
are  Mr.  Baldwin  himself  and  Mr.  John  Minor 
Botts,  both  of  whom  gave  their  testimony 
under  oath  before  the  Reconstruction  Com- 
mittee of  Congress  in  1866,  after  the  close  of 
the  war. 
Mr.  Botts  testifies  that  on  the  7th  of  April 
he  called  upon  the  President,  who  related  to 
him,  in  confidence,  that  a  week  or  ten  days 
previously  he  had  written  to  Summers  to  come 
to  Washington,  and  he,  instead  of  obeying 
the  summons,  had,  after  that  long  delay,  sent 
Baldwin.  On  Baldwin's  arrival  (on  the  5th  of 
April,  as  Botts  relates  the  story)  Lincoln  took 
him  into  a  private  room  in  the  Executive 
Mansion,  and  said  to  him  in  substance: 
Mr.  Baldwin,  why  did  you  not  come  here  sooner? 
I  have  been  waiting  and  expecting  some  of  you  gentle- 
men of  that  convention  to  come  to  me  for  more  than  a 
week  past.  I  had  a  most  important  proposition  to  make 
to  you.  But  I  am  afraid  you  have  come  too  late.  How- 
ever, I  will  make  the  proposition  now.  We  have  in 
Fort  Sumter,  with  Major  Anderson,  about  eighty  men. 
Their  provisions  are  nearly  exhausted.  I  have  not  only 
written  to  Governor  Pickens,  but  I  have  sent  a  special 
messenger t  to  him  to  say  that  I  will  not  permit  these 
tThis  messenger  was  not  sent  until  the  evening  of 
April  6th.
PREMIER    OR   PRESIDENT? 
Eeople  to  starve ;  that  I  shall  send  them  provisions.  If 
e  fires  on  that  vessel,  he  will  fire  upon  an  unarmed 
vessel  loaded  with  bread.  But  I  shall  at  the  same  time 
send  a  fleet  along  with  her,  with  instructions  not  to  en- 
ter the  harbor  of  Charleston  unless  that  vessel  is  fired 
into ;  and  if  she  is,  then  the  fleet  is  to  enter  the  harbor 
and  protect  her.  Now,  Mr.  Baldwin,  that  fleet  is  now 
lying  in  the  harbor  of  New  York,  and  will  be  ready  to 
sail  this  afternoon  at  5  o'clock ;  and  although  I  fear  it 
is  almost  too  late,  yet  I  will  submit  the  proposition 
which  I  intended  when  I  sent  for  Mr.  Summers. 
Your  convention  in  Richmond  has  been  sitting  now 
nearly  two  months,  and  all  that  they  have  done  has 
been  to  shake  the  rod  over  my  head.  You  have  recently 
taken  a  vote  in  the  Virginia  convention  on  the  right 
of  secession,  which  was  rejected  by  ninety  to  forty-five, 
a  majority  of  two-thirds,  showing  the  strength  of  the 
Union  party  in  that  convention.  If  you  will  go  back 
to  Richmond,  and  get  that  Union  majority  to  adjourn 
and  go  home  without  passing  the  ordinance  of  seces- 
sion, so  anxious  am  I  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace 
of  this  country,  and  to  save  Virginia  and  the  other 
border  States  from  going  out,  that  I  will  take  the  re- 
sponsibility of  evacuating  Fort  Sumter,  and  take  the 
chance  of  negotiating  with  the  cotton-States. 
Mr.  Botts  here  asked  how  Baldwin  received 
that  proposition. 
Sir  [replied  Lincoln,  with  a  gesture  of  impatience], 
he  would  not  listen  to  it  for  a  moment;  he  hardly 
treated  me  with  civility.  He  asked  me  what  I  meant 
by  an  adjournment ;  did  I  mean  an  adjournment  sine 
die?  Why,  of  course,  Mr.  Baldwin,  said  I.  I  mean 
an  adjournment  sine  die.  I  do  not  mean  to  assume 
such  a  responsibility  as  that  of  surrendering  that  fort 
to  the  people  of  Charleston  upon  your  adjournment, 
and  then  for  you  to  return  in  a  week  or  ten  days  and 
pass  your  ordinance  of  secession. 
Mr.  Botts  then  relates  that  he  asked  per- 
mission of  the  President  to  go  himself  and 
submit  that  proposition  to  the  Union  mem- 
bers of  the  convention,  but  that  Lincoln  re- 
plied it  was  too  late,  the  fleet  had  sailed.  Fur- 
ther, that  Baldwin  returned  to  Richmond 
without  even  disclosing  the  President's  offer; 
and  that  he  eventually  became  an  active  se- 
cessionist, and  held  a  commission  in  the  rebel 
army.* 
On  the  material  point  Baldwin's  testimony 
is  directly  to  the  contrary.  He  states  that 
Seward's  messenger  reached  Richmond  April 
3d;  that  at  the  request  of  Summers  he  im- 
mediately returned  with  him  to  Washington 
and  called  on  the  President  on  the  morning 
of  April  4th ;  that  Lincoln  took  him  into  a 
private  room  and  said,  in  substance :  "lam 
afraid  you  have  come  too  late;  I  wish  you 
could  have  been  here  three  or  four  days  ago. 
Why  do  you  not  adjourn  the  Virginia  conven- 
tion ?  "  "  Adjourn  it  how  ?  "  asked  Baldwin. 
"  Do  you  mean  sine  die  ?  "  "  Yes,"  said  Lincoln ; 
sine  die.  Why  do  you  not  adjourn  it?  It  is  a 
*  Testimony  of  John  Minor  Botts.  Report  of  the  Joint 
Committee  on  Reconstruction,  1st  sess.  39th  Cong. 
t  Testimony  of  John  B.  Baldwin.  Report  of  the  Joint 
Committee  on  Reconstruction,  1st  sess.  39th  Cong. 
Vol.  XXXV.— 83. 
standing  menace  to  me  which  embarrasses 
me  very  much." 
Baldwin  then  relates  how  he  made  a  gran- 
diloquent speech  to  the  President  about  the 
balance  of  power,  the  safeguards  of  the  Con- 
stitution, and  the  self-respect  of  the  conven- 
tion; that  the  Union  members  had  a  clear 
majority  of  nearly  three  to  one ;  they  were  con- 
trolling it  for  conservative  results,  and  desired 
to  have  their  hands  upheld  by  a  conciliatory 
policy ;  that  if  he  had  the  control  of  the  Presi- 
dent's thumb  and  finger  for  five  minutes  he 
could  settle  the  whole  question.  He  would 
issue  a  proclamation,  call  a  national  conven- 
tion, and  withdraw  the  forces  from  Sumter  and 
Pickens.  But  Mr.  Baldwin  declares  and  reit- 
erates that  he  received  from  Mr.  Lincoln  "  no 
pledge,  no  undertaking,  no  offer,  no  promise 
of  any  sort."  "  I  am  as  clear  in  my  recollec- 
tions," he  says,  "  as  it  is  possible  to  be  under 
the  circumstances,  that  he  made  no  such  sug- 
gestion as  I  understood  it,  and  said  nothing 
from  which  I  could  infer  it."  t  % 
A  careful  analysis  and  comparison  with  es- 
tablished data  show  many  discrepancies  and 
errors  in  the  testimony  of  both  these  witnesses. 
Making  due  allowances  for  the  ordinary  de- 
fects of  memory,  and  especially  for  the  strong 
personal  and  political  bias  and  prejudice  under 
which  they  both  received  their  impressions, 
the  substantial  truth  probably  lies  midway 
between  their  extreme  contradictory  state- 
ments. The  actual  occurrence  may  therefore 
be  summed  up  about  as  follows : 
Mr.  Seward  had  an  abiding  faith  in  the 
Unionism  and  latent  loyalty  of  Virginia  and 
the  border  States.  He  wished  by  conciliation 
to  re-awaken  and  build  it  up;  and  thereby  not 
merely  retain  these  States,  but  make  them  the 
instruments,  and  this  feeling  the  agency,  to 
undermine  rebellion  and  finally  reclaim  the 
cotton- States.  Lincoln  did  not  fully  share  this 
optimism;  nevertheless  he  desired  to  avoid 
actual  conflict,  and  was  willing  to  make  any  ex- 
perimental concession  which  would  not  involve 
the  actual  loss  or  abandonment  of  military  or 
political  advantage.  The  acts  of  the  previous 
Administration  had  placed  Fort  Sumter  in  a 
peril  from  which,  so  the  military  authorities 
declared,  he  could  not  extricate  it.  His  Cab- 
inet advised  its  evacuation.  Public  opinion 
would  justify  him  in  sacrificing  the  fort  to  save 
the  garrison.  He  had  ordered  Fort  Pickens 
reenforced;  he  was  daily  awaiting  news  of 
the  execution  of  his  announced  policy  to 
"  hold,  occupy,  and  possess  "  the  Government 
posts.  Pickens  once  triumphantly  secured,  the 
%  The  article  "  A  Piece  of  Secret  History,"  in  the 
"Atlantic  Monthly"  for  April,  1875,  contains  only 
the  substance  of  Baldwin's  testimony  before  the  Re- 
construction Committee.
6io 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
loss  of  Sumter  could  be  borne.  But  might  not 
the  loss  oi  Sumter  be  compensated?  Might 
he  not  utilize  that  severe  necessity,  and  make 
it  the  lever  to  procure  the  adjournment  of  the 
Virginia  convention,  which,  to  use  his  own 
figure,  was  daily  shaking  the  rod  over  his  head  ? 
This  we  may  assume  was  his  reasoning  and 
purpose  when  about  March  20th,  either  directly 
or  through  Seward,  he  invited  Summers,  the 
acknowledged  leader  of  the  Union  members 
of  the  convention,  to  Washington. 
Summers,  however,  hesitated,  delayed,  and 
finally  refused  to  come.  His  plea  of  business 
was  evidently  a  pretext,  not  a  valid  excuse. 
Meanwhile  things  had  changed.  The  anxiously- 
looked-for  news  of  the  reenforcement  of  Fort 
Pickens  did  not  arrive.  The  Cabinet  once  more 
voted,  and  changed  its  advice.  The  President 
ordered  the  preparation  of  the  Sumter  expedi- 
tion. A  second  expedition  to  Fort  Pickens 
had  been  begun.  Another  perplexing  com- 
plication, to  be  hereafter  mentioned,  had  oc- 
curred. At  this  juncture  Baldwin  made  his 
appearance,  but  clearly  he  had  come  too  late. 
By  this  time  (April  4,  1861)  his  presence  was 
an  embarrassment,  and  not  a  relief.  Fully  to 
inform  him  of  the  situation  was  hazardous,  im- 
possible; to  send  him  back  without  explana- 
tion was  impolite  and  would  give  alarm  at 
Richmond.  Lincoln  therefore  opened  conver- 
sation with  him,  manifesting  sufficient  personal 
trust  to  explain  what  he  intended  to  have  told 
Summers.  This  called  forth  Baldwin's  dog- 
matic and  dictatorial  rejoinder,  from  which 
Lincoln  discovered  two  things:  first,  that  Bald- 
win was  only  an  embryo  secessionist;  and,  sec- 
ond, that  the  Virginia  convention  was  little 
else  than  a  warming-pan  for  the  rebellion. 
Hence  the  abrupt  termination  of  the  interview, 
and  the  unexplained  silence  at  Richmond. 
PREMIER    OR    PRESIDENT  ? 
At  noon  on  the  29th  of  March  the  Cabinet 
assembled  and  once  more  took  up  the  all-ab- 
sorbing question  of  Sumter.  All  the  elements 
of  the  problem  were  now  before  them — Ander- 
son's condition  and  the  prospects  of  relief  as 
newly  reported  by  Fox ;  the  state  of  public 
opinion  in  Charleston  as  described  by  Hurl- 
but;  the  Attorney-General's  presentation  of 
the  legal  aspects  of  an  attempt  at  collecting 
the  customs  on  shipboard  ;  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury's  statement  of  the  condition  and 
resources  of  the  revenue  service ;  the  report 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  as  to  what  ships 
of  war  he  could  supply  to  blockade  the  port 
of  Charleston ;    and,  finally,  the  unexpected 
*  Bates,  diary.    Unpublished  MS. 
t  Seward,  memorandum.    Unpublished  MS. 
t  Chase,  memorandum.    Unpublished  MS. 
attitude  of  General  Scott  in  advising  the  evac- 
uation of  Fort  Pickens.  All  these  features 
called  out  so  much  and  such  varied  discussion, 
that  at  length  the  Attorney-General,  taking  up 
a  pen,  rapidly  wrote  on  a  slip  of  paper  a  short 
summing-up  of  his  own  conclusions.  This  he 
read  aloud  to  the  President,  who  thereupon 
asked  the  other  members  of  the  Cabinet  to  do 
the  same.*  They  all  complied,  and  we  have 
therefore  the  exact  record  of  the  matured 
opinions  of  the  Cabinet  members  then  present. 
The  importance  of  the  occasion  renders  these 
memoranda  of  enduring  interest.  Placed  in 
their  order  they  read  as  follows  : 
By  Mr.  Seward : 
First.  The  dispatch  of  an  expedition  to  supply  or 
reenforce  Sumter  would  provoke  an  attack,  and  so  in- 
volve a  war  at  that  point. 
The  fact  of  preparation  for  such  an  expedition  would 
inevitably  transpire  and  would  therefore  precipitate 
the  war  —  and  probably  defeat  the  object.  I  do  not 
think  it  wise  to  provoke  a  civil  war  beginning  at 
Charleston  and  in  rescue  of  an  untenable  position. 
Therefore  I  advise  against  the  expedition  in  every 
view. 
Second.  I  would  call  in  Captain  M.  C.  Meigs  forth- 
with. Aided  by  his  counsel  I  would  at  once  and  at 
every  cost  prepare  for  a  war  at  Pensacola  and  Texas, 
to  be  taken,  however,  only  as  a  consequence  of  main- 
taining the  possessions  and  authority  of  the  United 
States. 
Third.  I  would  instruct  Major  Anderson  to  retire 
from  Sumter  forthwith,  t 
By  Mr.   Chase  : 
If  war  is  to  be  the  consequence  of  an  attempt  to 
provision  Fort  Sumter,  war  will  just  as  certainly  re- 
sult from  the  attempt  to  maintain  possession  of  Fort 
Pickens. 
I  am  clearly  in  favor  of  maintaining  Fort  Pickens, 
and  just  as  clearly  in  favor  of  provisioning  Fort  Sum- 
ter. If  that  attempt  be  resisted  by  military  force  Fort 
Sumter  should,  in  my  judgment,  be  reenforced. 
If  war  is  to  be  the  result,  I  perceive  no  reason  why 
it  may  not  be  best  begun  in  consequence  of  military  re- 
sistance to  the  efforts  of  the  Administration  to  sustain 
troops  of  the  Union  stationed,  under  the  authority  of 
the  Government,  in  a  fort  of  the  Union,  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  service.  % 
By  Mr.  Welles : 
I  concur  in  the  proposition  to  send  an  armed  force 
off  Charleston,  with  supplies  of  provisions  and  rein- 
forcements for  the  garrison  at  Fort  Sumter,  and  of 
communicating  at  the  proper  time  the  intentions  of 
the  Government  to  provision  the  fort,  peaceably  if  un- 
molested. There  is  little  probability  that  this  will  be 
permitted,  if  the  opposing  forces  can  prevent  it.  An 
attempt  to  force  in  provisions  without  reenforcing  the 
garrison  at  the  same  time  might  not  be  advisable  ;  but 
armed  resistance  to  a  peaceable  attempt  to  send  pro- 
visions to  one  of  our  own  forts  will  justify  the  Govern- 
ment in  using  all  the  power  at  its  command  to  reenforce 
the  garrison  and  furnish  the  necessary  supplies. 
Fort  Pickens  and  other  places  retained  should  be 
strengthened  by  additional  troops,  and,  if  possible,  made 
impregnable. 
The  naval  force  in  the  Gulf  and  on  the  Southern 
coast  should  be  increased.  Accounts  are  published  that 
vessels  having  on  board  marketable  products  for  the
PREMIER    OR   PRESIDENT? 
611 
crews  of  the  squadron  at  Pensacola  are  seized  —  the 
inhabitants  we  know  are  prohibited  from  furnishing  the 
ships  with  provisions  or  water  ;  and  the  time  has  ar- 
rived when  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  assert 
and  maintain  its  authority.* 
By  Mr.  Smith : 
Viewing  the  question  whether  Fort  Sumter  shall 
be  evacuated  as  a  political  one,  I  remark  that  the  effect 
of  its  evacuation  upon  the  public  mind  will  depend  upon 
the  concurrent  and  subsequent  action  of  the  Govern- 
ment. If  it  shall  be  understood  that  by  its  evacuation 
we  intend  to  acknowledge  our  inability  to  enforce  the 
laws,  and  our  intention  to  allow  treason  and  rebellion 
to  run  its  course,  the  measure  will  be  extremely  disas- 
trous and  the  Administration  will  become  very  unpopu- 
lar. If,  however,  the  country  can  be  made  to  understand 
that  the  fort  is  abandoned  from  necessity,  and  at  the 
same  time  Fort  Pickens  and  other  forts  in  our  posses- 
sion shall  be  defended,  and  the  power  of  the  Govern- 
ment vindicated,  the  measure  will  be  popular  and  the 
country  will  sustain  the  Administration. 
Believing  that  Fort  Sumter  cannot  be  defended,  1 
regard  its  evacuation  as  a  necessity,  and  I  advise  that 
Major  Anderson's  command  shall  be  unconditionally 
withdrawn. 
At  the  same  time  I  would  adopt  the  most  vigorous 
measures  for  the  defense  of  the  other  forts,  and  if  we 
have  the  power  I  would  blockade  the  Southern  ports, 
and  enforce  the  collection  of  the  revenue  with  all  the 
power  of  the  Government,  t 
By  Mr.  Blair : 
First.  As  regards  General  Scott,  I  have  no  confi- 
dence in  his  judgment  on  the  questions  of  the  day.  His 
political  views  control  his  judgment,  and  his  course  as 
remarked  on  by  the  President  shows  that,  whilst  no 
one  will  question  his  patriotism,  the  results  are  the 
same  as  if  he  was  in  fact  traitorous. 
Second.  It  is  acknowledged  to  be  possible  to  re- 
lieve Fort  Sumter.  It  ought  to  be  relieved  without  ref- 
erence to  Pickens  or  any  other  possession.  South 
Carolina  is  the  head  and  front  of  this  rebellion,  and 
when  that  State  is  safely  delivered  from  the  authority 
of  the  United  States  it  will  strike  a  blow  against  our 
authority  from  which  it  will  take  years  of  bloody  strife 
to  recover. 
Third.  For  my  own  part,  I  am  unwilling  to  share 
in  the  responsibility  of  such  a  policy.  % 
By  Mr.  Bates: 
It  is  my  decided  opinion  that  Fort  Pickens  and  Key 
West  ought  to  be  reenforced  and  supplied,  so  as  to  look 
down  opposition  at  all  hazards  —  and  this  whether 
Fort  Sumter  be  or  be  not  evacuated. 
It  is  also  my  opinion  that  there  ought  to  be  a  naval 
force  kept  upon  the  Southern  coast  sufficient  to  com- 
mand it,  and  if  need  be  actually  close  any  port  that 
practically  ought  to  be  closed,  whatever  other  station 
is  left  unoccupied. 
It  is  also  my  opinion  that  there  ought  to  be  imme- 
diately established  a  line  of  light,  fast-running  vessels, 
to  pass  as  rapidly  as  possible  between  New  York  or 
Norfolk  at  the  North  and  Key  West  or  other  point  in 
the  Gulf  at  the  South. 
As  to  Fort  Sumter  —  I  think  the  time  is  come  either 
to  evacuate  or  relieve  it.  § 
The  majority  opinion  of  the  Cabinet  on  the 
15th  of  March  had  been  against  the  expedi- 
ency of  an  attempt  to  provision  Fort  Sumter; 
but  now,  after  a  lapse  of  two  weeks,  the  feel- 
ing was  changed  in  favor  of  the  proposed 
measure.  Irrespective  of  this  fresh  advice,  how- 
ever, the  President's  own  opinion  was  already 
made  up.  On  the  day  previous  he  had  in- 
structed Captain  Fox  to  prepare  him  a  short 
order  for  the  ships,  men,  and  supplies  he 
would  need  for  his  expedition,  ||  and  that  offi- 
cer complied  with  characteristic  and  promis- 
ing brevity : 
Steamers  Pocahontas  at  Norfolk,  Pawnee  at  Wash- 
ington, Harriet  Lane  at  New  York,  to  be  under  sail- 
ing orders  for  sea,  with  stores,  etc.,  for  one  month. 
Three  hundred  men  to  be  kept  ready  for  departuie 
from  on  board  the  receiving  ships  at  New  York. 
Two  hundred  men  to  be  ready  to  leave  Governor's 
Island  in  New  York.  Supplies  for  twelve  months  for 
one  hundred  men  to  be  put  in  portable  shape,  ready 
for  instant  shipping.  A  large  steamer  and  three  tugs 
conditionally  engaged.  51 
The  Cabinet  meeting  over,  the  President 
wrote  at  the  bottom  of  this  preliminary  req- 
uisition the  following  order  to  the  Secretary 
of  War :  "  Sir :  I  desire  that  an  expedition, 
to  move  by  sea,  be  got  ready  to  sail  as  early 
as  the  6th  of  April  next,  the  whole  accord- 
ing to  memorandum  attached,  and  that  you 
cooperate  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  for 
that  object."  **  This  order  and  its  duplicate 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  ft  duly  signed 
and  transmitted  to  the  two  departments,  Cap- 
tain Fox  hurried  away  to  New  York  to  super- 
intend the  further  details  of  preparation  in 
person. 
It  will  be  observed  that  the  President's  or- 
der is  simply  to  prepare  the  expedition ;  "  which 
expedition,"  in  his  own  language,  was  "  in- 
tended to  be  ultimately  used  or  not,  accord- 
ing to  circumstances."  \\  But  he  was  by  this 
time  convinced  that  the  necessity  would  arise. 
Nothing  had  yet  been  heard  from  the  order 
to  reenforce  Fort  Pickens  sent  two  weeks  pre- 
viously ;  on  the  contrary,  there  were  rumors 
through  the  Southern  newspapers  that  the 
Brooklyn,  containing  the  troops,  had  left  her 
anchorage  off  Pensacola  and  gone  to  Key 
West.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  she  had  first  trans- 
ferred her  troops  to  the  Sabine;  but  this  was 
not  and  could  not  be  known,  and  the  neces- 
sary inference  was  that  the  Brooklyn  had  car- 
ried them  away  with  her.  The  direction  to 
land  them  would  therefore  unavoidably  fail, 
and   both   Sumter  and  Pickens  be  thus  left 
*  Welles,  memorandum.    Unpublished  MS. 
t  Smith,  memorandum.    Unpublished  MS. 
t  Blair,  memorandum.    Unpublished  MS. 
%  Bates,  memorandum.    Unpublished  MS. 
II  Fox  to  Lincoln,  March  28,  1861.     MS. 
H  Fox,  memorandum.    War  Records. 
**  Lincoln  to  Secretary  of  War,  March  29,  1S61. 
War  Records. 
tt  Lincoln  to  Secretary  of  Navy,  March  29,  1S61. 
"Galaxy,"  Nov.,  1870. 
tt  Lincoln,  Message  to  Congress,  July  4,  1S61.
6l2 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
within  the  grasp  of  the  secessionists.  Such 
was  the  contingency  which  had  decided  the 
President  to  prepare  the  Sumter  expedi- 
tion.* 
The  logic  of  daily  events  had  by  this  time 
also  wrought  a  change  in  the  mind  of  Sew- 
ard. In  his  written  opinion  of  March  15th 
he  had  declared,  "  I  would  not  provoke  war 
in  any  way  now  "  ;  but  on  the  29th,  apparently 
alarmed,  like  the  rest,  at  the  advice  of  General 
Scott  to  make  further  concession  to  the  rebels, 
he  wrote,  "  I  would  at  once,  and  at  every  cost, 
prepare  for  a  war  at  Pensacola  and  Texas." 
That  very  afternoon,  as'  he  had  suggested  in 
this  same  paper,  he  brought  Captain  M.  C. 
Meigs,  the  engineer  officer  in  charge  of  the 
work  on  the  new  wings  of  the  Capitol  build- 
ing, to  the  President.  One  reason  for  select- 
ing him,  in  addition  to  his  special  training  and 
acknowledged  merit,  was  that  he  had  in  Jan- 
uary personally  accompanied  the  reinforce- 
ments then  sent  to  Key  West  and  Tortugas. 
On  the  way  to  and  from  the  President's,  Sew- 
ard explained  to  Meigs  that  he  wished  the 
President  to  see  some  military  man  who  would 
not  talk  politics ;  that  they  had  Scott  and  Tot- 
ten,  but  no  one  would  think  of  putting  either 
of  those  old  men  on  horseback.  They  were 
in  a  difficulty.  Scott  had  advised  giving  up 
both  Sumter  and  Pickens.  For  his  part,  his 
policy  had  been  to  give  up  Sumter;  but  he 
wished  to  hold  Pickens,  making  the  fight 
there  and  in  Texas,  throwing  the  burden  of 
the  war,  which  all  men  of  sense  saw  must 
come,  upon  those  who,  by  revolting,  had  pro- 
voked it.  t 
The  President  talked  freely  with  Captain 
Meigs,  and  after  some  inquiries  about  Sumter 
asked  him  whether  Fort  Pickens  could  be  held. 
Meigs  replied,  "  Certainly,  if  the  navy  would 
do  its  duty."  The  President  then  asked  him 
whether  he  could  go  down  there  again  and 
take  general  command  of  those  three  great 
fortresses,  Taylor,  Jefferson,  and  Pickens,  and 
keep  them  safe.  Meigs  answered  that  he  was 
only  a  captain,  and  could  not  command  the 
majors  who  were  there.  Here  Seward  broke 
in  with  :  "  I  understand  how  that  is ;  Cap- 
tain Meigs  must  be  promoted."  "  But  there 
is  no  vacancy,"  answered  the  modest  captain. 
Mr.  Seward,  however,  made  light  of  all  diffi- 
culties, and  told  the  President  if  he  wanted 
this  thing  done  to  put  it  in  Meigs's  charge. 
When  Pitt  wished  to  conquer  Canada,  he 
said,  he  sent  for  a  young  man  whom  he  had 
noticed  in  the  society  of  London,  and  told 
him  to  take  Quebec, —  to  ask  for  the  neces- 
sary means  and  do  it, —  and  it  was  done. 
Would  the  President  do  this  now  ?     Lincoln 
*  Lincoln,  Message  to  Congress,  July  4, 1861. 
t  Meigs,  diary.    Unpublished  MS. 
replied  he  would  consider  it,  and  let  him  know 
in  a  day  or  two. 
Two  days  afterward  (Sunday,  March  31st) 
Meigs  was  about  starting  for  church  when 
Colonel  Keyes,  General  Scott's  military  sec- 
retary, called  and  took  him  to  Mr.  Seward, 
who  requested  them  to  go  forthwith  and  in 
consultation  with  General  Scott  to  put  upon 
paper  an  estimate  and  project  for  relieving  and 
holding  Fort  Pickens,  and  to  bring  it  to  the 
President  before  4  o'clock  that  afternoon.  The 
two  officers  went  directly  to  the  engineer's 
bureau  to  inspect  the  necessary  charts  of  Pen- 
sacola Harbor  and  drawings  of  the  fortifica- 
tions, and  over  these  they  matured  their  plans. 
The  rapid  lapse  of  the  few  hours  allowed  com- 
pelled them  to  report  back  to  the  President 
before  seeing  General  Scott.  Lincoln  heard 
them  read  their  paper,  and  then  directed  them 
to  submit  it  to  the  general.  "  Tell  him,"  said 
he,  "  that  I  wish  this  thing  done,  and  not  to  let 
it  fail  unless  he  can  show  that  I  have  refused 
him  something  he  asked  for  as  necessary."  f
The  officers  obeyed,  and  on  the  way  encoun- 
tered Mr.  Seward,  who  went  with  them.  "  Gen- 
eral Scott,"  said  he,  on  entering  the  old  sol- 
dier's presence,  "  you  have  formally  reported 
to  the  President  your  advice  to  evacuate  Fort 
Pickens ;  notwithstanding  this,  I  now  come 
to  bring  you  his  order,  as  Commander-in-chief 
of  the  Army  and  Navy,  to  reenforce  and  hold 
it  to  the  last  extremity."  The  old  general  had 
his  political  crotchets,  but  he  was  at  heart  a 
soldier  and  a  disciplinarian.  "  Sir,"  replied  he, 
drawing  himself  up  to  his  full  height,  "  the 
great  Frederick  used  to  say,  '  When  the  king 
commands,  all  things  are  possible.'  It  shall 
be  done."  Meigs  and  Keyes  submitted  their 
plan,  which  he  approved  in  the  main,  adding 
a  few  details  they  had  in  their  haste  over- 
looked ;  the  project  was  further  discussed  and 
definitely  adopted. 
Fort  Pickens  stands  on  the  western  extremity 
of  Santa  Rosa  Island,  and  serves,  in  connec- 
tion with  its  twin  fort,  McRae,  on  the  mainland 
opposite,  to  guard  the  entrance  to  Pensacola 
Harbor.  But  in  this  case  the  two  forts  in- 
tended to  render  mutual  assistance  were  held 
by  opposing  forces,  bent  not  upon  protecting 
but  upon  destroying  each  other,  and  restrained 
only  by  the  existence  of  the  "  Sumter  and 
Pickens  truce,"  described  in  a  previous  chap- 
ter. So  far  as  a  mere  cannonade  might  go, 
Pickens  was  perhaps  as  strong  as  McRae ;  but 
Lieutenant  Slemmer  in  Pickens  had  only  a: 
handful  of  Union  men,  forty-six  soldiers  and 
thirty  ordinary  seamen  all  told,  while  some 
thousands  of  rebels  were  either  encamped  01 
within  reach  of  the  secession  General  Bragg 
himself  a  trained  and  skillful  soldier.  The  chief 
danger  was  that  Bragg  might  organize  a  largf
PREMIER    OR   PRESIDENT! 
body  of  men,  and  by  means  of  boats,  crossing 
the  bay  at  night  or  in  a  fog,  carry  Fort  Pick- 
ens by  a  sudden  assault  long  before  the  rein- 
forcements in  the  Union  fleet  could  be  landed, 
as  they  were  by  the  terms  of  the  truce  author- 
ized to  do  in  such  an  emergency.  The  sub- 
stance of  Meigs's  plan  was, that  while  a  transport 
vessel  bearing  troops  and  stores  landed  them 
at  Fort  Pickens,  outside  the  harbor,  a  ship-of- 
war,  arriving  simultaneously,  should  boldly 
steam  past  the  hostile  batteries  of  Fort  McRae, 
enter  the  harbor,  and  take  up  such  a  position 
within  as  to  be  able  to  prevent  any  crossing 
or  landing  by  the  rebels.  The  ship  destined 
to  run  the  batteries  would  necessarily  encoun- 
ter considerable  peril,  not  only  from  the  guns 
of  McRae,  but  also  from  those  of  Fort  Bar- 
rancas and  supposed  batteries  at  the  navy 
yard  —  all,  like  McRae,  on  the  mainland,  and 
forming  part  of  the  harbor  defenses. 
For  such  cooperation  Meigs  needed  a 
young,  talented,  and  daring  naval  officer,  and 
accordingly  he  made  choice  of  Lieutenant 
David  D.  Porter,  a  companion  and  intimate 
friend,  who,  as  he  believed,  combined  the  req- 
uisite qualities. 
One  important  characteristic  of  this  Pickens 
expedition  was  to  be  its  secrecy.  Seward  in 
his  argument  on  Sumter  had  much  insisted 
that  preparation  for  reenforcement  would  un- 
avoidably come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  reb- 
els, and  enable  them  to  find  means  to  oppose 
it.  This  argument  applied  with  even  greater 
force  to  Fort  Pickens ;  the  rebels  controlled 
both  the  post  and  the  telegraph  throughout 
the  South,  and  it  was  thought  that  upon  the 
first  notice  of  hostile  design  Bragg  would 
assault  and  overwhelm  the  fort.  Besides,  the 
orders  transmitted  through  regular  channels 
two  weeks  before  had  apparently  failed.  But 
now  that  the  ships  to  supply  Sumter  were 
being  got  ready,  it  was  doubtless  thought 
that  under  this  guise  the  Pickens  relief  could 
be  prepared  without  suspicion.  On  Mon- 
day, April  i,  1 86 1,  Captain  Meigs,  Colonel 
Keyes,  and  Lieutenant  Porter  were  busy,  un- 
der the  occasional  advice  of  Seward  and  Gen- 
eral Scott,  in  perfecting  the  details  of  their 
plans  and  in  drawing  up  the  formal  orders 
required.  These  were  in  due  time  signed  by 
the  President  himself,  it  being  part  of  the  plan 
that  no  one  but  the  officers  named,  not  even 
the  Secretaries  of  War  or  Navy,  should  have 
knowledge  of  them.*  This  was  an  error  which 
only  the  anomalous  condition  and  extreme 
peril  of  the  Government  would  have  drawn 
Lincoln  into,  and  it  was  never  repeated.  He 
doubtless  supposed  they  were  entirely  consist- 
ent with  the  Sumter  plans,  especially  as  Gen- 
eral Scott's  written  request  for  his   signature 
*  Meigs,  in  "National  Intelligencer,"  Sept.  16,  1865. 
accompanied  the  papers  —  the  general  being 
perfectly  cognizant  of  both  expeditions. 
Headquarters  of  the  Army, 
Washington,  April  1,  1861. 
Dear  Sir:  The  immediate  departure  of  a  war 
steamer,  with  instructions  to  enter  Pensacola  Harbor 
and  use  all  measures  in  his  power  to  prevent  any  at- 
tack from  the  mainland  upon  Fort  Pickens,  is  of  prime 
importance.  If  the  President,  as  Commander-in-chief, 
will  issue  the  order  of  which  I  inclose  a  draft,  an  im- 
portant step  towards  the  security  of  Fort  Pickens  will 
be  taken.  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  most  obe- 
dient servant,  Winfield  Scott. 
Hon.  W.  H.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State,  etc.  \ 
But  although  useful  to  secrecy,  this  course 
was  bound  to  produce  confusion  and  bad 
discipline;  and  such  was  its  immediate  result.. 
That  afternoon  the  commandant  of  the  Brook- 
lyn Navy  Yard  received  two  telegrams,  in  very 
similar  language,  directing  him  to  "  fit  out  the 
Powhatan  to  go  to  sea  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment."  One  was  signed  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  the  other  by  the  President ;  the 
former  intending  the  ship  to  go  to  Sumter,  the 
latter  to  Pickens,  and  neither  being  aware  of 
the  other's  action.  Neither  had  reason  to  an- 
ticipate any  such  conflict  of  orders  :  the  Pow- 
hatan was  not  included  in  Fox's  original  req- 
uisition, and  Meigs  did  not  even  know  that  the 
Sumter  expedition  was  being  prepared. 
On  the  same  afternoon  several  additional 
orders,  made  out  under  Seward's  supervision, 
were  brought  to  Lincoln.  Supposing  they  all 
related  to  this  enterprise,  he  signed  them  with- 
out reading ;  but  it  soon  turned  out  that  two 
of  them  related  to  a  matter  altogether  differ- 
ent. These  orders  changed  the  duty  of  several 
naval  officers :  Captain  Pendergrast  was  to  be 
sent  to  Vera  Cruz  on  account  of  "  important 
complications  in  our  foreign  relations";  and 
Captain  Stringham  was  to  go  to  Pensacola. 
When  these  last-mentioned  orders  reached 
the  hands  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  to 
whom  they  were  addressed  and  immediately 
transmitted,  that  official  was  not  only  greatly 
mystified  but  very  seriously  troubled  in  mind. 
He  hastened  to  the  President,  whom  he  found 
alone  in  the  executive  office,  writing.  "  What 
have  I  done  wrong  ?  "  Lincoln  inquired  play- 
fully, as  he  raised  his  head,  and  with  his  ever- 
accurate  intuition  read  trouble  in  the  counte- 
nance of  his  Secretary.  Mr.  Welles  presented 
the  anomalous  papers  and  asked  what  they 
meant;  he  had  heard  of  no  "foreign  compli- 
cations," and  he  preferred  Stringham  in  his 
present  duty. 
The  President  [says  Mr.  Welles]  expressed  as 
much  surprise  as  I  felt,  that  he  had  signed  and  sent 
me  such  a  document.  He  said  Mr.  Seward,  with  two 
or  three  young  men,  had  been  there  through  the 
day  on  a  matter  which  Mr.  Seward  had  much  at  heart ; 
that  he  had  yielded  to  the  project  of  Mr.  Seward,  but 
t  Unpublished  MS.
614 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
as  it  involved  considerable  detail,  and  he  had  his  hands 
full,  and  more  too.  he  had  left  Mr.  Seward  to  prepare 
the  necessary  papers.  These  papers  he  had  signed, 
some  of  them  without  reading,  trusting  entirely  to 
Mr.  Seward,  for  he  could  not  undertake  to  read  all 
papers  presented  to  him  ;  and  if  he  could  not  trust 
the  Secretary  of  State,  whom  could  he  rely  upon  in  a 
public  matter  that  concerned  us  all  ?  He  seemed  dis- 
inclined to  disclose  or  dwell  on  the  project,  but  assured 
me  he  never  would  have  s;gned  that  paper  had  he  been 
aware  oi  its  contents,  much  of  which  had  no  connec- 
tion with  Mr.  Seward's  scheme.  .  .  .  The  Presi- 
dent reiterated  they  were  not  his  instructions,  and 
wished  me  distinctly  to  understand  they  were  not, 
though  his  name  was  appended  to  them  —  said  the 
paper  was  an  improper  one — that  he  wished  me  to 
give  it  no  more  consideration  than  I  thought  proper  — 
treat  it  as  canceled — -as  if  it  had  never  been  written.* 
Mr.  Welles  acted  upon  this  verbal  assurance, 
and  was  highly  gratified  that  the  President 
thus  corrected  what  he  felt  to  be  an  encroach- 
ment upon  the  duties  and  powers  of  the  Navy 
Department.  Nevertheless  it  is  apparent  that 
he  had  his  doubts  whether  Lincoln  had  fully 
and  unreservedly  given  him  his  confidence  in 
this  affair.  In  these  surmises  he  was  correct; 
a  circumstance  had  occurred  between  the 
President  and  Seward  which  the  former  could 
not  communicate,  and  so  far  as  is  known  never 
did  communicate  to  any  person  but  his  private 
secretary,  and  of  which  the  President's  private 
papers  have  also  preserved  the  interesting  rec- 
ord. In  order  rightly  to  understand  it,  a  brief 
glance  at  contemporary  affairs  is  needful. 
It  will  hardly  be  possible  for  the  readers  of 
history  in  our  day  to  comprehend  the  state  of 
public  sentiment  in  the  United  States  during 
the  month  of  March,  1861.  The  desire  for 
peace  ;  the  hope  of  compromise;  the  persistent 
disbelief  in  the  extreme  purposes  of  the  South  ; 
and,  strongest  of  all,  a  certain  national  leth- 
argy, utterly  impossible  to  account  for, —  all 
marked  a  positive  decadence  in  patriotic  feel- 
ings. The  phenomenon  is  attested  not  only  in 
the  records  of  many  public  men  willing  to 
abandon  constitutional  landmarks  and  to  sac- 
rifice elementary  rights  of  mankind,  but  also 
shown  in  the  words  and  example  of  military 
officers  like  Scott  and  Anderson  in  their  con- 
senting to  shut  their  eyes  to  the  truths  and 
principles  of  their  own  profession, —  that  it  is 
the  right  of  the  Government  to  repel  menaces 
as  well  as  blows,  and  that  building  batteries 
is  as  effective  and  aggressive  war  as  firing  can- 
non-balls. 
This  perversion  of  public  opinion  in  fact 
extended  back  to  the  meeting  of  Congress  in 
December.  Under  the  spell  of  such  a  politi- 
cal nightmare  the  revolution  had  been  half  ac- 
complished. The  Union  flag  had  been  fired 
upon,  the  Federal  laws  defied,  the  secession 
government  organized  and  inaugurated.    The 
*  Welles,  in  "  Galaxy,"  November,  1870. 
work  of  the  conspirators  was  done,  but  the 
popular  movement  had  not  yet  fully  ratified 
it.  Ours  is  preeminently  a  country  of  mass 
meetings  and  conventions,  of  high-sounding 
resolves  and  speeches  of  flaming  rhetoric.  Per- 
haps their  constant  recurrence  makes  us  less 
critical  than  we  ought  to  be  in  scanning  their 
real  or  fictitious  value.  Because  a  certain  num- 
ber of  delegates  assembled  at  Montgomery 
and  framed  a  paper  government,  it  did  not 
necessarily  follow  that  the  people  of  the  cotton- 
States  stood  behind  them.  In  this  case  it  was 
even  so ;  but  the  military  thrall  by  which  rev- 
olution swept  away  conservatism  was  not  un- 
derstood by  the  North.  The  difficult  problem 
was  presented  to  the  Lincoln  administration, 
not  alone  whether  it  should  endeavor  to  knock 
down  the  revolutionary  edifice  half  built,  but 
also  whether  such  an  effort  might  not  excite 
the  whole  Southern  people  to  rise  en  masse  to 
complete  it.  The  disease  of  rebellion  existing 
in  an  advanced  stage,  could  the  cure  be  best 
effected  with  sedatives  or  irritants  ? 
From  our  point  of  view  the  answer  is  easy; 
but  it  was  not  of  so  ready  solution  in  March, 
1 86 1.  Lincoln  in  his  hesitation  to  provision 
Sumter  at  all  hazards  was  not  executing  his 
own  inclinations,  but  merely  submitting  to 
what  for  the  time  seemed  the  military  and, 
more  than  all,  the  political  necessities  of  the 
hour.  The  Buchanan  administration  had  first 
refused  and  then  postponed  succor  to  the  fort. 
Congress  had  neglected  to  provide  measures 
and  means  for  coercion.  The  conservative 
sentiment  of  the  country  protested  loudly 
against  everything  but  concession.  His  own 
Cabinet  was  divided  in  council.  The  times 
were  "  out  of  joint."  Public  opinion  was  awry. 
Treason  was  applauded  and  patriotism  re- 
buked. Laws  were  held  to  be  offenses,  and 
officials  branded  as  malefactors.  In  Lincoln's 
own  forcible  simile,  sinners  were  "  calling  the 
righteous  to  repentance." 
It  must  be  remembered  too,  that  during  the 
month  of  March,  1 86 1 , Lincoln  did  not  yet  know 
the  men  who  composed  his  Cabinet.  Neither, 
on  the  other  hand,  did  they  know  him.  He 
recognized  them  as  governors,  senators,  and 
statesmen,  while  they  yet  looked  upon  him  as 
a  simple  frontier  lawyer  at  most,  and  a  rival  to 
whom  chance  had  transferred  the  honor  they 
felt  to  be  due  to  themselves.  The  recognition 
and  establishment  of  intellectual  rank  is  diffi- 
cult and  slow.  Perhaps  the  first  real  question 
of  the  Lincoln  cabinet  was, "  Who  is  the  great- 
est man  ?  "  It  is  pretty  safe  to  assert  that  no 
one  —  not  even  he  himself —  believed  it  was 
Abraham  Lincoln.  Bearing  this  in  mind,  we 
shall  be  better  able  to  understand  and  explain 
acts  done  and  acts  omitted  during  that  mem- 
orable month.
PREMIER    OR   PRESIDENT? 
In  this  state  of  affairs  the  policy  of  the  new 
Administration  was  necessarily  passive,  ex- 
pectant, cautious,  and  tentative.  Other  causes 
contributed  to  their  embarrassments.  The 
change  from  a  long  Democratic  to  a  Republi- 
can regime  involved  a  sweeping  change  of 
functionaries  and  subordinates.  The  impend- 
ing revolution  made  both  sides  suspicious  and. 
vindictive ;  the  new  appointees  could  not,  as 
in  ordinary  times,  lean  upon  the  experience 
and  routine  knowledge  of  the  old.  Passion 
swayed  the  minds  of  men.  There  was  little 
calm  reasoning  or  prudent  counsel.  The  new 
party  was  not  yet  homogeneous.  A  certain 
friction  mutually  irritated  Republicans  of  Whig, 
of  Democratic,  or  of  Free-soil  antecedents 
against  each  other.  Douglas  was  artfully  lead- 
ing a  Senate  debate  to  foster  and  strengthen 
the  anti-war  feeling  of  the  North.  The  Cabinet 
had  not  become  a  working  unit.  Each  Cabi- 
net minister  was  beset  by  a  horde  of  applicants, 
by  over-officious  friends,  by  pressing  and  most 
contradictory  advice. 
Seward  naturally  took  a  leading  part  in  the 
new  Cabinet.  This  was  largely  warranted  by 
his  prominence  as  a  party  manager ;  his  ex- 
perience in  the  New  York  governorship  and 
in  the  United  States  Senate ;  the  quieting  and 
mediating  attitude  he  had  maintained  during 
the  winter;  the  influence  he  was  supposed  to 
wield  over  the  less  violent  Southerners ;  the  in- 
formation he  had  gained  from  the  Buchanan 
cabinet;  his  intimacy  with  General  Scott;  his 
acknowledged  ability  and  talent ;  his  optimism, 
which  always  breathed  hope  -and  impart- 
ed confidence.  During  the  whole  of  March 
he  had  been  busy  with  various  measures  of 
tentative  administration.  He  had  advised 
appointments,  written  diplomatic  notes  and 
circulars,  carried  *on  a  running  negotiation 
with  the  rebel  commissioners,  sought  to  es- 
tablish relations  with  the  Virginia  convention, 
sent  Lander  to  Texas  to  kindle  a  "  back  fire  " 
against  secession,  elaborated  his  policy  of 
evacuating  Sumter,  proposed  a  change  of 
party  name  and  organization,  and  set  on  foot 
the  secret  expedition  to  Fort  Pickens.  All  this 
activity,  however,  did  not  appear  to  satisfy 
his  desires  and  ambition.  His  philosophic 
vision  took  a  yet  wider  range.  He  was  eager 
to  enlarge  the  field  of  his  diplomacy  beyond 
the  boundaries  of  the  republic.  Regarding 
mere  partisanship  as  a  secondary  motive,  he 
was  ready  to  grapple  with  international  poli- 
tics. He  would  heal  a  provincial  quarrel  in 
the  zeal  and  fervor  of  a  continental  crusade. 
He  would  smother  a  domestic  insurrection  in 
the  blaze  and  glory  of  a  war  which  must  logic- 
ally be  a  war  of  conquest.  He  would  sup- 
plant the  slavery  question  by  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  And  who  shall  say  that  these  im- 
perial dreams  did  not  contemplate  the  possi- 
bility of  changing  a  threatened  dismember- 
ment of  the  Union  into  the  triumphant  an- 
nexation of  Canada,  Mexico,  and  the  West 
Indies  ? 
On  this  same  first  day  of  April,  while  Meigs 
and  Porter  were  busy  with  plans  and  orders 
about  Fort  Pickens,  Seward  submitted  to  Lin- 
coln the  following  extraordinary  state  paper, 
unlike  anything  to  be  found  in  the  political 
history  of  the  United  States  : 
Some  thoughts  for  the  President's  consider- 
ation, April  1,  1861. 
First.  We  are  at  the  end  of  a  month's  administra- 
tion, and  yet  without  a  policy,  either  domestic  or  foreign. 
Second.  This,  however,  is  not  culpable,  and  it  has 
even  been  unavoidable.  The  presence  of  the  Senate, 
with  the  need  to  meet  applications  for  patronage,  have 
prevented  attention  to  other  and  more  grave  matters. 
Third.  But  further  delay  to  adopt  and  prosecute 
our  policies  for  both  domestic  and  foreign  affairs  would 
not  only  bring  scandal  on  the  Administration,  but  dan- 
ger upon  the  country. 
Fourth.  To  do  this  we  must  dismiss  the  applicants 
for  office.  But  how  ?  I  suggest  that  we  make  the  local 
appointments  forthwith,  leaving  foreign  or  general  ones 
for  ulterior  and  occasional  action. 
Fifth.  The  policy  at  home.  I  am  aware  that  my 
views  are  singular,  and  perhaps  not  sufficiently  ex- 
plained. My  system  is  built  upon  this  idea  as  a  ruling 
one,  namely,  that  we  must 
Change  the  question  before  the  public  from 
one  upon  slavery,  or  about  slavery,  for  a  ques- 
tion upon  UNION  OR  DISUNION. 
In  other  words,  from  what  would  be  regarded  as  a 
party  question,  to  one  of  Patriotism  or  Union. 
The  occupation  or  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter,  al- 
though not  in  fact  a  slavery  or  a  party  question,  is  so 
regarded.  Witness  the  temper  manifested  by  the  Re-" 
publicans  in  the  free  States,  and  even  by  Union  men 
in  the  South. 
I  would  therefore  terminate  it  as  a  safe  means  for 
changing  the  issue.  I  deem  it  fortunate  that  the  last  Ad- 
ministration created  the  necessity. 
For  the  rest  I  would  simultaneously  defend  and  re- 
enforce  all  the  forts  in  the  Gulf,  and  have  the  navy 
recalled  from  foreign  stations  to  be  prepared  for  a  block- 
ade.   Put  the  island  of  Key  West  under  martial  law. 
This  will  raise  distinctly  the  question  of  Union  or 
Disunion.  I  would  maintain  every  fort  and  possession 
in  the  South. 
FOR   FOREIGN   NATIONS. 
I  would  demand  explanations  from  Spain  and  France, 
categorically,  at  once. 
I  would  seek  explanations  from  Great  Britain  and 
Russia,  and  send  agents  into  Canada,  Mexico,  and  Cen- 
tral America,  to  rouse  a  vigorous  continental  spirit 
of  independence  on  this  continent  against  European 
intervention. 
And,  if  satisfactory  explanations  are  not  receivedfrom 
Spain  and  France, 
Would  convene  Congress  and  declare  war  against 
them. 
But  whatever  policy  we  adopt,  there  must  be  an  en- 
ergetic prosecution  of  it. 
For  this  purpose  it  must  be  somebody's  business  to 
pursue  and  direct  it  incessantly. 
Either  the  President  must  do  it  himself,  and  be  all 
the  while  active  in  it,  or 
Devolve  it  on  some  member  of  his  Cabinet.  Once 
adopted,  debates  on  it  must  end,  and  all  agree  and 
abide.
6i6 
UNDER    THE   FOAM. 
It  is  not  in  my  especial  province. 
But  I  neither  seek  to  evade  nor  assume  responsi- 
bility.* 
The  conscientious  historian  must  ask  the 
reader  to  pause  and  re-read  this  most  remark- 
able and  pregnant  document.  It  is  a  little 
difficult  to  imagine  what  must  have  been  the 
feelings  of  a  President,  and  particularly  of  a 
frank,  loyal,  and  generous  nature  like  that  of 
Lincoln,  to  receive  from  his  principal  council- 
or and  anticipated  mainstay  of  his  Adminis- 
tration such  a  series  of  proposals.  That  he 
should  delegate  his  presidential  functions  and 
authority ;  that  he  should  turn  his  back  upon 
the  party  which  elected  him ;  that  he  should  ig- 
nore the  political  battle  which  had  been  fought 
and  the  victory  for  moral  government  which 
had  been  won  ;  that  he  should  by  an  arbitrary 
act  plunge  the  nation  into  foreign  war;  that  he 
should  ask  his  rival  to  rule  in  his  stead  — all  this 
might  be  romantic  statesmanship,  but  to  the 
cool,  logical  mind  of  the  President  it  must  have 
brought  thoughts  excited  by  no  other  event  of 
his  most  eventful  life.  What  was  to  be  said  in 
answer  ?  The  tender  of  a  grave  issue  like  this 
presupposed  grave  purposes  and  determina- 
tions. Should  he  by  a  fitting  rebuke  break 
up  his  scarcely  formed  Cabinet  and  alienate 
the  most  powerful  leader  after  himself,  who 
might  perhaps  carry  with  him  the  organized 
support  of  all  the  Northern  States  which  had 
voted  for  this  rival  at  Chicago  ? 
The  President  sent  his  reply  the  same  day. 
He  armed  himself  with  his  irresistible  logic, 
his  faultless  tact,  his  limitless  patience,  his 
kindest  but  most  imperturbable  firmness.  Only 
the  "hand  of  iron  in  the  glove  of  velvet" 
could  have  written  the  following  answer: 
Executive  Mansion,  April  i,  1861. 
Hon.  W.  H.  Seward. 
My  Dear  Sir:  Since  parting  with  you  I  have  been 
considering  your  paper  dated  this  day,  and  entitled 
"Some  thoughts  for  the  President's  consideration." 
The  first  proposition  in  it  is,  "  First,  We  are  at  the 
end  of  a  month's  administration,  and  yet  without  a 
policy,  either  domestic  or  foreign." 
At  the  beginning  of  that  month,  in  the  inaugural,  I 
said,  "  The  power  confided  to  me  will  be  used  to  hold, 
occupy,  and  possess  the  property  and  places  belonging 
to  the  Government,  and  to  collect  the  duties  and  im- 
posts." This  had  your  distinct  approval  at  the  time; 
and,  taken  in  connection  with  the  order  I  immediately 
gave  General  Scott,  directing  him  to  employ  every 
*  Unpublished  MS. 
means  in  his  power  to  strengthen  and  hold  the  forts, 
comprises  the  exact  domestic  policy  you  now  urge,  with 
the  single  exception  that  it  does  not  propose  to  aban- 
don Fort  Sumter. 
Again,  I  do  not  perceive  how  the  reenforcement  of 
Fort  Sumter  would  be  done  on  a  slavery  or  party  issue, 
while  that  of  Fort  Pickens  would  be  on  a  more  national 
and  patriotic  one. 
The  news  received  yesterday  in  regard  to  St.  Do- 
mingo certainly  brings  a  new  item  within  the  range  of 
our  foreign  policy ;  but  up  to  that  time  we  have  been 
preparing  circulars  and  instructions  to  ministers  and 
the  like,  all  in  perfect  harmony,  without  even  a  sugges- 
tion that  we  had  no  foreign  policy. 
Upon  your  closing  proposition,  that  "  whatever  pol- 
icy we  adopt,  there  must  be  an  energetic  prosecution 
of  it, 
"  For  this  purpose  it  must  be  somebody's  business 
to  pursue  and  direct  it  incessantly, 
"  Either  the  President  must  do  it  himself,  and  be  all 
the  while  active  in  it,  or 
"  Devolve  it  on  some  member  of  his  Cabinet.  Once 
adopted,  debates  on  it  must  end,  and  all  agree  and  abide," 
I  remark  that  if  this  must  be  done,  I  must  do  it.  When 
a  general  line  of  policy  is  adopted,  I  apprehend  there 
is  no  danger  of  its  being  changed  without  good  reason 
or  continuing  to  be  a  subject  of  unnecessary  debate; 
still,  upon  points  arising  in  its  progress  I  wish,  and 
suppose  I  am  entitled  to  have,  the  advice  of  all  the 
Cabinet. 
Your  Ob't  Serv't, A.  Lincoln,  t 
In  this  reply  not  a  word  is  omitted  which 
was  necessary,  and  not  a  hint  or  allusion  is 
contained  that  could  be  dispensed  with.  The 
answer  was  conclusive  and  ended  the  argu- 
ment. So  far  as  is  known,  the  affair  never 
reached  the  knowledge  of  any  other  member 
of  the  Cabinet,  or  even  the  most  intimate  of 
the  President's  friends;  nor  was  it  probably  ever 
again  alluded  to  by  either  Lincoln  or  Seward. 
Doubtless  it  needed  only  the  President's  note 
to  show  the  Secretary  of  State  how  serious  a 
fault  he  had  committed,  for  all  his  tireless 
industry  and  undivided  influence  continued  to 
be  given  for  four  long  years  to  his  chief,  not 
only  without  reserve,  but  with  a  sincere  and 
devoted  personal  attachment.  Lincoln,  on  his 
part,  easily  dismissed  the  incident  from  his 
thought  with  that  grand  and  characteristic 
charity  which  sought  only  to  cherish  the  vir- 
tues of  men  —  which  readily  recognized  the 
strength  and  acknowledged  the  services  of  his 
Secretary,  to  whom  he  unselfishly  gave,  to 
his  own  last  days,  his  generous  and  unwaver- 
ing trust. 
+  Unpublished  MS. 
/fff 
UNDER  THE    FOAM. 
LIGHTNESS  and  laughter  are  with  such  as  he 
Only  the  surf  upon  the  soul's  deep  sea ; 
Passions  of  time  but  froth  the  upper  main, 
While  far  beneath,  eternal  passions  reign. 
Charlotte  Fiske  Bates.
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
707 
canons'  homes,  each  set  back  in  its  luxuriant 
little  garden.  To  the  north  is  another  expanse 
of  green  and  then  more  houses.  Most  of  the 
dwellings  are  of  Elizabethan  design,  or  of  one  of 
those  Queen  Anne  or  Georgian  patterns  which 
in  this  country  we  call  "colonial."  In  size  and 
shape  they  constantly  remind  us  of  things  we 
have  seen  at  home,  but  in  material  and  color 
they  are  wholly  English.  They  have  fine  red- 
tiled  roofs,  and  their  walls  are  of  brick,  or  of 
brick  and  plaster,  or  of  stone  and  flint;  and 
where  the  stones  have  been  patched  with 
ruddy  bricks  there  is  no  effort  to  conceal  the 
disparity  in  material  which  gives  so  beauti- 
ful a  variety  in  tint.  Vines  cover,  trees  em- 
bower, and  flowers  encircle  them.  The  color 
effect  as  a  whole  is  enchanting,  and  the  air 
of  mingled  dignity,  unworldliness,  and  peace 
which  broods  over  the  church  itself  broods 
over  the  dwellings  of  its  ministrants  as  well. 
Richard  Poore,  who,  as  bishop  of  Salisbury, 
founded  its  new  church,  was  the  same  who  alittle 
later,  as  bishop  of  Durham,  founded  there  the 
Chapel  of  the  Nine  Altars.   It  is  unlikely  that 
he  was  in  either  case  the  architect;  and  though 
the  Early-English  style  is  used  in  both  buildings, 
it  is  so  differently  used  as  not  to  suggest  that 
their  designer  was  one  and  the  same.  The  ut- 
most simplicity  of  which  the  Lancet  Pointed 
style  is  capable  rules  at  Salisbury,  the  ut- 
most luxuriance  at  Durham  —  as  regards  not 
profuseness  of  ornament  alone  but  the  con- 
structional forms  themselves.  It  is  a  singular 
coincidence,  therefore,  but  doubtless  nothing 
more,  that  the  first  man  whom  we  know  to 
have  actually  built  at  Salisbury  —  perhaps  as 
architect,  perhaps  merely  as  clerk-of-the-works 
—  bears  the  name  of  the  northern  town,  Elias 
de  Derham. 
Although  Salisbury  was  a  cathedral  church 
from  very  early  times,  much  of  its  history  is  as 
void  of  great  prelatical  names  as  the  history 
of  Peterborough,  which  was  merely  an  abbey 
church  until  the  sixteenth  century.  Not  the 
bishops  but  the  earls  of  Salisbury,  whose  cross- 
legged  effigies  may  be  seen  in  the  nave,  made 
the  name  of  their  town  a  power  in  the  world. 
M.  G.  van  Rensselaer. 
ABRAHAM    LINCOLN:     A    HISTORY.* 
THE    CALL    TO    ARMS. 
BY    JOHN    G.    NICOLAY    AND    JOHN    HAY,    PRIVATE    SECRETARIES    TO    THE    PRESIDENT. 
THE    FALL    OF    SUMTER. 
MILITARY  and  naval  expeditions 
rarely  move  at  their  first  ap- 
pointed time.  That  prepared  by  Cap 
tain  Fox  for  Sumter  was,  by  the  Pres- 
ident's order,  directed  to  sail  on 
April  6,  but  did  not  actually  start  till 
the  9th;  that  prepared  by  Captain 
Meigs  for  Fort  Pickens  was  to  have 
got  off  on  the  2d,  but  only  sailed  on 
the  6th.  The  fitting  out  of  both  went 
on  simultaneously  at  New  York,  but 
the  officers  concerned  were  not  cog- 
nizant of  each  other's  plans  and  meas- 
ures, and  it  so  happened  that,  through 
a  misunderstanding  which  did  not 
come  to  light  until  after  the  sailing 
of  the  latter,  the  war  ship  Powhatan, 
upon  which  Captain  Fox  depended 
for  his  most  effective  aid  in  his  pro- 
posed efforts  to  relieve  Fort  Sumter, 
was  transferred  to  the  command  of 
Lieutenant  Porter,  and  sailed  to  Fort 
Pickens  instead.  The  details  of  the  in- 
cident are  too  long  for  the  pages  of 
this  magazine  and  must  be  passed, 
with  the  simple  statement  that  the  general  m.  c.  me 
*  Copyright  by  J.  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  1886 
(FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    BY    BRADY.) 
All  rights  reserved.
■oS 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN 
Meigs  expedition,  in  conjunction 
with  the  successful  delivery  of 
fresh  orders  to  the  tleet  at  Pen- 
sacola,  mule  Fort  Pickens  en- 
tirely secure  against  assault  by  the 
rebel  forces  under  Bragg,  and  also 
rendered  more  safe  the  Federal 
forts  at  Key  West  and  Tortugas. 
•  Meanwhile  affairs  at  Fort  Sum- 
ter were  hastening  to  a  crisis  more 
rapidly  than  President  Lincoln 
had  been  led  to  expect.  The 
various  occurrences  during  the 
month  of  March  had  created  in 
Anderson  the  strong  expecta- 
tion that  he  would  receive  orders 
to  evacuate  the  fort,  and  under 
this  belief  less  care  was  taken  to 
make  his  provisions  hold  out  than 
might  have  been  done.  His  letter 
of  the  31st  gave  notice  that  "  the 
last  barrel  of  flour  was  issued  day 
before  yesterday";  and  on  the 
first  day  of  April  he  once  more 
wrote : 
The  South  Carolina  Secretary  of  War 
lias  not  sent  the  authority   asked    for 
yesterday  to  enable  me  to  send  off  the 
discharged  laborers.    Having  been  in  daily  expectation 
since  the  return  of  Colonel  Lamon  to  Washington  of 
receiving  orders  to  vacate  this  post,  I  have  kept  these 
men  here  as  long  as  I  could.   ...   I  told  Mr.  Fox 
that  if  I  placed    the  command  on  short  allowance  I 
could  make  the  provisions  last  until  after  the  10th  of 
this  month  ;   but  as  I  have   received  no  instructions 
from  the  Department  that  it  was  desirable  I  should  do 
so,  it  has  not  been  done.     If  the  governor  permits  me 
to  send  off  the  laborers,  we  will  have  rations  enough  to 
last  us  about  one  week  longer.* 
Upon  receipt  of  this  notice  President  Lin- 
coln issued  his  final  order  for  the  departure  of 
the  Sumter  expedition,  of  which  he  gave  no- 
tice to  Anderson  in  the  following  instructions, 
drafted  with  his  own  hand : 
Washington,  April  4,  1861. 
Sir:  Your  letter  of  the  1st  instant  occasions 
some  anxiety  to  the  President.  On  information  of 
Captain  Fox  he  had  supposed  you  could  hold  out  till 
the  15th  instant  without  any  great  inconvenience,  and 
had  prepared  an  expedition  to  relieve  you  before  that 
period.  Hoping  still  that  you  will  be  able  to  sustain 
yourself  till  the  nth  or  12th  instant,  the  expedition 
will  go  forward;  and,  finding  your  flag  flying,  will  at- 
tempt to  provision  you,  and,  in  case  the  effort  is  re- 
sisted, will  endeavor  also  to  reenforce  you. 
You  will  therefore  hold  out,  if  possible,  till  the  ar- 
rival of  the  expedition.  It  is  not,  however,  the  intention 
of  the  President  to  subject  your  command  to  any  dan- 
ger or  hardship  beyond  what,  in  your  judgment,  would 
be  usual  in  military  life,  and  he  lias  entire  confidence 
that  you  will  act  as  becomes  a  patriot  and  a  soldier, 
under  all  circumstances.  Whenever,  if  at  all,  in  your 
judgment,  to  save  yourself  and  command,  a  capitulation 
becomes  a  necessity,  you  are  authorized  to  make  it.t 
*  Anderson  to  Thomas,  April  I,  1861.   War  Records, 
t  Lincoln,  Autograph  MS. 
COLONEL  GUSTAVUS  V.  FOX.   (FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  BY  CUDLIP.) 
This  manuscript  draft,  in  words  so  brief 
and  explicit,  in  tone  so  considerate  and  hu- 
mane, in  foresight  and  moderation  so  emi- 
nently characteristic  of  its  author,  as  manifested 
in  almost  every  important  document  of  his 
administration,  was  sent  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment, where  it  was  copied  in  quadruplicate, 
addressed  to  Major  Robert  Anderson,  signed 
by  Simon  Cameron,  Secretary  of  War,  and 
one  copy  immediately  transmitted  by  mail  to 
Fort  Sumter,J  while  other  copies  were  dis- 
patched by  other  methods.  That  same  after- 
noon the  Secretary  of  War  and  General  Scott 
gave  Captain  Fox  — who,  having  completed  his 
preliminary  arrangements,  had  come  to  Wash- 
ington for  the  purpose  —  his  final  and  confi- 
dential orders  for  the  command,  the  destination, 
the  supplies,  and  the  reinforcements  of  the 
expedition.  In  a  conversation  that  afternoon 
Fox  reminded  Lincoln  that  but  nine  days 
would  remain  in  which  to  reach  Charleston 
from  New  York,  a  distance  of  six  hundred  and 
thirty-seven  miles,  and  that  with  this  diminish ed 
time  his  chances  were  greatly  reduced.  But 
the  President,  who  had  calculated  all  the 
probabilities  of  failure,  and  who  with  more 
comprehensive  statesmanship  was  looking 
through  and  beyond  the  Sumter  expedition 
to  the  now  inevitable  rebel  attack  and  the  re- 
sponse of  an  awakened  and  united  North, 
calmly  assured  him  that  he  should  best  fulfill 
\  Anderson  to  Thomas,  April  8,  1861.   War  Records.
THE    CALL    TO  ARMS. 
709 
his  duty  to  make  the  attempt*  Captain 
Fox  returned  to  New  York  April  5,  with 
the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  for 
the  necessary  cooperation  of  the  war  vessels. 
On  the  evening  of  April  8  the  merchant 
steamer  Baltic,  bearing  two  hundred  recruits, 
the  required  supplies,  and  Captain  Fox, 
dropped  down  the  bay  and  went  to  sea  early 
next  morning,  with  the  belief  and  understand- 
ing that  the  war  ships  Powhatan,  Pawnee, 
Pocahontas,  and  Harriet  Lane,  and  the  steam- 
tugs  Uncle  Ben,  Ya?ikee,  and  Freeborn,  should 
meet  the  Baltic  at  the  appointed  rendezvous 
ten  miles  off  Charleston  bar,  due  east  of  the 
light-house,  on  the  morning  of  the  nth  of 
April. 
Towards  the  end  of  March,  while  the  inter- 
views and  conversations  were  going  on  be- 
tween Judge  Campbell  and  Seward,  and  the 
Sumter  affair  was  a  daily  topic  of  discussion, 
Lincoln  (to  use  his  own  words) 
told  Mr.  Seward  he  might  say  to  Judge  Campbell  that 
I  should  not  attempt  to  provision  the  fort  without  giv- 
ing them  notice.  That  was  after  I  had  duly  weighed 
the  matter  and  come  to  the  deliberate  conclusion  that 
that  would  be  the  best  policy.  If  there  was  nothing 
before  to  bind  us  in  honor  to  give  such  notice,  I  felt 
so  bound  after  this  word  was  out.t 
It  is  impossible  to  fix  the  exact  date  of  this 
presidential  instruction ;  but  several  allusions 
indicate  it  with  sufficient  nearness.  A  dispatch 
of  the  commissioners  under  date  of  March  22 
uses  the  phrase:  "and  what  is  of  infinite  im- 
portance to  us,  that  notice  will  be  given  him 
[Campbell]  of  any  change  in  the  existing  sta- 
tus."! So  also  Mr.  Welles,  advising  the  Fox 
expedition  in  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  March 
29,  adds,  "  and  of  communicating  at  the  prop- 
er time  the  intentions  of  the  Government  to 
provision  the  fort  peaceably  if  unmolested."  § 
Finally,  as  already  stated,  Mr.  Seward,  on  April 
1,  gave  Campbell  the  written  memorandum. 
"  The  President  may  desire  to  supply  Sumter, 
but  will  not  do  so  without  giving  notice  to 
Governor  Pickens."  || 
Now  that  the  Fox  expedition  was  ready 
and  ordered  to  sail,  President  Lincoln  pro- 
ceeded to  carry  out  this  part  of  his  plan.  Again, 
with  his  own  hand,  he  prepared  the  following 
instructions : 
Washington,  April  6,  1861. 
Sir  :  You  will  proceed  directly  to  Charleston,  South 
Carolina,  and  if,  on  your  arrival  there,  the  flag  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  flying  over  Fort  Sumter,  and  the 
fort  shall  not  have  been  attacked,  you  will  procure  an 
interview  with  Governor  Pickens,  'and  read  to  him  as 
*  Fox,  Report  to  Welles,  Feb.  24,  1865. 
t  J.  G.  N.,  personal  memoranda.    MS. 
X  Commissioners  to  Toombs,  March  22,  1861.    MS. 
§  Welles  to  Lincoln,  Cabinet  opinion,  March  29, 1861. 
il  Campbell  to  Seward,  April  13,  1861.  "Rebellion 
Record." 
Vol.  XXXV.— 97. 
follows  :   "lam  directed  by  the  President  of  the  I 
States  to  notify  you  to  expect  an  attempt  will  be  made 
to  supply  Fort  Sumter  with  provisions  only ;  and  that, 
if  such  an  attempt  be  not  resisted,  no  effort  to  throw 
in  men,  arms,  or  ammunition  will  be  made  without 
further  notice,  or  in  case  of  an  attack  upon  the  fort." 
After  you  shall  have  read  this  to  Governor  Pickei 
liver  to  him  the  copy  of  it  here  inclosed,  and  retain  this 
letter  yourself. 
But  if,  on  your  arrival  at  Charleston,  you  shall  as- 
certain that  Fort  Sumter  shall  have  been  already  evac- 
uated, or  surrendered  by  the  United  States  force,  or 
shall  have  been  attacked  by  an  opposing  force,  you  will 
seek  no  interview  with  Governor  Pickens,  but  return 
here  forthwith. 5[ 
This  autograph  manuscript  draftof  Lincoln's 
was  also  copied,  and  signed  "  Simon  Cameron, 
Secretary  of  War,"  and  placed  in  the  hands 
of  Mr.  R.  S.  Chew,  a  faithful  clerk  of  the 
State  Department,  who  proceeded  to  Charles- 
ton and  delivered  it  to  Governor  Pickens. 
Thus,  on  the  evening  of  April  8,  1861,  the 
Montgomery  authorities  received  decisive  in- 
formation that  all  their  hopes  of  recognition 
and  peaceful  disunion  were  at  an  end,  and  that 
the  desperate  trial  of  war  was  at  length  upon 
them.  Already,  to  some  extent,  forewarned  of 
this  contingency,  they  hastened  to  make  dis- 
positions to  meet  it.  The  seven  States  of  South 
Carolina,  Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Missis- 
sippi, Louisiana,  and  Texas  were  now  united 
in  the  rebel  Government ;  they  were  promptly 
notified  of  the  changed  condition  of  affairs, 
and  each  asked  to  raise  a  contingent  of  three 
thousand  volunteers.  Bragg,  at  Pensacola,  was 
notified  that  "Our  commissioners  at  Wash- 
ington have  received  a  flat  refusal,"  **  and  was 
instructed  to  put  himself  on  the  defensive, 
while  officers,  supplies,  and  soldiers  were  or- 
dered to  his  support  with  a  somewhat  spas- 
modic energy.  Beauregard  was  again  put  on 
the  alert  and  ordered  to  increase  his  vigilance 
and  vigor.  "  Under  no  circumstances  are  you 
to  allow  provisions  to  be  sent  to  Fort  Sum- 
ter." ff  "  Major  Anderson's  mails  must  be 
stopped.  The  fort  must  be  completely  isola- 
ted." %%  Beauregard  complied  with  alacrity; 
issued  orders,  and  sent  detachments  to  his 
posts  and  batteries ;  armed  additional  guard- 
boats  to  patrol  the  harbor ;  and  called  out  the 
entire  balance  of  the  contingent  of  five  thou- 
sand men  which  had  been  authorized. 
President  Lincoln  in  deciding  the  Sumter 
question  had  adopted  a  simple  but  effective 
policy.  To  use  his  own  words,  he  determined 
to  "  send  bread  to  Anderson  " ;  if  the  rebels 
fired  on  that,  they  would  not  be  able  to  con- 
ULincoln, instructions,  April5. 1861.  Autograph  MS. 
**  Walker  to  Bragg,  April  8,  1S61.  War  Records. 
tt  Walker  to  Beauregard,  April  S,  1861.  War  Rec- 
ords. 
it  Walker  to  Beauregard,  April  9,  1S61.  War  Rec- 
ords.
710 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
vince  the  world  that  he  had  begun  civil  war. 
All  danger  of  misapprehension,  all  accusations 
of  "invasion"  and  "subjugation,"'  would  fall 
to  the  ground  before  that  paramount  duty  not 
onlv  to  the  nation,  but  to  humanity.  This  was 
universal  statesmanship  reduced  to  its  simplest 
expression.  To  this  end  he  had  ordered  the 
relief  expedition  to  sail,  and  sent  open  notice 
to  Governor  Pickens  of  its  coming.  His  own 
dutv  thus  discharged,  no  less  in  kindness  than 
in  honesty,  the  American  people  would  take 
care  of  the  result.  It  is  the  record  of  history 
that  he  was  right  in  both  his  judgment  and 
his  faith. 
That  he  by  this  time  expected  resistance 
and  hostilities,  though  unrecorded,  is  reason- 
ably certain.  The  presence  of  armed  ships 
with  the  expedition,  and  their  instructions  to 
fight  their  way  to  the  fort  in  case  of  opposi- 
tion, show  that  he  believed  the  arbitrament 
of  the  sword  to  be  at  hand.  His  authorization 
to  Anderson  to  capitulate  after  the  ordinary 
risks  of  war  is  evidence  that  he  did  not  ex- 
pect a  decisive  battle  or  a  conclusive  victory. 
Whether  the  expedition  would  fail  or  succeed 
was  a  question  of  minor  importance.  He  was 
not  playing  a  game  of  military  strategy  with 
Beauregard.  He  was  looking  through  Sumter 
to  the  loyal  States;  beyond  the  insulted  flag  to 
the  avenging  nation. 
The  rebels,  on  their  part,  had  only  a  choice 
of  evils.  They  were,  as  wrong-doers  are  sure 
to  be,  on  the  horns  of  a  dilemma.  Their 
scheme  of  peaceable  secession  demanded  in- 
compatible conditions  —  the  union  of  the  South 
and  the  division  of  the  North.  To  preserve 
the  former  was  to  destroy  the  latter.  If  they 
set  war  in  motion,  they  would  lose  their  Dem- 
ocratic allies  in  the  free  States.  If  they  hesi- 
tated to  fight,  the  revolution  would  collapse 
in  the  slave-States.  As  usual  on  such  occa- 
sions, rash  advice  carried  the  day.  "  Gentle- 
men," said  an  uncompromising  fire-eater  to 
Jefferson  Davis  and  his  Cabinet,  "unless  you 
sprinkle  blood  in  the  face  of  the  people  of 
Alabama,  they  will  be  back  in  the  old  Union 
in  less  than  ten  days."* 
The  possibility  suggested  to  Captain  Hart- 
stene,  that  Sumter  might  be  relieved  by  boats 
on  a  dark  night,  evidently  decided  the  rebel 
authorities  to  order  an  immediate  attack  of 
*  McPherson,  "History  of  the  Rebellion,"  pp.ii2,ii3. 
t  As,  in  consequence  of  a  communication  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States  to  the  Governor  of 
South  Carolina,  we  were  in  momentary  expectation  of 
an  attempt  to'reenforce  Fort  Sumter,  or  of  a  descent 
upon  our  coast  to  that  end  from  the  United  States 
fleet  then  lying  at  the  entrance  of  the  harbor,  it  was 
manifestly  an  imperative  necessity  to  reduce  the  fort 
as  speedily  as  possible,  and  not  to  wait  until  the  ships 
and  the  fort  should  unite  in  a  combined  attack  upon 
us.  Beauregard,  Report,  April  27, 1861.    War  Records. 
the  fort.f  They  could  not  afford  the  risk  of 
its  successful  defense.  Its  capture  was  the  very 
life  of  the  rebellion. 
Therefore,  on  the  10th  of  April,  they  tele- 
graphed to  Beauregard : 
If  you  have  no  doubt  of  the  authorized  character  of 
the  agent  who  communicated  to  you  the  intention  of 
the  Washington  government  to  supply  Fort  Sumter 
by  force,  you  will  at  once  demand  its  evacuation,  and, 
if  this  is  refused,  proceed  in  such  a  manner  as  you  may 
determine  to  reduce  it.J 
At  2  p.  m.  on  the  nth  that  officer  accord- 
ingly made  the  demand,  offering  facilities  to 
remove  the  troops,  with  their  arms  and  private 
property,  and  the  privilege  of  saluting  their 
flag.§  The  demand  was  laid  before  a  council 
of  officers,  who  voted  a  unanimous  refusal.  || 
"  I  have  the  honor,"  thereupon  replied  Ander- 
son, "  to  acknowledge  .  the  receipt  of  your 
communication  demanding  the  evacuation  of 
this  fort;  and  to  say  in  reply  thereto,  that  it 
is  a  demand  with  which  I  regret  that  my  sense 
of  honor,  and  of  my  obligations  to  my  Govern- 
ment, prevent  my  compliance  " ;  at  the  same 
time  thanking  him  for  his  compliments  and 
courteous  terms.fl  The  rebel  aides-de-camp 
who  bore  these  messages  engaged  in  informal 
conversation  with  Anderson,  in  the  course  of 
which,  with  somewhat  careless  freedom,  he 
said  to  them :  "  Gentlemen,  if  you  do  not  bat- 
ter the  fort  to  pieces  about  us,  we  shall  be 
starved  out  in  a  few  days."  *#  The  phrase  was 
telegraphed  to  Montgomery,  whence  instruc- 
tions came  back  once  more  to  offer  time  to 
deliver  up  the  fort;  whereupon,  near  midnight 
of  the  nth,  Beauregard  again  wrote: 
If  you  will  state  the  time  at  which  you  will  evacuate 
Fort  Sumter,  and  agree  that  in  the  mean  time  you  will 
not  use  your  guns  against  us  unless  ours  shall  be  em- 
ployed against  Fort  Sumter,  we  will  abstain  from 
opening  fire  upon  you.tt 
It  was  long  past  midnight  when  the  aides 
once  more  reached  the  fort  and  handed  this 
second  message  to  Anderson.  Anderson  in 
return  submitted  to  them  the  following  prop- 
osition in  writing: 
I  will,  if  provided  with  the  proper  and  necessary 
means  of  transportation,  evacuate  Fort  Sumter  by  noon 
on  the  15th  instant  should  I  not  receive  prior  to  that 
time  controlling  instructions  from  my  Government,  or 
additional  supplies ;  and  that  I  will  not  in  the  mean 
X  Walker  to  Beauregard,  April  10,  1861.  War  Rec- 
ords. 
§  Beauregard  to  Anderson,  April  II,  1861.  War 
Records. 
||  Foster,  journal,  April  II,  1861.    War  Records. 
5[  Anderson  to  Beauregard,  April  II,  1861.  War 
Records. 
**  Chesnut,  Lee,  and  Chisholm  to  Adj. -Gen.  Jones, 
April  11,  1861.    War  Records. 
tt  Beauregard  to  Anderson,  April  11,  1861,  11  P.  M. 
Victor,  "History  Southern  Rebellion."
THE    CALL    TO  ARMS. 
711 
X* 
time  open  my  fire  upon  your  forces  unless  compelled 
to  do  so  by  some  hostile  act  against  this  fort  or  the 
flag  of  my  Government,  by  the  forces  under  your  com- 
mand or  by  some  portion  of  them,  or  by  ihe  perpetra- 
tion of  some  act  showing  a  hostile  intention  on  your 
part  against  this  fort  or  the  flag  it  bears.* 
This  cautious  and  resolute  answer  was  not 
what  the  rebel  commander  desired;  but  ap- 
parently he  expected  nothing  else,  for  he  had 
given  his  aides  discretionary  authority  to  refuse 
the  stipulation.  They  retired  to  an  adjoining 
room  to  consult  and  compose  their  answer, 
and  at  twenty  minutes  past  three  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  Friday,  April  12,  1861,  handed 
Anderson  their  written  notice  that  the  rebel 
batteries  would  open  their  fire  upon  the  fort 
in  one  hour.  Then  taking  their  leave,  they 
entered  their  boat  and  proceeded  directly  to 
Fort  Johnson,  and  gave  to  the  officer  com- 
manding that  post  "the  order  to  open  fire  at 
lie  time  indicated."  f 
Unwelcome  as  was  the  prospect  of  the  im- 
pending conflict,  it  must  in  one  sense  have 
been  a  relief  as  a  contrast  to  the  uncertainty 
in  which  the  fate  of  the  garrison  had  hung  for 
more  than  three  months.  The  decisive  mo- 
ment of  action  was  at  last  reached,  and  the 
spirit  and  strength  of  every  inmate  of  the  fort 
leaped  into  new  life  under  the  supreme  impulse 
of  combat.  Until  the  full  dawning  of  the  morn- 
ing, nothing  could  be  done  within  the  fort.  An- 
derson gave  the  necessary  orders  about  the 
coming  attack.  The  sentinels  were  all  with- 
drawn from  their  exposed  stations  on  the  par- 
apet ;  every  gate  and  opening  was  closed ; 
the  men  were  strictly  enjoined  not  to  leave 
the  shelter  of  the  casemates  except  on  special 
summons.  These  few  preparations  hastily  com- 
pleted, Sumter  seemed  to  the  outside  world  to 
have  relapsed  into  the  security  and  silence  of 
a  peaceful  sleep. 
The  fort  had  been  built  on  an  artificial  island 
midway  in  the  mouth  of  Charleston  harbor; 
it  was  three  miles  from  the  city,  but  projecting 
points  of  the  neighboring  islands  inclosed  it  in 
a  triangle.  On  these  the  rebels  had  built  their 
siege  works  —  to  the  north-east  Fort  Moultrie 
on  Sullivan's  Island,  distant  1800  yards;  to 
the  south,  the  Cumming's  Point  batteries  on 
Morris  Island,  distant  1300  yards ;  to  the  west, 
Fort  Johnson  on  James  Island,  distant  2500 
yards.  Some  were  built  merely  to  oppose  the 
expected  reinforcements  through  the  harbor 
channels;  most  of  them  were  earth-works.  Two 
were  constructed  of  wood  and  protected  with 
railroad  iron ;  one  of  these  had  been  designed 
to  serve  as  a  floating  battery,  but  proving  a 
*  Anderson  to  Beauregard,  April  12,  1861, 2.30  a.  m. 
Victor,  "Southern  Rebellion." 
tChesnut  and  Lee  to  Jones,  April  12,  1861.  War 
Records. 
t  F.  J.  Porter,  Inspection  Report.  War  Records. 
failure  in  this  object,  was  now  advantageously 
grounded  behind  a  protecting  sea-wall.  Alto- 
gether there  were  from  fourteen  to  nineteen 
of  these  batteries,  mounting  a  total  of  thirty 
guns  and  seventeen  mortars,  manned  and  sup- 
ported by  a  volunteer  force  of  four  to  six  thou- 
sand men.  The  greater  part  of  them  were 
holiday  soldiers,  but  among  their  officers 
were  a  dozen  or  two  formerly  belonging  to 
the  Federal  army  and  possessed  of  a  thorough 
military  education.  To  these  the  management 
of  the  enterprise  was  mainly  confided. 
Fort  Sumter,  on  its  part,  was  a  scarcely 
completed  work,  dating  back  to  the  period  of 
smooth-bore  guns  of  small  caliber;  its  walls 
were  of  brick,  forty  feet  high  and  eight  feet 
thick ;  it  was  pierced  for  one  hundred  and  forty 
guns,  to  be  mounted  in  two  tiers  of  casemates 
and  on  the  parapet.  But  when  Anderson  in- 
spected it  on  his  arrival  in  November  previous, 
the  brick-work  of  walls  and  casemates  was 
still  unfinished,  and  only  a  few  guns  were 
mounted.  I  Foster,  the  engineer  in  charge,  had, 
with  limited  help  and  materials,  and  in  the 
face  of  constant  obstacles  and  discourage- 
ments, pushed  the  work  towards  completion. 
There  was  now  a  total  of  forty-eight  guns 
mounted  and  ready  for  use,  though  furnished 
with  very  rude  and  insufficient  appliances. 
Of  these,  twenty-one  were  in  the  casemates 
and  twenty-seven  on  the  parapet.  To  man 
and  support  them  Anderson  had  a  garrison 
of  nine  commissioned  officers,  sixty-eight  non- 
commissioned officers  and  privates,  eight  musi- 
cians, and  forty-three  non-combatant  laborers 
— ra  total  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight 
souls.  We  shall  see  that  while  the  opposing 
artillery  was  nearly  equal  in  number,  there 
existed,  in  fact,  a  great  disparity  in  its  quality. 
Not  only  was  Anderson's  fire  diffused  and  that 
of  the  enemy  concentrated,  but  the  rebels  had 
on  their  side  seventeen  ten-inch  mortars,  which 
could  deliver  a  vertical  fire  and  drop  large 
shells  into  the  fort ;  while  Anderson  had  noth- 
ing to  answer  them  but  the  horizontal  fire  of 
his  guns  to  throw  missiles  against  the  face  of 
the  rebel  bomb-proofs,  formed  of  heavy  sand- 
banks or  sloping  railroad  iron. 
The  inhabitants  of  Charleston  were  informed 
of  the  intended  bombardment;  months  of 
speech-making,  drilling,  and  war  preparation 
had  excited  an  intense  eagerness  to  witness 
the  fight.  In  the  yet  prevailing  darkness  they 
came  pouring  out  of  their  houses  by  a  com- 
mon impulse,  and  thronged  to  the  wharves 
and  buildings  on  the  bay,  where  they  sought 
advantageous  positions  to  behold  the  long- 
wished-for  spectacle.  At  about  half-past  four, 
as  the  dim  outline  of  Fort  Sumter  began  to 
define  itself  in  the  morning  twilight,  they  saw 
a  shell  rise  from  the  mortar  batteries  near  Fort
7" 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
Johnson,  and  make  its  slow  and  graceful  curve 
upon  Sumter.  This  was  the  signal.  Gun  after 
gun  and  battery  after  battery  responded  to 
its  summons,  and  in  less  than  an  hour  all  the 
besieging  works  were  engaged  in  an  active 
cannonade. 
Inside  of  Sumter  the  garrison  received  the 
assault  with  a  certain  degree  of  deliberation. 
The  first  care  was  to  note  the  effect  of  the 
firing.  The  opening  shots  of  the  rebels  were 
badly  aimed,  and  fell  wide  of  the  mark.  With 
the  advancing  daylight  their  gunners  obtained 
a  better  range ;  the  solid  shot  began  to  strike 
the  face  of  the  wall,  and  the  shells  from  the 
mortars  to  explode  with  alarming  precision 
over  the  parapet.  Nevertheless,  no  great  or 
rapid  damage  was  done.  One  vital  point  was, 
however,  quickly  decided.  Housed  in  the  case- 
mates, the  garrison  was  comparatively  safe; 
but  out  on  the  unprotected  parapet,  under  the 
concentrated  fire  of  all  the  rebel  artillery,  An- 
derson's little  handful  of  cannoneers  would  melt 
away  like  frost  in  the  morning  sun.  With  a 
full  war  garrison  he  could  have  replaced  offi- 
cers and  men  as  they  were  shot  down;  but 
with  only  sufficient  trained  force  to  work 
nine  guns,  he  dared  not  risk  the  loss  of  a 
single  man.  His  first  reluctant  duty,  therefore, 
was  to  order  the  abandonment  of  all  his  bar- 
bette guns.  These  were  twenty-seven  in  num- 
ber, more  than  half  his  available  armament, 
and  comprising  nearly  all  his  pieces  of  large 
caliber.  Through  this  necessity  alone,  Fort 
Sumter  was  largely  shorn  of  its  offensive  pow- 
er. His  twenty-one  casemate  guns,  of  which 
only  four  were  forty-two  pounders,  and  the 
remainder  thirty-twos,  constituted  the  total 
of  his  fighting  artillery. 
The  rations  of  bread  having  been  exhausted 
a  day  or  two  before,  the  command  breakfasted 
on  pork  and  water,  and  at  about  7  o'clock 
Captain  Abner  Doubleday,  the  ranking  officer, 
took  his  station  at  a  casemate  gun  and  hurled 
the  defiance  of  Sumter,  with  a  solid  shot, 
against  the  formidable  iron-clad  battery  on 
Cumming's  Point.  Fully  roused  by  the  com- 
bined excitements  of  resentment  and  danger, 
the  men  sprang  with  alacrity  to  their  duty ; 
even  the  forty-three  engineer  workmen,  for- 
getting their  character  of  non-combatants, 
eagerly  volunteered  and  rendered  active  serv- 
ice in  the  defense.  In  fact,  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  garrison  somewhat  outstripped  its  pru- 
dence. They  began  the  engagement  with  a 
supply  of  only  seven  hundred  cartridges;  by 
the  middle  of  the  day  this  stock  had  become 
so  much  reduced  that  the  fort  was  compelled 
to  slacken  its  fire.  From  this  time  on  only  six 
guns  were  kept  in  action  —  two  towards  Morris 
Island,  two  towards  Fort  Moultrie,  and  two 
towards  the  batteries  on  the  west  end  of  Sulli- 
van's Island.  These  were  also  fired  at  longer 
intervals,  while  the  only  six  needles  in  the  fort 
were  kept  busy  sewing  up  cartridge-bags  out 
of  the  extra  clothing,  blankets,  hospital  sheets, 
and  even  coarse  paper. 
So  the  unequal  combat  went  on  throughout 
the  first  day.  The  journal  of  the  bombard- 
ment kept  by  Captain  Foster  shows  that  no 
very  decisive  damage  was  effected  on  either 
side.  From  the  fort  there  were  occasional  good 
shots.  The  iron-clad  batteries  were  repeatedly 
struck,  but  the  light  balls  bounded  oft"  their 
sloping  roofs.  At  other  batteries  they  buried 
themselves  harmlessly  in  the  impervious  rebel 
sand-banks.  Embrasures  were  struck;  groups 
of  rebel  officers  and  men  allowing  their  curios- 
ity to  draw  them  out  from  their  shelter  were 
hustled  pell-mell  back  into  their  bomb-proofs ; 
an  incautious  schooner,  receiving  a  ball,  hauled 
down  her  Confederate  flag  and  hurried  out  of 
range ;  the  two  forty-two  pounders  bearing 
on  Moultrie  silenced  a  gun,  riddled  the 
barracks  and  quarters,  and  tore  three  holes 
through  the  rebel  flag. 
The  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire  upon  Fort  Sumter 
[says  Foster]  during  the  day  was  very  marked  in 
respect  to  the  vertical  fire.  This  was  so  well  directed, 
and  so  well  sustained,  that  from  the  seventeen  mortars 
engaged  in  firing  ten-inch  shells  one-half  of  the  shells 
came  within  or  exploded  above  the  parapet  of  the  fort, 
and  only  about  ten  buried  themselves  in  the  soft  earth  of 
the  parade  without  exploding.  .  .  .  The  effect  of  the 
direct  fire  from  the  enemy's  guns  was  not  so  marked  as 
the  vertical.  For  several  hours'  firing  from  the  com- 
mencement, a  large  proportion  of  their  shot  missed  the 
fort.  Subsequently  it  improved,  and  did  considerable 
damage  to  the  roof  and  upper  story  of  the  barracks 
and  quarters,  and  to  the  tops  of  the  chimneys  on  the 
gorge.  .  .  .  The  shots  from  the  guns  in  the  batteries 
on  the  west  end  of  Sullivan's  Island  did  not  produce 
any  considerable  direct  effect,  but  many  of  them  took 
the  gorge  in  reverse  in  their  fall,  completely  riddling 
the  officers'  quarters,  even  down  to  the  first  story,  so 
great  was  the  angle  of  fall  of  many  of  the  balls. 
One  additional  danger  manifested  itself: 
three  times  during  the  day  the  wooden  build- 
ings in  the  fort  caught  fire,  but  were  extin- 
guished without  great  difficulty,  being  low 
and  easily  accessible.  The  rebel  batteries, 
provided  with  several  furnaces,  now  and  then 
fired  a  hot  shot ;  but  whether  these  or  burst- 
ing shells  started  the  burning  the  officers 
themselves  could  not  determine.  The  very 
work  of  ruin  going  on  in  the  building  used 
as  officers'  quarters  aided  in  restraining  the 
flames.  The  hallways  were  provided  with  iron 
water-tanks,  which,  being  soon  perforated  by 
cannon-balls,  deluged  the  chambers,  and  ren- 
dered the  wood  difficult  to  ignite. 
Amid  experience  of  this  kind  the  eventful 
1 2th  of  April,  the  first  day  of  the  Sumter 
bombardment,  at  length  drew  to  a  close.  The 
fire  of  Sumter  ceased ;  the  direct  fire  of  the
THE    CALL    TO   ARMS. 
7'3 
rebel  batteries  slackened,  and  was  finally  dis- 
continued ;  only  the  mortars  kept  up  a  slow 
and  sullen  bombardment  through  the  night  at 
intervals  of  from  ten  to  fifteen  minutes.  The 
work  of  sewing  up  cartridge-bags  was  contin- 
ued until  midnight;  sentinels  and  lookouts 
were  stationed  to  watch  for  the  possible  coming 
of  boats  from  the  fleet  —  possibly  of  boats 
bearing  a  storming  party  from  the  rebel 
camps.  But  the  night  proved  dark  and  rainy, 
with  a  continuance  of  the  prevailing  gale, 
making  the  waters  of  the  harbor  too  rough 
for  either  of  these  undertakings.  Under  cover 
of  the  thick  gloom,  Foster,  the  engineer,  vent- 
ured outside  the  walls  and  satisfied  himself 
"  by  personal  inspection  that  the  exterior  of 
the  work  was  not  damaged  to  any  consider- 
able extent,  and  that  all  the  facilities  for  taking 
in  supplies  in  case  they  arrived  were  as  com- 
plete as  circumstances  would  admit."  *  Three 
United  States  men-of-war  had  been  seen  off 
the  bar  during  the  afternoon,  and  the  fort  had 
dipped  its  flag  in  signal  to  them.  What  was 
the  fleet  doing  ? 
The  several  vessels  of  the  Fox  expedition 
were  scarcely  at  sea  when  they  encountered  a 
driving  gale.  Captain  Fox  himself,  who  sailed 
in  the  Baltic  on  the  morning  of  the  9th,  was 
yet  ignorant  of  the  changed  destination  of  the 
flag-ship  Powhatan.  This  was  doubtless  an 
entirely  unintentional  omission,  arising  through 
the  cares,  the  dangers,  the  confusion,  the 
cross-purposes,  the  system  of  profound  secrecy 
which  for  a  few  days  prevailed  at  Washington. 
The  Baltic  reached  the  rendezvous  off  Charles- 
ton just  in  time  to  hear  the  opening  guns  of 
the  bombardment.  The  Harriet  Lane  was  al- 
ready there.  The  Pawnee  arrived  at  daylight. 
There  was  an  apparent  conflict  of  orders,  and 
a  hesitation  to  cooperate.  The  Baltic  and  the 
Harriet  Lane  stood  in  to  offer  to  carry  provis- 
ions to  the  fort ;  but  as  they  neared  the  bar 
of  the  harbor,  they  saw  by  the  quick-flashing 
rebel  guns  that  the  war  was  already  begun. 
At  this  intelligence,  the  commander  of  the 
Paivnee  declared  his  intention  to  go  in  and 
li  share  the  fate  of  his  brethren  of  the  army." 
Fox,  cool  and  practical,  brought  him  back  to 
reason  by  explaining  the  Government  instruc- 
tions, and  induced  him  to  await  the  chance 
of  rendering  more  effective  service.  The  two 
ships  of  war  anchored  near  the  bar,  and  the 
Baltic  stood  off  and  on  to  await  the  arrival 
of  the  Powhatan  and  the  tugs.  This,  however, 
was  a  vain  hope.  The  Powhatan  was  on  her 
way  to  Pensacola,  the  tugs  had  been  scattered 
by  the  storm.  The  Freeborn  was  not  per- 
mitted to  leave  New  York.  The  Uncle  Ben 
was  driven  into  Wilmington  and  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  rebels.     The    Yankee  failed  to 
*  Foster,  journal,  April  12,  1861.  War  Records. 
reach  the  rendezvous  till  long  after  the  whole 
affair  was  over.  But,  still  ignorant  of  these 
disasters,  and  hoping  hourly  for  the  arrival  of 
the  missing  vessels,  the  fleet  waited  and  made 
signals  all  the  long  afternoon  and  through  the 
dark  and  stormy  night,  while  the  lookouts  in 
the  garrison  were  anxiously  scanning  the  tur- 
bulent waters  of  the  bay  for  the  coming  of  the 
boats,  and  the  rebel  gunners  stood  by  their 
channel  batteries  in  the  drenching  rain  hop- 
ing to  intercept  and  sink  them. 
Captain  Fox  and  the  officers  of  the  fleet 
were  sorely  disappointed  at  the  non-arrival  of 
the  Powhatan  and  the  tugs.  The  former  had 
on  board  the  armed  launches  and  the  neces- 
sary sailors  to  man  them ;  the  tugs  were  to 
have  carried  the  supplies  and  perhaps  drawn 
the  boats  in  tow.  With  these  facilities  for  trans- 
portation, there  is  every  probability  that  they 
would  have  reached  the  fort.  The  storm  was 
both  an  advantage  and  a  hindrance;  it  increased 
the  friendly  darkness  to  hide  them  from  the 
rebel  gunners,  but  at  the  same  time  it  lashed 
the  waters  of  the  bay  into  fury.  WThen  morn- 
ing came,  such  had  been  the  pitchy  gloom  of 
the  night  and  the  roaring  of  the  rain  and  the 
surf,  that  the  commanders  of  the  rebel  batteries 
were  unable  to  report  that  their  watch  and 
guard  had  been  completely  effective.  "  Opin- 
ions differ,"  wrote  one  of  their  best  officers, 
"  as  to  whether  anything  got  into  Sumter  last 
night.  They  may  or  may  not.  The  night  was 
dark  and  occasionally  stormy,  and  a  heavy- 
sea  running.  If  anything  did,  it  could  not  have 
been  very  extensive."! 
With  the  morning  of  the  13th,  Captain  Fox 
and  the  officers  began  to  despair  of  the  Pow- 
hatan and  the  tugs.  Unwilling  to  remain  mere 
idle  spectators  of  the  fight,  they  cast  about  to 
use  such  expedients  as  presented  themselves. 
Among  the  merchant  vessels  by  this  time  col- 
lected at  the  bar,  awaiting  the  issue  of  the  con- 
test, was  an  ice  schooner;  this  they  impressed 
and  began  to  prepare  for  an  attempt  to  enter 
the  following  night.  There  were  plenty  of  vol- 
unteers among  both  officers  and  seamen  for 
the  hazardous  duty;  but  long  before  night- 
fall the  bombardment  had  come  to  an  end. 
That  Captain  Fox's  undertaking  thus  termi- 
nated without  direct  practical  result  was  not 
his  fault.  With  characteristic  firmness  and 
generosity,  President  Lincoln  took  upon  him- 
self the  principal  blame  for  its  failure. 
The  practicability  of  your  plan  [so  he  wrote  to  Fox 
soon  afterward]  was  not  in  fact  brought  to  a  test.  By 
reason  of  a  gale  well  known  in  advance  to  be  possible 
and  not  improbable,  the  tugs,  an  essential  part  of  the 
plan,  never  reached  the  ground;  while,  by  an  accident 
for  which  you  were  in  nowise  responsible,  and  possi- 
bly I  to  some  extent  was,  you  were  deprived  of  a  war- 
vessel,  with  her  men,  which  you  deemed  of  great  im- 
t  Whiting  to  Beauregard,  April  13,  1S61.  MS.
7M 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
portance  to  the  enterprise.  .  .  .  You  and  I  both 
anticipated  that  the  cause  of  the  country  would  be  ad- 
vanced by  making  the  attempt  to  provision  Fort  Sum- 
ter, even  if  it  should  fail ;  and  it  is  no  small  consolation 
now  to  feel  that  our  anticipation  is  justified  by  the  re- 
sult.* 
"  Fort  Sumter  opened  early  and  spitefully, 
and  paid  especial  attention  to  Fort  Moultrie — 
almost  every  shot  grazing  the  crest  of  the  par- 
apet, and  crashing  through  the  quarters.f" 
This  was  the  rebel  report  of  the  beginning 
of  the  second  day's  bombardment,  April  13. 
The  garrison  of  Sumter  was  refreshed  by  a 
night  of  comparatively  secure  rest  in  their 
casemates,  and,  no  doubt,  a  hearty  breakfast 
of  pork  and  water,  and,  so  long  as  the  stock 
of  cartridges  made  up  during  the  night  held 
out,  they  kept  up  so  brisk  a  fire  from  their  few 
guns  that  the  rebels  began  to  be  confirmed  in 
the  opinion  that  the  fort  had  really  been  reen- 
forced.  On  their  side  the  besiegers  also  in- 
creased both  the  speed  of  firing  and  their 
accuracy  of  aim,  and  seeing  that  they  were 
making  no  headway  in  the  test  of  breaching 
the  walls,  they  began  to  pay  more  attention 
to  the  use  of  red-hot  shot.  J 
Thus  far  this  unequal  contest  of  nearly 
fifty  concentrating  guns,  replied  to  by  about 
six,  had  gone  on  without  material  damage  to 
either  party  —  showing,  in  proportion  to  the 
strength  of  each,  nothing  but  indented  brick 
walls  or  displaced  sand-bags,  battered  chim- 
neys and  perforated  barracks,  a  few  slight 
contusions  from  splinters,  and  one  or  two  dis- 
abled guns.  According  to  all  the  reports,  it 
might  have  proceeded  at  this  rate  the  whole 
week,  and  the  waste  of  ammunition  would 
have  been  its  most  serious  feature.  But  at  this 
stage  a  new  element  entered  into  the  strife, 
and  soon  turned  the  fortune  of  the  day  against 
the  unlucky  garrison  of  Sumter. 
At  about  9  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  roof 
of  the  officers'  quarters  once  more  caught  fire, 
either  from  a  bursting  shell  or  a  red-hotshot; 
and  this  time  a  distance  from  water,  and  the  ex- 
posure to  the  enemy's  missiles,  made  it  impos- 
sible to  extinguish  the  flames.  Worse  than  all, 
it  quickly  became  evident  that  the  fire  would 
soon  encircle  the  magazine  and  make  it  im- 
perative to  close  it.  At  Captain  Foster's  sug- 
gestion, all  hands  not  employed  at  the  guns 
now  sprang  to  the  work  of  taking  out  a  sup- 
ply of  powder.  About  fifty  barrels  were  thus 
secured,  distributed  for  safety  in  the  various 
casemates,  and  covered  with  wet  blankets, 
when  the  fire  and  heat  so  far  increased  that 
it  was  necessary  to  close  the  heavy  metal 
doors  of  the  magazine  and  bank  it  up  with 
earth.  The  enemy,  observing  the  smoke,  re- 
doubled the  fire   of  the  batteries;  a   strong 
*  Lincoln  to  Fox,  May  1,  1861. 
t  Ripley,  Report,  April  16,  1861.    War  Records. 
south  wind  carried  the  flame  to  all  the  bar- 
racks inside  the  fort ;  and  though  the  men 
fought  the  advance  of  the  fire,  they  were  at 
length  compelled  to  give  way  and  take  refuge 
in  the  casemates.  Even  here  they  were  not 
safe ;  the  course  of  the  wind  was  such  as  to 
fill  every  nook  and  corner  of  the  fort  with 
blinding,  stifling  smoke ;  the  men  crouched 
close  down  to  the  floors,  covered  their  faces 
with  wet  handkerchiefs,  or  took  exposed  sta- 
tions near  the  embrasures  to  obtain  a  breath 
of  fresh  air.  As  if  this  were  not  enough,  a  still 
subtler  danger  pursued  them.  The  rapid  con- 
flagration and  sweeping  wind  had  filled  the  air 
with  fire-flakes,  and  these  drifted  on  the  strong 
currents  and  counter-currents  into  the  case- 
mates to  such  an  extent  as  to  ignite  the  beds, 
boxes,  and  various  small  articles  hastily  col- 
lected there.  Under  such  circumstances  the 
fifty  barrels  of  powder  saved  with  so  much  ex- 
ertion from  the  magazine  could  no  longer  be 
kept,  and  upon  Anderson's  order  all  but  five 
barrels  were  thrown  through  the  embrasures  of 
the  fort  into  the  sea.  Noon  had  meanwhile 
come,  and,  engaged  in  these  pressing  occupa- 
tions, the  garrison  had  ceased  firing.  By-and- 
by  the  wind  changed  a  little,  rendering  the 
situation  somewhat  safer  and  more  comfort- 
able. There  were  but  few  cartridges  left ;  still 
an  occasional  shot  was  fired,  which  the  rebels 
themselves,  roused  to  admiration  of  the  gar- 
rison, received  with  cheers. 
A  new  incident  now  engaged  general  atten- 
tion. The  flag- staff  of  the  fort,  struck  seven 
different  times  during  the  first  day  and  three 
the  second,  fell  at  about  one  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon.  Lieutenant  Snyder  and  a  couple 
of  men,  without  much  delay,  again  hoisted  the 
flag  on  a  jury-mast  extemporized  on  the  par- 
apet. The  rebels  had  meanwhile  noted  the 
fall  of  the  flag,  and  sent  several  different  com- 
munications to  Sumter.  The  first  messenger 
was  the  ubiquitous  and  eccentric  Senator  Wig- 
fall.  Beauregard,  to  get  rid  of  him,  sent  him 
as  an  aide  to  the  commander  of  Morris  Island. 
From  there,  after  a  short  consultation  among 
the  rebel  officers,  he  was  dispatched  to  Fort 
Sumter  to  make  inquiries.  He  crossed  the  bay 
dramatically  in  an  open  boat,  with  his  hand- 
kerchief tied  to  his  sword  for  a  flag  of  truce, 
and  clambered  up  the  wall  to  an  accessible 
embrasure,  where,  one  account  says,  an  aston- 
ished artilleryman,  seeing  this  unique  appari- 
tion, summarily  made  him  a  prisoner  of  war.§ 
Officers  soon  came,  however,  and  after  a 
somewhat  spirited  dialogue,  and  some  further 
waving  of  Wigfall's  sword  and  handkerchief 
out  of  an  embrasure,  to  which  the  rebel  bat- 
teries paid  no  attention,  he  was  brought  into 
X  Foster,  journal,  April  13,  1861.   War  Records. 
§  Doubleday,  "Forts  Sumter  and  Moultrie."
THE    CALL    TO  ARMS. 
7*5 
Anderson's  presence.  He  made  a  compli- 
mentary speech  to  Anderson,  requesting  that 
hostilities  might  be  suspended  and  terms  of 
evacuation  arranged.  What  then  occurred 
Captain  Foster  reports  as  follows : 
The  commanding  officer  desiring  to  know  what 
terms  he  came  to  offer,  Mr.  Wigfall  replied,  "Any 
terms  that  you  may  desire, —  your  own  terms, —  the 
precise  nature  of  which  General  Beauregard  will  ar- 
range with  you."  The  commanding  officer  then 
accepted  the  conditions,  saying  that  the  terms  he  ac- 
cepted were  those  proposed  by  General  Beauregard 
on  the  nth,  namely:  to  evacuate  the  fort  with  his 
command,  taking  arms  and  all  private  and  company 
property,  saluting  the  United  States  flag  as  it  was 
lowered,  and  being  conveyed,  if  he  desired  it,  to  any 
Northern  port.  With  this  understanding  Mr.  Wigfall 
left,  and  the  white  flag  was  raised  and  the  United 
States  flag  lowered  by  order  of  the  commanding  officer. 
The  officious  Wigfall  had  not  been  gone  a 
great  while  when  two  different  messages  ar- 
rived at  Sumter  from  General  Beauregard  — 
the  first  to  inquire  whether  Anderson  needed 
assistance,  and  the  second  to  tender  him  the 
use  of  a  fire-engine  and  the  services  of  a  sur- 
geon, both  of  which  they  had  brought  from 
the  city.  All  of  these  Anderson  declined  with 
thanks,  saying  he  had  no  wounded,  that  the 
fire  was  by  this  time  nearly  burned  out,  and 
that  he  thought  the  magazine  safe.  From  these 
interviews  Anderson  now  learned  that  Beau- 
regard was  entirely  ignorant  of  WigfalFs  mis- 
sion or  his  own  capitulation.  He  explained 
the  circumstances,  and  threatened  to  hoist 
again  his  flag.  He  was  persuaded,  however, 
first  to  submit  the  matter  to  be  fully  reported 
at  headquarters.  General  Beauregard,  after 
some  parley,  ratified  Wigfall's  unauthorized 
proceeding  and  accepted  Anderson's  terms  in 
detail.  By  eight  o'clock  on  Saturday  evening 
the  capitulation  was  definitely  arranged,  and 
on  the  following  day,  Sunday,  April  14,  Ander- 
son and  his  command  sailed  northward  in  the 
Baltic,  which  had  come  to  the  relief  of  Sumter. 
In  a  military  point  of  view,  Anderson's  ca- 
pitulation was  hasty.  The  defense  of  the  fort 
can  hardly  be  called  heroic ;  there  was  not  a 
man  killed,  not  a  casemate  gun  disabled,  not 
a  breach  in  the  walls,  plenty  of  ammunition 
in  the  magazine,  and  starvation  not  immedi- 
ately impending. 
The  burning  of  the  quarters  [says  Captain  Foster] 
produced  a  great  effect  on  the  defense  while  the  fire 
lasted,  inasmuch  as  the  heat  and  smoke  were  almost 
stifling,  and  as  the  fire  burned  all  around  the  maga- 
zines, obliging  them  to  be  closed,  and  thus  preventing 
our  getting  powder  to  continue  the  firing.  It  also  de- 
stroyed the  main  gates  and  the  gun-carriages  on  the 
*The  opinion  of  the  rebel  engineer,  after  the  bom- 
bardment, agrees  with  that  of  Captain  Foster.  Major- 
Whiting  wrote  as  follows  to  Beauregard,  on  the  17th 
of  April,  proposing  to  abandon  Morris  Island  :  "  Fort 
Sumter  cannot  be  retaken  from  Morris  Island  alone. 
Your  mortar  batteries  have  accomplished  that  work. 
parapet  of  the  gorge.  But  we  could  have  resumed  the 
firing  as  soon  as  the  walls  cooled  sufficiently  to  open 
the  magazine,  and  then,  having  blown  down  the  wall 
left  projecting  above  the  parapet,  so  as  to  get  rid  of 
flying  bricks,  and  built  up  the  main  gates  with  stone  I 
and  rubbish,  the  fort  would  actually  have  been  in  a 
more  defensible  condition  than  when  the  action  com- 
menced. .  .  .  The  want  of  provisions  would  soon 
have  caused  the  surrender  of  the  fort,  but  with  plenty 
of  cartridges  the  men  would  have  cheerfully  fought 
five  or  six  days,  and,  if  necessary,  much  longer,  on 
pork  alone,  of  which  we  had  a  sufficient  supply.  I  do 
not  think  that  a  breach  could  have  been  effected  in  the 
gorge  at  the  distance  of  the  battery  on  Cumming's 
Point  within  a  week  or  ten  days;  and  even  then,  with 
the  small  garrison  to  defend  it  and  means  for  obstruct- 
ing it  at  our  disposal,  the  operation  of  assaulting  it, 
with  even  vastly  superior  numbers,  would  have  been 
very  doubtful  in  its  results.* 
An  ambitious  and  combative  commander, 
therefore,  carefully  noting  these  elements  of 
strength  and  resistance,  and  seeing  a  reliev- 
ing fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  would 
have  "  held  the  fort,"  and  sent  back  a  mes- 
sage of  defiance.  But  when  Anderson  first 
took  command  of  Sumter  he  wrote  that  "  my 
position  here  is  rather  a  politico-military  than 
a  military  one,"  and  on  this  assumption  he 
seems  to  have  acted  throughout.  Viewed  in 
a  political  light,  his  conduct  is  perfectly  justi- 
fiable. He  had  faithfully  maintained  the  au- 
thority of  the  Government  and  the  honor  of 
the  flag.  He  had  repelled  force  by  force.  Obey- 
ing President  Lincoln's  instructions,  he  had 
incurred  the  ordinary  risks  of  war,  and  now 
possessed  full  authority  to  save  himself  and 
his  command  by  capitulation. 
In  the  bombardment  of  Sumter  the  insur- 
gents for  the  third  time  made  active,  aggressive 
war  upon  the  United  States,  even  if  we  leave 
out  of  sight  the  occupation  of  forts  by  sim- 
ple entrance  or  by  the  show  of  force,  the 
building  of  batteries  to  menace  Sumter,  and 
receiving  the  surrender  made  by  Twiggs  in 
Texas.  In  fact,  since  the  27th  of  December,  a 
continued  series  of  acts  had  been  perpetrated 
by  them,  not  only  outraging  the  authority  of. 
but  levying  actual  war  against,  the  United 
States. 
The  rebels  indulged  in  great  rejoicing  over 
their  victory,  Charleston,  which  had  for  two 
days  witnessed  the  bombardment  almost  en 
masse,  was  once  more  vociferous  with  speeches 
and  ablaze  with  bonfires;  while  at  Mont- 
gomery the  insurgent  Secretary  of  War  or- 
dered an  official  salute  to  celebrate  the  sur- 
render, and  to  emphasize  the  prediction  of  the 
previous  evening  that  the  rebel  flag  would 
It  cannot  be  touched  from  Cumming's  Point.  The 
late  bombardment  shows  that.  Let  the  enemy  oc- 
cupy it  [Morris  Island]  entirely.  We  can  shell  him 
out  from  our  remaining  mortar  batteries  and  keep 
him  at  a  distance."  Whiting  to  Beauregard,  April  17, 
1 86 1.   MS.
716 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
"  float  over  the  dome  of  the  old  Capitol  at 
Washington  before  the  istof  May."* 
Looking  back  now  at  the  events  of  the  first 
month  of  Lincoln's  administration,  we  must 
wonder  at  the  impression  which  prevailed 
then,  and  which  has  so  often  been  expressed 
by  impulsive  men  since,  that  he  was  too  slow 
in  making  his  decision  to  provision  and  re- 
enforce  Fort  Sumter. 
We  find  that  on  the  15th  of  March,  only 
ten  days  after  his  first  information  about  the 
condition  of  the  fort,  he  formally  asked  the 
written  opinion  of  his  Cabinet  on  the  sub- 
ject ;  and  that  on  the  6th  of  April,  only  three 
weeks  later,  he  gave  his  final  order  that  the 
expedition  should  proceed  on  its  mission.  The 
intervening  time  was  spent  by  him  in  consult- 
ing his  Cabinet  and  his  military  and  naval 
officers  about  possible  plans  for  relief  and 
reenforcement ;  about  alternative  policies  to 
be  pursued;  watching  the  culminating  treason 
in  the  South  and  the  slowly  swelling  loyalty 
in  the  North ;  awaiting  the  end  of  the  contra- 
dictory words  and  acts  of  the  Virginia  Con- 
vention, whose  majority  protested  Unionism 
in  public  and  at  last  voted  secession  in  secret; 
allowing  his  Secretary  of  State,  by  an  unoffi- 
cial negotiation  with  the  rebel  commissioners, 
to  disclose  the  attitude  of  the  Montgomery 
cabinet;  using  the  delay  which  the  rebels  sup- 
posed they  had  contrived  for  their  own  benefit 
for  preparing  the  Sumter  expedition ;  making 
the  individual  members  of  his  Cabinet  respon- 
sible to  the  party  and  to  the  country  for  the 
advice  they  gave;  and  finally,  by  all  this,  to 
gain  a  coveted  "  choice  of  position  "  and  com- 
pel the  rebels  to  attack  and  thus  consolidate 
the  North. 
When  he  finally  gave  the  order  that  the  fleet 
should  sail  he  was  master  of  the  situation ; 
master  of  his  Cabinet ;  master  of  the  moral 
attitude  and  issues  of  the  struggle;  master  of 
the  public  opinion  which  must  arise  out  of 
the  impending  conflict;  master  if  the  rebels 
hesitated  or  repented,  because  they  would 
thereby  forfeit  their  prestige  with  the  South ; 
master  if  they  persisted,  for  he  would  then 
command  a  united  North.  And  all  this  was 
done,  it  must  be  remembered,  not  in  the 
retirement  which  gives  calm  reflection,  but 
after  the  rush  and  hurry  of  a  triumphal  jour- 
ney and  the  parade  of  an  inauguration,  in 
the  confusion  of  conflicting  counsel,  the 
worry  of  preliminary  appointments,  the  prev- 
alence of  an  atmosphere  of  treason  and  in- 
surrection, the  daily  defection  of  Government 
officials. 
In  the  face  of  such  self-assertion  and  vic- 
tory, the  verdict  of  history  can  never  be  that 
he  was  tardy  or  remiss;  to  have  acted  more 
*"  Rebellion  Record." 
peremptorily  in  that  strange  crisis,  when  all 
men's  minds  were  simply  groping  and  drifting, 
would  have  brought  upon  him  the  just  criticism 
of  recklessness.  No  act  of  his  will  gain  him 
greater  credit  than  his  kindly  forbearance  and 
patient  wisdom  in  allowing  full  time  and  re- 
flection for  the  final  decision  at  this  supreme 
juncture.  He  had  said  in  his  inaugural :  "  In 
your  hands,  my  dissatisfied  fellow-country- 
men, and  not  in  mine,  is  the  momentous  issue 
of  civil  war.  The  Government  will  not  assail 
you.  You  can  have  no  conflict  without  being 
yourselves  the  aggressors."  This  promise  to 
the  South  he  kept  in  its  most  vital  spirit  and 
meaning.  An  autocratic  ruler  might  have  act- 
ed more  arbitrarily ;  but  in  a  representative  gov- 
ernment it  would  have  been  imprudent  to  do 
otherwise  than  to  await  and  rely  upon  the  slow 
but  mighty  anger  of  an  outraged  patriotism. 
THE    CALL    TO    ARMS. 
President  Lincoln's  decision  and  orders 
to  prepare  the  Sumter  and  Pickens  expeditions 
brought  him  face  to  face  with  the  serious  pos- 
sibilities of  civil  war;  and  better  to  understand 
any  military  problems  with  which  he  might 
have  to  deal,  he  wrote  to  General  Scott  on 
the  1  st  of  April,  as  follows: 
Would  it  impose  too  much  labor  on  General  Scott 
to  make  short,  comprehensive,  daily  reports  to  me  of 
what  occurs  in  his  department,  including  movements 
by  himself,  and  under  his  orders,  and  the  receipt  of 
intelligence?    If  not,  I  will  thank  him  to  do  so.t 
General  Scott  at  once  complied  with  the 
request,  and  from  the  1st  of  April  to  the  4th 
of  May  sent  the  President  nearly  every  day  a 
short  memorandum  in  his  own  handwriting, 
inclosed  in  an  envelope  marked  "  confiden- 
tial " —  the  whole  series  forming  collectively 
a  sort  of  historical  journal  of  the  highest  in- 
terest and  authenticity;  and  portions  of  it 
show  better  than  any  comment  what  was  be- 
ing done  by  the  new  Administration  to  meet 
the  crisis  which  the  Fort  Sumter  bombardment 
precipitated  upon  the  country. 
"  General  Scott's  daily  report,  No.  3," —  so 
indorsed  in  Lincoln's  handwriting  and  dated 
April  3,  1 86 1, —  in  part  runs  thus: 
There  will  remain  in  Washington  a  detachment  of 
cavalry  recruits  from  Carlisle  recruiting  depot,  about 
80  men  and  horses;  Magruder's  horse  artillery;  Grif- 
fin's ditto,  belonging  to  the  Military  Academy  and  now 
needed  there;  Elsey's  foot  artillery  and  Haskin's  ditto. 
The  companies  of  foot  artillery  are  acting  as  infantry. 
The  number  of  marines  at  the  Washington  Navy  Yard 
varies.  We  heard  to-day  that  the  number  now  there 
is  some  200.  There  is  not  another  company  of  regu- 
lars within  reach  of  Washington,  except  7  at  Fort  Mon- 
roe, making  about  400  men,  the  minimum  force  needed 
there  under  existing  circumstances ;  one  company  at 
the  Fayetteville  arsenal,  N.  C,  to  guard  arms  and  am- 
munition against  a  thick  population  of  blacks ;  a  gar- 
rison of  recruits  (50)  at  Ft.  Washington,  ten  miles 
t  Unpublished  MS.
THE    CALL    TO  ARMS. 
7*7 
below  us ;  a  garrison  of  100  recruits  in  Fort  McHenry, 
Baltimore ;  about  750  recruits  in  New  York  harbor  ; 
220  ditto  at  Newport  Barracks  opposite  to  Cincinnati, 
and  about  350  men  at  Jefferson  Barracks  and  the  St. 
Louis  arsenal  near  by,  mostly  recruits.* 
This  memorandum  was  supplemented  two 
days  later  (April  5,  1 861)  by  a  detailed  report 
from  the  Adjutant-General  to  the  President, 
which  showed  the  full  strength  of  the  army 
of  the  United  States  and  its  distribution  to  be 
as  follows : 
Department  of  the  East,  3894;  Department  of  the 
West,  3584;  Department  of  Texas,  2258;  Depart- 
ment of  New  Mexico,  2624;  Department  of  Utah, 
685  ;  Department  of  the  Pacific,  3382  ;  miscellaneous, 
686;  grand  total,  officers  and  men,  17,113.* 
General  Scott's  daily  report,  April  5,  1861 : 
I  have  nothing  of  special  interest  to  report  to-day  ; 
but  that  machinations  against  the  Government  and  this 
capital  are  secretly  going  on  all  around  us,  in  Virginia, 
in  Maryland,  and  here,  as  well  as  farther  south,  I  have 
no  doubt.  I  cannot,  however,  say  that  they  are  as  yet 
formidable,  or  are  likely  ever  to  come  to  a  head.  I 
have  no  policemen  at  my  service,  and  no  fund  for  the 
payment  of  detectives,  but  under  the  circumstances 
recommend  that  such  agents  should  be  at  once  em- 
ployed in  Baltimore,  Annapolis,  Washington,  Alex- 
andria, Richmond,  and  Norfolk.  For  the  reasons  stated, 
I  am  not  prepared  to  suggest  that  a  militia  force  should 
be  called  out  to  defend  this  Capital,  under  section  2 
of  the  militia  act,  passed  February  28,  1795.  The  ne- 
cessity of  such  call,  however,  may  not  be  very  distant.* 
General  Scott's  daily  report,  April  6,  1861: 
A  second  steamer  will  arrive  from  Texas  at  New 
York  in  a  day  or  two,  with  six  troops  of  dismounted 
cavalry.  In  advance,  I  have  ordered  two  of  those 
companies  or  troops  to  proceed  from  the  ship  to  this 
place,  to  be  filled  up  with  men  (cavalry  recruits)  here. 
.  .  .  The  other  four  troops  of  cavalry  I  have  ordered 
to  proceed  from  the  ship  to  Carlisle  Barracks,  Penn- 
sylvania, to  be  remounted  there,  whence  they  can  be 
readily  brought  here  if  deemed  necessary.* 
General  Scott's  daily  report,  April  8,  1861 : 
For  the  defense  of  the  Government,  more  troops  are 
wanted.  The  steamer  with  the  dismounted  cavalry 
(six  companies)  from  Texas,  must  be  in  New  York  to- 
day or  to-morrow,  to  be  followed  by  another  steamer, 
with  about  the  same  number  of  troops,  from  Texas,  in 
a  week.  There  is  a  growing  apprehension  of  danger 
here  in  the  meantime.  I  rely  on  the  presence  of  a  third 
battery  of  flying  artillery  (Sherman's)  by  Saturday 
next.  It  is  coming  from  Minnesota.  Three  other  com- 
panies of  artillery  on  foot,  serving  as  infantry,  will  be 
at  New  York,  from  the  same  quarter,  in  fourteen  days. 
All  these  reinforcements,  excepting  Sherman's  battery, 
may  be  too  late  for  this  place.  For  the  interval  I  have 
sent  Colonel  Smith  (the  immediate  commander  of  all 
the  forces  in  the  District  of  Columbia)  to  learn  what 
number  of  reliable  volunteers  can  be  obtained  in  this 
city,  and  have  also  desired  him  to  see  whether  the 
companies  already  here  may  not  be  advantageously 
concentrated  near  to  the  President's  square.  I  beg 
leave  to  suggest  that  a  small  war  steamer,  to  cruise 
between  Alexandria  and  the  Long  Bridge  over  the 
Potomac,  would  be  of  great  importance  to  the  system 
of  defense  that  we  are  planning.  * 
Unpublished  MS. 
General  Scott's  daily  report,  April  9, 1861  ; 
I  suggested  to  the  Secretary  of  War  yesterday  the 
calling  out,  say  ten  companies,  of  the  militia  or  (by 
substitution)  uniformed  volunteers  of  this  city  to  aid  in 
the  defense  of  the  public  buildings  and  other  public 
property  of  the  Capital  against  "  an  invasion  or  insur- 
rection, or  probable  prospect  thereof."  The  necessity  for 
this  additional  force,  and  the  manner  of  employing  it, 
were  yesterday  pretty  fully  discussed  before  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  by  Colonel  Smith,  Colonel  Stone  (two 
most  excellent  officers),  and  myself.  Colonel  Stone, 
inspector-general  to  Major-General  Weightman's  divis- 
ion, thinks  that  twice  that  number  of  loyal  volunteers 
can  be  promptly  furnished  by  the  division,  and  I  ap- 
prehend that  the  twenty  companies  may  be  deemed 
necessary  in  a  few  days.  I  hope  that  the  President 
may  give  the  Secretary  of  War  the  authority  to  make 
the  call  for  ten  companies  at  once.  .  .  I  have  this 
moment  received  the  President's  instructions  of  this 
date,  through  the  Secretary  of  War,  on  the  safety  of 
this  District.* 
War  Department, 
Washington,  D.  C,  April  9,  1861. 
Lieutenant-General  Scott. 
Sir:  I  am  instructed  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States  to  direct  you  to  take  all  necessary  precautions  for 
protecting  this  Capital  against  a  surprise  or  any  assault 
whatever,  and  that  for  this  object,  among  other  means, 
you  proceed  forthwith  to  mature  a  plan  under  the  24th 
Section  of  the  Act  of  Congress  entitled  "An  Act  more 
effectually  to  provide  for  the  organization  of  the  militia 
of  the  District  of  Columbia,"  approved  March  3,  1803, 
and  that  you  advise  the  President  whenever  in  your 
judgment  the  occasion  shall  have  arisen  for  the  Pres- 
ident's action  under  said  section. 
Very  respectfully,  Simon  Cameron, 
Secretary  of  War. 
War  Department,  Adj. -General's  Office, 
Washington,  April  9,  1861. 
General  Orders  No.  9. 
I.  A  Military  Department  to  be  taken  from  the 
Department  of  the  East  and  called  the  Department 
of  Washington  is  hereby  constituted,  to  consist  of  the 
State  of  Maryland  and  the  District  of  Columbia,  ac- 
cording to  its  original  boundary. 
Brevet-Colonel  C.  F.  Smith,  10th  Infantry,  is  as- 
signed to  the  command  of  this  Department  according 
to  his  brevet  rank.  Headquarters  at  Washington 
City.    ...    By  order  : 
L.  Thomas,  Adjutant-General  A 
General  Scott's  daily  report,  April  n,  1861 : 
Several  companies  of  District  volunteers  were  mus- 
tered into  the  pay  and  service  of  the  United  States 
yesterday  and  this  forenoon,  and  the  process  is  still 
going  on.  A  few  individuals  in  several  companies  de- 
clining to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United 
States  were  of  course  rejected;  but  I  am  happy  to  re- 
port that  five  or  six  other  companies  have  sworn  al- 
legiance without  excepting  a  man.  The  stripping  of 
the  rejected  men  yesterday  of  their  arms,  accoutre- 
ments and  uniforms,  by  their  own  officers,  has,  I  learn, 
had  a  fine  effect  upon  the  patriotism  and  devotion  of  the 
entire  militia  of  the  District.  A  fine  company,  not  one 
of  the  ten  called  for,  having  presented  itself  this 
morning,  of  its  own  motion,  and  requested  it  might 
be  accepted,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  consent,  and  hope  for 
approval.  Before  night  we  shall  have  probably  eleven 
companies  sworn  in.  The  Clerk  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  having,  through  the  Secretary  of 
War,  desired  that  a  company  might  be  assigned  to 
guard  the  Capitol,  I  shall  instruct  Col.  Smith  to  com- 
ply with  that  reasonable  request.* 
t  War  Records. 
Vol.  XXXV.-
7iS 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
General  Scott's  daily  report,  April  13,  1S61 : 
The  two  companies  of  dismounted  cavalry  arrived 
hist  night,  as  I  had  anticipated  in  my  report  of  yester- 
day. At  my  instance  the  Secretary  of  War  has  called 
for  four  other  companies  of  District  volunteers,  which 
will  make  in  all  fifteen  companies  of  this  description 
for  the  defense  of  the  Capital,  besides  six  companies 
of  regulars,  the  marines  at  the  Navy  Yard,  and  (I  hope 
very  soon)  the  war  steamer  to  cruise  on  the  Potomac 
between  the  Long  Bridge  and  a  point  a  little  below  Al- 
exandria. The  next  regular  reinforcements  to  be  ex- 
pected here  are  :  Sherman's  battery  of  flying  artillery 
from  Minnesota,  and  the  companies  of  foot  artillery 
from  the  same  quarter,  in  five  and  seven  days ;  and  a 
portion  of  the  troops  expected  in  the  next  steamer  from 
Texas.  From  the  same  steamer  I  shall  have  the  means 
of  reenforcing  Fort  McHenry  (at  Baltimore),  a  most 
important  point.* 
These  extracts  show  us  the  steps  which 
were  being  quietly  taken  by  the  Government 
to  meet  the  possible  dangers  growing  out  of 
the  Fox  expedition  to  Charleston.  They  in- 
cluded every  resource  which  the  regular  army 
then  afforded;  and  to  call  upon  the  militia  of 
the  States  was,  of  course,  at  that  moment  out 
of  the  question,  as  it  would  have  frustrated 
the  very  result  the  President  had  planned 
and  anticipated. 
The  Sumter  fleet  finally  at  sea,  the  official 
notice  sent  to  Governor  Pickens,  and  the 
work  of  enrolling  militia  for  the  defense  of 
Washington  progressing  so  satisfactorily,  Lin- 
coln again  set  himself,  during  the  brief  res- 
pite, to  the  work  of  making  the  new  appoint- 
ments. Ordinarily  this  was  only  an  act  of 
official  favor  or  partisan  reward,  which  might 
be  performed  at  leisure ;  but  now  it  was  also 
a  work  of  pressing  need,  because  of  the  im- 
perative duty  of  substituting  faithful  and  loyal 
agents  for  indifferent  or  treasonable  ones  in 
the  public  service.  That  such  abounded,  the 
numerous  resignations  and  still  more  plentiful 
avowals  made  manifest  beyond  a  doubt.  The 
city  was  full  of  strangers;  the  White  House 
full  of  applicants  from  the  North.  At  any  hour 
of  the  day  one  might  see  at  the  outer  door 
and  on  the  staircase  one  file  going,  one  file 
coming.  In  the  anteroom  and  in  the  broad 
corridor  adjoining  the  President's  office  there 
was  a  restless  and  persistent  crowd, —  ten, 
twenty,  sometimes  fifty,  varying  with  the  day 
and  hour, —  each  one  in  pursuit  of  one  of  the 
many  crumbs  of  official  patronage.  They 
walked  the  floor;  they  talked  in  groups;  they 
scowled  at  every  arrival  and  blessed  every 
departure ;  they  wrangled  with  the  door-keep- 
ers for  right  of  entrance;  they  intrigued  with 
them  for  surreptitious  chances;  they  crowded 
forward  to  get  even  as  much  as  an  instant's 
glance  through  the  half-opened  door  into  the 
Executive  chamber.  They  besieged  the  repre- 
sentatives and  senators  who  had  privilege  of 
*  Unpublished  MS. 
precedence;  they  glared  with  envy  and  growled 
with  jealousy  at  the  Cabinet  ministers  who,  by 
right  and  usage,  pushed  through  the  throng 
and  walked  unquestioned  through  the  doors. 
At  that  day  the  arrangement  of  the  rooms 
compelled  the  President  to  pass  through  this 
corridor  and  the  midst  of  this  throng  when 
he  went  to  his  meals  in  the  other  end  of  the 
Executive  Mansion ;  and  thus,  once  or  twice 
a  day,  the  waiting  expectants  would  be  re- 
warded by  the  chance  of  speaking  a  word,  or 
handing  a  paper  direct  to  the  President  him- 
self—  a  chance  which  the  more  bold  and  per- 
sistent were  not  slow  to  improve. 
At  first,  Lincoln  bore  it  all  with  the  admi- 
rable fortitude  acquired  in  Western  political 
campaigns.  But  two  weeks  of  this  experience 
on  the  trip  from  Springfield  to  Washington, 
and  six  weeks  more  of  such  beleaguering  in 
the  Executive  office,  began  to  tell  on  his  nerves. 
What  with  the  Sumter  discussion,  the  rebel 
negotiation,  the  diplomatic  correspondence, 
he  had  become  worked  into  a  mental  strain 
and  irritation  that  made  him  feel  like  a  pris- 
oner behind  the  Executive  doors,  and  the 
audible  and  unending  tramp  of  the  applicants 
outside  impressed  him  like  an  army  of  jailers. 
We  can  well  imagine  how  it  intensified  the 
suspense  with  which  he  awaited  the  news 
from  the  fleet  and  the  answer  to  his  official 
communication  to  the  governor  of  South 
Carolina. 
Amid  such  surroundings  and  labors  the  Pres- 
ident received  the  news  which  now  reached 
the  whole  country  from  Sumter.  It  came  very 
gradually  —  first  the  military  scurry  about 
Charleston  ;  then  Beauregard's  demand  for  a 
surrender,  followed  by  Anderson's  prompt  re- 
fusal; and  finally,  on  the  morning  of  Saturday, 
April  13,  the  newspapers  of  Washington,  like 
those  of  every  city  in  the  Union,  North  and 
South,  were  filled  with  the  startling  head-lines 
and  the  thrilling  details  of  the  beginning  and 
progress  of  an  actual  bombardment.  That  day, 
however,  there  was  little  change  in  the  routine 
of  the  Executive  office.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  never 
liable  to  sudden  excitement  or  sudden  activ- 
ity. Through  all  his  life,  and  through  all  the 
unexpected  and  stirring  events  of  the  rebel- 
lion, his  personal  manner  was  one  of  steadi- 
ness of  word  and  act.  It  was  this  quality 
which,  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war,  con- 
veyed to  many  of  his  visitors  the  false  impres- 
sion of  his  indifference.  His  sagacity  gave 
him  a  marked  advantage  over  other  men  in 
enabling  him  to  forecast  probable  events; 
and  when  they  took  place,  his  great  caution 
restrained  his  comments  and  controlled  his 
outward  bearing.  Oftentimes,  when  men  came 
to  him  in  the  rage  and  transport  of  a  first 
indignation    over   some    untoward    incident,
THE    CALL    TO  ARMS. 
7'9 
they  were  surprised  to  find  him  quiet,  even 
serene, —  perhaps  with  a  smile  on  his  face  and 
a  jest  on  his  lips, —  engaged  in  routine  work, 
and  prone  to  talk  of  other  and  more  com- 
monplace matters.  Of  all  things  the  strut  and 
stagey  exhibition  of  mock-heroism  were  for- 
eign to  his  nature.  Generally  it  happened  that 
when  others  in  this  mood  sought  him,  his  own 
spirit  had  already  been  through  the  fiery  trial 
of  resentment  —  but  giving  no  outward  sign, 
except  at  times  with  lowered  eyebrow,  a  slight 
nodding  and  shaking  of  the  head,  a  mut- 
tering motion  or  hard  compression  of  the  lips, 
and,  rarely,  an  emphatic  downward  gesture 
with  the  clenched  right  hand.  His  judgment, 
like  his  perception,  far  outran  the  average 
mind.  While  others  fumed  and  fretted  at 
things  that  were,  all  his  inner  consciousness 
was  abroad  in  the  wide  realm  of  possibilities 
busily  searching  out  the  dim  and  difficult  path 
towards  things  to  be.  His  easy  and  natural 
attention  to  ordinary  occupations  afforded 
no  indication  of  the  double  mental  process 
which  was  habitual  with  him. 
So,  while  the  Sumter  telegrams  were  on 
every  tongue  and  revengeful  indignation  was 
in  every  heart,  there  was  little  variation  in  the 
business  of  the  Executive  Mansion  on  that 
eventful  Saturday.  The  miscellaneous  gath- 
ering was  larger  there,  as  it  was  larger  at  the 
Departments,  the  newspaper,  and  telegraph 
offices,  and  the  hotels.  More  leading  men  and 
officials  called  to  learn  or  to  impart  news. 
The  Cabinet,  as  by  a  common  impulse,  came 
together  and  deliberated  awhile.  All  talk, 
however,  was  brief,  sententious,  informal.  The 
issue  had  not  yet  been  reached.  Sumter  was 
still  under  fire.  Nevertheless,  the  main  ques- 
tion required  no  discussion,  not  even  decision, 
scarcely  an  announcement.  Jefferson  Davis's 
order  and  Beauregard's  guns  had  sufficiently 
denned  the  coming  action  of  the  Government. 
After  this,  President,  functionaries,  and  people 
had  but  a  single  purpose,  a  single  duty.  Lin- 
coln said  little  beyond  making  inquiries  about 
the  current  reports  and  criticising  the  proba- 
bility or  accuracy  of  their  details,  and  went 
on  receiving  visitors,  listening  to  suggestions 
or  recommendations,  and  signing  routine  pa- 
pers as  usual  throughout  the  day. 
One  important  exception  deserves  to  be 
noticed.  A  committee  from  the  Virginia  con- 
vention had  an  appointment  for  a  formal  au- 
dience with  him  that  morning.  The  doubling 
and  drifting  attitude  of  the  Old  Dominion  has 
already  been  described.  The  boasted  conserv- 
atism of  that  convention  was  a  sham.  Its 
Unionism  was  vague  and  traditional ;  its  com- 
plaint and  contumacy  were  real  and  present. 
Day  by  day,  with  the  loudest  professions  of 
loyalty  on  their  lips,  its  majority  was  apolo- 
gizing to  its  minority,  and  by  labored  argu- 
ment against  secession  steadily  convincing 
itself  that  treason  was  a  necessity  if  not  a  duty. 
Recoiling  from  the  fire  of  civil  war,  it  yielded 
itself  the  more  than  half-willing  cat's-paw  of 
conspiracy.  Bewailing  the  denial  of  shadowy 
claims  of  constitutional  rights,  it  soon  volun- 
tarily put  on  the  handcuffs  of  a  grinding  mili- 
tary despotism.  A  step  in  this  road  to  polit- 
ical ruin  was  the  appointment  of  a  committee 
to  visit  Lincoln,  requesting  that  he  should 
define  his  policy,  which  request  was  only  a 
covert  and  threatening  demand  for  the  evac- 
uation of  the  Southern  forts. 
To  this  committee,  Messrs.  Preston,  Stuart, 
and  Randolph,  respectively  a  "  conservative," 
a  "  Unionist,"  and  a"  secessionist,"  the  Presi- 
dent read  his  reply  just  written,*  on  this  morn- 
ing of  Saturday,  April  13.  The  paper  is  tem- 
perate and  dispassionate  even  to  coldness, 
and  indicates  his  ability  to  lift  questions  of 
public  consideration  out  of  the  hot,  blinding 
plane  of  personal  feeling  into  the  cool  light 
of  reason  and  expediency.  While  the  rebel 
guns  were  still  raining  bombs  and  red-hot  shot 
on  Sumter,  he  had  already  mapped  out  his 
course  of  procedure,  based  on  the  facts  within 
his  knowledge,  but  free  from  all  trace  of  ex- 
citement or  feeling  of  revenge. 
He  told  them  he  had  distinctly  defined  his 
policy  in  the  inaugural  address.  It  was  still 
the  plain  and  unmistakable  chart  of  his  inten- 
tions. It  had  been  his  plan  to  hold  only  the 
forts  still  occupied  by  the  Government  when 
he  became  President. 
But  if  [he  continued],  as  now  appears  to  be  true,  in 
pursuit  of  a  purpose  to  drive  the  United  States  au- 
thority from  these  places  an  unprovoked  assault  has 
been  made  upon  Fort  Sumter,  I  shall  hold  myself  at 
liberty  to  repossess,  if  I  can,  like  places  which  had 
been  seized  before  the  Government  was  devolved  up- 
on me.  And  in  every  event  I  shall,  to  the  extent  of 
my  ability,  repel  force  by  force.  Incase  it  proves  true 
that  Fort  Sumter  has  been  assaulted,  as  is  reported,  I 
shall  perhaps  cause  the  United  States  mails  to  be  with- 
drawn from  all  the  States  which  claim  to  have  seceded, 
believing  that  the  commencement  of  actual  war  against 
the  Government  justifies  and  possibly  demands  this.  I 
scarcely  need  to  say  that  I  consider  the  military  posts 
and  property  situated  within  the  States  which  claim  to 
have  seceded  as  yet  belonging  to  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  as  much  as  they  did  before  the  sup- 
posed secession.  Whatever  else  I  may  do  for  the  pur- 
pose, I  shall  not  attempt  to  collect  the  duties  and 
imposts  by  any  armed  invasion  of  any  part  of  the 
country;  not  meaning  by  this,  however,  that  I  may 
not  land  a  -force  deemed  necessary  to  relieve  a  fort 
upon  a  border  of  the  country.  From  the  fact  that  I 
have  quoted  a  part  of  the  inaugural  address,  it  must 
not  be  inferred  that  I  repudiate  any  other  part,  the 
whole  of  which  I  reaffirm,  except  so  far  as  what  I  now 
say  of  the  mails  may  be  regarded  as  a  modification.! 
*  Committee.  Report.   "  Richmond  Enquirer,"  April 
16,  1S61. 
t  Lincoln  to  committee,  April  13,  1S61.     MS.
720 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
In  this  reply  of  the  President  we  have  his 
entire  administrative  policy  regarding  the 
rebellion ;  but  it  must  be  noted  that  it  goes 
only  to  the  extent  of  his  actual  information  — 
it  deals  only  with  accomplished  facts.  The 
programme  of  the  inaugural  is  already  modi- 
fied ;  the  modification  is  slight  but  significant, 
and  based  not  upon  caprice  or  resentment,  but 
on  necessity.  According  to  fair  interpretation  of 
language,  the  programme  of  the  inaugural  was 
that  he  would  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union 
in  all  the  States  to  the  extent  of  his  ability; 
hold,  occupy,  and  possess  the  property  and 
places  belonging  to  the  Government,  and  col- 
lect the  duties  and  imposts.  This  he  would 
do,  however,  only  so  far  as  it  was  necessary 
to  protect  and  defend  the  Federal  authority, 
not  merely  against  domestic  violence,  but 
more  especially  against  foreign  influence  or 
aggression.  He  would  not  invade,  subjugate, 
menace,  or  harass  local  communities.  All 
boundaries  of  the  nation,  sea-board  or  inland, 
he  must, of  necessity,  hold  and  guard;  he  must 
occupy  and  control  every  custom-house  or  an 
efficient  equivalent  for  it.  The  favorite  theory 
was  that  duties  might  be  collected  on  ship- 
board in  insurgent  ports,  and  thus  avoid  the 
friction  of  customs  officers  with  the  local  popu- 
lace. On  inland  boundaries  other  substitutes 
might  perhaps  be  devised.  So,  also,  he  ex- 
plains in  his  reply,  the  military  posts  he  had 
intended  to  "  hold,  occupy,  and  possess"  wrere 
this  cordon  of  forts  on  the  exterior  boundary, 
all  of  which  were  still  in  Union  hands  when 
he  was  inaugurated.  The  interior  places  seized 
under  Buchanan's  administration  he  would 
not  immediately  grasp  at  with  the  military 
hand ;  he  would  forego  the  exercise  of  Federal 
offices  in  disaffected  districts  in  the  interior; 
as  a  means  of  reassurance  and  reconciliation 
he  would  even  send  the  malcontents  their 
regular  mails,  if  they  would  permit  him.  All 
this  not  as  a  surrender  of  a  single  Federal 
right,  but  to  avoid  violence,  bloodshed,  irri- 
tation; to  create  a  feeling  of  safety;  to  induce 
calm  reflection;  to  maintain  peace;  to  restore 
fraternal  sympathies  and  affections.  "You  can 
have  no  conflict,"  he  had  told  them,  "  without 
being  yourselves  the  aggressors." 
But,  in  immediate  connection  with  the  ten- 
der of  this  benign  policy,  he  had  also  warned 
them  that  it  would  be  modified  or  changed  if 
"  current  events  and  experience  shall  show  a 
modification  or  change  to  be  proper."  That 
experience  had  now  come.  The  rebels  had 
rejected  the  tendered  immunity,  spurned  the 
proffered  peace,  become  the  aggressors,  opened 
the  conflict  in  deliberate  malice.  He  there- 
fore modified  his  plan.  He  would  repel  force 
by  force.  He  would  withdraw  the  mails.  He 
would  recapture  Sumter,  taken  since  his  in- 
auguration, and,  if  he  could,  such  other  forts 
and  places  taken  under  his  predecessor  as 
were  essential  to  safety.  Thus  much  was  nec- 
essary for  protection  and  for  precaution.  Less 
he  could  not  do  and  fulfill  his  oath  of  office. 
Once  more  he  told  them  that  while  he  now 
felt  himself  by  their  act  compelled  to  close 
and  bolt  the  strong  doors  of  Federal  authority, 
he  would  yet  refrain  from  even  the  appearance 
of  punishment.  Though  he  gave  them  to  un- 
derstand that  he  might  attack  the  rebel  bat-  i
teries  on  Morris  Island,  or  recapture  Pensacola 
Navy  Yard,  or  build  a  fort  on  Arlington 
Heights  to  protect  Washington,  yet  he  would 
"not  attempt  to  collect  the  duties  and  imposts 
by  any  armed  invasion  of  any  part  of  the 
country." 
His  reply  to  the  committee  must  be  received 
with  the  same  qualification  which  he  attached 
to  his  inaugural.  He  still  reserved  the  right 
to  use  his  best  discretion  in  every  exigency, 
and  to  change  his  acts  under  the  inspiration 
of  current  events  and  experiences.  The  events 
of  the  day  were  his  beacons ;  the  necessities 
of  the  hour  formed  his  chart.  Throughout  the 
tedious  four-years'  war  he  pretended  to  no 
prophecy  and  recorded  no  predictions.  When 
souls  of  little  faith  and  great  fear  came  to  him 
with  pertinacious  questioning,  he  might  possi- 
bly tell  them  what  he  had  done ;  he  never  told 
them  what  he  intended  to  do.  "  My  policy 
is  to  have  no  policy,"  was  his  pithy  axiom  oft- 
entimes repeated ;  whence  many  illogically 
and  most  mistakenly  inferred  him  to  be  with- 
out plans  or  expedients.  His  promise  to  the 
Virginia  committee  must  therefore  be  regarded 
as  binding  under  the  conditions  of  that  day, 
namely :  seven  cotton-States  leagued  in  rebel- 
lion ;  actual  war  begun ;  seven  thousand  rebels 
in  arms  at  Charleston ;  Sumter  under  fire  with 
prospect  of  capitulation;  Virginia,  North  Caro- 
lina, Arkansas,  and  other  border  States  yet  in 
the  Union  under  loud  protestations  of  loyalty 
and  unceasing  deprecation  of  civil  war.  Lin- 
coln's reservation  was  well  considered.  One 
week  from  that  day  these  conditions  were 
transformed  almost  beyond  comparison,  com- 
pelling him  to  a  widely  different  line  of  action. 
On  the  day  they  received  their  answer,  the 
Virginia  committee  had  an  engagement  to 
dine  with  Secretary  Seward;  but  in  view  of 
the  Sumter  telegrams,  they  excused  them- 
selves and  hurried  back  to  Richmond. 
By  the  next  morning  (Sunday,  April  14) 
the  news  of  the  close  of  the  bombardment  and 
capitulation  of  Sumter  was  in  Washington. 
In  the  forenoon,  at  the  time  Anderson  and  his 
garrison  were  evacuating  the  fort,  Lincoln  and 
his  Cabinet,  together  with  sundry  military  offi- 
cers, were  at  the  Executive  Mansion,  giving 
final  shape  to  the  details  of  the  action  the
THE    CALL    TO  ARMS. 
721 
Government  had  decided  to  take.  A  procla- 
mation, drafted  by  himself,  copied  on  the  spot 
by  his  secretary,  was  concurred  in  by  his 
Cabinet,  signed,  and  sent  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment to  be  sealed,  filed,  and  copied  for  pub- 
lication in  the  next  morning's  newspapers. 
The  document  bears  date  April  15  (Monday), 
but  was  made  and  completed  on  Sunday.  This 
proclamation,  by  authority  of  the  Act  of  1795, 
called  into  service  seventy-five  thousand  mi- 
litia for  three  months,  and  convened  Congress 
in  extra  session  on  the  coming  4th  of  July. 
It  commanded  treasonable  combinations  to 
disperse  within  twenty  days,  and  announced 
that  the  first  object  of  this  military  force  was 
to  repossess  the  forts  and  places  seized  from 
the  Union.*  This  limit  of  time  was  made 
obligatory  by  the  terms  of  the  second  section 
of  the  Act  of  1795,  under  which  the  call  was 
issued.  It  was  necessary  to  convene  Congress, 
and  the  law  only  authorized  the  use  of  the 
militia  "  until  the  expiration  of  thirty  days  after 
the  commencement  of  the  then  next  session  of 
Congress." 
In  view  of  the  subsequent  gigantic  expan- 
sion of  the  civil  war,  eleventh-hour  critics  con- 
tinue to  insist  that  a  larger  force  should  have 
been  called  at  once.  They  forget  that  this  was 
nearly  five  times  the  then  existing  regular  army, 
and  that  in  the  Mexican  war  Scott  had  marched 
from  Vera  Cruz  to  the  capital  with  twenty -five 
thousand  men.  They  forget  that  only  very 
limited  quantities  of  arms,  equipments,  and 
supplies  were  in  the  Northern  arsenals.  They 
forget  that  the  treasury  was  bankrupt,  and  that 
an  insignificant  eight  million  loan  had  not  two 
weeks  before  been  discounted  nearly  six  per 
cent,  by  the  New  York  bankers,  some  bids 
ranging  as  low  as  eighty-five.t  They  forget 
that  the  shameful  events  of  the  past  four 
months  had  elicited  scarcely  a  single  spark 
of  war  feeling ;  that  the  great  American  public 
had  suffered  the  siege  of  Sumter  and  firing  on 
the  Star  of  the  West  with  a  dangerous  indif- 
ference. They  forget  the  doubt  and  dismay, 
the  panic  of  commerce,  the  division  of  coun- 
sels, the  attacks  from  within,  the  sneers  from 
without  —  that  faith  seemed  gone  and  patriot- 
ism dead.  Twenty-four  hours  later  all  this 
was  measurably  changed.  But  it  was  under 
such  circumstances  that  Lincoln  issued  his 
call  for  seventy- five  thousand  men  to  serve 
three  months.  Even  that  number  appeared 
a  hazardous  experiment  —  an  immense  army, 
*  Lincoln,  proclamation  April  15,  1861. 
t  The  following  letter  to  President  Lincoln,  dated 
Treasury  Department,  April  2,  1861,  is  from  unpub- 
lished MS.  : 
My  Dear  Sir  :  The  bids  for  the  $8,000,000  loan 
exceed  33,000,000  —  the  average  advance  from  Mr. 
Dix's  loan  is  from  3  to  4  per  cent.    The  highest  bid  — 
a  startling  expenditure.  As  matters  stood,  it 
seemed  enough  to  cope  with  the  then  visible 
forces  of  the  rebellion;  the  President  had  do 
means  of  estimating  the  yet  undeveloped  mili 
tary  power  of  the  insurgent  States.  The  ordi- 
nary indicia  to  accurate  administration  were 
wanting.  To  a  certain  degree  the  Government 
was  compelled  to  sail  in  a  fog.  But  it  is  pre- 
cisely in  such  emergencies  that  men  like  Lin- 
coln are  the  inestimable  possession  of  free 
nations.  Hopeful,  moderate,  steadfast,  he 
never  for  an  instant  forgot  that  he  was  the 
pilot,  not  the  ship.  He  remembered  what  he 
had  said  in  the  inaugural : 
If  the  Almighty  Ruler  of  nations  with  his  eternal 
truth  and  justice  be  on  your  side  of  the  North,  or  on 
yours  of  the  South,  that  truth  and  that  justice  will 
surely  prevail  by  the  judgment  of  this  great  tribunal 
of  the  American  people. 
He  felt  quite  as  confident  that  this  popular 
justice  would  ultimately  translate  itself  into 
armed  might.  But,  holding  this  faith,  he  was 
not  carried  away  by  any  too  sanguine  impulses. 
While  discussing  the  proclamation,  some  of 
his  advisers  made  a  disparaging  contrast  of 
Southern  enterprise  and  endurance  with  the 
Northern.  This  indulgent  self-deception  he 
checked  at  the  very  outset. 
We  must  not  forget  [he  said]  that  the  people 
of  the  seceded  States,  like  those  of  the  loyal  ones,  are 
American  citizens,  with  essentially  the  same  character- 
istics and  powers.  Exceptional  advantages  on  one  side 
are  counterbalanced  by  exceptional  advantages  on  the 
other.  We  must  make  up  our  minds  that  man  for  man 
the  soldier  from  the  South  will  be  a  match  for  the  sol- 
dier from  the  North  and  vice  versa.  % 
The  action  of  the  Government  brought  in 
its  train  countless  new  duties  and  details.  Both 
at  the  departments  and  the  Executive  Man- 
sion the  Sunday  was  one  of  labor,  not  of  rest — 
no  end  of  plans  to  be  discussed,  messages  to 
be  sent,  orders  to  be  signed.  The  President's 
room  was  filled  all  day  as  by  a  general  recep- 
tion. Already  the  patriotic  echoes  were  com- 
ing in  from  an  excited  country.  Governor 
Ramsey  of  Minnesota  telegraphed  that  he 
could  send  a  thousand  men,  and  other  locali- 
ties made  similar  tenders.  Senators  and  rep- 
resentatives yet  in  Washington  felt  authorized 
to  pledge  the  support  of  their  States  by  voice 
and  arms.  Of  all  such  words  of  cheer,  it  is  safe 
to  say  none  were  personally  so  welcome  and 
significant  as  the  unreserved  encouragement 
and  adhesion  of  Senator  Douglas  of  Illinois. 
for  only  $1000  though  —  is  par,  and  near  $3,000,000 
at  94  ;  and  I  hardly  think  of  taking  any  at  lower  rates. 
I  am  offered  %  Per  cent,  premium  on  $2,000,000  treas- 
ury notes.  All  this  shows  decided  improvement  in 
finances  and  will  gratify  you. 
Yours,  most  truly,  S.  P.  Chase. 
|  J.  G.  N.,  personal  recollection.
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
Having,  through  a  friend,  signified  his  de- 
sire for  an  interview,  Douglas  went  to  the  Ex- 
ecutive Mansion  between  7  and  8  o'clock  on 
this  same  Sunday  evening,  April  14,  and  being 
privately  received  by  the  President,  these  two 
remarkable  men  sat  in  confidential  interview, 
without  a  witness,  nearly  two  hours.  What  a 
retrospect  their  singular  careers  must  have 
forced  into  memory,  if  not  into  words,  in  this 
eventful  meeting!  —  their  contemporary  be- 
ginnings in  Illinois;  the  flat-boatman  in  San- 
gamon, the  auctioneer's  clerk  in  Scott  county; 
their  first  meetings  in  country  lawsuits;  their 
encounters  in  the  legislature;  their  greetings 
in  society;  their  intellectual  wrestlings  on  the 
stump;  their  emulation  in  local  politics;  their 
simultaneous  leadership  of  opposing  parties 
in  the  State;  their  champion  contest  for  the 
Senate,  ending  in  Douglas's  triumph ;  their  ri- 
val nominations  for  the  Presidency,  resulting 
in  Lincoln's  success.  This  was  not  the  end. 
Both  men  were  in  the  conscious  prime  of  intel- 
lect; both  believed  themselves  still  in  the 
undiminished  vigor  of  physical  manhood. 
Recognizing  his  defeat,  Douglas  was  by  no 
means  conquered.  If  Lincoln  was  in  the  White 
House,  he  was  yet  in  the  Senate.  Already  in 
a  Senate  debate  he  had  opened  his  trenches  to 
undermine  and  wreck  Lincoln's  administra- 
tion. Already  he  had  set  his  subtle  sophistry 
to  demonstrate  that  the  revenue  laws  gave  the 
Executive  no  authority  for  coercion.  His  usual 
skill  in  debate,  however,  failed  him  on  this  oc- 
casion ;  and  allowing  himself  to  be  carried  along 
in  a  singularly  weak  and  illogical  argument, 
intended  to  force  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  Repub- 
lican party  into  compromises  to  satisfy  the 
border  States  and  through  their  influence  re- 
claim the  cotton- States,  he  committed  the  se- 
rious blunder  of  declaring  it  unlawful  and 
unwise  to  enforce  the  revenue  laws  in  the  in- 
surrectionary ports  or  to  recapture  or  hold 
their  harbor  defenses,  except  at  Key  West  and 
Tortugas,  which  alone,  he  seemed  to  think,  were 
"  essentially  national."  He  strongly  deprecated 
the  "  reduction  "  and  "  subjugation  "  of  the 
seceded  States;  and,  declaring  himself  in  favor 
of  peace,  said,  with  emphasis :  "  War  is  dis- 
union. War  is  final,  eternal  separation."  Per- 
haps intending  merely  to  emphasize  his  atti- 
tude of  mediation,  he  carelessly  permitted 
himself  to  make  a  plea  to  tolerate  accomplished 
secession.*  All  this  was  very  far  short  of  the 
language  of  his  letter  of  acceptance,  that  "  the 
laws  must  be  administered,  the  constituted  au- 
thorities upheld,  and  all  unlawful  resistance  to 
these  things  must  be  put  down  with  firmness, 
impartiality,  and  fidelity."  The  adjournment 
of  the  Senate  had  terminated  the  debate  with- 
out issue.  Douglas  was  still  lingering  in  Wash- 
ington, when  suddenly  the  whole  country  was 
holding  its  breath  at  the  report  of  the  outrage, 
in  Charleston  harbor. 
Wedded  too  closely  to  the  acts  of  the  dema- 
gogue, Douglas  nevertheless  possessed  the* 
vision  and  power  of  the  statesman  in  a  high 
degree.  Past  failures  had  come  to  him  not  so; 
much  through  lack  of  ability,  as  through  ad- 
herence to  vicious  methods.  Estimating  suc- 
cess above  principle,  he  had  adopted  reckless" 
expedients,  and  leagued  himself  with  ques- 
tionable and  dangerous  combinations;  andJ 
his  speech  of  the  15th  of  March  was  only  ai 
new  instance  of  his  readiness  to  risk  his  con- 
sistency and  his  fame  for  a  plausible  but  de- 
lusive trick  in  party  strategy.  Until  this  time,_ 
throughout  all  his  minor  heresies,  he  had  kepti 
himself  true  and  unspotted  on  one  high  point 
of  political  doctrine.  The  Union  must  ber 
preserved,  the  laws  enforced.  In  the  face  off 
temptation  and  defeat,  in  New  Orleans  and  in 
Norfolk  as  boldly  as  in  New  York,  he  had  de- 
clared that  if  Lincoln  were  elected  he  must  bei 
inaugurated  and  obeyed.  This  was  popular 
sovereignty,  genuine  and  undefiled.  It  was 
against  this  principle  that  the  challenge  had 
been  hurled  at  Sumter,  and  the  incident  fur- 
nished Douglas  the  opportunity  to  retrieve  thei 
serious  mistake  of  his  recent  Senate  speech.; 
That  assault  could  no  longer  be  disguised  as> 
lawful  complaint  or  constitutional  redress  — 
it  was  the  spring  of  a  wild  beast  at  the  throat  I
of  the  nation.  It  changed  the  issue  from  coer- 
cion to  anarchy,  f  No  single  act  of  DouglasV 
life  so  strongly  marks  his  gift  of  leadership; 
as  that  he  nowr  saw  and  accepted  the  new? 
issue,  and  without  a  moment's  hesitation! 
came  forward  and  placed  himself  beside  Lin- 
coln in  defense  of  the  Government  —  the  firsti 
as  well  as  the  greatest  "  war  Democrat."  An 
army  with  banners,  not  a  marshal  with  a  writ,\ 
was  now  the  constitutional  remedy.  In  the^ 
face  of  unprovoked  military  assault  Douglas 
waived  all  personal  rivalry  and  party  issues,, 
and  assured  Lincoln,  without  questions  or; 
conditions,  of  his  help  to  maintain  the  Union. 
With  frankness  and  generosity  as  Lincoln's 
ruling  instincts,  his  long-continued  political 
contests  with  Douglas  had  always  been  kept 
within  the  bounds  of  personal  and  social  cour- 
tesy, if  we  except  their  Illinois  joint  debates, 
where  the  heat  of  discussion  had  once  or  twice 
carried  them  to  the  verge  of  a  personal  quar- 
rel. Those  passages,  however,  were  long  since 
*  Douglas,  Senate  speech,  March  15,  1861.  "Globe." 
tThe  very  existence  of  the  people  in  this  great  valley 
depends  upon  maintaining  inviolate  and  forever  that 
great  right  .secured  by  the  Constitution,  of  freedom  of 
trade,  of  transit,  and  of  commerce,  from  the  center 
of  the  continent  to  the  ocean  that  surrounds  it.   .   .  .
AN  EASTERN  LEGEND. 
72.3 
forgotten  by  both.  The  present  emergency 
was  too  grave  for  party  feeling.  Lincoln 
knew  Douglas  too  well  to  underrate  him. 
It  was  the  President's  method  to  apply  the 
representative  principle  to  problems  of  states- 
manship. It  did  not  need  an  instant's  reflec- 
tion to  remember  that  next  in  value  to  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  Republican  party  was 
the  voluntary  alliance  of  a  great  leader  whom 
more  than  a  million  voters  in  the  North  had 
so  lately  followed  unflinchingly  to  inevitable 
political  defeat,  and  with  whom  that  leader 
now  offered  to  reenforce  the  defenders  of  the 
Union.  If  Lincoln  had  ever  doubted  the  wis- 
dom of  his  Sumter  policy,  which  had  kept 
The  proposition  now  is  to  separate  these  United  States 
into  little  petty  confederacies.  First,  divide  them  into 
two ;  and  then,  when  either  party  gets  beaten  at  the 
next  election,  subdivide  again ;  then,  whenever  one 
gets  beaten  again,  another  subdivision;  and  then, 
when  you  beat  on  governor's  election,  the  discomfited 
will  rebel  again,  and  so  it  will  go  on.  And  if  this  new 
system  of  resistance  by  the  sword  and  bayonet  to  the 
results  of  the  ballot-box  shall  prevail  here  in  this  coun- 
open  the  road  to  this  alliance,  it  was  here 
vindicated.  On  the  following  morning,  side- 
by  side  with  Lincoln's  proclamation,  the  whole- 
country  read  the  telegraphic  announcement  of 
the  interview  and  the  authorized  declaration 
that  while  Douglas  was  yet  "  unalterably  op- 
posed to  the  Administration  on  all  its  political 
issues,  he  was  prepared  to  sustain  the  Pi 
dent  in  the  exercise  of  all  his  constitutional 
functions  to  preserve  the  Union,  and  maintain 
the  Government,  and  defend  the  Federal  capi- 
tal." *  If  there  had  been  any  possible  uncer- 
tainty in  the  premises  before,  this  was  sufficient 
to  make  the  whole  North  a  unit  in  demanding 
the  suppression  of  the  rebellion. 
try  of  ours,  the  history  of  the  United  States  is  already 
written  in  the  history  of  Mexico.  .  .  .  It  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  union  or  disunion.  It  is  a  question  of  order ;  of 
the  stability  of  the  Government;  of  the  peace  of  com- 
munities. The  whole  social  system  is  threatened  with 
destruction  and  with  disruption.  Douglas,  speech  at 
Bellair,  April  22,  186 1. 
*  Press  telegram,  April  15,  1861. 
AN    EASTERN    LEGEND. 
AT  his  Beloved's  door  he  knocked,  unheeding 
The  mocking  echoes  drifting  idly  by : 
Then  called  a  voice  —  the  while  his  glad  heart  bounded — 
"Ah,  who  is  there?"    He  answered,  "  It  is  I." 
"  Think  not  these  walls,"  the  sweet,  clear  voice  resounded, 
"  These  palace  walls  will  me  and  thee  contain." 
The  shining  door  stood  barred !    His  fervent  pleading 
Was  spent  in  vain. 
In  solitude,  where  desert  sands  are  gleaming, 
Burned  on  his  changeless  love  through  patient  years  : 
Once  more  he  comes,  and  knocks  with  trembling  fingers; 
Once  more  his  soul  a  thrilling  music  hears. 
Once  more  that  voice  across  the  silence  lingers — 
"  Ah,  who  is  there  ?  "    He  answers,  "7/  is  thou .'  " 
The  door  flies  back  !    The  sudden  splendor,  streaming. 
Enfolds  him  now ! 
Charlotte  IV.  Thurston.