THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
821 
mission  of  the  rifles  to  Columbia,  but  much  to  my  as- 
tonishment he  informed  me  that  since  he  had  looked 
over  the  report  of  "  Small  Fire-arms  "  (now  inclosed) 
that  he  found  he  had  labored  under  an  error  in  stating 
to  me  that  the  10,000  rifles  I  had  engaged  were  ready 
for  delivery  when  called  for  by  me.  He  said  he  could 
have  them  rifled,  but  it  would  take  3  or  4  months 
to  execute  the  contract,  but  suggested  that  we  should 
purchase  the  10,000  smooth-bored  muskets  instead,  as 
a  more  efficient  arm,  particularly  if  large-sized  buck- 
shot should  be  used,  which,  put  up  in  wire  case  capa- 
ble of  containing  12  of  them,  would  go  spitefully 
through  an  inch  plank  at  200  yards.  I  was  much  as- 
tonished at  the  result  of  my  interview  with  Governor 
Floyd  to-day,  for  he  had  not  only  informed  me  that 
the  rifles  would  be  ready  for  me  on  my  arrival,  but 
told  Mr.  Trescott  so  likewise,  and  that  if  I  had  been 
in  Washington  last  Saturday  I  could  have  got  them.  .  .  . 
If  you  will  be  satisfied  with  the  smooth-bored  muskets 
like  the  specimen  forwarded  to  you,  I  will  purchase 
them.  Better  do  this,  although  not  the  best  pattern, 
than  be  without  arms  at  a  crisis  like  the  present.  Col- 
onel Benjamin  Huger  can  give  you  much  information 
about  these  muskets.  This  is  derived  not  only  from 
Mr.  Floyd,  but  also  from  General  J.  E.  Johnston, 
Quartermaster-General,  who  was  President  of  the  Ord- 
nance Board  who  had  these  muskets  changed  from  flint 
to  percussion,  and  also  from  smooth  bore  to  rifle,  and 
he  says  that  for  our  purposes  the  smooth-bored  musket 
is  preferable  to  the  altered  rifle.  The  why  I  cannot 
explain  to-day.  ...  I  also  send  you  a  letter  from  Mr. 
Trescott,  in  reply  to  certain  inquiries  from  me.  I  am 
unable  to  make  any  comments  upon  them  nor- to  add 
other  facts  which  I  will  forward  you  more  leisurely  to- 
morrow. .  .  ."  * 
TRESCOTT  (ASST.  SEC.  STATE)  TO  DRAYTON. 
"Washington,  Nov.  19,  i860. 
"  (Private,  Confidential.) 
"  My  Dear  Drayton  :  It  is  difficult  to  reply  spe- 
cifically to  your  inquiries,  partly  because  I  do  not  be- 
lieve that  the  exact  course  of  the  Administration  has 
been  yet  determined  on,  and  partly  because  my  knowl- 
edge, or  rather  my  inference,  of  its  intentions  is  de- 
rived from  intercourse  with  its  members  which  I  am 
bound  to  consider  confidential.  I  do  not  regard  it  of 
serious  importance  to  you  to  know  the  individual  opin- 
ions of  either  the  President  or  the  Cabinet.  No  action 
of  any  sort  will  be  taken  until  the  message  has  been 
sent  indicating  the  opinions  of  the  Executive,  and  that 
message,  whatever  it  be,  will  find  our  legislature  in 
session,  and  the  convention  on  the  point  of  meeting. 
I  think  it  likely  that  the  President  will  state  forcibly 
what  he  considers  the  grievances  of  the  South,  that 
he  will  add  that  he  does  not  think,  if  the  right  of 
secession  existed,  it  would  be  a  wise  policy  for  the 
State  to  adopt,  and  that  he  does  not  think  the  right 
to  secede  does  exist,  and  then  refer  the  whole  matter 
to  Congress ;  what  he  will  do  when  the  State  does  se- 
cede, he  has  not  said,  and  I  do  not  know,  nor  any  man, 
I  believe.  He  will  do,  as  we  will,  what  he  believes  to 
be  his  duty,  and  that  duty,  I  suppose,  will  be  discharged 
in  full  view  of  the  consequences  following  any  line  of 
action  that  may  be  determined  on.  But  I  think  that, 
as  long  as  Cobb  and  Thompson  retain  seats  in  the 
Cabinet,  you  may  feel  confident  that  no  action  has 
been  taken  which  seriously  affects  the  position  of  any 
Southern  State. 
"I  think  that  I  may  safely  rely  upon  my  knowledge 
of  what  will  be  done,  and  you  may  rely  upon  my  res- 
ignation as  soon  as  that  knowledge  satisfies  me  of  any 
move  in  a  direction  positively  injurious  to  us,  or  alter- 
ing the  present  condition  of  things  to  our  disadvantage. 
When  you  pass  through  on  Wednesday,  however,  I 
will  speak  to  you  more  fully.    Yours,     W.  H.  T."  * 
THOS.  f.  dkayton  to  goveknoj-  Gl  :\. 
"Washington,  19th  Nov.,  i860. 
"  Mr.  Buchanan,  while  lie  can  discover  no  authority 
under  the  Constitution  to  justify  secession  by  a  State, 
on  the  other  hand  he  can  find  no  power  to  coer 
to  return  after  the  right  of  secession  has  been  exer- 
cised. He  will  not  allow  entry  or  clearance  of 
sel  except  through  the  Custom-house,to  be  established 
as  soon  as  secession  is  declared,  upon  the  deck  of  a 
man-of-war  off  the  harbor  of  Charleston.  He  will  en- 
force the  collection  of  duties,  not  by  Navy,  but  by 
a  Revenue  Cutter,  as  our  Collector  now  would  do  if  his 
authority  was  resisted.  I  will  write  to  you  more  fully 
when  I  return  from  New  York,  where  I  go  to-mor- 
row at  daylight,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  who  deems  it  important  that  I  should  go  there  to 
make  arrangements  for  shipping  the  arms  (should  you 
still  want  them)  from  that  point  instead  of  this  city.  .  .  . 
Do  send  a  copy  of  the  list  of  arms  at  the  Arsenals  to 
H.  R.  Lawton,  Milledgeville,  Ga.  I  am  getting  some 
smooth-bored  muskets  for  Georgia,  like  the  specimen 
I  sent  you.    ..." 
THOS.    F.    DRAYTON    TO    GOVERNOR    GIST. 
"Washington,  23d  Nov.,  i860. 
"  I  arrived  here  at  6  A.  M.  from  New  York,  where 
I  had  gone  at  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Floyd  to  engage 
Mr.  G.  B.  Lamar,  President  of  the  Bank  of  the  Re- 
public, to  make  an  offer  to  the  Secretary  for  such  a 
number  of  muskets  as  we  might  require.  The  Secre- 
tary at  War  was  reluctant  to  dispose  of  them  to  me, 
preferring  the  intermediate  agency.  Mr.  Lamar  has 
consented  to  act  accordingly,  and  to-day  the  Secretary 
has  written  to  the  commanding  officer  [at]  Watervliet 
Arsenal  to  deliver  five  or  ten  thousand  muskets  (altered 
from  flint  to  percussion)  to  Mr.  Lamar's  order.  Mr.  La- 
mar will  pay  the  United  States  paymaster  for  them,  and 
rely  upon  the  State  to  repay  him.  I  have  been  most 
fortunate  in  having  been  enabled  to  meet  the  payments 
for  the  arms  through  Mr.  L.,  for  I  feel  satisfied  that 
without  his  intervention  we  could  not  have  effected 
the  purchase  at  this  time.  ...  I  expect  to  return  at 
daylight  to-morrow  to  New  York,  for  I  am  very  anx- 
ious about  getting  possession  of  the  arms  at  Water- 
vliet, and  forward  them  to  Charleston.  The  Cabinetmay 
break  up  at  any  moment,  on  differences  of  opinion  with 
the  President  as  to  the  rights  of  secession,  and  a  new 
Secretary  of  War  might  stop  the  muskets  going  South, 
if  not  already  on  their  way  when  he  comes  into  office. 
"  I  will  write  to  you  again  by  the  next  mail.  The 
impression  here  and  elsewhere  among  many  Southern 
men  is,  that  our  senators  have  been  precipitate  in  re- 
signing ;  they  think  that  their  resignations  should 
have  been  tendered  from  their  seats  after  they  had  an- 
nounced to  the  Senate  that  the  State  had  seceded. 
Occupying  their  seats  up  to  this  period  would  have 
kept  them  in  communication  with  senators  from  the 
South  and  assisted  very  powerfully  in  shaping  to  our 
advantage  coming  events."  * 
If  any  further  quotation  be  necessary  to 
show  the  audacity  with  which  at  least  three 
Secretaries  and  one  Assistant  Secretary  of 
Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet  engaged  in  flagrant 
conspiracy  in  the  early  stages  of  rebellion,  it 
may  be  found  in  an  interview  of  Senator 
Clingman  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior, 
which  the  former  has  recorded  in  his  speeches 
and  writings  as  an  interesting  reminiscence. 
It  may  be  doubted  whether  Secretary  Thomp- 
son correctly  reported  the  President  as  wish- 
ing him  success  in  his  North  Carolina  mission, 
*  MS.  Confederate  Archives,  War  Department.
822 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
but  he  is,  of  course,  a  competent  witness  to  his 
own  declarations  and  acts. 
"About  the  middle  of  December  (1S60)  I  had  oc- 
casion to  see  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior  on  some 
'.  business.  On  my  entering  the  room,  Mr. 
Thompson  said  to  me,  '  Clingman,  I  am  glad  you  have 
called,  for  I  intended  presently  to  go  up  to  the  Senate 
to  see  you.  I  have  been  appointed  a  commissioner  by 
the  State  of  Mississippi  to  go  down  to  North  Carolina 
to  get  your  State  to  secede,  and  I  wished  to  talk  with 
you  about  your  Legislature  before  I  start  down  in  the 
morning  to  Raleigh,  and  to  learn  what  you  think  of 
my  chance  of  success.'  I  said  to  him, '  I  did  not  know 
that  you  had  resigned.'  He  answered,  '  Oh,  no,  I  have 
not  resigned.'  'Then,'  I  replied,  '  I  suppose  you  re- 
sign in  the  morning.'  '  No,'  he  answered,  *  I  do  not 
intend  to  resign,  for  Mr.  Buchanan  wished  us  all  to 
hold  on,  and  to  go  out  with  him  on  the  4th  of 
March.'  '  But,'  said  I,  '  does  Mr.  Buchanan  know  for 
what  purpose  you  are  going  to  North  Carolina  ?  ' 
'Certainly,'  he  said,  'he  knows  my  object.'  Being 
surprised  by  this  statement,  I  told  Mr.  Thompson  that 
Mr.  Buchanan  was  probably  so  much  perplexed  by  his 
situation  that  he  had  not  fully  considered  the  matter, 
and  that  as  he  was  already  involved  in  difficulty,  we 
ought  not  to  add  to  his  burdens  ;  and  then  suggested 
to  Mr.  Thompson  that  he  had  better  see  Mr.  Buchanan 
again,  and  by  way  of  inducing  him  to  think  the  matter 
over,  mention  what  I  had  been  saying  to  him.  Mr. 
Thompson  said,  '  Well,  I  can  do  so,  but  I  think  he 
fully  understands  it.'  In  the  evening  I  met  Mr. 
Thompson  at  a  small  social  party,  and  as  soon  as  I 
approached  him,  he  said,  '  I  knew  I  could  not  be  mis- 
taken. I  told  Mr.  Buchanan  all  you  said,  and  he  told 
me  that  he  wished  me  to  go,  and  hoped  I  might  suc- 
ceed.' I  could  not  help  exclaiming,  'Was  there  ever 
before  any  potentate  who  sent  out  his  own  Cabinet 
ministers  to  excite  an  insurrection  against  his  govern- 
ment !  '  The  fact  that  Mr.  Thompson  did  go  on  the 
errand,  and  had  a  public  reception  before  the  Legisla- 
ture, and  returned  to  his  position  in  the  Cabinet  is 
known,  but  this  incident  serves  to  recall  it."  * 
To  this  sketch  of  the  Cabinet  cabal  it  is 
necessary  to  add  the  testimony  of  his  partici- 
pation, by  one  who,  from  first  to  last,  was  a 
principal  and  controlling  actor.  Jefferson  Davis 
records  that : 
"In  November,  i860,  after  the  result  of  the  presi- 
dential election  was  known,  the  governor  of  Missis- 
sippi, having  issued  his  proclamation  convoking  a 
special  session  of  the  Legislature  to  consider  the  pro- 
priety of  calling  a  convention,  invited  the  senators 
and  representatives  of  the  State  of  Congress,  to  meet 
him  for  consultation  as  to  the  character  of  the  message 
he  should  send  to  the  Legislature  when  assembled. 
While  engaged  in  the  consultation  with  the  governor 
just  referred  to,  a  telegraphic  message  was  handed  to 
me  from  two  members  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet, 
urging  me  to  proceed  'immediately '  to  Washington. 
Tins  dispatch  was  laid  before  the  governor  and  the 
members  of  Congress  from  the  State  who  were  in 
conference  with  him,  and  it  was  decided  that  I  should 
comply  with  the  summons.  On  arrival  at  Washington, 
I  found,  as  had  been  anticipated,  that  my  presence 
there  was  desired  on  account  of  the  influence  which 
it  was  supposed  I  might  exercise  with  the  President 
(Mr.  Buchanan)  in  relation  to  his  forthcoming  mes- 
sage to  Congress.  On  paying  my  respects  to  the 
President,  he  told  me  that  he  had  finished  the  rough 
*"  Speeches  and  Writings  ofT.  L.  Clingman,"  p.  526. 
t  Davis :   "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Gov- 
ernment," pages  57,  58,  59. 
draft  of  his  message,  but  that  it  was  still  open  to  re- 
vision and  amendment,  and  that  he  would  like  to  read 
it  to  me.  He  did  so  and  very  kindly  accepted  all  the 
modifications  which  I  suggested.  The  message  was, 
however,  afterward  somewhat  changed."  t 
Here  is  a  substantial  unmasking  of  the  com- 
bined occult  influence  which  presided  over 
the  initiatory  steps  of  the  great  American 
Rebellion  —  its  central  council  —  the  master 
wheel  of  its  machinery  —  and  the  connecting 
relation  which  caused  all  its  subordinate  parts 
to  move  in  harmonious  accord. 
With  the  same  mind  to  dictate  a  secession 
message  to  a  legislature  and  a  non-coercion 
message  to  Congress  —  to  assemble  insurrec- 
tionary troops  to  seize  Federal  forts  and  with- 
hold government  troops  from  their  protection 
—  to  incite  governors  to  rebellion  and  over- 
awe a  weak  President  to  a  virtual  abdication 
of  his  rightful  authority,  history  need  not  won- 
der at  the  surprising  unity  and  early  success  of 
the  conspiracy  against  the  Union. 
THE    PRESIDENT'S     MESSAGE. 
Less  than  a  month  intervened  between  the 
November  election  at  which  Lincoln  had  been 
chosen  and  the  annual  session  of  Congress, 
which  would  meet  on  the  first  Monday  of 
December,  and  it  was  necessary  at  once  to 
begin  the  preparation  of  the  annual  message. 
Now  indeed  a  golden  opportunity  presented 
itself  to  President  Buchanan.  The  suffrages 
of  his  fellow-citizens  had  covered  his  polit- 
ical theories,  his  party  measures,  and  his  offi- 
cial administration  with  condemnation,  in  a 
perfect  avalanche  of  ballots.f  But  the  Charles- 
ton conspirators  had  within  a  very  few  days 
created  for  him  a  new  issue  overshadowing  all 
the  questions  on  which  he  had  suffered  politi- 
cal wreck.  Since  the  6th  of  November,  the 
campaign  of  the  Border  Ruffians  for  the  con- 
quest of  Kansas,  and  the  wider  congressional 
struggle  for  the  possession  of  the  Territories, 
might  be  treated  as  things  of  the  past.  Even 
had  they  still  been  pending  issues,  they  paled 
into  insignificance  before  the  paramount  ques- 
tion of  disunion.  Face  to  face  with  this  dan- 
ger, the  adherents  of  Lincoln,  of  Douglas,  of 
Bell,  and  the  fraction  of  his  own  partisans  in 
the  free  States  would  be  compelled  to  sink 
minor  discords,  and  as  one  man  to  follow  the 
constitutional  ruler  in  a  constitutional  defense 
of  the  laws,  the  flag,  and  the  territory  of  the 
Union. 
Without  change  of  position,  without  recan- 
tation of  principle,  without  abatement  even  of 
declared  party  doctrine,  honestly  executing 
%  3,832,240  opposition  popular  votes  against  847,953 
for  Breckinridge,  the  candidate  championed  by  the 
President  and  his  adherents.
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
only  the  high  mandate  of  the  Constitution,  he 
could  turn  from  the  old  issues  and  take  up 
the  new.  A  single  stride,  and  from  the  flying 
leader  of  a  discomfited  rout,  he  might  become 
the  mailed  hero  of  an  overpowering  host. 
Tradition,  patriotism,  duty,  the  sleepless  mo- 
nition of  a  solemn  official  oath, — all  summoned 
him  to  take  this  step,  and  a  brilliant  precedent 
in  presidential  annals,  an  incident  forever  lum- 
inous in  American  history,  assured  him  of  the 
plaudits  of  posterity. 
Unfortunately  for  himself  and  for  his  coun- 
try, President  Buchanan  had  neither  the  intel- 
lectual independence  nor  the  courage  equal 
to  such  an  act  of  moral  heroism.  Of  sincere 
patriotism  and  of  blameless  personal  rectitude, 
he  had  reached  political  eminence  by  slow 
promotion  through  seniority,  not  by  brilliancy 
of  achievement.  He  was  a  politician,  not  a 
statesman.  Of  fair  ability  and  great  industry 
in  his  earlier  life,  the  irresolution  and  passive- 
ness  of  advancing  age  and  physical  infirmity 
were  now  upon  him.  Though  from  the  great 
free  State  of  Pennsylvania,  he  saw  with  South- 
ern eyes  and  heard  with  Southern  ears,  and  had 
convinced  himself  that  the  South  was  acting 
under  the  impulse  of  resentment  arising  from 
deliberate  and  persistent  injuries  from  the 
North. 
The  fragment  of  an  autograph  diary  from 
the  pen  of  John  B.  Floyd,  Secretary  of  War,* 
affords  the  exact  evidence  of  the  temper  in 
which  President  Buchanan  officially  confronted 
the  rebellion  of  the  Southern  States.  The  fol- 
lowing are  extracts  from  entries,  on  several 
days,  beginning  with  November  7th,  i860, 
the  day  following  the  presidential  election : 
"  Washington  City,  November  7th,  i860. 
"...  The  President  wrote  me  a  note  this  evening, 
alluding  to  a  rumor  which  reached  the  city  to  the  ef- 
fect that  an  armed  force  had  attacked  and  carried  the 
forts  in  Charleston  Harbor.  He  desired  me  to  visit  him, 
which  I  did,  and  assured  him  that  the  rumor  was  alto- 
gether without  foundation,  and  gave  it  as  my  opinion 
that  there  was  no  danger  of  such  an  attempt  being  made. 
We  entered  upon  a  general  conversation  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  disunion  and  discussed  the  probabilities  of  it 
pretty  fully.  We  concurred  in  the  opinion  that  all 
indications  from  the  South  looked  as  if  disunion  was 
inevitable.  He  said  that  whilst  his  reason  told  him 
there  was  great  danger,  yet  his  feelings  repelled  the 
convictions  of  his  mind. 
"Judge  Black,  the  Attorney-General,  was  present 
during  a  part  of  the  conversation,  and  indicated  an  opin- 
ion, that  any  attempt  at  disunion  by  a  State  should  be 
put  down  by  all  the  power  of  the  Government.! 
i  *  Printed  in  "  The  Early  Life,  Campaigns,  and  Pub- 
lic Services  of  Robert  E.  Lee,  with  a  record  of  the  cam- 
paigns and  heroic  deeds  of  his  companions  in  arms,  by 
a  distinguished  Southern  journalist."  8vo.,  E.  B.  Treat, 
Publisher,  New  York  i87i,p.  789,  article  Major  Gen- 
eral John  B.  Floyd.  It  says :  "Among  his  private  pa- 
pers examined  after  his  death  the  fragment  of  a  diary 
was  found,  written  in  his  own  hand,  and  which  is  here 
copied  entire."  The  diary  also  bears  internal  evidence 
of  genuineness. 
"November  9th.  ...  A  Cabinet  meeting  was  held 
as  usual  at  I  o'clock;  all  the  members  were  present, 
and  the  President  said  the  business  of  the  meeting  was 
the  most  important  ever  before  the  Cabinet  since  his 
induction  into  office.  The  question,  he  said,  to  be  con- 
sidered and  discussed,  was  as  to  the  course  the  Admin- 
istration should  advise  him  to  pursue  in  relation  to 
the  threatening  aspect  of  affairs  in  the  South,  and  most 
particularly  in  South  Carolina.  After  a  considerable 
amount  of  desultory  conversation,  he  asked  the  opin- 
ions of  each  member  of  the  Cabinet  as  to  what  should 
be  done  or  said  relative  to  a  suggestion  which  he  threw 
out.  His  suggestion  was  that  a  proposition  should  be 
made  for  a  general  convention  of  the  States  as  provi- 
ded for  under  the  Constitution,  and  to  propose  some 
plan  of  compromising  the  angry  disputes  between  the 
North  and  the  South.  He  said  if  this  were  done,  and 
the  North  or  non-slaveholding  States  should  refuse  it, 
the  South  would  stand  justified  before  the  whole  world 
for  refusing  longer  to  remain  in  a  confederacy  where 
her  rights  were  so  shamefully  violated.  He  said  he 
was  compelled  to  notice  at  length  the  alarming  condi- 
tion of  the  country,  and  that  he  would  not  shrink  from 
the  duty. 
"  General  Cass  spoke  with  earnestness  and  much 
feeling  about  the  impending  crisis  —  admitted  fully  all 
the  great  wrongs  and  outrages  which  had  been  com- 
mitted against  the  South  by  Northern  fanaticism,  and 
deplored  it.  But  he  was  emphatic  in  his  condemnation 
of  the  doctrine  of  secession  by  any  State  from  the 
Union.  He  doubted  the  efficacy  of  the  appeal  for  a 
convention,  but  seemed  to  think  it  might  do  well 
enough  to  try  it.  He  spoke  warmly  in  favor  of  using 
force  to  coerce  a  State  that  attempted  to  secede. 
"Judge  Black,  the  Attorney-General,  was  emphatic  in 
his  advocacy  of  coercion,  and  advocated  earnestly  the 
propriety  of  sending  at  once  a  strong  force  into  the 
forts  in  Charleston  Harbor,  enough  to  deter  if  possible 
the  people  from  any  attempt  at  disunion.  He  seemed 
to  favor  the  idea  of  an  appeal  for  a  general  convention 
of  all  the  States. 
"  Governor  Cobb,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  de- 
clared his  very  decided  approbation  of  the  proposition, 
for  two  reasons  —  first,  that  it  afforded  the  President  a 
great  opportunity  for  a  high  and  statesmanlike  treat- 
ment of  the  whole  subject  of  agitation,  and  the  proper 
remedies  to  prevent  it;  secondly,  because,  in  his  judg- 
ment, the  failure  to  procure  that  redress  which  the 
South  would  be  entitled  to  and  would  demand  (and 
that  failure  he  thought  certain),  would  tend  to  unite 
the  entire  South  in  a  decided  disunion  movement.  He 
thought  disunion  inevitable,  and  under  present  circum- 
stances most  desirable. 
"  Mr.  Holt,  the  Postmaster-General,  thought  the 
proposition  for  the  convention  dangerous,  for  the  rea- 
son, that  if  the  call  should  be  made  and  it  should  fail 
to  procure  redress,  those  States  which  now  are  opposed 
to  secession,  might  find  themselves  inclined,  from  a 
feeling  of  honor,  to  back  the  States  resolving  on  dis- 
union. Without  this  common  demand  and  common 
failure,  he  thought  there  would  be  no  such  danger  of 
united  action,  and  therefore  a  stronger  prospect  of 
some  future  plan  of  reconciliation. 
"  Mr.  Thompson,  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior, 
thought  well  of  the  plan  of  calling  for  a  general  con- 
vention —  thought  his  State  (Mississippi)  about  equally 
tThe  astounding  mysteries  and  eccentricities  of 
politics  find  illustration  in  the  remarkable  contrast 
between  this  recorded  impulsive,  off-hand  and  patriotic 
expression  of  Attorney-General  Black,  on  November 
7th,  and  his  labored  official  opinion  of  an  exactly 
opposite  tenor,  certified  to  the  President  under  date 
of  November  20th.  See  Opinions  of  the  Attorney- 
General,  Vol.  IX,  p.  517.
8*4 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
divided  between  the  union  and  disunion  men.  He 
deprecated  the  idea  of  force,  and  said  any  show  of  it 
by  the  Government  would  instantly  make  Mississippi 
a  unit  in  favor  of  disunion. 
••  Mr.  Toucey,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  thought  well 
of  the  appeal  tor  the  convention  —  coincided  in  an 
opinion  I  had  expressed,  that  retaliatory  State  meas- 
ures  would  prove  most  availing  for  bringing  the 
Northern  fanatics  to  their  senses. 
"I  expressed  myself  decidedly  opposed  to  any  rash 
movement,  and  against  the  idea  of  secession  at  this 
time.  I  did  so  because  I  think  that  Lincoln's  adminis- 
tration will  fail,  and  be  regarded  as  impotent  for  good 
or  evil  within  four  months  after  his  inauguration.  We 
are  to  meet  to-morrow  at  I  o'clock. 
••  November  10th.  .  .  .  We  had  a  Cabinet  meeting 
to-day,  at  which  the  President  read  a  very  elaborate 
document,  prepared  either  as  a  part  of  his  message  or 
as  a  proclamation.  It  was  well  written  in  the  main, 
and  met  with  extravagant  commendation  from  General 
Cass,  Governor  Toucey,  Judge  Black,  and  Mr.  Holt. 
Cobb,  Thompson,  and  myself  found  much  to  differ  from 
in  it, —  Cobb  because  it  inculcated  submission  to  Lin- 
coln's election  and  intimated  the  use  of  force  to  coerce 
a  submission  to  his  rule,  and  because  it  reprehended 
the  policy  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill;  Thompson  be- 
cause of  the  doctrine  of  acquiescence  and  the  hostility 
to  the  secession  doctrine.  I  objected  to  it  because  I 
think  it  misses  entirely  the  temper  of  the  Southern 
people  and  attacks  the  true  State-Rights  doctrine  on  the 
subject  of  secession.  I  do  not  see  what  good  can  come 
of  the  paper,  as  prepared,  and  I  do  see  how  much  mis- 
chief may  flow  from  it." 
It  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  we  may 
accept  these  extracts  at  their  full  literal  import. 
Either  the  words  "  coerce,"  "  submission,"  "  use 
of  force,"  and  so  on  are  written  down  by  the 
diarist  in  a  sense  different  from  that  in  which 
they  were  spoken,  or  the  President  and  sev- 
eral of  his  counselors  underwent  an  amazing 
change  of  sentiment.  But  in  a  general  way 
they  show  us  that  on  the  fourth  day  after  Lin- 
coln's election  the  Buchanan  Cabinet  was  al- 
ready divided  into  hostile  camps.  Cass  of 
Michigan,  Secretary  of  State,  Toucey  of  Con- 
necticut, Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Black  of 
Pennsylvania,  Attorney-General,  and  Holt  of 
Kentucky,  Postmaster-General,  were  emphatic 
Unionists;  while  Cobb  of  Georgia,  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  Thompson  of  Mississippi, 
Secretary  of  the  Interior,  and  Floyd  of  Vir- 
ginia, Secretary  of  War,  were  secessionists — 
the  latter  yet  professing  devotion  to  the  Union, 
but  with  such  ifs  and  buts  as  left  sufficiently 
clear  evidence  of  his  inevitable  drift  to  disloy- 
alty. 
All  impulses  of  prudence  or  patriotism  ought 
to  have  moved  the  President  to  reconstruct 
his  Cabinet.  But  instead  of  some  energetic 
executive  act  of  this  character,  he  seems  to 
have  applied  himself  to  the  composition  of  a 
*  "  It  was  while  these  plans  for  a  coup  cfelat  before 
the  4th  of  March  were  being  matured  in  the  very  Cabi- 
net itself  and  in  the  presence  of  a  President  too  feeble 
to  resist  them  and  too  blind  even  to  see  them,  that  Mr. 
Stanton  was  sent  for  by  Mr.  Buchanan  to  answer  the 
question,  '  Can  a  State  be  coerced  ?  '  For  two  hours  he 
battled  and  finally  scattered  for  the  time  being  the  here- 
political  essay  to  teach  the  North  its  duty ; 
as  if  his  single  pen  had  power  to  change  the 
will  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  upon 
a  point  which  they  had  decided  by  their  votes 
only  four  days  previously  after  six  years  of 
discussion.  In  the  draft  of  this  document, 
which  he  read  to  his  Cabinet  on  November 
ioth,  we  have  the  important  record  that  "it  in- 
culcated submission  to  Lincoln's  election,  and 
intimated  the  use  of  force  to  coerce  a  submission 
to  his  rule," —  positions  which  Floyd  records 
were  "  met  with  extravagant  commendations 
from  General  Cass,  Governor  Toucey,  Judge 
Black,  and  Mr.  Holt."  This  was  a  true  touch- 
stone; it  instantly  brought  out  not  only  the 
open  secessionism  of  Cobb  and  Thompson, 
but  the  disguised  disloyalty  of  Floyd. 
It  is  a  strange  historical  phenomenon  that 
with  the  President  and  a  majority  of  the  Cab- 
inet in  this  frame  of  mind,  the  South  should 
have  been  permitted  to  organize  revolution. 
The  solution  seems  to  lie  in  the  temporizing  fee- 
bleness of  Buchanan  and  in  the  superior  finesse 
and  daring  conspiracy  of  Cobb,  Thompson, 
and  Floyd. 
Many  indications  make  it  evident  that  a  long 
and  laborious  factional  struggle  took  place  over 
the  preparation  of  the  President's  message.  The 
telegraph  announced  several  protracted  Cabi- 
net sessions;  and  as  early  as  the  21st  of  No- 
vember the  points  under  discussion  and  the 
attitude  of  the  President  and  his  several  offi- 
cial advisers  were  accurately  foreshadowed  in 
the  newspapers.  Nor  were  these  momentous 
deliberations  confined  to  the  Cabinet  proper. 
All  the  varieties  of  suggestion  and  contradic- 
tory counsels  which  were  solicited  or  tendered 
we  may  never  learn,  and  yet  we  know  enough 
to  infer  the  highest  extremes  and  antagonisms 
of  doctrine  and  policy.  On  the  one  hand  came 
Jefferson  Davis,  the  future  chief  of  the  Rebel- 
lion, at  the  urgent  call  of  his  fellow-conspira- 
tors; on  the  other  hand  came  Edwin  M. 
Stanton,  Buchanan's  future  Attorney-General 
and  Lincoln's  Secretary  of  War,*  called  in  by 
Mr.  Buchanan  himself,  to  help  him  through 
the  intricate  maze  of  his  perplexed  opinions 
and  inclinations.  How  many  others  may  have 
come  voluntarily  or  by  summons  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  guess.  Many  brains  and  hands,  how- 
ever, must  have  joined  in  the  work,  since  the 
document  is  such  a  heterogeneous  medley  of 
conflicting  theories,  irreconcilable  doctrines, 
impracticable  and  irrelevant  suggestions.  For 
at  length  the  hesitating  and  bewildered  Presi- 
sies  with  which  secession  had  filled  the  head  of  that 
old  broken-down  man.  He  was  requested  to  prepare 
an  argument  in  support  of  the  power  to  be  inserted  in 
theforthcomingmessage." — [Hon.  H.  L.  Dawes, in  the 
"Boston  Congregationalist. "  See  "  Atlantic  Monthly," 
XXVI.,  p.  468.]
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
dent,  unable  to  decide  and  impotent  to  con- 
struct, seems  to  have  made  his  message  a 
patchwork  from  the  contributions  of  his  ad- 
visers, regular  and  irregular,  with  the  inevita- 
ble effect,  not  to  combine  and  strengthen,  but 
to  weaken  and  confuse  the  warring  thoughts 
and  alien  systems. 
Aside  from  the  mere  recapitulation  of  de- 
partment reports,  the  message  of  President 
Buchanan  delivered  to  Congress  on  the  4th 
of  December  occupied  itself  mainly  with  two 
subjects, —  slavery  and  disunion.  On  the  ques- 
tion of  slavery  it  repeated  the  assertions  and 
arguments  of  the  Buchanan  faction  of  the 
Democratic  party  during  the  late  presidential 
campaign,  charging  the  present  peril  entirely 
upon  the  North.  As  a  remedy  it  recommended 
an  amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution 
expressly*  recognizing  slavery  in  States  which 
had  adopted  or  might  adopt  it,  and  also  ex- 
pressly giving  it  existence  and  protection  in 
the  Federal  Territories.  The  proposal  was  sim- 
ply childish.  Precisely  this  issue  had  been 
decided  at  the  presidential  election ;  to  do 
this  would  be  to  reverse  the  final  verdict  of 
the  ballot-box.  f 
On  the  question  of  disunion  or  secession,  the 
message  raised  a  vague  and  unwarrantable 
distinction  between  the  infractions  of  law  and 
allegiance  by  individuals,  and  the  infractions 
of  law  and  allegiance  by  the  commonwealth, 
or  body  politic  denominated  a  State.  Under  the 
first  head  it  held:  That  the  Union  was  designed 
to  be  perpetual;  that  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment is  invested  with  sovereign  powers  on 
special  subjects,  which  can  only  be  opposed 
or  abrogated  by  revolution;  that  secession 
is  unconstitutional,  and  is,  therefore,  neither 
more  nor  less  than  revolution ;  that  the  ex- 
ecutive has  no  right  to  recognize  the  seces- 
sion of  a  State;  that  the  Constitution  has 
established  a  perfect  government  in  all  its 
forms,  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial,  and 
this  government,  to  the  extent  of  its  powers, 
acts  directly  upon  the  individual  citizen  of 
every  State  and  executes  its  own  decrees  by 
the  agency  of  its  own  officers;  and,  finally, 
that  the  Executive  cannot  be  absolved  from 
his  duty  to  execute  the  laws. 
But,  continues  the  President,  the  laws  can 
only  be  executed  in  certain  prescribed  meth- 
ods, through  the  agency  of  courts,  marshals, 
posse  comitattcs,  aided,  if  necessary,  by  the 
militia  or  land  and  naval  forces.  The  means 
and  agencies,  therefore,  fail,  and  the  perform- 
ance of  this  duty  becomes  impracticable,  when, 
as  in  South  Carolina,  universal  public  senti- 
ment has  deprived  him  of  courts,  marshals, 
and  posse.  Present  laws  being  inadequate  to 
overcome  a  united  opposition,  even  in  a  single 
State,  Congress  alone  has  the  power  to  decide 
whether  they  can  be  effectually  amended,  f 
It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  summary, 
that  the  whole  of  the   President's  rambling 
*  Slavery  existed  by  virtue  of  express  enactments  in 
the  several  constitutions  of  the  slave  States,  but  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  gave  it  only  implied 
sanction. 
t "  It  was  with  some  surprise,  I  confess,  that  I  read 
the  message  of  the  President.  The  message  laid  down 
certain  conditions  as  those  upon  which  alone  the  great 
Confederacy  of  the  United  States  could  be  preserved 
from  disruption.  In  so  doing  the  President  appeared 
to  be  preparing  beforehand  an  apology  for  the  seces- 
sion. Had  the  conditions,  indeed,  been  such  as  the 
Northern  States  would  be  likely  to  accept,  the  mes- 
sage might  have  been  considered  one  of  peace.  But 
it  seems  very  improbable  that  the  Northern  States 
should  now,  at  the  moment  of  their  triumph,  and  with 
large  majorities  of  Republicans  in  their  assemblies,  sub- 
mit to  conditions  which,  during  many  years  of  strug- 
gle, they  have  rejected  or  evaded."  —  [Lord  John  Rus- 
sell to  Lord  Lyons,  December  25th,  i860.  British  Blue 
Book.  ] 
tThe  logic  of  the  message  utterly  breaks  down  by 
a  palpable  omission  to  state  the  well-known  fact  that, 
though  every  citizen  of  South  Carolina,  or  any  other 
State,  might  refuse  to  accept  or  execute  the  office  of 
United  States  marshal,  or,  indeed,  that  of  any  Federal 
officer,  the  want  could  be  immediately  lawfully  supplied 
by  appointing  any  qualified  citizen  of  any  other  State, 
who  might  lawfully  and  properly  lead  either  a  posse,  or 
Federal  forces,  or  State  militia,  to  put  down  obstruc- 
tion of  the  Fedei-al  laws,  insurrection,  or  rebellion. 
President  Buchanan  admitted  his  own  error,  and  re- 
pudiated his  own  doctrine,  when  on  January  2d,  fol- 
lowing, he  nominated  a  citizen  of  Pennsylvania  for  the 
office  of  collector  of  the  port  of  Charleston,  South 
Carolina. 
Vol.  XXXIV.— 113. 
But  this  whole  fine-spun  web  of  partisan  sophistry 
is  superfluous  and  mere  concealing  rubbish.  Sections 
two  and  three  of  the  Act  of  February  28th,  1 795,  author- 
ize the  President,  when  the  execution  of  the  laws  is 
obstructed  by  insurrection  too  powerful  for  courts  and 
marshals,  to  call  forth  the  militia  of  any  and  all  the 
States,  first  and  primarily  to  "  suppress  such  combina- 
tions," and,  secondly,  "  to  cause  the  laws  to  be  duly 
executed;  and  the  use  of  militia  so  to  be  called  forth 
may  be  continued,  if  necessary,  until  the  expiration  of 
thirty  days  after  the  commencement  of  the  then  next 
session  of  Congress."  In  performing  this  duty  the 
act  imposes  but  a  single  condition  or  prerequisite  on 
the  Executive  :  he  shall  by  proclamation  command  the 
insurgents  to  disperse.  These  sections  are  complete, 
harmonious,  self-sufficient,  and,  in  their  chief  provis- 
ions, nowise  dependent  upon  or  connected  with  any 
other  section  or  clause  of  the  act.  They  place  under 
the  President's  command  the  whole  militia,  and  by  a 
subsequent  law  (March  3d,  1807)  also  the  entire  army 
and  navy  of  the  Union,  against  rebellion.  The  asser- 
tion that  the  army  can  only  follow-  a  marshal  and  his 
writ  in  a  case  of  rebellion,  is  not  only  unsupported  by 
the  language  of  the  act,  but  utterly  refuted  by  strong 
implication.  The  last  section  repeals  a  former  provis- 
ion limiting  the  President's  action  to  cases  of  insur- 
rection of  which  United  States  judges  shall  have  given 
him  notice,  and  thereby  remits  him  to  any  and  all  his 
official  sources  of  information.  Jackson's  famous  force 
bill  only  provided  certain  supplementary  details  ;  it 
directly  recognized  and  invoked  the  great  powers  of 
the  Act  of  1795,  and  expiring  by  limitation,  left  its 
wholesome  plenitude  and  broad  original  grant  of 
authority  unimpaired.
826 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
discussion  of  the  first  head  of  the  disunion 
question  resulted  logically  in  three  ultimate 
conclusions:  (i)  That  South  Carolina  was 
in  revolt  ;  (2)  that  the  Constitution,  the  laws, 
aoral  obligation  all  united  gave  the  Gov- 
ernment the  right  to  suppress  this  revolt  by 
executing  the  laws  upon  and  against  the  citi- 
of  that  State  :  (3)  that  certain  defects 
in  the  laws  paralyzed  their  practical  enforce- 
ment. 
Up  to  this  point  in  his  argument,  his  opin- 
ions,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  their  sound- 
.  were  confined  to  the  legitimate  field  of 
executive  interpretation,  and  such  as  in  the 
exercise  of  his  official  discretion  he  might  with 
undoubted  propriety  communicate  to  Con- 
l  5S.  But  he  had  apparently  failed  to  satisfy 
his  own  conscience  in  thus  summarily  reason- 
ing the  executive  and  governmental  power  of 
a  young,  compact,  vigorous,  and  thoroughly 
organized  nation  of  thirty  millions  of  people 
into  sheer  nothingness  and  impotence.  How 
supremely  absurd  was  the  whole  national 
panoply  of  commerce,  credit,  coinage,  treaty 
power,  judiciary,  taxation,  militia,  army  and 
navy,  and  Federal  flag,  if,  through  the  mere 
joint  of  a  defective  law,  the  hollow  reed  of  a 
secession  ordinance  could  inflict  a  fatal  wound  ! 
The  President  proceeds,  therefore, to  discuss 
the  second  head  of  the  disunion  question,  by 
an  attempt  to  formulate  and  define  the  pow- 
ers and  duties  of  Congress  with  reference  to 
the  threatened  rebellion.  He  would  not  only 
roll  the  burden  from  his  own  shoulders  upon 
the  national  legislature,  but  he  would  by  vol- 
unteer advice  instruct  that  body  how  it  must 
be  borne  and  disposed  of.  Addressing  Con- 
gress, he  says  in  substance: 
"  You  may  be  called  upon  to  decide  the  momentous 
question,  whether  you  possess  the  power  by  force  of 
arms  to  compel  a  State  to  remain  in  the  Union.  The 
question,  fairly  stated,  is  :  Has  the  Constitution  dele- 
gated to  Congress  the  power  to  coerce  a  State  into  sub- 
mi  >siorj  which  is  attempting  to  withdraw,  orhas  actually 
withdrawn,  from  the  Confederacy?  If  answered  in 
the  affirmative,  it  must  be  on  the  principle  that  the 
power  has  been  conferred  upon  Congress  to  declare  and 
to  make  war  against  a  State.  After  much  serious  re- 
flection I  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  no  such 
has  been  delegated  to  Congress,  or  to  any  other 
department  of  the  Federal  Government.  It  may  be 
safely  asserted  that  the  power  to  make  war  against  a 
State  is  at  variance  with  the  whole  spirit  and  intent  of 
the  Constitution.  But  if  we  possessed  this  power, 
to  exercise  it  under  existing  circum- 
stances? Our  Union  rests  upon  public  opinion,  and 
can  never  be  cemented  by  the  blood  of  its  citizens 
in  civil  war.  Congress  possesses  many  means  of 
preserving  it  by  conciliation ;  but  the  sword  was  not 
placed  in  their  hand  to  preserve  it  by  force." 
Why  did  the  message  thus  leap  at  onebound 
without  necessary  connection  or  coherence 
from  the  discussion  of  executive  to  those  of 
legislative  powers  ?  Why  waste  words  over 
doubtful  theories  when  there  was  pressing-need 
to  suggest  practical  amendments  to  the  statute 
whose  real  or  imaginary  defects  Mr.  Buchanan 
had  pointed  out  ?  Why  indulge  in  lamenta- 
tions over  the  remote  possibility  that  Congress 
might  violate  the  Constitution,  when  the  oc- 
casion demanded  only  prompt  preventive  or- 
ders from  the  executive  to  arrest  the  actual 
threatened  violation  of  law  by  Charleston 
mobs  ?  Why  talk  of  war  against  States  when 
the  duty  of  the  hour  was  the  exercise  of  ac- 
knowledged authority  against  insurrectionary 
citizens  ? 
The  issue  and  argument  were  wholly  false 
and  irrelevant.  No  State  had  yet  seceded.  Ex- 
ecute such  laws  of  the  United  States  as  were 
in  acknowledged  vigor,  and  disunion  would 
be  impossible.  Buchanan  needed  only  to  do 
what  he  afterward  so  truthfully  asserted  Lincoln 
had  done.*  But  through  his  inaction,  and  still 
more  through  his  declared  want  of  either 
power  or  right  to  act,  disunion  gained  two 
important  points  and  advantages, —  the  influ- 
ence of  the  executive  voice  upon  public  opin- 
ion, and  especially  upon  Congress;  and  the 
substantial  pledge  of  the  Administration  that 
it  would  lay  no  straw  in  the  path  of  peaceful, 
organized  measures  to  bring  about  State 
secession. 
The  central  dogma  of  the  message,  that 
while  a  State  has  no  right  to  secede,  the  Un- 
ion has  no  right  to  coerce,  has  been  univer- 
sally condemned  as  a  paradox.  The  popular 
estimate  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  proposition  and 
arguments  was  forcibly  presented  at  the  time 
by  a  jesting  criticism  attributed  to  Mr.  Seward. 
"  I  think,"  said  the  New  York  senator,  "  the 
President  has  conclusively  proved  two  things : 
(1)  That  no  State  has  the  right  to  secede  un- 
less it  wishes  to ;  and  (2)  that  it  is  the  Presi- 
dent's duty  to  enforce  the  laws  unless  some- 
body opposes  him."  f  If  this  be  looked  upon 
as  the  sarcasm  of  a  political  enemy,  it  is  even 
less  damaging  than  the  serious  explanation 
put  upon  his  language  by  his  political  friends. 
The  recognized  organ  of  the  Administration 
said :  "  Mr.  Buchanan  has  increased  the  dis- 
pleasure of  the  Lincoln  party  by  his  repudia- 
tion of  the  coercion  theory,  and  his  firm  re- 
fusal to  permit  a  resort  to  force  as  a  means 
of  preventing  the  secession  of  a  sovereign 
State."|    Nor  were  intelligent  lookers-on  in 
*  "  Happily  our  civil  war  was  undertaken  and  prose-  eminent  of  the  United  States." — [Buchanan,  in  "  Mr. 
cuted  in  self-defense,  not  to  coerce  a   State,  but   to  Buchanan's  Administration,"  p.  129.J 
enforce  the  execution  of  the  laws  within  the  States  t  Corres.  N.  Y.  "  P>ening  Post." 
against  individuals,  and  to  suppress  an  unjust  rebellion  \  Washington    "  Constitution  "  of  December    19th, 
raised  by  a  conspiracy  among  them  against  the  Gov-  i860.
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
foreign  lands  a  whit  less  severe  in  their  judg- 
ment :  "  Mr.  Buchanan's  message,"  said  the 
London  "  Times,"  a  month  later,  "  has  been 
a  greater  blow  to  the  American  people  than 
all  the  rants  of  the  Georgian  governor  or  the 
'  ordinances'  of  the  Charleston  convention. 
The  President  has  dissipated  the  idea  that 
the  States  which  elected  him  constitute  one 
people." 
THE   CONSPIRACY    PROCLAIMED. 
To  a  great  majority  of  the  people  the  hopes 
and  chances  of  a  successful  compromise  seemed 
still  cheering  and  propitious.  There  was  in- 
deed a  prevailing  agitation  in  the  Southern 
part  of  the  Union,  but  it  had  taken  a  vir- 
ulent form  in  less  than  half  a  dozen  States. 
In  most  of  these  a  decided  majority  still  dep- 
recated disunion.  Three  of  the  great  political 
parties  of  the  country  were  by  the  voice  of 
their  leaders  pledged  to  peace  and  order ;  the 
fourth,  apparently  controlled  as  yet  by  the 
powerful  influences  of  official  subordination 
and  patronage,  must,  so  it  seemed,  yield  to 
the  now  expressed  and  public  advice  of  the 
President  in  favor  of  Union  and  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  law;  especially  in  view  of  the 
forbearance  and  kindness  he  was  personally 
exercising  toward  the  unruly  elements  of  his 
faction.  Throughout  the  Northern  States  the 
folly  and  evils  of  disunion  appeared  so  palpa- 
ble, that  it  was  not  generally  regarded  as  an 
imminent  danger,  but  rather  as  merely  a  pos- 
sible though  not  probable  event.  The  hasty 
and  seemingly  earnest  action  of  the  people 
and  authorities  of  South  Carolina  was  looked 
upon  as  a  historical  repetition  of  the  nullifica- 
tion crisis  of  183 1-2  ;  and  without  examining 
too  closely  the  real  present  condition  of  af- 
fairs, men  hoped,  rather  than  intelligently  ex- 
pected, that  the  parallel  would  continue  to 
the  end.  Some  sort  of  compromise  of  the  na- 
ture of  that  of  1850  was  the  prevailing  preoc- 
cupation in  politics. 
This  was  the  popular  view  of  the  situation. 
But  it  was  a  very  narrow  and  erroneous  view, 
because  it  lacked  the  essential  information  nec- 
essary to  form  a  correct  and  solid  judgment. 
The  deep  estrangement  between  the  sections 
was  imperfectly  realized.  The  existence  of  four 
parties,  a  very  unusual  occurrence  in  American 
politics,  had  seriously  weakened  party  cohe- 
sion, and  more  than  quadrupled  party  prejudice 
and  mistrust.  There  was  a  strong  undercurrent 
of  conviction  and  purpose,  not  expressed  in 
speeches  and  platforms.  But  the  most  serious 
ignorance  was  in  respect  to  the  character  and 
fidelity  of  the  high  officers  of  the  government. 
Of  the  personal  timidity  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  of 
the  treachery  of  at  least  three  members  of  the 
Cabinet,  of  the  exclusion  of  General  Scott  from 
military  councils,  of  the  President's  persistent 
refusal  to  send  troops  to  Anderson,  of  his  Stipu- 
lation with  the  South  Carolina  members,  of  the 
intrigue  which  drove  General  Cass  from  the 
head  of  the  State  Department  and  from  the 
Cabinet,  the  people  at  large  knew  nothing,  or 
so  little  that  they  could  put  no  intelligent  con- 
struction upon  the  event.  The  debates  of  Con- 
gress shed  the  first  clear  light  upon  the  situa- 
tion, but  the  very  violence  and  bitterness  of 
the  secession  speeches  caused  the  multitude  to 
doubt  their  sincerity  and  truthfulness,  or,  as  a 
final  probability,  placed  their  authors  in  the 
category  of  fanatics  who  would  gain  no  fol- 
lowers. 
While,  therefore,  the  Republicans  in  Con- 
gress and  in  the  country  maintained,  as  a  rule, 
an  expectant  and  watchful  silence,  the  con- 
servatives, made  up  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
supporters  of  Bell  and  Everett,  were  active  in 
setting  on  foot  a  movement  for  compromise, 
in  the  final  success  of  which  they  had  the  full- 
est confidence ;  and  it  is  but  justice  to  their  in- 
tegrity and  ability  to  add  that  this  confidence 
was  fully  warranted  by  the  delusive  indica- 
tions of  surface  politics.  Highly  patriotic  in 
sentiment  and  purpose  and  highly  prudent  in 
word  and  act,  their  leading  men  in  Congress 
had  promptly  opposed  secession,  had  moved 
a  Senate  Committee  of  Thirteen,  and  secured 
the  authorization,  the  appointment,  and  the  or- 
ganization of  a  House  Committee  of  Thirty- 
three.  Already  had  some  twenty-three  different 
propositions  of  adjustment  been  submitted  to 
this  committee,  and  under  the  circumstances  it 
actually  seemed  as  if  only  a  little  patience  and 
patriotic  earnestness  were  needed  to  find  a 
compromise, —  perhaps  an  amendment  of  the 
Constitution  which  the  feverish  unrest  and  im- 
patience of  the  nation  would  compel  Congress 
to  enact  or  propose,  and  the  different  States 
and  sections,  willing  or  unwilling,  to  accept 
and  ratify. 
Superior  political  wisdom  and  more  thor- 
ough information,  as  wrell  as  a  finer  strategy, 
a  quicker  enthusiasm,  a  more  absolute  devo- 
tion, and  a  more  unremitting  industry,  must  be 
freely  accorded  to  the  conspirators  who  now 
labored  night  and  day  in  the  interest  of  dis- 
union. They  counted  more  clearly  than  their 
opponents  the  demoralization  of  parties  at  the 
North,  the  latent  revolutionary  discontent  at 
the  South,  the  potent  influence  of  brilliant  and 
combined  leadership,  and  the  social,  commer- 
cial, and  political  conditions  which  might  be 
brought  into  present  and  ultimate  action.  They 
recognized  that  they  wrere  but  a  minority,  a 
faction;  but  they  also  realized  that  as  such 
they  had  a  substantial  control  of  from  six  to 
eleven  States  whenever  they  chose  to  make 
that  control  effective,  and  that,  for  present  uses
828 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
at  least,  the  President  was,  under  their  influ- 
ence, but  as  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  potter. 
Better  than  the  Republicans  from  the  North, 
or  even  the  conservatives  from  the  border 
States,  they  knew  that  in  the  cotton-States  a 
widespread  change  of  popular  sentiment  was 
then  being  wrought  and  might  very  soon  be 
complete.  Except  upon  the  extreme  alterna- 
tive oi  disunion,  the  people  of  the  border 
States  were  eager  to  espouse  their  quarrel, 
and  join  them  in  a  contest  for  alleged  political 
rights.  Nearly  half  the  people  of  the  North 
were  ready  to  acknowledge  the  existence  and 
justness  of  their  formulated  complaints.  The 
election  of  Lincoln  was  indeed  a  flimsy  and 
specious  pretext  for  separation,  but  it  had  the 
merit  of  universal  publicity,  and  of  rankling 
irritation  among  the  unthinking  masses.  Agri- 
culture was  depressed,  commerce  was  in  panic, 
manufacturing  populations  were  in  want,  the 
national  treasury  was  empty,  the  army  was  dis- 
persed, the  fleet  was  scattered.  The  national 
prestige  was  humbled,  the  national  sentiment 
despondent,  the  national  faith  disturbed. 
Meanwhile  their  intrigues  had  been  suc- 
cessful beyond  hope.  The  Government  was 
publicly  committed  to  the  fatal  doctrine  of 
non-coercion,  and  was  secretly  pursuing  the 
equally  fatal  policy  of  concession.  Reinforce- 
ments had  been  withheld  from  Charleston 
and  must  from  motives  of  consistency  be  with- 
held from  all  other  forts  and  stations.  An  un- 
official stipulation,  with  the  President,  and  a 
peremptory  order  to  Anderson,  secured  beyond 
chance  the  safe  and  early  secession  of  South 
Carolina,  and  the  easy  seizure  of  the  Govern- 
ment property  and  forts  at  Charleston.  The 
representatives  of  foreign  governments  were 
already  secretly  coquetting  for  the  favor  of  a 
free  port  and  an  advantageous  cotton-market. 
Friendly  voices  came  to  the  South  from  the 
North,  in  private  correspondence,  in  the  pub- 
lic press,  even  in  the  open  debates  of  Congress, 
promising  that  cities  should  go  up  in  flames 
and  the  fair  country  be  laid  waste  ere  a  single 
Northern  bayonet  should  molest  them  in  their 
meditated  secession. 
{ "pon  such  a  real  or  assumed  state  of  facts 
the  conspirators  based  their  theory,  and  risked 
their  chances  of  success  in  dismembering  the 
republic, —  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  they 
chose  their  opportunity  with  a  skill  and  fore- 
sight which  for  a  considerable  period  of  time 
gave  them  immense  advantages  over  the  friends 
of  the  Union.  One  vital  condition  of  success, 
however,  they  strangely  overlooked,  or  rather, 
perhaps,  deliberately  crowded  out  of  their 
problem, —  the  chance  of  civil  war,  without  for- 
eign intervention.  For  the  present  their  whole 
plan  depended  upon  the  assumption  that  they 
could  accomplish  their  end  by  means  of  the 
single  instrumentality  of  peaceable  secession; 
and  with  this  view  they  proceeded  to  put  their 
scheme  into  prompt  execution. 
The  House  Committee  of  Thirty-three  had 
been  organized  by  the  selection  of  Thomas 
Corwin  as  its  chairman,  and  had  entered 
hopefully  upon  the  task  confided  to  it.  An 
angry  and  excited  caucus  of  active  conspir- 
ators was  said  to  have  been  held  the  week 
previous,  to  intimidate  the  members  from  the 
cotton- States  and  induce  them  to  refuse  to 
serve  on  the  committee,  but  this  coercive 
movement  only  partly  succeeded.  The  com- 
mittee held  along  meeting  on  December  12th, 
and  now  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  was  once 
more  convened  for  work.  The  informal  prop- 
ositions and  discussions  of  the  day  previous 
were  renewed,  but  resulted  only  in  calling  out 
views  and  schemes  too  vague  on  the  one  hand 
or  too  extreme  on  the  other.  The  subject  was 
about  to  be  laid  over  to  the  following  Satur- 
day, when  Mr.  Rust  of  Arkansas  startled  the 
committee  with  the  information  that  the  ex- 
tremists were  obtaining  signatures  to  a  paper 
to  announce  to  the  South  that  no  further  con- 
cession was  expected  from  the  North,  and  that 
any  adjustment  of  pending  difficulties  had  be- 
come impossible.  lie  therefore  offered  a  resolu- 
tion to  meet  this  unexpected  crisis,  but  accepted 
the  following  substitute,  offered  by  Mr.  Dunn 
of  Indiana : 
"  Resolved,  That  in  the  opinion  of  this  committee, 
the  existing  discontent  among  the  Southern  people  and 
the  growing  hostility  among  them  to  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment are  greatly  to  be  regretted,  and  that  whether 
such  discontent  and  hostility  are  without  just  cause  or 
not,  any  reasonable,  proper,  and  constitutional  reme- 
dies and  effectual  guarantees  of  their  peculiar  rights 
and  interests,  as  recognized  by  the  Constitution,  neces- 
sary to  preserve  the  peace  of  the  country  and  the  per- 
petuation of  the  Union,  should  be  promptly  and  cheer- 
fully granted." 
Other  amendments  were  voted  down,  and 
this  proposition  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  22 
to  8 ;  and  thus  in  good  faith  a  tender  of  reason- 
able concession  and  honorable  and  satisfactory 
compromise  was  made  by  the  North  to  the 
South.  But  the  peace-offering  was  a  waste  of 
patience  and  good-will.  Caucus  after  caucus 
of  the  secession  leaders  had  only  grown  more 
aggressive,  and  deepened  and  strengthened 
their  inflexible  purpose  to  push  the  country 
into  disunion.  Keeping  themselves  thoroughly 
informed  of  every  political  intrigue  and  every 
official  movement,  they  timed  their  own  deci- 
sions and  demonstrations  with  a  fatal  prompt- 
ness and  precision.  The  presence  of  General 
Scott,  who  after  a  long  illness  had  come 
from  New  York  to  Washington,  on  December 
1 2  th,  to  give  his  urgent  advice  to  the  work  of 
counteracting  secession  by  vigorous  military 
preparation,  did  not  in  the  least  disconcert  or
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT.  829 
hinder  the  secession   leaders.     His   patriotic  senators  and  representatives  of  the  States  of 
appeal  to  the  Secretary  of  War*  on  the  13th  North  Carolina, South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Ala- 
naturally  fell  without  effect  upon  the  ears  of  bama,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  Florida,  Texas, 
one  of  their  active  confederates.  and  Arkansas.   It  precedes  every  ordinal] 
This  vital  issue  once  decided,  the  revolu-  secession,  and  is  the  "official"  beginni] 
tionists  did  not  lose  or  delay  a  single  moment  the  subsequent  "Confederate  States,"  just  as 
in  taking  their  next  step  forward.  Neither  the  Governor  Gist's  October  circular  was  the  "  of- 
temporizing  concession  of  the  President  nor  ficial"  beginning  of  South  Carolina  secession. 
the  conciliatory  and  half-apologetic  resolution 
of  the  Committee  of  Thirty-three  for  one  in-  Address    of   certain    Southern    members    of 
stant  changed  or  affected  their  determination  Congress. 
to  destroy  the  Government  and  dissolve  the       To  our  Constituents. 
jj    •  Washington,  December  14th,  i860. 
Union.  ,  c         The  argument  is  exhausted.    All  hope  of  relief  in 
Friday,  December  14th,  i860,  was  a  day  Ot  the  Uni0n  through  the  agency  of  committees,  congres- 
gloom  and  despondency  in  Mr.  Buchanan's  sional  legislation,  or  constitutional  amendments  is  ex- 
office,  bringing  to  his  mind  more  forcibly  than  tinguished,  and  we  trust  the  South  will  not  be  deceived 
he  had 1  ever ^before  realized  the  utter  shipwreck  &  «-«£-  ZX^ZsttTJ^Tte 
into  which  he  had  guided  his  Administration.  purpose  to  grant  nothing  that  will  or  ought  to  satisfy 
To  the  jubilant  secessionists,  on  the  Other  hand,  the  South.  We  are  satisfied  the  honor,  safety,  and  in- 
it  was  not  onlv  a  day  of  perilous  triumph  dependence  of  the  Southern  people  require  the  organ- 
arl-nVv^rl  hut  skn  nf  annarpntlv  a«;«;iirpH  <uir-  nation  of  a  Southern  Confederacy  —  a  result  to  be 
achieved,  but  also  ot  apparently  assured  .uc-  obtained  onl  bv  separate  State  secession  — that  the 
cesses  yet  to  come.  The  hitherto  official  organ  primary  object  of  each  slaveholding  State  ought  to  be 
of  the  Administration  in  its  issue  of  the  follow-  its  speedy  and  absolute  separation  from  a  Union  with 
ing  morning  contained  two  publications  which  hostile  States. 
gave  startling  notice  to  the  country  of  the  j.  l.  Pugh   of  Alabama. 
weakness  of  the  right  and  the  strength  of  the  David  Clopton   of  Alabama. 
wrong  in  the  swiftly  forming  struggle  for  na-  Sy denham^ Moore    of  Alabama. 
tionai  existence.  j;  
A;  stallworth!  '.'.'.'.'.'.  '.  
'.  
'.'..'.'.of  Alabama.' 
The   first  of  these   documents   was  a  proc-  J.  W.  H.   Underwood      of  Georgia. 
lamation  from  the  President  of  the  United  L-  J.  Gartrell   of  Georgia. 
States,  stating  that  in  response  to  numerous  James  Jackson   of  Georgia. 
i    ,       j &  .         L   j  ^     K.       L,     j  c  T  John   J.  Tones   of  Georgia. 
appeals  he  designated  the  fourth  day  of  Janu-  JMarti^  £  Crawford   of  Georgia. 
ary,  proximo,  as  a  day  of  humiliation,  fasting,            Alfred  Iverson,  U.  S.  Senator.  . .     Georgia, 
and  prayer.    The  "  dangerous  and  distracted  George  S.  Hawkins    of  Florida. 
condition  of  our  country  "  was  therein  thus  set  J- J C'  Hll^man  •  •  •••■■•■■••■  of  Arkansas. 
-      ,  J  Jefferson  Davis,  U.  S.  Senator     Mississippi. 
tortn  :  A.  G.  Brown,  U.  S.  Senator. .      Mississippi. 
.  Wm.  Barksdale   of  Mississippi. 
The  Union  of  the  States  is  at  the  present  moment  a  R>  singleton      of  Mississippi. 
threatened  with  alarming  and  immediate  danger -panic  Reuben  Davis   of  Mississippi. 
and  distress  of  a  fearful  character  prevail  throughout  Burton  Crai      
 of  North  Carolina. 
the  land -our  laboring  population  are  without  em-  Thomas  Ruffin   of  North  Carolina. 
ployment  and  consequently  deprived  of  the  means  of  John  Sliddl   u#  S.  Senator ...      Louisiana, 
earning  their  bread -indeed  hope  seems  to  have  de-  j    
p    Benjamin,  TJ.  S.  Senator.      Louisiana. 
serted  the  minds  of  men.    All  classes  are  in  a  state  of  *    M>  Landrum   of  Louisiana. 
confusion  and  dismay,  and  the  wisest  counsels  of  our  JLewis  T<  Wigfall   jj.  s>  Senator.  .  .     Texas. 
best  and  purest  men  are  wholly  disregarded.    .    .    .  John  Hemphill,  U.  S.  Senator        Texas. 
Humbling  ourselves  before  the  Most    High,    .  j    H    Rea^an   of  Texag 
let   us  implore   him  to  remove  from  our  hearts  that  JM    L    Bonham   of  South  Carolina. 
false  pride  of  opinion  which  would  impel  us  to  persevere  Wm    Porcher  Miles   Gf  South  Carolina. 
m  wrong  for  the  sake  of  consistency,  rather  than  yield  John  McQueen   of  South  Carolina. 
a  just   submission    to   the  unforeseen   exigencies  by  john  D<  Xshmore   of  South  Carolina. 
which  we  are  now  surrounded.    .    .    .    An  omnipotent  J 
Providence  may  overrule  existing  evils  for  permanent  T      ,       ,      r    ,  ,    ,     •  -,  -, 
good."t  Instead  of  the  argument  being  exhausted, 
it  was  scarcely  begun.     So  far  from  congres- 
The  second  manifesto  was  more  practical,  sional  or  constitutional  relief  having  been  re- 
more  pertinent,  more  resolute.  As  the  first  pub-  fused,  the  Southern  demand  for  them  had  not 
lie  and  combined  action  of  the  conspirators,  it  been  formulated.    Not  only  had  no  committee 
forms  the  hinge  upon  which  they  well-nigh  denied  hearing  or  action,  but  the  Democratic 
turned  the  fate  of  the  New  World  Republic.  Senate,  at  the  instance  of  a  Southern  State,  had 
It  was  a  brief  document,  but  contained  and  ordered  the  Committee  of  Thirteen,  which  the 
expressed  all  the  essential  purpose  of  the  con-  Democratic  and  Southern  Vice-President  had 
spiracy.    It  was  signed  by  about  one-half  the  not  yet  even  appointed;  and  when  the  names 
*  "  Scott  Auto."  Vol.  II.,  p.  613.  were  announced  a  week  later,  Jefferson  Davis, 
t  Washington  "  Constitution,"  Dec.  15th,  i860.  one  of  the  signers  of  this  complaint  of  non-
s 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
action,  was  the  only  man  who  refused  to  serve 
on  the  committee  —  a  refusal  he  withdrew 
when  persuaded  by  his  co-conspirators  that 
he  could  better  aid  their  designs  by  accepting. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Committee  of  Thirty- 
three,  raised  by  the  Republican  House,  ap- 
pointed by  a  Northern  Speaker,  and  presided 
over  by  a  Northern  chairman,  had  the  day  be- 
fore by  more  than  a  two-thirds  vote  distinctly 
tendered  the  Southern  people  "any  reasonable, 
proper,  and  constitutional  remedies  and  effec- 
tual guarantees." 
Outside  of  congressional  circles  there  was 
same  absence  of  any  new  complications, 
any  new  threats,  any  new  dangers  from  the 
North.  Since  the  day  when  Abraham  Lin- 
coln was  elected  President  there  had  been 
absolutely  no  change  of  word  or  act  in  the 
attitude  or  intention  of  himself  or  his  follow- 
ers. By  no  possibility  could  they  exert  a  par- 
ticle of  adverse  political  power,  executive, 
legislative,  or  judicial,  for  nearly  three  months 
to  come.  Not  only  was  executive  authority 
in  the  hands  of  a  Democratic  Administration, 
which  had  made  itself  the  peculiar  champion 
of  the  Southern  party,  but  it  had  yielded  every 
successive  demand  of  administrative  policy 
made  by  the  conspirators  themselves.  The 
signers  of  this  address  to  their  Southern  con- 
stituents had  not  one  single  excuse.  Their 
proclamation  was  a  falsehood ;  but  nothing 
less  would  serve  their  new  step  in  conspiracy. 
SOUTH    CAROLINA    SECESSION. 
The  secret  circular  of  Governor  Gist  of 
South  Carolina,  heretofore  quoted, inaugurated 
the  great  American  Rebellion  a  full  month 
before  a  single  ballot  had  been  cast  for  Abra- 
ham Lincoln.  This  was  but  repeating  in  a 
bolder  form  the  action  taken  by  Governor 
Wise  of  Virginia,  during  the  Fremont  cam- 
paign four  years  before.  But,  instead,  as  in 
that  case,  of  confining  himself  to  a  proposed 
consultation  among  slave -State  executives, 
Governor  Gist  proceeded  almost  immediately 
to  a  public  and  official  revolutionary  act. 
On  the  1 2th  of  October,  i860,  he  issued  his 
proclamation  convening  the  Legislature  of 
h  Carolina  in  extra  session,  "  to  appoint 
electors  of  President  and  Vice-President.  .  .  . 
and  also  that  they  may,  if  advisable,  take  action 
for  the  safety  and  protection  of  the  State." 
There  was  no  external  peril  menacing  either 
the  commonwealth  or  its  humblest  citizen; 
but  the  significance  of  the  phrase  was  soon 
developed. 
A  large  caucus  of  prominent  South  Carolina 
leaders  was  held  on  the  25th  of  October  at 
the  residence  of  Senator  Hammond.  Their 
deliberations  remained  secret,  but  the  deter- 
mination arrived  at  appears  clearly  enough  in 
the  further  official  action  of  Governor  Gist, 
who  was  present,  and  who  doubtless  carried 
out  the  plans  of  the  assemblage.  When  the 
legislature  met  on  November  5th  (the  day 
before  the  presidential  election)  the  governor 
sent  them  his  opening  message,  advocating 
both  secession  and  insurrection,  in  direct  and 
undisguised  language.  He  recommended  that 
in  the  event  of  Lincoln's  election,  a  conven- 
tion should  be  immediately  called ;  that  the 
State  should  secede  from  the  Federal  Union ; 
and  "  if  in  the  exercise  of  arbitrary  power 
and  forgetful  of  the  lessons  of  history,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  should  at- 
tempt coercion,  it  will  be  our  solemn  duty 
to  meet  force  by  force."  To  this  end  he 
recommended  a  reorganization  of  the  militia 
and  the  raising  and  drilling  an  army  of  ten 
thousand  volunteers.  He  placed  the  prospects 
of  such  a  revolution  in  a  hopeful  light.  "  The 
indications  from  many  of  the  Southern  States," 
said  he,  "justify  the  conclusion  that  the  seces- 
sion of  South  Carolina  will  be  immediately 
followed,  if  not  adopted  simultaneously,  by 
them,  and  ultimately  by  the  entire  South.  The 
long-desired  cooperation  of  the  other  States 
having  similar  institutions,  for  which  so  many 
of  our  citizens  have  been  waiting,  seems  to  be 
near  at  hand ;  and,  if  we  are  true  to  ourselves, 
will  soon  be  realized."* 
The  legislature,  remaining  in  extra  session, 
and  cheered  and  urged  on  by  repeated  popular 
demonstrations  and  the  inflamed  speeches 
of  the  highest  State  officials,  proceeded 
without  delay  to  carry  out  the  governor's 
programme. 
The  first  day's  session  of  the  legislature 
(November  5th)  developed  one  of  the  most 
important  preparatory  steps  of  the  long-ex- 
pected revolution.  The  legislature  of  1859 
had  appropriated  a  military  contingent  fund 
of  $100,000  "  to  be  drawn  and  accounted  for 
as  directed  by  the  Legislature."  The  appro- 
priation had  been  allowed  to  remain  un- 
touched. It  was  now  proposed  to  place  this 
sum  at  the  control  of  the  governor  to  be  ex- 
pended in  obtaining  improved  small  arms,  in 
purchasing  a  field  battery  of  rifled  cannon,  in 
providing  accouterments,  and  in  furnishing 
an  additional  supply  of  tents ;  and  a  resolu- 
tion to  that  effect  duly  passed  two  days  later.f 
The  chief  measure  of  the  session,  however, 
was  a  bill  to  provide  for  calling  the  pro- 
posed State  convention,  which,  it  was  well 
understood,  should  adopt  an  ordinance  of 
secession. 
The  delegates  to  the  convention  were  duly 
*  Governor  Gist's  Message,  Nov.  5th,  i860.  "  S.  C. 
House  Journal,"  pp.  10,  II. 
t "  S.  C.  House  Journal,"  pp.  13,  14.
THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
»3i 
elected  on  the  6th  of  December,  and  assem- 
bled and  organized  at  Columbia,  the  capital 
of  the  State,  on  the  17th  of  the  same  month  ; 
on  account  of  a  local  epidemic,  however,  both 
the  convention  and  the  legislature  adjourned 
to  Charleston,  where  the  former  reassembled 
on  the  following  day  and  the  latter  two  days 
afterwards.  Elected  under  the  prevailing  se- 
cession furor,  which  tolerated  no  opposition, 
and  embracing  the  leading  conspirators  in  its 
membership,  the  convention  was  practically 
unanimous.  "There  is  no  honor,"  said  the 
chairman  on  taking  his  seat,  "  I  esteem  more 
highly  than  to  sign  the  ordinance  of  secession 
as  a  member  of  this  body ;  but  I  will  regard 
it  as  the  greatest  honor  of  my  life  to  sign  it  as 
your  presiding  officer."  * 
The  legislature  of  South  Carolina  had  also 
just  elected  a  new  governor,  who  was  inaugu- 
rated on  the  same  day  on  which  the  convention 
met.  This  was  F.  W.  Pickens,  a  revolutionist 
of  a  yet  more  radical  and  energetic  type  than 
his  predecessor  Gist,  and  who,  as  we  have 
seen,  had  been  in  close  consultation  with  the 
Cabinet  cabal  at  Washington,  more  than  a 
month  before.  He  was,  of  course,  anxious  to 
signalize  his  advent ;  and  to  this  end  he  im- 
mediately dispatched  to  Washington  a  special 
messenger,  bearing  the  following  letter  to  Pres- 
ident Buchanan : 
"  (Strictly  confidential.) 
"Columbia,  December  17th,  i860. 
"  My  Dear  Sir  :  With  a  sincere  desire  to  prevent  a 
collision  of  force,  I  have  thought  proper  to  address  you 
directly  and  truthfully  on  points  of  deep  and  immedi- 
ate interest. 
"  I  am  authentically  informed  that  the  forts  in 
Charleston  Harbor  are  now  being  thoroughly  prepared 
to  turn,  with  effect,  their  guns  upon  the  interior  and 
the  city.  Jurisdiction  was  ceded  by  this  State  expressly 
for  the  purpose  of  external  defense  from  foreign  inva- 
sion, and  not  with  any  view  that  they  should  be  turned 
upon  the  State. 
"  In  an  ordinary  case  of  mob  rebellion,  perhaps  it 
might  be  proper  to  prepare  them  for  sudden  outbreak. 
But  when  the  people  of  the  State,  in  sovereign  con- 
vention assembled,  determine  to  resume  their  original 
powers  of  separate  and  independent  sovereignty,  the 
whole  question  is  changed,  and  it  is  no  longer  an  act 
of  rebellion.  I,  therefore,  most  respectfully  urge  that 
all  work  on  the  forts  be  put  a  stop  to  for  the  present, 
and  that  no  more  force  may  be  ordered  there. 
"The  regular  convention  of  the  people  of  the  State 
of  South  Carolina,  legally  and  properly  called,  under 
our  Constitution,  is  now  in  session,  deliberating  upon 
the  gravest  and  most  momentous  questions,  and  the  ex- 
citement of  the  great  masses  is  great,  under  a  sense  of 
deep  wrongs,  and  a  profound  necessity  of  doing  some- 
thing to  preserve  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  State. 
"  To  spare  the  effusion  of  blood,  which  no  human 
*  "  Convention  Journal,"  p.  10. 
t  Pickens  to  Buchanan,  December  1 7th,  i860.  "  S.  C. 
House  Journal,"  1861,  p.  167. 
tin  his  message  of  November  5th,  1861,  Governor 
Pickens  of  South  Carolina  refers  to  William  H.  Tres- 
cott,  Esq.,  who  was  in  December,  i860,  Assistant  Sec- 
retary of  State  at  Washington,  as  "a  distinguished 
power  may  be  able  to  prevent,  I  earnestly  beg  your  im- 
mediate consideration  of  all  the  points  I  call  your  atten- 
tion to.  It  is  not  improbable  that,  under  orders  from 
the  Commandant,  or  perhaps  from  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Army,  the  alteration  and  defenses  of 
those  posts  are  progressing  v/ithout  the  knowledge  of 
yourself  or  the  Secretary  of  War. 
"The  arsenal,  in  the  city  of  Charleston,  with  the 
public  arms,  I  am  informed, was  turned  over  very  prop- 
erly to  the  keeping  and  defense  of  a  State  force,  at  the 
urgent  request  of  the  governor  of  South  Carolina.  I 
would  most  respectfully,  and  from  a  sincere  devotion 
to  the  public  peace,  request  that  you  would  allow  me  to 
send  a  small  force,  not  exceeding  twenty-five  men  and 
an  officer,  to  take  possession  of  Fort  Sumter,  immedi- 
ately, in  order  to  give  a  feeling  of  safety  to  trie  commu- 
nity. There  are  no  United  States  troops  in  that  fort 
whatever,  or  perhaps  only  four  or  five,  at  present ; 
besides  some  additional  workmen  or  laborers,  lately 
employed  to  put  the  guns  in  order.  If  Fort  Sumter 
could  be  given  to  me,  as  governor,  under  a  permission 
similar  to  that  by  which  the  governor  was  permitted  to 
keep  the  arsenal,  with  the  United  States  arms  in  the 
city  of  Charleston,  then  I  think  the  public  mind  would 
be  quieted  under  a  feelingof  safety;  and  as  the  conven- 
tion is  now  in  full  authority,  it  strikes  me  that  could  be 
done  with  perfect  propriety.  I  need  not  go  into  par- 
ticulars, for  urgent  reasons  will  force  themselves  readily 
upon  your  consideration. 
"  If  something  of  the  kind  be  not  done,  I  cannot  an- 
swer for  the  consequences. 
"I  send  this  by  a  private  and  confidential  gentleman, 
who  is  authorized  to  confer  with  Mr.  Trescott  fully, 
and  to  receive  through  him  any  answer  you  may  think 
proper  to  give  to  this. 
"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  most  respectfully, 
"Yours  truly,         F.   W.   PlCKEXs. 
"To  the  President  of  the  United  States. "f 
Arrived  in  Washington,  the  special  messen- 
ger who  bore  this  document  sought  the  active 
agent  f  of  the  central  cabal,  Mr.  Trescott,  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  State,  and  was  by  him  on 
Thursday  morning,  December  20th,  conducted 
to  the  White  House  and  presented  to  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan, to  whom  he  personally  delivered  his 
communication.  The  President  received  the 
document  and  promised  an  answer  to  it  on  the 
following  day.§  The  temper  and  condition  of 
his  mind  is  plainly  reflected  in  what  he  wrote. 
He  seems  to  have  realized  no  offense  in  this 
insult  to  the  sovereignty  and  dignity  of  the 
United  States  whose  Constitution  he  had  sworn 
to  "  preserve,  protect,  and  defend  " ;  no  patri- 
otic resentment  against  the  South  Carolina 
conspirators  who,  as  he  knew  by  the  telegraph, 
were  assembling  that  same  day  in  convention  to 
inaugurate  local  rebellion;  —  his  whole  answer 
breathes  a  tone  of  apology  that  his  oath  and 
duties  will  not  permit  him  to  oblige  the  South 
Carolina  governor;  and  he  feebly  gropes  for 
relief  from  his  perplexities  in  the  suggestion 
citizen,  appointed,  as  I  have  since  been  informed  by  my 
predecessor,  to  remain  at  Washington  as  confidential 
representative  of  the  State. ": — "  South  Carolina  House 
Journal,"  1861,  p.  31. 
§  Curtis's  "Life  of  Buchanan,"  President's  memoran- 
dum, p.  383.
\>- 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
that  Congress  might  perhaps  somehow  arrange 
the  trouble.    This  was  the  answer  prepared : 
-Washington,  December  20th,  1S60. 
'•  My  DEAR  Sir:  I  have  received  your  favor  of 
the  17th  inst  by  Mr.  Hamilton.  From  it  I  deeply  re- 
gret to  observe  that  you  seem  entirely  to  have  misap- 
prehended my  position,  which  I  supposed  had  been 
clearly  stated  in  my  message.  I  have  incurred,  and 
shall  incur,  any  reasonable  risk  within  the  clearly  pre- 
scribed line  of  my  executive  duties  to  prevent  a  collision 
between  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States  and 
the  citizens  of  South  Carolina  in  defense  of  the  forts 
within  the  harbor  of  Charleston.  Hence  I  have  de- 
clined for  the  present  to  reenforce  these  forts,  relying 
upon  the  honor  of  South  Carolinians  that  they  will  not 
be  assaulted  whilst  they  remain  in  their  present  condi- 
tion ;  but  that  commissioners  will  be  sent  by  the  con- 
vention to  treat  with  Congress  on  the  subject.  I  say 
with  Congress  because,  as  I  state  in  my  message, 
'Apart  from  the  execution  of  the  laws  so  far  as  this 
may  be  practicable,  the  Executive  has  no  authority  to 
decide  what  shall  be  the  relations  between  the  Federal 
Government  and  South  Carolina.  He  has  been  invested 
with  no  such  discretion.  He  possesses  no  power  to 
change  the  relations  heretofore  existing  between  them, 
much  less  to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  that 
State. '  This  would  be  to  invest  a  mere  executive  officer 
with  the  power  of  recognizing  the  dissolution  of  the 
confederacy  among  our  thirty-three  sovereign  States.  It 
bears  no  resemblance  to  the  recognition  of  a  foreign 
de  facto  government,  involving  no  such  responsibility. 
Any  attempt  to  do  this  would,  on  my  part,  be  a  naked 
act  of  usurpation. 
"  As  an  executive  officer  of  the  Government,  I  have 
no  power  to  surrender  to  any  human  authority  Fort 
Sumter,  or  any  of  the  other  forts  or  public  property 
in  South  Carolina.  To  do  this  would,  on  my  part,  as  I 
have  already  said,  be  a  naked  act  of  usurpation.  It  is 
for  Congress  to  decide  this  question,  and  for  me  to  pre- 
serve the  status  of  the  public  property  as  I  found  it  at 
the  commencement  of  the  troubles. 
"  If  South  Carolina  should  attack  any  of  these  forts, 
she  will  then  become  the  assailant  in  a  war  against  the 
United  States.  It  will  not  then  be  a  question  of  co- 
ercing a  State  to  remain  in  the  Union,  to  which  I  am 
utterly  opposed,  as  my  message  proves,  but  it  will  be  a 
question  of  voluntarily  precipitating  a  conflict  of  arms 
on  her  part,  without  even  consulting  the  only  author- 
ity which  possesses  the  power  to  act  upon  the  subject. 
Between  independent  governments,  if  one  possesses  a 
fortress  within  the  limits  of  another,  and  the  latter 
should  seize  it  without  calling  upon  the  appropriate 
authorities  of  the  power  in  possession  to  surrender  it, 
this  would  not  only  be  a  just  cause  of  war,  but  the  act- 
ual commencement  of  hostilities. 
"  No  authority  was  given,  as  you  suppose,  from  my- 
self or  from  the  War  Department,  to  Governor  Gist, 
to  guard  the  United  States  Arsenal  in  Charleston  by 
a  company  of  South  Carolina  volunteers.  In  this  re- 
spect you  have  been  misinformed —  I  have,  therefore, 
bei  i!  more  astonished  in  my  life,  than  to  learn 
from  you  that  unless  Fort  Sumter  be  delivered  into 
your  hands,  you  cannot  be  answerable  for  the  conse- 
quence . 
It  is  easy  to  infer  from  results,  that  while  the 
President  was  laboring  over  this  document  the 
central  cabal  was  busy.  They  saw  that  the  rash 
zeal  of  Governor  Pickens  was  endangering  the 
fine  web  of  conspiracy  they  had  wound  around 
*  Curtis',  "  Life  of  Buchanan,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  384. 
t  Trescott  to  Pickens.  "  South  Carolina  House  Jour- 
nal," 1861,  p.  170. 
him.  He  was  committed  to  non-coercion; 
committed  to  non-reenforcements  ;  committed 
to  await  the  arrival  of  South  Carolina  com- 
missioners. This  new  demand  from  a  new  au- 
thority not  only  indicated  a  division  of  sen- 
timent and  purpose  in  the  insurrectionary 
councils  in  the  Palmetto  State,  but  created 
an  opportunity  through  which  Mr.  Buchanan 
under  a  possible  healthier  impulse  of  patriot- 
ism might  repudiate  the  whole  obligation  of 
non-resistance  to  their  schemes  into  which 
they  had  beguiled  him.  They  clearly  saw,  as 
they  themselves  explained,  that  though  he 
would  not  deliver  Sumter  now,  he  might  be 
willing  to  "approach  such  action"  hereafter, 
"  a  possibility  not  at  all  improbable,  and  which 
ought  to  be  kept  open."!  Mr.  Trescott  there- 
fore hastened  to  take  the  advice  of  two  of  the 
South  Carolina  congressmen, —  McQueen  and 
Bonham, —  and  it  is  not  a  violent  presumption 
to  assume  also  of  the  chief  senatorial  conspira- 
tors ;  for  only  six  days  had  elapsed  since  the 
congressional  circular  was  signed  and  pub- 
lished, which  called  upon  the  cotton-States  to 
proceed  with  the  plot  of  secession  and  the 
formation  of  a  Southern  confederacy.  A  tele- 
gram was  at  once  sent  to  Charleston,  mildly 
explaining  to  Governor  Pickens  the  blunder 
he  was  making  and  asking  his  authority  to 
withdraw  his  letter  to  Mr.  Buchanan.  Gov- 
ernor Pickens  must  be  credited  with  astute- 
ness enough  to  comprehend  the  situation,  for 
he  at  once  gave  the  consent  requested.  On 
Friday  morning  Mr.  Trescott  waited  upon  Mr. 
Buchanan  and  informed  him  that  he  would 
not  be  required  to  answer,  but  that  Governor 
Pickens  had  withdrawn  his  demand ;  and  Mr. 
Trescott  records,  with  an  evident  appreciation 
of  the  whole  affair  as  a  successful  stroke  oi 
policy,  that  "the  withdrawal  of  the  letter 
was  a  great  relief  to  the  President."  To  under- 
stand more  fully  the  whole  scope  and  spirit  of 
the  incident,  we  must  read  the  report  of  it  which 
he  then  transmitted  to  Charleston  : 
"  To  His  Excellency  F.  W.  Pickens, 
"Governor  of  South  Carolina: 
"Washington,  December  21st,  i860. 
"  Sir  :  Your  confidential  letter  to  the  President  was 
duly  delivered  to  him  yesterday  by  D.  H.  Hamilton, 
Esq.,  according  to  your  instructions.  It  was  with- 
drawn (no  copy  having  been  taken)  this  morning  by 
me,  under  the  authority  of  your  telegraphic  dispatch. 
Its  withdrawal  was  most  opportune.  It  reached  here 
under  circumstances  which  you  could  not  have  antici- 
pated, and  it  produced  the  —  effect  upon  the  President. 
"  He  had  removed  Colonel  Gardiner  from  command 
at  Fort  Moultrie,  for  carrying  ammunition  from  the 
arsenal  at  Charleston ;  he  had  refused  to  send  rein- 
forcements to  the  garrison  there  ;  he  had  accepted  the 
resignation  of  the  oldest,  most  eminent,  and  highest 
member  of  his  Cabinet,  rather  than  consent  to  send 
additional  force,  and  the  night  before  your  letter  ar- 
rived, he,  upon  a  telegraphic  communication  that  arms 
had  been  removed  from  the  arsenal  to  Fort  Moultrie, 
the  Department  of  War  had  issued  prompt  orders  by
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
telegraph  to  the  officer  removing  them,*  to  restore 
them  immediately.  He  had  done  this  upon  his  deter- 
mination to  avoid  all  risk  of  collision,  and  upon  the 
written  assurance  of  the  majority  of  the  Congressional 
Delegation  from  the  State  that  they  did  not  believe 
there  was  any  danger  of  an  attack  upon  the  forts  be- 
FRANCIS    W.    PICKENS,    GOVERNOR    OF    SOUTH    CAROLINA,    l86l. 
(FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH    IN    POSSESSION   OF   LOUIS   MANIGAULT.) 
fore  the  passage  of  the  Ordinance,  and  an  expression 
of  their  trust  and  hope  that  there  would  be  none  after, 
until  the  State  had  sent  commissioners  here.  His 
course  had  been  violently  denounced  by  the  Northern 
press,  and  an  effort  was  being  made  to*  —  a  Congres- 
sional investigation.  At  that  moment  he  could  not 
have  gone  to  the  extent  of  action  you  desired  and  I 
felt  confident  that  if  forced  to  answer  your  letter  then 
he  would  have  taken  such  ground  as  would  have  pre- 
vented his  ever  approaching  it  hereafter,  a  possibility 
not  at  all  improbable,  and  which  ought  to  be  kept  open. 
I  considered,  also,  that  the  chance  of  public  investiga- 
tion rendered  the  utmost  caution  necessary  as  to  any 
communications  from  the  State,  and  having  presented 
the  letter,  and  ascertained  what  the  nature  of  the  re- 
ply would  be,  you  had  all  the  advantage  of  knowing 
the  truth,  without  the  disadvantage  of  having  it  put  on 
record.  Besides  this,  the  President  seemed  to  think 
that  your  request  was  based  upon  the  impossibility  of 
your  restraining  the  spirit  of  our  people;  an  inter- 
pretation which  did  you  injustice,  and  the  possibility 
of  which  I  deemed  it  due  to  you  to  avoid.    He  also  ap- 
*  The  blanks  and  the  awkward  rhetorical  construc- 
tion are  copied  exactly  as  the  authors  find  them  printed 
in  the  "  South  Carolina  House  Journal." 
t  Trescott  to  Pickens,  December  21st,  1S60.  "  S.  C. 
House  Journal,"  1861,  pp.  169-171. 
t  In  Mr.  Curtis's  "Life  of  Buchanan,"  Vol.  II.,  p. 
383,  will  be  found  the  private  memorandum  of  Presi- 
dent Buchanan  giving  his  statement  of  the  incident : 
"  On  Thursday  morning,  December  20th,  i860,  Ham- 
ilton, late  marshal  of  South  Carolina,  sent  especially 
for  this  purpose,  presented  me  a  letter  from  Governor 
Pickens,  in  the  presence  of  Mr.  Trescott,  dated  at  Col- 
umbia, South  Carolina,  17th  December  (Monday).  He 
was  to  wait  till  this  day  (Friday  afternoon)  for  my  an- 
swer. The  character  of  the  letter  will  appear  from  the 
answer  to  it  which  I  had  prepared.  Thursday  night, 
between  9  and  10  o'clock,  Mr.  Trescott  called  upon 
me.  He  said  that  he  had  seen  Messrs.  Bonham  and 
Vol.  XXXIV— 114. 
peared  to  labor  under  the  impression  that  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  members  of  Congress  and  your  own 
differed  essentially,  and  this,  I  thought,  on  account  of 
both,  should  not  be  stated  in  any  reply  to  you.     1  was 
also  perfectly  satisfied  that  the  status  of  the  garri 
would  not  be  disturbed. 
"  Under  these  circumstances,  if  I  had  been  acting 
under  formal  credentials  from  you,  and  the  letter  had 
been  unsealed,  I  would  have  delayed  its  presentation 
for  some  hours,  until  I  could  have  telegraphed  you, 
but  that  was  impossible.  As  Mr.  Hamilton,  therefore, 
had  brought  with  him  General  McQueen  and  General 
Bonham,  when  he  called  on  me  and  delivered  the  let- 
ter, and  had  even  gone  so  far  as  to  express  the  wish 
that  they  should  be  present  when  he  delivered  it  to 
the  President  —  a  proposition  which  they  declined, 
however  —  I  deemed  it  not  indiscreet,  nor  in  violation 
of  the  discretionary  confidence  which  your  letter  im- 
plied, to  take  their  counsel.  We  agreed  perfectly,  and 
the  result  was  the  telegraphic  dispatch  of  last  night. 
The  withdrawal  of  the  letter  was  a  great  relief  to  the 
President,  who  is  most  earnestly  anxious  to  avoid  an 
issue  with  the  State  or  its  authorities,  and  I  think,  has 
encouraged  his  disposition  to  go  as  far  as  he  can  in 
this  matter,  and  to  treat  those  who  may  represent  the 
State  with  perfect  frankness. 
"  I  have  had  this  morning  an  interview  with  Gover- 
nor Floyd,  the  Secretary  of  War.  No  order  has  been 
issued  that  will  at  all  disturb  the  present  condition  of 
the  garrisons,  and  while  I  cannot  even  here  venture 
into  details,  which  are  too  confidential  to  be  risked  in 
any  way,  I  am  prepared  to  say,  with  a  full  sense  of  the 
responsibility,  that  nothing  will  be  done  which  will 
either  do  you  injury  or  properly  create  alarm.  Of 
course  when  your  commissioners  have  succeeded  or 
failed  to  effect  their  negotiations,  the  whole  issue  is 
fairly  before  you,  to  be  met  as  courage,  honor,  and 
wisdom  may  direct. 
"  My  delay  in  answering  your  telegraph  concerning 
Colonel  Huger,  was  caused  by  his  absence  from  this 
place.  He  came,  in  reply  to  my  telegraph  last  night, 
and  this  morning  I  telegraphed,  upon  his  decision, 
which  I  presume  he  has  explained  by  a  letter  of  this 
same  date.  As  Dr.  Hamilton  leaves  this  evening,  I 
have  only  time  to  write  this  hurried  letter,  and  am,  sir, 
"  Very  respectfully, 
"Wm.  Henry  Trescott. t 
"  I  inclose  your  confidential  letter  in  this."  J 
We  must  now  turn  our  attention  from  the 
executive  rooms  of  the  presidential  mansion 
in  Washington  to  the  executive  rooms  of  South 
Carolina  in  Charleston,  where  on  the  same  day 
a  feeble  counterpart  of  the  transaction  we  have 
described  was  going  on.  Since  the  beginning 
of  these  new  troubles,  especially  since  the  dis- 
McQueen  of  the  South  Carolina  delegation,  that  they 
all  agreed  that  this  letter  of  Governor  Pickens  was  in 
violation  of  the  pledge  which  had  been  given  by  them- 
selves not  to  make  an  assault  upon  the  forts,  but  to 
leave  them  m  statu  quo  until  the  result  of  an  application 
of  commissioners  to  be  appointed  by  the  State  was 
known  ;  that  Pickens,  at  Columbia,  could  not  have 
known  of  the  arrangements.  They  —  to  wit,  Bonham, 
McQueen,  and  Trescott  —  had  telegraphed  to  Pickens 
for  authority  to  withdraw  his  letter.  Friday  morning, 
lo  o'clock,  2 1  st  December,  Mr.  Trescott  called  upon 
me  with  a  telegram  of  which  the  following  is  a  copy 
from  that  which  he  delivered  to  me  :  '  December  21st, 
i860.  —  You  are  authorized  and  requested  to  withdraw 
my  letter  sent  by  Dr.  Hamilton  immediately.  F.  W. 
P.'  Mr.  Trescott  read  to  me,  from  the  same  telegram, 
that  Governor  Pickens  had  seen  Mr.  Cushing :  the 
letter  was  accordingly  written."
834 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
cussion  and  issuing  oi  his  message.  President 
Buchanan  felt  anxious  and  ill  at  ease,  lie 
could  oot  shut  his  eyes  to  the  fact  that  in  South 
Carolina  at  least  a  tide  of  revolution  was  stead- 
ily rising.  He  appears  to  have  dimly  felt  that 
his  official  responsibility  and  honor  were  some- 
how involved;  and  since  he  had  reasoned  the 
executive  power  into  nothingness,  the  idea 
suggested  itself  to  his  mind  that  a  little  friendly 
expostulation  at  least  was  due  from  him.  Un- 
der some  such  impulse  he  wrote  the  following 
letter  to  Governor  Pickens,  and  with  it  dis- 
patched the  Hon.  Caleb  Gushing  to  Charles- 
ton, to  see  if  he  might  not  exert  a  personal 
influence  upon  the  maleontents,  who  paid  no 
heed  to  any  wishes  or  interests  but  their  own  : 
"  Washington,  December  iSth,  i860. 
•■  My  Dear  Sir  :  From  common  notoriety,  I  assume 
the  fact  that  the  State  of  South  Carolina  is  now  delib- 
erating on  the  question  of  seceding  from  the  Union. 
Whilst  any  hope  remains  that  this  may  be  prevented, 
or  even  retarded,  so  long  as  to  allow  the  people  of  her 
S*^; 
POSTMASTER-GENEKAL    JOSEPH     HOLT. 
(FROM    a    photograph    BY    BRADY.) 
sister  States  an  opportunity  to  manifest  their  opinions 
upon  the  causes  which  have  led  to  this  proceeding,  it 
i-  my  duty  to  exert  all  the  means  in  my  power  to  avert 
so  'Iread  a  catastrophe.  I  have,  therefore,  deemed  it 
advisable  to  send  to  you  the  Hon.  Caleb  Cushing,  in 
whose  integrity,  ability,  and  prudence  I  have  full  con- 
fidence, to  hold  communications  with  you  on  my  behalf, 
for  the  purpose  of  changing  or  modifying  the  contem- 
plated  action  of  the  State  in  the  manner  I  have  already 
suggested.  Commending  Mr.  Cushing  to  your  kind 
attention,  for  his  own  sake,  as  well  as  that  of  the  cause, 
I  remain,  "  Very  respectfully,  your  friend, 
"James  Buchanan. 
"  Hi^  Excellency  Francis  W.  Pickens.""' 
Mr.  Cushing  was  a  man  of  great  affability, 
and  of  prominence  in  the  Democratic  party. 
He-  had  been  Attorney-General  under  Presi- 
dent  Pierce,  and  was  called  to  preside  over 
*  Buchanan  to  Pickens,  December   18th,  i860.   "  S. 
C.  House  Journal,"  1861,  p.  171. 
the  Charleston  convention,  until  the  dissension 
iti  that  body  between  Northern  and  Southern 
Democrats  caused  its  disruption  and  adjourn- 
ment to  Baltimore.  In  the  second  disruption 
at  Baltimore,  Mr.  Cushing  had  followed  the 
fortunes  of  the  Southern  leaders,  and  with 
them  had  seceded,  and  presided  over  that 
fraction  of  the  original  body  which  nominated 
Breckinridge.  Though  a  Massachusetts  man, 
he  was  thus  affiliated  in  party  principle,  party 
organization,  and  party  action  with  the  South, 
and  President  Buchanan  not  unnaturally 
thought  that  he  was  a  proper  personal  agent, 
and  ought  to  be  an  influential  party  represen- 
tee, capable,  in  behalf  of  the  Administration, 
of  dissuading  the  Charleston  conspirators  from 
their  dangerous  determination,  or  at  least  from 
their  reckless  precipitancy. 
But  the  sequel  shows  that  Buchanan  both 
misunderstood  the  men  he  had  to  deal  with, 
and  was  unequal  in  purpose  or  will  to  cope 
with  their  superior  daring  and  resolution. 
Mr.  Cushing  arrived  in  Charleston  on  the 
day  the  South  Carolina  convention  passed  its 
ordinance  of  secession.  He  obtained  an  inter- 
view with  Governor  Pickens,  and  presented 
the  President's  letter.  "  I  had  but  a  short  in- 
terview with  him,"  says  Governor  Pickens  in 
his  message  of  November  5th,  1861,  "  and 
told  him  I  would  return  no  reply  to  the  Presi- 
dent's letter,  except  to  say  very  candidly  that 
there  was  no  hope  for  the  Union,  and  that,  so 
far  as  I  was  concerned,  I  intended  to  maintain 
the  separate  independence  of  South  Carolina, 
and  from  this  purpose  neither  temptation  nor 
danger  should  for  a  moment  deter  me."  There 
is  a  notable  contrast  in  this  haughty  and  defi- 
ant reception  by  a  South  Carolina  governor 
of  the  messenger  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  to  the  cringing  and  apologetic  spirit  in 
which  the  President  had  on  that  same  morn- 
ing received  the  messenger  of  the  governor 
and  replied  to  his  demand.  Mr.  Cushing's  reply 
deserves  special  notice.  "  He  said,"  continues 
Governor  Pickens,  "  that  he  could  not  say  what 
changes  circumstances  might  produce,  but 
when  he  left  Washington  there  was  then  no  in- 
tention whatever  to  chan  ge  the  status  of  the  forts 
in  our  harbor  in  any  way."  By  this  language 
Mr.  Cushing  himself  seems  to  have  changed 
his  errand  from  a  patriotic  mission  of  protest 
and  warning  to  one  conveying  hopeful  and 
advantageous  information  to  the  conspirators. 
It  could  hardly  have  been  without  a  sense 
of  personal  mortification  to  Mr.  Cushing  that 
the  drama  which  he  had  been  sent  to  avert, 
or  at  least  to  postpone,  immediately  unrolled 
itself  under  his  very  eyes,  and  his  mortification 
must  have  risen  to  indignation  when  he  was 
requested  by  his  presence  to  grace  the  pageant. 
The  South  Carolina  convention,  during  the
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
two  days  which  had  elapsed  since  its  adjourn- 
ment hither  from  Columbia,  had  been  deliber- 
ating in  secret  session.  A  little  after  midday 
of  December  20th,  the  streets  of  Charleston 
were  filled  with  the  following  placards,  giving 
the  public  the  first  notice  of  its  action  : 
CHARLESTON 
MERCURY 
EXTRA: 
Passed  unanimously  at  1.15  o'clock,  P.  .  W.,  .December 
20/A,  I860. 
AN   ORDINANCE 
To  dissolve  the  Union  between  the  State  of  South  Carolina  and 
other  Stati  s  united  with  her  under  the  compact  entitled  "  The 
Constitution  oj"  (he  United  States  of  America." 
We,  the  People  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  in  Convention  assembled,  do  declare  and  ordain,  and 
it  is  hereby  declared  and  ordained, 
That  the  Ordinance  adopted  by  us  in  Convention,  on  the  twenty-third  day  of  May,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand,  seven  hundred  and.  eighty-eight,  whereby  the  Constitution  of  the 
(Jniteu  States  of  America  was  ratihed,  and  also,  an  Acts  and  parts  of  Acts  of  the  General 
Assembly  of  this  State,  ratifying  amendments  of  the  said  Constitution,  are  hereby  repealed ; 
and  that  the  union  now  subsisting  botweeu  South  Carolina  and  other  States,  under  the  name  of 
"The  United  States  of  America,"  is  hereby  dissolved. 
THE 
UNION 
IHSIHIIl 
The  usual  jubilations  immediately  followed, 
— ringing  of  bells,  salutes  of  cannon,  and  the 
noise  and  display  of  street  parades.  The  con- 
vention resolved  to  celebrate  the  event  further 
by  a  public  ceremonial  to  which  it  invited  the 
governor,  the  legislature,  and  other  dignitaries ; 
and  both  branches. of  the  legislature  also  sent 
a  committee  to  Caleb  dishing  to  give  him  an 
official  invitation  to  attend.  At  half-past  6 
that  evening  the  members  of  the  convention 
marched  in  procession  to  Institute  Hall,  where 
the  public  signing  of  the  ordinance  of  seces- 
sion was  performed  with  appropriate  solemni- 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL  JEREMIAH  S.  BLACK. 
(FROM  A  PHOTOGRAPH  BY  BRADY.) 
ties,  and  at  its  close  the  President  announced : 
"  The  ordinance  of  secession  has  been  signed 
and  ratified,  and  I  proclaim  the  State  of  South 
Carolina  an  Independent  Commonwealth." 
The  city  and  the  State  joined  in  general  ex- 
ultation as  if  a  great  work  had  been  accom- 
plished, as  if  the  efforts  of  a  generation  had 
been  crowned  with  fulfillment,  and  nothing  re- 
mained but  to  rest  and  enjoy  the  ripened  fruit 
of  independence.  There  seemed  to  be  no 
dream,  amid  all  this  rejoicing,  that  nothing  def- 
inite had  as  yet  been  effected ;  that  the  reck- 
less day's  act  was  but  the  prelude  to  the  most 
terrible  tragedy  of  the  age,  the  unchaining  of 
a  storm  which  should  shake  the  continent  with 
terror  and  devastation,  leaving  every  Southern 
State  a  wreck,  and  sweeping  from  the  face  of 
the  earth  the  institution  in  whose  behalf  the 
fatal  work  was  done. 
The  secession  ordinance  having  been  passed . 
signed,  and  proclaimed,  the  convention  busied 
itself  for  the  next  few  days  in  making  up  a 
public  statement  of  its  reasons  for  the  anoma- 
lous procedure.  The  discussion  showed  a 
wide  divergence  of  opinion  as  to  the  causes 
which  had  produced  the  act.  One  ascribed 
it  to  the  election  of  Lincoln,  another  to  the 
failure  of  the  Northern  States  to  execute  the 
fugitive-slave  law,  a  third  to  the  antislavery 
sentiment  of  the  free  States,  a  fourth  to  the 
tariff,  a  fifth  to  unconstitutional  appropriations 
by  Congress,  and  so  on.  On  the  24th  of  De- 
cember the  convention  adopted  a  "  Declara- 
tion of  Causes,"  and  an  "  Address  to  the  Slave- 
holding  States,"  the  two  papers  together  em-
8*6 
■I  BRA  11  AM  LINCOLN. 
bracing  the  above  and  other 
specifications.  Since  neither 
the  Constitution  of  the  Uni- 
ted States  nor  the  laws  of 
Congress  contained  any 
section,  clause,  word,  or  rea- 
sonable implication  that 
authorized  an  act  of  seces- 
sion,  the  "  Declaration  of 
Causes  "  formulated  the 
doctrine  of  State-rights  in 
justification.  That  doctrine 
in  substance  was,  that  the 
several  States  entered  the 
Union  as  sovereignties ; 
that  in  forming  the  Federal 
Government  they  delega- 
ted to  it  only  specific  pow- 
ers for  specific  ends  ;  that 
the  Federal  Government 
was  not  a  sovereign  over 
sovereignties,  but  was  only 
an  agent  between  them ; 
that  there  existed  no  com- 
mon arbiter  to  adjudge 
differences;  that  each  State 
or  sovereignty  might  judge 
for  itself  any  violation  of 
the  common  agreement 
and  choose  its  own  mode 
of  redress  ;  consequently 
that  each  State  might  ad- 
here to  or  secede  from  the 
Union,  at  its  own  sovereign 
will  and  pleasure. 
This  doctrine,  springing 
from    early    differences   of 
c  institutional      interpreta- 
tion, had  not  been  promul- 
gated in  its  ultra  form  until 
S  >uth   Carolina's  nullifica- 
tion movement  in  1832.  It 
had  been  accepted  and  sus- 
tained by  only  a  small  frac- 
tion of  the  American  people.  The  whole  current, 
action,  and  development  of  the  government 
of  the  United  States  under  the  Constitution  was 
based  upon  the  opposite  theory.    Washington 
and  the  succeeding  Presidents  rejected  it  in  their 
practical  administration ;  Marshall  and  the  Su- 
preme Court  condemned  it  in  their  judicial  de- 
(  isions;  Webster  refuted  it  in  hishighest  consti- 
tutional arguments;  Congress  repudiated  itin  its 
legislation;  Jackson  denounced  it  in  executive 
proc  lamation  as  treasonable  and  revolutionary; 
and  the  people  of  the  Union  at  large  regarded 
it  as  an  absurd  and  dangerous  political  heresy. 
CHARLESTON    HARBOR. 
We  have  sketched  the  positions  assumed  by 
President  Buchanan  upon  the  political  theories 
MAJOR     ROBERT     ANDERSON.        (FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH     BY     BRADY.) 
involved  in  the  secession  movement,  as  well 
as  the  contradictory  policy  he  proposed  to  pur- 
sue in  dealing  with  it.  In  addition,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  state  briefly  the  practical  action 
so  far  taken  by  him,  especially  in  regard  to 
the  forts  in  Charleston  Harbor,  the  possession 
of  which  was  so  earnestly  desired  by  the  lead- 
ers of  rebellion  in  South  Carolina.  To  secede, 
to  declare  their  political  independence  without 
power  to  control  their  harbors  and  regulate  their 
commerce,  would  be  an  absurdity  calculated 
to  draw  upon  them  only  the  ridicule  of  foreign 
powers.  The  possession  of  the  Federal  forts, 
therefore,  far  exceeded  in  importance  even 
their  ordinance  of  secession,  and  had  engaged 
a  much  earlier  and  deeper  solicitude  on  their 
part.    These  forts  were  three  in  number.    Look
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
at  any  good  map  of  Charleston  Harbor,  and  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  city  lies  on  the  extreme 
point  of  a  tongue  of  land  between  the  Ashley 
and  Cooper  rivers,  every  part  being  within  easy 
range  under  the  guns  of  Castle  Pinckney,  which 
stands  on  a  small  island,  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  distant.  Four  miles  to  seaward  is  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor,  and  nearly  midway  there- 
in stands  the  more  extensive  and  imposing 
work  of  Fort  Sumter,  its  guns  not  only  sweep- 
ing all  the  approaches  and  ship-channels,  but 
the  shores  and  islands  on  either  hand.  It  needs 
but  a  glance  at  the  map  to  see  that,  with 
proper  garrisons  and  armaments,  Fort  Sumter 
commands  the  harbor,  and  Castle  Pinckney 
commands  the  city,  in  the  absence  of  very 
formidable  preparations  for  attack. 
Owing  to  the  long  period  of  peace  through 
which  the  country  had  passed,  these  works  were 
in  a  neglected  condition,  and  only  partly  oc- 
cupied. There  was  only  an  ordnance  sergeant 
in  Castle  Pinckney,  only  an  ordnance  sergeant 
in  Fort  Sumter,  and  a  partial  garrison  at  Fort 
Moultrie.  Both  Sumter  and  Moultrie  were 
greatly,  and  Castle  Pinckney  slightly,  out  of 
repair,  with  no  mounted  guns  or  the  usual 
necessary  appurtenances  for  defense.  During 
the  summer  of  i860  Congress  made  an  ap- 
propriation for  these  works ;  and  the  engineer 
captain  who  had  been  in  charge  for  two  years 
past  had,  indeed,  been  ordered  to  begin  and 
prosecute  repairs  in  the  two  forts.  Whether 
this  step  was  taken  to  afford  ultimate  help  to 
the  Union  or  help  to  the  Rebellion,  will  per- 
haps never  be  historically  proved,  nor  is  the 
fact  material. 
It  is  needless  at  this  point  to  enter  upon 
certain  very  interesting  details  showing  how 
these  forts,  from  the  very  first,  became  objects 
of  prime  solicitude ;  how  the  leaders  and  peo- 
ple of  Charleston  in  various  ways  manifested 
their  purpose  to  seize  them;  how  General 
Scott  recommended  that  they  should  be  reen- 
forced;  how  the  officer  in  command  specifi- 
cally asked  that  the  garrison  in  Moultrie  might 
be  increased;  how  Secretary  of  War  Floyd  sent 
an  officer  to  inspect  their  condition. 
A  more  necessary  fact  to  be  stated  is  that 
the  Administration,  on  the  13th  of  November, 
ordered  Major  Robert  Anderson  of  Kentucky 
to  take  command  of  the  forts  and  forces  in 
Charleston  Harbor.  In  the  execution  of  this 
duty  Major  Anderson  reached  Fort  Moultrie 
and  assumed  command  on  November  21st; 
and  having  from  his  several  interviews  with 
the  President,  Secretary  of  War,  and  Lieuten- 
ant-General  Scott  become  fully  impressed  with 
the  importance  of  his  trust,  proceeded  as  a 
first  step  to  acquaint  himself  thoroughly  with 
his  situation  and  resources.  As  a  result  his  re- 
port urgently  warned  the  Government  that  the 
Vol.  XXXIV.— 115. 
harbor  must  be  immediately  and  strongly  reen- 
forced,  and  this  suggestion  he  repeated  from 
time  to  time  with  earnestness  and  persistence. 
This  judicious  advice,  however,  was  neglected 
by  the  President  and  rejected  by  the  Secretary 
of  War.  "  It  is  believed," —  so  ran  the  reply 
and  apparently  the  final  decision  of  the  Gov- 
ernment,— 
"  from  information  thought  to  be  reliable,  that  an 
attack  will  not  be  made  on  your  command,  and  the 
Secretary  has  only  to  refer  to  his  conversation  with 
you,  and  to  caution  you  that  should  his  convictions 
unhappily  prove  untrue,  your  actions  must  be  such  as 
to  be  free  from  the  charge  of  initiating  a  collision.  If 
attacked,  you  are,  of  course,  expected  to  defend  the 
trust  committed  to  you  to  the  best  of  your  ability. 
The  increase  of  the  force  under  your  command,  how- 
ever much  to  be  desired,  would,  the  Secretary  thinks, 
judging  from  the  recent  excitement  produced  on  ac- 
count of  an  anticipated  increase,  as  mentioned  in  your 
letter,  but  add  to  that  excitement,  and  might  lead  to 
serious  results." 
It  is  a  fair  inference  from  facts  not  necessary 
to  relate  here  that  the  Charleston  leaders  of 
secession  had  knowledge  of  this  decision  of 
the  Secretary  of  War ;  but  so  eager  was  their 
desire  to  prevent  reinforcements  that  they  pro- 
ceeded to  obtain  a  substantial  pledge  in  that 
behalf. 
On  Saturday,  December  8th,  four  of  the 
representatives  in  Congress  from  South  Caro- 
lina requested  an  interview  of  President  Bu- 
chanan, which  he  granted  them.  One  of  their 
number  has  related  the  substance  of  their  ad- 
dress with  graphic  frankness : 
"  Mr.  President,  it  is  our  solemn  conviction  that  if 
you  attempt  to  send  a  solitary  soldier  to  these  forts, 
the  instant  the  intelligence  reaches  our  people  (and 
we  shall  take  care  that  it  does  reach  them,  for  we 
have  sources  of  information  in  Washington  so  that  no 
orders  for  troops  can  be  issued  without  our  getting  in- 
formation) these  forts  will  be  forcibly  and  immediately 
stormed. 
"  We  all  assured  him  that  if  an  attempt  was  made 
to  transport  reinforcements,  our  people  would  take 
these  forts,  and  that  we  would  go  home  and  help  them 
to  do  it ;  for  it  would  be  suicidal  folly  for  us  to  allow 
these  forts  to  be  manned.  And  we  further  said  to  him 
that  a  bloody  result  would  follow  the  sending  of  troops 
to  those  forts,  and  that  we  did  not  believe  that  the  au- 
thorities of  South  Carolina  would  do  anything  prior 
to  the  meeting  of  this  convention,  and  that  we  hoped 
and  believed  that  nothing  would  be  done  after  this  body 
met  until  we  had  demanded  of  the  general  government 
the  recession  of  these  forts."  * 
Here  was  an  avowal  to  the  President  him- 
self—  not  only  of  treason  at  Charleston,  but 
of  conspiracy  in  the  executive  departments 
of  the  general  Government ;  a  demand  cou- 
pled with  menace.  Instead  of  meeting  these 
with  a  stern  rebuke  and  dismissal,  the  Presi- 
dent cowered  and  yielded.  He  hastened  to 
assure  his  visitors  that  it  was  his  determination 
"  not  to  reenforce  the  forts  in  the  harbor  and 
*  Statement  of  Miles  and  Keitt  to  the  South  Carolina 
Convention.
8*8 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
thus  produce  a  collision,  until  they  had  been 
actually  attacked,"  or  until  he  had  "  certain 
evidence  that  they  were  about  to  be  attacked." 
The  President  suggested  that  "  for  pruden- 
tial reasons  "  it  would  be  best  to  put  in  writ- 
ing what  they  had  said  to  him  verbally.  This 
they  readily  promised,  and  on  Monday,  the 
ioth,  gave  him,  duly  signed  by  five  of  the 
South  Carolina  representatives,  this  important 
paper: 
"  Washington,  December  9th,  i860. 
u  In  compliance  with  our  statement  to  you  yester- 
day, we  now  express  to  you  our  strong  convictions 
that  neither  the  constituted  authorities,  nor  any  body 
of  the  people  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  will  either 
attack  or  molest  the  United  States  forts  in  the  harbor 
oi  Charleston,  previously  to  the  action  of  the  conven- 
tion, and  we  hope  and  believe  not  until  an  offer  has 
been  made  through  an  accredited  representative  to 
negotiate  for  an  amicable  arrangement  of  all  matters 
between  the  State  and  the  Federal  Government,  pro- 
vided that  no  reinforcements  shall  be  sent  into  those 
forts,  and  their  relative  military  status  shall  remain  as 
at  present." 
When  President  Buchanan  came  to  look  at 
the  cold,  explicit  language  of  this  document, 
he  shrank  from  the  definite  programme  to 
which  it  committed  him.  "  I  objected  to  the 
word  '  provided,'  as  it  might  be  construed  into 
an  agreement  on  my  part  which  I  never  would 
make.  They  said  nothing  was  further  from 
their  intention  ;  they  did  not  so  understand 
it,  and  I  should  not  so  consider  it."*  There 
followed  mutual  protests  that  the  whole  trans- 
action was  voluntary,  informal,  and  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  mediation  ;  that  neither  party  pos- 
sessed any  delegated  authority  or  binding 
power. 
While  the  Charleston  conspirators  had  thus 
taken  effectual  steps  to  bind  the  future  acts 
of  the  Executive  in  respect  to  the  forts  in 
Charleston  Harbor,  and  to  make  sure  that  the 
rising  insurrection  in  South  Carolina  should 
not  be  crippled  or  destroyed  by  any  surprise  or 
sudden  movement  emanating  from  Washing- 
ton, they  were  not  less  watchful  to  counteract 
and  prevent  any  possible  hostile  movement 
against  them  on  the  part  of  Major  Anderson 
or  his  handful  of  officers  and  troops  in  Fort 
Moultrie,  undertaken  on  their  own  discretion. 
Their  boast  of  secret  sources  of  information  in 
Washington,  coupled  with  subsequent  events, 
furnish  unerring  proof  that  Mr.  Floyd,  Secre- 
tary of  War,  though  openly  opposing  disunion, 
was  already  in  their  confidence  and  councils, 
and  was  lending  them  such  active  coopera- 
*  Buchanan  to  Comrs.,  December  31st,  i860.  W.  R., 
I.,  p.  116. 
t  "  The  President  has  listened  to  him  with  due  friend- 
liness and  respect,  but  the  War  Department  has  been 
little  communicative.  Up  to  this  time  he  has  not  been 
shown  the  written  instructions  of  Major  Anderson, 
nor  been  informed  of  the  purport  of  those  more  re- 
cently conveyed  to  Fort  Moultrie  verbally  by  Major 
tion  as  might  be  disguised  or  perhaps  still  ex- 
cused to  his  own  conscience  as  tending  to  avert 
collision  and  bloodshed. 
Shortly  before,  or  about  the  time  of  the  truce 
we  have  described,  Secretary  Floyd  sent  an 
officer  of  the  War  Department  to  Fort  Moul- 
trie with  special  verbal  instructions  to  Major 
Anderson,  which  were  duly  communicated  and 
the  substance  of  them  reduced  to  writing  and 
delivered  to  that  officer,  on  the  1  ith  of  Decem- 
ber, being  the  day  following  the  final  conclu- 
sion of  the  President's  unofficial  truce  at 
Washington. 
Upon  mere  superficial  inspection  this  order 
disclosed  only  the  then  dominant  anxiety  of 
the  Administration  to  prevent  collision.  But 
if  we  remember  that  it  was  issued  and  sent  to 
Major  Anderson  without  the  President's  knowl- 
edge and  without  the  knowledge  of  General 
Scott,f  and  especially  if  we  keep  in  sight  the 
state  of  public  sentiment  of  both  Charleston 
and  Washington  and  the  paramount  official 
influences  which  had  taken  definite  shape  in 
the  President's  truce,  we  can  easily  read  be- 
tween the  lines  that  it  wras  a  most  artfully  con- 
trived document  to  lull  suspicion  while  it  ef- 
fectually restrained  Major  Anderson  from  any 
act  or  movement  which  might  check  or  control 
the  insurrectionary  preparations.  He  must  do 
nothing  to  provoke  aggression;  he  must  take 
no  hostile  attitude  without  evident  and  immi- 
nent necessity ;  he  must  not  move  his  troops 
into  Fort  Sumter,  unless  it  were  attempted  to 
attack  or  take  possession  of  one  of  the  forts  or 
such  a  design  was  tangibly  manifested.  Prac- 
tically, when  the  attempt  to  seize  the  vacant 
forts  might  come  it  would  be  too  late  to  pre- 
vent it,  and  certainly  too  late  to  move  his  own 
force  into  either  of  them.  Practically,  too,  any 
serious  design  of  that  nature  would  never  be 
permitted  to  come  to  his  knowledge.  Supple- 
ment these  negations  and  restrictions  by  the 
unrecorded  verbal  explanations  and  comments 
made  by  Major  Buell,  by  his  emphatic  and 
express  disapproval  of  the  meager  defensive 
preparations  which  had  been  made,  such  as 
his  open  declaration  that  a  few  loop-holes 
"  would  have  a  tendency  to  irritate  the  peo- 
ple," J  and  we  can  readily  imagine  how  a  faith- 
ful officer,  whose  reiterated  reasonable  requests 
had  been  refused,  felt  that  under  such  instruc- 
tions, amid  such  surroundings,  under  such  neg- 
lect, "his  hands  were  tied"  and  that  he  and  his 
little  command  were  a  foredoomed  sacrifice^ 
Buell."— [General  Scott  (by  G.  W.  Lay)  to  Twiggs, 
December  28th,  i860.  "  War  Records,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  580.] 
%  Doubleday's  "Sumter,"  p.  51. 
§  In  a  Senate  speech,  January  ioth,  1861  ("  Globe," 
page  307),  Jefferson  Davis,  commentingon  these  orders, 
while  admitting  that  they  empowered  Major  Anderson 
to  go  from  one  post  to  another,  said,  "  though  his  or- 
ders were  not  so  designed,  as  I  am  assured."
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
THE  RETIREMENT  OF  CASS. 
The  non-coercion  doctrine  had  been  yielded 
as  early  as  November  20th,  in  the  Attorney- 
General's  opinion  of  that  date.  The  fact  was 
rumored  not  only  in  the  political  circles  of 
the  capital,  but  in  the  chief  newspapers  of  the 
country ;  and  the  three  secession  members  of 
the  Cabinet  had  doubtless  communicated  it 
confidentially  to  all  their  prominent  and  influ- 
ential confederates.  Since  that  time  South  Caro- 
lina had  continued  her  preparation  for  secession 
with  unremitting  industry;  Mississippi  had 
authorized  a  convention  and  appointed  com- 
missioners to  visit  all  the  slave  States  and  prop- 
agate disunion — -among  them  Mr.  Thompson, 
Buchanan's  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  exer- 
cised this  insurrectionary  function  while  yet 
remaining  in  the  Cabinet.  North  Carolina  had 
refused  to  go  into  an  election  of  United  States 
senator;  Florida  had  passed  a  convention 
bill;  Georgia  had  initiated  legislative  proceed- 
ings to  bring  about  a  conference  of  the  South- 
ern States  at  Atlanta;  both  houses  of  the 
National  Congress  had  rung  with  secession 
speeches,  while  daily  and  nightly  caucuses 
took  place  at  Washington. 
Mr.  Buchanan's  truce  with  the  South  Car- 
olina representatives  had  as  little  effect  in  arrest- 
ing the  secession  intrigues  as  his  non-coercion 
doctrine  officially  announced  in  the  annual 
message.  On  the  evening  of  the  very  day 
(December  8th)  on  which  he  received  the 
South  Carolina  pledge,  his  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  Howell  Cobb  of  Georgia,  tendered 
his  resignation,  announcing  in  the  same  letter 
his  intention  to  embark  in  the  active  work  of 
disunion.  "  My  withdrawal,"  he  wrote  to  the 
President,  "  has  not  been  occasioned  by  any- 
thing you  have  said  or  done."  Ignoring  the 
fact  that  the  Treasury  was  prosperous  and 
solvent  when  he  took  charge  of  it,  and  that  at 
the  moment  of  his  leaving,  it  could  not  pay 
its  drafts,  Mr.  Cobb  five  days  later  published 
a  long  and  inflammatory  address  to  the  peo- 
ple of  Georgia,  concluding  with  this  exhorta- 
tion :  "  I  entertain  no  doubt  either  of  your 
right  or  duty  to  secede  from  the  Union.  Arouse 
then  all  your  manhood  for  the  great  work  be- 
fore you  and  be  prepared  on  that  day  to  an- 
nounce and  maintain  your  independence  out 
of  the  Union,  for  you  will  never  again  have 
equality  and  justice  in  it." 
The  President  had  scarcely  yet  found  a 
successor  for  Mr.  Cobb  when  the  head  of  his 
Cabinet,  Lewis  Cass,  Secretary  of  State,  also 
tendered  his  resignation  and  retired  from  the 
Administration. 
The  incident  of  Secretary  Cass's  resignation 
brings  into  relief  the  mental  reservations  under 
which  Buchanan's    paradoxical  theories  had 
been  concurred  in  by  his  Cabinet.  A  private 
memorandum,  in  Mr.  Buchanan's  hand  writing, 
commenting  on  the  event,  makes  the  follow- 
ing emphatic  statement: 
"  His  resignation  was  the  more  remarkable  on  ac- 
count of  the  cause  he  assigned  for  it.  When  my  late 
message  (of  December,  i860)  was  read  to  the  Cabinet 
before  it  was  printed,  General  Cass  expressed  hi-,  un- 
reserved and  hearty  approbation  for  it,  accompanied 
by  every  sign  of  deep  and  sincere  feeling.  lie  had  but 
one  objection  to  it,  and  this  was,  that  it  was  not  suffi- 
ciently strong  against  the  power  of  Congress  to  make 
war  upon  a  State  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  her 
to  remain  in  the  Union  ;  and  the  denial  of  this  power 
was  made  more  emphatic  and  distinct  upon  his  own 
suggestion." — [G.  T.  Curtis's  "Life  of  Buchanan," 
II.,  p.  399.] 
But  this  position  was  probably  qualified  and 
counterbalanced  in  his  own  mind  by  the  Presi- 
dent's positive  promise  that  he  would  collect 
the  Federal  revenue  and  protect  the  Federal 
property.  Little  by  little,  however,  delay  and 
concession  rendered  this  impossible.  The  col- 
lector at  Charleston  still  nominally  exercised 
his  functions  as  a  Federal  officer;  but  it  was 
an  open  secret  among  the  Charleston  author- 
ities, and  must  also  by  this  time  have  become 
known  to  the  Government  at  Washington,  that 
he  was  only  holding  the  place  in  trust  for  the 
coming  secession  convention.  As  to  protecting 
the  Federal  property,  the  refusal  to  send  Ander- 
son troops,  the  President's  truce,  the  gradual 
development  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  irresolution 
and  lack  of  courage,  and  finally  Mr.  Cobb's 
open  defection,  must  have  convinced  Mr.  Cass 
that  under  existing  determinations,  orders,  and 
influences  it  was  an  utterly  hopeless  prospect. 
The  whole  question  seems  to  have  been 
finally  debated  and  decided  in  a  long  and 
stormy  Cabinet  session  held  on  December 
13th.*  The  events  of  the  past  few  days  had 
evidently  shaken  the  President's  confidence  in 
his  own  policy.  He  startled  his  dissembling 
and  conspiring  Secretary  of  War  with  the  sud- 
den question,  "  Mr.  Floyd,  are  you  going  to 
send  recruits  to  Charleston  to  strengthen  the 
forts?"  "Don't  you  intend  to  strengthen  the 
forts  at  Charleston  ?  "  The  apparent  change 
of  policy  alarmed  the  Secretary,  but  he  replied 
promptly  that  he  did  not.  "  Mr.  Floyd,"  con- 
tinued Mr.  Buchanan,  "  I  would  rather  be  in 
the  bottom  of  the  Potomac  to-morrow  than 
that  these  forts  in  Charleston  should  fall  into 
the  hands  of  those  who  intend  to  take  them. 
It  will  destroy  me,  sir,  and,  Mr.  Floyd,  if  that 
thing  occurs  it  will  cover  your  name  with  an 
infamy  that  all  time  can  never  efface,  because 
it  is  in  vain  that  you  will  attempt  to  show  that 
you  have  not  some  complicity  in  handing  over 
those  forts  to  those  who  take  them."   The  wilv 
*  Floyd's  Richmond  speech.  "N.  Y.  Herald,"  Jan- 
uary  17th,  1861,  p.  2.
S40 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
Secretary  replied,  "  I  will  risk  my  reputation, 
1  will  trust  my  life  that  the  forts  are  safe  under 
the  declarations  of  the  gentlemen  of  Charles- 
ton." "  That  is  all  very  well,"  replied  the 
President,  "but  does  that  secure  the  forts?" 
"  N  o,  sir  :  but  it  is  a  guaranty  that  I  am  in  ear- 
nest." said  Floyd.  "  I  amnot  satisfied,"  said  the 
President. 
Thereupon  the  Secretary  made  the  never- 
failing  appeal  to  the  fears  and  timidity  of  Mr. 
Buchanan.    He  has  himself  reported  the  lan- 
ge  he  used : 
-  I  am  sorry  for  it,"  said  he;  "you  are  President, 
it  is  for  you  to  order.  You  have  the  right  to  order, 
and  I  will  consider  your  orders  when  made.  But  I 
would  be  recreant  to  you  if  I  did  not  tell  you  that  this 
policy  of  garrisoning  the  forts  will  lead  to  certain  con- 
flicts'; it  is  the  inauguration  of  civil  war,  and  the  be- 
ginning of  the  effusion  of  blood. 
"  [If]  it  is  a  question  of  property,  why  not  put  an  ord- 
nance sergeant  —  a  man  who  wears  worsted  epaulets 
on  his  shoulders  and  stripes  down  his  pantaloons  —  as 
the  representative  of  the  property  of  the  United  States  ? 
That  will  be  enough  to  secure  the  forts.  If  it  is  a  question 
of  property,  he  represents  it,^  and  let  us  wait  until  the 
issue  is  made  by  South  Carolina.  She  will  go  out  of 
the  Union  and  send  her  commissioners  here.  Up  to 
that  point  the  action  is  insignificant.  Action  after  this 
demands  the  attention  of  the  great  council  of  the  na- 
tion. Let  us  submit  the  question  to  Congress- — it  is 
for  Congress  to  deal  with  the  matter." 
This  crafty  appeal  to  the  President's  hesi- 
tating inclinations  was  seconded  by  the  ac- 
tive persuasions  of  the  leading  conspirators  of 
Congress  whom  Floyd  promptly  called  to  his 
assistance. 
"  I  called  for  help  from  that  bright  Saladin  of  the 
South,  Jefferson  Davis  of  Mississippi  —  and  I  said, 
'  Come  to  my  rescue,  the  battle  is  a  little  more  than 
my  weak  heart  can  support  —  come  to  me,'  and  he 
came.  Then  came  that  old  jovial-looking,  noble-hearted 
representative  from  Virginia,  James  M.  Mason.  Here 
caire  that  anomaly  of  modern  times,  the  youthful  Nes- 
tor, here  came  Hunter.  From  the  North,  the  South, 
the  Fast,  and  the  West  there  came  up  the  patriots  of  the 
country,  the  champions  of  constitutional  liberty,  and 
they  talked  with  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
and  they  quieted  his  fears  and  assured  him  in  the  line 
of  duty.  They  said,  '  Let  there  be  no  force  ' ;  and  the 
President  said  to  me,  '  I  am  content  with  your  policy ! ' 
and  then  it  was  that  we  determined  that  we  would  send 
no  more  troops  to  the  harbor  in  Charleston. "  —  [Floyd's 
Richmond  speech.  "N.  Y.  Herald,"  January  17th, 
1861,  p.  2.] 
"With  a  last  effort  to  rouse  the  President  from 
his  lethargy,  Cass  demanded  in  the  Cabinet 
meeting  of  the  13th,  that  the  forts  should  be 
strengthened.  But  he  was  powerless  to  break 
the  spell.    Says  Floyd  : 
"The  President  said  to  him  in  reply,  with  a  beauti- 
ful countenance  and  with  a  heroic  decision  that  I  shall 
never  forget,  in  the  council  chamber,  'I  have  considered 
*  Jefferson  Davis,  in  his  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Con- 
federate Government,"  p.  215,  Vol.  I.,  also  lays  claim 
to  this  suggestion  :  "  The  President's  objection  to  this 
was,  that  it  was  his  bounden  duty  to  preserve  and  pro- 
tect the  property  of  the  United  States.  To  this  I  re- 
plied with  all  the  earnestness  the  occasion  demanded, 
this  question —  I  am  sorry  to  differ  from  the  Secretary 
of  State — 1  have  made  up  my  mind.  The  interests 
of  the  country  do  not  demand  a  reenforcement  of  the 
forces  in  Charleston.  ■  I  cannot  do  it  —  and  I  take  the 
responsibility  of  it  upon  myself.'" 
The  other  Union  members  of  the  Cabinet 
received  the  rumor  of  Mr.  Cass's  resignation 
with  gloomy  apprehensions.  Postmaster-  Gen- 
eral Holt,f  with  whom  by  reason  of  their 
loyal  sympathy  he  had  been  on  intimate  terms, 
hastened  to  him  to  learn  whether  the  report 
were  indeed  true  and  whether  his  determina- 
tion were  irrevocable.  Cass  confirmed  the 
fact  with  his  own  lips;  saying  that,  represent- 
ing the  Northern  and  loyal  constituency 
which  he  did,  he  could  no  longer  without  dis- 
honor to  himself  and  to  them  remain  in  such 
treasonable  surroundings.  Holt  endeavored 
to  persuade  him  that  under  the  circumstances 
it  was  all  the  more  necessary  that  the  loyal 
members  of  the  Cabinet  should  remain  at 
their  posts,  in  order  to  prevent  the  country's 
passing  into  the  hands  of  the  secessionists  by 
mere  default.  But  Cass  replied,  No;  that  the 
public  feeling  and  sentiment  of  his  section 
would  not  tolerate  such  a  policy  on  his  part. 
"  For  you,"  he  said,  "  coming  from  a  border 
State,  where  a  modified,  perhaps  a  divided, 
public  sentiment  exists,  that  is  not  only  a 
possible  course,  but  it  is  a  true  one;  it  is  your 
duty  to  remain,  to  sustain  the  Executive  and 
counteract  the  plots  of  the  traitors.  But  my 
duty  is  otherwise;  I  must  adhere  to  my  resig- 
nation." 
FORT   SUMTER. 
The  Charleston  conspirators  were  aware 
that,  in  their  well-laid  intrigues  to  obtain  pos- 
session of  all  the  Charleston  forts,  there  was 
one  point  of  weakness  and  danger.  They  had 
secured  a  virtual  pledge  that  no  reinforcements 
would  be  sent,  and  they  had  reasonable  con- 
fidence that  at  any  desirable  moment  they 
could,  by  a  sudden,  overwhelming  assault,  cap- 
ture Fort  Moultrie  with  its  slender  garrison 
of  sixty  soldiers  under  Anderson's  command. 
But  if  Anderson  should  suddenly  move  his 
garrison  into  Fort  Sumter,  a  larger  and  stronger 
work,  rising  sheer  out  of  the  waters  of  the  bay, 
midway  in  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  their  task 
would  be  more  serious,  perhaps  impossible. 
Against  such  a  contingency  they  had  taken  two 
important  precautions.  The  vaguely  worded 
instructions  of  Secretary  Floyd,  as  interpreted 
by  themselves,  seemed  to  forbid  such  a  move- 
ment on  his  part ;  and  to  make  assurance  more 
that  I  would  pledge  my  life  that,  if  an  inventory  were 
taken  of  all  the  stores  and  munitions  in  the  fort,  and 
an  ordnance  sergeant  with  a  few  men  left  in  charge 
of  them,  they  would  not  be  disturbed." 
t  Holt,  conversation  with  J.  G.  N.  MS.
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
841 
certain  they  had  set  two  guard-boats  to  patrol- 
ling the  harbor  at  night  to  discover  and  pre- 
vent any  surprise  of  this  character. 
Anderson  also  clearly  saw  the  point  of  mil- 
itary advantage,  and  by  a  very  pointed  sugges- 
tion asked  on  December  2 2d  for  instructions 
from  the  War  Department  for  a  movement 
from  Moultrie  to  Sumter,*  but  found  no  re- 
sponse in  the  hopes  and  designs  of  Secretary 
Floyd. 
The  officers  meantime  freely  visited  the  city 
and  exchanged  social  courtesies  with  leading 
secessionists  with  many  mutual  protestations 
of  the  highest  regard.  "  We  appreciate  your 
position,"  said  their  entertainers.  "  It  is  a 
point  of  honor  with  you  to  hold  the  fort,  but 
a  political  necessity  obliges  us  to  take  it."  f  But 
after  the  passage  of  the  ordinance  of  seces- 
sion, Major  Anderson  had  ceased  his  visits 
to  Charleston.  Christmas  day,  however,  was 
once  more  celebrated  with  these  social  ameni- 
ties at  a  family  party  in  Moultrieville,  on  Sul- 
livan's Island.  When  Anderson  returned  from 
the  scene  of  merry-making,  in  the  solitude  of 
his  soldier's  room  he  formed  the  resolution  to 
abandon  Fort  Moultrie  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment ;  and  on  the  evening  of  December 
26th  the  transfer  was  secretly  and  successfully 
accomplished. 
A    BLUNDERING     COMMISSION. 
On  Wednesday,  December  26th,  at  3  o'clock 
p.  m.,  it  being  about  the  same  time  of  the  same 
day  that  Anderson  was  completing  his  prepa- 
rations to  leave  Moultrie,  Messrs.  Barnwell, 
Adams,  and  Orr,  the  three  commissioners  from 
South  Carolina,  reached  Washington.  They 
were  by  authority  of  the  convention  empow- 
ered to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  peace  and  friend- 
ship between  the  embryo  republic  and  the 
United  States ;  to  secure  the  delivery  of  the 
forts,  arsenal,  and  light-houses ;  to  divide  the 
public  property  and  apportion  the  public  debt, 
and  generally  to  settle  all  pending  questions, 
upon  the  assumption  that  South  Carolina  was 
no  longer  a  member  of  the  Union,  but  an  in- 
dependent foreign  State. 
There  being  no  concealment  about  the  tem- 
per and  purpose  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  the  arrival 
of  the  commissioners  was  promptly  commu- 
nicated to  him,  and  he  with  an  equal  prompt- 
ness appointed  an  interview  with  them  at  1 
o'clock  of  the  next  day,  Thursday,  December 
27th.  On  their  part,  the  commissioners  delib- 
erately settled  themselves  for  business  by  tak- 
ing a  house  and  appointing  a  secretary.    But 
at  sunrise  on  Thursday  things  were  no  longer 
as  they  had  been  at  the  previous  sunset.  An- 
derson's move  on  the  military  chess-board  had 
changed  not  only  the  game  of  war  but,  yet  more 
radically,  the  game  of  politics.  The  Charles- 
ton authorities,  dumfounded  by  the  event,  prob- 
ably suspected  treachery  from  the  Administra- 
tion, and  under  this  impulse  interdicted  the 
transmission  of  the  news  northward}:  until  the 
next  forenoon.  They,  however,  sent  the  in- 
formation to  the  commissioners  at  Washington, 
who  communicated  it  to  Mr.  Buchanan. § 
Catching  at  straws,  Buchanan's  first  impulse 
was  to  assume  that  Anderson  had  abandoned 
Moultrie  in  a  panic,  and  to  restore  the  status 
by  ordering  him  back  into  the  fort.  He  had 
the  distinct  impression  that  his  orders  did 
not  contemplate  or  permit  the  change;  show- 
ing either  how  ignorant  he  was  of  the  Buell 
memorandum,  which  had  passed  under  his 
personal  notice  only  six  days  before,  or  how 
thoroughly  that  contradictory  document  had 
mystified  him  as  well  as  everybody  else.  Had 
the  influences  which  were  theretofore  para- 
mount in  Washington  yet  remained  intact,  it 
is  more  than  likely  that  this  first  impulse  of 
the  President  would  have  been  carried  out. 
But  things  were  changed  at  the  capital  as  well 
as  in  Charleston.  An  embezzlement  of  near  a 
million  dollars'  worth  of  Indian  Trust  Bonds 
had  come  to  light  and  kept  the  Federal  city 
and  the  whole  country  in  a  ferment  for  nearly 
a  week.  A  department  clerk  and  a  New  York 
contractor  were  in  prison  ;  but  the  responsibil- 
ity of  the  affair  had  been  brought  home  to 
Secretary  Floyd  so  pointedly  that  three  days 
before  the  President  requested  his  resignation. 
Floyd  was  in  no  haste  to  comply,  and  Mr. 
Buchanan  was  too  timid  to  dismiss  his  dis- 
graced minister  summarily,  who  still  exercised 
the  functions  of  Secretary  of  War. 
Anderson's  report,  written  at  8  p.  m.  on 
December  26th  and  sent  by  mail,  had  not  yet 
reached  Washington.  Floyd  was,  therefore, 
incredulous  about  what  the  commissioners 
told  him,  but  took  immediate  steps  to  verify 
the  rumor.  "  Information  has  reached  here 
this  morning,"  he  telegraphed  to  Anderson 
on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  "  that  you  have 
abandoned  Fort  Moultrie,  spiked  your  guns, 
burned  the  carriages,  and  gone  to  Fort  Sum- 
ter. It  is  not  believed,  because  there  is  no 
order  for  any  such  movement.  Explain  the 
meaning  of  this  report." 
"  The  telegram  is  correct,"  replied  Ander- 
son; "  I  abandoned  Fort  Moultrie  because  I 
*  Anderson  to  A.  G.,  December  22d,  i860.  W.  R.,  I., 
p.  105. 
t  Doubleday,  p.  47. 
X  The  news  of  the  evacuation  of  Moultrie,  which 
should  have  been  telegraphed  before  midnight,  did  not 
reach  Washington  till  about  noon  next  day,  and  then 
only  by  way  of  Baltimore.  (Washington  "  Star/'  27th, 
Baltimore  telegram.) 
%  Mr.  Buchanan's  Administration,  p.  180.
84a 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
was  certain  that  if  attacked  my  men  must  have 
been  sacrificed,  and  the  command  of  the  har- 
bor lost.  I  spiked  the  guns  and  destroyed  the 
carnages  to  keep  the  guns  from  being  used 
against  us."'  And  he  added,  "  If  attacked,  the 
garrison  would  never  have  surrendered  with- 
out a  light.'' 
Meanwhile  the  Cabinet  was  called  together 
to  deliberate  on  the  unwelcome  news.  During 
the  two  weeks  which  had  elapsed  since  the  re- 
tirement  of  Cass  and  Cobb,  a  profound  change 
had  occurred  in  that  body  of  presidential  ad- 
visers. Governor  Thomas  of  Maryland,  also 
a  secessionist,  was  made  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury, a  substitution  which  brought  no  reform ; 
but.  on  the  other  hand,  Black  had  not  only 
been  made  Secretary  of  State  but  had  been 
man  elously  transformed  in  his  political  senti- 
ments and  acts  by  being  brought  into  contact 
and  companionship  with  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  a 
man  oi  iron  will  and  hearty  Union  sentiments, 
who  was  nominated  to  succeed  him  as  Attor- 
ney-General. A  new  and  healthier  atmosphere 
pervaded  the  executive  council  chamber  in 
the  discussion  of  the  crisis.  But  the  political 
condition  of  the  nation  was  so  abnormal,  the 
public  service  so  disorganized,  and  the  execu- 
tive so  timid,  that  forthree  days  and  four  nights, 
from  the  evening  of  the  27th  to  the  morning 
of  the  31st,  Anderson  hung  doubtfully  in  the 
balance  between  honorable  approval  and  dis- 
graceful censure.* 
Secretary  Floyd  maintained  with  vehemence 
the  existence  of  a  mutual  pledge  created  by 
the  President's  truce  of  the  10th ;  and  claimed 
that  Anderson  had  violated  this  pledge,  since 
there  was  nothing  in  his  instructions  which 
could  in  any  wise  justify  his  removal  to  Sum- 
ter. Against  this  assumption  Mr.  Black,  the 
new  Secretary  of  State, took  much  more  radi- 
cal union  ground  than  he  had  hitherto  occupied. 
He  insisted  that  Anderson's  transfer  was  in 
perfect  accordance  with  his  orders,  announced 
his  unqualified  approval  of  it,  and  asserted  the 
duty  of  the  Administration  to  sustain  it.  In 
rd  to  the  issue  thus  raised,  the  President 
exhibited  his  usual  irresolution.  He  denied 
the  technical  existence  of  a  pledge,  but  could 
not,  of  course,  deny  its  spirit;  and  sided  with 
Floyd  in  the  belief  that  Anderson's  zeal  had  out- 
run the  limitof  his  instructions.  The  Buell  mem- 
orandum and  the  modifying  order  were  sent 
for  in  hot  ha^te,  and  now  for  the  first  time  un- 
derwent Cabinet  criticism.  The  studied  am- 
biguity of  these  papers  furnished  arguments 
for  both  sides;  the  entire  question  turning 
upon  the  point  whether  Anderson  had  "  tan- 
gible evidence  of  a  design  to  proceed  to  a 
hostile  act."    Floyd  now  submitted  a  written 
*  C.  F.  Black,  "Essays  and  Speeches  of  J.  S.  Black," 
pp.  1 1  and  12. 
demand  that  he  should  be  allowed  at  once  to 
order  the  garrison  to  be  withdrawn  entirely 
from  the  harbor  of  Charleston,  alleging  that 
the  Government  was  dishonored  in  the  viola- 
tion of  its  most  solemn  pledges. 
Pending  the  discussion,  the  Cabinet  ad- 
journed until  evening.  The  President's  audi- 
ence to  the  commissioners  had  been  postponed 
until  the  next  day ;  but  they  were  not  idle. 
All  that  day  and  until  midnight  they  were  the 
center  of  the  consternation,  the  hopes,  and  the 
counsels  of  the  conspirators.f  Meanwhile  the 
official  leakage,  the  Baltimore  dispatches,  and 
finally  the  issue  of  the  afternoon  papers  had 
communicated  Anderson's  stroke  to  the  whole 
Federal  city,  which  seethed  with  excitement. 
General  Scott,  confined  to  his  sick-room,  sent 
his  aide-de-camp  to  remind  the  President  of  the 
existence  of  such  an  officer  as  the  General-in- 
Chief  of  the  American  armies.  In  the  evening 
the  adjourned  Cabinet  meeting  resumed  its 
deliberations,  and  continued  the  session  to  a 
late  hour.  News  went  forth  to  the  Northern 
newspapers  that  night  that  before  its  close  a 
vote  of  four  to  three  had  decided  against  or- 
dering the  troops  back  to  Moultrie.  This  news, 
however,  wras  premature.  Whether  a  vote  was 
taken  or  not,  the  question  did  not  reach  a  de- 
cision. What  was  done  is  described  in  the 
language  of  Mr.  Buchanan  : 
"  In  this  state  of  suspense,  the  President  determined 
to  await  official  information  from  Major  Anderson  him- 
self. After  its  receipt,  should  he  be  convinced  upon 
full  examination  that  the  major,  on  a  false  alarm,  had 
violated  his  instructions,  he  might  then  think  seriously 
of  restoring  for  the  present  the  former  status  quo  of 
the  forts." 
But  the  aggressive  acts  of  the  insurgents 
were  continually  outrunning  the  vacillating 
decisions  of  the  President.  During  the  after- 
noon and  evening  of  Thursday,  Fort  Moultrie, 
Castle  Pinckney,  the  Arsenal,  Post-office,  and 
Custom-house  at  Charleston  passed  into  the 
hands  of  the  insurrection.  Like  the  news  of 
Anderson's  transfer  the  day  before,  the  infor- 
mation was  suppressed  by  the  Charleston  au- 
thorities. Beyond  its  transmission  perhaps  to 
their  friends  in  Washington,  none  of  the  trans- 
actions at  Charleston  on  Thursday  afternoon 
and  night  were  permitted  to  be  telegraphed 
to  the  North,  until  about  10  o'clock  on  Friday 
morning  the  28th,  in  the  hope  that  the  order 
for  Anderson's  return  could  be  extorted  from 
the  President  before  he  should  be  stung  to 
resistance. 
But  the  seizures  at  Charleston,  made  on  the 
personal  judgment  of  Governor  Pickens,  and 
against  at  least  the  implied  consent  of  the  con- 
vention, were  of  doubtful  expediency  for  them, 
t  Charleston  "  Courier,"  December  28th,  i860. 
Washington  dispatch  of  27.I1.
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
and  were  so  regarded  by  many  ardent  seces- 
sionists. The  "  Richmond  Whig  "  denounced 
them  as  a  "  shameful  outrage,"  and  soundly  be- 
rated South  Carolina  for  not  being  content  to  go 
out  of  the  Union  peacefully.  These  seizures, 
however,  might  still  have  been  turned  to  ad- 
vantage, but  for  the  more  serious  blunder  now 
committed  by  the  commissioners  themselves. 
Their  promised  interview  with  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan, postponed  from  1  o'clock  on  Thurs- 
day, on  account  of  the  Anderson  news,  was 
held  at  half-past  2  on  Friday  the  28th.  The 
President  had  that  forenoon  heard  of  the 
Charleston  outrages,  and  knew  that  from  be- 
ing the  agents  of  a  conspiracy  they  had  now 
become  the  emissaries  of  an  insurrection.  But 
he  failed  to  note  the  declaration  of  the  Con- 
stitution that  treason  against  the  United  States 
consists  in  levying  war  against  them,  or  in  ad- 
hering to  their  enemies,  giving  them  aid  and 
comfort.  According  to  his  explanations  the 
Constitution  indeed  forbade  his  recognizing 
the  authority  of  the  commissioners,  or  decid- 
ing their  claim ;  but  he  would  give  this  claim 
point  and  dignity  by  referring  it  officially  to 
Congress,  with  the  sanction  of  a  presidential 
message. 
Had  sound  judgment  guided  them  they 
would  have  seized  eagerly  upon  this  quasi 
acceptance  of  their  mission, —  which  virtually 
gave  them  the  President  as  an  ally, —  divided 
and  paralyzed  Congress  by  a  sudden  and  com- 
bined intrigue,  and  made  a  conciliatory  appeal 
to  the  commercial  apprehensions  of  the  North- 
ern cities  and  manufacturing  districts.  But  in- 
stead they  now  ventured  their  whole  success 
upon  a  single  desperate  chance.  Assuming  a 
tone  of  anger  and  accusation,  they  impugned 
the  honor  of  the  Government,  asked  explana- 
tions of  Anderson's  conduct  under  the  futile 
threat  of  suspending  negotiations  which  were 
not  yet  begun,  and  urged  the  immediate  with- 
drawal of  the  troops  from  the  harbor  of 
Charleston. 
Under  wiser  advice  Mr.  Buchanan's  hesi- 
tating decision  finally  went  against  them;  and 
in  that  failure  terminated  the  last  and  only 
hope  of  accomplishing  peaceable  secession. 
THE  CABINET  REGIME. —  BUCHANAN'S  VIRTUAL 
ABDICATION. 
The  ultimatum  presented  by  the  commis- 
sioners was  at  once  made  the  subject  of  a 
Cabinet  discussion,  and  continued  in  the  even- 
ing of  the  same  day.  No  decision  was  arrived 
at,  and  the  meetings  would  be  without  spe- 
cial interest,  were  it  not  for  the  report  of  one 
of  the  incidents  that  shows  the  feeling  which 
divided  the  presidential  advisers  into  two  ir- 
The  scene  is  given  in 
reconcilable  factions. 
the  language  of  one  of  the  participants  in  the 
evening  session  of  Friday,  December  28th, 
who  afterward  recounted  the  event  in  the 
council-room  of  the  White  House  itself. 
"  The  last  I  saw  of  Floyd,"  said  Secretary 
Stanton,  "  was  in  this  room,  lying  on  the  sofa 
which  then  stood  between  the  windows  yon- 
der. I  remember  it  well  —  it  was  on  the  night 
of  the  28th  of  December,  i860.  We  had  had 
high  words  and  had  almost  come  to  blows,  in 
our  discussion  over  Fort  Sumter.  Thompson 
was  here  —  Thompson  was  a  plausible  talker, 
and  as  a  last  resort,  having  been  driven  from 
every  other  argument,  advocated  the  evacua- 
tion of  the  fort  on  the  plea  of  generosity. 
South  Carolina,  he  said,  was  but  a  small  State 
with  a  sparse  white  population  —  we  were  a 
great  and  powerful  people  and  a  strong,  vig- 
orous government.  We  could  afford  to  say  to 
South  Carolina,  '  See,  we  will  withdraw  our 
garrison  as  an  evidence  that  we  mean  you 
no  harm.'  " 
Stanton  replied  to  him,  "  Mr.  President,  the 
proposal  to  be  generous  implies  that  the  Gov- 
ernment is  strong,  and  that  we  as  the  public 
servants  have  the  confidence  of  the  people. 
I  think  that  is  a  mistake.  No  administration 
has  ever  suffered  the  loss  of  public  confidence 
and  support  as  this  has  done.  Only  the  other 
day  it  was  announced  that  a  million  of  dollars 
had  been  stolen  from  Mr.  Thompson's  depart- 
ment. The  bonds  were  found  to  have  been 
taken  from  the  vault  where  they  should  have 
been  kept,  and  the  notes  of  Mr.  Floyd  were 
substituted  for  them.  Now  it  is  proposed  to 
give  up  Sumter.  All  I  have  to  say  is,  that 
no  administration,  much  less  this  one,  can 
afford  to  lose  a  million  of  money  and  a  fort  in 
the  same  week.  Floyd  remained  silent  and 
did  not  reappear  in  that  chamber."* 
The  Cabinet  was  again  convened  on  the 
evening  of  Saturday,  December  29th ;  but 
when  it  met,  there  was  one  vacant  seat  at  the 
council-board.  During  that  day,  Floyd  sent  in 
his  formal  resignation,  complaining  that  he 
had  been  subjected  "toa  violation  of  solemn 
pledges  and  plighted  faith."  The  resignation 
was  duly  accepted  on  the  following  Monday, 
and  the  War  Department  placed  provision- 
ally under  the  charge  of  Postmaster- General 
Holt.f  To  the  six  assembled  councilors.  Mr. 
Buchanan  now  submitted  the  draft  of  his  re- 
ply to  the  commissioners.  The  precise  terms 
and  substance  of  this  document  remain  un- 
published, and  we  are  compelled  to  gather  its 
import  from  a  rather  elaborate  written  criti- 
cism of  it  by  a  member  of  the  Cabinet.  This 
indicates,  however,  with  sufficient   clearness 
*  Stanton,  conversation.  J.  G.  N.,  Personal  memo- 
randa.   MS. 
tR.  R.,  I.,  Doc.  10.
844 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
that  the  paper,  like  all  Mr.  Buchanan's  writ- 
ings and  conversations  of  this  period,  was  con- 
tradictory, loose  in  expression,  and  entirely 
lacking  in  any  clear  presentation  of  issues. 
Most  radical  oi  all  the  changes  effected  by 
these  developments  was  that  wrought  in  the 
Hon.  Jeremiah  S.  Black,  Secretary  of  State. 
Growing  with  his  increasing  national  responsi- 
bilities he  now.  with  the  Sumter  crisis,  seems 
to  have  risen,  for  a  time  at  least,  to  genuine 
leadership. 
On  Sunday  morning,  December  30th,  con- 
vinced of  the  President's  intention  to  adhere 
to  his  submitted  reply  to  the  commissioners, 
Mr.  Black  convened  the  Union  section  of  the 
Cabinet,  and  announcing  to  them  his  inability 
to  further  sustain  the  President's  contemplated 
action,  declared  his  intention  to  resign,  in 
which  resolve  he  was  also  joined  by  Mr.  Stan- 
ton. After  due  discussion  and  reflection,  Mr. 
Toucey  carried  the  information  of  this  threat- 
ened defection  to  the  President.  Mr.  Buchan- 
an's courage  utterly  broke  down  before  the 
prospect  of  finding  himself  alone  in  face  of 
the  political  complications  which  came  crowd- 
ing upon  him.  He  at  once  sent  for  Mr.  Black ; 
and  after  a  confidential  interview,  the  details 
of  which  have  never  been  revealed,  he  gave 
the  objectionable  draft  of  his  reply  to  his  Secre- 
tary of  State,  with  liberty  to  make  all  changes 
and  amendments  which  in  his  opinion  might 
be  necessary.  It  was  the  President's  virtual 
abdication. 
Mr.  Black  rewrote  his  answer  to  the  com- 
missioners, refusing  their  demand.  This  result 
abruptly  terminated  their  mission,  and  sent 
them  home,  not  alone  in  the  bitterness  of 
disappointment,  but  to  the  great  consterna- 
tion of  the  Charleston  conspirators.  It  also 
left  Anderson  in  command  and  possession  of 
Sumter,  with  at  least  the  implied  approval  of 
the  Government.  There  is  not  space  here  to 
relate  the  events  of  the  next  few  days  :  the 
sudden  change  of  policy  pervading  the  Exec- 
utive Mansion;  the  vigorous  efforts  of  the 
Union  members  of  the  Cabinet  to  send  reen- 
forcements  to  Anderson  ;  the  relief  expedition 
which  sailed  in  the  steamer  Star  of  the  West, 
and  its  unsuccessful  effort  to  reach  Fort  Sum- 
ter; how  Governor  Pickens  began  the  construc- 
tion of  batteries  around  it  with  which  the  reb- 
els bombarded  and  captured  the  fort  some 
three  months  later;  and  finally  the  further 
transformation  of  the  executive  council  of  the 
President  by  the  retirement  of  the  two  seces- 
sionist members  Thompson  and  Thomas,  the 
hitter  being  succeeded  by  John  A.  Dix  as 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  who  has  left  so 
brilliant  a  record  as  a  stanch  defender  of  the 
Government  and  the  Union.  With  the  adjourn- 
ment of  that  Cabinet  meeting  on    Saturday 
night,  December  29th,  therefore,  terminated 
the  real  administration  of  James  Buchanan. 
Thenceforward,  though  he  still  continued  to 
affix  his  official  signature,  the  country  was 
practically  governed,  in  his  name,  by  his  Cab- 
inet, to  the  end  of  the  presidential  term. 
THE     COTTON     "  REPUBLICS." 
In  the  main  the  secession  incidents  and  pro- 
ceedings enacted  in  South  Carolina  were  imi- 
tated and  repeated  in  the  other  cotton  States. 
Their  several  governors  initiated  the  move- 
ment by  early  official  action, —  proclamations, 
messages,  and  orders.  The  office-holders  at 
each  State  capital  formed  a  convenient  local 
caucus  and  committee  of  conspiracy.  The 
programme  in  each  case  ran  through  essentially 
the  same  stages.  There  was  first  the  meeting 
of  the  legislature,  prompted  and  influenced 
by  the  State  officials  and  the  senators  and 
representatives  in  Congress.  Then  under  a 
loud  outcry  of  public  danger  which  did  not 
exist,  hasty  measures  to  arm  and  defend  the 
State ;  large  military  appropriations  and  ex- 
tensive military  organization.  Next  an  act  to 
call  a  convention,  ostensibly  to  consult  public 
opinion,  but  really  for  the  occasion  to  rouse 
and  mislead  it.  In  each  of  the  cotton  States 
the  Breckinridge  Democracy,  the  most  ultra 
of  the  three  factions,  all  pro-slavery,  was 
largely  in  the  majority.  Again,  the  long  po- 
litical agitation  had  brought  into  power  and 
prominence  the  most  radical  leaders  of  this 
extreme  party.  These  radical  leaders  were 
generally  disunionists  at  heart,  even  where 
they  had  not  been  active  and  persistent  con- 
spirators. They  now  took  up  with  alacrity  the 
task  of  electing  a  secession  convention.  That 
the  people  were  not  with  them  a  month  before 
the  presidential  election  is  proved  by  the  re- 
plies of  the  several  governors  to  South  Caro- 
lina, which  are  cited  in  a  previous  chapter. 
Nothing  but  the  election  itself  had  occurred 
to  change  that  feeling ;  no  threat,  no  act,  no 
law,  no  catastrophe.  Had  governors  and  offi- 
cials remained  silent,  the  people  would  have 
felt  no  want  and  seen  no  danger.  But  when 
official  action  began  the  agitation,  first  by 
proclamations,  then  by  legislative  enactments, 
and  lastly  by  forcing  the  issue  upon  the  peo- 
ple through  an  election  for  delegates,  there 
came  an  inevitable  growth  and  cumulation  of 
excitement.  In  this  election  it  was  the  auda- 
cious, the  ambitious,  the  reckless  element 
which  took  the  lead  ;  which  gathered  enthu- 
siasm, which  organized  success. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  this  result 
was  reached  under  specially  favoring  condi- 
tions. The  long  slavery  agitation  had  engen- 
dered a  brooding  discontent,  and  the  baseless
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
complaint  of  sectional  injustice  had  grown 
through  mere  repetition  from  clamor  into  be- 
lief. The  presidential  election  left  behind  it 
the  sharp  sting  of  defeat.  Not  in  form  and  in 
law,  but  nevertheless  in  essential  characteris- 
tics, the  South  was  controlled  by  a  landed 
aristocracy.  The  great  plantation  masters 
dominated  society  and  politics.  There  was  no 
diffused  and  healthy  popular  action,  as  in  the 
town  meetings  of  New  England.  Even  the 
slaves  of  the  wealthy  proprietors  spoke  with 
habitual  contempt  of  the  "  poor  white  trash  " 
who  lived  in  mean  cabins  and  hoed  their  own 
corn  and  cotton.  Except  in  Georgia  the  op- 
position to  the  secessionists'  programme  was 
either  hopelessly  feeble  or  entirely  wanting. 
The  Bell  and  Douglas  factions  had  bitterly 
denounced  Lincoln  and  the  Republicans  dur- 
ing the  presidential  campaign.  Disarmed  by 
their  own  words,  they  could  not  now  defend 
them.  The  seaboard  towns  and  cities  of  the 
South,  jealous  of  the  commercial  supremacy 
of  the  North,  anticipated  in  independence 
and  free  trade  a  new  growth  and  a  rich  pros- 
perity. Over  all  floated  the  constant  dream 
of  Southern  Utopians,  an  indefinite  expan- 
sion southward  into  a  great  slave  empire. 
We  may  infer  that  under  these  various  causes 
the  election  in  most  instances  went  by  de- 
fault. 
Three  special  agencies  cooperated  with 
marked  effect  to  stimulate  the  movement. 
Very  early  each  cotton  State  sent  commis- 
sioners to  each  of  the  other  Southern  States, 
and  in  every  case  the  most  active  and  zealous 
secessionists  were  of  course  appointed.  These 
commissioners  attended,  harangued,  and  in- 
trigued with  the  various  deliberative  assemblies, 
and  thus  constituted  a  network  of  most  indus- 
trious propagandism.  Another  potent  influence 
was  the  assembling  of  military  conventions, 
that  is,  convocations  of  the  captains,  majors, 
colonels,  and  would-be  generals,  to  spur  on 
or  intimidate  lagging  legislatures  and  conven- 
tions. Finally,  the  third  and  most  effective 
piece  of  machinery  was  the  State  delegations 
in  Congress  assembled  in  Washington  city  at 
the  beginning  of  December,  and  sending  a 
running  fire  of  encouragement  or  orders  home 
to  the  capitals  of  their  States. 
Even  with  all  this  organization  acting  in- 
telligently and  persistently  to  a  common  end, 
from  two  to  three  months  were  required  to 
work  up  the  people  of  the  cotton  States  to 
an  acquiescence  in  the  rebellion  the  conspira- 
tors had  for  years  been  planning.  Without 
being  exactly  of  contemporaneous  date,  it 
happened  that  in  general  the  month  of  No- 
vember witnessed  the  assembling  of  the  legis- 
latures and  the  making  of  necessary  laws  and 
appropriations.  The  month  of  December  was 
Vol.  XXXIV.— 116. 
mainly  occupied  by  the  election  of  delegates 
to  the  State  conventions.  In  this  stage  the 
voice  of  central  authority  from  Washington 
was  begun  to  be  utilized.  While  the  election 
excitement  was  at  its  highest  ferment,  there 
came  from  Washington,  under  date  of  the  14th 
of  December,  the  revolutionary  circular,  signed 
by  about  one-half  the  Southern  senators  and 
representatives  in  Congress  already  quoted 
elsewhere.  This  circular  announced  that  ar- 
gument was  exhausted,  that  hope  was  extin- 
guished, that  the  Republicans  would  grant 
nothing  which  would  or  ought  to  satisfy  the 
South,  and  that  the  honor,  safety,  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  Southern  people  required 
immediate  separate  State  secession,  and  the 
organization  of  a  Southern  confederacy.  The 
effect  of  a  congressional  firebrand  of  such  di- 
mensions thrown  upon  the  inflammable  tem- 
per of  the  cotton  States  at  such  a  juncture, 
may  be  easily  imagined.  Their  people  could  not 
know  that  no  single  assertion  in  this  circular 
was  warranted  by  the  facts;  that  Congress 
had  not  deliberated,  that  the  compromise 
committees  had  not  reported,  and  that  the 
Republicans  had  in  no  shape  presented  or  de- 
clared an  ultimatum.  The  circular  had  been 
issued  for  a  purpose,  and  served  the  end  com- 
pletely. Few  Southern  voters  or  speakers  could 
dare  to  stand  up  and  deny  in  Georgia  or  Ala- 
bama the  accusation  made  by  these  "  honor- 
able "  signers  in  Washington. 
'  But  the  central  cabal  did  not  stop  with  this 
single  pronimciamento.  By  this  time  the  rev- 
olution, both  local  and  central,  had  gained 
an  accelerated  momentum,  and  was  rushing 
rapidly  to  its  climax.  Non-coercion  was  prom- 
ised, Cass  was  driven  from  the  Cabinet,  the 
President  was  overawed,  Congress  was  de- 
moralized. Secession  had  secured  a  free  path, 
and  counted  on  an  easy  victory.  So  far  as 
had  been  divulged,  the  programme  hitherto 
was  to  complete  separation  by  easy  stages  dur- 
ing the  remainder  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  term, 
and  not  to  organize  the  new  Confederacy  till 
after  the  4th  of  March.  But  about  New  Year's 
the  central  conspiracy  received  a  serious  check. 
There  was  a  Cabinet  crisis.  Buchanan  momen- 
tarily asserted  himself.  Floyd  wTas  in  turn  driven 
from  the  Cabinet,  the  Unionists  gained  con- 
trol of  it,  and  Holt  was  made  Secretary  of  War. 
This  portended  loyalty,  decision,  energy,  rein- 
forcements. Immediately  there  came  a  shower 
of  telegrams  and  orders  from  the  Washing- 
ton fire-eaters  to  the  cotton-State  leaders, 
proclaiming  danger  and  urging  action.  The 
central  cabal  was  called  together,  deliber- 
ated earnestly,  and  perfected  and  hastened 
the  plot.  At  a  caucus  held  on  January  5th 
(in  one  of  the  rooms  of  the  Capitol  build- 
ing itself,  it  is  said)  the  decisive  and  final  rev-
846 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
olutionary  programme  committed  itself  to  the 
following  distinct  points  and  plan.  First :  Im- 
mediate secession.  Second  :  A  convention  at 
Montgomery.  Alabama,  not  later  than  the 
15th  of  February,  to  organize  a  Confederacy. 
Third :  That,  to  prevent  hostile  legislation 
under  the  changed  and  loyal  impulses  of  the 
President  and  his  reconstructed  Cabinet,  the 
cotton-State  senators  should  yet  remain  awhile 
in  their  places,  to  "  keep  the  hands  of  Mr. 
Buchanan  tied."  Finally,  and  most  im- 
portant of  all,  the  caucus  appointed  a  com- 
mittee, consisting  of  Jefferson  Davis  and  Sen- 
ators Slidell  and  Mallory,  "  to  carry  out  the 
object  of  this  meeting."*  The  future  chief  of 
the  great  rebellion  was  chosen  to  preside  over 
its  primary  organization. 
If  there  had  been  any  hesitation  in  the  sev- 
eral State  conventions  about  taking  the  final 
plunge,  we  may  suppose  that  it  disappeared 
when  the  programme  outlined  in  this  cen- 
tral caucus  of  January  5th,  at  Washington, 
was  transmitted.  We  find  that  nearly  the 
whole  secession  movement  very  speedily  fol- 
lowed. Mississippi  passed  her  ordinance  on 
January  9th,  Florida  on  January  10th,  Alabama 
on  January  nth,  Georgia  on  January  19th, 
Louisiana  on  January  26th,  and  Texas,  where 
peculiar  conditions  existed,  on  February  1st. 
Immediately  connected  with  the  passage  of 
these  secession  ordinances,  in  some  instances 
even  preceding  them,  the  next  step  in  the  in- 
surrectionary scheme  was  taken.  Each  gover- 
nor who  organized  the  revolution  in  his  State, 
now  finding  a  little  army  of  impulsive  volun- 
teers and  ambitious  officers  at  his  nod  and 
beck,  orders  two  or  three  regiments  to  the 
nearest  fort  or  arsenal,  where  an  ordnance 
sergeant,  or  an  attenuated  infantry  or  artillery 
*  Senator  Yulee  of  Florida  to  Joseph  Finegan,  Esq. 
"Washington,  January  7,  1861. 
"  My  Dear  Sir  :  On  the  other  side  is  a  copy  of  reso- 
lutions adopted  at  a  consultation  of  the  Senators  from 
the  seceding  States  —  in  which  Georgia,  Alabama, 
Louisiana.  Arkansas,  Texas,  Mississippi,  and  Florida 
were  present.  The  idea  of  the  meeting  was  that  the 
States  should  go  out  at  once,  and  provide  for  the  early 
organization  of  a  Confederate  Government,  not  later 
than  15th  February.  This  time  is  allowed  to  enable 
Louisiana  and  Texas  to  participate.  It  seemed  to  be 
the  opinion  that  if  we  left  here,  force,  loan,  and  volun- 
teer bills  might  be  passed,  which  would  put  Mr.  Lin- 
coln in  immediate  condition  for  hostilities;  whereas 
by  remaining  in  our  places  until  the  4th  of  March,  it 
is  thought  we  can  keep  the  hands  of  Mr.  Buchanan 
tied,  and  disable  the  Republicans  from  effecting  any 
legislation  which  will  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  in- 
coming Administration.  The  resolutions  will  be  sent 
by  the  delegation  to  the  President  of  the  Convention. 
I  have  not  been  able  to  find  Mr.  Mallory  this  morn- 
ing. Hawkins  is  in  Connecticut.  I  have  therefore 
thought  it  best  to  send  you  this  copy  of  the  resolutions. 
"  In  haste,  yours  truly, 
"D.  L.  Yulee. 
"Joseph  Finegan,  Esq. 
"'  Sovereignty  Convention,'  Tallahassee,  Florida." 
company  of  Federal  soldiers  is  representing 
the  government  title  rather  than  the  govern- 
ment power.  The  insurgents  demand  posses- 
sion, and  make  a  display  of  force.  The  officer 
in  charge  yields  to  the  inevitable.  He  receives 
the  demand  for  surrender  in  the  name  of  the 
State ;  he  complies  under  protest.  There  is  a 
salute  to  the  flag,  peaceable  evacuation,  and 
he  is  allowed  unmolested  transit  home  as  a 
military  courtesy.  By  this  process  there  was 
a  quick  succession  of  captures  through  which 
all  the  military  strongholds  and  depots  in 
the  cotton  States,  excepting  Fort  Sumter  in 
Charleston  Harbor,  Fort  Pickens  in  Pensacola 
Harbor,  Fort  Taylor  at  Key  West,  and  Fort 
Jefferson  on  Tortugas  Island  passed  to  the 
occupation  and  use  of  the  rebellion;  giving  it 
a  vantage-ground  for  defense,  and  a  store  of 
war  material  for  offense,  which  for  the  first 
time  since  the  presidential  election  gave  the 
revolution  a  serious  and  formidable  strength. 
We  have  thus  far  described  the  secession  move- 
ment throughout  the  South  in  its  general  aspect. 
A  glance  at  some  of  its  features  more  in  de- 
tail may  not  be  without  interest. 
The  State  of  Florida  was  the  most  zeal- 
ous follower  of  South  Carolina.  She  has  a 
magnificent  geographical  area ;  and  even  al- 
lowing that  perhaps  three-fourths  of  it  may 
be  rivers  and  swamps,  there  yet  remain 
near  ten  million  acres  of  habitable  land ; 
which,  with  a  climate  favorable  to  a  class  of 
sub-tropical  products  much  in  demand,  is 
enough  to  make  her  eventually  the  garden 
State  of  the  South.  But  this  immense  domain 
was  practically  a  wilderness,  notwithstanding 
her  earliest  permanent  settlement  was  almost 
three  centuries  old.  Her  white  population 
did  not  reach  the  ratio  of  one  representative 
The  following  were  the  resolutions  referred  to  : 
"  Resolved  I.  That  in  our  opinion  each  of  the  South- 
ern States  should,  as  soon  as  may  be,  secede  from  the 
Union. 
"  Resolved  2.  That  provision  should  be  made  for  a 
convention  to  organize  a  Confederacy  of  the  seceding 
States,  the  convention  to  meet  not  later  than  the  15th 
of  February,  at  the  city  of  Montgomery,  in  the  State 
of  Alabama. 
"  Resolved,  That  in  view  of  the  hostile  legislation  that 
is  threatened  against  the  seceding  States,  and  which 
may  be  consummated  before  the  4U1  of  March,  we  ask 
instructions  whether  the  delegations  are  to  remain  in 
Congress  until  that  date  for  the  purpose  of  defeating 
such  legislation. 
"Resolved,  That  a  committee  be  and  are  hereby 
appointed,  consisting  of  Messrs.  Davis,  Slidell,  and 
Mallory,  to  carry  out  the  objects  of  this  meeting." 
"  The  copy  of  these  resolutions,  forwarded  by  Sena- 
tor Mallory  January  6th,  1861,  to  the  president  of  the 
Florida  Convention,  shows  that  they  were  adopted  on 
the  5th  of  that  month,  and  that  they  were  signed  by 
Messrs.  Davis  and  Brown,  of  Mississippi ;  Hemphill 
and  Wigfall,  of  Texas ;  Slidell  and  Benjamin,  of  Loui- 
siana ;  I verson  and  Toombs,  of  Georgia;  Johnson,  of 
Arkansas;  Clay,  of  Alabama,  and  Yulee  and  Mallory, 
of  Florida."    W.   R.,  Vol.   I.,  443-4.
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
in  Congress.*  There  was  not  a  single  town 
of  three  thousand  inhabitants  within  her  bor- 
ders. She  therefore  became  an  easy  prey  to  her 
ultra  pro-slavery  leaders,  who  were  the  first 
to  applaud  and  second  the  Charleston  insur- 
rection. "  Florida  is  with  the  gallant  Pal- 
metto State,"  wrote  her  governor,  November 
9th ;  and  his  message  to  the  legislature,  No- 
vember 26th,  clamored  for  "  secession  from 
our  faithless,  perjured  Confederates."  Under 
the  manipulations  of  such  an  executive,  backed 
by  the  equally  aggressive  advice  and  exertions 
of  her  two  United  States  senators,  prominent 
among  the  conspirators  at  Washington,  she 
went  through  the  forms  of  a  convention,  and 
the  passing  of  a  secession  ordinance,  January 
10th.  Her  governor,  with  total  disregard  of  au- 
thority, had  already  seized  the  arsenal  at  Ap- 
palachicola  on  January  5th,  Fort  Marion  and 
the  ordnance  depot  at  St.  Augustine  on  the 
7th,  as  well  as  a  schooner  belonging  to  the 
Coast  Survey.  There  were,  in  the  arsenal,  no 
arms,  but  500,000  musket  cartridges,  300,000 
rifle  cartridges,  and  50,000  pounds  of  gun- 
powder. On  the  8th  he  ordered  the  seizure  of 
the  navy  yard  and  forts  at  Pensacola,  which 
was  accomplished  on  the  12th.  However  in- 
significant in  her  political  power,  the  gain  of 
Florida  was  nevertheless  of  great  military  and 
strategical  value  to  the  rebellion. 
In  Mississippi,  the  revolutionary  sentiment 
had  long  been  fostered  by  her  most  able  and 
influential  politicians.  Jefferson  Davis,  eager 
to  wear  the  mantle  of  Calhoun,  had  two  years 
before  announced  the  new  rebellion.  His 
speech  at  Vicksburg,  November  27th,  1858,  is 
thus  reported  in  the  "  Daily  Mississippian  " : 
"Before  concluding  his  remarks,  he  would  anticipate 
the  interrogatory  which  his  audience  might  be  dis- 
posed to  propound  to  him,  in  view  of  the  fast 
growing  strength  of  the  abolition  party,  as  to  what 
policy  he  would  recommend  in  the  event  of  the  triumph 
of  that  party  in  i860.  He  was  for  resistance  —  stern 
resistance.  Rather  than  see  the  executive  chair  of 
the  nation  filled  by  a  sworn  enemy  of  our  rights,  he 
would  shatter  it  into  a  thousand  fragments  before  he 
had  an  opportunity  of  taking  his  seat.  .  .  .  The 
Government  is  at  an  end  the  very  moment  that  an 
abolitionist  is  elected  to  the  presidency." 
The  governor  of  Mississippi  also  was  one 
of  the  most  advanced  revolutionists  in  the 
South.  He  declared  himself  ready  for  action 
as  early  as  August  30th,  i860. 
"I  assure  you,"  wrote  he,  "that  I  do  sympathize 
and  expect  to  continue  to  act  with  those  who  dare  all 
and  hazard  all,  rather  than  see  Mississippi  become  a 
dependent  province  of  a  Black  Republican  government, 
and  hold  her  constitutional  rights  by  the  frail  tenure  of 
*  The  population  of  Florida  in  i860  was  :  White, 
77,748;  free  colored,  932;  slave,  61,745;  total,  140,425. 
The  ratio  of  representation  for  Members  of  Congres3, 
from  1852  to  1863,  was  93,423.—"  Spofford's  American 
Almanac,"  1878,  p.  170. 
Black  Republican  oath.  When  sparks  cease  to  fly  up- 
wards, Comanches  respect  treaties,  and  wolves  kill 
sheep  no  more,  the  oath  of  a  Black  Republican  might 
be  of  some  value  as  a  protection  to  slave  property." 
With  Jefferson  Davis  in  the  Senate  to  con- 
spire and  advise,  and  Governor  Pettus  at  home 
to  order  and  execute,  the  fate  of  Mississippi 
could  not  long  remain  in  doubt.  The  legis- 
lature had  in  the  previous  winter  provided  a 
military  fund  of  $150,000.  Early  in  October 
the  State  made  a  purchase  of  arms,  which  at 
Jefferson  Davis's  request,  and  with  Floyd's 
concurrence,  were  obligingly  inspected  by  a 
government  officer.  The  legislature  was  con- 
vened to  meet,  November  26th,  to  consider 
"  the  propriety  and  necessity  of  providing 
surer  and  better  safeguards  for  the  lives,  liber- 
ties, and  property  of  her  citizens  than  have 
been  found  or  are  to  be  hoped  for  in  Black 
Republican  oaths."  Commissioners  to  other 
States  were  appointed,  and  an  election  ordered, 
in  pursuance  of  which  a  convention  met,  Jan- 
uary 7th,  and  passed  a  secession  ordinance  on 
January  9th,  84  yeas  to  15  nays.  The  pro- 
ceedings, as  in  other  States,  were  secret  and 
precipitate.  Military  organization  was  stimu- 
lated to  the  utmost,  and  on  the  20th  the  un- 
finished fort  on  Ship  Island  and  the  Marine 
Hospital  on  the  Mississippi  River  were  seized 
by  the  insurrectionists  at  the  governor's  orders. 
The  State  of  Alabama  had  by  her  dominant 
partisanship  on  the  slavery  question  been  car- 
ried farther  toward  revolt  than  the  other  cot- 
ton States.  Her  legislature,  on  February  24th, 
i860,  with  but  two  dissenting  voices,  provided 
by  joint  resolution  that  in  case  of  the  election 
of  a  Republican  President,  the  governor  should 
at  once  by  proclamation  order  an  election  of 
delegates  to  a  convention  "  to  consider  and 
do  whatever  in  the  opinion  of  said  convention 
the  rights,  interests,  and  honor  of  the  State  of 
Alabama  requires  [sic]  to  be  done  for  their  pro- 
tection." A  fund  of  $200,000  was  appropri- 
ated for"  military  contingences  ";  and  the  gov- 
ernor was  further  authorized  to  send  delegates 
to  any  future  convention  of  the  slave  States. 
A  week  after  the  November  elections,  the 
governor  in  a  public  letter  announced  that  he 
would  exercise  this  power  to  inaugurate  revo- 
lution as  soon  as  the  choice  of  Lincoln  should 
be  made  certain  by  the  vote  of  the  electoral 
college  on  December  5th.  In  the  same  letter 
he  made  a  labored  argument  that  Alabama 
ought  to  secede  at  once  and  "  cooperate  af- 
terward." His  proclamation  was  in  due  time 
issued,  and  the  delegates  were  elected  on  De- 
cember 24th.  A  spirited  canvass  seems  to  have 
been  made.  Judge  Campbell,  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court,  addressed  the  voters  in 
an  earnest  letter  against  disunion.  Partisans 
separated  themselves  into  three  groups  desig-
s4s 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
nated  respectively  as  "  submissionists,"  "  co- 
opera  tionists,"  and  "straight-out  secessionists." 
The  southern  half  of  the  State,  embracing  the 
cotton-lands  and  strong  slave  counties  on  the 
gulf,  was  intensely  revolutionary;  the  north- 
ern end,  reaching  up  towards  the  commerce 
of  the  tree  States,  was,  or  believed  itself  to  be, 
conservative  and  union-loving  ;  and  the  final 
popular  decision  was  supposed  to  hang  in 
considerable  doubt. 
The  meeting  of  the  convention  at  Mont- 
gomery, January  7th,  soon  dispelled  this  idea. 
On  the  first  day  it  unanimously  adopted  a 
resolution  declaring  in  substance  that  "  Ala- 
bama cannot  and  will  not  submit  to  the  Ad- 
ministration of  Lincoln  and  Hamlin."  Why 
any  of  the  members  after  such  a  vote  should 
have  hesitated  to  commit  themselves  to  the 
full  scope  of  the  conspirator's  programme, 
shows  the  confused  perception  of  their  own  at- 
titude and  intentions.  They  did  not  appear  to 
realize  how  helplessly  they  were  drifting  in  a 
current  of  revolution.  Upon  such  material 
the  radical  secessionists  concentrated  their  in- 
fluence. Outside  pressure  gathered  in  over- 
whelming force.  Telegrams  poured  in  upon 
them  in  profusion.  "  They  came  so  thick  and 
fast,  they  seemed  like  snowflakes  to  fall  from 
the  clouds,"  said  one  of  the  members.  Crowds 
besieged  the  doors.  The  governor  had  on 
January  4th,  without  warrant,  seized  Mount 
Vernon  arsenal  and  Forts  Morgan  and  Gaines 
at  Mobile,  and  had  caused  the  banks  to  sus- 
pend, and  he  now  asked  to  be  justified  in  these 
usurpations.  News  arrived  that  Florida  and 
Mississippi  had  seceded.  Application  was 
made  for  military  help  to  seize  Pensacola.  In 
the  midst  of  the  excitement  came  telegrams  of 
the  firing  on  the  Star  of  the  West  at  Charles- 
ton, and  its  attending  incidents. 
Before  these  combined  influences  conserva- 
tive resolves  and  combinations  gave  way,  and 
an  ordinance  of  immediate  secession  was  pre- 
pared. The  ubiquitous  Yancey,  fresh  from  his 
Northern  disavowals  of  the  "  Scarlet  Letter," 
was  once  more  on  hand  in  the  role  of  leading 
conspirator,  and  came  near  "  precipitating  rev- 
olution "  in  the  convention  itself,  by  his  flam- 
ing declamation.  The  "  cooperationists  "  were 
pleading  for  delay,  when  he  indiscreetly  threat- 
ened the  penalties  of  treason  against  any  fac- 
tious minority  which  should  venture  to  disobey 
an  ordinance  of  secession.  The  Northern  mem- 
bers flared  up  under  the  taunt.  "  Will  the  gen- 
tlemen go  into  those  sections  of  the  State  and 
hang  ah  who  are  opposed  to  secession  ?  Will 
he  hang  them  by  families,  by  neighborhoods, 
by  counties,  by  congressional  districts  ?  Who, 
sir,  will  give  the  bloody  order?  .  .  .  Are 
these  to  be  the  first-fruits  of  a  Southern  Re- 
public ?  "    "  Coming  at  the  head  of  any  force 
which  he  can  muster,"  replied  another  mem- 
ber, "  aided  and  assisted  by  the  executive 
of  this  State,  we  will  meet  him  at  the  foot  of 
our  mountains,  and  there  with  his  own  selected 
weapons,  hand  to  hand,  and  face  to  face, 
settle  the  question  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people." 
The  flurry  was  quieted,  however,  and  the 
ordinance  reported  on  the  third  day  of  the 
session.  The  conservatives  endeavored  to  sub 
stitute  a  project  of  a  slave-State  convention 
and  a  basis  of  settlement  with  the  North,  bu 
it  was  voted  down,  54  to  45.  After  this  the 
radicals  had  easy  sailing,  and  on  January 
nth  the  ordinance  passed,  61  to  39.  It  is 
touching  to  read  the  expressions  of  regret,  of 
doubt,  of  protest,  with  which  the  opposition 
members  reluctantly  gave  in  their  adhesion, 
and  parted  from  their  government  and  their 
flag,  under  the  final  and  fallacious  prompt- 
ings of  State  pride  and  the  baneful  heresy  of 
paramount  State  allegiance.  And  this  linger- 
ing sorrow  of  delegates  was  followed  in  many 
localities  by  the  lingering  condemnation  and 
remonstrance  of  their  constituents.  Four  weeks 
later  Hon.  Jere.  Clemens  wrote  from  Hunts- 
ville  :  "  There  is  still  much  discontent  here  at 
the  passage  of  the  ordinance  of  secession,  but 
it  is  growing  weaker  daily,  and,  unless  some- 
thing is  done  to  stir  it  up  anew,  will  soon 
die  away  " ;  adding,  also,  "  Last  week  Yancey 
was  burned  in  effigy  in  Limestone."  But  it 
was  all  of  no  avail ;  the  people  writhed  help- 
lessly in  the  toils  of  their  false  leaders. 
The  State  of  Georgia  was  then,  and  is  still,  re- 
garded as  the  Empire  State  of  the  South.  Her 
action,  therefore,  became  an  object  of  the  great- 
est solicitude.  Her  leading  men  were  known 
to  be  divided  in  sentiment.  The  North  looked 
with  some  confidence  there  for  a  conservative 
reaction ;  but  they  were  leaning  on  a  broken 
reed.  With  all  their  asseverations  of  loyalty, 
the  Unionists  of  that  State  were  such  only 
upon  impossible  conditions.  "  As  a  Union 
man,"  wrote  B.  H.  Hill,  in  September,  "  I 
shall  vote  in  November.  As  a  Union  man  I 
shall  hope  for  the  right.  As  a  Southern  man 
I  shall  meet  the  enemy  and  go  with  my 
State."  Stephens,  equally  unsound  in  his  alle- 
giance, was  ultra-radical  on  slavery.  He  be- 
lieved it  the  normal  condition  of  the  negro, 
and  looked  forward  to  its  spread  into  every 
State  of  the  Union.  Supporting  Douglas,  he 
repudiated  "  Squatter  Sovereignty."  H.  V. 
Johnson  was  an  old-time  "  resistance  "  advo- 
cate. This  kind  of  leadership  was  quasi 
disunion,  especially  under  the  assaults  of 
aggressive  and  uncompromising  revolution- 
ists like  Toombs,  Iverson,  Cobb,  and  Gov- 
ernor Brown. 
Nevertheless,  the  popular  voice,  which  some- 
;
THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT. 
times  restrains  the  rashness  of  leaders,  was  yet 
in  doubt,  and  compelled  a  policy  of  slow  ap- 
proaches to  insurrection.  Governor  Brown, 
therefore,  in  his  message  of  November  8th,  went 
only  to  the  extent  of  recommending  retalia- 
tory legislation,  and  that  the  State  should  be 
armed.  The  vote  at  the  presidential  election 
had  been:  Breckinridge,  51,889;  Bell,42,886; 
Douglas,  11,590.  The  statutes  required  a  ma- 
jority vote  for  electors,  hence  there  was  no 
choice  by  the  people.  In  conformity  with  law, 
the  legislature  was  obliged  to  appoint  them ; 
and  accordingly  it  chose  (January  29th)  a  col- 
lege favorable  to  Breckinridge.  In  the  interim 
the  legislature  was  convulsed  with  the  topics 
of  the  hour.  Stephens  made  a  famous  plea  for 
union ;  Toombs  an  equally  fervid  harangue 
for  disunion. 
Meanwhile  the  members  had  listened  to  an 
insidious  suggestion  apparently  midway  be- 
tween the  two  extremes.  "  The  truth  is,  in 
my  judgment,"  writes  Stephens,  "  the  waver- 
ing scale  in  Georgia  was  turned  by  a  senti- 
ment, the  key-note  to  which  was  given  in 
the  words — '  We  can  make  better  terms  out  of 
the  Union  than  in  it.'  It  was  Mr.  Thomas  R. 
R.  Cobb  who  gave  utterance  to  this  key-note 
in  his  speech  before  the  legislature  two  days 
anterior  to  my  address  before  the  same  body. 
This  idea  did  more,  in  my  opinion,  in  carrying 
the  State  out,  than  all  the  arguments  and  elo- 
quence of  all  others  combined."  A  formidable 
outside  pressure  in  the  shape  of  a  military 
convention,  and  a  large  secession  caucus  was 
also  organized  and  led  by  Governor  Brown. 
The  legislature  could  not  resist  the  impetuous 
current.  A  military  appropriation  of  one  mill- 
ion dollars  was  made  November  13th,  and  a 
convention  bill  passed  on  the  18th. 
Perhaps  the  most  hotly  contested  election 
campaign  which  occurred  in  any  Southern 
State  now  took  place  for  the  convention,  in 
the  course  of  which  fifty-two  members  of  the 
legislature  joined  in  a  "cooperation  "  address, 
urging  a  conference  of  Southern  States  instead 
of  immediate  secession.  The  vote  was  cast 
January  2d,  and,  encouraged  by  apparent  suc- 
cess, Governor  Brown,  on  the  following  day, 
ordered  the  seizure  of  Fort  Pulaski,  and  placed 
the  telegraph  under  surveillance.  The  con- 
vention assembled  at  Milledgeville  on  January 
1 6th,  and  the  respective  factions  mustered 
their  adherents  for  the  combat.  The  struggle 
was  short  and  decisive.  In  place  of  a  brief 
and  direct  secession  resolution  the  conserva- 
tives offered  to  substitute  a  proposition  to  hold 
a  Southern  conference  at  Atlanta,  and  setting 
forth  certain  "  indispensable  "  amendments  to 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  It  is 
almost  needless  to  say  they  were  exacting  and 
advanced  to  a  degree  not  yet  suggested  in 
any  quarter.  The  "  Georgia  platform,"  hith- 
erto proclaimed  by  Mr.  Stephens  as  his  creed, 
was  left  far  behind.  That  was  a  simple  affirm- 
ance of  the  settlement  of  1850.  These  new 
"guarantees"  embraced  provisions  which 
would  in  practice  have  legalized  slavery  in 
the  free  States.  There  was  no  more  hope  that 
the  North  would  accept  them  than  that  it  would 
set  up  a  monarchy.  Radical  as  was  this  alter- 
native, the  straight-out  secessionists  would 
not  even  permit  a  vote  to  be  taken  upon  it. 
The  secession  resolution  was  rushed  through 
under  the  previous  question,  166  yeas  to  130 
nays.  On  the  following  day  an  inquiry  into 
the  election  for  delegates  was  throttled  with 
similar  ferocity,  168  to  127.  After  this  all 
opposition  broke  down,  and  on  January  19th 
the  secession  ordinance  was  passed,  208  yeas 
to  89  nays.  It  was  finally  meekly  signed  by 
all  the  delegates  but  six,  and  even  those  prom- 
ised their  lives  and  fortunes  to  the  cause.  Gov- 
ernor Brown,  on  January  24th,  set  up  the  cap- 
sheaf  of  insurrection  by  sending  six  or  seven 
hundred  volunteers  to  demand  and  receive  the 
surrender  of  the  Augusta  arsenal,  declaring 
with  sarcastic  etiquette  in  his  demand  that 
"  the  State  is  not  only  at  peace,  but  anxious  to 
cultivate  the  most  amicable  relations  with  the 
United  States  Government." 
The  State  of  Louisiana  followed  in  the  main 
the  action  of  the  already  mentioned  cotton 
States  except  that  it  was  somewhat  more  tardy. 
Her  governor  and  her  senators  in  Congress 
were  as  pronounced  as  the  other  principal 
conspirators,  but  her  people  as  a  whole  were 
not  yet  quite  so  ripe  for  insurrection.  "  The 
State  of  Louisiana,"  wrote  one  of  the  secession 
emissaries,  "  from  the  fact  that  the  Mississippi 
River  flows  through  its  extent  and  debouches 
through  her  borders,  and  that  the  great  com- 
mercial depot  of  that  river  and  its  tribu- 
taries is  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  occupies  a 
position  somewhat  more  complicated  than 
any  other  of  the  Southern  States,  and  may 
present  some  cause  of  delay  in  the  consum- 
mation and  execution  of  the  purpose  of  a 
separation  from  the  North-western  States,  and 
the  adoption  cf  anew  political  status."  Here 
as  elsewhere,  however,  the  executive  sword 
was  thrown  into  the  vibrating  scale.  First, 
the  governor's  proclamation  calling  an  extra 
session  of  the  legislature  to  meet  December 
10th;  then,  on  the  plea  of  public  danger,  an 
appropriation  to  arm  the  State ;  next,  on 
pretext  of  consulting  public  opinion,  a  con- 
vention bill;  then,  having  volunteers,  the 
seizure  of  Baton  Rouge  barracks  and  arsenal 
(January  10th)  and  Forts  Jackson  and  St. 
Phillip  (January  15th),  and  other  Federal 
property;  and  then  the  terrorism  of  loud- 
mouthed revolution.     When  the  convention
8^o 
MY  SHADOW. 
met,  January  23d.  its  tide  was  already  as 
irresistible  as  the  waters  of  the  Mississippi. 
A  proposition  for  a  slave-State  conference 
was  voted  down,  106  to  24  ;  another  to  "  pro- 
vide for  a  popular  vote,"  defeated  by  84  to  43, 
and  on  January  26th,  some  of  the  "cooper- 
ation "  delegates  having  prudently  silenced 
their  scruples,  the  seeession  ordinance  was 
passed,  113  yeas  to  17  nays.  Two  excep- 
tional incidents  occurred  in  the  action  of  Lou- 
isiana. One  was  the  unanimous  adoption  of 
a  resolution  recognizing  "  the  right  of  the  free 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River  and  its  tribu- 
taries by  all  friendly  States  bordering  thereon," 
and  also  "  the  right  of  egress  and  ingress  of  the 
mouths  of  the  Mississippi  by  all  friendly  States 
and  powers."  The  other  was  that  one  of  her  Fed- 
eral representatives,  Hon.  John  E.  Bouligny, 
remained  true  to  his  oath  and  his  loyalty,  and 
continued  to  hold  his  seat  in  Congress  to  the 
end  of  his  term  —  the  solitary  instance  from 
the  cotton  States. 
It  is  a  significant  feature  in  the  secession 
o 
proceedings  of  the  six  cotton  States  which 
first  took  action,  that    their   conventions   in 
every  case  neglected  or  refused  to  submit 
their  ordinances  of  secession  to  a  vote  of  the 
people  for  ratification  or  rejection.  The  whole 
spirit  and  all  the  phenomena  of  the  movement 
forbade  their  doing  so.  From  first  to  last  the 
movement  was  forced,  not  spontaneous,  offi- 
cial, not  popular;  and  its  leaders  could  not 
risk  the  period  of  doubt  which  a  submission 
of  the  ordinances  would  involve,  much  less 
their  rejection  at  the  polls.  To  this  general 
rule  Texas,  the  seventh  seceding  State,  forms 
an  exception.  Governor  Houston  opposed  se- 
cession, and  as  long  as  possible  thwarted  the 
conspirators'  plans.  By  a  bolder  usurpation 
than  elsewhere,  they  nevertheless  assembled 
an  independent  and  entirely  illegal  conven- 
tion, passed  an  ordinance  of  secession,  Febru- 
ary 1st,  and  held  an  election  to  ratify  or  reject 
it,  February  23d.  Long  before  this  they  had  in 
substance  joined  the  State  to  the  rebel  Con- 
federacy, and  the  popular  vote  showed  a 
nominal  majority  for  secession,  though  the 
partial  returns  and  the  voting,  amid  a  local 
revolution,  afforded  no  trustworthy  indication 
of  a  popular  sentiment. 
($u^  /rr/ 
MY  SHADOW. 
UP  and  down  it  follows,  follows, 
I  can  never  quite  escape; 
On  the  hills  and  in  the  hollows, 
This  familiar,  silent  shape 
Still  is  with  me,  tireless  ever; 
Friend  or  foe  —  whoe'er  I  meet, 
This  companion  leaves  me  never, 
Keeping  step  with  soundless  feet. 
Can  no  pain  nor  passion  move  thee, 
O  my  comrade  ?  I  am  tossed 
By  the  tempests  sent  to  prove  me, — 
On  thy  calm  their  wrath  is  lost. 
Come  thou  near,  my  patient  lover, 
Let  me  whisper  that  I  see  — 
What  no  other  may  discover  — 
Change  at  last  has  come  to  thee ! 
Looking  at  it,  I  am  lonely, 
For  a  stranger  still  it  seems ; 
Though  it  follows  me  —  me  only, 
Yet,  as  something  seen  in  dreams, 
I  behold  it.    Oft  I  wonder 
Whither  all  its  steps  do  tend; 
All  its  features  hidden  under 
Veils  no  changeful  winds  can  rend. 
Once  thy  feet  were  swift  beside  me : 
Not  a  hill  too  high  to  climb; 
From  the  heat  thou  didst  not  hide  thee, 
Naught  to  thee  were  space  and  time; 
Light  as  air,  I  saw  thee  dancing 
Down  the  pathway  where  I  strayed, — 
Dost  thou  see  the  night  advancing? 
Art  thou  of  the  dark  afraid  ? 
Canst  thou  hear  me,  lover,  stranger  ? 
Silent  shape,  I  tell  thee  now, 
I,  through  safety  and  through  danger, 
Am  become  as  changed  as  thou ; 
Yet  my  heart  leaps  on  before  me, 
New  stars  bum  within  the  sky ; 
Courage,  courage  !    I  implore  thee, — 
O  my  comrade,  faster  fly ! 
Ellen  M.  H.  Gates.
THE  LAST  APPEAL    OF   THE   RUSSIAN   LIBERALS. 
try.  This  feeling  is  not  a  mere  transitory  im- 
pression ;  it  is  a  well-founded  consciousness  of 
the  fact  that  our  ruling  mechanism  does  not 
answer  to  the  mutability  and  the  increasing 
complexity  of  a  great  empire's  demands.  Now, 
as  in  "  the  good  old  times,"  the  central  Gov- 
ernment jealously  excludes  the  people  from 
participation  in  the  national  life  and  takes  up- 
on itself  the  difficult  task  of  thinking  and  act- 
ing for  them.  This  task  was  hard  enough  even 
when  the  life  of  the  people  went  on  in  the 
long-established  patriarchal  way  to  which  both 
society  and  the  Government  were  accustomed, 
but  that  order  of  things  has  undergone  in  re- 
cent years  more  vital  changes  than  perhaps 
ever  came  to  a  similar  system  in  any  country 
in  the  course  of  a  single  generation.  The 
emancipation  of  the  serfs  has  completely  and 
radically  transformed  the  whole  economic  life 
of  the  agricultural  peasants  and  the  landed 
proprietors  as  well  as  their  relations  to  each 
other.  Artificial  methods  of  swift  intercom- 
munication and  transportation  have  altered 
the  time-honored  routes  and  methods  of  trade 
and  production,  have  created  new  industries 
and  destroyed  old  ones,  and  have  put  the  for- 
tunes of  whole  provinces  in  the  hands  of  the 
railroad  authorities.  Banks  and  financial  insti- 
tutions of  various  kinds  have  sprung  up  in  great 
numbers  and  have  bound  widely  separated  re- 
gions together  with  meshes  of  mutual  obliga- 
tion and  indebteduess.  These  changes,  com- 
plicated and  supplemented  by  others  like  them, 
have  created  everywhere  a  thousand  questions 
and  necessities  which  previously  did  not  exist, 
and  have  so  interwoven  the  interests  of  sepa- 
rate localities  that  delay  or  error  in  the  settle- 
ment of  a  question  at  one  point  has  a  direct 
influence  upon  the  fortunes  of  other  places  often 
veryremote.  Every  local  necessity  orcalamity, 
whether  it  be  a  drought,  the  grain  beetle,  the 
disorganization  of  a  railroad,  an  epidemic  dis- 
ease, pleuro-pneumonia  among  cattle,  or  in- 
dustrial stagnation,  exerts,  without  losing  its 
local  significance,  a  wide-spread  influence 
upon  the  well-being  of  the  empire  as  a  whole. 
In  an  economic  life  thus  complicated,  one 
central  administration,  even  though  it  possess 
superhuman  wisdom  and  energy,  cannot  pos- 
sibly deal  with  the  innumerable  questions  and 
problems  which,  in  the  absence  of  |  opular 
self-government,  necessarily  devolve   I  pen  it. 
Whole  classes  of  wants  and  demands  either 
remain  entirely  unsatisfied,  are  inadequately 
appeased  by  methods  which  take  no  account 
of  local  interests,  or  are  met  by  a  series  of  un- 
systematic and  mutually  contradictory  meas- 
ures. Each  of  these  ways  of  dealing  with  such 
wants  and  demands  undermines  respect  for 
authority  and  inspires  painful  distrust. 
The  only  way  to  extricate  the  country  from 
its  present  position  is  to  summon  an  inde- 
pendent parliament  \Sobranid\  consisting  of 
representatives  of  the  zemstvos;  to  give  that 
parliament  a  share  in  the  control  of  the  na- 
tional life,  and  to  securely  guarantee  personal 
rights,  freedom  of  thought,  and  freedom  of 
speech.  Such  freedom  will  call  into  action 
the  best  capabilities  of  the  people,  will  rouse 
the  slumbering  life  of  the  nation,  and  will  de- 
velop the  abundant  productive  resources  of 
the  country.  Liberty  will  do  more  than  the 
severest  repressive  measures  to  crush  anarch- 
istic parties  hostile  to  the  State.  Free  dis- 
cussion will  show  the  error  of  their  theories, 
and  the  substitution  of  vigorous  healthful  ac- 
tivity for  epidemic  discontent  in  the  life  of  the 
people  will  deprive  them  of  the  field  in  which 
they  carry  on  their  propaganda. 
The  Russians  are  as  fit  for  free  institutions 
as  the  Bulgarians  are,  and  they  feel  deep 
humiliation  at  being  kept  so  long  under  guard- 
ianship. The  desire  for  such  institutions,  al- 
though forced  into  concealment,  and  half 
stifled  by  repressive  measures,  finds  expression, 
nevertheless,  in  the  zemstvos,  in  the  assem- 
blies of  the  nobles,  and  in  the  press.  The  grant- 
ing of  such  institutions,  and  the  calling  to- 
gether of  a  representative  body  to  preside  over 
them,  will  give  to  the  nation  renewed  strength, 
and  renewed  faith  in  the  Government  and  in 
its  own  future.  When  the  people  of  Russia 
made  themselves  ready  for  the  recent  war,  it 
was  with  an  instinctive  feeling  that  in  the 
great  work  of  freeing  kindred  nations  there 
was  the  promise  of  freedom  for  themselves. 
Are  such  expectations,  hopes,  and  promises 
never  to  be  realized  ? 
The  above  temperate,  patriotic,  and  courageous  address  was  laid  before  the  Tsar,  and  he 
acted  upon  it;  but,  unfortunately,  his  action  came  too  late.  On  the  12th  of  March,  1881,  he 
signed  a  proclamation  announcing  to  the  people  his  intention  to  summon  a  national 
assembly  and  to  grant  a  constitutional  form  of  government.  On  the  very  next  day,  before 
this  proclamation  had  been  made  public,  he  was  assassinated. 
George  Kennan.