ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
GOVERNOR    CLAIBORNE    F.    JACKSON. 
propriety  before  I  acted  in  this  matter.  The  whole  of 
the  laws  which  I  have  sworn  to  take  care  that  they  be 
faithfully  executed  were  being  resisted,  and  failing  to 
be  executed,  in  nearly  one-third  of  the  States.  Must 
I  have  allowed  them  to  finally  fail  of  execution,  even 
had  it  been  perfectly  clear  that  by  the  use  of  the  means 
necessary  to  their  execution  some  single  law,  made  in 
such  extreme  tenderness  of  the  citizen's  liberty,  that 
practically  it  relieves  more  of  the  guilty  than  the  inno- 
cent, should,  to  a  very  limited  extent,  be  violated  ?  To 
state  the  question  more  directly,  are  all  the  laws  but 
one  to  go  unexecuted,  and  the  Government  itself  go  to 
pieces,  lest  that  one  be  violated  ?  Even  in  such  a  case 
I  should  consider  my  official  oath  broken,  if  I  should 
allow  the  Government  to  be  overthrown,  when  I  might 
think  the  disregarding  the  single  law  would  tend  to 
preserve  it.  But  in  this  case  I  was  not,  in  my  own 
judgment,  driven  to  this  ground.  In  my  opinion,  I 
violated  no  law.  The  provision  of  the  Constitution  that 
"  The  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not 
ispended  unless  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  of 
invasion,  the  public  safety  may  require  it,"  is  equiva- 
lent to  a  provision  —  is  a  provision  —  that  such  privi- 
,iay  be  suspended  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or 
invasion,  the  public  safety  does  require  it.  I  decided 
that  we  have  a  case  of  rebellion,  and  that  the  public 
-afety  doe-,  require  the  qualified  suspension  of  the 
privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  which  I  author- 
ized to  be  made.  Xow  it  is  insisted  that  Congress,  and 
not  the  executive,  is  vested  with  this  power.  But  the 
If  is  silent  as  to  which,  or  who,  is  to 
exercise  the  power ;  and  as  the  provision  plainly  wa> 
made  for  a  dangerous  emergency,  I  cannot  bring  my- 
self to  believe  that  the  framers  of  that  instrument  in- 
tended that  in  every  ca>e  the  danger  should  run  its 
course  until  Congress  could  be  called  together,  the 
very  assembling  of  which  might  be  prevented,  as  was 
intended  in  this  ca>e  by  the  rebellion.* 
The  alterations  and  corrections  from  this 
first  draft  into  the  more  impersonal  form  as 
finally  sent  to  Congress  and  officially  printed, 
*  Lincoln,  Special  Message,  July 4,  1861.  Autograph 
MS.  of  original  draft. 
but  nowise  changing  its  argument  or  substance. 
are  also  entirely  in  Lincoln's  handwriting. 
That  second  and  corrected  form  better  befits 
the  measured  solemnity  of  a  State  paper. 
But  in  the  language  quoted  above  we  seem 
brought  into  direct  contact  with  the  living 
workings  of  Lincoln's  mind,  and  in  this  light 
the  autograph  original  possesses  a  peculiar  bi- 
ographical interest  and  value. 
MISSOURI. 
The  governor  of  Missouri,  Claiborne  F. 
Jackson,  was  early  engaged  in  the  secession 
conspiracy,  though,  like  other  border-State 
executives,  he  successfully  concealed  his  ex- 
treme designs  from  the  public.  There  was  an 
intolerant  pro-slavery  sentiment  throughout 
the  State  ;  but.  unlike  other  border  States, 
it  contained  a  positive  and  outspoken  minor- 
ity of  equally  strong  antislavery  citizens  in  a 
few  localities,  chiefly  in  the  great  commercial 
city  of  St.  Louis,  and  made  up  mainly  of  its 
German  residents  and  voters,  numbering  fully 
one-half  the  total  population,  which  in  i860 
was  160.000.  This  was  the  solitary  exception  to 
the  general  pro-slavery  reaction  in  the  whole 
South  during  the  decade.  Here,  in  1856.  a 
young,  talented,  courageous  leader  and  skill- 
ful politician.  Francis  P.  Blair.  Jr. .though  him- 
self a  slaveholder,  had  dared  to  advocate  the 
doctrine  and  policy  of  gradual  emancipation, 
and  on  that  issue  secured  an  election  to  Con- 
gress. The  same  issue  repeated  in  1858 
brought  him  sufficiently  near  an  election  to  enti- 
tle him  to  contest  his  opponent's  seat.  In  i860 
Blair  and  his  followers,  now  fully  acting  with 
the  Republican  party,  cast  17.028  votes  for 
Lincoln,  while  the  remaining  votes  in  the  State 
were  divided  as  follows:  Douglas,  58,801 :  Bell, 
58,372  :  Breckinridge,  31.317.  Blair  was  also 
to  Congress.  The  combined 
and  Bell  vote  showed  an 
mt  the  gov- 
ernor elected  by  the  Douglas  plurality  almost 
immediately  became  a  disunionist  and  seces- 
sion conspirator. 
With  Blair  as  a  leader,  and  such  an  organ- 
ized minority  at  his  call,  the  intrigues  of  Gov- 
ernor Jackson  to  force  Missouri  into  secession 
met  from  the  outset  with  many  difficulties, 
notwithstanding  the  governor's  official  powers, 
influential  following,  and  the  prevalent  pro- 
slavery  opinion  of  the  State.  The  legislature 
was  sufficiently  subservient  :  it  contained  a 
majority  of  radical  secessionists,  and  only 
about  fifteen  unconditional  Union  members, 
who,  however,  were  vigilant  and  active,  and 
made  the  most  of  their  minority  influence. 
The  same  general  expedients  resorted  to  in 
other  States  by  the  conspirators  were  used  in 
again   elected 
Lincoln.  Douglas 
overwhelming  Union  majority
T1IK   noiiDKIt    STATES. 
Missouri  —  visits  and  speeches  from  Southern 
commissioners;  messages  and  resolutions  of 
"  Southern  "  rights  and  sympathy  and  strong 
enunciation  of  the  doctrine  of  non-coercion; 
military  bills  and  measures  to  arm  and  con- 
trol the  State  ;  finally,  a  "  sovereign  "  State 
Convention.  Here  they  overshot  their  mark. 
A  strong  majority  of  Union  members  was 
elected.  The  convention  met  at  Jefferson  City, 
the  State  capital,  adjourned  to  the  healthier 
atmosphere  of  St.  Louis,  and  by  an  outspoken 
report  and  decided  votes  condemned  secession 
and  took  a  recess  till  December  following. 
The  secession  leaders,  however,  would  not 
accept  their  popular  defeat.  In  the 
interim  Sumter  fell,  and  Lincoln 
issued  his  call  for  troops.  Governor 
Jackson,  as  we  have  seen,  insulting- 
ly denounced  the  requisition  as 
'•  illegal,  unconstitutional,  revolu- 
tionary, inhuman,  and  diabolical," 
and  again  convened  his  rebel  legis- 
lature in  extra  session  to  do  the 
revolutionary  work  which  the  "  sov- 
ereign "  Missouri  convention  had 
so  recently  condemned. 
It  was  an  essential  feature  of 
Governor  Jackson's  programme  to 
obtain  possession  of  the  St.  Louis 
arsenal,  and  as  early  as  January  he 
had  well-nigh  completed  his  intrigue 
for  its  surrender  to  the  State  by  a 
treacherous  officer.  But  suspicion 
was  aroused,  the  commandant 
changed,  and  the  arsenal  reen- 
forced;  by  the  middle  of  February 
the garrison  had  been  increased  to 
488  regulars  and  recruits.  In  the 
mean  time  local  intrigue  was  active. 
The  secessionists  organized  bodies 
of  "  Minute  men "  to  capture  it, 
while  the  Union  men  with  equal 
alertness  formed  a  safety  committee, 
and  companies  of  Home  Guards  to 
join  in  its  defense.  These  latter  were 
largely  drawn  from  the  German  part 
of  the  city,  to  which  the  arsenal 
lay  contiguous,  and  their  guardian- 
ship over  it  was  therefore  more 
direct  and  effective.  Lincoln  was  inaugurated, 
and  making  Montgomery  Blair  his  postmaster- 
general  and  Edward  Bates  his  attorney-gen- 
eral, Missouri  had  virtually  two  representatives 
in  the  Cabinet.  Francis  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  brother 
of  Montgomery,  therefore  found  no  great  dif- 
ficulty in  having  the  command  of  the  arsenal 
given  to  Captain  Nathaniel  Lyon,  not  only  a 
devoted  soldier,  but  a  man  of  thorough  anti- 
slavery  convictions.  Lvon  was  ea°;er  to  forestall 
the  secession  conspiracy  by  extensive  prepar- 
ation and  swift  repression ;    but  the   depart- 
ment commander,  General  Harney,  and  the 
ordnance  officer,  Major  Eiagner,  whom  Lyon 
had  displaced,  both  of  more  slow  and  <  auhous 
temper,  and  reflecting  the  local  political  1 
servatism,  thwarted  and  hampered  Lyon  and 
Blair,  who  from  the  beginning  felt  and  acted 
in  concert.  No  great  difficulty  grew  out  of 
this  antagonism  till  the  President's  call  for 
troops;  then  it  created  discussion,  delay,  want 
of  cooperation.  Blair  could  not  get  his  volun- 
teers mustered  into  service,  and  Governor 
Yates  of  Illinois  could  get  no  arms.  The  Pre  - 
ident  finally  grew  impatient.  Harney  was 
relieved  and  called  to  Washington,  and  Lyon 
MATOR-GENERAL    FRANCIS 
PHOTOGRAPH    BY   BRADY.) 
directed  to  muster-in  and  ami  the  four  Mis- 
souri regiments  of  volunteers  with  all  expe- 
dition, and  to  send  the  extra  arms  to  Spring- 
field, Illinois,  while  three  Illinois  regiments 
were  ordered  to  St.  Louis  to  assist  in  guard- 
ing the  arsenal. 
These  orders  were  issued  in  Washington  on 
April  20.  By  this  time  St.  Louis,  like  the 
whole  Union,  was  seething  with  excitement, 
except  that  public  opinion  was  more  evenly 
divided  than  elsewhere.  There  were  Union 
speeches  and  rebel  speeches ;  cheers  for  Lin-
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
coin  and  cheers  for  Davis;  Union  flags 
and  rebel  flags :  Union  headquarters  and 
rebel  headquarters.  With  this  also  there 
was  mingled  a  certain  antipathy  of  na- 
tionality, all  the  Germans  being  deter- 
mined Unionists.  The  antagonism  quick- 
ly grew  into  armed  organizations.  The 
Unionists  were  mustered,  armed,  and 
drilled  at  the  arsenal  as  United  States 
volunteers.  On  the  other  hand  Governor 
Jackson,  having  decided  on  revolution, 
formed  at  St.  Louis  a  nominal  camp  of 
instruction  under  the  State  militia  laws. 
The  camp  was  established  at  Lindell's 
Grove,  was  christened  "  Camp  Jackson," 
in  honor  of  the  governor,  and  was  com- 
manded by  Brigadier-General  D.  M. 
Frost,  a  West  Point  graduate.  Two  reg- 
iments quickly  assembled,  and  a  third 
was  in  process  of  formation.  The  flag  of 
the  United  States  still  floated  over  it  and 
many  Unionists  were  in  the  ranks  of  the 
old  holiday  parade  militia  companies, 
but  the  whole  leadership  and  animating 
motive  were  in  aid  of  rebellion :  it  was 
already  literally  one  of  Jefferson  Davis's 
outposts.  As  soon  as  Governor  Jackson 
had  avowed  his  treason,  he  dispatched 
two  confidential  agents  to  Montgomery 
to  solicit  arms  and  aid,  by  whom  Jef- 
ferson Davis  wrote  in  reply : 
After   learning  as  well  as  I  could   from  the 
gentlemen  accredited  to  me  what  was  most  need- 
ful for  the  attack  on  the  arsenal,  I  have  directed 
that  Captains  Green  and  Duke  should  be  fur- 
nished with  two  12-pounder  howitzers  and  two 
32-pounder  guns,  with  the  proper  ammunition 
for  each.     These  from   the    commanding  hills 
will  be  effective,  both  against  the  garrison  and 
to  breach  the  inclosing  walls  of  the  place.       I 
concur  with  you  as  to  the  great  importance  of 
capturing  the  arsenal  and  securing  its  supplies, 
rendered  doubly  important  by  the  means  taken 
to  obstruct  your  commerce  and  render  you  unarmed 
victims  of  a  hostile  invasion.    We  look  anxiously  and 
hopi  fully  for  the  day  when  the  star  of  Missouri  shall 
be  added  to  the  constellation  of  the  Confederate  States 
of  America.*1 
In  reality  he  already  regarded  the  "star" 
as  in  the  "constellation."  Three  days  later 
the  rebel  Secretary  of  War  wrote  to  the  gov- 
ernor: 
Can  you  arm  and  equip  one  regiment  of  infantry 
{',r  service  in  Virginia  to  rendezvous  at  Richmond? 
Transportation  will  be  provided  by  this  Government. 
The  regiment  to  elect  its  own  officers,  and  must  enlist 
for  not  less  than  twelve  months,  unless  sooner  dis- 
charged.! 
In  face  of  the  overwhelming  Union  senti- 
ment of  Missouri,  so  lately  manifested  by  the 
*  Davis  to  Jackson,  April  23,  1861.  War  Records. 
t  Walker  to  Jackson,  April  26, 186 1.  War  Records. 
X  Jackson  to  Walker,  May  5,  1861.    War  Records. 
^■^^m^^m^  -:  '-■-'m]T,pn   npi'iii'iii'iiiiiiiiiiiii'iiii!   iciiinph 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL   NATHANIEL    LYON. 
(FROM   A    PHOTOGRAPH    BY    BRADY.) 
action  of  the  State  convention,  Governor 
Jackson  was  not  prepared  for  so  bold  a  pro- 
ceeding, and  therefore  wrote  in  reply : 
Yours  of  the  26th  ultimo,  via  Louisville,  is  received. 
I  have  no  legal  authority  to  furnish  the  men  you  de- 
sire. Missouri,  you  know,  is  yet  under  the  tyranny 
of  Lincoln's  government  —  so  far,  at  least,  as  forms  go. 
We  are  wofully  deficient  here  in  arms  and  cannot  fur- 
nish them  at  present ;  but  so  far  as  men  are  concerned 
we  have  plenty  of  them  ready,  willing,  and  anxious  to 
march  at  any  moment  to  the  defense  of  the  South. 
Our  legislature  has  just  met,  and  I  doubt  not  will  give 
me  all  necessary  authority  over  the  matter.  If  you  can 
arm  the  men  they  will  go  whenever  wanted,  and  to 
any  point  where  they  may  be  most  needed.  I  send 
this  to  Memphis  by  private  hand,  being  afraid  to  trust 
our  mails  or  telegraphs.  Let  me  hear  from  you  by 
the  same  means.  Missouri  can  and  will  put  one  hun- 
dred thousand  men  in  the  field  if  required.  We  are 
using  every  means  to  arm  our  people,  and  until  we 
are  better  prepared  must  move  cautiously.  I  write 
this  in  confidence.  With  my  prayers  for  your  success, 
etc.*
THE  BORDER   STATES. 
H 
First  to  capture  the  arsenal  and  then  to 
reenforce  the  armies  of  Jefferson  Davis  was 
doubtless  the  immediate  object  of  Camp  Jack- 
son. It  would  be  a  convenient  nucleus  which 
at  the  given  signal  would  draw  to  itself  simi- 
lar elements  from  different  parts  of  the  State. 
Already  the  arsenal  at  Liberty  —  the  same  one 
from  which  arms  were  stolen  to  overawe  Kan- 
sas in  1855 — had  been  seized  on  April  20 
and  its  contents  appropriated  by  secessionists 
in  western  Missouri.  Jeff  M.  Thompson  had 
been  for  some  weeks  drilling  a  rebel  camp  at 
St.  Joseph,  and  threatening  the  neighboring 
arsenal  at  Leavenworth.  The  legislature  was 
maturing  a  comprehensive  military  bill  which 
would  give  the  governor  power  to  concentrate 
and  use  these  scattered  fractions  of  regiments. 
Until  this  was  passed,  Camp  Jackson  had  a 
lawful  existence  under  the  old  militia  laws. 
But  the  Union  Safety  Committee,  and  es- 
pecially Mr.  Blair  and  Captain  Lyon,  followed 
the  governor's  intrigue  at  every  step,  and 
reporting  the  growing  danger  to  Washington 
received  from  President  Lincoln  extraordi- 
nary powers  to  overcome  it.  An  order  to 
Captain  Lyon  read  as  follows : 
The  President  of  the  United  States  directs  that 
you  enroll  in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States 
the  loyal  citizens  of  St  Louis  and  vicinity,  not  exceed- 
ing, with  those  heretofore  enlisted,  ten  thousand  in 
number,  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  authority 
of  the  United  States  for  the  protection  of  the  peace- 
able inhabitants  of  Missouri ;  and  you  will,  if  deemed 
necessary  for  that  purpose  by  yourself  and  by  Messrs. 
Oliver  T.  Filley,  John  How,  James  O.  Broadhead, 
Samuel  T.  Glover,  J.  Witzig,  and  Francis  P.  Blair, 
Jr.,  proclaim  martial  law  in  the  city  of  St.  Louis,  etc.* 
It  was  upon  this  order,  with  certain  addi- 
tional details,  that  General  Scott  made  the 
indorsement,  "  It  is  revolutionary  times,  and 
therefore  I  do  not  object  to  the  irregularity 
of  this." 
The  Union  Safety  Committee  soon  had  in- 
disputable evidence  of  the  insurrectionary 
purposes  and  preparations.  On  the  night 
of  May  8  cannon,  ammunition,  and  several 
hundred  muskets,  sent,  by  Jefferson  Davis, 
were  landed  at  the  St.  Louis  levee  from  a  New 
Orleans  steamer,  and  at  once  transferred  to 
Camp  Jackson.  They  had  been  brought  from 
the  arsenal  at  Baton  Rouge,  Louisiana, 
and  were  a  part  of  the  United  States  arms 
captured  there  in  January  by  the  governor  of 
that  State.  The  proceeding  did  not  escape 
the  vigilance  of  the  Safety  Committee,  but 
the  material  of  war  was  allowed  to  go  unob- 
structed to  the  camp.  The  next  day  Captain 
Lyon  visited  Camp  Jackson  in  disguise,  and 
thus  acquainting  himself  personally  with  its 
condition,  strategical  situation,  and  surround- 
ings matured  his  plan  for  its  immediate  cap- 
ture. All  legal  obstacles  which  had  been  urged 
Vol.  XXXVI.— 10. 
against  such  a  summary  proceeding  were  now 
removed  by  the  actual  presence  in  the  camp 
of  the  hostile  supplies  brought  from  Baton 
Rouge. 
At  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  May  10 
a  strong  battalion  of  regulars  with  six  pi 
of  artillery,  four  regiments  of  Missouri  Vol- 
unteers, and  two  regiments  of  Home  Guards, 
all  under  command  of  Captain  Lyon,  were 
rapidly  marching  through  different  streets  to 
Camp  Jackson.  Arrived  there,  it  was  but  a 
moment's  work  to  gain  the  appointed  posi- 
tions surrounding  the  camp,  and  to  plant  the 
batteries,  ready  for  action,  on  commanding 
elevations.  General  Frost  heard  of  their  corn- 
ing, and  undertook  to  avert  the  blow  by  send- 
ing Lyon  a  letter  denying  that  he  or  his  com- 
mand, or  "  any  other  part  of  the  State  forces," 
meant  any  hostility  to  the  United  States — 
though  it  was  himself  who  had  endeavored 
to  corrupt  the  commandant  of  the  arsenal 
in  January,  t  and  who,  in  a  letter  to  the 
governor,  J  had  outlined  and  recommended 
these  very  military  proceedings  in  Missouri, 
convening  the  legislature,  obtaining  heavy 
guns  from  Baton  Rouge,  seizing  the  Liberty 
arsenal,  and  establishing  this  camp  of  instruc- 
tion, expressly  to  oppose  President  Lincoln. 
So  far  from  being  deterred  from  his  purpose, 
Lyon  refused  to  receive  Frost's  letter;  and, 
as  soon  as  his  regiments  were  posted,  sent  a 
written  demand  for  the  immediate  surrender 
of  Camp  Jackson,  "  with  no  other  condition 
than  that  all  persons  surrendering  under  this 
demand  shall  be  humanely  and  kindly  treated." 
The  case  presented  no  alternative ;  and  seeing 
that  he  was  dealing  with  a  resolute  man,  Frost 
surrendered  with  the  usual  protest.  Camp  and 
property  were  taken  in  possession ;  arms  were 
stacked,  and  preparation  made  to  march  the 
prisoners  to  the  arsenal,  where  on  the  follow- 
ing day  they  were  paroled  and  disbanded. 
Up  to  this  time  everything  had  proceeded 
without  casualty,  or  even  turbulent  disorder ; 
but  an  immense  assemblage  of  the  street  popu- 
lace followed  the  march  and  crowded  about  the 
camp.  Most  of  them  were  peaceful  spectators 
whose  idle  curiosity  rendered  them  forgetful  of 
danger;  but  among  the  number  was  tbe  usual 
proportion  of  lawless  city  rowdies,  of  combat- 
ive instincts,  whose  very  nature  impelled  them 
to  become  the  foremost  elements  of  disorder 
and  revolution.  Many  of  them  had  rushed  to 
the  scene  of  expected  conflict  with  such  weap- 
ons as  they  could  seize;  and  now  as  the  home- 
ward march  began  they  pressed  defiantly  upon 
the   troops,  with   cheers   for  Jeff  Davis   and 
*  Cameron  to  Lyon,  April  30^  1861.    War  Records, 
t  Frost  to  Jackson,  January  24,  iSci.     Peckham, 
"  General  Nathaniel  Lyon,"'  p.  43. 
t  Frost  to  Jackson,  April  15,  1S61.    Ibid.,  p.  147.
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
insults  and  bitter  imprecations  upon  the  sol- 
diers. It  seems  a  fatality  that  when  a  city 
mob  in  anger  and  soldiers  with  loaded  guns 
are  by  any  circumstances  thrown  into  close 
act  u  produces  the  same  incidents  and 
results.  There  are  insult  and  retort,  a  rush  and 
a  repulse:  then  comes  a  shower  of  missiles, 
finally  a  pistol-shot,  and  after  it  a  return  volley 
from  the  troops,  followed  by  an  irregular  fusil- 
lade from  both  sides.  Who  began  it,  or  how  it 
was  done,  can  never  be  ascertained.  It  so  hap- 
ed  on  this  occasion,  both  at  the  head  and 
rear  of  the  marching  column  and  during  a 
momentary  halt ;  and.  as  usual,  the  guilty  es- 
caped, and  innocent  men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren fell  in  their  blood,  while  the  crowd  fled 
pell-mell  in  mortal  terror.  Two  or  three  sol- 
diers and  some  fifteen  citizens  were  killed  and 
many  wounded. 
As  at  Baltimore,  the  event  threw  St.  Louis 
into  the  excitement  of  a  general  riot.  Gun 
stores  were  broken  into  and  newspaper  offices 
threatened ;  but  the  police  checked  the  out- 
break, though  public  tranquillity  and  safety 
were  not  entirely  restored  for  several  days. 
Aside  from  its  otherwise  deplorable  results, 
the  riot  produced,  or  rather  magnified,  a  mili- 
tary and  political  complication.  On  the  day 
after  the  capture  of  Camp  Jackson,  General 
Harney  returned  from  Washington,  and  once 
more  assumed  command.  His  journey  also 
was  eventful.  Arrested  by  the  rebels  at  Har- 
per's Ferry,  he  had  been  sent  to  Richmond ; 
there  the  authorities,  anxious  to  win  him 
over  to  secession  by  kindness,  set  him  at  lib- 
erty. Proof  against  their  blandishments,  how- 
ever, he  merely  thanked  them  for  their  cour- 
tesy, and,  loyal  soldier  as  he  was,  proceeded 
to  his  superiors  and  his  duty  at  Washington. 
This  circumstance  greatly  aided  his  explana- 
tions and  excuses  before  General  Scott,  Presi- 
dent Lincoln,  and  the  Cabinet,  and  secured 
his  restoration  as  Department  Commander. 
But  his  return  to  St.  Louis  proved  ill  timed. 
His  arrival  there  in  the  midst  of  the  excitement 
over  the  capture  of  Camp  Jackson  and  the  riot 
emphasized  and  augmented  the  antagonism 
between  the  radical  Unionists,  led  by  Blair  and 
Lyon,  and  the  pro-slavery  and  conservative 
Unionists,  who  now  made  the  general  their 
rallying  point.  Paying  too  much  attention  to 
the  complaints  and  relying  too  blindly  upon 
the  false  representations  and  promises  of  sc- 
on conspirators  like  Frost,  and  greatly 
underrating  the  active  elements  of  rebellion 
in  Missouri,  Flarney  looked  coldly  upon  the 
volunteers  and  talked  of  disbanding  the  Home 
Guards.  This  brought  him  into  conflict  with 
the  Union  Safety  Committee  and  President 
Lincoln's  orders.  Delegations  of  equally  influ- 
ential citizens  representing  both  sides  went  to 
Washington,  in  a  stubborn  mistrust  of  each  oth- 
er's motives.  In  their  appeal  to  Lincoln,  Lyon's 
friends  found  a  ready  advocate  in  Mr.  Blair, 
Postmaster-General,  and  Harney's  friends  in 
Mr.  Bates,  the  Attorney- General;  and  the  Mis- 
souri discord  was  thus  in  a  certain  degree, 
and  at  a  very  early  date,  transplanted  into  the 
Cabinet  itself.  This  local  embitterment  in  St. 
Louis  beginning  here  ran  on  for  several  years, 
and  in  its  varying  and  shifting  phases  gave 
the  President  no  end  of  trouble  in  his  endeavor 
from  first  to  last  to  be  just  to  each  faction. 
Harney  was  strongly  intrenched  in  the  per- 
sonal friendship  of  General  Scott ;  besides,  he 
was  greatly  superior  in  army  rank,  being  a 
brigadier-general,  while  Lyon  was  only  a  cap- 
tain. On  the  other  hand,  Lyon's  capture  of 
Camp  Jackson  had  shown  his  energy,  cour- 
age, and  usefulness,  and  had  given  him  great 
popular  eclat.  Immediately  to  supersede  him 
seemed  like  a  public  censure.  It  was  one  of 
the  many  cases  where  unforeseen  circum- 
stances created  a  dilemma,  involving  irritated 
personal  susceptibilities  and  delicate  questions 
of  public  expediency. 
President  Lincoln  took  action  promptly  and 
firmly,  though  tempered  with  that  forbear- 
ance by  which  he  was  so  constantly  en- 
abled to  extract  the  greatest  advantage  out 
of  the  most  perplexing  complications.  The 
delegations  from  Missouri  with  their  letters 
arrived  on  May  16,  a  week  after  the  Camp 
Jackson  affair.  Having  heard  both  sides,  Lin- 
coln decided  that  in  any  event  Lyon  must  be 
sustained.  He  therefore  ordered  that  Harney 
should  be  relieved,  and  that  Lyon  be  made  a 
brigadier-general  of  volunteers.  In  order,  how- 
ever, that  this  change  might  not  fall  too  harshly, 
Lincoln  did  not  make  his  decision  public,  but 
wrote  confidentially  to  Frank  Blair,  under  date 
of  May  18: 
My  Dear  Sir  :  We  have  a  good  deal  of  anxiety 
here  about  St.  Louis.  I  understand  an  order  has  gone 
from  the  War  Department  to  you,  to  be  delivered  or 
withheld  in  your  discretion,  relieving  General  Harney 
from  his  command.  I  was  not  quite  satisfied  with  the 
order  when  it  was  made,  though  on  the  whole  I  thought 
it  best  to  make  it ;  but  since  then  I  have  become  more 
doubtful  of  its  propriety.  I  do  not  write  now  to  coun- 
termand it,  but  to  say  I  wish  you  would  withhold  it, 
unless  in  your  judgment  the  necessity  to  the  contrary 
is  very  urgent.  There  are  several  reasons  for  this. 
We  had  better  have  him  a  friend  than  an  enemy.  It 
will  dissatisfy  a  good  many  who  otherwise  would  be 
quiet.  More  than  all,  we  first  relieve  him,  then  restore 
him,  and  now  if  we  relieve  him  again  the  public  will 
ask,  "Why  all  this  vacillation  ?"  Still,  if  in  your  judg- 
ment it  is  indispensable,  let  it  be  so. 
Upon  receipt  of  this  letter  both  Blair  and 
Lyon,  with  commendable  prudence,  deter- 
mined to  carry  out  the  President's  suggestion. 
Since  Harney's  return  from  Washington  his 
words  and  acts  had  been  more  in  conformity
THE  BORDER   STATES. 
with  their  own  policy.  He  had  published  a  proc- 
lamation defending  and  justifying  the  capture 
of  Camp  Jackson,  and  declaring  that  "  Mis- 
souri must  share  the  destiny  of  the  Union," 
and  that  the  whole  power  of  the  United  States 
would  be  exerted  to  maintain  her  in  it.  Espe- 
cially was  the  proclamation  unsparing  in  its 
denunciation  of  the  recent  military  bill  of  the 
rebel  legislature. 
This  bill  cannot  be  regarded  in  any  other  light  than 
an  indirect  secession  ordinance,  ignoring  even  the 
forms  resorted  to  by  other  States.  Manifestly  its  most 
material  provisions  are  in  conflict  with  the  Constitu- 
tion and  laws  of  the  United  States.  To  this  extent  it 
is  a  nullity,  and  cannot,  and  ought  not  to,  be  up- 
held. .  .  .  Within  the  field  and  scope  of  my  com- 
mand and  authority  the  supreme  law  of  the  land 
must  and  shall  be  maintained,  and  no  subterfuges, 
whether  in  the  form  of  legislative  acts  or  otherwise,  can 
be  permitted  to  harass  or  oppress  the  good  and  law- 
abiding  people  of  Missouri.  I  shall  exert  my  authority 
to  protect  their  persons  and  property  from  violations 
of  every  kind,  and  I  shall  deem  it  my  duty  to  suppress 
all  unlawful  combinations  of  men,  whether  formed  un- 
der pretext  of  military  organizations,  or  otherwise.* 
He  also  suggested  to  the  War  Department 
the  enlistment  of  Home  Guards  and  the  need 
of  additional  troops  in  Missouri.  So  far  as 
mere  theory  and  intention  could  go,  all  this 
was  without  fault.  There  can  be  no  question 
of  Harney's  entire  loyalty,  and  of  his  skill 
and  courage  as  a  soldier  dealing  with  open 
enemies.  Unfortunately,  he  did  not  possess 
the  adroitness  and  daring  necessary  to  circum- 
vent the  secret  machinations  of  traitors. 
Governor  Jackson,  on  the  contrary,  seems 
to  have  belonged  by  nature  and  instinct  to 
the  race  of  conspirators.  He  and  his  rebel 
legislature,  convened  in  special  session  at  Jef- 
ferson City,  were  panic-stricken  by  the  news  of 
the  capture  of  Camp  Jackson.  On  that  night 
of  May  10  the  governor,  still  claiming  and 
wielding  the  executive  power  of  the  State, 
sent  out  a  train  to  destroy  the  telegraph  and  to 
burn  the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Osage  River, 
in  order  to  keep  the  bayonets  of  Lyon  and 
Blair  at  a  safe  distance.  At  night  the  legisla- 
ture met  for  business,  the  secession  members 
belted  with  pistols  and  bowie-knives,  with  guns 
lying  across  their  desks  or  leaning  against 
chairs  and  walls,  while  sentinels  and  soldiers 
filled  the  corridors  and  approaches.  The  city 
was  in  an  uproar;  the  young  ladies  of  the 
female  seminary  and  many  families  were  moved 
across  the  river  for  security. f  All  night  long 
the  secession  governor  and  his  secession  ma- 
jority hurried  their  treasonable  legislation 
through  the  mere  machinery  of  parliamentary 
forms.  It  was  under  these  conditions  that  the 
*  Harney,  Proclamation,  May  14, 1861.  War  Records, 
t  Peckham, "  General  Nathaniel  Lyon,"  pp.  168-178. 
X  Price,   Harney  Agreement,   May  21,   1861.    War 
Records. 
famous  military  bill  and  kindred  acts 
passed.  It  appropriated  three  millions;  autho- 
rized the  issue  of  bonds;  diverted  the  school 
fund;  anticipated  two  years'  taxes;  made  the 
governor  a  military  dictator,  and  ignored  the 
Federal  Government.  Jtwasin  truth, as  Harney 
called  it,  "an  indirect  secession  ordinal 
Armed  with  these  revolutionary  enactments, 
but  still  parading  his  State  authority,  Gov- 
ernor Jackson  undertook  cautiously  to  con- 
solidate his  military  power.  Ex- Governor 
Sterling  Price  was  appointed  Major-General 
commanding  the  Missouri  State  Guard;  who, 
more  conveniently  to  cloak  the  whole  con- 
spiracy, now  sought  an  interview  with  Harney, 
and  entered  with  him  into  a  public  agreement, 
vague  and  general  in  its  terms,  "  of  restoring 
peace  and  good  order  to  the  people  of  the 
State  in  subordination  to  the  laws  of  the 
general  and  State  governments." 
General  Price,  having  by  commission  full  authority 
over  the  militia  of  the  State  of  Missouri,  undertakes, 
with  the  sanction  of  the  governor  of  the  State,  already 
declared,  to  direct  the  whole  power  of  the  State  officers 
to  maintain  order  within  the  State  among  the  people 
thereof,  and  General  Harney  publicly  declares  that,  this 
object  being  thus  assured,  he  can  have  no  occasion, 
as  he  has  no  wish,  to  make  military  movements  which 
might  otherwise  create  excitements  and  jealousies, 
which  he  most  earnestly  desires  to  avoid. X 
Blinded  and  lulled  by  treacherous  profes- 
sions, Harney  failed  to  see  that  this  was  evad- 
ing the  issue  and  committing  the  flock  to  the 
care  of  the  wolf.  Price's  undertaking  to 
"maintain  order"  was,  in  fact,  nothing  else 
than  the  organization  of  rebel  companies  at 
favorable  points  in  the  State,  and  immediately 
brought  a  shower  of  Union  warnings  and 
complaints  to  Harney.  Within  a  week  the 
information  received  caused  him  to  notify 
Price  of  these  complaints,  and  of  his  intention 
to  organize  Union  Home  Guards  for  protec- 
tion^ More  serious  still,  reliable  news  came 
that  an  invasion  was  threatened  from  the  Ar- 
kansas border.  Price  replied  with  his  blandest 
assurances,  denying  everything.  The  aggres- 
sions, he  said,  were  acts  of  irresponsible  in- 
dividuals. To  organize  Home  Guards  would 
produce  neighborhood  collision  and  civil  war. 
He  should  carry  out  the  agreement  to  the 
letter.  Should  troops  enter  Missouri  from 
Arkansas  or  any  other  State  he  would  "  cause 
them  to  return  instanter."  || 
Harney,  taking  such  declarations  at  their 
surface  value,  and  yielding  himself  to  the 
suggestions  and  advice  of  the  St.  Louis  con- 
servatives who  disliked  Lyon  and  hated  Blair, 
remained   inactive,  notwithstanding   a  sharp 
%  Harney  to  Price,  May  27,  1861.    War  Records. 
||  Price    to    Harney,    May  2S   and   May  29.    War 
Records.
6S 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
admonition  from  Washington.    The  Adjutant- 
Genera]  wrote  : 
The  President  observes  with  concern  that  not- 
withstanding the  pledge  of  the  State  authorities  to 
cooperate  in  preserving  peace  in  Missouri,  loyal 
citizens  in  great  numbers  continue  to  be  driven  from 
their  bonus.  .  .  .  The  professions  of  loyalty  to 
the  Union  by  the  State  authorities  of  Missouri  are 
not  to  be  relied  upon.  They  have  already  falsified 
their  professions  too  often,  and  are  too  far  commit- 
ted to  secession,  to  be  entitled  to  your  confidence, 
and  you  can  only  be  sure  of  their  desisting  from  their 
wicked  purposes  when  it  is  out  of  their  power  to  pros- 
ecute them.  You  will  therefore  be  unceasingly  watchful 
of  their  movements,  and  not  permit  the  clamors  of  their 
partisans  and  opponents  of  the  wise  measures  already 
taken  to  prevent  you  from  checking  every  movement 
against  the  Government,  however  disguised,  under  the 
pretended  State  authority.  The  authority  of  the  United 
States  is  paramount,  and  whenever  it  is  apparent  that 
a  movement,  whether  by  color  of  State  authority  or 
not,  is  hostile,  you  will  not  hesitate  to  put  it  down.* 
Harney  had  announced  this  identical  policy 
in  his  proclamation  of  May  14.  The  difficulty 
was  that  he  failed  to  apply  and  enforce  his 
own  doctrines,  or  rather  that  he  lacked  pene- 
tration to  discern  the  treachery  of  the  State 
authorities.  He  replied  to  the  War  Department : 
My  confidence  in  the  honor  and  integrity  of  General 
Price,  in  the  purity  of  his  motives,  and  in  his  loyalty  to 
the  Government  remains  unimpaired.  His  course  as 
President  of  the  State  Convention  that  voted  by  a 
large  majority  against  submitting  an  ordinance  of  se- 
cession, and  his  efforts  since  that  time  to  calm  the 
elements  of  discord,  have  served  to  confirm  the  high 
opinion  of  him  I  have  for  many  years  entertained,  t 
Lyon  and  Blair  wrere  much  better  informed, 
and  the  latter  wrote  to  Lincoln: 
...  I  have  to-day  delivered  to  General  Harney 
the  order  of  the  1 6th  of  May  above  mentioned  reliev- 
ing him,  feeling  that  the  progress  of  events  and  con- 
dition of  affairs  in  this  State  make  it  incumbent  upon 
me  to  assume  the  grave  responsibility  of  this  act,  the 
dis'retionary  power  in  the  premises  having  been  given 
rne  by  the  President.} 
The  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War  duly 
sustained  the  act. 
This  change  of  command  soon  brought 
matters  in  Missouri  to  a  crisis.  The  State  au- 
thorities were  quickly  convinced  that  Lyon 
would  tolerate  no  evasion,  temporizing,  or  mis- 
understanding. They  therefore  asked  an  in- 
terview; and   Lyon  sent  Governor  Jackson 
*  Thomas  to  Harney,  May  27,  1861.   War  Records. 
+  Harney  to  Thomas,  June  5,  1 861.    War  Records. 
:  I  .  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  to  the  President,  May  30,  1861. 
Peckham,  "  General  Nathaniel  Lyon,"  p.  223. 
§  In  issuing  this  proclamation  I  hold  it  to  be  my 
solemn  duty  to  remind  you  that  Missouri  is  still  one 
of  the  United  States;  that  the  Executive  Department 
of  the  State  government  does  not  arrogate  to  itself  the 
power  to  disturb  that  relation  ;  that  that  power  has 
been  wisely  vested  in  a  convention  which  will  at 
the  proper  time  express  your  sovereign  will ;  and  that 
meanwhile  it  is  your  duty  to  obey  all  constitutional  rz- 
quirements  of  the  Federal  Government. 
and  General  Price  a  safeguard  to  visit  St.  Louis. 
They  on  the  one  part,  and  Lyon  and  Blair  on 
the  other,  with  one  or  two  witnesses,  held  an  in- 
terview of  four  hours  on  June  n.  The  gov- 
ernor proposed  that  the  State  should  remain 
neutral ;  that  he  would  not  attempt  to  organ- 
ize the  militia  under  the  military  bill,  on  con- 
dition that  the  Union  Home  Guards  should 
be  disarmed  and  no  further  Federal  troops 
should  be  stationed  in  Missouri.  Lyon  rejected 
this  proposal,  insisting  that  the  governor's 
rebel "  State  Guards  "  should  be  disarmed  and 
the  military  bill  abandoned,  and  that  the  Fed- 
eral Government  should  enjoy  its  unrestricted 
right  to  move  and  station  its  troops  through- 
out the  State,  to  repel  invasion  or  protect  its 
citizens.    This  the  governor  refused. 
So  the  discussion  terminated.  Jackson  and 
Price  hurried  by  a  special  train  back  to  Jeffer- 
son City,  burning  bridges  as  they  went.  Ar- 
rived at  the  capital,  the  governor  at  once 
published  a  proclamation  of  war.  He  recited 
the  interview  and  its  result,  called  fifty  thou- 
sand militia  into  the  active  service  of  the 
State,  and  closed  his  proclamation  by  coupling 
together  the  preposterous  and  irreconcilable 
announcements  of  loyalty  to  the  United  States 
and  declaration  of  war  against  them  —  a  very 
marvel  of  impudence,  even  among  the  numer- 
ous kindred  curiosities  of  secession  literature.  § 
This  sudden  announcement  of  active  hostil- 
ity did  not  take  Lyon  by  surprise.  Thoroughly 
informed  of  the  conspirators'  plans,  he  had 
made  his  own  preparations  for  equally  ener- 
getic action.  Though  Jackson  had  crippled 
the  railroad,  the  Missouri  River  was  an  open 
military  highway,  and  numerous  swift  steam- 
boats lay  at  the  St.  Louis  wharf.  On  the  aft- 
ernoon of  June  13  he  embarked  one  of  his 
regular  batteries  and  several  battalions  of  his 
Missouri  Volunteers,  and  steamed  with  all 
possible  speed  up  the  river  to  Jefferson  City, 
the  capital  of  the  State,  leading  the  movement 
in  person.  He  arrived  on  the  15th  of  June, 
and,  landing,  took  possession  of  the  town  with- 
out resistance,  and  raised  the  Union  flag  over 
the  State-house.  The  governor  and  his  ad- 
herents hurriedly  fled,  his  Secretary  of  State 
carrying  off  the  great  seal  with  which  to  cer- 
tify future  pretended  official  acts. 
But  it  is  equally  my  duty  to  advise  you  that  your 
first  allegiance  is  due  to  your  own  State,  and  that  you 
are  under  no  obligation  whatever  to  obey  the  uncon- 
stitutional edicts  of  the  military  despotism  which  has 
enthroned  itself  at  Washington,  nor  to  submit  to  the 
infamous  and  degrading  sway  of  its  wicked  minions  in 
this  State.  No  brave  and  true-hearted  Missourian  will 
obey  one  or  submit  to  the  other.  Rise,  then,  and  drive 
out  ignominiously  the  invaders  who  have  dared  to. 
desecrate  the  soil  which  your  labors  have  made  fruit- 
ful, and  which  is  consecrated  by  your  homes.  [Jack- 
son, Proclamation,  June  12,  1861.  Peckham,  "  General 
Nathaniel  Lyon,"  p.  252.]
THE  BORDER   STATES. 
There  had  been  no  time  for  the  rebellion  to 
gather  any  head  at  the  capital ;  but  at  the  town 
of  Boonville,  fifty  miles  farther  up  the  river, 
General  Price  was  collecting  some  fragments 
of  military  companies.  This  nucleus  of  op- 
position Lyon  determined  also  to  destroy. 
Leaving  but  a  slight  guard  at  the  capital,  he 
reembarked  his  force  next  day,  and  reaching 
Boonville  on  the  17th  landed  without  diffi- 
culty, and  put  the  half-formed  rebel  militia 
to  flight  after  a  spirited  but  short  skirmish. 
General  Price  prudently  kept  away  from 
the  encounter;  and  Governor  Jackson,  who 
had  come  hither,  and  who  witnessed  the 
disaster  from  a  hill  two  miles  distant,  once 
more  betook  himself  to  flight.  Two  on  the 
Union  and  fifteen  on  the  rebel  side  were 
killed. 
This  affair  at  Boonville  was  the  outbreak  of 
open  warfare  in  Missouri,  though  secret  mili- 
tary aggression  against  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment had  been  for  nearly  six  months  car- 
ried on  by  the  treasonable  State  officials,  aided 
as  far  as  possible  by  the  conspiracy  in  the 
cotton-States. 
The  local  State  government  of  Missouri, 
thus  broken  by  the  hostility  of  Governor  Jack- 
son and  subordinate  officials,  was  soon  regu- 
larly restored.  It  happened  that  the  Missouri 
State  convention,  chosen,  as  already  related, 
with  the  design  of  carrying  the  State  into  re- 
bellion, but  which,  unexpectedly  to  the  con- 
spirators, remained  true  to  the  Union,  had, 
on  adjourning  its  sessions  from  March  to  De- 
cember, wisely  created  an  emergency  commit- 
tee with  power  to  call  it  together  upon  any  nec- 
essary occasion.  This  committee  now  issued  its 
call,  under  which  the  convention  assembled  in 
Jefferson  City  on  the  2  2d  of  July.  Many  of  its 
members  had  joined  the  rebellion,  but  a  full 
constitutional  quorum  remained,  and  took  up 
the  task  of  reconstituting  the  disorganized  ma- 
chinery of  civil  administration.  By  a  series  of 
ordinances  it  declared  the  State  offices  vacant, 
abrogated  the  military  bill  and  other  treason- 
able legislation,  provided  for  new  elections, 
and  finally,  on  the  31st  of  July,  inaugurated  a 
provisional  government,  which  thereafter  made 
the  city  of  St.  Louis  its  official  headquarters. 
Hamilton  R.  Gamble,  a  conservative,  was  made 
governor.  He  announced  his  unconditional 
adherence  to  the  Union,  and  his  authority  was 
immediately  recognized  by  the  greater  portion 
of  the  State.  Missouri  thus  remained  through 
the  entire  war,  both  in  form  and  in  substance, 
a  State  in  the  Union. 
Nevertheless  a  considerable  minority  of  its 
population,  scattered  in  many  parts,  was 
strongly  tinctured  with  sympathy  for  the  re- 
bellion. The  conspiracy  so  long  nursed  by 
Governor  Jackson  and  his  adherents  had  taken 
deep  and  pernicious  root.  An  anomalous  con- 
dition of  affairs  suddenly  sprung  up.  Amidst 
a  strongly  dominant  loyalty  there  smoldered 
the  embers  of  rebellion,  and  during  the  whole 
civil  war  there  blazed  up  fitfully,  often  where 
least  expected,  the  flames  of  neighborhood 
strife  and  guerrilla  warfare  to  an  extent  and 
with  a  fierceness  not  equaled  in  any  other 
State.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  narrate 
how,  under  cover  of  this  sentiment,  the  lead- 
ers of  secession  bands  and  armies  made  re- 
peated and  desolating  incursions;  and  how, 
some  months  later,  Governor  Jackson  with  his 
perambulating  State  seal  set  up  a  pretended 
legislature  and  State  government,  and  the 
Confederate  authorities  at  Richmond  enacted 
the  farce  of  admitting  Missouri  to  the  South- 
ern Confederacy.  It  was,  however,  from  first 
to  last,  a  palpable  sham;  the  pretended  Con- 
federate officials  in  Missouri  had  no  capital  or 
archives,  controlled  no  population,  perma- 
nently held  no  territory,  collected  no  taxes; 
and  Governor  Jackson  was  nothing  more  than 
a  fugitive  pretender,  finding  temporary  refuge 
within  Confederate  camps. 
KENTUCKY. 
The  three  States  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and 
Illinois,  forming  McClellan's  department,  were 
bounded  south  of  the  Ohio  River  by  the  single 
State  of  Kentucky,  stretching  from  east  to 
west,  and  occupying  at  least  four-fifths  of  the 
entire  Ohio  line.  Kentucky  was  a  slave  State. 
This  domestic  institution  allied  her  naturally 
to  the  South,  and  created  among  her  people 
a  pervading  sympathy  with  Southern  com- 
plaints and  demands.  Her  geographical  po- 
sition and  her  river  commerce  also  connected 
her  strongly  with  the  South.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  traditions  of  her  local  politics  bound 
her  indissolubly  to  the  Union.  The  fame  of 
her  great  statesman,  Henry  Clay,  rested  upon 
his  lifelong  efforts  for  its  perpetuity.  The 
compromise  of  1850,  which  thwarted  and  for 
ten  years  postponed  the  Southern  rebellion, 
was  his  crowning  political  triumph.  But 
Henry  Clay's  teaching  and  example  were 
being  warped  and  perverted.  A  feebler 
generation  of  disciples,  unable,  as  he  would 
have  done,  to  distinguish  between  honorable 
compromise  and  ruinous  concession,  under- 
took now  to  quell  war  by  refusing  to  take 
up  arms ;  desired  an  appeal  from  the  battle- 
field to  moral  suasion ;  proposed  to  preserve 
the  Government  by  leaving  revolution  un- 
checked. 
The  legislature,  though  appealing  to  the 
South  to  stay  secession,  and  though  firmly 
refusing  to  call  a  State  convention,  never- 
theless protested  against  the  use  of  force  or
7° 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
coercion  by  the  General  Government  against 
the  seceding  States.  John  J.  Crittenden  took 
similar  ground,  counseling  Kentucky  to  stand 
the  Union  and  correctly  characterizing 
ssion  as  simple  revolution.  Nevertheless 
he  advised  against  the  policy  of  coercion,  and 
said  of  the  seceded  States,  "  Let  them  go  on 
in  peace  with  their  experiment."*  A  public 
meeting  of  leading  citizens  at  Louisville  first 
denounced  secession  and  then  denounced 
the  President  for  attempting  to  put  down 
secession.  They  apostrophized  the  flag  and 
\  ow  ed  to  maintain  the  LTnion,  but  were 
ready  to  fight  Lincoln,  f  It  makes  one 
smile  to  read  again  the  childish  contradic- 
tions which  eminent  Kentucky  statesmen 
uttered  in  all  seriousness. 
A  people  that  have  prospered  beyond  example  in 
the  records  of  time,  free  and  self-governed,  without 
oppression,  without  taxation  to  be  felt,  are  now  going 
to  cut  each  other's  throats;  and  why?  Because  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  and  Davis  could  n't  settle  the  etiquette 
upon  which  the  troops  were  to  be  withdrawn  from 
Fort  Sumter.  % 
This  was  the  analysis  of  one.  Another  was 
equally  infelicitous : 
Why  this  war  ?  .  .  .  Because  Mr.  Lincoln  has  been 
elected  President  of  the  country  and  Mr.  Davis  could 
not  be,  and  therefore  a  Southern  Confederacy  was  to 
be  formed  by  Southern  demagogues,  and  now  they  are 
attempting  to  drag  you  on  with  them.  .  .  .  Let  us 
not  fight  the  North  or  South,  but,  firm  in  our  position, 
tell  our  sister  border  States  that  with  them  we  will 
stand  to  maintain  the  Union,  to  preserve  the  peace, 
and  uphold  our  honor  and  our  flag,  which  they  would 
trail  in  the  dust.  ...  If  we  must  fight,  let  us  fight 
Lincoln  and  not  our  Government.  $ 
The  resolutions  of  the  meeting  wTere  quite 
as  illogical.    They  declared  that 
the  present  duty  of  Kentucky  is  to  maintain  her  pres- 
ent independent  position,  taking  sides  not  with  the 
Administration,  nor  with  the  seceding  States,  but  with 
the  Union  against  them  both  ;  declaring  her  soil  to  be 
sacred  from  the  hostile  tread  of  either;  and,  if  neces- 
sary, to  make  the  declaration  good  with  her  strong 
ri^ht  arm.  || 
The  preposterous  assumption  was  also 
greatly  strengthened  in  the  popular  mind  by 
the  simultaneous  publication  of  an  address 
of  the  same  tenor  in  Tennessee,  from  John 
Hell  and  others.  He  had  been  one  of  the 
four  candidates  for  President  in  the  election 
of  i860  —  the  one  for  whom  .both  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee  cast  their  electoral  votes;  and 
as  the  standard-bearer  of  the  "  Constitutional 
Union"  party  had  in  many  ways  reiterated 
his   and    their  devotion  to  "  the  Union,  the 
Constitution,  and  the  enforcement  of  the 
laws."  The  address  distinctly  disapproved 
secession ;  it  condemned  the  policy  of  the 
Administration  j  it  unequivocally  avowed  the 
duty  of  Tennessee  to  resist  by  force  of  arms 
the  subjugation  of  the  South.^f  What  shall  be 
said  when  men  of  reputed  wisdom  and  ex- 
perience proclaim  such  inconsistencies  ?  All 
these  incidents  are  the  ever-recurring  signs  of 
that  dangerous  demoralization  of  public  senti- 
ment, of  that  utter  confusion  of  political  prin- 
ciples, of  that  helpless  bewilderment  of  public 
thought,  into  which  portions  of  the  country- 
had  unconsciously  lapsed. 
Governor  Magoffin  of  Kentucky  and  his 
personal  adherents  seem  to  have  been  ready 
to  rush  into  overt  rebellion.  His  official 
message  declared  that  Kentucky  would  resist 
the  principles  and  policy  of  the  Republican 
party  "  to  the  death,  if  necessary  " ;  that  the 
Union  had  practically  ceased  to  exist;  and  that 
she  would  not  stand  by  with  folded  arms 
while  the  seceded  States  were  being  "subju- 
gated to  an  anti-slavery  Government."  With 
open  contumacy  he  replied  to  President  Lin- 
coln's official  call,  "  Kentucky  will  furnish  no 
troops  for  the  wicked  purpose  of  subduing 
her  sister  Southern  States."**  He  applied  to 
Jefferson  Davis  for  arms,  and  to  the  Louisville 
banks  for  money,  but  neither  effort  succeeded. 
The  existing  legislature  contained  too  many 
Union  members  to  give  him  unchecked  con- 
trol of  the  public  credit  of  the  State.  He  was 
therefore  perforce  driven  to  adhere  to  the 
policy  of  "  neutrality,"  as  the  best  help  he 
could  give  the  rebellion.  Nevertheless,  he  was 
not  without  power  for  mischief.  The  militia 
of  Kentucky  had  recently  been  reorganized 
under  the  personal  influence  and  direction  of 
S.  B.  Buckner,  who,  as  inspector- general,  was 
the  legal  and  actual  general-in-chief.  Buck- 
ner, like  the  governor,  ex- Vice-President 
Breckinridge,  and  others,  was  an  avowed 
"neutral  "  but  a  predetermined  rebel,  who  in 
the  following  September  entered  the  military 
service  of  Jefferson  Davis.  For  the  present 
his  occupation  was  rather  that  of  political  in- 
trigue to  forward  the  secession  of  Kentucky, 
which  he  carried  on  under  pretense  of  his  for- 
mal and  assumed  instructions  from  the  gov- 
ernor to  employ  the  "  State  Guard,"  or  rather 
its  shadow  of  authority,  to  prevent  the  vio- 
lation of  "  State  neutrality  "  by  either  the 
Southern  or  the  Northern  armies. 
The  public  declarations  and  manifestations 
in  Kentucky  were  not  reassuring  to  the  people 
*  Crittenden,  speech  before  Kentucky  legislature, 
March  26,  1861.   New  York  "Tribune,"  March  30. 
t"  Rebellion  Record.'' 
i  James  Guthrie,  speech  at  Louisville,  Ky.,  April 
18,   1861.     Ibid. 
§  Archibald  Dixon,  speech  at  Louisville,  April  18, 
[861.     Ibid. 
||  "  Rebellion  Record." 
U  Ibid. 
'**  Magoffin  to  Cameron,  April  15, 1861.  War  Records.
THE  BORDER   STATES. 
north  of  the  Ohio  line.    Governor  Morton  of 
Indiana  wrote : 
The  country  along  the  Ohio  River  bordering  on 
Kentucky  is  in  a  state  of  intense  alarm.  The  people 
entertain  no  doubt  but  that  Kentucky  will  speedily  go 
out  of  the  Union.  They  are  in  daily  fear  that  maraud- 
ing parties  from  the  other  side  of  the  river  will  plunder 
and  burn  their  towns.* 
Even  after  the  lapse  of  some  weeks  this  fear 
was  not  dissipated.  General  McClellan  wrote : 
The  frontier  of  Indiana  and  Illinois  is  in  a  very  ex- 
cited and  almost  dangerous  condition.  In  Ohio  there  is 
more  calmness.  I  have  been  in  more  full  communica- 
tion with  the  people.  A  few  arms  have  been  supplied, 
and  all  means  have  been  taken  to  quiet  them  along  the 
frontier.  Special  messengers  have  reached  me  from 
the  governors  of  Indiana  and  Illinois,  demanding  heavy 
guns  and  expressing  great  alarm.  I  sent  Lieutenant 
Williams  to  confer  with  Governor  Morton,  to  tell  him 
that  I  have  no  heavy  guns,  and  to  explain  to  him  the 
impropriety  of  placing  them  in  position  along  the 
frontier  just  at  the  present  time.  I  have  promised 
Governor  Yates  some  heavy  guns  at  Cairo  as  soon  as 
I  can  get  them. 
McClellan  himself  was  not  free  from  appre- 
hension : 
I  am  very  anxious  to  learn  the  views  of  the  Gen- 
eral [Scott]  in  regard  to  western  Virginia,  Kentucky, 
and  Missouri.  At  any  moment  it  may  become  neces- 
sary to  act  in  some  one  of  these  directions.  From 
reliable  information  I  am  sure  that  the  governor  of 
Kentucky  is  a  traitor.  Buckner  is  under  his  influ- 
ence, so  it  is  necessary  to  watch  them.  I  hear  to-night 
that  one  thousand  secessionists  are  concentrating  at  a 
point  opposite  Gallipolis.    Cairo  is  threatened.! 
He  proposed,  therefore,  to  reenforce  and 
fortify  Cairo,  place  several  gunboats  on  the 
river,  and  in  case  of  need  to  cross  into  Ken- 
tucky and  occupy  Covington  Heights  for  the 
better  defense  of  Cincinnati. 
This  condition  of  affairs  brought  another 
important  question  to  final  decision.  The 
governor  of  Illinois  had  ordered  the  summary 
seizure  of  war  material  at  Cairo,  and  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  formally  approved  it.  Ordi- 
nary river  commerce  was  more  tenderly  dealt 
with.    Colonel  Prentiss  wrote  : 
No  boats  have  been  searched  unless  I  had  been  pre- 
viously and  reliably  informed  that  they  had  on  board 
munitions  of  war  destined  to  the  enemies  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  in  all  cases  where  we  have  searched  we 
have  found  such  munitions.  My  policy  has  been  such 
that  no  act  of  my  command  could  be  construed  as  an 
insult,  or  cause  to  any  State  for  secession.  % 
But  the  threatening  demonstrations  from 
the  South  were  beginning  to  show  that  this 
was  a  dangerous  leniency.    McClellan  there- 
*  Morton  to  Cameron,  April  28, 1861.  War  Records, 
t  McClellan   to   Townsend,    May    10,   1S61.     War 
Records. 
X  Prentiss  to  Headquarters. 
%  McClellan  to  Scott,  May  7,  1861.    War  Records. 
||  Townsend  to  McClellan,  May  8,  1861.  Ibid. 
fore  asked  explicitly  whether  provisions  des- 
tined for  the  seceded  States  or  for  the  Southern 
army  should  longer  be  permitted  to  be  & 
to  which  an  official  order  came  on  May  8: 
"  Since  the  order  of  the  2d,  the  Secretary  of 
War  decides  that  provisions  must  be  stopped 
at  Cairo."  || 
In  reality  matters  in  Kentucky  were  not 
quite  so  bad  as  they  appeared  to  the  public 
eye.  With  sober  second  thought,  the  underly 
ing  loyalty  of  her  people  began  to  assert  itself. 
Breckinridge  and  his  extreme  Southern  d<K  - 
trines  had  received  only  a  little  more  than 
one-third  the  votes  of  the  State.fl  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  a  Kentuckian  by  birth,  and  had  been  a 
consistent  Whig ;  their  strong  clanship  could 
not  quite  give  him  up  as  hopelessly  lost  in 
abolitionism.  Earnest  Unionists  also  quickly 
perceived  that  "  armed  neutrality  "  must  soon 
become  a  practical  farce  \  many  of  them  from 
the  first  used  it  as  an  artful  contrivance  to  kill 
secession.  The  legislature  indeed  declared 
for  "  strict  neutrality,"  and  approved  the  gov- 
ernor's refusal  to  furnish  troops  to  the  Presi- 
dent.** Superficially,  this  was  placing  the  State 
in  a  contumacious  and  revolutionary  attitude. 
But  this  official  action  was  not  a  true  expo- 
nent of  the  public  feeling.  The  undercurrent 
of  political  movement  is  explained  by  a  letter 
of  John  J.  Crittenden,  at  that  time  the  most 
influential  single  voice  in  the  State.  On  the 
17th  of  May  he  wrote  to  General  Scott : 
The  position  of  Kentucky,  and  the  relation  she  oc- 
cupies toward  the  government  of  the  Union,  is  not,  I 
fear,  understood  at  Washington.  It  ought  to  be  well 
understood.  Very  important  consequences  may  depend 
upon  it  and  upon  her  proper  treatment.  Unfortunately 
for  us,  our  governor  does  not  sympathize  with  Ken- 
tucky in  respect  to  the  secession.  His  opinions  and 
feelings  incline  him  strongly  to  the  side  of  the  South. 
His  answer  to  the  requisition  for  troops  was  in  its 
terms  hasty  and  unbecoming,  and  does  not  correspond 
with  usual  and  gentlemanly  courtesy.  But  while  she 
regretted  the  language  of  his  answer,  Kentucky  acqui- 
esced in  his  declining  to  furnish  the  troops  called  for, 
and  she  did  so,  not  because  she  loved  the  Union  the  less, 
but  she  feared  that  if  she  had  parted  with  those  troops, 
and  sent  them  to  serve  in  your  ranks,  she  would  have 
been  overwhelmed  by  the  secessionists  at  home  and 
severed  from  the  Union;  and  it  was  to  preserve, sub- 
stantially and  ultimately,  our  connection  with  the  Union 
that  induced  us  to  acquiesce  in  the  partial  infraction 
of  it  by  our  governor's  refusal  of  the  troops  required. 
This  was  the  most  prevailing  and  general  motive.  To 
this  may  be  added  the  strong  indisposition  of  our  peo- 
ple to  a  civil  war  with  the  South,  and  the  apprehended 
consequences  of  a  civil  war  within  our  State  and  among 
our  own  people.  I  could  elaborate  and  strengthen  all 
this,  but  I  will  leave  the  subject  to  your  own  reflection  : 
with  this  only  remark,  that  I  think  Kentucky's  excuse 
5[  The  vote   of  Kentucky 
S60 
Lincoln. 
1364;  Douglas,  25,651;  Breckinridge,  53,143;    Bell, 
66,058.    ["  Tribune  Almanac,"   1S61T] 
**  Resolutions,  May  16, 1S61.  Van  Home, "  History 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,''  Vol.  I.,  p.  7.
;- 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
is  a  good  one,  and  that,  under  all  the  circumstances  of 
implicated  case,  she  is  rendering  better  service  in 
her  present  position  than  she  could  by  becoming  an 
active  party  in  the  contest.* 
In  truth.  Kentucky  was  undergoing  a  severe 
political  struggle.  The  governor  was  constantly 
stimulating  the  revolutionary  sentiment.  The 
legislature  had  once  more  met,  on  May  6,  be- 
ing a  second  time  convened  in  special  session 
by  the  governor's  proclamation.  The  gov- 
ernor's special  message  now  boldly  accused 
the  President  of  usurpation,  and  declared  the 
Constitution  violated,  the  Government  sub- 
verted, the  Union  broken.  He  again  urged 
that  the  State  be  armed  and  a  convention  be 
called.  It  was  these  more  radical  and  dan- 
gerous measures  which  the  Union  members 
warded  oft"  with  a  legislative  resolution  of 
"  neutrality."  So  also  the  military  bill  which 
was  eventually  passed  was  made  to  serve  the 
Union  instead  of  the  secession  cause.  A  Union 
Board  of  Commissioners  was  provided  to  con- 
trol the  governor's  expenditures  under  it.  A 
"  Home  Guard"  was  authorized,  to  check  and 
offset  Buckner's  "State  Guard"  of  rebellious 
proclivities.  Privates  and  officers  of  both  or- 
ganizations were  required  to  swear  allegiance 
to  both  the  State  and  the  Union.  Finally,  it 
provided  that  the  arms  and  munitions  should 
be  used  neither  against  the  United  States  nor 
against  the  Confederate  States,  unless  to  pro- 
tect Kentucky  against  invasion.  Such  an  atti- 
tude of  qualified  loyalty  can  only  be  defended 
by  the  plea  of  its  compulsory  adoption  as  a 
lesser  evil.  But  it  served  to  defeat  the  con- 
spiracy to  assemble  a  "sovereignty  conven- 
tion" to  inaugurate  secession;  and  the  progress 
of  the  Kentucky  legislature,  from  its  "  anti- 
coercion  "  protest  in  January  to  its  merely 
defensive  "  neutrality  "  resolutions  and  laws  in 
May,  was  an  immense  gain. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion,  Lin- 
coln felt  that  Kentucky  would  be  a  turning 
weight  in  the  scale  of  war.  He  believed  he 
knew  the  temper  and  fidelity  of  his  native 
State,  and  gave  her  his  special  care  and  con- 
fident e.  Though  Governor  Magoffin  refused 
him  troop-,  there  came  to  him  from  private 
he  unmistakable  assurance  that  many 
Kentuckians  were  ready  to  fight  for  the  Union. 
His  early  and  most  intimate  personal  friend, 
Joshua  F.  Speed,  was  now  an  honored  and 
influential  citizen  of  Louisville.  At  Washing- 
ton also  he  had  taken  into  a  cordial  acquaint- 
anceship a  characteristic  Kcntuckian,  William 
on,  a  young,  brave,  and  energetic  lieuten- 
ant of  the  United  States  Navy.  Nelson  saw 
his  usefulness,  and  perhaps  also  his  opportu- 
nity, in  an  effort  to  redeem  his  State,  rather  than 
in  active  service  on  the  quarter-deck.  He  pos- 
sessed the  social  gifts,  the  free  manners,  the 
impulsive  temperament  peculiar  to  the  South. 
Mr.  Lincoln  gave  him  leave  of  absence,  and 
sent  him  to  Kentucky  without  instructions. 
At  the  same  time  the  President  brought  an- 
other personal  influence  to  bear.  Major  An- 
derson was  the  hero  of  the  hour,  and  being  a 
Kentuckian,  that  State  rang  with  the  praise 
of  his  prudence  and  valor  in  defending  Sum- 
ter. On  the  7th  of  May,  Lincoln  gave  him  a 
special  commission,  "  To  receive  into  the 
army  of  the  United  States  as  many  regiments 
of  volunteer  troops  from  the  State  of  Ken- 
tucky, and  from  the  western  part  of  the  State 
of  Virginia,  as  shall  be  willing  to  engage  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States,"  f  etc.,  and  sent 
him  to  Cincinnati,  convenient  to  both  fields 
of  labor.  These  three  persons,  Speed  and  Nel- 
son at  Louisville,  and  Anderson  within  easy 
consulting  distance,  formed  a  reliable  rallying- 
point  and  medium  of  communication  with  the 
President.  The  Unionists,  thus  encouraged, 
began  the  formation  of  Union  Clubs  and  Home 
Guards,  while  the  Government  gave  them  as- 
surance of  protection  in  case  of  need.  Wrote 
General  McClellan : 
The  Union  men  of  Kentucky  express  a  firm  de- 
termination to  fight  it  out.  Yesterday  Garrett  Davis 
told  me :  "We  will  remain  in  the  Union  by  voting  if  we 
can,  by  fighting  if  we  must,  and  if  we  cannot  hold  our 
own,  we  will  call  on  the  General  Government  to  aid  us." 
He  asked  me  what  I  would  do  if  they  called  on  me 
for  assistance,  and  convinced  me  that  the  majority  were 
in  danger  of  being  overpowered  by  a  better-armed  mi- 
nority. I  replied  that  if  there  were  time  I  would  refer 
to  General  Scott  for  orders.  If  there  were  not  time, 
that  I  would  cross  the  Ohio  with  20,000  men.  If  that 
were  not  enough,  with  30,000;  and  if  necessary,  with 
40,000 ;  but  that  I  would  not  stand  by  and  see  the  loyal 
Union  men  of  Kentucky  crushed.  I  have  strong  hopes 
that  Kentucky  will  remain  in  the  Union,  and  the  most 
favorable  feature  of  the  whole  matter  is  that  the  Union 
men  are  now  ready  to  abandon  the  position  of  "  armed 
neutrality,"  and  to  enter  heart  and  soul  into  the  contest 
by  our  side.  % 
In  a  short  time  Nelson  quietly  brought  five 
thousand  Government  muskets  to  Louisville, 
under  the  auspices  and  control  of  a  committee 
of  leading  citizens.  Wrote  Anderson  to  Lincoln : 
I  had  the  pleasure  to  receive  yesterday  your  letter 
of  the  14th  [May]  introducing  Mr.  Joshua  F.  Speed, 
and  giving  me  instructions  about  issuing  arms  to  our 
friends  in  Kentucky.  I  will  carefully  attend  to  the 
performance  of  that  duty.  Mr.  Speed  and  other  gen- 
tlemen for  whom  he  will  vouch,  viz.,  Hon.  James 
Guthrie,  Garrett  Davis,  and  Charles  A.  Marshall,  ad- 
vise that  I  should  not,  at  present,  have  anything  to  do 
with  the  raising  of  troops  in  Kentucky.  The  commit- 
tee charged  with  that  matter  will  go  on  with  the 
organization  and  arming  of  the  Home  Guard,  which 
they  will  see  is  composed  of  reliable  men.§ 
*  Unpublished  MS. 
t  War  Records. 
X  McClellan  to  Townsend,  May  17,  1861.  War 
Records. 
§  Anderson  to  Lincoln,  May  19,  1861.  Unpublished 
MS.
THE  BORDER   STATES. 
Under  date  of  May  28  Lincoln  received 
further  report  of  these  somewhat  confidential 
measures  to  counteract  the  conspiracy  in  his 
native  State : 
The  undersigned,  a  private  committee  to  distribute 
the  arms  brought  to  the  State  of  Kentucky  by  Lieu- 
tenant William  Nelson,  of  the  United  States  Navy, 
among  true,  reliable  Union  men,  represent  to  the  Ex- 
ecutive Department  of  the  United  States  Government 
that  members  of  this  Board  have  superintended  the 
distribution  of  the  whole  quantity  of  five  thousand 
muskets  and  bayonets.  We  have  been  reliably  informed 
and  believe  that  they  have  been  put  in  the  hands  of 
true  and  devoted  Union  men,  who  are  pledged  to  sup- 
port the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the 
enforcement  of  the  laws ;  and,  if  the  occasion  should 
arise,  to  use  them  to  put  down  all  attempts  to  take  Ken- 
tucky, by  violence  or  fraud,  out  of  the  Union.* 
The  committee  added  that  this  had  greatly 
strengthened  the  cause,  that  twenty  thousand 
more  could  be  safely  intrusted  to  the  Union 
men,  who  were  applying  for  them  and  eager  to 
get  them,  and  recommended  that  this  system 
of  arming  Kentucky  be  resumed  and  widely 
extended.! 
The  struggle  between  treason  and  loyalty 
in  the  Kentucky  legislature  had  consumed 
the  month  of  May,  ending,  as  we  have  seen,  by 
decided  advantages  gained  for  the  Union,  and 
attended  by  the  important  understanding  and 
combination  between  prominent  Kentucky 
citizens  and  President  Lincoln  whereby  the 
loyalists  were  furnished  with  arms  and  as- 
sured of  decisive  military  support.  The  Ken- 
tucky legislature  adjourned  sine  die  on  May 
24,  and  the  issue  was  thereupon  transferred 
to  the  people  of  the  State.  The  contest  took 
a  double  form  :  first  an  appeal  to  the  ballot  in 
an  election  for  members  of  Congress,  which 
the  President's  call  for  a  special  session  on  the 
4th  of  July  made  necessary.  A  political  cam- 
paign ensued  of  uuiversal  and  intense  excite- 
ment. Whatever  the  Union  sentiment  of  the 
State  had  hitherto  lacked  of  decision  and  bold- 
ness was  largely  aroused  or  created  by  this  con- 
test. The  Unionists  achieved  a  brilliant  and 
conclusive  triumph.  The  election  was  held  on 
the  20th  of  June,  and  nine  out  of  the  ten  Con- 
gressmen chosen  were  outspoken  loyalists. 
The  second  phase  of  the  contest  was,  that 
it  evoked  a  partial  show  of  military  force  on 
both  sides  of  the  question.  The  military  bill 
passed  on  the  last  day  of  the  May  session 
provided  for  organizing  "  Home  Guards  "  for 
local  defense.  Whether  by  accident  or  design, 
Buckner's  old  militia  law  to  organize  the 
"  State  Guards  "  had  required  an  oath  of  alle- 
giance from  the  officers  only.     The  new  law 
*  The  report  was  signed  by  C.  A.  Wickliffe,  Garrett 
Davis,  J.  H.  Garrard,  J.  Harlan,  James  Speed,  and 
Thornton  F.Marshall;  and  also  indorsed  by  J.  F.  Rob- 
inson, W.  B.  Houston,  J.  K.  Goodloe,  T.  B.  Brunner, 
and  J.  F.  Speed. 
t  Committee,  Report,May  28, 1861.  Unpublished  MS. 
Vol.  XXXVI.  — 11. 
required  all  the  members  to  swear  fidelity  to 
both  Kentucky  and  the  United  States,  and  a 
refusal  terminated  their  membership.  J  This 
searching  touchstone  at  once  instituted  a 
process  of  separating  patriots  from  traitor  . 
The  organization  of  Home  Guards  and  the 
reorganization  of  the  State  Guards  went  on 
simultaneously.  It  would  perhaps  be  more 
correct  to  say  disorganization  of  the  State- 
Guards  ;  for  many  loyal  members  took  advan- 
tage of  the  requirement  to  abandon  the  corps 
and  to  join  the  Home  Guards,  while  disloyal 
ones  seized  the  same  chance  to  go  to  rebel 
camps  in  the  South;  and  under  the  action  of 
both  public  and  private  sentiment  the  State 
Guards  languished  and  the  Home  Guards  grew 
in  numerical  strength  and  moral  influence. 
Meanwhile,  as  a  third  military  organization, 
Kentuckians  were  enlisting  directly  in  the  serv- 
ice of  the  United  States.  Even  before  the 
already  mentioned  commission  to  Anderson, 
Colonels  Guthrie  and  WoodrufThad  established 
"  Camp  Clay,"  on  the  Ohio  shore  above  Cin- 
cinnati, where  a  number  of  Kentuckians  joined 
a  yet  larger  proportion  of  Ohioans,  and  were 
mustered  into  the  three-months'  service  as  the 
1st  and  2d  regiments  Kentucky  Volunteer 
Infantry.§  These  regiments  were  afterward 
reorganized  for  the  three-years' service;  and 
this  time,  mainly  filled  with  real  Kentuckians, 
were  on  the  9th  and  10th  of  June  remustered 
under  their  old  and  now  entirely  appropriate 
designations.  About  this  time  also  State  Sena- 
tor Rousseau,  who  had  made  a  brilliant  Union 
record  in  the  legislature,  obtained  authority 
to  raise  a  brigade.  On  consulting  with  the 
Union  leaders,  it  was  resolved  still  to  humor 
the  popular  "  neutrality  "  foible  till  after  the 
congressional  election;  and  to  this  end  he 
established  "  Camp  Joe  Holt,"  on  the  In- 
diana shore,  where  he  gathered  his  recruits.  || 
The  same  policy  kept  the  headquarters  of 
Anderson  yet  in  Cincinnati. 
With  the  favorable  change  of  public  senti- 
ment, and  the  happy  issue  of  the  congres- 
sional election,  the  Union  men  grew  bolder. 
Nelson  had  all  this  while  been  busy,  and  had 
secretly  appointed  the  officers  and  enrolled 
the  recruits  for  four  regiments  from  central 
Kentucky.  At  the  beginning  of  Jul}"  he  threw 
off  further  concealment,  and  suddenly  assem- 
bled his  men  in  "  Camp  Dick  Robinson," 
which  he  established  between  Danville  and 
Lexington.  His  regiments  were  only  partly 
full  and  indifferently  armed,  and  the  transmis- 
sion of  proper  arms  to  his  camp  was  persist- 
%  Act  of  May  24,  1S61.  "  Session  Laws/'  p.  6. 
%  Van  Home,  "  Army  of  the  Cumberland,''  Vol.  I., 
p.  14. 
||  Van  Home,  "Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  Vol.  I., 
p.  16.
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
ently  opposed  by  rebel  intrigue,  threats,  and 
forcible  demonstrations.  Nevertheless  the 
camp  held  firm,  and  by  equal  alertness  and 
courage  secured  its  guns,  and  so  far  sustained 
and  strengthened  the  loyal  party  that  at  the 
general  election  of  the  5th  of  August  a  new 
legislature  was  chosen  giving  the  Union  mem- 
bers a  majority  of  three-fourths  in  each  branch. 
Thus  in  a  long  and  persistent  contest,  ex- 
tending from  January  to  August,  the  secession 
conspirators  of  Kentucky,  starting  with  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  governor's  cooperation,  military 
control,  and  general  acceptance  of  the  "  neu- 
trality "  delusion,  were,  nevertheless,  outgen- 
eraled and  completely  baffled.  Meanwhile  the 
customary  usurpations  had  carried  Tennessee 
into  active  rebellion;  and  now,  despairing  of 
success  by  argument  and  intrigue,  and  inspir- 
ited by  the  rebel  success  at  Bull  Run,  the 
local  conspiracy  arranged  to  call  in  the  assist- 
ance of  military  force.  On  the  1 7  th  of  August 
the  conspirators  assembled  in  caucus  in  Scott 
county,*  and,  it  is  alleged,  arranged  a  three- 
fold programme :  first,  the  governor  should 
officially  demand  the  removal  of  Union  camps 
and  troops  from  the  State;  secondly,  under 
pretense  of  a  popular  "  peace  "  agitation,  a 
revolutionary  rising  in  aid  of  secession  should 
take  place  in  central  Kentucky ;  thirdly,  a  sim- 
ultaneous invasion  of  rebel  armies  from  Ten- 
nessee should  crown  and  secure  the  work. 
Whether  or  not  the  allegation  was  literally 
true,  events  developed  themselves  in  at  least 
an  apparent  conformity  to  the  plan.  Governor 
Magoffin  wrote  a  letter  to  the  President,  un- 
der date  of  August  19,  urging  "the  removal 
from  the  limits  of  Kentucky  of  the  military 
force  now  organized  and  in  camp  within  the 
State."  In  reply  to  this,  President  Lincoln, 
on  August  24,  wrote  the  governor  a  temper- 
ate but  emphatic  refusal : 
I  believe  it  is  true  that  there  is  a  military  force 
in  camp  within  Kentucky,  acting  by  authority  of 
the  United  States,  which  force  is  not  very  large,  and 
is  not  now  being  augmented.  I  also  believe  that 
arms  have  been  furnished  to  this  force  by  the 
United  States.  I  also  believe  this  force  consists  exclu- 
of  Kentuckians,  having  their  camp  in  the  imme- 
diate vicinity  of  their  own  homes,  and  not  assailing  or 
menacing  any  of  the  good  people  of  Kentucky.  In  all 
I  have  done  in  the  premises  I  have  acted  upon  the 
urgent  solicitation  of  many  Kentuckians,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  what  I  believed,  and  still  believe,  to  be  the 
wish  of  a  mnjority  of  all  the  Union-loving  people  of 
Kentucky.  While  I  have  conversed  on  this  subject 
with  many  eminent  men  of  Kentucky,  including  a  large 
majority  of  her  members  of  Congress,  I  do  not  remem- 
ber that  any  one  of  them  or  any  other  person,  except 
your  Excellency  and  the  bearer  of  your  Excellency's 
letter,  has  urged  me  to  remove  the  military  force  from 
Kentucky,  or  to  disband  it.  One  other  very  worthy 
citizen  of  Kentucky  did  solicit  me  to  have  the  augment- 
ing of  the  force  suspended  for  a  time.  Taking  all  the 
means  within  my  reach  to  form  a  judgment,  I  do  not 
believe  it  is  the  popular  wish  of  Kentucky  that  this 
force  shall  be  removed  beyond  her  limits,  and  with  this 
impression  I  must  respectfully  decline  to  so  remove 
it.  I  most  cordially  sympathize  with  your  Excellency 
in  the  wish  to  preserve  the  peace  of  my  own  native 
State,  Kentucky.  It  is  with  regret  I  search  and  cannot 
find  in  your  not  very  short  letter  any  declaration  or 
intimation  that  you  entertain  any  desire  for  the  preser- 
vation of  the  Eederal  Union. 
The  other  features  of  the  general  plot  suc- 
ceeded no  better  than  Magoffin's  application 
to  Lincoln.  Three  public  demonstrations  were 
announced,  in  evident  preparation  and  prompt- 
ing of  a  popular  rebel  uprising  in  central  Ken- 
tucky. Under  pretense  of  an  ovation  to 
Vallandigham,  an  Ohio  congressman  and 
Democratic  politician,  who  had  already  made 
himself  notorious  by  speeches  of  a  rebel  ten- 
dency, a  meeting  was  held  in  Owen  county 
on  September  5.  On  September  10  a  large 
"peace"  mass  meeting  was  called  at  Frank- 
fort, the  capital,  to  overawe  the  newly  assem- 
bled loyal  legislature.  Still  a  third  gathering, 
of  "States  Rights"  and  "peace"  men,  was 
called  at  Lexington  on  September  20,  to  hold 
a  camp  drill  of  several  days,  under  supervision 
of  leading  secessionists.t 
The  speeches  and  proceedings  of  these 
treacherous  "peace"  meetings  sufficiently  re- 
vealed their  revolutionary  object.  They  were 
officered  and  managed  by  men  whose  prior 
words  and  acts  left  no  doubt  of  their  sympa- 
thies and  desires,  and  the  most  conspicuous  of 
whom  were  soon  after  in  important  stations 
of  command  in  the  rebel  armies.  The  reso- 
lutions were  skillfully  devised:  though  the 
phraseology  was  ambiguous,  the  arrangement 
and  inference  led  to  one  inevitable  conclusion. 
The  substance  and  process  were :  Firstly,  that 
peace  should  be  maintained ;  secondly,  to  main- 
tain peace  we  must  preserve  neutrality ;  thirdly, 
that  it  is  incompatible  with  neutrality  to  tax 
the  State  "for  a  cause  so  hopeless  as  the  mili- 
tary subjugation  of  the  Confederate  States  " ; 
fourthly,  that  a  truce  be  called  and  commission- 
ers appointed  to  treat  for  a  permanent  peace. 
At  the  larger  gatherings,  where  the  proceed- 
ings were  more  critically  scanned,  prudence 
dictated  that  they  should  refrain  from  defi- 
nite committal ;  but  at  some  of  the  smaller 
preliminary  meetings  the  full  purpose  was 
announced  "  that  the  recall  of  the  invading 
armies,  and  the  recognition  of  the  separate  in- 
dependence of  the  Confederate  States,  is  the 
true  policy  to  restore  peace  and  preserve  the 
relations  of  fraternal  love  and  amity  between 
the  States." 
While  these  peace  meetings  were  in  course 
of  development,  the  second  branch  of  the  plot 
was  not  neglected.    In  the  county  of  Owen  an 
*  "Danville  Quarterly  Review,"  June,  1862. 
t  "  Danville  Quarterly  Review,"June  and  September, 
1862,  pp.  245,  381,  385,  and  388.
THE  BORDER   STATES. 
insurrectionary  force  was  being  organized  by 
Humphrey  Marshall.  There  was  no  conceal- 
ment of  his  purpose  to  march  upon  Frankfort, 
where  the  legislature  of  the  State  had  lately 
met,  and  by  force  of  arms  to  scatter  it  and 
break  up  the  session.  Senator  Garrett  Davis  of 
Kentucky  related  the  attendant  circumstances 
in  a  speech  in  the  United  States  Senate : 
I  reached  there  to  attend  a  session  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals  on  the  very  evening  that  it  was  said  Hum- 
phrey Marshall  was  to  make  his  incursion  into  Frank- 
lin county,  and  to  storm  the  capital.  Some  members, 
especially  secession  members  of  the  legislature,  and 
some  citizens  of  the  town  of  Frankfort,  and  one  or  two 
judges  of  our  Court  of  Appeals,  left  Frankfort  hurriedly 
in  the  expectation  that  it  was  to  be  sacked  that  night 
by  Humphrey  Marshall's  insurgent  hosts.  I  myself, 
with  other  gentlemen,  provided  ourselves  with  arms 
to  take  part  in  the  defense  of  the  legislature  and  the 
capital  of  the  State.  We  sent  to  Lexington,  where 
there  were  encamped  three  to  five  hundred  Union 
troops,  who  had  been  enlisted  in  the  Union  service  for 
the  defense  of  the  legislature  and  the  capital  of  our 
State,  and  had  them  brought  down  at  3  o'clock  in  the 
morning.* 
As  events  progressed,  both  these  branches 
of  the  plot  signally  failed.  The  peace  meet- 
ings did  not  result  in  a  popular  uprising ;  they 
served  only  to  show  the  relative  weakness  of 
the  secession  conspiracy.  Such  manifestations 
excited  the  Union  majority  to  greater  vigi- 
lance and  effort,  and  their  preparation  and 
boldness  overawed  the  contemplated  insur- 
rectionary outbreak.  A  decisive  turn  of  affairs 
had  indeed  come,  but  armed  conflict  was 
avoided.  Instead  of  the  Union  legislature 
being  driven  from  the  capital  and  dispersed, 
Vice-President  Breckinridge,  General  Buckner, 
William  Preston,  and  other  leaders  of  the  con- 
spiracy soon  after  hurriedly  left  Kentucky 
with  their  rebellious  followers  and  joined  the 
Confederate  army,  just  beyond  the  Tennessee 
border,  to  take  part  in  the  third  branch  of  the 
plot, —  a  simultaneous  invasion  of  Kentucky 
at  three  different  points. 
THE    CONFEDERATE    MILITARY    LEAGUE. 
It  was  constantly  assumed  that  secession 
was  a  movement  of  the  entire  South.  The  fal- 
lacy of  this  assumption  becomes  apparent  when 
we  remember  the  time  required  for  the  full  or- 
ganization and  development  of  the  rebellion. 
From  the  1 2  th  of  October,  when  Governor  Gist 
issued  his  proclamation  convening  the  South 
Carolina  legislature  to  inaugurate  secession, 
to  January  26,  when  Louisiana  passed  her  se- 
cession ordinance,  is  a  period  of  three  and 
a  half  months.  In  this  first  period,  as  it  may 
be  called,  only  the  six  cotton- States  reached 
a  positive  attitude  of  insurrection ;  and  they, 
*  Garrett  Davis,  Senate  speech,  March  13,  1862. 
"  Congressional  Globe,"  p.  12 14. 
as  is  believed,  by  less  than  a  majority  of  their 
citizens.  Texas,  the  seventh,  did  not  finally 
join  them  till  a  week  later.  During  all  this 
time  the  eight  remaining  slave  States,  with 
certainly  as  good  a  claim  to  be  considered  the 
voice  of  the  South,  earnestly  advised  and  pro- 
tested against  the  precipitate  and  dangerou: 
step.  But  secession  had  its  active  partisans 
in  them.  As  in  the  cotton-States,  their  several 
capitals  were  the  natural  centers  of  disunion ; 
and,  with  few  exceptions,  their  State  officials 
held  radical  opinions  on  the  slavery  question. 
With  the  gradual  progress  of  insurrection 
therefore  in  the  extreme  South  four  of  the 
interior  slave  States  gravitated  into  secession. 
Their  change  was  very  gradual;  perhaps 
principally  because  a  majority  of  their  people 
wished  to  remain  in  the  Union,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  wait  until  by  slow  degrees  the 
public  opinion  could  be  overcome. 
The  anomalous  condition  and  course  of 
Virginia  has  already  been  described  —  its 
Union  vote  in  January,  the  apparently  over- 
whelming Union  majority  of  its  convention, 
its  vacillating  and  contradictory  votes  during 
February  and  March,  and  its  sudden  plunge 
into  a  secession  ordinance  and  a  military  league 
with  Jefferson  Davis  immediately  after  the 
Sumter  bombardment.  The  whole  develop- 
ment of  the  change  is  explained  when  we  re- 
member that  Richmond  had  been  one  of  the 
chief  centers  of  secession  conspiracy  since 
the  Fremont  and  Buchanan  campaign  of 
1856. 
In  the  other  interior  slave  States  the  seces- 
sion movement  underwent  various  forms,  ac- 
cording to  the  greater  obstacles  which  its 
advocates  encountered.  North  Carolina,  it  will 
be  remembered,  gave  a  discouraging  answer 
to  the  first  proposal,  and  the  earliest  demon- 
strations of  the  conspiracy  elicited  no  popular 
response.  On  the  9th  and  10th  of  January  an 
immature  combination  of  State  troops  and  citi- 
zens seized  Forts  Caswell  and  Johnston,  but 
the  governor  immediately  ordered  their  res- 
toration to  the  Federal  authorities.  The  gov- 
ernor excused  the  hostile  act  by  alleging  the 
popular  apprehension  that  Federal  garrisons 
were  to  be  placed  in  them,  and  earnestly  dep- 
recated any  show  of  coercion.!  He  received 
a  conciliatory  response  from  the  War  Depart- 
ment (January  15,  1861)  that  no  occupation 
of  them  was  intended  unless  they  should  be 
threatened.  % 
Nevertheless  conspiracy  continued,  and. 
as  usual,  under  the  guise  of  solicitude  for 
peace ;  and  in  a  constant  clamor  for  additional 
guarantees,  the  revolutionary  feeling  was  aug- 
mented little  by  little.    There  seems  to  have 
t  Ellis  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  12,  1S61.     War  Records. 
X  Holt  to  Ellis,  Jan.  15,  1861.   Ibid.
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
been  great  fluctuation  of  public  opinion.  A  con- 
vention was  ordered  by  the  legislature  and  sub- 
sequently voted  down  at  the  polls.  Commis- 
sioners were  sent  to  the  peace  convention  at 
Washington,  and  also  to  the  provisional  rebel 
Congress  at  Montgomery,  with  instructions 
limiting  their  powers  to  an  effort  at  mediation. 
At  the  same  time  the  North  Carolina  House 
passed  a  unanimous  resolution  that  if  recon- 
ciliation  tailed,  North  Carolina  must  go  with 
the  slave  States.  Next  a  military  bill  was 
passed  to  reorganize  the  militia,  and  arm  ten 
thousand  volunteers.*  In  reality  it  seems  to 
have  been  the  same  struggle  which  took 
place  elsewhere;  the  State  officials  and  radi- 
cal politicians  favoring  secession,  and  the  peo- 
ple clinging  to  the  Union,  but  yielding  finally 
to  the  arts  and  intrigues  of  their  leaders.  When 
Sumter  was  bombarded  and  President  Lincoln 
called  for  troops,  the  governor  threw  his 
whole  influence  and  authority  into  the  insur- 
rectionary movement.  He  sent  an  insulting 
refusal  to  Washington,!  and  the  next  day 
ordered  his  State  troops  to  seize  Forts  Caswell 
and  Johnston.  A  week  later  (April  22)  he 
seized  the  Fayetteville  arsenal,  containing 
37,000  stands  of  arms,  3000  kegs  of  powder, 
and  an  immense  supply  of  shells  and  shot.  We 
may  also  infer  that  he  was  in  secret  league 
with  the  Montgomery  rebellion;  for  the  rebel 
Secretary  of  War  at  once  made  a  requisition 
upon  him,  and  he  placed  his  whole  military 
preparation  at  the  service  of  Jefferson  Davis, 
sending  troops  and  arms  to  Richmond  and 
elsewhere.  It  was  a  bold  usurpation  of  ex- 
ecutive power.  Neither  legislature  nor  con- 
vention had  ordered  rebellion;  but  from  that 
time  on  the  State  was  arrayed  in  active  hos- 
tility to  the  Union.  It  was  not  till  the  1st 
of  May  that  the  legislature  for  the  second 
time  ordered  a  convention,  which  met  and 
passed  an  ordinance  of  secession  on  the  20th 
of  that  month,  also  formally  accepting  the  Con- 
federate States  Constitution. 
In  the  State  of  Arkansas  the  approaches  to 
ssion  were  even  slower  and  more  difficult 
than  in  North  Carolina.  There  seems  to  have 
been  little  disposition  at  first,  among  her  own 
pie  or  leaders,  to  embark  in  the  disastrous 
rtaking.    The  movement  appears  to  have 
begun  when,  on  December  20,  i860,  a 
•oner  came  from  Alabama,  and  by  an 
address  to  the  legislature  invited  Arkansas  to 
unite  in  the  movement  for  separation.    No  di- 
rect success  followed  the  request,  and  the  de- 
ceitful expedient  of  a  convention  to  ascertain 
the  will  of  the   people   was  resorted  to.    All 
parties  joined  in  this  measure;  the  fire-eaters 
to  promote  secession,  the  Unionists  to  thwart 
it.     An  election  for  or  against  a  convention 
took  place  February   18,    1861,  resulting  in 
27,412  votes  for  and  15,826  votes  against  it; 
though  as  compared  with  the  presidential 
election  it  was  estimated  that  at  least  10,815 
voters  did  not  go  to  the  polls.  At  a  later  elec- 
tion for  delegates  the  returns  indicated  a  Union 
vote  of  23,626  against  a  secession  vote  of 
17,927.  When  the  convention  was  organized, 
March  4,  1861,  the  delegates  are  reported  to 
have  chosen  Union  officers  by  a  majority  of 
six  ;  %  many  of  the  delegates  must  have  already 
betrayed  their  constituents  by  a  change  of 
front.  Revolutionary  tricks  had  been  em- 
ployed, the  United  States  arsenal  at  Little 
Rock  had  been  seized  (February  8),  and  the 
ordnance  stores  at  Napoleon  (February  12), 
while  no  doubt  the  insurrectionary  influences 
from  the  neighboring  cotton-States  were  in- 
definitely multiplied.  With  all  this  the  progress 
of  the  conspirators  was  not  rapid.  A  condi- 
tional secession  ordinance  was  voted  down  by 
the  convention,  39  to  35.  This  ought  to  have 
effectually  killed  the  movement ;  but  it  shows 
the  greater  aggressiveness  and  persistence  of 
the  secession  leaders,  that,  instead  of  yielding 
to  their  defeat,  they  kept  alive  their  scheme, 
by  the  insidious  proposal  to  take  a  new  popu- 
lar vote  on  the  question  in  the  following  Au- 
gust. Meanwhile  there  were  a  continual  loss 
of  Union  sentiment  and  growth  of  secession 
excitement ;  and,  as  in  other  States,  when  the 
Sumter  catastrophe  occurred,  the  governor 
and  his  satellites  placed  the  State  in  an  atti- 
tude of  insurrection  by  the  refusal  to  comply 
with  Lincoln's  call  for  troops,  and  by  hostile 
military  organization.  Thereafter  disunion  had 
a  free  course.  The  convention  was  hastily 
called  together  April  20,  and,  meeting  on 
the  6th  of  May,  immediately  passed  the  cus- 
tomary ordinance  of  secession. 
In  no  other  State  did  secession  resort  to 
such  methods  of  usurpation  as  in  Tennessee. 
The  secession  faction  of  the  State  was  insig- 
nificant in  numbers,  but  its  audacity  was  per- 
haps not  equaled  in  any  other  locality ;  and 
it  may  almost  be  said  that  Governor  Harris 
carried  the  State  into  rebellion  single  handed. 
The  whole  range  of  his  plottings  cannot,  of 
course,  be  known.  Fie  called  a  session  of 
the  legislature  January  7,  1861,  and  sent 
them  a  highly  inflammatory  message.  A  con- 
vention bill  was  passed  and  approved  Janu- 
ary 19,  1 86 1,  which  submitted  the  question 
of  "  convention  "  or  "  no  convention,"  and 
which  also  provided  that  any  ordinance  of 
disunion  should  be  ratified  by  popular  vote 
before  taking  effect.  At  the  election  held  on 
February  9  there  appeared  on  the  vote  for 
delegates  a  Union  majority  of  64,114,  and 
*  "Annual  Cyclopedia,"  1861,  p.  538. 
t  Ellis  to  Cameron,  April  15,  1861.      War  Records. 
t"  Annual  Cyclopedia,"  1861,  p.  22.
THE  BORDER   STATES. 
against  holding  the  convention  a  majority  of 
11,875.  This  overwhelming  popular  decision 
for  a  time  silenced  the  conspirators.  The  fall 
of  Fort  Sumter  and  Lincoln's  call  for  troops 
afforded  the  governor  a  new  pretext  to  con- 
tinue his  efforts.  He  sent  the  President  a  de- 
fiant refusal,  and  responded  to  a  requisition 
from  Montgomery  for  troops,  being  no  doubt 
in  secret  league  with  the  rebellion.  In  the 
revolutionary  excitement  which  immediately 
followed,  the  governor's  official  authority,  and 
the  industrious  local  conspiracy  of  which  he 
was  the  head,  carried  all  before  them.  Since  it 
was  evident  that  he  could  not  obtain  a  con- 
vention to  do  his  bidding,  he  resolved  to  em- 
ploy the  legislature,  which  he  once  more  called 
together.  In  secret  sessions  he  was  able  to 
manipulate  it  at  his  will.  On  the  1st  of  May 
the  legislature  passed  a  joint  resolution  di- 
recting the  governor  to  appoint  commissioners 
"  to  enter  into  a  military  league  with  the 
authorities  of  the  Confederate  States,"  placing 
the  whole  force  of  the  State  at  the  control  of 
Jefferson  Davis,  and  on  the  7th  of  the  month 
a  formal  military  league  or  treaty  to  this  effect 
was  signed.*  Even  after  this  the  governor 
had  difficult  work.  Eastern  Tennessee  was 
pervaded  by  so  strong  a  Union  sentiment 
that  it  continued  to  labor  and  protest  against 
being  dragged  into  rebellion  contrary  to  its 
will,  but  the  opposition  was  of  little  direct 
avail.  Military  organization  had  its  grasp  on 
the  whole  State,  and  citizens  not  in  arms  had 
no  choice  but  to  submit  to  the  orders  issued 
from  Montgomery  and  Nashville. 
It  will  be  seen  from  this  recital  that  the 
secession  movement  divides  itself  into  two 
distinct  periods.  The  first  group,  the  cotton- 
States,  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama, 
Mississippi,  Louisiana,  Florida,  and  Texas, 
took  action  mainly  bet  ween  the  12th  of  Octo- 
ber, i860,  and  February  4,  1861,  a  period  of 
a  little  more  than  three  and  a  half  months. 
The  second  group,  the  interior  slave  States, 
Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Tennessee,  and  Ar- 
kansas, was  occupied  by  the  struggle  about 
three  months  longer,  or  a  total  of  six  months 
after  Lincoln's  election.  So  also  these  two 
periods  exhibited  separate  characteristics  in 
their  formative  processes.  The  first  group,  be- 
ing more  thoroughly  permeated  by  the  spirit 
of  revolt,  and  acting  with  greater  vigor  and 
promptness,  shows  us  the  semblance  at  least  of 
voluntary  confederation,  through  its  Provis- 
ional Congress  at  Montgomery.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  action  of  the  four  interior  slave  States 
*  "  Rebellion  Record." 
was,  in  each  case,  with  more  or  less  distinctness 
at  first,  merely  that  of  joining  the  original  nu- 
cleus in  a  military  league,  in  which  the  excite- 
ment of  military  preparation  and  allurement 
of  military  glory,  not  the  consideration  of 
political  expediency,  turned  the  scale. 
There  remained  still  the  third  group,  con- 
sisting of  the  border  slave  States  of  Delaware, 
Maryland,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri.  The  ef- 
forts of  the  conspirators  to  involve  Maryland 
in  secession  have  already  been  detailed,  as 
well  as  the  persistence  they  employed  to  gain 
control  of  Kentucky  and  Missouri.  In  these 
three  States,  however,  the  attempt  failed  be- 
cause of  the  direct  and  indirect  military  sup- 
port which  the  Government  was  able  to  give 
immediately  to  the  Union  sentiment  and  or- 
ganizations. Had  it  been  possible  to  extend 
the  same  encouragement  and  help  to  Arkan- 
sas and  Tennessee,  they  also  might  have  been 
saved.  This  becomes  more  apparent  when 
we  remember  how  quickly  half  of  Virginia 
was  reclaimed  and  held  steadfastly  loyal  dur- 
ing the  war.  The  remaining  slave  State,  Del- 
aware, was  so  slightly  tainted  with  treason 
that  her  attitude  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have 
been  in  doubt;  moreover,  her  geographical 
position  threw  her  destiny  inseparably  with 
the  free  States. 
The  adhesion  which  we  have  described 
of  the  four  interior  slave  States  of  Virginia. 
North  Carolina,  Tennessee,  and  Arkansas  to 
the  Confederate  States  at  once  wholly  changed 
the  scope  and  resources  of  the  rebellion.  It 
extended  its  territorial  area  nearly  one-third, 
and  almost  doubled  its  population  and  re- 
sources. It  could  now  claim  to  be  a  compact 
nation  of  eleven  States,  with  a  territory  more 
than  double  the  size  of  any  European  nation 
except  Russia,  and  with  a  population  of  five 
and  a  half  millions  of  whites  and  three  and  a 
half  millions  of  blacks.  It  had  a  long  sea-coast, 
several  fine  harbors,  and  many  navigable 
rivers.  It  contained  a  great  variety  of  lands, 
important  diversities  of  climate,  and  a  wide 
range  of  agricultural  products.  Its  country 
was  as  yet  sparsely  inhabited,  and  was  known 
to  include  very  considerable  mineral  wealth, 
while  its  manufacturing  capabilities  were  al- 
most wholly  untouched.  The  exultation  and 
enthusiastic  prophecies  of  the  rebel  chiefs 
at  the  successful  beginning  of  their  daring- 
project  were  perhaps  not  unnatural  when  we 
reflect  that  their  mischievous  design  and  repre- 
hensible cause  had  secured  the  support  of  such 
fair  and  substantial  elements  of  national  great- 
ness and  power.
[BEGUN  IN  THE  NOVEMBER  NUMBER.) 
THE    GRAYSONS:    A    STORY    OF    ILLINOIS* 
BY    EDWARD    EGGLESTON, 
Author  of  "  The  Hoosier  Schoolmaster,"  "  The  Circuit  Rider,"  "  Roxy,"  etc. 
XX. 
LINCOLN1    AND    BOB. 
AST  by  the  "  City  Hotel  " 
in  Moscow  stood  a  beech- 
tree,  as  we  have  said,  and 
under  this  tree  were  two 
or  three  benches.  This  um- 
brageous spot  was  the  cool 
and  favorite  loafing-place 
of  the  villagers,  the  tryst- 
ing-place  for  making  bargains  or  meeting 
friends.  The  ground  was  beaten  by  many  feet 
to  the  hardness  of  a  floor,  and  the  village  boys 
delighted  to  play  marbles  in  this  convenient 
spot.  Their  cries  of  "  rounses,"  "  taw,"  "  dubs," 
"  back  licks,"  and  "  vent  "  might  often  be  heard 
there  before  and  after  school  hours.  On  one 
of  these  benches  under  the  beech-tree  Bob 
McCord  had  an  interview  with  Tom  Grayson's 
lawyer,  according  to  appointment,  on  the  day 
of  Lincoln's  return  from  court  at  Perrysburg. 
"  What 's  this  about  lynching  Tom  ?  "  Lin- 
coln inquired.  "  A  lot  of  fellows  rode  into 
Perrysburg  looking  for  him  last  Thursday 
night." 
"  Yes,"  said  Bob,  with  a  hearty  chuckle ;  "  I 
put  'em  onto  that  air  track  myself.  They  wuz 
comin'  down  h-yer,  but  I  made  'em  think  't 
Tom  wuz  moved  to  Perrysburg." 
'•Are  they  going  to  try  it  again?"  asked 
Lincoln. 
':  Not  right  off;  they  're  sort-uh  discairaged 
like.  A  few  uv  'em  wuz  cocked  un  primed  to 
a  Sunday  night, —  sech  uv  'em  as  had  n't 
gin  it  up  arter  ridin'  over  to  Perrysburg, — but 
we  fooled  'em  ag'in.  Pete  Markham,  the  dep- 
uty sher'f,  jes  sidled  over  to  camp-meetin'  un 
let  on  't  he  wuz  a-lookin'  fer  somebody  what 
knowed  sum  pin  about  a  young  feller  weth  red 
whiskers  un  one  eye  a  leetle  crossed-like.  Ma- 
gill,  the  clerk,  went  over  to  camp-meetin'  un 
down  onto  the  Run,  un  gin  it  out  on  the  sly 
like  zif  he  could  n'  keep  it  in,  that  they  'd  dis- 
kivered  the  tracks  uv  a  young  feller  from  an- 
other k-younty  weth  red  whiskers,  un  so  on, 
that  had  done  the  shootin'.  The  story  run  like 
a  perrary  lire  in  a  high  wind  un  sort-uh  mixed 
'em  up  in  the'r  minds,  like.  I  've  got  it  fixed 
*  Copyright,  1 887,  by  Edward  I 
so  as  they  can't  come  down  unbeknownst  to 
me;  un  ef  wust  comes  to  wust,  w'y,  I  've  got 
my  eye  sot  onto  a  crowbar." 
"  A  crowbar  ?  What  could  you  do  with  a 
crowbar,  Bob  ?  "  asked  Lincoln,  with  a  puzzled 
contraction  of  the  brows.  "  You  would  n't  try 
to  whale  the  whole  crowd  with  it,  would  you  ?  " 
"  W'y,  Abe,  I  'low,  ef  a  rale  tight  pinch 
comes,  to  try  a  tussle  weth  that  air  jail.  I  don't 
know  's  I  could  prize  out  one  uv  them  air  iron 
grates,  but  ef 't  wuz  to  come  to  that,  I  'd  try  to 
git  Tom  out  uv  harm's  way.  You  say  the 
word  un  I  '11  find  some  way  to  let  'im  out 
anyhow." 
"No,  no;  don't  do  that.  If  he  runs  away 
he  '11  be  caught,  and  then  he  '11  be  sure  to  be 
lynched,  or  hanged.  Let  me  try  the  law  first, 
and  then  it  '11  be  time  enough  to  use  crow- 
bars afterward  if  I  fail.  Do  you  know  Dave 
So  vine  ?  " 
"  When  I  see  'im.  He  's  an  ornery  kind  uv 
a  cuss.    I  don't  know  's  he  rickollecks  me." 
"  So  much  the  better  if  he  does  n't.  You 
must  get  him  to  tell  you  all  about  the  shoot- 
ing—  his  story  of  it.  Get  him  to  tell  more 
than  was  brought  out  at  the  inquest.  Make 
him  explain  it,  and  find  out  if  he  's  going  to 
clear  out  before  the  trial." 
"  I  heern  tell  't  he  won't  talk,"  said  Bob. 
"  Theprosecutin'  attorney 's  shut  'im  up  tight  'z 
bees-wax,  they  say." 
Lincoln  mused  awhile.  "  If  the  prosecuting 
attorney  has  shut  him  up,  you  must  open  him. 
Contrive  some  way  to  get  his  story  and  find 
out  what  he  means  to  do." 
But  it  was  not  easy  to  encounter  Dave  in 
these  days.  Since  he  had  acquired  notoriety, 
as  the  only  witness  of  the  murder,  he  had  been 
seized  with  an  unprecedented  diffidence,  and 
kept  himself  out  of  public  gaze.  The  boys 
about  the  village  conjectured  that  he  was  "lay- 
ing low  for  big  game."  Bob,  however,  had  no 
objection  to  waiting  for  Sovine's  coming.  He 
liked  this  lurking  for  prey  as  a  cat  likes  the 
watching  at  a  mouse-hole.  Besides,  loafing  of 
any  sort  suited  Big  Bob's  genius.  He  could 
sit  astride  a  barrel  on  the  shady  side  of  a  gro- 
cery for  hours  with  no  sense  of  exhaustion. 
More  than  one  day  McCord  had  passed  in 
■ggleston.     All  rights  reserved.
ABRAHAM    LINCOLN:     A    HISTORY.* 
BY   JOHN    G.    NICOLAY    AND    JOHN    HAY,    PRIVATE    SECRETARIES    TO    THE    PRESIDENT. 
THE    ADVANCE. 
ECESSION  sophistry  about 
oppression  and  subjuga- 
tion was  sufficiently  an- 
swered by  the  practical 
logic  of  the  Southern 
States  in  collecting  armies 
and  uniting  in  military 
leagues.  Military  neces- 
sity, not  political  expediency,  was  now  the 
unavoidable  rule  of  action.  The  Washington 
authorities  had  long  foreseen  that  merely  fill- 
ing the  National  capital  with  Northern  regi- 
ments would  not  by  itself  give  security  to  the 
Government  buildings  and  archives.  The  pres- 
idential mansion,  the  Capitol,  and  the  various 
department  offices  all  lay  within  easy  reach  of 
rebel  batteries  which  might  rise  in  a  single 
night  at  commanding  points  on  the  southern 
bank  of  the  Potomac,  and  from  which  hostile 
shot  and  shell  could  speedily  reduce  the  whole 
city  to  ruins.  As  early,  therefore,  as  the  3d  of 
May,  Scott  instructed  General  Mansfield,  the 
local  commander,  to  seize  and  fortify  Arlington 
Heights.  Various  causes  produced  a  postpone- 
ment of  the  design,  urgent  as  was  the  neces- 
sity; but  finally  the  needed  reinforcements 
arrived.  Under  plans  carefully  matured,  the 
Union  forces  commanded  by  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Irvin  McDowell  on  the  morning  of  May 
24  made  their  advance  across  the  Potomac 
River  and  entered  Virginia.  Here  was  begun 
that  formidable  system  of  earth- works,  crown- 
ing every  hill  in  an  irregular  line  for  perhaps 
ten  miles,  extending  from  the  river-bend  above 
Georgetown  to  the  bay  into  which  Hunting 
Creek  flows,  below  Alexandria,  which  consti- 
tuted such  an  immense  military  strength, 
and  so  important  a  moral  support  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and,  indeed,  to  the  Union 
sentiment  of  the  whole  country  during  the 
entire  war. 
Three  other  movements  of  troops  were  be- 
gun about  the  same  time.  General  Butler  was 
transferred  from  Baltimore  to  Fort  Monroe  to 
collect  nine  or  ten  regiments  for  aggressive 
purposes.  General  Robert  Patterson,  who 
was  organizing  the  Pennsylvania  militia,  as- 
sembled the  contingent  of  that  State  with  a 
view  to  a  movement  against  Harper's  Ferry. 
And  General  George  B.  McClellan,  appointed 
to  organize  the  contingent  from  the  State  of 
Ohio,  had  his  earliest  attention  directed  to- 
ward a  movement  into  western  Virginia. 
Prompted  by  many  different  shades  of  feel- 
ing, there  now  arose  throughout  the  North 
a  demand  for  military  action  and  military  suc- 
cess. Assuming  the  undeniable  preponderance 
of  men  and  means  in  the  free  States,  public 
opinion  illogically  also  assumed  that  they 
could  be  made  immediately  victorious.  Under 
bold  head-lines  a  leading  newspaper  kept 
"The  nation's  war  cry  "  standing  in  its  col- 
umns :  "  Forward  to  Richmond !  Forward  to 
Richmond!  The  rebel  Congress  must  not  be 
allowed  to  meet  there  on  the  20th  of  July. 
By  that  date  the  place  must  be  held  by  the 
National  army !  "  f  Though  this  was  but  a  sin- 
gle voice,  it  brought  responsive  echoes  from 
all  parts  of  the  North. 
Two  months  of  the  first  three-months'  en- 
listment of  the  militia  called  into  service  were 
already  gone;  it  seemed  desirable  that  the 
remaining  third  of  their  term  should  be  util- 
ized in  an  energetic  movement.  General 
Scott's  original  idea  had  been  that  this  ener- 
getic movement  should  occur  at  Harper's 
Ferry;  but  Johnston's  evacuation  of  that  place, 
and  Patterson's  over-caution  and  defensive 
strategy,  frustrated  the  design.  Under  the  in- 
creasing political  pressure,  the  most  promising 
alternative  was  thought  to  be  a  direct  advance 
from  Washington  against  Manassas  Junction, 
the  strategical  importance  of  which  the  Con- 
federates had  instinctively  recognized,  espe- 
cially its  relation  to  Harper's  Ferry.  Colonel 
Cocke  had  written  to  Lee,  May  15 : 
These  two  columns,  one  at  Manassas  and  one  at 
Winchester,  could  readily  cooperate  and  concentrate 
upon  the  one  point  or  the  other ;  either  to  make  head 
against  the  enemy's  columns  advancing  down  the  val- 
ley, should  he  force  .Harper's  Ferry,  or  in  case  we 
repulse  him  at  Harper's  Ferry,  the  Winchester  sup- 
porting column  could  throw  itself  on  this  side  of  the 
mountains  to  cooperate  with  the  column  at  Manassas. 
On  the  29th  of  June  President  Lincoln 
called  his  Cabinet  and  principal  military  offi- 
cers to  a  council  of  war  at  the  Executive 
Mansion,  to  discuss  a  campaign  against  the 
rebels  at  Manassas.  General  Scott  took  occa- 
t  "  New  York  Tribune,"  June  20,  1S61. 
Copyright  by  J.  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  18S6.     All  rights  reserved.
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN: 
siou  to  say  that  he  was  not  in  favor  of  such 
a  movement.  "  He  did  not  believe  in  a  little 
war  by  piecemeal.  But  he  believed  in  a  war 
of  large  bodies."  He  adhered  to  the  "  ana- 
conda "  policy,  and  a  decisive  campaign  down 
the  Mississippi  River  in  the  autumn  and  win- 
ter. "  We  were  to  go  down,  light  all  the  bat- 
tles that  were  necessary,  take  all  the  positions 
we  could  find  and  garrison  them,  fight  a  bat- 
\  ew  Orleans  and  win  it,  and  thus  end  the 
war."*  But  being  overruled  by  the  President 
and  Cabinet  in  favor  of  an  immediate  move- 
ment, the  old  soldier  gracefully  yielded  his 
preference,  and  gave  his  best  counsel  and  co- 
operation to  the  new  enterprise.  He  caused 
to  be  read  the  plan  matured  by  General  Mc- 
Dowell and  approved  by  himself. 
McDowell's  plan  stated  that  the  secession 
forces  then  at  Manassas  Junction,  under  com- 
mand of  General  Beauregard,  and  its  de- 
pendencies, were  estimated  at  twenty-five 
thousand.  When  threatened  they  would  call 
up  all  reinforcements  within  reach. 
If  General  T-  E.  Johnston's   force  is  kept  engaged 
bv  Major-General  Patterson,  and  Major-General  Butler 
occupies  the  force  now  in  his  vicinity,  I  think  they  will 
not  be  able  to  bring  up  more  than  ten  thousand  men. 
So  we  must  calculate    on   having   to  do  with    about 
thirty-five  thousand  men.   .   .   .   Leaving  small  garri- 
in  the  defensive  works,  I  propose  to  move  against 
Manassas  with  a  force  of  30,000  of  all  arms,  organized 
j    columns,    with    a    reserve    of    10,000.    .    .    . 
After    uniting   the    columns     this    side  of   it,  I    pro- 
pose to  attack  the    main    position    by    turning  it,   if 
ible,  so  as  to  cut  off  communications  by  rail  with 
the  South,  t 
Pefore,  however,  the  preparation  for  this 
advance  had  even  been  completed,  the  first 
campaign  of  the  war,  though  not  an  extensive 
one,  was  already  finished  with  a  decided  sue- 
to  the  Union  arms. 
When  the  Richmond  convention  by  the 
1  secession  ordinance  of  the  17th  of 
April,  and  a  few  days  later  by  a  military  league 
with  Jefferson  Davis,  literally  kidnapped  Vir- 
ginia and  transferred  her,  bound  hand  and  foot, 
to  the  rebel  government  at  Montgomery,  the 
western  half  of  the  State  rose  with  an  almost 
unanimous  protest  against  the  rude  violation 
If-government,  and  resolved  to  secede 
from  1.    A  series  of  popular  meetings 
was  held,  with  such  success  that  on  the  13th 
of  May  delegates  from  twenty-five  counties 
met  for  consultation  at  Wheeling,  and  agreed 
on  such  further  action  and  cooperation  as 
would  enable  them  to  counteract  and  escape 
the  treason  and  alienation  to  which  they  had 
been  committed  without  their  consent.  The 
leaders  made  their  designs  known  to  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  at  Washington,  and  to  General 
McClellan  at  Gincinnati,  commanding  the 
*  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War. 
Department  of  the  Ohio,  and  were  not  only 
assured  of  earnest  sympathy,  but  promised 
active  help  from  the  Ohio  contingent  of  three- 
months'  volunteers,  whenever  the  decisive 
moment  of  need  should  arrive.  In  conform- 
ity with  this  understanding,  an  expedition  un- 
der McClellan's  orders  moved  against  and 
dispersed  a  little  nucleus  of  rebel  troops  at 
Philippi,  in  a  secluded  mountain  valley  about 
fifteen  miles  south  of  Grafton. 
Under  shelter  and  encouragement  of  this 
initial  military  success,  the  political  scheme 
of  forming  a  new  State  proceeded  with  accel- 
erated ardor.  As  early  as  June  n  a  delegate 
convention,  representing  about  forty  counties 
lying  between  the  crest  of  the  Alleghanies 
and  the  Ohio  River,  met  and  organized  at 
Wheeling.  On  the  13th  of  June,  after  reciting 
the  various  treasonable  usurpations  of  the 
Richmond  convention  and  Governor  Letcher, 
it  adopted  a  formal  declaration  that  all  the 
acts  of  the  convention  and  the  executive  were 
without  authority  and  void,  and  declared  va- 
cated all  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial 
offices  in  the  State  held  by  those  "wdio  ad- 
here to  said  convention  and  executive."  On 
the  19th  of  June  an  ordinance  was  adopted 
creating  a  provisional  State  government,  un- 
der which  F.  H.  Peirpoint  was  appointed 
governor,  to  wield  executive  authority  in 
conjunction  with  an  executive  council  of  five 
members.  A  legislature  was  constituted  by 
calling  together  such  members-elect  as  would 
take  a  prescribed  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
United  States  and  to  the  restored  government 
of  Virginia,  and  providing  for  filling  the  va- 
cancies of  those  who  refused.  A  similar  pro- 
vision continued  or  substituted  other  State 
and  county  officers.  After  adding  sundry 
other  ordinances  to  this  groundwork  of  res- 
toration, the  convention  on  the  25th  took 
a  recess  till  August.  The  newly  constituted 
legislature  soon  met  to  enact  laws  for  the 
provisional  government;  and  on  July  9  it 
elected  two  United  States  senators,  who  were 
admitted  to  seats  four  days  later. 
So  far  the  work  was  simply  a  repudiation 
of  secession  and  a  restoration  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  whole  State  which  had  been 
usurped.  But  the  main  motive  and  purpose 
of  the  counter-revolution  was  not  allowed  to 
halt  nor  fail.  In  August  the  Wheeling  con- 
vention reassembled,  and  on  the  20th  adopt- 
ed an  ordinance  creating  the  new  State  of 
Kanawha  (afterward  West  Virginia)  and  pro- 
viding for  a  popular  vote  to  be  taken  in  the  fol- 
lowing October  on  the  question  of  ratification. 
The  Richmond  government  had  no  thought 
of  surrendering  western  Virginia  to  the  Union 
without  a  struggle.  Toward  the  end  of  June 
t  McDowell  toTownsend,  June,  1861.  War  Records.
A    HISTORY. 
they  sent  General  Garnett  to  oppose  the  Fed- 
feral  forces.  He  took  position  in  a  mountain- 
pass  at  Laurel  Hill  with  3  or  4  regiments,  and 
stationed  Colonel  Pegram  in  another  pass  at 
Rich  Mountain,  17  miles  south,  with  a  regi- 
ment and  6  guns.  Early  in  July,  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  learning  the  weakness  of  the  rebels, 
resolved  to  drive  them  from  their  positions. 
He  sent  General  Morris  with  5  or  6  regiments 
against  Garnett,  and  himself  moved  with  some 
7  regiments  upon  Pegram's  intrenched  camp. 
General  Rosecrans,  commanding  McClellan's 
advance,  was  fortunate  enough  to  obtain  a 
Union  mountaineer,  thoroughly  familiar  with 
the  locality,  who  led  a  detachment  of  1 900  men 
to  the  rear  of  the  rebel  position,  where  they 
easily  dispersed  an  outpost  of  300  men  with  2 
guns  stationed  near  the  summit.  This  victory 
made  Pegram's  position  untenable ;  and,  has- 
tily abandoning  his  intrenched  camp  and  guns, 
he  sought  to  join  Garnett  at  Laurel  Hill  by  a 
northward  march  along  the  mountain-top. 
Garnett,  however,  was  already  retreating ; 
and  Pegram,  unable  to  escape,  surrendered 
his  command  of  between  500  and  600  to  Mc- 
Clellan  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  of  July. 
A  difficult  route  of  retreat  to  the  northward 
still  lay  open  to  Garnett,  and  he  made  diligent 
efforts  to  impede  the  pursuit,  which  was  pushed 
with  vigor.  About  noon  of  July  13  Captain 
Benham  with  three  Union  regiments  came  up 
with  the  rebel  wagon  train  at  Carrick's  Ford, 
one.  of  the  crossings  of  Cheat  River,  twenty-six 
miles  north-west  of  Laurel  Hill.  Here  Garnett 
deployed  his  rear-guard  of  a  regiment  with  three 
guns  to  protect  his  train ;  but  by  a  sharp  at- 
tack the  Union  forces  drove  the  enemy,  captur- 
ing one  of  the  guns.  In  a  desultory  skirmish 
a  little  farther  on  Garnett  himself  was  killed  by 
a  sharpshooter,  and  that  incident  terminated 
the  pursuit.  The  Unionists  secured  the  wagon 
train,  and  the  remnant  of  rebels  successfully 
continued  their  farther  retreat. 
Large  political  and  military  results  followed 
this  series  of  comparatively  slight  encounters. 
They  terminated  the  campaign  for  the  pos- 
session of  western  Virginia,  and  the  movement 
for  the  establishment  of  a  separate  State  there- 
after went  on  unchecked.  The  most  important 
result  was  upon  the  personal  fortunes  of  General 
McClellan.  These  were  the  first  decided  Union 
victories  of  the  war,  and  they  were  hailed  \>y 
the  North  with  a  feeling  of  triumph  altogether 
disproportionate  to  their  real  magnitude.  When 
on  the  following  day  McClellan  summed  up  in 
a  single  laconic  dispatch*  the  scattered  and 
disconnected  incidents  of  three  different  days, 
happening  forty  miles  apart,  the  impression, 
without  design  on  his  part,  was  most  natu- 
rally produced  upon  the  authorities  and  the 
country  that  so  sweeping  and  effective  a  cam- 
paign could  only  be  the  work  of  a  military 
genius  of  the  first  order.  McClellan  was  the 
unquestioned  hero  of  the  hour.  The  eclat  of 
this  achievement  soon  called  him  to  Washing- 
ton, and  in  a  train  of  events  which  followed 
had  no  insignificant  influence  in  securing  his 
promotion,  on  the  1st  of  November  follow- 
ing, without  further  victories,  to  the  command 
of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 
BULL    RUN.  t 
It  had  been  arranged  that  McDowell's  ad- 
vance against  the  enemy  at  Manassas  should 
begin  on  July  9  :  by  dint  of  extraordinary  ex- 
ertions he  was  ready  and  issued  his  marching 
orders  on  July  16.  %  But  his  organization  was 
very  imperfect  and  his  preparations  were  far 
from  complete.  Many  of  his  regiments  reached 
him  but  two  days  before,  and  some  only  on 
the  day  he  moved.  He  started  with  barely 
wagons  enough  for  his  ammunition  and  hos- 
pital supplies  ;  tents,  baggage,  and  rations  were 
to  follow.  §  The  utmost  caution  was  enjoined 
to  avoid  another  Vienna  or  Big  Bethel  disas- 
ter. Three  things,  his  marching  orders  said, 
would  be  held  unpardonable  :  First,  to  come 
upon  a  battery  or  a  breastwork  without  knowl- 
edge of  its  position.  Seco?id,  to  be  surprised. 
Thi?'d,  to  fall  back.  His  army  being  a  new, 
untried  machine,  his  men  unused  to  the  fa- 
tigues and  privations  of  a  march, progress  was 
slow.  With  a  cumbersome  movement  it  felt 
its  way  toward  Fairfax  Court  House  and  Cen- 
treville,  the  outposts  of  the  enemy  having 
sufficient  time  to  retire  as  it  advanced.  Tyler 
commanded  his  first  division,  of  4  brigades; 
Hunter  the  second  division,  of  2  brigades; 
Heintzelman  the  third  division,  of  3  bri- 
gades; and  Miles  the  fifth  division,  of  2  bri- 
gades.   The  fourth  division,  under  Runyon, 
*  HUNTSVILLE,  Va.,  July  14,  1861. 
Colonel  Townsend  :  Garnett  and  forces  routed ; 
his  baggage  and  one  gun  taken ;  his  army  demoral- 
ized ;  Garnett  killed.  We  have  annihilated  the  enemy 
in  western  Virginia,  and  have  lost  13  killed  and  not 
more  than  40  wounded.  We  have  in  all  killed  at  least 
200  of  the  enemy,  and  their  prisoners  will  amount  to  at 
least  1000.  Have  taken  seven  guns  in  all.  I  still  look 
for  the  capture  of  the  remnant  of  Garnett's  army  by 
General  Hill.  The  troops  defeated  are  the  crack  regi- 
ments of  eastern  Virginia,  aided  by  Georgians,  Ten- 
nesseeans,  and  Carolinians.    Our  success  is  complete 
and  secession  is  killed  in  this  country. 
Geo.  B.  McClellan, 
Major-  General  Commandifig. 
[War  Records.] 
t  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  see  Nicolay,  "  The  Outbreak  of  Rebellion,"  pp. 
169-197. 
I  \\  ar  Records. 
§  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War.
*»4 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN: 
was  left  behind  to  guard  his  communications. 
His  total  command  embraced  an  aggregate 
of  34,320  men;  his  marching  column  proper 
consisted  of  a  little  less  than  28,000  men,  in- 
cluding artillery,  a  total  of  49  guns,  and  a 
single  battalion  of  cavalry. 
When,  on  the  morning  of  July  18,  Tyler 
reached  Centreville,  he  found  that  the  enemy 
had  everywhere  retired  behind  the  line  of  Bull 
Run.  a  winding,  sluggish  stream  flowing  south- 
rly  toward  the  Potomac,  about  thirty-two 
miles  south-east  of  Washington.  While  it  is 
fordable  in  many  places,  it  generally  has  steep 
and  sometimes  precipitous  and  rocky  banks 
with  wooded  heights  on  the  west.  Three  miles 
beyond  the  stream  lies  Manassas  Junction  on 
a  high,  open  plateau.  Here  the  railroads,  from 
Richmond  on  the  south  and  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  on  the  west,  come  together.  To  pro- 
tect this  junction  the  rebels  had  some  slight 
field-works,  armed  with  14  or  15  heavy  guns, 
and  garrisoned  by  about  2000  men.  Beaure- 
gard, in  command  since  the  1st  of  June,  had 
gathered  an  army  of  nearly  22,000  men  and  29 
guns.  The  independent  command  of  Holmes, 
called  up  from  Aquia  Creek,  augmented  his 
force  to  a  little  over  23,000  men  and  35  guns. 
Instead  of  keeping  this  about  the  Manassas 
earth- works  he  had  brought  it  close  down  to  the 
banks  of  Bull  Run  and  posted  it  along  a  line 
some  eight  miles  in  length,  extending  from  the 
Manassas  railroad  to  the  stone  bridge  on  the 
Warrenton  turnpike,  and  guarding  the  five 
intermediate  fords. 
The  enemy  retired  from  Centreville  as  Tyler 
approached  that  place ;  and  taking  a  light  de- 
tachment to  make  a  reconnaissance,  he  fol- 
lowed their  main  body  toward  the  crossing  of 
Bull  Run  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  near  the  cen- 
ter of  Beauregard's  extended  line.  Tyler  was 
under  express  orders  to  observe  well  the  roads, 
but  not  to  bring  on  an  engagement.*  Appar- 
ently lured  on,  however,  by  the  hitherto  easy 
approach,  his  reconnaissance  became  a  skir- 
.  and  calling  up  support,  the  skirmish  be- 
a  preliminary  battle.  Before  he  was  well 
aware  of  it  60  men  had  fallen,  2  exposed 
field-pieces  had  been  with  difficulty  extricated, 
1  regiment  had  retreated  in  confusion,  and 
3  others  were  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  to 
make  a  new  charge.  At  this  point  Tyler  re- 
membered his  instructions  and  called  off  his 
troops.  'I  his  engagement  at  Blackburn's  Ford, 
so  apparently  without  necessity  or  advantage, 
greatly  exasperated  the  men  and  officers  en- 
gaged in  it,  and  seriously  chilled  the  fine 
spirit  in  which  the  army  started  on  its  march. 
The  attacking  detachment  did  not  then  know 
that  the  enemy  had  suffered  equal  loss  and 
demoralization,  t 
McDowell  began  his    campaign  with   the 
purpose  of  turning  the  flank  of  the  enemy  on 
the  south ;  but  the  examinations  made  on  the 
18th  satisfied  him  that  the  narrow  roads  and 
rough  country  in  that  direction  made  such  a 
movement  impracticable.  When,  in  addition, 
he  heard  Tyler's  cannonade  on  the  same  day, 
he  hurried  forward  his  divisions  to  Centre- 
ville; and  the  report  of  that  day's  engagement 
also  seemed  to  prove  it  inexpedient  to  make 
a  direct  attack.?  That  night  McDowell  as- 
sembled his  division  commanders  at  Centre- 
ville and  confidentially  informed  them  that 
he  had  changed  his  original  plan,  and  resolved 
to  march  northward  and  turn  Beauregard's  left 
flank. f  All  of  Friday,  the  1 9th,  and  Saturday,  the 
20th,  were  spent  in  an  effort  of  the  engineers 
to  find  an  unfortified  ford  over  Bull  Run  in 
that  direction;  and  thus  the  main  battle  was 
postponed  till  Sunday,  July  21.  During  those 
two  days,  while  McDowell's  army  was  re- 
freshed by  rest  and  supplied  with  rations,  the 
strength  of  the  enemy  in  his  front  was  greatly 
increased. 
McDowell's  movement  was  based  upon  the 
understanding  and  promise  that  Patterson 
should  hold  Johnston  in  the  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley, and  General  Scott  made  every  exertion 
to  redeem  this  promise.  On  the  13th  he  di- 
rected Patterson  to  detain  Johnston  "  in  the 
valley  of  Winchester";  and  as  the  critical 
time  approached,  and  hearing  no  official  re- 
port from  him  for  three  whole  days,  he  sent 
him  a  sharp  admonition:  "  Do  not  let  the 
enemy  amuse  and  delay  you  with  a  small 
force  in  front,  whilst  he  reenforces  the 
[Manassas]  Junction  with  his  main  body."! 
And  still  more  emphatically  on  the  18th, 
while  the  engagement  of  Blackburn's  Ford 
was  being  fought  by  McDowell's  troops :  "  I 
have  certainly  been  expecting  you  to  beat  the 
enemy.  If  not,  to  hear  that  you  had  felt  him 
strongly,  or  at  least  had  occupied,  him  by 
threats  and  demonstrations.  You  have  been 
at  least  his  equal,  and,  I  suppose,  superior  in 
numbers.  Has  he  not  stolen  a  march  and 
sent  reinforcements  toward  Manassas  Junc- 
tion? A  week  is  enough  to  win  victories."  § 
Patterson  was  touched  by  the  implied  censure, 
and  answered  restively:  "  The  enemy  has 
stolen  no  march  upon  me.  I  have  kept  him 
actively  employed,  and  by  threats  and  re- 
connaissances in  force  have  caused  him  to  be 
reenforced."  ||  But  the  facts  did  not  bear  out 
the  assertion.  He  had  been  grossly  outwitted, 
and  the  enemy  was  at  that  moment  making  the 
stolen  march  which  Scott  feared,  and  of  which 
*  McDowell  to  Tyler,  July  18,  1861.    War  Records. 
t  War  Records. 
X  Scott  to  Patterson,  July  17,  1861.    War  Records. 
0  Scott  to  Patterson.     War  Records. 
II  Patterson  to  Scott,  July  18,  1861.     War  Records.  •
A   HISTORY. 
Patterson  remained  in  profound  ignorance  till 
two  days  later. 
Since  the  9th  of  July  his  readiness  to  "offer 
battle,"  or  to  "  strike  "  when  the  proper  mo- 
ment should  arrive,  had  oozed  away.  He 
became  clamorous  for  reinforcements,  and 
profuse  of  complaints.  Making  no  energetic 
reconnaissance  to  learn  the  truth,  and  credit- 
ing every  exaggerated  rumor,  he  became  im- 
pressed that  he  was  "in  face  of  an  enemy 
far  superior  in  numbers."  Understanding  per- 
fectly the  nature  and  importance  of  his  assigned 
task,  and  admitting  in  his  dispatches  that "  this 
force  is  the  key-stone  of  the  combined  move- 
ments " ;  ambitious  to  perform  a  brilliant  act, 
and  commanding  abundant  means  to  execute 
his  plan,  his  courage  failed  in  the  trying  mo- 
ment. "  To-morrow  I  advance  to  Bunker  Hill," 
he  reported  on  July  14,  "  preparatory  to  the 
other  movement.  If  an  opportunity  offers,  I 
shall  attack."*  Reaching  Bunker  Hill  on  the 
15th,  he  was  within  nine  miles  of  the  enemy. 
His  opportunity  was  at  hand.  Johnston  had 
only  1 2 ,000  men  all  told ;  Patterson,  from  1 8,000 
to  22,000.  All  that  and  the  following  day  he 
must  have  been  torn  by  conflicting  emotions. 
He  was  both  seeking  and  avoiding  a  battle. 
He  had  his  orders  written  out  for  an  attack. 
But  it  would  appear  that  his  chief  of  staff, 
Fitz-John  Porter,  together  with  Colonels  Aber- 
crombie  and  Thomas,  at  the  last  moment  per- 
suaded him  to  change  his  mind.  Making  only 
a  slight  reconnaissance  on  the  16th,  he  late 
that  night  countermanded  his  orders,  and  on 
July  17  marched  to  Charlestown — nominally 
as  a  flank  movement,  but  practically  in  re- 
treat. Johnston,  the  Confederate  commander, 
was  at  Winchester,  in  daily  anticipation  of 
Patterson's  attack,  when  at  midnight  of  July 
17  he  received  orders  to  go  at  once  to  the 
help  of  Beauregard  at  Manassas.  By  9  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  18th  his  scouts  brought 
him  information  that  Patterson's  army  was 
at  Charlestown.  Relieved  thus  unexpectedly 
from  a  menace  of  danger  which  otherwise  he 
could  neither  have  resisted  nor  escaped,  he 
lost  no  time.  At  noon  of  the  same  day  he  had 
his  whole  effective  force  of  9000  men  on  the 
march  1  by  noon  of  Saturday,  July  20,  6000 
of  them,  with  20  guns,  were  in  Beauregard's 
camp  at  Bull  Run,  ready  to  resist  McDowell's 
attack. 
The  Union  army  lay  encamped  about  Cen- 
treville;  from  there  the  Warrenton  turnpike 
ran  westward  over  a  stone  bridge,  crossing 
Bull  Run  to  Gainesville,  several  miles  beyond. 
Unaware  as  yet  that  Johnston  had  joined 
Beauregard,  McDowell  desired  to  seize 
Gainesville,  a  station  on  the  railroad,  to  pre- 
*  Patterson  to  Townsend,  July  14,  1861.  War 
Records. 
Vol.  XXXVI.— 41. 
vent  such  a  junction.  The  stone  bridge  was 
thought  to  be  defended  in  force,  besides  being 
mined,  ready  to  be  blown  up.  The  engineers, 
however,  late  on  Saturday,  obtained  informa- 
tion that  Sudley  Ford,  two  or  three  miles 
above,  could  be  readily  carried  and  crossed 
by  an  attacking  column. 
On  Saturday  night,  therefore,  McDowell 
called  his  officers  together  and  announced  his 
plan  of  battle  for  the  following  day.  Tyler's 
division 'was  ordered  to  advance  on  the  War- 
renton turnpike  and  threaten  the  stone  bridge ; 
while  Hunter  and  Heintzelman,  with  their  di- 
visions, should  make  a  circuitous  and  secret 
night  march,  seize  and  cross  Sudley  Ford,  and 
descending  on  the  enemy's  side  of  Bull  Run 
should  carry  the  batteries  at  the  stone  bridge 
by  a  rear  attack,  whereby  Tyler  would  be  able 
to  cross  and  join  in  the  main  battle. 
Beauregard,  on  his  part,  also  planned  an  ag- 
gressive movement  forthat  same  Sunday  morn- 
ing. No  sooner  had  Johnston  arrived  than  he 
proposed  that  the  Confederates  should  sally 
from  their  intrenchments,  cross  the  five  fords 
of  Bull  Run  they  were  guarding,  march  by  the 
various  converging  roads  to  Centreville,  and 
surprise  and  crush  the  Union  army  in  its 
camps.  The  orders  for  such  an  advance  and 
attack  were  duly  written  out,  and  Johnston,  as 
ranking  officer,  signed  his  approval  of  them  in 
the  gray  twilight  of  Sunday  morning.  But  it 
proved  wasted  labor.  At  sunrise  Tyler's  sig- 
nal guns  announced  the  Union  advance  and 
attack.  The  original  plan  was  thereupon  aban- 
doned, and  Beauregard  proposed  a  modifica- 
tion—  to  stand  on  the  defensive  with  their  left 
flank  at  the  stone  bridge,  and  attack  with  their 
right  from  the  region  of  Blackburn's  Ford.  This 
suggestion  again  Johnston  adopted  and  or- 
dered to  be  carried  out.  There  had  been  con- 
fusion and  delay  in  the  outset  of  McDowell's 
march,  and  the  flanking  route  around  by  Sud- 
ley Ford  proved  unexpectedly  long.  Tyler's 
feigned  attack  at  the  stone  bridge  was  so  fee- 
ble and  inefficient  that  it  betrayed  its  object; 
the  real  attack  by  Hunter  and  Heintzelman,  de- 
signed to  begin  at  daylight,  could  not  be  made 
until  near  1 1  o'clock.  The  first  sharp  encounter 
took  place  about  a  mile  north  of  the  Warren- 
ton turnpike ;  some  five  regiments  on  each  side 
being  engaged.  The  rebels  tenaciously  held 
their  line  for  an  hour.  But  the  Union  column 
was  constantly  swelling  with  arriving  batteries 
and  regiments.  Tyler's  division  found  a  ford, 
and  crossing  Bull  Run  a  short  distance  above 
the  stone  bridge,  three  of  its  brigades  joined 
Hunter  and  Heintzelman.  About  12  o'clock 
the  Confederate  line,  composed  mainly  of 
Johnston's  troops,  wavered  and  broke,  and 
was  swept  back  across  and  out  of  the  valley 
of  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and  down  the  road
386  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN: 
running  southward  from  Sudley  Ford  to  Ma-  personal  safety  by  riding  to  the  front.    Never- 
nassas  ]  unction.  theless  he  persisted,  and  was  overjoyed  to  find 
Hie  commanders  and  other  officers  on  both  that  the  Union  army  had,  by  a  sudden  and 
sides  were  impressed  with  the  conviction  that  unexplained  impulse,  half  marched,  half  run 
this  conflict  o\  the  forenoon  had  decided  the  from  the  field.  The  rebel  detachments  of 
fortunes  oi  the  day.  Beauregard's  plan  to  cavalry  hung  about  the  line  of  retreat,  and 
make  a  counter-attack  from  his  right  flank  by  sudden  dashes  picked  up  a  large  harvest 
against  Centreville  had  failed  through  a  mis-  of  trophies  in  guns  and  supplies,  but  they 
carriage  o\  orders:  and  leaving  Johnston  at  dared  not  venture  a  serious  attack;  and  so 
headquarters  to  .watch  the  entire  field,  he  unconvinced  were  they  as  yet  of  the  final  re- 
hastened  personally  to  endeavor  to  check  the  suit,  that  that  night  the  rebel  commanders  set 
tide  of  defeat.  Jackson,  afterward  known  by  a  strong  and  vigilant  guard  in  all  directions 
the  sobriquet  of  "  Stonewall,"  had  already  against  the  expected  return,  and  offensive 
formed  his  fresh  brigade,  also  of  Johnston's  operations,  by  McDowell  next  morning.  The 
armv.  on  the  crest  of  a  ridge  half  a  mile  south  precaution  was  needless,  for  the  Union  army 
of  the  Warrenton  turnpike.  Other  regiments  was  so  much  demoralized  that  the  command- 
ami  batteries  were  hurried  up,  until  they  con-  ers  deemed  it  unsafe  to  make  a  stand  at  Cen- 
stituted  a  semicircular  line  of  12  regiments,  treville,  where  the  reserves  were  posted;  and 
22  guns,  and  2  companies  of  cavalry,  strongly  a  rapid  though  orderly  retreat  was  continued 
posted  and  well  hidden  in  the  edge  of  a  piece  through  the  night,  and  until  all  organized  regi- 
of  woods  behind  the  screen  of  a  thick  growth  ments  or  fragments  reached  their  old  camps 
of  young  pines.  within  the  fortifications  on  the  Potomac,  and 
At  half-past    2   o'clock   in   the   afternoon,  the  scattered  fugitives  made  their  way  across 
McDowell  attacked  this  second  position  of  the  river  into  the  city  of  Washington. 
the  enemy  with  an  immediately  available  force        McDowell's  defeat  was  wholly  due  to  Pat- 
of  about  14  regiments,  24  guns,  and  a  single  terson's  inefficiency.     He  was  charged  with 
battalion  of  cavalry.    Here  the  advantages  of  the  task  of  defeating  or  holding  Johnston  in 
position  were  all  strongly  against  him.    The  the  Shenandoah  Valley;    he    had   a   double 
enemy  was  posted,  concealed,  and  his  artil-  force  with  which  to  perform  his  task.    Had  he 
lery  concentrated,  while  McDowell's  brigades  done  so,  McDowell,  who  in  that  case  would 
were  at  the  foot  of  the  hill;  not  only  where  the  have  been  superior  in   numbers   to   Beaure- 
ascent  must  be  made  in  open  view,  but  where  gard,  and  whose  plans  were  in  the  main  judi- 
the  nature  of  the  ground  rendered  a  united  cious,  could  easily  have  conquered.    It  was 
advance  impossible.     A  series  of  successive  Johnston's  army,  which   Patterson  had  per- 
and  detached  assaults  followed.    Two  batteries  mitted  to  escape,  that  principally  fought  the 
were  lost  by  mistaking  a  rebel  for  a  Union  battle  of  Bull  Run  and  defeated  McDowell.* 
regiment;  and  because  of  the  lax  organiza-  Nor  is  there  any  good  sense  in  that  criticism 
tion  and  want  of  discipline  in  the  raw  volun-  which  lays  the  blame  upon  General  Scott  and 
teer  regiments,  the   strength  of  McDowell's  the  Administration  for  not  having  first  united 
command  melted  away  in  a  rapid  demoraliza-  the  two  Federal  armies.    The  Administration 
tion  and  disintegration.  The  scales  of  victory,  furnished  a   superior   force    against    Beaure- 
however,  yet  vibrated  in  uncertainty,  when  gard    at    Bull    Run,    and    an    overwhelming 
at  4  in  the  afternoon  the  remainder  of  John-  force  against   Johnston   at  Winchester,   and 
ston's   army   arrived,   and    seven   fresh   rebel  assured  victory  in  each  locality  by  the  only 
regiments  were  thrown   against  the  extreme  reliable  condition  —  other  things  being  equal 
ind  partly  in  rear  of  the  Union  line.  — an   excess   of  numbers.     Had   Patterson 
This  heavy  numerical  overweight  at  a  de-  held    his  foe,  as    he   might,  and   McDowell 
cisive  time  and  place  terminated  the  battle  defeated  Beauregard,  as  he  would  have  done, 
very  suddenly.    The   abundant  rumors   that  the  capture  of  Johnston's  force  between  the 
Johnston  was  coming  to  the  help  of  Beaure-  two  Federal  armies  was  practically  certain,  as 
gard  seemed  verified;    and  the  Union  regi-  General  Scott  intended. t 
ments.  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  they  had  been        „    ,     „ ,  ,    .     r  ,     ,  ..     . 
-■,,,-, ,  ■  •'-■r,,ii,    f,„Uf;„„  ,  „,.*  ,  r  i'„  cr  11    1  The  following:  analysis  of  the  forces  engaged  m  the 
.fully  fighting  part  of  his  force  all  day,  main  am]  decisiv^    hJes  of  the  actual  figgt£g  shows 
were  now  seized  with  a  panic,  and  began  by  it  conclusively: 
a  common  impulse  to  move  in  retreat.    The  Johnston's  beauregard's 
ii  r   .  1        •  •      .  i  ARMY.  ARMV. 
suddenness  ot  their  victory  was  as  unexpected  Regs.      Guns.      Regs.       Guns. 
to  the  rebel   as  to  the  Union   commanders.  Battle  of  the  morning    4  4  1  1 
T    rr  T,  ill  r  t-.  •    i  Battle  of  the  afternoon      9  16  3  6 
Jefferson   Davis,  who  had  come  from  Rich-  Final  flank  attack  which  cre- 
mond,  arriving  at  Manassas  at  4  o'clock,  was       ated  the  pan,c   J  J  j_  11 
informed  that  the  battle  was  lost,  and  was  im-  16  24  8  8 
plored  by  his  companions  not  to  endanger  his        t  Scott  to  McClellan,  July  18,  1861.    War  Records.
A   HISTORY. 
Scott  was  aware  of  the  danger  which  Pat- 
terson's negligence  had  created.  "  It  is  known 
that  a  strong  reenforcement  left  Winchester  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  18th,  which  you  will  also 
have  to  beat,"  he  telegraphed  McDowell  on 
the  day  of  the  battle,  which  it  was  then  too 
late  to  countermand.*  He  also  promised  him 
immediate  reinforcements.  The  confidence 
of  the  General-in-Chief  remained  unshaken, 
and  he  telegraphed  McClellan  :  "  McDowell 
is  this  forenoon  forcing  the  passage  of  Bull 
Run.  In  two  hours  he  will  turn  the  Manassas 
Junction  and  storm  it  to-day  with  superior 
force."  f 
It  may  well  be  supposed  that  President 
Lincoln  suffered  great  anxiety  during  that 
eventful  Sunday;  but  General  Scott  talked 
confidently  of  success,  and  Lincoln  bore  his 
impatience  without  any  visible  sign,  and 
quietly  went  to  church  at  n  o'clock.  Soon 
after  noon  copies  of  telegrams  began  to 
come  to  him  at  the  Executive  Mansion  from 
the  War  Department  and  from  army  head- 
quarters. They  brought,  however,  no  certain 
information,  as  they  came  only  from  the  near- 
est station  to  the  battle-field,  and  simply  gave 
what  the  operator  saw  and  heard.  Toward 
3  o'clock  they  became  more  frequent,  and 
reported  considerable  fluctuation  in  the  ap- 
parent course  and  progress  of  the  cannonade. 
The  President  went  to  the  office  of  General 
Scott,  where  he  found  the  general  asleep,  and 
woke  him  to  talk  over  the  news.  Scott  said 
such  reports  were  worth  nothing  as  indications 
either  way  —  that  the  changes  in  the  currents 
of  wind  and  the  variation  of  the  echoes  made 
it  impossible  for  a  distant  listener  to  deter- 
mine the  course  of  a  battle.  He  still  expressed 
his  confidence  in  a  successful  result,  and  com- 
posed himself  for  another  nap  when  the  Pres- 
ident left. 
Dispatches  continued  to  come  about  every 
ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  still  based  on  hearing 
and  hearsay.  But  the  rumors  grew  more 
cheering  and  definite.  They  reported  that  the 
battle  had  extended  along  nearly  the  whole 
line ;  that  there  had  been  considerable  loss ; 
but  that  the  secession  lines  had  been  driven 
back  two  or  three  miles,  some  of  the  dis- 
patches said,  to  the  Junction.  One  of  General 
Scott's  aides  now  also  came,  bringing  the  tele- 
gram of  an  engineer,  repeating  that  McDow- 
ell had  driven  the  enemy  before  him,  that  he 
had  ordered  the  reserves  to  cross  Bull  Run, 
and  wanted  reinforcements  without  delay.J 
The  aide  further  stated  substantially  that 
the  general  was  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  this 
report,  and  that  McDowell  would  immediately 
attack  and  capture  the  Junction,  perhaps  to- 
night, but  certainly  by  to-morrow  noon.  Deem- 
ing all  doubt  at  an  end,  President  Lincoln 
ordered  his  carriage,  and  went  out  to  take  his 
usual  evening  drive. 
He  had  not  yet  returned  when,  at  6  o'cl< 
Secretary  Seward  came  to  the  Executive  Man- 
sion, pale  and  haggard.  "  Where  is  the  Presi- 
dent?" he  asked  hoarsely  of  the  private 
secretaries.  "  Gone  to  drive,"  they  answered. 
"Have  you  any  late  news?"  he  continued. 
They  read  him  the  telegrams  which  an- 
nounced victory.  "  Tell  no  one,"  said  he. 
"That  is  not  true.  The  battle  is  lost.  The 
telegraph  says  that  McDowell  is  in  full  retreat, 
and  calls  on  General  Scott  to  save  the  capital. 
Find  the  President  and  tell  him  to  come  im- 
mediately to  General  Scott's."  Half  an  hour 
later  the  President  returned  from  his  drive, 
and  his  private  secretaries  gave  him  Seward's 
message —  the  first  intimation  he  received  of 
the  trying  news.  He  listened  in  silence,  with- 
out the  slightest  change  of  feature  or  expres- 
sion, and  walked  away  to  army  headquarters. 
There  he  read  the  unwelcome  report  in  a  tele- 
gram from  a  captain  of  engineers :  "  General 
McDowell's  army  in  full  retreat  through  Cen- 
treville.  The  day  is  lost.  Save  Washington 
and  the  remnants  of  this  army.  .  .  .  The 
routed  troops  will  not  re-form."  §  This  infor- 
mation was  such  an  irreconcilable  contradic- 
tion of  the  former  telegram  that  General 
Scott  utterly  refused  to  believe  it.  That  one 
officer  should  report  the  army  beyond  Bull 
Run,  driving  the  enemy  and  ordering  up  re- 
serves, and  another  immediately  report  it 
three  miles  this  side  of  Bull  Run,  in  hopeless 
retreat  and  demoralization,  seemed  an  impos- 
sibility. Yet  the  impossible  had  indeed  come 
to  pass;  and  the  apparent  change  of  fortune 
had  been  nearly  as  sudden  on  the  battle-field 
as  in  Washington. 
The  President  and  the  Cabinet  met  at  Gen- 
eral Scott's  office,  and  awaited  further  news  in 
feverish  suspense,  until  a  telegram  from  Mc- 
Dowell confirmed  the  disaster.  ||  Discussion 
was  now  necessarily  turned  to  preparation  for 
the  future.  All  available  troops  were  hurried 
forward  to  McDowell's  support ;  Baltimore 
was  put  on  the  alert ;  telegrams  were  sent  to 
the  recruiting  stations  of  the  nearest  Northern 
States  to  lose  no  time  in  sending  all  their  or- 
ganized regiments  to  Washington:  McClellan 
was  ordered  to  "  come  down  to  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley  with  such  troops  as  can  be  spared 
from  western  Virginia."  fl   A  great  number  of 
*Scott,Testimony,Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War. 
+  Scott  to  McClellan,  July  21,  1861.     War  Records. 
%  Wendell  to  Thomas,  July  21,  1861,  4  P.  m.     War 
Records. 
$  Alexander,  July  21,  1S61.  War  Records. 
||  McDowell   to    Townsend,   July   21,    1S61.     War 
Records. 
If  Scott  to  McClellan,  July  21,  186 1.  War  Records.
288 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN: 
civilians,  newspaper  correspondents,  and  sev- 
eral senators  and  representatives  had  followed 
McDowell's  army  to  Centreville :  one  of  the 
latter.  Mr.  Ely  of  New  York,  went  to  the  bat- 
tle-field  itsdt".  and  was  captured  and  sent  for 
a  long  sojourn  to  Libby  Prison  in  Richmond. 
Such  o\  these  non-combatants  as  had  been 
fortunate  enough  to  keep  their  horses  and  ve- 
hicles were  the  first  to  reach  Washington,  arriv- 
ing about  midnight.  President  Lincoln  had  by 
this  time  returned  to  the  Executive  Mansion, 
and  reclining  on  a  lounge  in  the  Cabinet  room 
he  heard  from  several  of  these  eye-witnesses 
their  excited  and  exaggerated  narratives,  in 
which  the  rush  and  terror  and  unseemly  stam- 
pede oi  lookers-on  and  army  teamsters  were 
altogether  disproportionate  and  almost  ex- 
clusive features.  The  President  did  not  go  to 
his  bed  that  night ;  morning  found  him  still 
c  n  his  lounge  in  the  Executive  office,  hearing 
a  repetition  of  these  recitals  and  making  mem- 
oranda of  his  own  comments  and  conclusions. 
As  the  night  elapsed,  the  news  seemed  to 
grow  worse.  McDowell's  first  dispatch  stated 
that  he  would  hold  Centreville.  His  second, 
•  the  larger  part  of  the  men  are  a  confused 
mob,  entirely  demoralized";  but  he  said  that 
he  would  attempt  to  make  a  stand  at  Fairfax 
Court  House.*  His  third  reported  from  that 
point  that  "many  of  the  volunteers  did  not 
wait  for  authority  to  proceed  to  the  Potomac, 
but  left  on  their  own  decision.  They  are  now 
pouring  through  this  place  in  a  state  of  utter  dis- 
•g  nization.  .  .  .  I  think  now,  as  all  of  my 
commanders  thought  at  Centreville,  there  is  no 
alternative  but  to  fall  back  to  the  Potomac."  f 
Reports  from  other  points  generally  confirmed 
the  prevalence  of  confusion  and  disorganiza- 
tion. Monday  morning  the  scattered  fugitives 
reached  the  bridges  over  the  Potomac,  and 
n  rushing  across  them  into  Washington. 
Jt  was  a  gloomy  and  dismal  day.  A  drizzling 
rain  set  in  which  lasted  thirty-six  hours.  Many 
a  panic-stricken  volunteer  remembered  after- 
ward with  gratitude,  that  when  he  was  wan- 
derirj .  .exhausted,  and  hungry  through 
the  streets  of  the  capital,  her  loyal  families 
opened  their  cheerful  doors  to  give  him  food, 
rest,  and  encouragement. 
I  I      ofthe  lain'  ipal  reasons  which  prevented 
i  >owelPs  making  a  stand  at  Centreville  or 
fax  Court  House  was  the  important  fact 
that  the  term  of  service  of  the  three-months' 
milit:  nized  under  President  Lincoln's 
first  proclamation,  was  about  to  expire.    "In 
'  McDowell  to  '1  own  iend,  July  21,  186 r.  War  Rec- 
ords. 
t  McDowell  to  Townsend,  July  22,  1861. 
tMcDo  port,  August  4,  1861.    War    Rec- 
fl  Cameron  to  Stetson,  Grinell,  and  others,  July  22, 
1 86 1.    War  Records. 
the  next  few  days,"  says  McDowell  in  his  re- 
port, "  day  by  day  I  should  have  lost  ten 
thousand  of  the  best  armed,  drilled,  officered, 
and  disciplined  troops  in  the  army."  J  This 
vital  consideration  equally  affected  the  armies 
at  other  points ;  and  bearing  it,  as  well  as  the 
local  exigency,  in  mind,  the  President  and  the 
Cabinet  determined  on  several  changes  of 
army  leadership.  McDowell  was  continued 
in  command  on  the  Virginia  side  of  the  Po- 
tomac, with  fifteen  regiments  to  defend  and 
hold  the  forts.  McClellan  was  called  to  Wash- 
ington to  take  local  command,  and  more  es- 
pecially to  organize  a  new  army  out  of  the 
three-years'  regiments  which  were  just  be- 
ginning to  come  in  from  the  various  States. 
Patterson  was  only  a  three-months'  general, 
appointed  by  the  governor  of  Pennsylvania; 
his  time  expired,  and  he  was  mustered  out  of 
service.  Banks  was  sent  to  Harper's  Ferry  to 
succeed  him.  Dix  was  put  in  command  at 
Baltimore,  and  Rosecrans  in  western  Virginia. 
By  noon  of  Monday  the  worst  aspects  ofthe 
late  defeat  were  known ;  and  especially  the  reas- 
suring fact  that  the  enemy  was  making  no  pur- 
suit; and  so  far  as  possible  immediate  dangers 
were  provided  against.  The  War  Department 
was  soon  able  to  reply  to  anxious  inquiries 
from  New  York : 
Our  loss  is  much  less  than  was  at  first  represented, 
and  the  troops  have  reached  the  forts  in  much  better 
condition  than  we  expected.  We  are  making  most  vig- 
orous efforts  to  concentrate  a  large  and  irresistible 
army  at  this  point.  Regiments  are  arriving.  .  .  . 
Our  works  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac  are  im- 
pregnable, being  well  manned  with  reinforcements. 
The  capital  is  safe.  § 
On  the  following  day  Lincoln  in  person  vis- 
ited some  ofthe  forts  and  camps  about  Arling- 
ton Heights,  and  addressed  the  regiments  with 
words  of  cheer  and  confidence. 
Compared  with  the  later  battles  of  the  civil 
war,  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  involved  but  a 
very  moderate  loss  ||  in  men  and  material.  Its 
political  and  moral  results,  however,  were  wide- 
spread and  enduring.  The  fact  that  the  rebel 
army  suffered  about  equal  damage  in  numbers 
of  killed  and  wounded,  and  that  it  was  crip- 
pled so  as  to  be  unable  for  months  to  resume 
the  offensive,  could  not  be  immediately  known. 
The  flushed  hope  of  the  South  magnified  the 
achievement  as  a  demonstration  of  Southern 
invincibility.  The  event  of  a  pitched  battle 
won  gave  the  rebellion  and  the  Confederate 
government  a  standing  and  a  sudden  respect- 
||  The  official  reports  show  a  loss  to  the  Union  side 
in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  of  25  guns  (the  Confederates 
claim  28),  481  men  killed,  ion  men  wounded,  and 
1460  (wounded  and  other  Union  soldiers)  sent  as  pris- 
oners to  Richmond.  On  the  Confederate  side  the  loss 
was  387  killed,  1582  wounded,  and  a  few  prisoners 
taken. — War  Records.
A   HISTORY. 
ability  before  foreign  powers  it  had  hardly 
dared  hope  for.  With  the  then  personal  gov- 
ernment of  France,  and  with  the  commer- 
cial classes  whose  influence  always  rules  the 
government  of  England,  it  gained  at  once  a 
scarcely  disguised  active  sympathy. 
Upon  the  irritated  susceptibilities,  the 
wounded  loyalty,  the  sanguine  confidence  of 
the  North,  the  Bull  Run  defeat  fell  with  a 
cruel  bitterness.  The  eager  hopes  built  on  the 
victories  of  western  Virginia  were  dashed  to 
the  ground.  Here  was  a  fresher  and  deeper 
humiliation  than  Sumter  or  Baltimore.  But 
though  her  nerves  winced,  her  will  never  fal- 
tered! She  was  both  chastened  and  strength- 
ened in  the  fiery  trial.  For  the  moment,  how- 
ever, irritation  and  disappointment  found  vent 
in  loud  complaint  and  blind  recrimination. 
One  or  two  curious  incidents  in  this  ordeal 
of  criticism  may  perhaps  be  cited.  A  few  days 
after  the  battle,  in  a  conversation  at  the  White 
House  with  several  Illinois  members  of  Con- 
gress, in  the  presence  of  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  of  War,  General  Scott  himself  was 
so  far  nettled  by  the  universal  chagrin  and 
fault-finding  that  he  lost  his  temper  and  sought 
an  entirely  uncalled-for  self-justification.  "  Sir, 
I  am  the  greatest  coward  in  America,"  said 
he.  "  I  will  prove  it.  I  have  fought  this  bat- 
tle, sir,  against  my  judgment;  I  think  the 
President  of  the  United  States  ought  to  re- 
move me  to-day  for  doing  it.  As  God  is  my 
judge,  after  my  superiors  had  determined  to 
fight  it  I  did  all  in  my  power  to  make  the 
army  efficient.  I  deserve  removal  because  I 
did  not  stand  up,  when  my  army  was  not  in  a 
condition  for  fighting,  and  resist  it  to  the  last." 
The  President  said,  "  Your  conversation  seems 
to  imply  that  I  forced  you  to  fight  this  bat- 
tle." General  Scott  then  said,  "  I  have  never 
served  a  President  who  has  been  kinder  to 
me  than  you  have  been."  Richardson,  who 
in  a  complaining  speech  in  Congress  related 
the  scene,  then  drew  the  inference  that  Scott 
intended  to  pay  a  personal  compliment  to 
Mr.  Lincoln,  but  that  he  did  not  mean  to  ex- 
onerate the  Cabinet;  and  when  pressed  by 
questions,  further  explained:  "Let  us  have 
no  misunderstanding  about  this  matter.  My 
colleagues  understood  that  I  gave  the  lan- 
guage as  near  as  I  could.  Whether  I  have 
been  correctly  reported  or  not  I  do  not  know. 
If  I  did  not  then  make  the  correct  statement, 
let  me  do  it  now.  I  did  not  understand  Gen- 
eral Scott,  nor  did  I  mean  so  to  be  under- 
stood, as  implying  that  the  President  had 
forced  him  to  fight  that  battle."  *  The  inci- 
dent illustrates  how  easily  history  may  be  per- 
verted by  hot-blooded  criticism.  Scott's  petu- 
lance drove  him  to  an  inaccurate  statement 
*  "Globe,"  July  24  and  Aug.  1, 186 1,  pp.  246111101387. 
of  events;  Richardson's  partisanship  warped 
Scott's  error  to  a  still  more  unjustifiable  de- 
duction, and  both  reasoned  from  a  changed 
condition  of  things.  Two  weeks  before,  Scott 
was  confident  of  victory,  and  Richardson 
chafing  at  military  inaction.  The  exact  facts 
have  already  been  stated.  Scott  advised 
against  an  offensive  campaign  into  Virginia, 
but  consented  —  was  not  forced  —  to  prepare 
and  direct  it.  He  made  success  as  certain  as 
it  ever  can  be  made  in  war;  but  the  inefficiency 
of  Patterson  foiled  his  plan  and  preparation. 
Even  then  victory  was  yet  possible  and  prob- 
able but  for  the  panic,  against  which  there 
is  no  safeguard,  and  which  has  been  fatal  to 
armies  in  all  times  and  in  all  countries. 
Historical  judgment  of  war  is  subject  to  an 
inflexible  law,  either  very  imperfectly  under- 
stood or  very  constantly  lost  sight  of.  Military 
writers  love  to  fight  over  the  battles  of  history 
exclusively  by  the  rules  of  the  professional 
chess-board,  always  subordinating,  often  to- 
tally ignoring,  the  element  of  politics.  This  is 
a  radical  error.  Every  war  is  begun,  dominated, 
and  ended  by  political  considerations ;  without 
a  nation,  without  a  government,  without  money 
or  credit,  without  popular  enthusiasm  which 
furnishes  volunteers,  or  public  support  which 
endures  conscription,  there  could  be  no  army 
and  no  war  —  neither  beginning  nor  end  of 
methodical  hostilities.  War  and  politics,  cam- 
paigns and  statecraft,  are  Siamese  twins,  in- 
separable and  interdependent ;  and  to  talk  of 
military  operations  without  the  direction  and 
interference  of  an  Administration  is  as  absurd 
as  to  plan  a  campaign  without  recruits,  pay, 
or  rations.  Applied  to  the  Bull  Run  campaign, 
this  law  of  historical  criticism  analyzes  and 
fixes  the  relative  responsibilities  of  government 
and  commanders  with  easy  precision.  When 
Lincoln,  on  June  29,  assembled  his  council  of 
war,  the  commanders,  as  military  experts, 
correctly  decided  that  the  existing  armies 
could  win  a  victory  at  Manassas  and  a  vic- 
tory at  Winchester.  General  Scott  correctly 
objected  that  these  victories,  if  won,  would  not 
be  decisive;  and  that  in  a  military  point  of 
view  it  would  be  wiser  to  defer  any  offensive 
campaign  until  the  following  autumn.  Here 
the  President  and  the  Cabinet,  as  political  ex- 
perts, intervened,  and  on  their  part  decided,  cor- 
rectly, that  the  public  temper  would  not  admit 
of  such  a  delay.  Thus  the  Administration  was 
responsible  for  the  forward  movement,  Scott 
for  the  combined  strategy  of  the  two  armies, 
McDowell  for  the  conduct  of  the  Bull  Run 
battle,  Patterson  for  the  escape  of  Johnston, 
and  Fate  for  the  panic;  for  the  opposing  forces 
were  equally  raw,  equally  undisciplined,  and  as 
a  whole  fought  the  battle  with  equal  courage 
and  gallantry.
■9° 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN: 
But  such  an  analysis  oi  causes  and  such  an 
apportionment  of  responsibilities  could  not  be 
made  by  the  public,  or  even  by  the  best-in- 
formed individuals  beyond  Cabinet  circles,  in 
the   first  fortnight   succeeding   the  Bull  Run 
-  ster.  All  was  contused  rumor,  blind  in- 
ference, seething  passion.  That  the  public  at 
and  the  touch-and-go  newspaper  writers 
should  indulge  in  harsh  and  hasty  language  is 
scarcely  to  be  wondered  at;  but  the  unseemly 
and  precipitate  judgments  and  criticisms  of 
those  holding  the  rank  of  leadership  in  public 
affairs  are  less  to  be  excused.  Men  were  not 
yet  tempered  to  the  fiery  ordeal  of  revolu- 
tion, and  still  thought  and  spoke  under  the 
Strong  impulse  of  personal  prejudice,  and  with 
that  untamed  and  visionary  extravagance 
which  made  politics  such  a  chaos  in  the  pre- 
ceding winter.  That  feeling,  momentarily 
quelled  and  repressed  by  the  rebel  guns  at 
Sumter,  was  now  in  danger  of  breaking  out 
afresh.  In  illustration  we  need  only  to  cite 
the  words  of  prominent  leaders  in  the  three 
parties  of  the  North,  namely:  Stanton,  late 
Buchanan's  attorney-general,  and  destined 
soon  to  become  famous  as  Lincoln's  War 
Secretary ;  Richardson,  who  had  been  the 
trusted  lieutenant  of  Douglas,  and  now,  since 
Douglas  was  dead,  the  ostensible  spokesman 
of  the  faction  which  had  followed  that  leader  ; 
and  thirdly,  Horace  Greeley,  exercising  so 
prominent  an  influence  upon  the  public  opin- 
ion of  the  country  through  the  columns  of 
••  The  Tribune." 
The  Buchanan  cabinet  was  still  writhing 
under  the  odium  which  fell  upon  the  late  Ad- 
ministration, and  much  more  severely  upon 
the  Breckinridge  Democracy.  Mr.  Buchanan 
and  his  Cabinet  were  eager  to  seize  upon 
every  shadow  of  self-justification,  and  natu- 
rally not  slow  to  emphasize  any  apparent 
shortcoming  of  their  successors.  Stanton, 
with  his  impulsive  nature,  was  especially  se- 
on  the  new  President  and  Administration. 
In  his  eyes  the  only  hope  of  the  country  lay 
in  the  members  of  Buchanan's  reconstructed 
I  inet.  '1  hus  he-  wrote  to  his  colleague  Dix, 
on  June  u.  in  language  that  resembled  a 
stump  speech  of  the  presidential  campaign  : 
No  one  can  imagine  tUj  deplorable  condition  of  this 
city  and  tli  of  the  Government,  who  did  not 
witn<  and  panic  of  the  Administration, 
and  the  painful  imbecility  of  Lincoln.  We  looked  to 
New  York  in  that  dark  hour  as  our  only  deliverance 
under  Providence,  and,  thank  God,  it  came.  .  .  .  But 
when  we  witness  venality  and  corruption  growing  in 
every  dry,  and  controlling  the  millions  of  money 
that  should  be  a  patriotic  sacrifice  for  national  deliver- 
ance, and  treating  the  treasure  of  the  nation  as  a 
v  to  be  divided  among  thieves,  hope  dies  away: 
deliverance  from  this  danger  also  must  come  from 
New  York.  ...  Of  military  affairs  I  can  form 
no  judgment.    Every  day  affords   fresh  proof  of  the 
design  to  give  the  war  a  party  direction.  The  army 
appointments  appear  (with  two  or  three  exceptions 
only)  to  be  bestowed  on  persons  whose  only  claim  is 
their  Republicanism  —  broken-down  politicians  with- 
out experience,  ability,  or  any  other  merit.  Democrats 
are  rudely  repulsed,  or  scowled  upon  with  jealous  and 
ill-concealed  aversion.  The  Western  Democracy  are 
already  becoming  disgusted,  and  between  the  corrup- 
tion of  some  of  the  Republican  leaders  and  the  self- 
seeking  ambition  of  others  some  great  disaster  may 
soon  befall  the  nation.  How  long  will  the  Democracy 
of  New  York  tolerate  these  things  ?  .  .  .  We  hoped 
to  see  you  here,  especially  after  you  had  accepted  the 
appointment  of  major-general.  But  now  that  the  Ad- 
ministration has  got  over  its  panic,  you  are  not  the 
kind  of  man  that  would  be  welcome.* 
This  letter  plainly  enough  shows  Mr.  Stan- 
ton's attitude  toward  the  new  Administration. 
His  letter  of  the  following  day  to  ex- Presi- 
dent Buchanan  reveals  the  state  of  feeling 
entertained  by  Dix: 
The  recent  appointments  in  the  army  are  generally 
spoken  of  with  great  disapprobation.  General  Dix  is 
very  much  chagrined  with  the  treatment  he  has  re- 
ceived from  the  War  Department,  and  on  Saturday  I 
had  a  letter  declaring  his  intention  to  resign  immedi- 
ately, t 
Again,  July  16: 
General  Dix  is  still  here.  He  has  been  shamefully 
treated  by  the  Administration.  We  are  expecting  a 
general  battle  to  be  commenced  at  Fairfax  to-day,  and 
conflicting  opinions  of  the  result  are  entertained,  t 
And  once  more,  on  July  26  : 
The  dreadful  disaster  of  Sunday  can  scarcely  be 
mentioned.  The  imbecility  of  this  Administration 
culminated  in  that  catastrophe :  an  irretrievable  mis- 
fortune and  national  disgrace,  never  to  be  forgotten, 
are  to  be  added  to  the  ruin  of  all  peaceful  pursuits  and 
national  bankruptcy  as  the  result  of  Lincoln's  "running 
the  machine  "  for  five  months.  You  perceive  that  Ben- 
nett is  for  a  change  of  the  Cabinet,  and  proposes  for 
one  of  the  new  Cabinet  Mr.  Holt.  .  .  .  It  is  not  un- 
likely that  some  change  in  the  War  and  Navy  De- 
partments may  take  place,  but  none  beyond  these  two 
departments  until  Jefferson  Davis  turns  out  the  whole 
concern.  The  capture  of  Washington  seems  now  to  be 
inevitable  :  during  the  whole  of  Monday  and  Tuesday 
it  might  have  been  taken  without  any  resistance.  The 
rout,  overthrow,  and  utter  demoralization  of  the  whole 
army  is  complete.  Even  now  I  doubt  whether  any 
serious  opposition  to  the  entrance  of  the  Confederate 
forces  could  be  offered.  While  Lincoln,  Scott,  and  the 
Cabinet  are  disputing  who  is  to  blame,  the  city  is  un- 
guarded and  the  enemy  at  hand.  General  McClellan 
reached  here  last  evening.  But  if  he  had  the  ability 
of  Csesar,  Alexander,  or  Napoleon,  what  can  he  ac- 
complish? Will  not  Scott's  jealousy,  Cabinet  intrigues, 
Republican  interference,  thwart  him  at  every  step? 
While  hoping  for  the  best,  I  cannot  shut  my  eyes  against 
the  dangers  that  beset  the  Government,  and  especially 
this  city.  It  is  certain  that  Davis  was  in  the  field 
on  Sunday,  and  the  secessionists  here  assert  that  he 
headed  in  person  the  last  victorious  charge.  General 
Dix  is  in  Baltimore.  After  three  weeks'  neglect  and 
insult  he  was  sent  there. t 
While  Stanton  and  Dix  were  thus  nursing 
their  secret  griefs  on  behalf  of  one  of  the  late 
*Dix,  "Memoirs  of  John  A.  Dix." 
t"  North  American  Review,"  November,  1879.
A   HISTORY. 
2')\ 
political  factions,  Richardson,  as  the  spokes- 
man of  the  Douglas  wing  of  the  Democracy, 
was  indulging  in  loud  complaints  for  the  other. 
Charging  that  the  division  of  the  Democratic 
party  at  Charleston  had  brought  the  present 
calamity  upon  the  Union,  he  continued : 
This  organization  of  the  Breckinridge  party  was  for 
the  purpose  of  destroying  the  Government.  That  was 
its  purpose  and  its  object.  What  do  we  see  ?  Without 
the  aid  and  cooperation  of  the  men  of  the  North  that 
party  was  powerless.  The  men  from  the  Northern 
States  who  aided  and  encouraged  this  organization 
which  is  in  rebellion  are  at  the  head  to-day  of  our 
army.  Butler  of  Massachusetts,  Dix  of  New  York  and 
Patterson  of  Pennsylvania,  and  Cadwalader  —  all  of 
them  in  this  movement  to  breakdown  and  disorganize 
the  Democratic  party  and  the  country.  Why  is  it  ? 
This  Douglas  party  furnished  you  one-half  of  your  en- 
tire army.  Where  is  your  general,  where  is  your  man 
in  coinmand  to-day  who  belongs  to  that  party  ?  Why 
is  this  ?  Have  you  Republicans  sympathized  with 
this  Breckinridge  party  ?  Are  you  sympathizing  with 
them,  and  lending  your  aid  to  the  men  who  lead  our 
armies  into  misfortune  and  disgrace?* 
Richardson  was  easily  answered.  A  mem- 
ber correctly  replied  that  these  and  other 
three-months'  generals  had  been  selected  by 
the  governors  of  various  States,  and  not  by 
the  President;  moreover,  that  Patterson  had 
been  specially  recommended  by  General  Scott, 
whom  Richardson  was  eulogizing,  and  that 
there  would  be  plenty  of  opportunity  before 
the  war  was  over  for  the  Douglas  men  to  win 
honors  in  the  field.  But  all  this  did  not  soothe 
Richardson's  temper,  which  was  roused  mainly 
by  his  revived  factional  jealousy. 
Unjust  fault-finding  was  to  be  expected  from 
party  opponents ;  but  it  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  it  was  a  genuine  surprise  to  the  Pres- 
ident to  receive  from  a  party  friend,  and  the 
editor  of  the  most  influential  newspaper  in  the 
Union,  the  following  letter,  conveying  an  in- 
direct accusation  of  criminal  indifference,  and 
proposing  an  immediate  surrender  to  rebellion 
and  consent  to  permanent  disunion  : 
New  York,  Monday,  July  29,  1861. 
Midnight. 
Dear  Sir:  This  is  my  seventh  sleepless  night  — 
yours,  too,  doubtless  —  yet  I  think  I  shall  not  die, 
because  I  have  no  right  to  die.  I  must  struggle  to  live, 
however  bitterly.  But  to  business.  You  are  not  con- 
sidered a  great  man,  and  I  am  a  hopelessly  broken  one. 
You  are  now  undergoing  a  terrible  ordeal,  and  God 
has  thrown  the  gravest  responsibilities  upon  you.  Do 
not  fear  to  meet  them.  Can  the  rebels  be  beaten  after 
all  that  has  occurred,  and  in  view  of  the  actual  state 
of  feeling  caused  by  our  late,  awful  disaster  ?  If  they 
can, —  and  it  is  your  business  to  ascertain  and  decide, — 
write  me  that  such  is  your  judgment,  so  that  I  may 
know  and  do  my  duty.  And  if  they  cannot  be  beaten ,— 
if  our  recent  disaster  is  fatal, —  do  not  fear  to  sacrifice 
yourself  to  your  country.  If  the  rebels  are  not  to  be 
beaten, —  if  that  is  your  judgment  in  view  of  all  the 
light  you  can  get, —  then  every  drop  of  blood  hence- 
forth shed  in  this  quarrel  will  be  wantonly,  wickedly 
shed,  and  the  guilt  will   rest  heavily  on  the  soul  of 
every  promoter  of  the  crime.    I   pray  you  to    ' 
quickly  and  let  me  know  my  duty. 
If  the  Union  is  irrevocably  gone,  an  armistice  for 
30,60,90,  120  days — better  still  for  a  year — ought 
at  once  to  be  proposed,  with  a  view  to  a  pe 
adjustment.  Then  Congress  should  call  a  national 
convention,  to  meet  at  the  earliest  possible  day.  And 
there  should  be  an  immediate  and  mutual  exchange 
or  release  of  prisoners  and  a  disbandment  of  foi 
I  do  not  consider  myself  at  present  a  judge  of  any- 
thing but  the  public  sentiment.  That  seems  to  me 
everywhere  gathering  and  deepening  against  a  pro  - 
ecution  of  the  war.  The  gloom  in  this  city  i->  fune- 
real,—  for  our  dead  at  Bull  Run  were  many,  and  they 
lie  unburied  yet.  On  every  brow  sits  sullen,  scorching, 
black  despair.  It  would  be  easy  to  have  Mr.  Critten- 
den move  any  proposition  that  ought  to  be  adopted,  or 
to  have  it  come  from  any  proper  quarter.  The  first 
point  is  to  ascertain  what  is  best  that  can  be  done  — 
which  is  the  measure  of  our  duty,  and  do  that  very 
thing  at  the  earliest  moment. 
This  letter  is  written  in  the  strictest  confidence,  and 
is  for  your  eye  alone.  But  you  are  at  liberty  to  say 
to  members  of  your  Cabinet  that  you  knaij  I  will 
second  any  move  you  may  see  fit  to  make.  But  do 
nothing  timidly  nor  by  halves.  Send  me  word  what 
to  do.  I  will  live  till  I  can  hear  it  at  all  events.  If  it 
is  best  for  the  country  and  for  mankind  that  we  make 
peace  with  the  rebels  at  once  and  on  their  own  terms, 
do  not  shrink  even  from  that.  But  bear  in  mind  the 
greatest  truth  :  "  Whoso  would  lose  his  life  for  my 
sake  shall  save  it."  Do  the  thing  that  is  the  highest 
right,  and  tell  me  how  I  am  to  second  you. 
Yours,  in  the  depths  of  bitterness, 
Horace  Greeley.! 
These  few  citations  are  noteworthy,  because 
of  the  high  quarters  whence  they  emanated 
and  the  subsequent  relations  some  of  their 
authors  bore  to  the  war.  They  give  us  pene- 
trating glimpses  of  how  the  Bull  Run  disaster 
was  agitating  the  public  opinion  of  the  North. 
But  it  must  not  be  hastily  inferred  that  such 
was  the  preponderant  feeling.  The  great  tides 
of  patriotism  settled  quickly  back  to  their 
usual  level.  The  army,  Congress,  and  the 
people  took  up,  a  shade  less  buoyantly,  but 
with  a  deeper  energy,  the  determined  prose- 
cution of  the  war,  and  soon  continued  their 
cheerful  confidence  in  the  President,  Cabi- 
net, and  military  authorities.  The  war  gov- 
ernors tendered  more  troops  and  hurried 
forward  their  equipped  regiments;  the  Ad- 
ministration pushed  the  organization  of  the 
long-term  volunteers ;  and  out  of  the  scattered 
debris  of  the  Bull  Run  forces  there  sprang  up 
that  magnificent  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which 
in  a  long  and  fluctuating  career  won  such  his- 
toric renown. 
Meanwhile,  in  this  first  shadow  of  defeat. 
President  Lincoln  maintained  his  wonted  equi- 
poise of  manner  and  speech.  A  calm  and 
resolute  patience  was  his  most  constant  mood ; 
to  follow  with  watchfulness  the  details  of  the 
*  Richardson,  Speech  in  House  of  Representatives, 
July  24,  1 86 1. 
t  Unpublished  Autograph  MS.
o. 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN 
accumulation  oi   a  new  army  was  his  most 
•  occupation.    He  smiled  at  frettings  like 
.  of  Scott,  Pix,  and  Richardson;  but  let- 
ike  that  of  Greeley  made  him  sigh  at  the 
ge  weakness  ol  human  character.    Such 
things  gave  him  pain,  but  they  bred  no  resent- 
ment, and  elicited  no  reply.  Already  at  this 
2  began  the  display  of  that  rare  abil- 
ity in  administration  which  enabled  him  to 
smooth  mountains  of  obstacles  and  bridge  riv- 
;'  difficulty  in  his  control  of  men.  From 
this  time  onward  to  the  end  of  the  war  his  touch 
was  daily  and  hourly  amidst  the  vast  machin- 
ery of  command  and  coordination  in  Cabinet, 
i  gress,  army,  navy,  and  the  hosts  of  na- 
tional politics.  To  still  the  quarrels  of  factions, 
to  allay  the  jealousies  of  statesmen,  to  compose 
ivalries  of  generals,  to  soothe  the  vanity 
of  officials,  to  prompt  the  laggard,  to  curb  the 
ardent,  to  sustain  the  faltering,  was  a  substra- 
tum of  daily  routine  underlying  the  great 
events  of  campaigns,  battles,  and  high  ques- 
tions of  state. 
On  the  night  following  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run.  while  Lincoln  lay  awake  on  a  sofa  in  the 
Executive  office,  waiting  to  gather  what  per- 
sonal information  he  could  from  the  many 
officers  and  prominent  civilians  who  were  ar- 
riving  at  Washington  after  their  flight  from  the 
-field,  he  already  began  sketching  a  pen- 
cil memorandum  of  the  policy  and  military 
gramme  most  expedient  to  be  adopted  in 
the  new  condition  of  affairs.  This  memoran- 
dum sketch  or  outline  he  added  to  from  time 
to  time  during  the  succeeding  days.  On  the 
27th  of  July  he  seems  to  have  matured  his 
•ions  on  the  late  disaster,  and  with  his 
own  hand  he  carefully  copied  his  memoran- 
dum in  this  completed  form  : 
July  23,  1861. 
1.  Let  the  plan  for  making  the  blockade  effective  be 
I  forward  with  all  possible  dispatch. 
2.  i.  volunteer  forces  at  Fort  Monroe  and  vi- 
lity,  under  General  Butler,  be  constantly  drilled,  dis- 
ned,  and  instructed  without  more  for  the  present. 
3.  Let  Baltimore  be  held  as  now,  with  a  gentle  but 
firm  and  certain  hand. 
4.  Let  the  force  now  under  Patterson  or  Banks  be 
trengthened  and  made  secure  in  its  position. 
"      Let  the  force-,  in  western  Virginia  act  till  further 
■  ding  to  instructions  or  orders  from  Gen- 
eral McClellan. 
puli   forward  his  organization 
ions  in  the  West  as  rapidly  as  possible,  giv- 
ing r;  ial  attention  to  Mi    om  i. 
rces  late  before  Manassas,  except  the 
nonths'  men,  be  reorganized  as  rapidly  as  possi- 
ble in  their  camps  here  and  about  Arlington. 
Let  the  three-monthi '  forces  who  decline  to  enter 
the  1<  be  discharged  as  rapidly  as  circum- 
stances will  permit. 
9.    Let  the  new  volunteer  forces  be  brought  forward 
•  as  possible;  and  especially  into  the  camps  on 
the  two  sides  of  the  river  here. 
July  27,  1861. 
When  the  foregoing  shall  have  been  substantially 
attended  to, 
1.  Let  Manassas  Junction  (or  some  point  on  one  or 
other  of  the  railroads  nearest  it)  and  Strasburg  be 
seized,  and  permanently  held,  with  an  open  line  from 
Washington  to  Manassas,  and  an  open  line  from  Har- 
per's Ferry  to  Strasburg  —  the  military  men  to  find 
the  way  of  doing  these. 
2.  This  done,  a  joint  movement  from  Cairo  on  Mem- 
phis; and  from  Cincinnati  on  east  Tennessee.* 
FREMONT. 
Missouri  had  been  saved  from  organized 
rebellion,  but  the  smell  and  blackness  of  in- 
surrectionary fire  were  strong  upon  her.  While 
Governor  Jackson  and  General  Price,  flying 
from  the  battle  of  Boonville  as  fugitives,  were 
momentarily  helpless,  they  nevertheless  had 
reasonable  hope  of  quick  support.  W7hatever 
of  latent  rebellion  and  secret  military  prepa- 
ration existed  were  set  in  motion  by  the  gov- 
ernor's proclamation  of  June  12  and  his 
order  dividing  the  State  into  nine  military 
districts  and  issuing  commissions  to  a  skeleton 
army  under  the  provisions  of  the  military  bill 
passed  by  his  rebel  legislature  before  their  ex- 
pulsion from  the  capital  by  Lyon.  Thus  every 
one  inclined  to  take  up  arms  against  the  Union 
had  the  plausible  excuse  of  authority  and  the 
guidance  of  a  designated  commander  and  ren- 
dezvous, and  a  simultaneous  movement  toward 
organization  long  preconcerted  immediately 
began.  Missouri  is  a  large  State.  She  had  over 
68,000  square  miles  of  territory,  and  a  popu- 
lation of  over  a  million  souls;  a  trifling  percent- 
age would  yield  a  formidable  force.  The  spirit 
and  impulse  of  revolution  were  at  fever  heat, 
and  all  the  fire  of  the  Border-Ruffian  days 
smoldered  along  the  frontier.  The  governor's 
brigadier-generals  designated  camps,  and  the 
hot-blooded  country  lads  flocked  to  them,  find- 
ing a  charm  of  adventure  in  the  very  privations 
they  were  compelled  to  undergo.  For  half  a 
year  disloyalty  had  gone  unpunished ;  the  re- 
cent reports  of  march  and  battle  served  rather 
to  sharpen  their  zeal. 
Three  railroads  radiated  from  St.  Louis  — 
one  toward  the  west,  with  its  terminus  at 
Sedalia;  one  toward  the  south-west,  with  ter- 
minus at  Rolla;  one  toward  the  south,  with  ter- 
minus at  Ironton.  The  first  of  these  reached 
only  about  three-fourths,  the  last  two  scarcely 
half-way,  across  the  State.  Western  Missouri, 
therefore,  seemed  beyond  any  quick  reach  of 
a  military  expedition  from  St.  Louis.  General 
Price,  proceeding  westward  from  Boonville, 
found  one  of  these  camps  at  Lexington ;  the 
governor,  proceeding  southward,  was  attended 
by  a  little  remnant  of  fugitives  from  the  bat- 
*  Lincoln,  Autograph  MS.
A    HISTORY. 
tie  of  Boonville.  With  such  following  as  each 
could  gather  both  directed  their  course  toward 
the  Arkansas  line,  collecting  adherents  as  they 
went.  Their  pathway  was  not  entirely  clear. 
Before  leaving  St.  Louis,  Lyon  had  sent  an 
expedition  numbering  about  twenty-five  hun- 
dred, commanded  by  Sweeny,  a  captain  of  reg- 
ulars, by  rail  to  Rolla  and  thence  by  a  week's 
march  to  Springfield,  from  which  point  he  had 
advanced  a  part  of  his  force  under  Sigel  to 
Carthage,  near  the  extreme  south-western  cor- 
ner of  the  State.  Jackson  and  Price,  having 
previously  united  their  forces,  thus  found  Sigel 
directly  in  their  path.  As  they  greatly  out- 
numbered him,  by  the  battle  of  Carthage,  July 
5 , —  a  sharp  but  indecisive  engagement, —  they 
drove  him  back  upon  Springfield,  and  effected 
a  junction  with  the  rebel  force  gathered  in  the 
north-western  corner  of  Arkansas,  which  had 
already  assisted  them  by  demonstrations  and 
by  capturing  one  of  Sigel's  companies. 
Delayed  by  the  need  of  transportation,  Lyon 
could  not  start  from  Boonville  on  his  south- 
western march  until  the  3d  of  July.  The  im- 
provised forces  of  Jackson  and  Price,  moving 
rapidly,  because  made  up  largely  of  cavalry, 
or,  rather,  unorganized  horsemen,  were  far  in 
advance  of  him,  and  had  overwhelmed  Sigel 
before  Lyon  was  well  on  his  way.  Neverthe- 
less he  pushed  ahead  with  energy,  having 
called  to  him  a  detachment  of  regulars  from 
Fort  Leavenworth,  and  volunteers  from  Kan- 
sas numbering  about  2200.  These  increased 
his  column  to  about  4600  men.  By  July  13 
he  was  at  Springfield,  and  with  the  forces  he 
found  there  was  at  the  head  of  an  aggre- 
gate of  between  7000  and  8000  men. 
The  Confederate  authorities  had  ambitious 
plans  for  the  West.  They  already  possessed 
Arkansas  ;  the  Indian  Territory  was  virtually 
in  their  grasp;  Missouri  they  looked  upon 
with  somewhat  confident  eyes;  even  the  ulti- 
mate conquest  of  Kansas  seemed  more  than 
a  remote  possibility.  Nor  were  such  plans 
confined  to  mere  speculation.  Major-General 
Polk  was  stationed  at  Memphis  early  in  July 
to  command  the  Mississippi  region.  The  neu- 
trality policy  in  Kentucky  for  the  moment 
left  the  Tennessee  contingent  idle.  Being  ap- 
pealed to  by  Governor  Jackson,  Polk  made 
immediate  preparations  for  a  campaign  in 
Missouri.  On  July  23  he  reported  to  the 
Confederate  government  his  purpose  to  send 
two  strong  columns  into  that  State  —  one  under 
McCulloch,  of  about  25,000  men,  against  Lyon 
at  Springfield;  another,  under  Pillow  and  Har- 
dee, to  march  upon  Ironton  in  south-east  Mis- 
souri, where  he  estimated  they  would  collect 
a  force  of  18,000.    He  wrote: 
They  are  directed  to  pass  in  behind  Lyon's  force  by 
land,  or  to  proceed  to  St.  Louis,  seize  it,  and,  taking 
Vol.  XXXVI.— 42. 
possession  of  the  boats  at  that  point,  to  proceed  up  the 
river  Missouri,  raising  the  Missourians  asthey  go;  and 
at  such  point  as  may  appear  most  suitable  to  'letach  a 
force  to  cut  off  Lyon's  return  from  the  we  .'.   .   . 
as  I  think,  I  can  drive  the  enemy  from  Missouri  with 
the  force  indicated,  I  will  then  enter  Illinois  and  take 
Cairo  in  the  rear  on  my  return.* 
He  was  obliged  a  few  days  later  to  curtail 
this  extravagant  programme.  Governor  Jack- 
son, he  learned,  to  his  chagrin,  had  exag- 
gerated the  available  forces  fully  one-half,  f 
Although  he  had  already  sent  Pillow  to  New 
Madrid,  he  now  "  paused  "  in  the  execution 
of  his  plan;  and  the  rivalry  of  the  various 
rebel  commanders  seems  soon  to  have  com- 
pletely paralyzed  it.  The  "  neutrality  "  attitude 
of  the  governors  of  both  Missouri  and  Ken- 
tucky greatly  delayed  the  progress  of  the  war 
in  the  West.  The  middle  of  June  came  before 
Lyon  chased  the  rebels  from  Jefferson  City, 
and  in  Kentucky  open  and  positive  military 
action  was  deferred  till  the  first  weeks  of  Sep- 
tember. Meanwhile,  however,  it  was  felt  that 
the  beginning  of  serious  hostilities  was  only  a 
question  of  time.  The  Mississippi  River  was 
blockaded,  commerce  suspended,  Cairo  gar- 
risoned and  fortified,  gun-boats  were  being 
built,  regiments  were  being  organized  and  sent 
hither  and  thither,  mainly  as  yet  to  keep  the 
neighborhood  peace.  In  the  East  the  several 
Virginia  campaigns  were  in  progress,  and 
General  Scott's  "  anaconda  "  plan  was  well 
understood  in  confidential  circles. 
This  condition  of  affairs  made  the  whole 
Mississippi  Valley  sensitive  and  restless.  The 
governors  of  the  North-west  met,  and,  by  me- 
morial and  delegation,  urged  the  Administra- 
tion to  make  the  Ohio  line  secure  by  moving 
forward  and  occupying  advanced  posts  in 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  Especially  did  they 
urge  the  appointment  of  a  competent  com- 
mander who  could  combine  the  immense  re- 
sources of  the  West,  and  make  them  effective 
in  a  grand  campaign  southward  to  open  the 
Mississippi. 
Almost  universal  public  sentiment  turned 
to  John  C.  Fremont  as  the  desired  leader  for 
this  duty.  He  was  about  forty-eight  years  of 
age.  As  student,  as  explorer,  as  a  prominent 
actor  in  making  California  a  State*  of  the  LTn- 
ion,  he  had  shown  talent,  displayed  energy, 
and  conquered  success  in  situations  of  diffi- 
culty and  peril.  As  senator  for  a  brief  term, 
his  votes  proved  that  the  North  could  rely  on 
his  convictions  and  principles.  As  the  presi- 
dential candidate  of  the  Republican  party  in 
1856,  his  name  had  broadened  into  national 
representative  value.  The  post  of  honor  then 
had  brought  him  defeat.  He  might  well  claim 
the  post  of  duty  for  a  chance  to  win  a  victory. 
*  Polk  to  Walker,  July  23.  1S61.     War  Records. 
t  War  Records.
294 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN: 
The  dash  o(  romance  in  his  career  easily  re- 
kindled popular  enthusiasm;  political  sagac- 
ity indicated  that  he  should  be  encouraged  to 
this  popularity  into  armies,  and  lead 
them  to  military  success  in  aid  of  the  imperiled 
nation.  The  inclination  of  the  Administration 
coincided  with  the  sentiment  of  the  people. 
ard  had  proposed  him  for  Secretary  of 
War,  and  Lincoln  mentioned  him  for  the 
French  mission  ;  but  in  the  recent  distribution 
-  no  place  at  once  suitable  to  his 
abilities  and  adequate  to  his  claims  had  been 
found  available.  This  new  crisis  seemed  to 
have  carved  out  the  work  for  the  man. 
He  had  passed  the  previous  winter  in  France, 
but  upon  the  outbreak  of  rebellion  at  once  re- 
turned to  his  country.  On  his  arrival  in  the 
city  oi'  New  York,  about  the  ist  of  July,  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  appointed  him  a  major-general 
in  the  regular  army,  and  on  the  3d  created 
the  Western  department,  consisting  of  the 
State  of  Illinois  and  all  the  States  and  Terri- 
tories between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Rocky 
Mountains,  and  placed  it  under  his  command, 
with  headquarters  at  St.  Louis. 
For  a  man  whose  genius  could  have  risen 
to  the  requirements  of  the  occasion  it  was  a 
magnificent  opportunity,  an  imperial  theater. 
Unfortunately,  the  country  and  the  Adminis- 
tration had  overrated  Fremont's  abilities.  In- 
stead of  proceeding  at  once  to  his  post  of  duty, 
he  remained  in  New  York,  absorbed  largely  in 
his  personal  affairs.  Two  weeks  passed  before 
he  sent  his  letter  of  acceptance  and  oath  of 
office.  "  Please  proceed  to  your  command 
without  coming  here,"  telegraphed  General 
Scott,  two  days  later.  Postmaster-General 
Blair  testified: 
As  soon  as  he  was  appointed,  I  urged  him  to  go  to 
his  department.  .  .  .  The  President  questioned  me 
every  day  about  his  movements.  I  told  him  so  often 
that  Fremont  was  off,  or  was  going  next  day,  according 
to  my  information,  that  I  felt  mortified  when  allusion 
was  made  to  it,  and  dreaded  a  reference  to  the  subject. 
Finally,  on  the  receipt  of  a  dispatch  from  Lyon  by  my 
brother,  describing  the  condition  of  his  command,  I  felt 
justified  in  telegraphing  (General  Fremont  that  he  must 
go  at  once.  But  he  remained  till  after  Bull  Run;  and 
'hen,  when  he  should  have  known  the  inspiration 
that  v.  the  rebels,  he  traveled  leisurely  to  St. 
-.* 
When,  on  July  25,  he  finally  reached  his 
dquarters,  and  formally  assumed  com- 
mand, he  did  not  find  his  new  charge  a  bed 
of  roses.  The  splendid  military  strength  of 
the  North -west  was  only  beginning  its  devel- 
opment. Recruiting  offices  were  full;  but 
commanders  of  departments  and  governors  of 
States  quarreled  over  the  dribblets  of  arms  and 
equipments  remaining  in  the  arsenals,  and 
which  were  needed  in  a  dozen  places  at  once. 
*  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War. 
The  educated  and  experienced  officers  and 
subalterns  of  the  old  regular  army,  familiar 
with  organization  and  routine,  did  not  suffice 
to  furnish  the  needed  brigadier-generals  and 
colonels,  much  less  adjutants,  commissaries, 
quartermasters,  and  drill-sergeants.  Error, 
extravagance,  delay,  and  waste  ensued.  Regi- 
ments were  rushed  off  to  the  front  without 
uniforms,  arms,  or  rations;  sometimes  without 
being  mustered  into  service.  Yet  the  latent 
resources  were  abundant  in  quantity  and  ex- 
cellent in  quality,  and  especially  in  the  qual- 
ities of  mind,  ambition,  earnestness,  and  talent 
competent  through  practical  service  to  rise 
to  every  requirement  of  duty  and  sacrifice  — 
genius  which  could  lead,  and  patriotic  devo- 
tion ready  to  serve,  suffer,  and  die.  What 
magnificent  capabilities  in  those  early  Western 
volunteers;  what  illustrious  talent  in  those 
first  regiments  found  by  Fremont  and  coming 
at  his  call !  —  Lyon,  Grant,  Blair,  McClernand, 
Pope,  Logan,  Schofield,  Curtis,  Sturgis,  Pal- 
mer, Hurlbut,  and  a  hundred  others  whose 
names  shine  on  the  records  of  the  war,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  thousands  who,  unheralded, 
went  gloriously  to  manful  duty  and  patriotic 
death. 
The  three  weeks  loitered  away  in  New 
York  already  served  to  quadruple  Fremont's 
immediate  task.  Lyon  had  taken  the  field, 
and  Blair  had  gone  to  Washington  to  take 
his  seat  in  the  special  session  of  Congress 
as  representative.  The  whole  service  immedi- 
ately felt  the  absence  from  headquarters  of 
these  two  inspiring  and  guiding  leaders.  At 
three  points  in  Fremont's  new  department 
matters  wore  a  threatening  aspect.  The  plen- 
tiful seeds  of  rebellion  sown  by  Governor  Jack- 
son throughout  Missouri  were  springing  up 
in  noxious  rankness.  Amidst  dominant  loy- 
alty existed  a  reckless  and  daring  secession 
minority,  unwilling  to  submit  to  the  control  of 
superior  sentiment  and  force.  Following  the 
battle  of  Boonville  there  broke  out  in  many 
parts  of  the  State  a  destructive  guerrilla  war- 
fare, degenerating  into  neighborhood  and 
family  feuds,  and  bloody  personal  reprisal  and 
revenge,  which  became  known  under  the  term 
of  "  bushwhacking.  "  Houses  and  bridges 
were  burned,  farms  were  plundered,  railroads 
were  obstructed  and  broken,  men  were  kid- 
napped and  assassinated.  During  the  whole 
period  of  the  war  few  organized  campaigns  dis- 
turbed the  large  territory  of  the  State ;  but  dis- 
order, lawlessness,  crime,  and  almost  anarchy 
were  with  difficulty  repressed  from  beginning 
to  end. 
The  local  administration  charged  with  the 
eradication  of  these  evils  was  greatly  embar- 
rassed and   often   thwarted  through  the  un 
fortunate  jealousy  and  rivalry  between    the
A    HISTORY. 
factions  of  radicals  and  conservatives,  both  ad- 
herents of  the  Union.  Equally  loyal,  equally 
sincere  in  their  devotion  to  the  Government, 
they  paralyzed  each  other's  efforts  by  a  blind 
opposition  and  recrimination.  As  events  pro- 
gressed these  factions  increased  in  their  ani- 
mosity toward  each  other,and  their  antagonistic 
attitude  was  continued  throughout  the  whole 
war  period.  This  conflict  of  local  sentiment — 
personal,  political,  and  military — produced  no 
end  of  complications  requiring  the  repeated 
direct  interference  of  President  Lincoln,  and 
taxed  to  the  utmost  his  abounding  forbearance. 
Neighborhood  troubles  were  growing  in  north- 
ern Missouri  before  Fremont  left  New  York; 
and  Lyon's  adjutant  selected  Erigadier- Gen- 
eral Pope  to  take  command  there  and  restore 
order.  Fremont  gave  the  permission  by  tele- 
graph; and  when  he  reached  St.  Louis,  Gen- 
eral Pope  had  eight  Illinois  regiments  employed 
in  this  duty.* 
Fremont's  second  point  of  difficulty  was 
the  strong  report  of  danger  to  Cairo.  The 
rebel  general  Polk,  at  Memphis,  was  in  the 
midst  of  his  preparations  for  his  Missouri  cam- 
paign, already  mentioned.  About  the  time  of 
Fremont's  arrival  Pillow  had  just  moved  six 
thousand  Tennesseeans  to  New  Madrid,  and 
reported  his  whole  force  "  full  of  enthusiasm 
and  eager  for  the  '  Dutch  hunt.'  "  News  of 
this  movement,  and  the  brood  of  wild  rumors 
which  it  engendered,  made  General  Prentiss, 
the  Union  commander  at  Cairo,  exceedingly 
uneasy,  and  he  called  urgently  for  assistance. 
Cairo,  the  strategic  key  of  the  whole  Missis- 
sippi Valley,  was  too  important  to  be  for  a 
moment  neglected ;  and  in  a  few  days  after 
his  arrival  Fremont  gathered  the  nearest 
available  reinforcements,  about  eight  regi- 
ments in  all,  and,  loading  them  on  a  fleet  of 
steamboats,  led  them  in  person  in  a  some- 
what ostentatious  expedition  to  Cairo;  and 
the  demonstration,  greatly  magnified  by  ru- 
mor, doubtless  had  much  influence  in  check- 
ing the  hopes  of  the  rebel  commanders  for 
an  early  capture  of  Missouri  and  Illinois. 
The  reenforcement  of  Cairo  was  very  proper 
as  a  measure  of  precaution.  It  turned  out, 
however,  that  the  need  was  much  less  urgent 
than  Fremont's  third  point  of  trouble,  namely, 
*  General  Pope,  under  date  of  August  3,  makes  a 
graphic  statement  of  the  methods  of  the  bushwhack- 
ers :  "  The  only  persons  in  arms,  so  far  as  I  could 
learn,  were  a  few  reckless  and  violent  men  in  parties 
of  twenty  or  thirty,  who  were  wandering  about,  com- 
mitting depredations  upon  all  whose  sentiments  were 
displeasing,  and  keeping  this  whole  region  in  apprehen- 
sion and  uneasiness.  ...  So  soon  as  these  maraud- 
ers found  that  troops  were  approaching,  which  they 
easily  dkk  from  the  very  persons  who  ask  for  pro- 
tection, they  dispersed,  each  man  going  to  his  home, 
and,  in  many  cases,  that  home  in  the  very  town  oc- 
cupied by  the  troops.    .    .    .    When  troops  were  sent 
the  safety  of  Lyon  at  Springfield,  in  south- 
western Missouri.  When  Lyon  left  St.  Louis 
he  had  conceived  this  campaign  to  the  south- 
west, not  merely  to  control  that  part  of  the 
State  and  to  protect  it  against  invasion,  but 
also  with  the  ultimate  hope  of  extending  his 
march  into  Arkansas.  For  this  he  knew  his 
force  in  hand  was  inadequate ;  but  he  be- 
lieved that  from  the  troops  being  rapidly  or- 
ganized in  the  contiguous  free  States  he  would 
receive  the  necessary  help  as  soon  as  it  was 
needed.  We  have  seen  that  he  reached  Spring- 
field with  an  aggregate  of  about  7000  or 
8000  men.  It  was,  for  those  early  days, 
a  substantial,  compact  little  army,  some- 
what seasoned,  well  commanded,  self-reliant, 
and  enthusiastic.  Unfortunately  it  also,  like 
the  armies  at  every  other  point,  was  under 
the  strain  and  discouragement  of  partial  disso- 
lution. The  term  of  enlistment  of  the  three- 
months'  militia  regiments,  raised  under  the 
President's  first  proclamation,  was  about  to 
expire.  In  every  detachment,  army,  and  at 
every  post,  throughout  the  whole  country, 
there  occurred  about  the  middle  of  July,  1861, 
the  incident  of  quick  succession  of  companies 
and  regiments  going  out  of  the  service.  Many 
of  these  corps  immediately  reorganized  under 
the  three-years'  call;  many  remained  tem- 
porarily in  the  field  to  take  part  in  some  im- 
pending battle.  But  despite  such  instances 
of  generous  patriotism,  there  was  at  all  points 
a  shrinkage  of  numbers,  an  interval  of  disor- 
ganization, a  paralysis  of  action  and  move- 
ment. 
On  the  whole,  therefore,  Lyon  found  his  new 
position  at  Springfield  discouraging.  He  was 
120  miles  from  a  railroad;  provisions  and 
supplies  had  not  arrived  as  expected;  half  his 
army  would  within  a  brief  period  be  mustered 
out  of  service;  McClellanf  was  in  western  Vir- 
ginia, Fremont  in  New  York,  Blair  in  Wash- 
ington. He  scarcely  knew  who  commanded. 
or  where  to  turn.  The  rebels  were  in  for- 
midable force  just  beyond  the  Arkansas  line. 
The  dispatches  at  this  juncture  take  on  an 
almost  despairing  tone. 
All  idea  of  any  farther  advance  movement,  or  of 
even  maintaining  our  present  position,  must  soon  be 
abandoned,  unless  the  Government  furnish  us  promptly 
out  against  these  marauders,  they  found  only  men 
quietly  working  in  the  field  or  sitting  in  their  offices, 
who,  as  soon  as  the  backs  of  the  Federal  soldiers 
were  turned,  were  again  in  arms  and  menacing  the 
peace."  [Pope  to  Sturgeon,  August  3,  1S61.  War 
Records.] 
t  While  McClellan  was  yet  at  Cincinnati,  organizing 
the  Ohio  contingent  of  three-months'  men,  Missouri 
had  been  temporarily  attached  to  his  department.  Be- 
yond a  few  suggestions  by  telegraph,  however,  he  did 
not  give  it  any  attention  in  detail,  because  his  hands 
were  already  full  of  work.  His  Virginia  campaign  soon 
required  his  presence  and  entire  time.