4i4 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN: 
je;  the  place  of  the  seizure;  and  the  prece- 
dents and  respective  positions  assumed,  in  analogous 
cases,  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
I'    on  a  submission,  containing  the  foregoing  facts, 
with  those  set  forth  in  the  before-mentioned  dispatch 
ir   Lordship,  together  with  all  other  facts  which 
either  party  may  deem  material.   I  am  instructed  to 
he  Government    of  the  United  States   will,  if 
to  by  her   Majesty's  Government,  go  to  such 
illation  as  is  usual  among  nations,  and  will 
the  award. 
Or,  in  the    alternative,  her  Majesty's  Government 
may,  upon  the  same  record,  determine  whether  any, 
and  if  any,  what,  reparation  is  due  from  the  United 
3  ;   provided  no  such  reparation  shall  be  different 
in  character  from,  nor  transcend,  that  proposed  by  your 
Lordship,  as  instructed  in  and  by  the  dispatch  aforesaid; 
and  provided  further,  that  the  determination  thus  made 
shall  be  the  law  for  all  future  analagous  cases  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.* 
We  may  suppose  that  upon  consultation 
with  Mr.  Seward,  Mr.  Lincoln  decided  that, 
desirable  as  this  proceeding  might  be,  it  was 
precluded  by  the  impatient,  inflexible  terms 
of  the  British  demand.  Only  three  days  of 
the  seven-days'  grace  remained ;  if  they  should 
not  by  the  coming  Thursday  agree  to  deliver 
Mason  and  Slidell,the  British  legation  would 
close  its  doors,  and  the  consternation  of  a 
double  war  would  fill  the  air.  It  is  probable, 
therefore,  that  even  while  writing  this  draft, 
Lincoln  had  intimated  to  his  Secretary  of 
State  the  need  of  finding  good  diplomatic 
reasons  for  surrendering  the  prisoners. 
A  note  of  Mr.  Seward  shows  us  that  the 
Cabinet  meeting  to  consider  finally  the  Trent 
question  was  appointed  for  Tuesday  morning, 
December  24;  but  the  Secretary  says  that, 
availing  himself  of  the  President's  permission, 
he  had  postponed  it  to  Wednesday  morning 
at  10  a.  m.,  adding,  "I  shall  then  be  ready." 
It  is  probably  true,  as  he  afterward  wrote,  f 
that  the  whole  framing  of  his  dispatch  was 
left  to  his  own  ingenuity  and  judgment,  and 
that  neither  the  President  nor  any  member 
of  the  Cabinet  had  arrived  at  any  final  deter- 
mination. The  private  diary  of  Attorney- 
Ceneral  Bates  supplies  us  some  additional 
details : 
net  council  at  io  a.  M.,  December  25,  to  con- 
the  relation-  with  England  on  Lord  Lyons's  de- 
mand of  the  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell  ;  a  long 
and  i:  ion,  lasting  till  2  P.   M.    The  in- 
structions of  the  British  Minister  to  Lord  Lyons  were 
...    There  was  read  a  draft  of  answer  by  the 
ary  of  State. 
The  President's  experimental  draft  quoted 
above  was  not  read;  there  is  no  mention  of 
Lincoln,  unpublished  MS. 
t  The  consideration  of  the  Trent  case  was  crowded 
out  b  domestic  afiairs  until  Christmas  Day. 
It  was  considered  on  my  presentation  of  it  on  the  25th 
and  26th  of  December.  The  Government,  when  it  took 
the  subject  up,  had  no  idea  of  the  grounds  upon  which 
it  would  explain  its  action,  nor  did  it  believe  it  would 
either  the  reading  or  the  points  it  raised.  The 
whole  discussion  appears  to  have  been  con- 
fined to  Seward's  paper.  There  was  some  des- 
ultory talk,  a  general  comparing  of  rumors 
and  outside  information,  a  reading  of  the  few 
letters  which  had  been  received  from  Europe. 
Mr.  Sumner,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations,  was  invited  in, 
and  read  letters  he  had  received  from  John 
Bright  and  Richard  Cobden,  liberal  members 
of  the  British  Parliament  and  devoted  friends 
of  the  Union.  During  the  session  also  there 
was  handed  in  and  read  the  dispatch  just  re-' 
ceived  from  his  Government  by  M.  Mercier, 
the  French  minister,  and  which,  in  substance, 
took  the  English  view  of  the  matter.  The 
diary  continues: 
Mr.  Seward's  draft  of  letter  to  Lord  Lyons  was 
submitted  by  him,  and  examined  and  criticised  by  us 
with  apparently  perfect  candor  and  frankness.  All  of 
us  were  impressed  with  the  magnitude  of  the  subject, 
and  believed  that  upon  our  decision  depended  the 
dearest  interest,  probably  the  existence,  of  the  nation. 
I,  waiving  the  question  of  legal  right, —  upon  which 
all  Europe  is  against  us,  and  also  many  of  our  own 
best  jurists, —  urged  the  necessity  of  the  case ;  that  to  go 
to  war  with  England  now  is  to  abandon  all  hope  of 
suppressing  the  rebellion,  as  we  have  not  the  possession 
of  the  land,  nor  any  support  of  the  people  of  the  South. 
The  maritime  superiority  of  Britain  would  sweep  us 
from  all  the  Southern  waters.  Our  trade  would  be  ut- 
terly ruined,  and  our  treasury  bankrupt;  in  short,  that 
we  must  not  have  war  with  England. 
There  was  great  reluctance  on  the  part  of  some  of 
the  members  of  the  Cabinet  —  and  even  the  Presi- 
dent himself —  to  acknowledge  these  obvious  truths ; 
but  all  yielded  to,  and  unanimously  concurred  in,  Mr. 
Seward's  letter  to  Lord  Lyons,  after  some  verbal 
and  formal  amendments.  The  main  fear,  I  believe, 
was  the  displeasure  of  our  own  people  —  lest  they 
should  accuse  us  of  timidly  truckling  to  the  power 
of  England.  % 
The  published  extracts  from  the  diary  of 
Secretary  Chase  give  somewhat  fully  his  opin- 
ion on  the  occasion : 
Mr.  Chase  thought  it  certainly  was  not  too  much  to 
expect  of  a  friendly  nation,  and  especially  of  a  nation  of 
the  same  blood,  religion,  and  characteristic  civilization 
as  our  own,  that  in  consideration  of  the  great  rights 
she  would  overlook  the  little  wrong;  nor  could  he 
then  persuade  himself  that,  were  all  the  circumstances 
known  to  the  English  Government  as  to  ours,  the  sur- 
render of  the  rebel  commissioners  would  be  insisted 
upon.  The  Secretary  asserted  that  the  technical  right 
was  undoubtedly  with  England.  .  .  .  Were  the  cir- 
cumstances reversed,  our  Government  would,  Mr. 
Chase  thought,  accept  the  explanation,  and  let  England 
keep  her  rebels  ;  and  he  could  not  divest  himself  of  the 
belief  that,  were  the  case  fairly  understood,  the  Brit- 
ish Government  would  do  likewise.  "But,"  contin- 
ued Secretary  Chase,  "we  cannot  afford  delays.   While 
concede  the  case.  Yet  it  was  heartily  unanimous  in 
the  actual  result  after  two  days'  examination,  and  in 
favor  of  the  release.  Remember  that  in  a  council  like 
ours  there  are  some  strong  wills  to  be  reconciled. 
[Seward  to  Weed,  Jan.  22,  1862.  Weed,  "Autobiog- 
raphy," Vol.  II.,  p.  409.] 
X  Bates,  Diary.    Unpublished  MS.
A   HISTORY. 
4i5 
the  matter  hangs  in  uncertainty  the  public  mind  will 
remain  disquieted,  our  commerce  will  suffer  serious 
harm,  our  action  against  the  rebels  must  be  greatly 
hindered,  and  the  restoration  of  our  prosperity  — 
largely  identified  with  that  of  all  nations  —  must  be 
delayed.  Better,  then,  to  make  now  the  sacrifice  of  feel- 
ing involved  in  the  surrender  of  these  rebels,  than 
even  avoid  it  by  the  delays  which  explanations  must 
occasion.  I  give  my  adhesion,  therefore,  to  the  con- 
clusion at  which  the  Secretary  of  State  has  arrived. 
It  is  gall  and  wormwood  to  me.  Rather  than  consent 
to  the  liberation  of  these  men,  I  would  sacrifice  every- 
thing I  possess.  But  I  am  consoled  by  the  reflection 
that  while  nothing  but  severest  retribution  is  due  to 
them,  the  surrender  under  existing  circumstances  is 
but  simply  doing  right  —  simply  proving  faithful  to 
our  own  ideas  and  traditions  under  strong  temptations 
to  violate  them  ;  simply  giving  to  England  and  the 
world  the  most  signal  proof  that  the  American  nation 
will  not  under  any  circumstances,  for  the  sake  of  in- 
flicting just  punishment  on  rebels,  commit  even  a  tech- 
nical wrong  against  neutrals."  * 
In  these  two  recorded  opinions  are  reflected 
the  substantial  tone  and  temper  of  the  Cabinet 
discussion,  which  ended,  as  both  Mr.  Bates  and 
Mr.  Seward  have  stated,  in  a  unanimous  con- 
currence in  the  letter  of  reply  as  drawn  up  by 
the  Secretary  of  State.  That  long  and  re- 
markably able  document  must  be  read  in  full, 
both  to  understand  the  wide  range  of  the  sub- 
ject which  he  treated  and  the  clearness  and 
force  of  his  language  and  argument.  It  con- 
stitutes one  of  his  chief  literary  triumphs. 
There  is  room  here  only  to  indicate  the  con- 
clusions arrived  at  in  his  examination.  First, 
he  held  that  the  four  persons  seized  and  their 
dispatches  were  contraband  of  war;  secondly, 
that  Captain  Wilkes  had  a  right  by  the  law 
of  nations  to  detain  and  search  the  Trent ; 
thirdly,  that  he  exercised  the  right  in  a  lawful 
and  proper  manner;  fourthly,  that  he  had  a 
right  to  capture  the  contraband  found.  The 
real  issue  of  the  case  centered  in  the  fifth 
question :  "  Did  Captain  Wilkes  exercise  the 
right  of  capturing  the  contraband  in  conform- 
ity with  the  law  of  nations  ? "  Reciting 
the  deficiency  of  recognized  rules  on  this 
point,  Mr.  Seward  held  that  only  by  taking 
the  vessel  before  a  prize  court  could  the  ex- 
istence of  contraband  be  lawfully  established ; 
and  that  Captain  Wilkes  having  released  the 
vessel  from  capture,  the  necessary  judicial 
examination  was  prevented,  and  the  capture 
left  unfinished  or  abandoned. 
Mr.  Seward's  dispatch  continued: 
I  trust  that  I  have  shown  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
British  Government,  by  a  very  simple  and  natural 
statement  of  the  facts  and  analysis  of  the  law  appli- 
cable to  them,  that  this  Government  has  neither  medi- 
tated, nor  practiced,  nor  approved  any  deliberate  wrong 
*  Warden,  "  Life  of  Chase,"  pp.  393,  394. 
t  Seward  to  Lyons,  Dec.  26,  1861. 
%  In  a  dispatch  to  Lord  Lyons  of  Jan.  23,  1862,  in 
which  he  discusses  the  questions  at  some  length,  Lord 
Russell  held :  first,  that  Mason  and  Slidell  and  their 
supposed  dispatches,  under  the  circumstances  of  their 
in  the  transaction  to  which  they  have  called  its  atten- 
tion, and,  on  the  contrary,  that  what  has    happened 
has  been  simply  an  inadvertency,  consisting  in  a  de- 
parture by  the  naval  officer,  free  from  any  wrongful 
motive,  from  a  rule  uncertainly  established,  and  prob- 
ably by  the  several  parties  concerned  either  imperfectly 
understood  or  entirely  unknown.  For  this  error  the 
British  Government  has  a  right  to  expect  the  same 
reparation  that  we,  as  an  independent  State,  should 
expect  from  Great  Britain  or  from  any  other  friendly  na- 
tion in  a  similar  case.  .  .  .  If  I  decide  this  case  in 
favor  of  my  own  Government,  I  must  disavow  its  most 
cherished  principles,  and  reverse  and  forever  abandon 
its  essential  policy.  The  country  cannot  afford  the 
sacrifice.  If  I  maintain  those  principles  and  adhere  to 
that  policy,  I  must  surrender  the  case  itself.  .  .  . 
The  four  persons  in  question  are  now  held  in  military 
custody  at  Fort  Warren,  in  the  State  of  Massachusetts. 
They  will  be  cheerfully  liberated. t 
With  the  formal  delivery  of  Mason  and 
Slidell  and  their  secretaries  to  the  custody 
of  the  British  minister,  the  diplomatic  incident 
was  completed  on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 
Lord  Russell,  on  his  part,  while  announcing 
that  her  Majesty's  Government  differed  from 
Mr.  Seward  in  some  of  the  conclusions  f  at 
which  he  had  arrived,  nevertheless  acknowl- 
edged that  the  action  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment constituted  "  the  reparation  which  her 
Majesty  and  the  British  nation  had  a  right 
to  expect."  §  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
not  merely  the  rulers  and  Cabinets  of  both 
nations,  but  also  those  of  all  the  great  Euro- 
pean powers,  were  relieved  from  an  oppress- 
ive apprehension  by  this  termination  of  the 
affair. 
If  from  one  point  of  view  the  United  States 
suffered  a  certain  diplomatic  defeat  and  hu- 
miliation, it  became,  in  another  light,  a  real  in- 
ternational victory.  The  turn  of  affairs  placed 
not  only  England,  but  France  and  other  na- 
tions as  well,  distinctly  on  their  good  behavior. 
In  the  face  of  this  American  example  of  mod- 
eration they  could  no  longer  so  openly  brave 
the  liberal  sentiment  of  their  own  people  by 
the  countenance  they  had  hitherto  given  the 
rebellion.  So  far  from  improving  or  enhancing 
the  hostile  mission  of  Mason  and  Slidell,  the 
adventure  they  had  undergone  served  to  di- 
minish their  importance  and  circumscribe  their 
influence.  The  very  act  of  their  liberation 
compelled  the  British  authorities  sharply  to 
define  the  hollow  pretense  under  which  they 
were  sent.  In  his  instructions  to  the  British 
Government  vessel  which  received  them  at 
Provincetown  and  conveyed  them  to  England, 
Lord  Lyons  wrote  : 
It  is  hardly  necessary  that  I  should  remind  you  that 
these  gentlemen  have  no  official  character.    It  will  be 
seizure,  were  not  contraband  ;  secondly,  that  the  bring- 
ing of  the  Trent  before  a  prize  court,  though  it  would 
alter  the  character  would  not  diminish  the  offense 
against  the  law  of  nations. 
§  Russell  to  Lyons,  Jan.  10, 1S62.
4i6 
BIRD   MUSIC:    SPARROWS. 
right  for  you  to  receive  them  with  all  courtesy  and  re- 
as  private  gentlemen  of  distinction  ;  but  it  would 
•  v  improper  to  pay  to  them  any  of  those  honors 
which  are  paid  to  official  persons.* 
The  same  result  in  a  larger  degree  awaited 
their  advent  in  Europe.  Under  the  intense 
publicity  of  which  they  had  been  the  subject, 
officials  of  all  degrees  were  in  a  measure  com- 
pelled to  avoid  them  as  political  "  suspects." 
Mason  was  received  in  England  with  cold  and 
studied  neglect ;  while  Slidell  in  France,  though 
privately  encouraged  by  the  Emperor  Napo- 
leon III.,  finally  found  himself  a  victim  instead 
of  a  beneficiary  of  his  selfishness. 
*  Lyons    to    Commander    Hewett,  Dec.    30,    1861. 
British  "Blue  Book." 
f^y/fflf 
BIRD     MUSIC:    SPARROWS. 
THE     SONG     SPARROW. 
THE  sparrow  family  is  a  large  one.  There 
may  be  twenty  species,  half  of  which,  at 
least,  spend  their  summer  in  New  England. 
The  song  sparrows  are  the  most  numerous, 
sing  the  most,  and  exhibit  the  greatest  variety 
of  melody.  Standing  near  a  small  pond  re- 
cently, I  heard  a  song  sparrow  sing  four  distinct 
songs  within  twenty  minutes,  repeating  each 
several  times. 
L^T 
-rr- 
f 
-m-     /r\ 
y  u 
fa       L 
•  *  1*  *  1*  r 
p
D  *__ 
-W- 
J 
Z^F^^F 
eU _ — U   V   5« — U-t — 5 
J-g  t  t-M-- 
:|  U»t— fr=Ec-,J 
^^££_£_£_-£-_- 
I  have  more  than  twenty  songs  of  this  spar- 
row, and  have  heard  him  in  many  other  forms. 
He  generally  gives  a  fine  trill  at  the  beginning 
id  of  his  song.  Sometimes,  however,  it  is 
introduced  in  the  middle,  and  occasionally  is 
omitted,  especially  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
season.  There  is  a  marked  difference  in  the 
quality  and  volume  of  the  voices  of  different  in- 
dividuals. During  the  season  of  1885  I  listened 
almost  daily  to  the  strongest  and  best  sparrow 
voi<  e  that  I  have  ever  heard.  There  was  a 
fullness  and  richness,  particularly  in  the  trills, 
that  reminded  one  of  the  bewitching  tones  of 
the  wood-thrush.  These  are  some  of  his  songs : 
!%=*= 
j*_       M.       .m.       M.       M.     /r\ 
*       U                                             III 
t5L^- 
^i=g=g=g=gz 
That  the  singers  of  any  species  sing  ex- 
actly alike,  with  the  same  voice  and  style,  and 
in  the  same  key  always,  is  a  great  mistake.
THE  KNIGHT  IN  SILVER   MAIL. 
when  one  o'  that  same  seek  of  people  name 
to  me  the  very  subjects  I  be'n  a-thinkin'  and 
a  actuil'  a-dreamin'  about,  ef  it  did  n't  'pears 
like  to  me  the  good  Lord  sent  him  a-purpose." 
With  hand  yet  trembling,  she  took  from  her 
bosom  a  marriage-license,  and,  handing  it  to 
Mr.  Hooks,  said: 
"There  's  a  paper  for  you,  Mr.  Hooks, 
which  people  is  now  ready  and  a-waitin'  for 
you  to  'tend  to  it." 
Turning  her  face  towards  the  dining-room, 
she  called  aloud : 
"  Mimy,  you  may  come  in,  and  the  balance 
of  'em." 
The  door  opened,  Mimy  and  the  other  ne- 
groes, having  on  every  item  of  Sunday  clothes 
that  that  plantation  had  on  hand,  filed  in  and 
took  position  near  the  walls.    After  a  decent 
56. 
moment,  a-tiptoe,  his  arm  already  curved  to 
receive  that  of  his  bride,  stepped  forth  Mr. 
Abner  Hines. 
"And  I  do  believe,  on  my  soul,"  Mr.  Hooks 
said  some  time  afterwards,  "that  arfter  I  have 
jinded  them  two  together,  hard  and  fast, 
a'cordin'  to  law  and  gospul,  that  it  were  in 
me  to  raake  prob'ble  the  biggest,  everlastin'est 
speech  I  ever  spread  myself  before  a  augence; 
but  the  fact  were,  everybody  got  to  laughin' 
and  cryin'  so  they  drownded  my  woices.  Ah, 
well!  it  were  a  ruther  egzitin'  time  all  thoo. 
But  everything  have  swaged  down  peaceable. 
Thebreth'en  they  forgive  me  for  dancin',  when 
Susan  Ann  give  in  the  pootty  expeunce  she 
told,  and  it  were  give'  out  I  would  n't  do  so 
no  more. 
R.  M.  Johnston. 
THE    KNIGHT    IN    SILVER    MAIL. 
SHE  left  the  needle  in  the  rose 
And  put  her  broidery  by, 
And  leaning  from  her  casement  tall 
She  heard  the  owlets  cry. 
The  purple  sky  was  thick  with  stars, 
And  in  the  moonlight  pale 
She  saw  come  riding  from  the  wood 
A  knight  in  silver  mail. 
"  Oh,  I  would  see  thy  face,  my  love, 
Oh,  I  would  see  thy  face  ! 
Why  dost  thou  keep  thy  visor  down  ? 
It  is  a  lonely  place." 
His  voice  was  like  the  hollow  reeds 
That  rustle  in  the  gale  : 
"  'T  is  lonelier  in  my  castle,"  said 
The  knight  in  silver  mail. 
His  plume  was  like  the  snowy  foam 
That  wreathes  the  roaring  tide, 
The  glory  of  his  golden  locks 
His  helmet  could  not  hide. 
She  took  the  lily  from  her  breast 
(Like  hers,  its  beauty  frail), 
And  dropped  it  as  he  rode  beneath  - 
The  knight  in  silver  mail. 
About  her  gown  of  crimson  silk 
She  drew  a  mantle  dark. 
She  saw  the  stately  castle-towers 
Uprising  from  the  park, 
And  on  the  lake  the  mated  swans, 
Asleep  in  shadow,  sail, 
But  left  it  all  to  follow  him, 
The  knight  in  silver  mail. 
He  let  his  steed  go  riderless, 
He  took  her  by  the  hand 
And  led  her  over  brake  and  brier 
Into  a  lonesome  land. 
"  Oh,  are  they  headstones  all  a-row 
That  glimmer  in  the  vale?" 
"  My  castle-walls  are  white,"  replied 
The  knight  in  silver  mail. 
"  So  close  unto  thy  castle-doors 
Why  buryest  thou  the  dead  ?  " 
"  For  ten  long  years  I  've  slept  with  them 
Ah,  welcome  home  !  "  he  said. 
He  clasped  her  dainty  waist  around, 
And  in  the  moonlight  pale 
Upraised  his  visor,  and  she  saw 
The  knight  in  silver  mail. 
At  dawn  her  father's  men-at-arms 
Went  searching  everywhere, 
And  found  her  with  the  churchyard  dews 
A-sparkle  in  her  hair. 
And  lo  !  a  sight  to  make  the  best 
And  bravest  of  them  quail, 
Beside  her  in  the  tangled  grass, 
A  skeleton  in  mail. 
Vol.  .XXXVI.— 78. 
Minna  Irving,
ABRAHAM    LINCOLN:    A    HISTORY. 
TENNESSEE    AND    KENTUCKY. 
BY    JOHN    G.    NICOLAY    AND   JOHN    HAY,    PRIVATE    SECRETARIES    TO    THE    PRESIDENT. 
HALLECK. 
:N  sending  General  Hunter 
to  relieve  Fremont,  the 
President  did  not  intend 
that  he  should  remain  in 
charge  of  the  Department 
of  the  West.  Out  of  its  vast 
/^UtfiL  extent  the  Department  of 
Kansas  was  created  a  few 
days  afterward,  embracing  the  State  of  Kan- 
sas the  Indian  Territory,  and  the  Territories 
of  Nebraska,  Colorado,  and  Dakota,  with  head- 
quarters at  Fort  Leavenworth,  and  Hunter  was 
transferred  to  its  command.  General  Halleck 
was  assigned  to  the  Department  of  the  Mis- 
souri, embracing  the  States  of  Missouri,  Iowa, 
Minnesota,  Wisconsin,  Illinois,  Arkansas,  and 
that  portion  of  Kentucky  west  of  the  Cumber- 
land River. 
Henry  Wager  Halleck  was  born  in  Oneida 
County,  New  York,  January  15,  1815.  Edu- 
cated at  Union  College,  he  entered  the  mili- 
tary academy  at  West  Point,  where  he  grad- 
uated third  in  a  class  of  thirty-one,  and 
was  made  second  lieutenant  of  engineers 
July  1,  1839.  While  yet  a  cadet  he  was  em- 
ployed at  the  academy  as  assistant  professor 
of  engineering.  From  the  first  he  devoted 
himself  with  constant  industry  to  the  more 
serious  studies  of  his  profession.  He  had  at- 
,<\  a  first  lieutenancy  when  the  Mexican 
war  broke  out,  and  was  sent  to  the  Pacific 
t.  Valuable  services  in  the  military  and 
naval  operations  prosecuted  there  secured  him 
the  brevet  of  captain  from  May  1,  1847.  On 
the  conquest  of  California  by  the  United 
States  forces,  he  took  part  in  the  political  or- 
ganization of  the  new  State,  first  as  Secretary 
of  State  under  the  military  governors,  and 
afterward  as  leading  member  of  the  conven- 
tion which  framed  the  constitution  under  which 
California  was  admitted  to  the  Union. 
He  remained  in  the  army  and  in  charge  of 
various  engineering  duties  on  the  Pacific  coast 
until  August  1,  1854,  having  been  meanwhile 
promoted  captain  of  engineers.  At  that  date 
he  resigned  his  commission  to  engage  in  civil 
pursuits.  He  became  a  member  of  a  law  firm, 
and  was  also  interested  in  mines  and  railroads, 
*  Copyright  by  J.  G.  Nicolay  and  J 
when  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion  called  him 
again  into  the  military  service  of  the  Govern- 
ment. He  was  not  only  practically  accom- 
plished in  his  profession  as  a  soldier,  but  also 
distinguished  as  a  writer  on  military  art  and 
science.  Halleck's  high  qualifications  were 
well  understood  and  appreciated  by  General 
Scott,  at  whose  suggestion  he  was  appointed 
a  major-general  in  the  regular  army  to  date 
from  August  19,  1861,  with  orders  to  report 
himself  at  army  headquarters  in  Washington. 
A  phrase  in  one  of  Scott's  letters,  setting  forth 
McClellan's  disregard  for  his  authority,  creates 
the  inference  that  the  old  general  intended  that 
Halleck  should  succeed  him  in  chief  command. 
But  when  the  latter  reached  Washington,  the 
confusion  and  disasters  in  the  Department  of 
the  West  were  at  their  culmination,  and  urgent 
necessity  required  him  to  be  sent  thither  to 
succeed  Fremont. 
General  Halleck  arrived  at  St.  Louis  on 
November  18,  1861,  and  assumed  command 
on  the  19th.  His  written  instructions  stated 
forcibly  the  reforms  he  was  expected  to  bring 
about,  and  his  earlier  reports  indicate  that 
his  difficulties  had  not  been  overstated  —  ir- 
regularities in  contracts,  great  confusion  in 
organization,  everywhere  a  want  of  arms  and 
supplies,  absence  of  routine  and  discipline. 
Added  to  this  was  reported  danger  from  the 
enemy.  He  telegraphs  under  date  of  Novem- 
ber 29: 
I  am  satisfied  that  the  enemy  is  operating  in  and 
against  this  State  with  a  much  larger  force  than  was 
supposed  when  I  left  Washington,  and  also  that  a  gen- 
eral insurrection  is  organizing  in  the  counties  near  the 
Missouri  River,  between  Boonville  and  Saint  Joseph. 
A  desperate  effort  will  be  made  to  supply  and  winter 
their  troops  in  this  State,  so  as  to  spare  their  own  re- 
sources for  a  summer  campaign. 
An  invasion  was  indeed  in  contemplation, 
but  rumor  had  magnified  its  available  strength. 
General  Price  had,  since  the  battle  of  Lexing- 
ton, lingered  in  south-western  Missouri,  and 
was  once  more  preparing  for  a  northward 
march.  His  method  of  campaigning  was 
peculiar,  and  needed  only  the  minimum  of 
organization  and  preparation.  His  troops 
were  made  up  mainly  of  young,  reckless, 
hardy  Missourians,  to  whom  a  campaign  was 
mn  Hay,  1886.     All  rights  reserved.
TENNESSEE  AND  KENTUCKY. 
5^3 
an  adventure  of  pastime  and  excitement,  and 
who  brought,  each  man,  his  own  horse,  gun, 
and  indispensable  equipments  and  clothing. 
The  usual  burdens  of  an  army  commissariat 
and  transportation  were  of  little  moment  to 
these  partisans,  who  started  up  as  if  by  magic 
from  every  farm  and  thicket,  and  gathered 
their  supplies  wherever  they  went.  To  quote 
the  language  of  one  of  the  Missouri  rebel 
leaders:  "  Our  forces,  to  combat  or  cut  them 
off,  would,  require  only  a  haversack  to  where 
the  enemy  would  require  a  wagon."  The  evil 
of  the  system  was,  that  such  forces  vanished 
quite  as  rapidly  as  they  appeared.  The  en- 
thusiastic squads  with  which  Price  had  won 
his  victory  at  Lexington  were  scattered  among 
their  homes  and  haunts.  The  first  step  of  a 
campaign,  therefore,  involved  the  gathering 
of  a  new  army,  and  this  proved  not  so  easy 
in  the  opening  storms  of  winter  as  it  had  in 
the  fine  midsummer  weather.  On  the  26th 
of  November,  1861,  Price  issued  a  call  for 
50,000  men.  The  language  of  his  proclama- 
tion, however,  breathed  more  of  despair  than 
of  confidence.  He  reminded  his  adherents  that 
only  one  in  forty  had  answered  to  the  former 
call,  and  that  "  Boys  and  small  property- 
holders  have  in  main  fought  the  battles  for 
the  protection  of  your  property."  He  repeated 
many  times,  with  emphasis,  "  I  must  have 
50,000  men."  *  His  prospects  were  far  from 
encouraging.  McCulloch,  in  a  mood  of  stub- 
born disagreement,  was  withdrawing  his  army 
to  Arkansas,  where  he  went  into  winter  quar- 
ters. Later  on,  when  Price  formally  requested 
his  cooperation,  McCulloch  as  formally  re- 
fused. For  the  moment  the  Confederate 
cause  in  south-western  Missouri  was  languish- 
ing. Governor  Jackson  made  a  show  of  keep- 
ing it  alive  by  calling  the  fugitive  remnant 
of  his  rebel  legislature  together  at  Neosho, 
and  with  the  help  of  his  sole  official  relic  — 
the  purloined  State  seal  —  enacting  the  well- 
worn  farce  of  passing  a  secession  ordinance, 
and  making  a  military  league  with  the  Con- 
federate States. 
The  Confederate  Congress  at  Richmond 
responded  to  the  sham  with  an  act  to  admit 
Missouri  to  the  Confederacy.  An  act  of  more 
promise  at  least,  appropriating  a  million  dol- 
lars to  aid  the  Confederate  cause  in  that  State, 
had  been  passed  in  the  preceding  August. 
Such  small  installment  of  this  fund,  however, 
as  was  transmitted  failed  even  to  pay  the 
soldiers,  who  for  their  long  service  had  not 
as  yet  received  a  penny.  In  return  the  Rich- 
mond authorities  asked  the  transfer  of  Mis- 
souri troops  to  the  Confederate  service ;  but 
with  this  request  the  rebel  Missouri  leaders 
*  War  Records. 
t  Davis  to  Jackson,  Jan. 
1862.    Ibid. 
were  unable  immediately  to  comply.  When, 
under  date  of  December  30,  1861,  Gov- 
ernor Jackson  complained  of  neglect  and 
once  more  urged  that  Price  be  made  com- 
mander in  Missouri,  Jefferson  Davis  respond- 
ed sarcastically  that  not  a  regiment  had 
been  tendered,  and  that  he  could  not  ap- 
point a  general  before  he  had  troops  for  him.t 
From  all  these  causes  Price's  projected  winter 
campaign  failed,  and  he  attributed  the  failure 
to  McCulloch's  refusal  to  help  him. % 
The  second  part  of  the  rebel  programme 
in  Missouri,  that  of  raising  an  insurrection 
north  of  the  Missouri  River,  proved  more  ef- 
fective. Halleck  was  scarcely  in  command 
when  the  stir  and  agitation  of  depredations 
and  the  burning  of  bridges,  by  small  squads  of 
secessionists  in  disguise,  were  reported  from 
various  counties  of  northern  Missouri.  Fed- 
eral detachments  went  promptly  in  pursuit, 
and  the  perpetrators  as  usual  disappeared, 
only  however  to  break  out  with  fresh  out- 
rages when  quiet  and  safety  had  apparently 
been  restored.  It  was  soon  evident  that  this 
was  not  merely  a  manifestation  of  neighbor- 
hood disloyalty,  but  that  it  was  part  of  a  delib- 
erate system  instigated  by  the  principal  rebel 
leaders.  "  Do  you  intend  to  regard  men," 
wrote  Price  to  Halleck,  January  12,  1862, 
"  whom  I  have  specially  dispatched  to  de- 
stroy roads,  bum  bridges,  tear  up  culverts,  etc., 
as  amenable  to  an  enemy's  court-martial,  or 
will  you  have  them  to  be  tried  as  usual,  by 
the  proper  authorities,  according  to  the  stat- 
utes of  the  State  ?  "  §  Halleck,  who  had  placed 
the  State  under  martial  law,  to  enable  him  to 
deal  more  effectually  with  this  class  of  offend- 
ers, stated  his  authority  and  his  determination, 
with  distinct  emphasis,  in  his  reply  of  January 
22,  1862  : 
You  must  be  aware,  general,  that  no  orders  of  yours 
can  save  from  punishment  spies,  marauders,  robbers, 
incendiaries,  guerrilla  bands,  etc.,  who  violate  the  laws 
of  war.  You  cannot  give  immunity  to  crime.  But  let 
us  fully  understand  each  other  on  this  point.  If  you 
send  armed  forces,  wearing  the  garb  of  soldiers  and 
duly  organized  and  enrolled  as  legitimate  belligerents, 
to  destroy  railroads,  bridges,  etc.,  as  a  military  act, 
we  shall  kill  them,  if  possible,  in  open  warfare ;  or,  if 
we  capture  them,  we  shall  treat  them  as  prisoners  of 
war.  But  it  is  well  understood  that  you  have  sent 
numbers  of  your  adherents,  in  the  garb  of  peaceful 
citizens  and  under  false  pretenses,  through  our  lines 
into  northern  Missouri,  to  rob  and  destroy  the  prop- 
erty of  Union  men  and  to  burn  and  destroy  railroad 
bridges,  thus  endangering  the  lives  of  thousands,  and 
this,  too,  without  any  military  necessity  or  possible 
military  advantage.  Moreover,  peaceful  citizens  of 
Missouri,  quietly  working  on  their  farms,  have  been 
instigated  by  your  emissaries  to  take  up  arms  as  in- 
surgents, and  to  rob  and  plunder,  and  to  commit 
arson  and  murder.  They  do  not  even  act  under  the 
garb  of  soldiers,  but  under  false  pretenses  and  in  the 
t  Price  to  Polk,  Dec.  23, 
§  Price  to  Halleck.    Ibid.
564 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
guise  of  peaceful  citizens.    You  certainly  will  not  pre- 
tend that  men  guilty  of  such  crimes,  although  "  specially 
inted  and  instructed  by  you."  are  entitled  to  the 
ts  and  immunities  of  ordinary  prisoners  of  war. 
One  important  effect  which  Price  hoped  to 
produce  by  the  guerrilla  rising  he  was  instigat- 
ing was  to  nil  his  army  with  recruits.  "  The 
most  populous  and  truest  counties  of  the 
State.'*  he  wrote,  "lie  upon  or  north  of  the 
Missouri  River.  .  .  .  I  sent  a  detachment  of 
noo  men  to  Lexington,  which  after  remain- 
ing only  a  part  of  one  day  gathered  togeth- 
er about  2500  recruits,  and  escorted  them 
in  safety  to  me  at  Osceola."  His  statement 
was  partly  correct,  but  other  causes  contrib- 
uted both  to  this  partial  success  and  the  par- 
tial defeat  that  immediately  followed.  Just  at 
the  time  this  expedition  went  to  Lexington, 
the  various  Federal  detachments  north  of  the 
Missouri  River  were  engaged  in  driving  a 
number  of  secession  guerrilla  bands  south- 
ward across  that  stream.  Halleck  was  di- 
recting the  joint  movements  of  the  Union 
troops,  and  had  stationed  detachments  of 
Pope's  forces  south  of  the  Missouri  River, 
with  the  design  of  intercepting  and  capturing 
the  fugitive  bands.  A  slight  failure  of  some 
of  the  reports  to  reach  him  disconcerted  and 
partly  frustrated  his  design.  The  earliest 
guerrilla  parties  which  crossed  at  and  near 
Lexington  escaped  and  made  their  way  to 
Price,  but  the  later  ones  were  intercepted  and 
captured  as  Halleck  had  planned.  Pope  re- 
ports, September  19: 
Colonel  Davis  came  upon  the  enemy  near  Milford 
late  this  afternoon,  and  having  driven  in  his  pickets 
assaulted  him  in  force.  A  brisk  skirmish  ensued,  when 
the  enemy,  finding  himself  surrounded  and  cut  off, 
surrendered  at  discretion.  One  thousand  three  hundred 
pri -oners,  including  3  colonels  and  17  captains,  1000 
tand  of  arms,  1000  horses,  65  wagons,  tents,  baggage, 
and  supplies  have  fallen  into  our  hands.  Our  loss  is  2 
killed  and  8  wounded.* 
On  the  next  day  he  found  his  capture  was 
still  larger,  as  he  telegraphs:  "Just  arrived 
here.    Troops  much  embarrassed  with  nearly 
prisoners  and  great  quantity  of  captured 
property." 
In  anticipation  of  the  capture  or  dispersion 
of  these  north-western  detachments  of  rebels, 
Halleck  had  directed  the  collection  of  an  army 
at  and  about  Rolla,  with  the  view  to  move  in 
force  against  Price.  General  Samuel  R.  Cur- 
tis was,  on  December  25,  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  Union  troops  to  operate  in 
the  south-western  district  of  Missouri.  Some 
10,000  men  were  gathered  to  form  his  col- 
umn ;  and  had  he  known  Price's  actual  con- 
dition, the  possibility  of  a  short  and  successful 
campaign  was  before  him.    But  the  situation 
*  Pope  to  Halleck.    War  Records. 
was  also  one  of  difficulty.  The  railroad  ended 
at  Rolla;  Springfield,  the  supposed  location 
of  Price's  camp,  was  a  hundred  and  twenty 
miles  to  the  south-west,  with  bad  roads,  through 
a  mountainous  country.  Rebel  sentiment  and 
sympathy  were  strong  throughout  the  whole 
region,  and  the  favoring  surroundings  enabled 
Price  to  conceal  his  designs  and  magnify  his 
numbers.  Rumors  came  that  he  intended  to 
fight  at  Springfield,  and  the  estimates  of  his 
strength  varied  from  20,000  to  40,000.  The 
greatest  obstacle  to  a  pursuit  was  the  severity 
of  the  winter  weather;  nevertheless  the  Union 
soldiers  bore  their  privations  with  admirable 
patience  and  fortitude,  and  Halleck  urged  a 
continuance  of  the  movement  through  every 
hindrance  and  discouragement.  He  writes  to 
McClellan,  January  14,  1862: 
I  have  ordered  General  Curtis  to  move  forward, 
with  all  his  infantry  and  artillery.  His  force  will  not 
be  less  than  12,000.  The  enemy  is  reported  to  have 
between  35  and  40  guns.  General  Curtis  has  only  24 ; 
but  I  send  him  6  pieces  to-morrow,  and  will  send  6 
more  in  a  few  days.  I  also  propose  placing  a  strong  re- 
serve at  Rolla,  which  can  be  sent  forward  if  necessary. 
The  weather  is  intensely  cold,  and  the  troops,  supplied 
as  they  are  with  very  inferior  clothing,  blankets,  and 
tents,  must  suffer  greatly  in  a  winter  campaign,  and  yet 
I  see  no  way  of  avoiding  it.  Unless  Price  is  driven 
from  the  State,  insurrections  will  continually  occur  in 
all  the  central  and  northern  counties,  so  as  to  prevent 
the  withdrawal  of  our  troops. 
A  few  days  later  (January  18)  Halleck 
wrote  to  Curtis  that  he  was  about  to  reen- 
force  him  with  an  entire  division  from  Pope's 
army,  increasing  his  strength  to  fifteen  thou- 
sand; that  he  would  send  him  mittens  for  his 
soldiers :  % 
Get  as  many  hand-mills  as  you  can  for  grinding 
corn.  .  .  .  Take  the  bull  by  the  horns.  I  will  back 
you  in  such  forced  requisitions  when  they  become  nec- 
essary for  supplying  the  forces.  We  must  have  no 
failure  in  this  movement  against  Price.  It  must  be  the 
last. 
And  once  more,  on  January  27,  he  repeated 
his  urgent  admonition : 
There  is  a  strong  pressure  on  us  for  troops,  and  all 
that  are  not  absolutely  necessary  here  must  go  else- 
where. Pope's  command  is  entirely  broken  up ;  4000 
in  Davis's  reserve  and  6000  ordered  to  Cairo.  Push 
on  as  rapidly  as  possible  and  end  the  matter  with 
Price. 
This  trying  winter  campaign  led  by  General 
Curtis,  though  successful  in  the  end,  did  not 
terminate  so  quickly  as  General  Halleck  had 
hoped.  Leaving  the  heroic  Western  soldiers 
camping  and  scouting  in  the  snows  and  cut- 
ting winds  of  the  bleak  Missouri  hills  and 
prairies,  attention  must  be  called  to  other  in- 
cidents in  the  Department  of  the  Missouri. 
While  Halleck  was  gratifying  the  Government 
and  the  Northern  public  with  the  ability  and
TENNESSEE  AND  KENTUCKY. 
565 
vigor  of  his  measures,  one  point  of  his  admin- 
istration had  excited  a  wide-spread  dissatis- 
faction and  vehement  criticism.  His  military 
instincts  and  methods  were  so  thorough  that 
they  caused  him  to  treat  too  lightly  the  polit- 
ical aspects  of  the  great  conflict  in  which  he 
was  directing  so  large  a  share.  Fremont's  treat- 
ment of  the  slavery  question  had  been  too 
radical ;  Halleck's  now  became  too  conserva- 
tive. It  is  not  probable  that  this  grew  out  of 
his  mere  wish  to  avoid  the  error  of  his  prede- 
cessor, but  out  of  his  own  personal  conviction 
that  the  issue  must  be  entirely  eliminated  from 
the  military  problem.  He  had  noted  the  dif- 
ficulties and  discussions  growing  out  of  the 
dealings  of  the  army  with  fugitive  slaves,  and 
hoping  to  rid  himself  of  a  perpetual  dilemma, 
one  of  his  first  acts  after  assuming  command 
was  to  issue  his  famous  General  Order  No.  3 
(November  20,  1861),  the  first  paragraph  of 
which  ran  as  follows : 
It  has  been  represented  that  important  information 
respecting  the  numbers  and  condition  of  our  forces  is 
conveyed  to  the  enemy  by  means  of  fugitive  slaves 
who  are  admitted  within  our  lines.  In  order  to  rem- 
edy this  evil,  it  is  directed  that  no  such  persons  be 
hereafter  permitted  to  enter  the  lines  of  any  camp  or 
of  any  forces  on  the  march,  and  that  any  now  within 
such  lines  be  immediately  excluded  therefrom.* 
This  language  brought  upon  him  the  in- 
dignant protest  of  the  combined  antislavery 
sentiment  of  the  North.  He  was  berated 
in  newspapers  and  denounced  in  Congress, 
and  the  violence  of  public  condemnation 
threatened  seriously  to  impair  his  military 
usefulness.  He  had  indeed  gone  too  far.  The 
country  felt,  and  the  army  knew,  that  so  far 
from  being  generally  true  that  negroes  carried 
valuable  information  to  the  enemy,  the  very 
reverse  was  the  rule,  and  that  the  "  contra- 
bands "  in  reality  constituted  one  of  the  most 
important  and  reliable  sources  of  knowledge 
to  the  Union  commanders  in  the  various  fields, 
which  later  in  the  war  came  to  be  jocosely 
designated  as  the  "  grape-vine  telegraph." 
Halleck  soon  found  himself  put  on  the  de- 
fensive, and  wrote  an  explanatory  letter  to 
the  newspapers.  A  little  later  he  took  occa- 
sion officially  to  define  his  intention : 
The  object  of  these  orders  is  to  prevent  any  person 
in  the  army  from  acting  in  the  capacity  of  negro-catcher 
or  negro-stealer.  The  relation  between  the  slave  and 
his  master,  or  pretended  master,  is  not  a  matter  to  be 
determined  by  military  officers,  except  in  the  single 
case  provided  for  by  Congress.  This  matter  in  all 
other  cases  must  be  decided  by  the  civil  authorities. 
One  object  in  keeping  fugitive  slaves  out  of  our  camp 
is  to  keep  clear  of  all  such  questions.  .  .  .  Orders 
No.  3  do  not  apply  to  the  authorized  private  servants 
of  officers  nor  the  negroes  employed  by  proper  author- 
*  War  Records. 
t  Halleck  to  Asboth,  Dec.  26,  1861.    Ibid. 
ity  in  the  camps.  It  applies  only  to  fugitive  slaves. 
The  prohibition  to  admit  them  within  our  lines  does 
not  prevent  the  exercise  of  all  proper  offices  of  human- 
ity in  giving  them  food  and  clothing  outside  where 
such  offices  are  necessary  to  prevent  suffering.t 
It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Missouri 
State  Convention  in  the  month  of  July  ap- 
pointed and  inaugurated  a  provisional  State 
government.  This  action  was  merely  designed 
to  supply  a  temporary  executive  authority  un- 
til the  people  could  elect  new  loyal  State  offi- 
cers, which  election  was  ordered  to  be  held  on 
the  first  Monday  in  November.  The  conven- 
tion also,  when  it  finished  the  work  of  its  sum- 
mer session,  adjourned  to  meet  on  the  third 
Monday  in  December,  1861,  but  political  and 
military  affairs  remained  in  so  unsettled  a  con- 
dition during  the  whole  autumn  that  anything 
like  effective  popular  action  was  impracticable. 
The  convention  was  therefore  called  together 
in  a  third  session  at  an  earlier  date  (October 
n,  1 861),  when  it  wisely  adopted  an  ordinance 
postponing  the  State  election  for  the  period  of 
one  year,  and  for  continuing  the  provisional 
government  in  office  until  their  successors 
should  be  duly  appointed. 
With  his  tenure  of  power  thus  prolonged, 
Governor  Gamble,  also  by  direction  of  the 
convention,  proposed  to  the  President  to 
raise  a  special  force  of  Missouri  State  militia 
for  service  within  the  State  during  the  war 
there,  but  to  act  with  the  United  States  troops 
in  military  operations  within  the  State  or  when 
necessary  to  its  defense.  President  Lincoln 
accepted  the  plan  upon  the  condition  that 
whatever  United  States  officer  might  be  in 
command  of  the  Department  of  the  West 
should  also  be  commissioned  by  the  governor 
to  command  the  Missouri  State  militia;  and 
that  if  the  President  changed  the  former,  the 
governor  should  make  the  corresponding 
change,  in  order  that  any  conflict  of  authority 
or  of  military  plans  might  be  avoided.  This 
agreement  was  entered  into  between  President 
Lincoln  and  Governor  Gamble  on  November 
6,  and  on  November  27  General  Schofield  re- 
ceived orders  from  Halleck  to  raise,  organize, 
and  command  this  special  militia  corps.  The 
plan  was  attended  with  reasonable  success, 
and  by  the  15th  of  April,  1862,  General  Scho- 
field reports,  "  an  active  efficient  force  of 
13,800  men  was  placed  in  the  field,"  nearly 
all  of  cavalry. 
The  raising  and  organizing  of  this  force, 
during  the  winter  and  spring  of  1861-62, 
produced  a  certain  degree  of  local  military 
activity  just  at  the  season  when  the  partisan 
and  guerrilla  operations  of  rebel  sympathiz- 
ers were  necessarily  impeded  or  wholly  sus- 
pended by  severe  weather;  and  this,  joined  with 
the  vigorous  administration  of  General  Hal-
566 
lock,  and  the  fact  that  Curtis  was  chasing  the 
army  of  Price  out  of  south-western  Missouri, 
a  delusive  appearance  oi  quiet  and  order 
throughout  the  State.    We  shall  see  how  this 
ity  was  rudely  disturbed  during  the  sum- 
mer oi   1862   by  local  efforts  and   uprisings, 
gh  the  rebels  were  not  able  to  bring  about 
any  formidable  campaign  of  invasion,  and  Mis- 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
tion  became,  in  the  public  estimation,  rather 
a  sign  of  suspicion  than  an  assurance  of  hon- 
esty and  good  faith.  It  grew  into  one  of  the 
standing  jests  of  the  camps  that  when  a  Union 
soldier  found  a  rattlesnake,  his  comrades 
would  instantly  propose  with  mock  gravity, 
"  Administer  the  oath  to  him,  boys,  and  let 
him  go." 
souri  as  a  whole  remained  immovable  in  her 
military  and  political  adherence  to  the  Union. 
With  the  view  still  further  to  facilitate  the 
restoration  of  public  peace,  the  State  con- 
vention at  the  same  October  (1861)  session, 
extended  amnesty  to  repentant  rebels  in  an 
ordinance  which  provided  that  any  person 
who  would  make  and  file  a  written  oath  to 
support  the  Federal  and  State  governments, 
declaring  that  he  would  not  take  up  arms 
against  the  United  States,  or  the  provisional 
rnment  of  Missouri,  nor  give  aid  and 
comfort  to  their  enemies  during  the  present 
civil  war,  should  be  exempt  from  arrest  and 
punishment  for  previous  rebellion. 
persons  doubtless  took  this  oath  and 
kept  it  with  sincere  faith.  But  it  seems  no  less 
certain  that  many  others  who  also  took  it  so 
persistently  violated  both  its  spirit  and  letter 
as  to  render  it  practically  of  no  service  as  an 
external  test  of  allegiance  to  the  Union.  In 
the  years  of  local  hatred  and  strife  which  en- 
sued, oaths  were  so  recklessly  taken  and  so 
willfully  violated  that  the  ceremony  of  adjura- 
THE    TENNESSEE     LINE. 
In  the  State  of  Kentucky  the  long  game 
of  political  intrigue  came  to  an  end  as  the 
autumn  of  1861  approached.  By  a  change 
almost  as  sudden  as  a  stage  transformation- 
scene,  the  beginning  of  September  brought  a 
general  military  activity  and  a  state  of  quali- 
fied civil  war.  This  change  grew  naturally 
out  of  the  military  condition,  which  was  no 
longer  compatible  with  the  uncertain  and  ex- 
pectant attitude  the  State  had  hitherto  main- 
tained. The  notes  of  preparation  for  Fre- 
mont's campaign  down  the  Mississippi  could 
not  be  ignored.  Cairo  had  become  a  great 
military  post,  giving  the  Federal  forces  who 
held  it  a  strategical  advantage  both  for  de- 
fense and  offense  against  which  the  Confed- 
erates had  no  corresponding  foothold  on  the 
great  river.  The  first  defensive  work  was 
Fort  Pillow,  215  miles  below,  armed  with 
only  twelve  32-pounders.  To  oppose  a  more 
formidable  resistance  to  Fremont's  descent 
was    of    vital    importance,    which    General
TENNESSEE  AND  KENTUCKY. 
567 
Polk's  West  Point  education  enabled  him  to 
realize. 
But  the  Mississippi,  with  its  generally  level 
banks,  afforded  relatively  few  points  capable 
Df  effective  defense.  The  one  most  favorable 
to  the  Confederate  needs  was  at  Columbus, 
in  the  State  of  Kentucky,  eighteen  miles  be- 
low Cairo,  on  a  high  bluff  commanding  the 
river  for  about  five  miles.  Both  the  Union  and 
Confederate  commanders  coveted  this  situa- 
tion, for  its  natural  advantages  were  such  that 
when  fully  fortified  it  became  familiarly  known 
is  the  "  Gibraltar  of  the  West."  So  far,  through 
the  neutrality  policy  of  Kentucky,  it  had  re- 
mained unappropriated  by  either  side.  On 
the  first  day  of  September,  the  rebel  General 
Polk,  commanding  at  Memphis,  sent  a  mes- 
senger to  Governor  Magoffin  to  obtain  con- 
fidential information  about  the  "  future  plans 
and  policy  of  the  Southern  party  in  Kentucky," 
explaining  his  desire  to  "  be  ahead  of  the  en- 
emy in  occupying  Columbus  and  Paducah." 
Buckner  at  the  same  time  was  in  Richmond, 
proposing  to  the  Confederate  authorities  cer- 
tain military  movements  in  Kentucky,  "  in 
advance  of  the  action  of  her  governor."  On 
September  3  they  promised  him,  as  definitely 
as  they  could,  countenance  and  assistance  in 
his  scheme ;  and  a  week  after,  he  accepted  a 
brigadier-general's  commission  from  Jefferson 
Davis.  While  Buckner  was  negotiating,  Gen- 
eral Polk  initiated  the  rebel  invasion  of 
Kentucky.  Whether  upon  information  from 
Governor  Magoffin  or  elsewhere,  he  ordered 
Pillow  with  his  detachment  of  six  thousand 
men  to  move  up  the  river  from  New  Madrid 
and  occupy  the  town  of  Columbus. 
The  Confederate  movement  created  a  gen- 
eral flurry  in  neutrality  circles.  Numerous 
protests  went  to  both  Polk  and  the  Richmond 
authorities,  and  Governor  Harris  hastened  to 
assure  Governor  Magoffin  that  he  was  in  en- 
tire ignorance  of  it,  and  had  appealed  to  Jef- 
ferson Davis  to  order  the  troops  withdrawn. 
Even  the  rebel  Secretary  of  War  was  mysti- 
fied by  the  report,  and  directed  Polk  to  order 
the  troops  withdrawn  from  Kentucky.  Jeffer- 
son Davis  however,,  either  with  prior  knowl- 
edge or  with  truer  instinct,  telegraphed  to 
Polk:  "The  necessity  justifies  the  action."* 
[n  his  letter  to  Davis,  the  general  strongly 
irgued  the  propriety  of  his  course :  "  I  be- 
ieve,  if  we  could  have  found  a  respectable 
pretext,  it  would  have  been  better  to  have 
seized  this  place  some  months  ago,  as  I  am 
:onvinced  we  had  more  friends  then  in  Ken- 
:ucky  than  we  have  had  since,  and  every  hour's 
ielay  made    against  us.    Kentucky  was  fast 
*  Davis  to  Polk,  Sept.  4,  1861.    War  Records, 
t  Davis  to  Polk,  Sept.  15,  1861.     Ibid. 
X  Davis  to  Harris,  Sept.   13,  1861.    Ibid. 
melting  away  under  the  influence  of  the  Lin- 
coln Government."  He  had  little  need  to 
urge  this  view.  Jefferson  Davis  had  already 
written  him,  "We  cannot  permit  the  indeter- 
minate quantities,  the  political  elements,  to 
control  our  action  in  cases  of  military  neces- 
sity ";t  and  to  Governor  Harris,  "  Security 
to  Tennessee  and  other  parts  of  the  Confed- 
eracy is  the  primary  object.  To  this  all  else 
must  give  way."  \ 
To  strengthen  further  and  consolidate  the 
important  military  enterprises  thus  begun, 
Jefferson  Davis  now  adopted  a  recommenda- 
tion of  Polk  that 
They  should  be  combined  from  west  to  east  across 
the  Mississippi  Valley,  and  placed  under  the  direction 
of  one  head,  and  that  head  should  have  large  discre- 
tionary powers.  Such  a  position  is  one  of  very  great 
responsibility,  involving  and  requiring  large  experience 
and  extensive  military  knowledge,  and  I  know  of  no 
one  so  well  equal  to  that  task  as  our  friend  General 
Albert  S.  Johnston. 
Johnston,  with  the  rank  of  general,  was  duly 
assigned,  on  September  10,  to  the  command 
of  Department  No.  2,  covering  in  general  the 
States  of  Tennessee,  Arkansas,  part  of  Missis- 
sippi, Kentucky,  Missouri,  Kansas,  and  the 
Indian  Territory.  Proceeding  at  once  to 
Nashville  and  conferring  with  the  local  au- 
thorities, he  wrote  back  to  Richmond,  under 
date  of  September  16  : 
So  far  from  yielding  to  the  demand  for  the  with- 
drawal of  our  troops,  I  have  determined  to  occupy 
Bowling  Green  at  once.  ...  I  design  to-morrow 
(which  is  the  earliest  practicable  moment)  to  take 
possession  of  Bowling  Green  with  five  thousand  troops, 
and  prepare  to  support  the  movement  with  such  force 
as  circumstances  may  indicate  and  the  means  at  my 
command  may  allow. 
The  movement  was  promptly  carried  out. 
Buckner  was  put  in  command  of  the  expedi- 
tion; and  seizing  several  railroad  trains,  he 
moved  forward  to  Bowling  Green  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  1 8th,  having  sent  ahead  five  hundred 
men  to  occupy  Munfordville,  and  issuing  the 
usual  proclamation,  that  his  invasion  was  a 
measure  of  defense.  Meanwhile  the  third  col- 
umn of  invaders  entered  eastern  Kentucky 
through  Cumberland  Gap.  Brigadier- General 
Zollicoffer  had  eight  or  ten  thousand  men  un- 
der his  command  in  eastern  Tennessee,  but. 
as  elsewhere, much  scattered,  and  badly  armed 
and  supplied.  Under  his  active  supervision, 
during  the  month  of  August  he  somewhat 
improved  the  organization  of  his  forces  and 
acquainted  himself  with  the  intricate  topog- 
raphy of  the  mountain  region  he  was  in. 
Prompted  probably  from  Kentucky,  he  was 
ready  early  in  September  to  join  in  the  com- 
bined movement  into  that  State.  About  the 
10th  he  advanced  with  six  regiments  through.
56S 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
Cumberland  Gap  to  Cumberland  Ford,  and 
.  g  in  planning  further  aggressive  movements 
gainst    the   small    Union   force,  principally 
Home  Guards,  which  had  been  collected  and 
organized  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson. 
The  strong  Union  legislature  which  Ken- 
tucky elected  in  August  met  in  Frankfort,  the 
capital,  on  the  2d  of  September.  Polk,  hav- 
ing securely  established  himself  at  Columbus, 
notified  the  governor  of  his  presence,  and  of- 
fered as  his  only  excuse  the  alleged  intention 
of  the  Federal  troops  to  occupy  it.  The  legis- 
lature, not  deeming  the  excuse  sufficient, 
passed  a  joint  resolution  instructing  the  gov- 
ernor "  to  inform  those  concerned  that  Ken- 
tucky expects  the  Confederate  or  Tennessee 
troops  to  be  withdrawn  from  her  soil  uncon- 
ditionally." *  The  governor  vetoed  the  resolu- 
tion, on  the  ground  that  it  did  not  also  embrace 
the  Union  troops;  the  legislature  passed  it 
over  his  veto.  Governor  Magoffin  now  issued 
his  proclamation,  as  directed.  Polk  and  Jeffer- 
son Davis  replied  that  the  Confederate  army 
would  withdraw  if  the  Union  army  would  do 
the  same.  To  this  the  legislature  responded 
with  another  joint  resolution,  that  the  condi- 
tions prescribed  were  an  insult  to  the  dignity 
of  the  State,  "  to  which  Kentucky  cannot  list- 
en without  dishonor,"  and  "that  the  invad- 
ers must  be  expelled."  The  resolution  further 
required  General  Robert  Anderson  to  take  in- 
stant command,  with  authority  to  call  out  a 
volunteer  force,  in  all  of  which  the  governor 
was  required  to  lend  his  aid.  Kentucky  was 
thus  officially  taken  out  of  her  false  attitude 
of  neutrality,  and  placed  in  active  cooperation 
with  the  Federal  Government  to  maintain  the 
Union.  Fvery  day  increased  the  strength  and 
zeal  of  her  assistance.  A  little  later  in  the  ses- 
sion a  law  was  enacted  declaring  enlistments 
under  the  Confederate  flag  a  misdemeanor 
and  the  invasion  of  Kentucky  by  Confederate 
soldiers  a  felony,  and  prescribing  heavy  pen- 
alties for  both.  Finally,  the  legislature  author- 
ized the  enlistmentof  forty  thousand  volunteers 
to  "  repel  invasion,"  providing  also  that  they 
should  be  mustered  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  and  cooperate  with  the  armies 
of  the  Union.  This  was  a  complete  revolution 
from  the  anti-coercion  resolutions  that  the  pre- 
legislature  had  passed  in  January. 
Hitherto  there  were  no  Federal  forces  in 
tuc  kv  except  the  brigade  which  Lieuten- 
ant Nelson  had  organized  at  Camp  Dick 
Robinson  ;  the  Home  Guards  in  various  coun- 
ties, though  supplied  with  arms  by  the  Fed- 
eral Government,  were  acting  under  State 
militia  laws.  General  Robert  Anderson,  com- 
manding the  military  department  which  em- 
braced Kentucky,  still  kept  his  headquarters 
*  War  Records. 
at  Cincinnati,  and  Rousseau,  a  prominent 
Kentuckian,  engaged  in  organizing  a  brigade 
of  Kentuckians,  had  purposely  made  his  camp 
on  the  Indiana  side  of  the  Ohio  River.  Never- 
theless President  Lincoln,  the  governors  of 
Ohio  and  Indiana,  and  the  various  military 
commanders  had  for  months  been  ready  to  go 
to  the  assistance  of  the  Kentucky  Unionists 
whenever  the  emergency  should  arise.  Even  if 
the  neutral  attitude  of  Kentucky  had  not  been 
brought  to  an  end  by  the  advance  of  the  Con- 
federate forces,  it  would  have  been  by  that  of 
the  Federals.  A  point  had  been  reached  where 
further  inaction  was  impossible.  Three  days 
before  General  Pillow  occupied  Hickman, 
Fremont  sent  General  Grant  to  south-eastern 
Missouri,  to  concentrate  the  several  Federal 
detachments,  drive  out  the  enemy,  and  de- 
stroy a  rumored  rebel  battery  at  Belmont.  His 
order  says  finally,  "  It  is  intended,  in  connec- 
tion with  all  these  movements,  to  occupy  Co- 
lumbus, Kentucky,  as  soon  as  possible."  It 
was  in  executing  a  part  of  this  order  that  the 
gun-boats  sent  to  Belmont  extended  their  re- 
connaissance down  the  river,  and  discovered 
the  advance  of  the  Confederates  on  the  Ken- 
tucky shore.  An  unexpected  delay  in  the 
movement  of  one  of  Grant's  detachments  oc- 
curred at  the  same  time;  and  that  command- 
er, with  the  military  intuition  which  afterward 
rendered  him  famous,  postponed  the  continu- 
ance of  the  local  operations  in  Missouri,  and 
instead  immediately  prepared  an  expedition 
into  Kentucky,  which  became  the  initial  step 
of  his  brilliant  and  fruitful  campaign  in  that 
direction  a  few  months  later.  He  saw  that 
Columbus,  his  primary  objective  point,  was 
lost  for  the  present ;  but  he  also  perceived 
that  another,  of  perhaps  equal  strategical 
value,  yet  lay  within  his  grasp,  though  clearly 
there  was  no  time  to  be  wasted  in  seizing  it. 
The  gun-boat  reconnaissance  on  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  which  revealed  the  rebel  occupa- 
tion of  Kentucky,  was  begun  on  September  4. 
On  the  following  day  General  Grant,  having 
telegraphed  the  information  to  Fremont  and 
to  the  Kentucky  legislature,  hurriedly  organ- 
ized an  expedition  of  2  gun-boats,  1800  men, 
16  cannon  for  batteries,  and  a  supply  of  pro- 
visions and  ammunition  on  transports.  Tak- 
ing personal  command,  he  started  with  the 
expedition  from  Cairo  at  midnight  of  the  5th, 
and  proceeded  up  the  Ohio  River  to  the  town 
of  Paducah,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee, 
where  he  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the  6th. 
A  contraband  trade  with  the  rebels,  by  means 
of  small  steamboats  plying  on  the  Tennessee 
and  Cumberland  rivers,  had  called  special  at- 
tention to  the  easy  communication  between  this 
point  and  central  Tennessee.  He  landed  with- 
out opposition  and  took  possession,  making
TENNESSEE  AND  KENTUCKY. 
$f><) 
arrangements  to  fortify  and  permanently  hold 
the  place ;  having  done  which,  he  himself  re- 
turned to  Cairo  the  same  afternoon,  to  report 
his  advance  and  forward  reinforcements.  The 
importance  of  the  seizure  was  appreciated  by 
the  rebels,  for,  on  the  13th  of  September,  Buck- 
ner  wrote  to  Richmond,  "  Our  possession  of 
Columbus  is  already  neutralized  by  that  of 
Paducah." 
The  culmination  of  affairs  in  Kentucky  had 
been  carefully  watched  by  the  authorities  in 
Washington.  From  a  conference  with  Presi- 
dent Lincoln,  Anderson  returned  to  Cincin- 
nati on  September  1,  taking  with  him  two 
subordinates  of  exceptional  ability,  Brigadier- 
Generals  Sherman  and  Thomas.  A  delegation 
of  prominent  Kentuckians  met  him,  to  set 
forth  the  critical  condition  of  their  State.  He 
dispatched  Sherman  to  solicit  help  from  Fre- 
mont and  the  governors  of  Indiana  and  Illinois, 
and  a  week  later  moved  his  headquarters  to 
Louisville,  also  sending  Thomas  to  Camp 
Dick  Robinson,  to  take  direction  of  affairs  in 
that  quarter.  By  the  time  that  Sherman  re- 
turned from  his  mission  the  crisis  had  already 
developed  itself.  The  appearance  of  Polk's 
forces  at  Columbus,  the  action  of  the  legisla- 
ture, the  occupation  of  Paducah  by  Grant,  and 
the  threatening  rumors  from  Buckner's  camp, 
created  a  high  degree  of  excitement  and  appre- 
hension. On  September  16  Anderson  reported 
Zollicoffer's  invasion  through  Cumberland 
Gap,  upon  which  the  President  telegraphed 
him  to  assume  active  command  in  Kentucky 
at  once.  Added  to  this,  there  came  to 
Louisville  on  the  18th  the  positive  news  of 
Buckner's  advance  to  Bowling  Green.  This 
information  set  all  central  Kentucky  in  a  mili- 
tary ferment;  for  the  widely  published  an- 
nouncement that  the  State  Guards,  Buckner's 
secession  militia,  would  meet  at  Lexington 
on  September  20,  to  have  a  camp  drill  under 
supervision  of  Breckinridge,  Humphrey  Mar- 
shall, and  other  leaders,  seemed  too  plainly 
coincident  with  the  triple  invasion  to  be  de- 
signed for  a  mere  holiday.  A  rising  at  Lex- 
ington and  a  junction  with  Zollicoffer  might 
end  in  a  march  upon  Frankfort,  the  capital, 
to  disperse  the  legislature;  a  simultaneous 
advance  by  Buckner  in  force  and  capture  of 
Louisville  would,  in  a  brief  campaign,  com- 
plete the  subjugation  of  Kentucky  to  the  re- 
bellion. There  remains  no  record  to  show 
whether  or  not  such  a  plan  was  among  the 
movements,  "  in  advance  of  the  governor's 
action,"  which  Buckner  discussed  with  Jeffer- 
son Davis  on  September  3  at  Richmond. 
The  bare  possibility  roused  the  Unionists  of 
Kentucky  to  vigorous  action.  With  an  evi- 
dent distrust  of  Governor  Magoffin,  a  caucus 
of  the  Union  members  of  the  legislature  as- 
Vol.  XXXVI.— 79. 
sumed  quasi-executive  authority,  and  through 
the  speakers  of  the  two  Houses  reque 
General  Thomas,  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson,  to 
send  a  regiment,  "  fully  prepared  for  fight,"  to 
Lexington  in  advance  of  the  advertised  "  camp 
drill"  of  the  State  Guards;  also  promising 
that  the  Home  Guards  should  rally  in  force 
to  support  him.  Thomas  ordered  the  move- 
ment, and,  in  spite  of  numerous  obstacles, 
Colonel  Bramlette  brought  his  regiment  to 
the  Lexington  fair  ground  on  the  night  of 
the  19th  of  September.  His  advent  was  so 
sudden  that  he  came  near  making  important 
arrests.  Breckinridge,  Humphrey  Marshall, 
Morgan,  and  other  leaders  were  present,  but, 
being  warned,  fled  in  different  directions,  and 
the  "  camp  drill,"  shorn  of  its  guiding  spirits, 
proved  powerless  for  the  mischievous  ends 
which  had  evidently  been  intended. 
At  Louisville,  General  Anderson  lost  no 
time  in  the  effort  to  meet  Buckner's  advance. 
There  were  no  organized  troops  in  the  city, 
but  the  brigade  Rousseau  had  been  collecting 
on  the  Indiana  shore  was  hastily  called  across 
the  river  and  joined  to  the  Louisville  Home 
Guards,  making  in  all  some  2500  men,  who 
were  sent  out  by  the  railroad  to  wards  Nashville, 
under  the  personal  command  of  Sherman.  An 
expedition  of  the  enemy  had  already  burned 
the  important  railroad  bridges,  apparently, 
however,  with  the  simple  object  of  creating 
delay.  Nevertheless,  Sherman  went  on  and 
occupied  Muldraugh's  Hill,  where  he  was  soon 
reenforced;  for  the  utmost  efforts  had  been 
used  by  the  governors  of  Ohio  and  Indiana 
to  send  to  the  help  of  Kentucky  every  avail- 
able regiment.  If  Buckner  meditated  the  cap- 
ture of  Louisville,  this  show  of  force  caused 
him  to  pause;  but  he  remained  firm  at  Bowling 
Green,  also  increasing  his  army,  and  ready  to 
take  part  in  whatever  movement  events  might 
render  feasible. 
No  serious  or  decisive  conflicts  immediately 
followed  these  various  moves  on  the  military 
chess-board.  For  the  present  they  served 
merely  to  define  the  hostile  frontier.  With 
Polk  at  Columbus,  Buckner  at  Bowling  Green, 
and  Zollicoffer  in  front  of  Cumberland  Gap, 
the  Confederate  frontier  was  practically  along 
the  northern  Tennessee  line.  The  Union 
line  ran  irregularly  through  the  center  of 
Kentucky.  One  direct  result  was  rapidly  to 
eliminate  the  armed  secessionists.  Humphrey 
Marshall,  Breckinridge,  and  others  who  had 
set  up  rebel  camps  hastened  with  their  fol- 
lowers within  the  protection  of  the  Confeder- 
ate line.  Before  further  operations  occurred, 
a  change  of  L^nion  commanders  took  place. 
The  excitement,  labors,  and  responsibilities 
proved  too  great  for  the  physical  strength  of 
General  Anderson.    Relieved  at  his  own  re-
570 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
quest,    on    October   S,    he    relinquished   the 
command   to    General    Sherman,   who    was 
gnated  by  General  Scott  to  succeed  him. 
new  and  heavy  duties  which  fell  upon 
him  were  by  no  means  to  Sherman's  liking. 
"  I  am  forced  into  the  command  of  this  De- 
partment against  my  will,"  he  wrote.    Look- 
;  his  held  with  a  purely  professional  eye, 
lisproportion  between  the  magnitude  of 
his  task  and  the  immediate  means  for  its  ac- 
tlishment  oppressed  him  like  a  nightmare. 
There  were  no  troops  in  Kentucky  when  he 
e.  The  recruits  sent  from  other  States 
were  gradually  growing  into  an  army,  but  as 
yet  without  drill,  equipments,  or  organization. 
Kentucky  herself  was  in  a  curious  transition. 
By  vote  of  her  people  and  her  legislature,  she 
had  decided  to  adhere  to  the  Union ;  but  as 
a  practical  incident  of  war,  many  of  her  en- 
ergetic and  adventurous  young  men  drifted  to 
Southern  camps,  while  the  Union  property- 
holders  and  heads  of  families  were  unfit  or 
unwilling  immediately  to  enlist  in  active  ser- 
vice to  sustain  the  cause  they  had  espoused. 
The  Home  Guards,  called  into  service  for  ten 
days,  generally  refused  to  extend  their  term. 
The  arms  furnished  them  became  easily  scat- 
tered, and,  even  if  not  seized  or  stolen  by  young 
secession  recruits  and  carried  to  the  enemy, 
were  with  difficulty  recovered  for  use.  Now 
that  the  General  Government  had  assumed 
command  and  the  State  had  ordered  an  army, 
many  neighborhoods  felt  privileged  to  call  for 
protection  rather  than  furnish  a  quota  for  of- 
fense. Even  where  they  were  ready  to  serve, 
the  enlistment  of  the  State  volunteers,  recently 
authorized  by  the  legislature,  had  yet  scarcely 
begun. 
About  the  middle  of  October,  Mr.  Cameron, 
Secretary  of  War,  returning  from  a  visit  to 
Fremont,  passed  through  Louisville  and  held 
a  military  consultation  with  Sherman.  Gen- 
eral Sherman  writes : 
I  remember  taking  a  large  map  of  the  United  States, 
and  assuming  the  people  of  the  whole  South  to  be  in 
rebellion,  that  our  task  was  to  subdue  them,  showed 
that  McClellan  was  on  the  left,  having  a  frontage  of  less 
than  I0O  miles,  and  Fremont  the  right,  about  the  same; 
whereas  1,  the  center,  had  from  the  Big  Sandy  to 
Paducah,  over  300  miles  of  frontier  ;  that  McClellan 
ha'l  100,000  men,  Fremont  60,000,  whereas  to  me 
had  only  been  allotted  about  18,000.  I  argued  that  for 
the  purpose  of  defense  we  should  have  60,000  men 
at  once,  and  for  offense  would  need  200,000  before  we 
done.  Mr.  Cameron,  who  still  lay  on  the  bed, 
threw  up  his  hands  and  exclaimed,  "  Great  God !  where 
are  they  to  come  from  ?  "  I  asserted  that  there  were 
plenty  of  men  at  the  North,  ready  and  willing  to  come 
if  he  would  only  accept  their  services;  for  it  was  no- 
torious that  iegiments  had  been  formed  in  all  the 
North-western  States  whose  services  had  been  refused 
by  the  War  Department,  on  the  ground  that  they  would 
not  be  needed.    We  discussed  all  these  matters  fully, 
in  the  most  friendly  spirit,  and  I  thought  I  had  aroused 
Mr.  Cameron  to  a  realization  of  the  great  war  that 
was  before  us,  and  was  in  fact  upon  us.  * 
While  recognizing  many  of  the  needs  which 
Sherman  pointed  out,  the  Secretary  could  not 
immediately  promise  him  any  great  augmen- 
tation of  his  force. 
Complaints  and  requests  of  this  character 
were  constantly  coming  to  the  Administration 
from  all  the  commanders  and  governors,  and 
a  letter  of  President  Lincoln,  written  in  reply 
to  a  similar  strain  of  fault-finding  from  Indiana, 
plainly  indicates  why  such  requirements  in  all 
quarters  could  not  be  immediately  supplied : 
Washington,  D.  C,  Sept.  29,  1S61. 
His  Excellency  Gov.  O.  P.  Morton:  Your 
letter  by  the  hand  of  Mr.  Prunk  was  received  yester- 
day. I  write  this  letter  because  I  wish  you  to  believe 
of  us  (as  we  certainly  believe  of  you)  that  we  are  do- 
ing the  very  best  we  can.  You  do  not  receive  arms 
from  us  as  fast  as  you  need  them ;  but  it  is  because 
we  have  not  near  enough  to  meet  all  the  pressing 
demands,  and  we  are  obliged  to  share  around  what 
we  have,  sending  the  larger  share  to  the  points  which 
appear  to  need  them  most.  We  have  great  hope  that 
our  own  supply  will  be  ample  before  long,  so  that 
you  and  all  others  can  have  as  many  as  you  need.  I 
see  an  article  in  an  Indianapolis  newspaper  denoun- 
cing me  for  not  answering  your  letter  sent  by  special 
messenger  two  or  three  weeks  ago.  I  did  make  what 
I  thought  the  best  answer  I  could  to  that  letter.  As 
I  remember,  it  asked  for  ten  heavy  guns  to  be  dis- 
tributed with  some  troops  at  Lawrenceburgh,  Madi- 
son, New  Albany,  and  Evansville  ;  and  I  ordered  the 
guns  and  directed  you  to  send  the  troops  if  you  had 
them.  As  to  Kentucky,  you  do  not  estimate  that  State 
as  more  important  than  I  do;  but  I  am  compelled 
to  watch  all  points.  While  I  write  this  I  am  if  not 
in  range  at  least  in  hearing  of  cannon  shot,  from  an 
army  of  enemies  more  than  a  hundred  thousand  strong. 
I  do  not  expect  them  to  capture  this  city;  but  I  know 
they  would  if  I  were  to  send  the  men  and  arms  from 
here  to  defend  Louisville,  of  which  there  is  not  a  sin- 
gle hostile  armed  soldier  within  forty  miles,  nor  any 
force  known  to  be  moving  upon  it  from  any  distance. 
It  is  true  the  army  in  our  front  may  make  a  half-cir- 
cle around  southward  and  move  on  Louisville ;  but 
when  they  do,  we  will  make  a  half-circle  around  north- 
ward and  meet  them  ;  and  in  the  mean  time  we  will 
get  up  what  forces  we  can  from  other  sources  to  also 
meet  them. 
I  hope  Zollicoffer  has  left  Cumberland  Gap  (though 
I  fear  he  has  not),  because,  if  he  has,  I  rather  infer  he 
did  it  because  of  his  dread  of  Camp  Dick  Robinson, 
reenforced  from  Cincinnati,  moving  on  him,  than  be- 
cause of  his  intention  to  move  on  Louisville.  But  if  he 
does  go  round  and  reenforce  Buckner,  let  Dick  Rob- 
inson come  round  and  reenforce  Sherman,  and  the  thing 
is  substantially  as  it  was  when  Zollicoffer  left  Cum- 
berland Gap.  I  state  this  as  an  illustration  ;  for  in  fact 
I  think  if  the  Gap  is  left  open  to  us  Dick  Robinson 
should  take  it  and  hold  it ;  while  Indiana,  and  the 
vicinity  of  Louisville  in  Kentucky, can  reenforce  Sher- 
man faster  than  Zollicoffer  can  Buckner.   .   .   . 
Yours,  very  truly,  A.  Lincoln.! 
The  conjectures  of  the  President  proved 
substantially  correct.  Great  as  was  the  need  of 
arms  for  Union  regiments,  the  scarcity  among 
the  rebels  was  much  greater.     Of  the  30,000 
Sherman,  "  Memoirs,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  203. 
\  Unpublished  MS.
TENNESSEE  AND   KENTUCKY. 
57' 
stands  which  Johnston  asked  for  when  he  as- 
sumed command,  the  rebel  War  Department 
:ould  only  send  him  iooo.  Ammunition  and 
supplies  were  equally  wanting.  He  called  out 
50,000  volunteers  from  Tennessee,  Mississippi, 
ind  Arkansas,  but  reinforcements  from  this 
md  other  sources  were  slow.  His  greatest 
mmediate  help  came  by  transferring  Hardee 
with  his  division  from  Missouri  to  Bowling 
Green.  If,  as  Sherman  surmised,  a  concentra- 
;ion  of  his  detachments  would  have  enabled 
iim  to  make  a  successful  march  on  Louisville, 
le  was  unwilling  to  take  the  risk.  The  contin- 
gency upon  which  the  rebel  invasion  was 
3robably  based,  the  expected  rising  in  Ken- 
;ucky,  had  completely  failed.  Johnston  wrote 
;o  Richmond: 
We  have  received  but  little  accession  to  our  ranks 
;ince  the  Confederate  forces  crossed  the  line ;  in  fact, 
10  such  enthusiastic  demonstration  as  to  justify  any 
novements  not  warranted  by  our  ability  to  maintain 
Dur  own  communications.* 
One  of  his  recruiting  brigadiers  wrote : 
The  Kentuckians  still  come  in  small  squads ;  I  have 
nduced  the  most  of  them  to  go  in  for  the  war.  This 
■equires  about  three  speeches  a  day.  When  thus  stirred 
ip  they  go,  almost  to  a  man.  Since  I  have  found  that 
[  can't  be  a  general,  I  have  turned  recruiting  agent 
md  sensation  speaker  for  the  brief  period  that  I  shall 
-emain.t 
For  the  present  Johnston's  policy  was  purely 
defensive;  he  directed  Cumberland  Gap  to 
3e  fortified,  and  completed  the  works  at  Co- 
umbus, "  to  meet  the  probable  flotilla  from  the 
North,  supposed  to  carry  two  hundred  heavy 
^uns,"  while  Buckner  was  vigorously  admon- 
shed  to  "  Hold  on  to  Bowling  Green."  He 
made  this  order  when  Buckner  had  six  thou- 
sand men;  but  even  when  that  number  was 
doubled,  after  the  arrival  of  Hardee,  Johnston 
was  occupied  with  calculations  for  defense 
md  asking  for  further  reenforcements.J 
LINCOLN    DIRECTS    COOPERATION. 
At  the  beginning  of  December,  1861,  the 
President  was  forced  to  turn  his  serious  per- 
sonal attention  to  army  matters.  Except  to 
Drganize,  drill,  and  review  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  to  make  an  unfruitful  reconnaissance 
and  to  suffer  the  lamentable  Ball's  Bluff  dis- 
aster, McClellan  had  nothing  to  show  for  his 
six  months  of  local  and  two  months  of  chief 
command.  The  splendid  autumn  weather, 
:he  wholesome  air  and  dry  roads,  had  come 
md  gone.  Rain,  snow,  and  mud,  crippling 
logs  to  military  movements  in  all  lands  and 
*  War  Records. 
t  Alcorn    to  Buckner,  Oct.  21, 1861.    Ibid. 
t  Johnston  to  Cooper,  Oct.  1 7, 1861.    Ibid. 
epochs,  were  to  be  expected  for  a  quarter  if 
not  for  half  of  the  coming  year.  Worse  than  all, 
McClellan  had  fallen  seriously  ill.  With  most 
urgent  need  of  early  action,  every  prospect 
of  securing  it  seemed  to  be  thus  cut  off.  In 
this  dilemma  Lincoln  turned  to  the  Western 
commanders.  "  General  McClellan  is  sick," 
he  telegraphed  to  Halleck  on  the  last  day  of 
the  year.  "Are  General  Buell  and  yourself  in 
concert?"  The  following  day,  being  New 
Year's,  he  repeated  his  inquiry,  or  rather  his 
prompting  suggestion,  that,  McClellan  being 
incapable  of  work,  Buell  and  Halleck  should 
at  once  establish  a  vigorous  and  hearty  co- 
operation. Their  replies  were  not  specially 
promising.  "  There  is  no  arrangement  between 
General  Halleck  and  myself,"  responded 
Buell,  adding  that  he  depended  on  McClellan 
for  instructions  to  this  end;  while  Halleck 
said,  "  I  have  never  received  a  word  from 
General  Buell.  I  am  not  ready  to  cooperate 
with  him";  adding,  in  his  turn,  that  he  had 
written  to  McClellan,  and  that  too  much 
haste  would  ruin  everything.  Plainly,  there- 
fore, the  military  machine,  both  East  and 
West,  was  not  only  at  a  complete  standstill, 
but  was  without  a  programme. 
Of  what  avail,  then,  were  McClellan's  of- 
fice and  function  of  General-in-Chief,  if  such 
a  contingency  revealed  either  his  incapacity 
or  his  neglect?  The  force  of  this  question  is 
immensely  increased  when  we  see  how  in  the 
same  episode  McClellan's  acts  followed  Lin- 
coln's suggestions.  However  silent  and  con- 
fiding in  the  skill  and  energy  of  his  generals, 
the  President  had  studied  the  military  situa- 
tion with  unremitting  diligence.  In  his  tele- 
gram of  December  31  to  Halleck,  he  started 
a  pregnant  inquiry.  "  When  he  [Buell]  moves 
on  Bowling  Green,  what  hinders  it  being  re- 
enforced  from  Columbus  ? "  And  he  asked 
the  same  question  at  the  same  time  of  Buell. 
Halleck  seems  to  have  had  no  answer  to 
make;  Buell  sent  the  only  reply  that  was 
possible  :  "  There  is  nothing  to  prevent  Bowl- 
ing Green  being  reenforced  from  Columbus  if 
a  military  force  is  not  brought  to  tear  on  the 
latter  place." 
Lincoln  was  not  content  to  permit  this  know- 
nothing  and  do-nothing  policy  to  continue.  "I 
have  just  been  with  General  McClellan,  and  he 
is  much  better,"  he  wrote  the  day  after  New 
Year's;  and  in  this  interview  the  necessity 
for  action  and  the  telegrams  from  the  Western 
commanders  were  fully  discussed,  as  becomes 
evident  from  the  fact  that  the  following  day 
McClellan  wrote  a  letter  to  Halleck  containing 
an  earnest  suggestion  to  remedy  the  neglect  and 
need  pointed  out  by  Lincoln's  dispatch  of  De- 
cember 31.  In  this  letter  McClellan  advised  an 
expedition  up  the  Cumberland  River,  a  dem-
57^ 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
onstration  on  Columbus,  and  a  feint  on  the 
Tennessee  River,  all  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
venting reenforcements  from  joining  Buckner 
and  Johnston  at  Bowling  Green,  whom  Buell 
was  preparing  to  attack. 
Meanwhile  Lincoln's  dispatch  of  inquiry 
had  renewed  the  attention,  and  perhaps 
aroused  the  ambition,  of  Buell.  He  and  Hal- 
leek  had,  after  Lincoln's  prompting,  inter- 
changed dispatches  about  concerted  action. 
Halleck  jeported  a  withdrawal  of  troops  from 
Missouri  "almost  impossible";  to  which  Buell 
replied  that  "  the  great  power  of  the  rebell- 
ion in  the  West  is  arrayed  "  on  a  line  from 
Columbus  to  Bowling  Green,  and  that  two 
gun-boat  expeditions  with  a  support  of  20,000 
men  should  attack  its  center  by  way  of  the 
Cumberland  and  Tennessee  rivers,  and  that 
"  whatever  is  done  should  be  done  speedily, 
within  a  few  days."  Halleck,  however,  did 
not  favorably  entertain  the  proposition.  His 
reply  discussed  an  altogether  different  ques- 
tion. He  said  it  would  be  madness  for  him 
with  his  forces  to  attempt  any  serious  opera- 
tion against  Camp  Beauregard  or  Columbus; 
and  that  if  BuelPs  Bowling  Green  movement 
required  his  help  it  ought  to  be  delayed  a 
few  weeks,  when  he  could  probably  furnish 
some  troops.  Leaving  altogether  unanswered 
Buell's  suggestion  for  the  movement  up  the 
Cumberland  and  the  Tennessee,  Halleck 
stated  his  strong  disapproval  of  the  Bowling 
Green  movement,  and  on  the  same  day  he 
repeated  these  views  a  little  more  fully  in 
a  letter  to  the  President.  Premising  that  he 
could  not  at  the  present  time  withdraw  any 
troops  from  Missouri,  "  without  risking  the 
loss  of  this  State,"  he  said  : 
I  know  nothing  of  General  Buell's  intended  oper- 
ations, never  having  received  any  information  in  regard 
to  the  general  plan  of  campaign.  If  it  be  intended 
that  his  column  shall  move  on  Bowling  Green  while 
another  moves  from  Cairo  or  Paducah  on  Columbus 
or  Camp  Beauregard,  it  will  be  a  repetition  of  the 
same  strategic  error  which  produced  the  disaster  of 
Hull  Run.  To  operate  on  exterior  lines  against  an 
enemy  occupying  a  central  position  will  fail,  as  it 
always  has  failed,  in  ninety-nine  cases  out  of  a  hun- 
dred. It  is  condemned  by  every  military  authority  I 
have  ever  read.  General  Buell's  army  and  the  forces 
lucah  occupy  precisely  the  same  position  in  re- 
lation to  each  other  and  to  the  enemy  as  did  the  armies 
of  McDowell  and  Patterson  before  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run. 
Lincoln,  finding  in  these  replies  but  a  con- 
tinuation of  not  only  the  system  of  delay,  but 
also  the  want  of  plans,  and  especially  of 
energetic  joint  action,  which  had  thus  far  in 
a  majority  of  cases  marked  the  operations  of 
the  various  commanders,  was  not  disposed 
further  to  allow  matters  to  remain  in  such  un- 
fruitful conditions.  Under  his  prompting  Mc- 
Clellan,  on  this  same  6th  of  January,  wrote  to 
Buell, "  Halleck,  from  his  own  account,  will  not 
soon  be  in  a  condition  to  support  properly  a 
movement  up  the  Cumberland.  Why  not 
make  the  movement  independently  of  and 
without  waiting  for  that  ?  "  And  on  the  next 
day  Lincoln  followed  this  inquiry  with  a  still 
more  energetic  monition :  "  Please  name  as 
early  a  day  as  you  safely  can,  on  or  before 
which  you  can  be  ready  to  move  southward 
in  concert  with  Major-General  Halleck.  Delay 
is  ruining  us,  and  it  is  indispensable  for  me  to 
have  something  definite.  I  send  a  like  dis- 
patch to  Major-General  Halleck."  This  some- 
what peremptory  order  seems  to  have  brought 
nothing  except  a  reply  from  Halleck :  "  I  have 
asked  General  Buell  to  designate  a  day  for  a 
demonstration  to  assist  him.  It  is  all  I  can 
do  till  I  get  arms."  Three  days  later,  Halleck's 
already  quoted  letter  of  the  6th  reached  Wash- 
ington by  mail,  and  after  its  perusal  the  Presi- 
dent indorsed  upon  it,  with  a  heart-sickness 
easily  discernible  in  the  words,  "The  within 
is  a  copy  of  a  letter  just  received  from  General 
Halleck.  It  is  exceedingly  discouraging.  As 
everywhere  else,  nothing  can  be  done." 
Nevertheless,  something  was  being  done : 
very  little  at  the  moment,  it  is  true,  but  enough 
to  form  the  beginning  of  momentous  results. 
On  the  same  day  on  which  Halleck  had  writ- 
ten the  discouraging  letter  commented  upon 
above  by  the  President,  he  had  also  transmit- 
ted to  Grant  at  Cairo  the  direction,  "  I  wish 
you  to  make  a  demonstration  in  force  on  May- 
field  and  in  the  direction  of  Murray."  The  ob- 
ject was,  as  he  further  explained,  to  prevent 
reenforcements  being  sent  to  Buckner  at 
Bowling  Green.  He  was  to  threaten  Camp 
Beauregard  and  Murray,  to  create  the  im- 
pression that  not  only  was  Dover  (Fort  Don- 
elson)  to  be  attacked,  but  that  a  great  army 
to  be  gathered  in  the  West  was  to  sweep  down 
towards  Nashville,  his  own  column  being 
merely  an  advance  guard.  Flag-OfficerFoote 
was  to  assist  by  a  gun-boat  demonstration. 
"  Be  very  careful,  however,"  added  Halleck, 
"  to  avoid  a  battle  ;  we  are  not  ready  for  that ; 
but  cut  off  detached  parties  and  give  your  men 
a  little  experience  in  skirmishing." 
If  Halleck's  order  for  a  demonstration 
against  Mayfield  and  Murray,  creating  an  in- 
direct menace  to  Columbus  and  Dover,  had 
gone  to  an  unwilling  or  negligent  officer,  he 
could  have  found  in  his  surrounding  con- 
ditions abundant  excuses  for  evasion  or  non- 
compliance. There  existed  at  Cairo,  as  at 
every  other  army  post,  large  or  small,  lack  of 
officers,  of  organization,  of  arms,  of  equip- 
ments, of  transportation,  of  that  multitude  of 
things  considered  necessary  to  the  efficiency 
of  moving  troops.  But  in  the  West  the  sud- 
den increase  of  armies  brought  to  command,
TENNESSEE  AND  KENTUCKY. 
573 
and  to  direction  and  management,  a  large 
proportion  of  civilians,  lacking  methodical  in- 
struction and  experience,  which  was  without 
question  a  serious  defect,  but  which  left  them 
free  to  invent  and  to  adopt  whatever  expedi- 
ents circumstances  might  suggest,  or  which 
rendered  them  satisfied,  and  willing  to  enter 
upon  undertakings  amidst  a  want  of  prepara- 
tion and  means  that  better  information  might 
have  deemed  indispensable. 
The  detailed  reports  and  orders  of  the  ex- 
pedition we  are  describing  clearly  indicate 
these  latter  characteristics.  We  learn  from 
them  that  the  weather  was  bad,  the  roads 
heavy,  the  quartermaster's  department  and 
transportation  deficient,  and  the  gun-boats 
without  adequate  crews.  Yet  nowhere  does 
it  appear  that  these  things  were  treated  as  im- 
pediments. Halleck's  instructions  dated  Janu- 
ary 6  were  received  by  Grant  on  the  morning 
of  the  8th,  and  his  answer  was  that  immediate 
preparations  were  being  made  for  carrying 
them  out,  and  that  Flag-Officer  Foote  would 
cooperate  with  three  gun-boats.  "The  con- 
tinuous rains  for  the  last  week  or  more,"  says 
Grant,  "have  rendered  the  roads  extremely 
bad,  and  will  necessarily  make  our  move- 
ment slow.  This  however  will  operate  worse 
upon  the  enemy,  if  he  should  come  out  to 
meet  us,  than  upon  us."  The  movement  began 
on  the  evening  of  January  9,  and  its  main 
delay  occurred  through  Halleck's  orders.  It 
was  fully  resumed  on  the  12  th.  Brigadier- 
General  McClernand,  with  five  thousand 
men,  marched  southward,  generally  parallel 
to  the  Mississippi  River,  to  Mayfield,  midway 
between  Fort  Henry  and  Columbus,  and 
pushed  a  reconnaissance  closely  up  to  the 
latter  place.  Brigadier-General  Smith,  start- 
ing from  Paducah,  marched  a  strong  column 
southward,  generally  parallel  to  the  Tennessee 
River,  to  Calloway,  near  Fort  Henry.  Foote 
and  Grant,  with  three  gun-boats,  two  of  them 
new  iron-clads,  ascended  the  Tennessee  to 
Fort  Henry,  drew  the  fire  of  the  fort,  and 
threw  several  shells  into  the  works.  It  is  need- 
less to  describe  the  routes,  the  precautions,  the 
marching  and  counter-marching  to  mystify  the 
enemy.  While  the  rebels  were  yet  expecting  a 
further  advance,  the  several  detachments  were 
already  well  on  their  return.  "The  expedi- 
dition,"  says  Grant,  "if  it  had  no  other  effect, 
served  as  a  fine  reconnaissance."  But  it  had 
more  positive  results.  Fort  Henry  and  Co- 
lumbus were  thoroughly  alarmed  and  drew  in 
their  outposts,  while  the  Union  forces  learned 
from  inspection  that  the  route  offered  a  feasi- 
ble line  of  march  to  attack  and  invest  Colum- 
bus, and  demonstrated  the  inherent  weakness 
and  vulnerability  of  Fort  Henry.  This,  be  it 
remembered,  was  done  with  raw  forces  and 
without  preparation,  but  with  officers  and 
men  responding  alike  promptly  to  every  or- 
der and  executing  their  task  more  than  cheer- 
fully, even  eagerly,  with  such  means  as  were 
at  hand  when  the  order  came.  "The  recon- 
naissance thus  made,"  reports  McClernand, 
"  completed  a  march  of  140  miles  by  the  cav- 
alry, and  75  miles  by  the  infantry,  over  icy 
or  miry  roads,  during  a  most  inclement 
season."  He  further  reports  that  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  "  prevented  me  from  tak- 
ing, on  leaving  Cairo,  the  five-days'  supply  of 
rations  and  forage  directed  by  the  command- 
ing officer  of  this  district;  hence  the  necessity 
of  an  early  resort  to  other  sources  of  supply. 
None  other  presented  but  to  quarter  upon  the 
enemy  or  to  purchase  from  loyal  citizens.  I 
accordingly  resorted  to  both  expedients  as  I 
had  opportunity." 
Lincoln's  prompting  did  not  end  with  merely 
havingproduced  this  reconnaissance.  The  Pres- 
ident's patience  was  well-nigh  exhausted ;  and 
while  his  uneasiness  drove  him  to  no  act  of 
rashness,  it  caused  him  to  repeat  his  admoni- 
tions and  suggestions.  In  addition  to  his  tel- 
egrams and  letters  to  the  Western  commanders 
between  December  31  and  January  6,  he 
once  more  wrote  to  both,  on  January  13,  to 
point  out  how  advantage  might  be  taken  of 
the  military  condition  as  it  then  existed.  Hal- 
leck  had  emphasized  the  danger  of  moving 
on  "  exterior  lines,"  and  insisted  that  it  was 
merely  repeating  the  error  committed  at  Bull 
Run  and  would  as  inevitably  produce  disas- 
ter. Lincoln  in  his  letter  shows  that  the  de- 
feat at  Bull  Run  did  not  result  from  move- 
ment on  exterior  lines,  but  from  failure  to  use 
exterior  lines  with  judgment  and  concert ;  and 
he  further  illustrated  how  the  Western  armies 
might  now,  by  judicious  cooperation,  secure 
important  military  results. 
My  Dear  Sir  :  *  Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  is 
received,  in  which  you  say,  "  I  have  received  your 
letter  and  General  McClellan's,  and  will  at  once 
devote  all  my  efforts  to  your  views  and  his."  In  the 
midst  of  my  many  cares  I  have  not  seen  nor  asked 
to  see  General  McClellan's  letter  to  you.  For  my 
own  views,  I  have  not  offered,  and  do  not  now  offer, 
them  as  orders ;  and  while  I  am  glad  to  have  them 
respectfully  considered,  I  would  blame  you  to  follow 
them  contrary  to  your  own  clear  judgment,  unless 
I  should  put  them  in  the  form  of  orders.  As  to 
General  McClellan's  views,  you  understand  your  duty 
in  regard  to  them  better  than  I  do.  With  this  pre- 
liminary, I  state  my  general  idea  of  this  war  to  be,  that 
we  have  the  greater  numbers,  and  the  enemy  has  the 
greater  facility  of  concentrating  forces  upon  points  of 
collision ;  that  we  must  fail  unless  we  can  find  some 
way  of  making  our  advantage  an  overmatch  for  his ; 
and  that  this  can  only  be  done  by  menacing  him  with 
superior  forces  at  different  points  at  the  same  time,  so 
that  we  can  safely  attack  one  or  both  if  he  makes  no 
*  This  letter  was  addressed  to  Buell,  but  a  copy  of 
it  was  also  sent  to  Halleck.    [War  Records.]
574 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
gc ;  and  if  he  weakens  one  to  strengthen  the  other, 
ar  to  attack  the  strengthened  one,  but  seize  and 
hold  the  weakened  one.  gaining  so  much.     To  illus- 
Suppose  last  summer,  when  Winchester  ran 
away  to  reenibrce  Manassas,  we  had  forborne  to  attack 
..    hut    had    seized    and   held    Winchester.     I 
i  illustrate,  not  to  criticise.    I  did  not 
►nfidence  in  McDowell,  and  I  think  less  harshly 
•i  than  some  others  seem  to.    In  application 
ral  rule  1  am  suggesting,  every  particular 
.ill    have    its    modifying    circumstances,  among 
which  the  most  constantly  present  and  most  difficult 
:et  will  be  the  want  of  perfect  knowledge  of  the 
enemy's  movements.    This    had  its  part  in  the  Bull 
Kan  case;   but  worse  in  that  case  was  the  expiration 
terms  oi  the  three-months'  men.    Applying  the 
principle  to  your  case,  my  idea  is  that  Halleck  shall 
menace  Columbus  and  "down  river"  generally,  while 
menace  Bowling  Green  and  east  Tennessee.    If 
the  enemy  shall  concentrate  at  Bowling  Green  do  not 
retire  from  his  front,  yet  do  not  fight  him  there  either ; 
but  seize  Columbus  and  east  Tennessee,  one  or  both,  left 
exposed  by  the  concentration  at  Bowling  Green.     It 
is  a  matter  of  no  small  anxiety  to  me,  and  one  which 
I  am  sure  you  will  not  overlook,  that  the  east  Tennes- 
see line  is  so  long  and  over  so  bad  a  road. 
Buell  made  no  reply  to  this  letter  of  Lin- 
coln's; but  Halleck  sent  an  indirect  answer 
a  week  later,  in  a  long  letter  to  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  under  date  of  January  20.  The  com- 
munication is  by  no  means  a  model  of  corre- 
spondence when  we  rememberthat  it  emanates 
from  a  trained  writer  upon  military  science. 
It  is  long  and  somewhat  rambling;  it  finds 
fault  with  politics  and  politicians  in  war,  in 
evident  ignorance  of  both  politics  and  poli- 
ticians. It  charges  that  past  want  of  success 
';  is  attributable  to  the  politicians  rather  than 
to  the  generals,"  in  plain  contradiction  of  the 
actual  facts.  It  condemns  "  pepper-box  strat- 
and  recommends  detached  operations 
in  the  same  breath.  The  more  noticeable 
point  of  the  letter  is  that,  while  reiterating 
that  the  General-in-Chief  had  furnished  no 
general  plan,  and  while  the  principal  com- 
manders had  neither  unity  of  views  nor  con- 
cert  of  action,  it  ventures,  though  somewhat 
feebly,  to  recommend  a  combined  system  of 
aions  for  the  West.  Says  Halleck,  in  this 
letter: 
The  idea  of  moving  down  the  Mississippi  by  steam 
my  opinion,  impracticable,  or  at  least  premature. 
It  is  not  a  proper  line  of  operations,  at  least  now.    A 
much  more  feasible  plan  is  to  move  up  the  Cumberland 
and  Tennessee,  making  Nashville  the  first  objective 
point.    This  would  turn  Columbus  and  force  the  aban- 
lonment  of  Bowling  Green.    .    .    .    This  line  of  the 
Cumberland  or  Tennessee  is  the  great  central  line  of  the 
m  theater  of  war,  with  the  Ohio  below  the  mouth 
as  the  base,  and  two  good  navigable 
^ding  far  into  the  interior  of  the  theater  of 
oper-!  t  the  plan  should  not  be  attempted  with- 
out a  large  force  —  not  less  than  60,000  effective  men. 
The  idea  was  by  no  means  new.  Buell  had 
tentatively  suggested  it  to  McClellan  as  early 
as  November  27;  McClellan  had  asked  fur- 
ther details  about  it  December  5 ;  Buell  had 
again  specifically  elaborated  it,  "  as  the  most 
important  strategical  point  in  the  whole  field 
of  operations,"  to  McClellan  on  December 
29,  and  as  the  "  center "  of  the  rebellion 
front  in  the  West,  to  Halleck  on  January  3. 
Yet,  recognizing  this  line  as  the  enemy's 
chief  weakness,  McClellan  at  Washington. 
Buell  at  Louisville,  and  Halleck  at  St.  Louis, 
holding  the  President's  unlimited  trust  and 
authority,  had  allowed  nearly  two  months 
to  elapse,  directing  the  Government  power  to 
other  objects,  to  the  neglect,  not  alone  of 
military  success,  but  of  plans  of  cooperation, 
of  counsel,  of  intention  to  use  this  great  and 
recognized  military  advantage,  until  the  coun- 
try was  fast  losing  confidence  and  even  hope. 
Even  now  Halleck  did  not  propose  immedi- 
ately to  put  his  theory  into  practice.  Like 
Buell,  he  was  calling  for  more  troops  for  the 
"  politicians  "  to  supply.  It  is  impossible  to 
guess  when  he  might  have  been  ready  to 
move  on  his  great  strategic  line,  if  subordi- 
nate officers,  more  watchful  and  enterprising, 
had  not  in  a  measure  forced  the  necessity 
upon  his  attention. 
GRANT    AND    THOMAS    IN    KENTUCKY. 
In  the  early  stage  of  military  organization 
in  the  West,  when  so  many  volunteer  col- 
onels were  called  to  immediate  active  duty  in 
the  field,  the  West  Point  education  of  Grant 
and  his  practical  campaign  training  in  the 
Mexican  war  made  themselves  immediately 
felt  and  appreciated  at  the  department  head- 
quarters. His  usefulness  and  superiority  were 
at  once  evident  by  the  clearness  and  brevity 
of  his  correspondence,  the  correctness  of  rou- 
tine reports  and  promptness  of  their  transmis- 
sion, the  pertinence  and  practical  quality  of 
his  suggestions,  the  readiness  and  fertility  of 
expedient  with  which  he  executed  orders. 
Any  one  reading  over  his  letters  of  this  first 
period  of  his  military  service  is  struck  by  the 
fact  that  through  him  something  was  always 
accomplished.  There  was  absence  of  excuse, 
complaint,  or  delay ;  always  the  report  of 
a  task  performed.  If  his  means  or  supplies 
were  imperfect,  he  found  or  improvised  the 
best  available  substitute ;  if  he  could  not  exe- 
cute the  full  requirement,  he  performed  so 
much  of  it  as  was  possible.  He  always  had 
an  opinion,  and  that  opinion  was  positive,  in- 
telligible, practical.  We  find  therefore  that 
his  allotted  tasks  from  the  very  first  rose 
continually  in  importance.  He  gained  in 
authority  and  usefulness,  not  by  solicitation 
or  intrigue,  but  by  services  rendered.  He  was 
sent  to  more  and  more  difficult  duties,  to  larger 
supervision,  to  heavier  responsibilities.  From 
guarding  a  station  at  Mexico  on  the  North
TENNESSEE  AND  KENTUCKY. 
575 
Missouri  railroad,  to  protecting  a  railroad 
;erminus  at  Ironton  in  south-east  Missouri ; 
rom  there  to  brief  inspection  duty  at  Jeffer- 
ion  City,  then  to  the  command  of  the  military 
listrict  of  south-east  Missouri;  finally  to  the 
command  of  the  great  military  depot  and 
endezvous  at  Cairo,  Illinois,  with  its  several 
mtlying  posts  and  districts,  and  the  supervis- 
on  of  its  complicated  details  about  troops, 
irms,  and  supplies  to  be  collected  and  for- 
varded  in  all  directions, —  clearly  it  was  not 
chance  which  brought  him  to  such  duties, 
nit  his  fitness  to  perform  them.  It  was  from 
he  vantage  ground  of  this  enlarged  com- 
nand  that  he  had  checkmated  the  rebel  oc- 
:upation  of  Columbus,  by  immediately  seizing 
?aducah  and  Smithland.  And  from  Cairo 
ilso  he  organized  and  led  his  first  experiment 
n  field  fighting,  at  what  is  known  as  the  bat- 
le  of  Belmont. 
Just  before  Fremont  was  relieved,  and  while 
le  was  in  the  field  in  nominal  pursuit  of  Price, 
le  had  ordered  Grant  to  clear  south-eastern 
Missouri  of  guerrillas,  with  the  double  view 
)f  restoring  local  authority  and  preventing 
eenforcements  to  Price.  Movements  were 
n  progress  to  this  end  when  it  became  ap- 
)arent  that  the  rebel  stronghold  at  Columbus 
vas  preparing  to  send  out  a  column. 
Grant  organized  an  expedition  to  counter- 
ict  this  design,  and  on  the  evening  of  No- 
vember 6  left  Cairo  with  about  3000  men 
m  transports,  under  convoy  of  2  gun-boats, 
md  steamed  down  the  river.  Upon  informa- 
ion  gained  while  on  his  route,  he  determined 
;o  break  up  a  rebel  camp  at  Belmont  Land- 
ng,  on  the  Missouri  shore  opposite  Columbus, 
is  the  best  means  of  making  his  expedition 
effective.  On  the  morning  of  the  7th  he  had 
anded  his  troops  at  Hunter's  Point,  three 
niles  above  Belmont,  and  marched  to  a  favor- 
ible  place  for  attack  back  of  the  rebel  en- 
trapment, which  was  situated  in  a  large  open 
ield  and  was  protected  on  the  land  side  by  a 
ine  of  abatis.  By  the  time  Grant  reached 
lis  position  the  rebel  camp,  originally  con- 
sisting of  a  single  regiment,  had  been  reen- 
"orced  by  four  regiments  under  General  Pillow, 
rom  Columbus.  A  deliberate  battle,  with  about 
iqual  forces,  ensued.  Though  the  Confederate 
ine  courageously  contested  the  ground,  the 
Union  line,  steadily  advancing,  swept  the  reb- 
els back,  penetrating  the  abatis  and  gaining 
:he  camp  of  the  enemy,  who  took  shelter  in 
disorder  under  the  steep  river-bank.  Grant's 
:roops  had  gained  a  complete  and  substantial 
victory,  but  they  now  frittered  it  away  by  a 
disorderly  exultation,  and  a  greedy  plunder 
3f  the  camp  they  had  stormed.  The  record 
does  not  show  who  was  responsible  for  the 
unmilitary  conduct,  but  it  quickly  brought  its 
retribution.  Before  the  Unionists  were  aware 
of  it,  General  Polk  had  brought  an  additional 
reenforcement  of  several  regiments  a' 
the  river  and  hurriedly  marched  them  to  cut 
off  the  Federal  retreat,  which,  instead  of  an 
orderly  march  from  the  battle-field,  became  a 
hasty  scramble  to  get  out  of  danger.  Grant 
himself,  unaware  that  the  few  companies  left 
as  a  guard  near  the  landing  had  already  em- 
barked, remained  on  shore  to  find  them,  and 
encountered  instead  the  advancing  rebel  line. 
Discovering  his  mistake,  he  rode  back  to  the 
landing,  where  "  his  horse  slid  down  the 
river-bank  on  its  haunches  and  trotted  on 
board  a  transport  over  a  plank  thrust  out  for 
him."  *  Belmont  was  a  drawn  battle ;  or, 
rather,  it  was  first  a  victory  for  the  Federals 
and  then  a  victory  for  the  Confederates.  The 
courage  and  the  loss  were  nearly  equal :  79 
killed  and  289  wounded  on  the  Union  side; 
105  killed  and  419  wounded  on  the  Confed- 
erate side. 
Brigadier- General  McClernand,  second  in 
command  in  the  battle  of  Belmont,  was  a  fel- 
low-townsman of  the  President,  and  to  him 
Lincoln  wrote  the  following  letter  of  thanks 
and  encouragement  to  the  troops  engaged : 
This  is  not  an  official  but  a  social  letter.  You  have 
had  a  battle,  and  without  being  able  to  judge  as  to  the 
precise  measure  of  its  value,  I  think  it  is  safe  to  say 
that  you,  and  all  with  you,  have  done  honor  to  your- 
selves and  the  flag,  and  service  to  the  country.  Most 
gratefully  do  I  thank  you  and  them.  In  my  present 
position,  I  must  care  for  the  whole  nation  ;  but  I  hope 
it  will  be  no  injustice  to  any  other  State  for  me  to  in- 
dulge a  little  home  pride,  that  Illinois  does  not  disap- 
point us.  I  have  just  closed  a  long  interview  with  Mr. 
Washburne,  in  which  he  has  detailed  the  many  diffi- 
culties you  and  those  with  you  labor  under.  Be  as- 
sured, we  do  not  forget  or  neglect  you.  Much,  very 
much,  goes  undone  ;  but  it  is  because  we  have  not  the 
power  to  do  it  faster  than  we  do.  Some  of  your  forces 
are  without  arms;  but  the  same  is  true  here,  and  at 
every  other  place  where  w7e  have  considerable  bodies 
of  troops.  The  plain  matter-of-fact  is,  our  good  peo- 
ple have  rushed  to  the  rescue  of  the  Government  faster 
than  the  Government  can  find  arms  to  put  into  their 
hands.  It  would  be  agreeable  to  each  division  of  the 
army  to  know  its  own  precise  destination  ;  but  the 
Government  cannot  immediately,  nor  inflexibly  at  any 
time,  determine  as  to  all ;  nor,  if  determined,  can  it  tell 
its  friends  without  at  the  same  time  telling  its  enemies. 
We  know  you  do  all  as  wisely  and  well  as  you  can  ;  and 
you  will  not  be  deceived  if  you  conclude  the  same  is 
true  of  us.    Please  give  my  respects  and  thanks  to  all.t 
Belmont  having  been  a  mere  episode,  it 
drew  after  it  no  further  movement  in  that  di- 
rection. Grant  and  his  command  resumed 
their  routine  work  of  neighborhood  police  and 
observation.  Buelland  Halleck,  both  coming 
to  their  departments  as  new  commanders 
shortly  afterward,  were  absorbed  with  diffi- 
culties at  other  points.    Secession  was  not  yet 
*  Force,  "  From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth/'  p.  23. 
t  Lincoln  to  McClernand,  Nov.  10,  1861.    Unpub- 
lished MS.
576 
quieted  in  Kentucky.  The  Union  troops  at 
Cairo,  Paducah,  Smithland,  and  other  river 
towns  yet  stood  on  the  defensive,  fearing  rebel 
attack  rather  than  preparing  to  attack  rebels. 
Columbus  and  Bowling  Green  were  the  prin- 
cipal Confederate  camps,  and  attracted  and 
received  the  main  attention  from  the  Union 
commanders. 
The  first  noteworthy  occurrence  following 
Belmont,  as  well  as  the  beginning  of  the  suc- 
cession of  brilliant  Union  victories  which  dis- 
tinguished the  early  months  of  the  year  1862, 
was  the  battle  of  Mill  Springs,  in  eastern 
Kentucky.  It  had  been  the  earnest  desire  of 
President  Lincoln  that  a  Union  column  should 
be  sent  to  seize  and  hold  east  Tennessee,  and 
General  McClellan  had  urged  such  movement 
upon  General  Buell  in  several  dispatches  al- 
most peremptory  in  their  tone.  At  first  Buell 
seemed  to  entertain  the  idea  and  promised 
compliance;  but  as  his  army  increased  in 
strength  and  discipline  his  plans  and  hopes 
centered  themselves  in  an  advance  against 
Bowling  Green,  with  the  design  to  capture 
Nashville.  General  Thomas  remained  posted 
in  eastern  Kentucky,  hoping  that  he  might  be 
called  upon  to  form  his  column  and  lead  it 
through  the  Cumberland  Gap  to  Knoxville; 
but  the  weeks  passed  by,  and  the  orders  which 
he  received  only  tended  to  scatter  his  few 
regiments  for  local  defense  and  observation. 
With  the  hesitation  of  the  Union  army  at  this 
point,  the  Confederates  became  bolder.  Zolli- 
coffer  established  himself  in  a  fortified  camp 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Cumberland  River, 
where  he  could  at  the  same  time  defend 
Cumberland  Gap  and  incite  eastern  Kentucky 
to  rebellion.  Here  he  became  so  troublesome 
that  Buell  found  it  necessary  to  dislodge  him, 
and  late  in  December  sent  General  Thomas 
orders  to  that  effect.  Thomas  was  weak  in 
numbers,  but  strong  in  vigilance  and  courage. 
He  made  a  difficult  march  during  the  early 
weeks  of  January,  1862,  and  halted  at  Logan's 
Cross  Roads,  within  ten  miles  of  the  rebel 
camp,  to  await  the  junction  of  his  few  regi- 
ments. The  enemy,  under  Zollicoffer  and  his 
district  commander,  Crittenden,  resolved  to 
advance  and  crush  him  before  he  could  bring 
his  force  together.  Thomas  prepared  for  and 
accepted  battle.  The  enemy  had  made  a  fa- 
tiguing night  march  of  nine  miles,  through  a 
cold  rain  and  over  muddy  roads.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  January  19  the  battle,  begun  with  spirit, 
soon  had  a  dramatic  incident.  The  rebel 
commander,  Zollicoffer,  mistaking  a  Union 
regiment,  rode  forward  and  told  its  command- 
ing officer,  Colonel  Speed  S.  Fry,  that  he  was 
firing  upon  friends.  Fry,  not  aware  that  Zol- 
licoffer was  an  enemy,  turned  away  to  order 
his  men  to  stop  firing.    At  this  moment  one  of 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
Zollicoffer's  aides  rode  up,  and  seeing  the  true 
state  of  affairs  drew  his  revolver  and  began 
firing  at  Fry,  wounding  his  horse.  Fry,  wheel- 
ing in  turn,  drew  his  revolver  and  returned  the 
fire,  shooting  Zollicoffer  through  the  heart.* 
The  fall  of  the  rebel  commander  served  to 
hasten  and  complete  the  defeat  of  the  Con- 
federates. They  retreated  in  disorder  to  their 
fortified  camp  at  Mill  Springs.  Thomas  or- 
dered immediate  pursuit,  and  the  same  night 
invested  their  camp  and  made  preparations 
to  storm  their  intrenchments  the  following 
morning.  When  day  came,  however,  it  was 
found  that  the  rebels  had  precipitately  crossed 
the  Cumberland  River  during  the  night,  aban- 
doning their  wounded,  twelve  pieces  of  artil- 
lery, many  small-arms,  and  extensive  supplies, 
and  had  fled  in  utter  dispersion  to  the  moun- 
tains. It  was  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
Union  victories  of  the  war.  General  Thomas's 
forces  consisted  of  a  little  over  six  regiments, 
those  of  Crittenden  and  Zollicoffer  something 
over  ten  regiments,  f  It  was  more  than  a  de- 
feat for  the  Confederates.  Their  army  was 
annihilated,  and  Cumberland  Gap  once  more 
stood  exposed,  so  that  Buell  might  have  sent 
a  Union  column  and  taken  possession  of  east- 
ern Tennessee  with  but  feeble  opposition.  It 
is  possible  that  the  brilliant  opportunity  would 
at  last  have  tempted  him  to  comply  with  the 
urgent  wishes  of  the  President  and  the  express 
orders  of  the  General-in-Chief,  had  not  unex- 
pected events  in  another  quarter  diverted  his 
attention  and  interest. 
There  was  everywhere,  about  the  months  of 
December,  1861,  and  January,  1862,  a  percep- 
tible increase  of  the  Union  armies  by  fresh 
regiments  from  the  Northern  States,  a  better 
supply  of  arms  through  recent  importations, 
an  increase  of  funds  from  new  loans,  and  the 
delivery  for  use  of  various  war  material,  the 
product  of  the  summer's  manufacture.  Of  prime 
importance  to  the  military  operations  which 
centered  at  Cairo  was  the  completion  and 
equipment  of  the  new  gun-boats.  A  word  of 
retrospect  concerning  this  arm  of  the  military 
service  is  here  necessary.  Commander  John 
Rodgers  was  sent  West  in  the  month  of  May, 
1 86 1,  to  begin  the  construction  of  war  vessels 
for  Western  rivers.  Without  definite  plans  he 
had  purchased,  and  hastily  converted,  and 
armed  as  best  he  might,  three  river  steamers. 
These  were  put  into  service  in  September. 
They  were  provided  with  cannon,  but  had 
no  iron  plating.  They  were  the  Tyler, %  of  7 
guns ;  the  Lexingto?t,  of  6  guns ;  and  the  Con- 
*  Cist,  "Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  pp.  17,  18. 
t  Van  Home,  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land," Vol.  I.,  p.  57. 
tThis  vessel  seems  to  have  been  named  the  Tyler  ?X 
one  time  and  the  Taylor  at  another.
TENNESSEE  AND   KENTUCKY. 
577 
esloga,  of  3  guns.  Making  Cairo  their  cen- 
tral station,  they  served  admirably  in  the  lighter 
duties  of  river  police,  in  guarding  transports, 
and  in  making  hasty  trips  of  reconnaissance. 
For  the  great  expedition  down  the  Mississippi, 
projected  during  the  summer  and  fall  of  1861, 
a  more  powerful  class  of  vessels  was  provided.* 
The  distinguished  civil  engineer  James  B. 
Eads  designed  and  was  authorized  to  build 
7  new  gun-boats,  to  carry  13  guns  each, 
and  to  be  protected  about  the  bows  with  iron 
plating  capable  of  resisting  the  fire  of  heavy 
artillery.  They  were  named  the  Cairo,  Caron- 
delet,  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  Mound  City,  Pitts- 
burg, and  St.  Louis.  Two  additional  gun-boats 
of  the  same  type  of  construction,  but  of  larger 
size, —  the  Benton,  of  16  guns,  and  the  Essex, 
of  5  guns, —  were  converted  from  other  vessels 
about  the  same  time.  At  the  time  Flag-Officer 
Foote  finally  accepted  the  first  seven  (January 
15,  1862),  it  had  been  found  impossible  to 
supply  them  with  crews  of  Eastern  seamen. 
Resort  was  had  to  Western  steamboatmen,  and 
also  to  volunteers  from  infantry  recruits.  The 
joint  reconnaissance  of  Grant  and  Foote  to 
Fort  Henry  on  the  Tennessee  River,  January 
14,  has  been  related.  A  second  examination 
was  made  by  General  Smith,  who  on  January 
22  reports  that  he  had  been  within  two  miles 
and  a  half  of  the  fort;  that  the  river  had  risen 
fourteen  feet  since  the  last  visit,  giving  a  better 
opportunity  to  reconnoiter;  more  important, 
that  the  high  water  had  drowned  out  a  trouble- 
some advance  battery,  and  that,  in  his  opinion, 
two  iron-clad  gun-boats  could  make  short  work 
of  it.  It  is  evident  that,  possessed  of  this  ad- 
ditional information,  Grant  and  Foote  imme- 
diately resolved  upon  vigorous  measures. 
Grant  had  already  asked  permission  to  visit 
Halleck  at  St.  Louis.  This  was  given;  but 
Halleck  refused  to  entertain  his  project.  So 
firmly  convinced  was  Grant,  however,  that  his 
plan  was  good,  that,  though  unsuccessful  at 
first,  he  quickly  renewed  the  request. t  "  Com- 
manding-General Grant  and  myself,"  tele- 
graphed Foote  to  Halleck  (January  28,  1862), 
"  are  of  opinion  that  Fort  Henry  on  the  Ten- 
nessee River  can  be  carried  with  four  iron-clad 
gun-boats  and  troops  to  permanently  occupy. 
Have  we  your  authority  to  move  for  that  pur- 
pose when  ready  ?  "  To  this  Grant  on  the 
same  day  added  the  direct  proposal,  "  With 
permission,  I  will  take  Fort  Henry  on  the  Ten- 
*  To  show  the  unremitting  interest  of  the  President 
in  these  preparations,  and  how  his  encouragement  and 
prompting  followed  even  their  minor  details,  we  quote 
from  his  autograph  manuscript  a  note  to  the  Secretary 
of  War : 
Executive  Mansion,  Jan.  24,  1S62. 
Hon.  Secretary  of  War. 
My  Dear  Sir:    On  reflection  I  think   you  better 
make  a  peremptory  order  on  the  ordnance  officer  at 
Vol.  XXXVI.—  80. 
nessee,  and  establish  and  hold  a  large  I 
there."    It  would  appear  that  no  immediate 
answer  was  returned,  for  on  the  following 
day  Grant  renews  his  proposition  with  more 
emphasis. I 
Jt  is  easy  to  perceive  what  produced  the 
sudden  change  in  Halleck's  mind.  Grant's 
persistent  urging  was  evidently  the  main  in- 
fluence, but  two  other  events  contributed 
essentially  to  the  result.  The  first  was  the 
important  victory  gained  by  Thomas  at  Mill 
Springs  in  eastern  Kentucky  on  January  19, 
the  certain  news  of  which  was  probably  just 
reaching  him ;  the  second  was  a  telegram 
from  Washington,  informing  him  that  Gen- 
eral Beauregard,  with  fifteen  regiments  from 
the  Confederate  army  in  Virginia,  was  being 
sent  to  Kentucky  to  be  added  to  Johnston's 
army.§  "  I  was  not  ready  to  move,"  explains 
Halleck  afterward,  "  but  deemed  best  to  an- 
ticipate the  arrival  of  Beauregard's  forces." 
It  is  well  also  to  remember  in  this  connection 
that  two  days  before,  President  Lincoln's  War 
Order  No.  1  had  been  published,  ordering  a 
general  movement  of  all  the  armies  of  the 
Union  on  the  coming  2 2d  of  February.  What- 
ever induced  it,  the  permission  now  given 
was  full  and  hearty.  "  Make  your  prepara- 
tions to  take  and  hold  Fort  Henry,"  Halleck 
telegraphed  to  Grant  on  the  30th  of  January. 
"  I  will  send  you  written  instructions  by 
mail." 
Grant  and  Foote  had  probably  already  be- 
gun their  preparation.  Receiving  Halleck's 
instructions  on  February  1,  Grant  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  started  his  expedition  of  15,000 
men  on  transports,  and  Foote  accompanied 
him  with  7  gun-boats  for  convoy  and  attack. 
Their  plan  contemplated  a  bombardment  by 
the  fleet  from  the  river,  and  assault  on  the 
land  side  by  the  troops.  For  this  purpose 
General  McClernand,  with  a  division,  was 
landed  four  miles  below  the  fort  on  February 
4.  They  made  a  reconnaissance  on  the  5th. 
and  being  joined  by  another  division,  under 
General  Smith,  were  ordered  forward  to  invest 
the  fort  on  the  6th.  This  required  a  circui- 
tous march  of  eight  miles,  during  which  the  gun- 
boats of  Flag-Officer  Foote,  having  less  than 
half  the  distance  to  go  by  the  river,  moved  on 
and  began  the  bombardment.  The  capture 
proved  easier  than  was  anticipated.  General 
Tilghman,the  Confederate  commander  of  the 
Pittsburg  to  ship  the  ten  mortars  and  two  beds  to  Cairo 
instantly,  and  all  others  as  fast  as  finished,  till  ordered 
to  stop,  reporting  each  shipment  to  the  Department 
here.  Vours  truly, 
A.  Lincoln. 
t  Grant,  "  Memoirs,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  287. 
t  Ibid. 
%  McClellan  to  Halleck  and  Buell,  January  20,  1S62. 
War  Records.
578 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
fort,  had.  early  that  morning,  sent  away  his 
3000  infantry  to  Fort  Donelson,  being  con- 
vinced that  he  was  beset  by  an  overpowering 
force.  He  kept  only  one  company  of  artiller- 
i  work  the  eleven  river  guns  of  the  fort; 
with  these  he  defended,  the  work  about  two 
hours,  but  without  avail.  Foote's  4  iron- 
plated  gun-boats  steamed  boldly  within  600 
yards.  The  bombardment,  though  short,  was 
well  sustained  on  both  sides,  and  not  without 
I;-  fluctuating  chances.  Two  of  the  heaviest 
guns  in  the  fort  were  soon  silenced,  one  by 
bursting,  the  other  being  rendered  useless  by 
an  accident  with  the  priming  wire.  At  this 
I  a  rebel  shot  passed  through  the  case- 
mate and  the  boiler  of  the  gun-boat  Essex,  and 
she  drifted  helplessly  out  of  the  fight.  But 
the  remaining  gun-boats  continued  theirclose 
and  fierce  attack,  and  five  more  of  the  rebel 
guns  being  speedily  disabled,  General  Tilgh- 
man  hauled  down  his  flag  and  came  onboard 
to  surrender  the  fort.  McClernand's  troops, 
from  the  land  side,  soon  after  entered  the 
work  and  took  formal  possession.  On  the  same 
day  Grant  telegraphed  to  Halleck,  "  Fort 
Henry  is  ours";  and  his  dispatch  bore  yet 
another  significant  announcement  eminently 
characteristic  of  the  man,  "  I  shall  take  and 
destroy  Fort  Donelson  on  the  8th." 
FORT   DONELSON. 
The  news  of  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry 
created  a  sudden  consternation  among  the 
Confederate  commanders  in  Tennessee.  It 
seemed  as  if  the  key-stone  had  unexpectedly 
fallen  out  of  their  arch  of  well-planned  de- 
fenses. Generals  Johnston,  Beauregard,  and 
Hardee  immediately  met  in  a  council  of  war 
at  Bowling  Green,  and  after  full  discussion 
united  in  a  memorandum  acknowledging  the 
ier  and  resolving  on  the  measures  which 
in  their  judgment  it  rendered  necessary.   They 
iw  that  Fort  Donelson  would  probably 
aiso  fall ;  that  Johnston's  army  must  retreat  to 
iville  to  avoid  capture;  that  since  Colum- 
bus was  now  separated  from  Bowling  Green, 
the  main  army  at  Columbus  must  retreat  to 
Humboldt,  or  possibly  to  Grand  Junction, 
leaving  only  a  sufficient  garrison  to  make  a  des- 
perate defense  of  the  works  and  the  river;* 
and  immediate  orders  were  issued  to  prepare  for 
nts.  Nevertheless,  Johnston,  to 
his  own  language,  resolved,  "to  fight  for 
Nashville  at  Donelson."  For  this  purpose  he 
divided  the  army  at  Bowling  Green,  starting 
of  his  men  under  Generals  Buckner 
and  Floyd,  together  with  4000   more  under 
*  Beauregard,  Memorandum,  Feb.  7,  1862.  War 
Reco 
t  Johnston  to   ,  March  17, 1862.   War  Records. 
Pillow  from  other  points,  on  a  rapid  march  to 
reenforce  the  threatened  fort,f  while  General 
Hardee  led  his  remaining  14,000  men  on  their 
retreat  to  Nashville.  £  This  retreat  was  not 
alone  a  choice  of  evils.  Even  if  Fort  Henry 
had  not  fallen  and  Donelson  been  so  seriously 
menaced,  the  overwhelming  force  of  Buell 
would  have  compelled  a  retrograde  move- 
ment. Had  Buell  been  a  commander  of 
enterprise  he  would  have  seized  this  chance 
of  inflicting  great  damage  upon  the  dimin- 
ished enemy  in  retreat.  His  advance  guard, 
indeed,  followed;  but  Johnston's  remnant, 
marching  night  and  day,  succeeded  in  reach- 
ing the  Cumberland  River  opposite  Nashville, 
where,  after  preparations  to  cross  in  haste, 
the  rebel  commander  awaited  with  intense 
eagerness  to  hear  the  fate  of  Donelson. 
Of  the  two  commanders  in  the  West,  the 
idea  of  the  movement  up  the  Tennessee  and 
Cumberland  rivers  was  more  favorably 
thought  of  by  Halleck  than  by  Buell.  Buell 
pointed  out  its  value,  but  began  no  movement 
that  looked  to  its  execution.  Halleck,  on  the 
contrary,  not  only  realized  its  importance, 
but  immediately  entertained  the  design  of 
ultimately  availing  himself  of  it;  thus  he 
wrote  at  the  time  he  ordered  the  reconnais- 
sance which  demonstrated  its  practicability : 
"  The  demonstration  which  General  Grant  is 
now  making  I  have  no  doubt  will  keep  them 
[the  enemy]  in  check  till  preparations  can  be 
made  for  operations  on  the  Tennessee  or 
Cumberland."  §  His  conception  of  the  neces- 
sary preparations  was,  however,  almost  equiv- 
alent to  the  rejection  of  the  plan.  He  thought 
that  it  would  require  a  force  of  60,000  men ;  and 
to  delay  it  till  that  number  and  their  requisite 
material  of  war  could  be  gathered  or  detached 
under  prevailing  ideas  would  amount  to  indefi- 
nite postponement. 
When  at  last,  through  Grant's  importunity, 
the  movement  was  actually  begun  by  the  ad- 
vance to  capture  Fort  Henry,  a  curious  inter- 
est in  the  expedition  and  its  capabilities 
developed  itself  among  the  commanders. 
Grant's  original  proposition  was  simply  to 
capture  Fort  Henry  and  establish  a  large 
camp.  Nothing  further  was  proposed,  and 
Halleck's  instructions  went  only  to  the  same 
extent,  with  one  addition.  As  the  reported 
arrival  of  Beauregard  with  reinforcements 
had  been  the  turning  influence  in  Halleck's 
consent,  so  he  proposed  that  the  capture  of 
Fort  Henry  should  beimmediatelyfollowedby 
a  dash  at  the  railroad  bridges  across  the  Ten- 
nessee and  their  destruction,  to  prevent  those 
reinforcements  from  reaching  Johnston.    But 
X  Johnston  to  Benjamin,  Feb.  8, 1862.  War  Records. 
§  Halleck  to  McClellan,  Jan.  14,  1862.    War  Rec- 
cords.
TENNESSEE  AND   KENTUCKY. 
579 
with  the  progress  of  Grant's  movement  the 
chances  of  success  brightened,  and  the  plan 
began  correspondingly  to  expand.  On  the 
2d  of  February,  when  Grant's  troops  were 
preparing  to  invest  Fort  Henry,  Halleck's 
estimate  of  coining  possibilities  had  risen  a 
little.    He  wrote  to  Buell : 
At  present  it  is  only  proposed  to  take  and  occupy 
Fort  Henry  and  Dover  [Donelson],  and,  if  possible, 
cut  the  railroad  from  Columbus  to  Bowling  Green. 
Here  we  have  Donelson  added  to  Henry 
in  the  intention  of  the  department  com- 
mander. That  the  same  intention  existed  in 
Grant's  mind  is  evident,  for,  as  already  re- 
lated, on  the  fall  of  Henry  on  the  6th,  he 
immediately  telegraphed  to  Haileck :  "  Fort 
Henry  is  ours.  ...  I  shall  take  and  destroy 
Fort  Donelson  on  the  8th  and  return  to  Fort 
Henry."  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  in 
proposing  to  destroy  Fort  Donelson,  he  still 
limits  himself  to  his  original  proposition  of  an 
intrenched  camp  at  Fort  Henry. 
At  the  critical  moment  Halleck's  confidence 
in  success  at  Fort  Henry  wavered,  and  he 
called  upon  Buell  with  importunity  for  suffi- 
cient help  to  make  sure  work  of  it.  Buell's 
confidence  also  seems  to  have  been  very 
weak;  for, commanding  72,502  men, —  46,150 
of  them  "in  the  field,"  —  he  could  only  bring 
himself  to  send  a  single  brigade  *  to  aid  in  a 
work  which  he  had  described  as  of  such  mo- 
mentous consequence.  Afterward,  indeed,  he 
sent  eight  regiments  more  ;  but  these  were  not 
from  his  70,000  in  the  field.  They  were  raw 
troops  from  Ohio  and  Indiana,  which  McClel- 
lan, with  curious  misconception  of  their  use- 
fulness, had  ordered  to  Buell,  who  did  not 
need  them,  instead  of  to  Haileck,  who  was 
trying  to  make  every  man  do  double  duty. 
Out  of  this  uncertainty  about  the  final  re- 
sult at  Fort  Henry,  the  indecision  of  Buell's 
character  becomes  deplorably  manifest.  Mc- 
Clellan,  satisfied  that  Buell  could  not  ad- 
vance against  Johnston's  force  at  Bowling 
Green  over  the  difficult  winter  roads,  and 
having  not  yet  heard  of  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Henry,  suggested  to  both  Buell  and  Haileck 
the  temporary  suspension  of  operations  on 
other  lines  in  order  to  make  a  quick  combined 
movement  up  the  Tennessee  and  the  Cumber- 
land. This  was  on  February  6.  Buell's  fancy 
at  first  caught  at  the  proposal,  for  he  replied 
that  evening : 
This  whole  move,  right  in  its  strategical  bearing, 
but  commenced  by  General  Haileck  without  apprecia- 
tion, preparative  or  concert,  has  now  become  of  vast 
magnitude.  I  was  myself  thinking  of  a  change  of 
the  line  to  support  it  when  I  received  your  dispatch. 
It  will  have  to  be  made  in  the  face  of  50,000,  if  not 
60,000  men,  and  is  hazardous.  I  will  answer  definitely 
in  the  morning.t 
Haileck  was  more  positive  in   hi 
tions.    He  telegraphed  to  McClellan  on  the 
same  day : 
If  you  can  give  me,  in  addition  to  what  I  have  in  this 
department,  10,000  men,  I  will  take  Fort  Henry,  cut  the 
enemy's  line,  and  paralyze  Columbus.    Give  me 25 
and  I  will  threaten  Nashville  and  cut  off  railroai 
munication,  so  as  to  force  the  enemy  to  abandon  Bowl- 
ing Green  without  a  battle. 
News  of  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry  having 
been  received  at  Washington,  McClellan 
twenty-four  hours  later  telegraphed  to  Hai- 
leck :  "  Either  Buell  or  yourself  should  soon 
go  to  the  scene  of  operations.  Why  not  have 
Buell  take  the  line  of  [thej  Tennessee  and 
operate  on  Nashville,  while  your  troops  turn 
Columbus?  These  two  points  gained,  a  com- 
bined movement  on  Memphis  will  be  next  in 
order."  The  dispatch  was  in  substance  re- 
peated to  Buell,  who  by  this  time  thought  he 
had  made  up  his  mind,  for  two  hours  later  he 
answered:  "I  cannot,  on  reflection,  think  a 
change  of  my  line  would  be  advisable.  .  .  . 
I  hope  General  Grant  will  not  require  further 
reenforcements.  I  will  go  if  necessary."  Thus 
on  the  night  of  the  7th,  with  the  single  drilled 
brigade  from  Green  River  and  the  eight  raw 
regiments  from  Ohio  and  Indiana,  he  pro- 
posed to  leave  the  important  central  line  on 
which  Grant  had  started  to  its  chances. 
A  night's  reflection  made  him  doubt  the 
correctness  of  his  decision,  for  he  telegraphed 
on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  "  I  am  concen- 
trating and  preparing,  but  will  not  decide 
definitely  yet."  Halleck's  views  were  less 
changeable:  at  noon  on  the  8th,  he  again 
urged  that  Buell  should  transfer  the  bulk  of 
his  forces  to  the  Cumberland  River,  to  move 
by  water  on  Nashville.  To  secure  this  coop- 
eration, he  further  proposed  a  modification 
of  department  lines  to  give  Buell  command 
on  the  Cumberland  and  Hitchcock  or  Sher- 
man on  the  Tennessee,  with  superior  com- 
mand for  himself  over  both. 
No  immediate  response  came  from  Wash- 
ington, and  three  days  elapsed  when  Haileck 
asked  Buell  specifically  :  "  Can't  you  come 
with  all  your  available  forces  and  command 
the  column  up  the  Cumberland  ?  I  shall  go 
to  the  Tennessee  this  week."t  Buell's  desire, 
vibrating  like  a  pendulum  between  the  two 
brilliant  opportunities  before  him,  now  swings 
towards  Halleck's  proposal,  but  with  provoking 
indefiniteness  and  fatal  slowness.  He  an- 
swers that  he  will  go  either  to  the  Cumberland 
or  to  the  Tennessee,  but  that  it  will  require  ten 
days  to  transfer  his  troops. §  In  this  emergency, 
*  Buell  to  McClellan,  Feb.  5,  1S62.    War  Records, 
t  Buell  to  McClellan,  Feb.  6.  1S62.    War  Records. 
$  Haileck  to  Buell,  Feb.  11,  1S02.    War  Records. 
§  Buell  to  Haileck,  Feb.  12,  1S62.    War  Records.
5« 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
when  hours  counted  as  weeks,  Buell  showed 
himself  almost   as  helpless   and  useless  as  a 
dismasted  ship,  rolling   uneasily  and  idly  in 
the   sea.    With,  by  this  time, 
Dearly  100.000  men*  in  the  field,  and  with 
certainly  a  larger  proportion  of  drilled  and  in- 
ted  regiments  than  could  be  found  either 
.  camp  oi  Grant  or  in  the  camps  of  the 
mid  not  make  himself  felt  in  any 
direction  j   he  would  neither  attack  the  enemy 
in  front  nor  send  decisive  help  to  Grant.    He 
-  forth  the  everlasting  cry  of  preparation, 
ot  delay,  of  danger. 
During  his  painful  hesitation,  events  forced 
him  to  a  new  conclusion.  News  came  that 
the  rebels  had  evacuated  Bowling  Green,  and 
he  telegraphed  : 
The  evacuation  of  Bowling  Green,  leaving  the  way 
to    Nashville,   makes    it   proper  to  resume  my 
original  plan.     I  shall  advance  on  Nashville  with  all 
the  speed  I  can. 
From  this  last  determination,  Halleck  ap- 
pealed beseechingly  to  the  General-in-Chief. 
He  announced  that  Grant  had  formally  in- 
vested Fort  Donelson  and  that  the  bombard- 
ment was  progressing  favorably,  but  he  further 
explained  that  since  the  evacuation  of  Bowl- 
ing Green,  the  enemy  were  concentrating 
against  Grant.  He  claimed  that  it  was  bad 
strategy  for  Buell  to  advance  on  Nashville 
over  broken  bridges  and  bad  roads,  and  this 
point  he  reiterated  with  emphasis.  He  tele- 
graphed on  February  16: 
I  am  still  decidedly  of  the  opinion  that  Buell  should 
not  advance  on  Nashville,  but  come  to  the  Cumberland 
with  his  available  forces.  United  to  Grant  we  can  take 
and  hold  Fort  Donelson  and  Clarksville,  and  by  an- 
other central  movement  cut  off  both  Columbus  and 
Nashville.  .  .  .  Unless  we  can  take  Fort  Donelson 
oon  we  shall  have  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy 
on  us.  Fort  Donelson  is  the  turning-point  of  the  war, 
and  we  must  take  it,  at  whatever  sacrifice. 
But.  his  appeal  was  unavailing.  McClellan 
took  sides  with  Buell,  insisting  that  to  occupy 
Nashville  would  be  most  decisive.  Buell  had, 
ed,  ordered  Nelson's  division  to  go  to  the 
help  of  Grant;  but  in  the  conflict  of  his  own 
doubts  and  intentions  the  orders  had  been  so 
tardy  that  Nelson's  embarkation  was  only  be- 
ginning on  the  day  when  Donelson  surren- 
dered. McClellan 's  further  conditional  order 
to  Buell,  to  help  Grant  if  it  were  necessary,  of- 
*  The  following  is  the  force  in  the  whole  of  the  late 
Department  of  the  Ohio,  as  nearly  as  can  be  ascer- 
tained at  present:  92  regiments  infantry,  60,882  for 
duty;   79,3  ate,  present  and  absent.     11  regi- 
ments, 1  bal  and  7  detached   companies  cavalry, 
9222  for  duty;  11,496  aggregate,  present  and  absent. 
28  field  and  2  siege  batteries,  3368  for  duty;  3953 
aggregate,  present  and  absent.  [Buell  to  Thomas,  Feb- 
ruary 14,  1862.    War  Records.] 
fered  a  yet  more  distant  prospect  of  succor. 
If  the  siege  of  Donelson  had  been  prolonged, 
assistance  from  these  directions  would  of 
course  have  been  found  useful.  In  the  actual 
state  of  facts,  however,  they  show  both  Buell 
and  McClellan  incapable,  even  under  con- 
tinued pressure,  of  seizing  and  utilizing  the 
fleeting  chances  of  war  which  so  often  turn 
the  scale  of  success,  and  which  so  distinctly 
call  out  the  higher  quality  of  military  leader- 
ship. 
Amidst  the  sluggish  counsels  of  commanders 
of  departments,  the  energy  of  Grant  and  the 
courage  and  intrepidity  of  his  raw  Western 
soldiers  had  already  decided  one  of  the  great 
crises  of  the  war.  Grant  had  announced  to 
Halleck  that  he  would  storm  Fort  Donelson 
on  the  8th  of  February,  but  he  failed  to  count 
one  of  the  chances  of  delay.  "  I  contemplated 
taking  Fort  Donelson  to-day  with  infantry 
and  cavalry  alone,"  reported  he,  "  but  all  my 
troops  may  be  kept  busily  engaged  in  saving 
what  we  now  have  from  the  rapidly  rising 
waters."!  This  detention  served  to  change 
the  whole  character  of  the  undertaking.  If 
he  could  have  marched  and  attacked  on  the 
8th,  he  would  have  found  but  6000  men  in 
the  fort,  which  his  own  troops  largely  outnum- 
bered; as  it  turned  out,  the  half  of  Johnston's 
army  sent  from  Bowling  Green  and  other 
points,  conducted  by  Generals  Pillow,  Floyd, 
and  Buckner,  arrived  before  the  fort  was  in- 
vested, increasing  the  garrison  to  an  aggregate 
of  17,000  and  greatly  extending  the  lines  of 
rifle-pits  and  other  defenses.  J  This  presented 
an  altogether  different  and  more  serious  prob- 
lem. The  enemy  before  Grant  was  now,  if 
not  superior,  at  least  equal  in  numbers,  and 
had  besides  the  protection  of  a  large  and  well- 
constructed  earth-work,  armed  with  seventeen 
heavy  and  forty-eight  field-guns.  It  is  prob- 
able that  this  changed  aspect  of  affairs  was 
not  immediately  known  to  him;  if  it  was,  he 
depended  on  the  reinforcements  which  Hal- 
leck had  promised,  and  which  soon  began  to 
arrive.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  12th  he 
started  on  his  march,  with  the  divisions  of 
McClernand  and  Smith,  numbering  15,000. 
At  noon  they  were  within  two  miles  of  Donel- 
son. That  afternoon  and  all  the  following  day, 
February  13,  were  occupied  in  driving  in  the 
rebel  pickets,  finding  the  approaches,  and 
drawing  the  lines  of  investment  around  the 
t  Grant  to  Cullum,  February  8,  1862.  War  Rec- 
ords. 
t  General  Grant's  estimate  of  the  Confederate  forces 
is  21,000.  He  says  he  marched  against  the  fort  with 
but  15,000,  but  that  he  received  reinforcements  be- 
fore the  attack,  and  their  continued  arrival  had,  at 
the  time  of  the  surrender,  increased  his  army  to  about 
27,000.  Grant,  "  Personal  Memoirs,"  Vol.  I.,  pp.  299 
and  315.
TENNESSEE  AND   KENTUCKY. 
S»« 
fort.  A  gallant  storming  assault  by  four  Illi- 
nois regiments  upon  one  of  the  rebel  batteries 
was  an  exciting  incident  of  the  afternoon's 
advance,  but  was  unsuccessful. 
To  understand  the  full  merit  of  the  final 
achievement,  the  conditions  under  which  the 
siege  of  Donelson  was  thus  begun  must  be 
briefly  mentioned.  The  principal  fort,  or  earth- 
work which  bore  the  military  name,  lay  on  the 
west  bank  of  the  Cumberland  River,  half  a 
mile  north  of  the  little  town  of  Dover.  The 
fort  occupied  the  terminal  knoll  of  a  high 
ridge  ending  in  the  angle  between  the  river 
and  the  mouth  of  Hickman  Creek.  This  main 
work  consisted  of  two  batteries  of  heavy  guns, 
primarily  designed  to  control  the  river  navi- 
gation. But  when  General  Johnston  resolved 
to  defend  Nashville  at  Donelson  and  gathered 
an  army  of  17,000  men  for  the  purpose,  the 
original  fort  and  the  town  of  Dover,  and  all 
the  intervening  space,  were  inclosed  by  a  long, 
irregular  line  of  rifle-pits  connecting  more  sub- 
stantial breastworks  and  embankments  on  the 
favorable  elevations,  in  which  field-batteries 
were  planted;  the  whole  chain  of  intrench- 
ments,  extending  from  Hickman  Creek  on  the 
north  till  it  inclosed  the  town  of  Dover  on 
the  south,  having  a  total  length  of  about  two 
and  a  half  miles.  Outside  the  rifle-pits  were 
the  usual  obstructions  of  felled  trees  and 
abatis,  forming  an  interlacing  barrier  difficult 
to  penetrate. 
The  Union  troops  had  had  no  fighting  at 
Fort  Henry ;  at  that  place  the  gun-boats  had 
done  the  whole  work.  The  debarkation  on 
the  Tennessee,  the  reconnaissance,  the  march 
towards  Donelson,  the  picket  skirmishing 
during  the  12th  and  13th,  had  only  been  such 
as  to  give  them  zest  and  exhilaration.  When, 
on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  the  march  began, 
the  weather  was  mild  and  agreeable ;  but  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  13th,  while  the  army  was 
stretching  itself  cautiously  around  the  rebel  in- 
trenchments,  the  thermometer  suddenly  went 
down,  a  winter  storm  set  in  with  rain,  snow, 
sleet,  ice,  and  a  piercing  north-west  wind, 
that  made  the  men  lament  the  imprudence 
they  had  committed  in  leaving  overcoats 
and  blankets  behind.  Grant's  army  was  com- 
posed entirely  of  Western  regiments  ;  fifteen 
from  the  single  State  of  Illinois,  and  a  further 
aggregate  of  seventeen  from  the  States  of  Ken- 
tucky, Ohio,  Indiana,  Missouri,  and  Iowa. 
Some  of  these  regiments  had  seen  guerrilla 
fighting  in  Missouri,  some  had  been  through 
the  battle  of  Belmont,  but  many  were  new  to 
the  privations  and  dangers  of  an  active  cam- 
paign. Nearly  all  the  officers  came  from  civil 
life;  but  a  common  thought,  energy,  and  will 
animated  the  whole  mass.  It  was  neither  dis- 
cipline nor  mere  military  ambition ;    it  was 
patriot  work  in  its  noblest  and  purest  form. 
They  had  left  their  homes  and  varied  peaceful 
occupations  to  defend  the  Government  and 
put  down  rebellion.  They  were  in  the  flush 
and  exaltation  of  a  common  heroic  impulse : 
in  such  a  mood,  the  rawest  recruit  was  as 
brave  as  the  oldest  veteran ;  and  in  this  spirit 
they  endured  hunger  and  cold,  faced  snow 
and  ice,  held  tenaciously  the  lines  of  the  si 
climbed  without  flinching  through  the  tangled 
abatis,  and  advanced  into  the  deadly  fire  from 
the  rifle-pits  with  a  purpose  and  a  devotion 
never  excelled  by  soldiers  of  any  nation  or 
epoch. 
Flag-Officer  Foote,  with  six  gun-boats,  ar- 
rived the  evening  of  the  13th;  also  six  regi- 
ments sent  by  water.  Fort  Henry  had  been 
reduced  by  the  gun-boats  alone,  and  it  was 
resolved  first  to  try  the  effect  of  these  new 
and  powerful  fighting  machines  upon  the 
works  of  Donelson.  Accordingly  on  Friday, 
February  14,  the  assault  was  begun  by  an 
attack  from  the  six  gun-boats.  As  before,  the 
situation  of  the  fort  enabled  the  four  iron- 
clads to  advance  up-stream  towards  the  bat- 
teries, the  engines  holding  them  steadily 
against  the  swift  current,  presenting  their 
heavily  plated  bows  as  a  target  for  the  enemy. 
The  attack  had  lasted  an  hour  and  a  half. 
The  iron-clads  were  within  400  yards  of  the 
rebel  embankments,  the  heavy  armor  was 
successfully  resisting  the  shot  and  shell  from 
the  fort,  the  fire  of  the  enemy  was  slackening, 
indicating  that  the  water-batteries  were  be- 
coming untenable,  when  two  of  the  gun-boats 
were  suddenly  disabled  and  drifted  out  of  the 
fight,  one  having  her  wheel  carried  away,  and 
the  other  her  tiller-ropes  damaged. 
These  accidents,  due  to  the  weakness  and 
exposure  of  the  pilot-houses,  compelled  a  ces- 
sation of  the  river  attack  and  a  withdrawal 
of  the  gun-boats  for  repairs,  and  gave  the 
beleaguered  garrison  corresponding  exulta- 
tion and  confidence.  Flag-Officer  Foote  had 
been  wounded  in  the  attack,  and  deeming 
it  necessary  to  take  his  disabled  vessels  tem- 
porarily back  to  Cairo,  he  requested  Grant  to 
visit  him  for  consultation.  Grant  therefore 
went  on  board  one  of  the  gun-boats  before 
dawn  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  and  it  was 
arranged  between  the  commanders  that  he 
should  perfect  his  lines  and  hold  the  fort  in 
siesfe  until  Foote  could  return  from  Cairo  to 
assist  in  renewing  the  attack. 
During  all  this  time  there  had  been  a  fluc- 
tuation of  fear  and  hope  in  the  garrison  —  from 
the  repulse  of  McClernard's  assault  on  the 
1 3th,  the  prompt  investment  of  the  fort,  the  gun- 
boat attack  and  its  repulse.  There  was  want 
of  harmony  between  Floyd.  Pillow,  and  Buck- 
ner,  the  three  commanders  within  the  fort.
s** 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
Prior  to  the  gun-boat  attack  a  bold  sortie  was 
resolved  upon,  which  project  was,  however, 
.  loned  through  the  orders  or  non-compli- 
of  Pillow.    That  night  the  second  council 
of  war  determined  to  make  a  serious  effort  to 
extricate  the  garrison.    At  6  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  the   15th  the  divisions  of  Pillow 
and  Buckner  moved  out  to  attack   McCler- 
l's  division,  imd  if  possible  open  an  avenue 
01  retreat  by  the  road  running  southward  from 
!)  >ver  to  Charlotte.     The  Confederates  made 
attack  not  only  with  spirit  but  with  su- 
•r  numbers.    Driving  back  McClernand's 
..  they  were  by  1  r  o'clock  in  the  forenoon 
incomplete  possession  of  the  coveted  Charlotte 
roa  1.    lUickner,  who  simultaneously  attacked 
McClernand's  left,  did  not  fare  so  well.    He 
repulsed,  and  compelled  to  retire  to  the 
intrenchments  from  which  he  had  issued.    At 
this    critical   point   Grant  returned   from  his 
visit  to  Foote.    What  he  found  and  what  he 
did  is  stated  with  brevity  in  the  message  he 
h  istily  sent  back: 
If  all  the  gun-boats  that  can  will  immediately  make 
their  appearance  to  the  enemy  it  may  secure  us  a  victory. 
Otherwise  all  may  be  defeated.  A  terrible  conflict  en- 
sued in  my  absence,  which  has  demoralized  a  portion 
of  my  command,  and  I  think  the  enemy  is  much  more 
-  1.  If  the  gun-boats  do  not  show  themselves,  it  will 
reassure  the  enemy  and  still  further  demoralize  our 
-.  I  must  order  a  charge,  to  save  appearances. 
I  do  not  expect  the  gun-boats  to  go  into  action,  but 
to  make  appearance  and  throw  a  few  shells  at  long 
range.* 
In  execution  of  the  design  here  announced, 
Grant  sent  an  order  to  General  C.  F.  Smith, 
commanding  the  second  division,  who  held 
the  extreme  left  of  the  investing  line,  to  storm 
the  intrenchments  in  front  of  him.  His  men 
had  as  yet  had  no  severe  fighting,  and  now 
went  forward  enthusiastically  to  their  allotted 
task,  earning  an  important  outwork  with  im- 
petuous gallantry.  Learning  of  his  success, 
Lt  in  turn  ordered  forward  the  entire  re- 
mainder of  his  force  under  Wallace  and  Mc- 
Clernand.  This  order  was  also  executed  during 
the  afternoon,  and  by  nightfall  the  whole  of 
)  ound  lost  by  the  enemy's  morning  attack 
filly  regained.  There  is  a  conflict  of  tes- 
timony about  the  object  of  the  attack  of  the 
enemy.  Buckner  says  it  was  to  effect  the  im- 
medi  pe  of  the   garrison;   Pillow  says 
he  had  no  such  understanding,  and  that  neither 
he  nor  any  one  else  made  preparation  for  de- 
parture. The  opportunity,  therefore,  which  his 
division  had  during  the  forenoon  to  retire  by 
the  open  road  to  Charlotte  was  not  improved. 
By  evening  the  chance  was  gone,  for  the  Fed- 
erals had  once  more  closed  that  avenue  of 
escape. 
War  Records. 
During  the  night  of  the  15th,  the  Confed- 
erate commanders  met  in  council  to  decide 
what  they  should  do.  Buckner,  the  junior, 
very  emphatically  gave  the  others  to  under- 
stand that  the  situation  of  the  garrison  was 
desperate,  and  that  it  would  require  but  an 
hour  or  two  of  assault  on  the  next  morning 
to  capture  his  portion  of  the  defenses.  Such  a 
contingency  left  them  no  practical  alternative. 
Floyd  and  Pillow,  however,  had  exaggerated 
ideas  of  the  personal  danger  they  would  be  in 
from  the  Government  if  they  permitted  them- 
selves to  become  prisoners,  and  made  known 
their  great  solicitude  to  get  away.  An  agree- 
ment was  therefore  reached  through  which 
Floyd,  the  senior  general,  first  turned  over  his 
command  to  Pillow;  then  Pillow,  the  second 
in  command,  in  the  same  way  relinquished 
his  authority  to  Buckner,  the  junior  general. 
This  formality  completed,  Floyd  and  Pillow 
made  hasty  preparations,  and  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  arrival  of  a  rebel  steamer  boarded  it, 
with  their  personal  followers,  during  the  night, 
and  abandoned  the  fort  and  its  garrison. 
As  usual,  the  active  correspondents  of  West- 
ern newspapers  were  with  the  expedition, 
and  through  their  telegrams  something  of  the 
varying  fortunes  of  the  Kentucky  campaign 
and  the  Donelson  siege  had  become  known 
to  the  country,  while  President  Lincoln  at 
Washington  gleaned  still  further  details  from 
the  scattering  official  reports  which  came  to 
the  War  Department  through  army  channels. 
His  urgent  admonitions  to  Buell  and  Halleck 
in  the  previous  month  to  bring  about  efficient 
cooperation  have  already  been  related.  The 
new  and  exciting  events  again  aroused  his 
most  intense  solicitude,  and  prompted  him  to 
send  the  following  suggestion  by  telegraph  to 
Halleck : 
You  have  Fort  Donelson  safe,  unless  Grant  shall  be 
overwhelmed  from  outside,  to  prevent  which  latter 
will,  I  think,  require  all  the  vigilance,  energy,  and  skill 
of  yourself  and  Buell,  acting  in  full  cooperation.  Co- 
lumbus will  not  get  at  Grant,  but  the  force  from  Bowl- 
ing Green  will.  They  hold  the  railroad  from  Bowling 
Green  to  within  a  few  miles  of  Fort  Donelson,  with 
the  bridge  at  Clarksville  undisturbed.  It  is  unsafe  to 
rely  that  they  will  not  dare  to  expose  Nashville  to 
Buell.  A  small  part  of  their  force  can  retire  slowly  to- 
wards Nashville,  breaking  up  the  railroad  as  they  go, 
and  keep  Buell  out  of  that  city  twenty  days.  Mean- 
time Nashville  will  be  abundantly  defended  by  forces 
from  all  South  and  perhaps  from  here  at  Manassas. 
Could  not  a  cavalry  force  from  General  Thomas  on 
the  Upper  Cumberland  dash  across,  almost  unresisted, 
and  cut  the  railroad  at  or  near  Knoxville,  Tennessee? 
In  the  midst  of  a  bombardment  at  Fort  Donelson,  why 
could  not  a  gun-boat  run  up  and  destroy  the  bridge  at 
Clarksville?  Our  success  or  failure  at  Fort  Donelson 
is  vastly  important,  and  I  beg  you  to  put  your  soul  in 
the  effort.    I  send  a  copy  of  this  to  Buell. 
Before  this  telegram  reached  its  destination, 
the  siege  of  Donelson  was  terminated.
LINCOLN  CATHEDRAL. 
On  Sunday  morning,  the  16th  of  February, 
when  the  troops  composing  the  Federal  line 
of  investment  were  preparing  for  a  final  as- 
sault, a  note  came  from  Buckner  to  Grant, 
proposing  an  armistice  to  arrange  terms  of 
capitulation.  The  language  of  Grant's  reply 
served  to  crown  the  fame  of  his  achievement : 
Yours  of  this  date,  proposing  armistice  and  appoint- 
ment of  commissioners  to  settle  terms  of  capitulation, 
is  just  received.  No  terms  except  unconditional  and 
immediate  surrender  can  be  accepted.  I  propose  to 
move  immediately  upon  your  works. 
His  resolute  phrase  gained  him  a  prouder 
title  than  was  ever  bestowed  by  knightly 
accolade.  Thereafter,  the  army  and  the  coun- 
try, with  a  fanciful  play  upon  the  initials  of 
his  name,  spoke  of  him  as  "  Unconditional 
Surrender  Grant."  Buckner  had  no  other 
balm  for  the  sting  of  his  defeat  than  to  say 
that  Grant's  terms  were  ungenerous  and  un- 
chivalric,  but  the  necessity  compelled  him  to 
accept  them.  That  day  Grant  was  enabled 
to  telegraph  to  Halleck : 
We  have  taken  Fort  Donelson  and  from  12,000  to 
15,000  prisoners,  including  Generals  Buckner  and 
Bushrod   R.   Johnson ;    also   about  20,000  stand   of 
S«3 
arms,  48  pieces  of  artillery,  17  heavy  guns,  from  2000 
to  4000  horses,  and  large  quantities   of  comm 
stores. 
By  this  brilliant  and  important  victory 
Grant's  fame  sprang  suddenly  into  full  and 
universal  recognition.  Congress  was  in  session 
at  Washington ;  his  personal  friend  and  repre- 
sentative, Hon.  Elihu  B.  Washburne;  member 
from  the  Galena  district  of  Illinois,  lost  no 
time  in  proposing  a  resolution  of  thanks  to 
Grant  and  his  army,  which  was  voted  without 
delay  and  with  generous  gratitude.  With  even 
more  heartiness,  President  Lincoln  nominated 
him  major-general  of  volunteers,  and  the  Sen- 
ate at  once  confirmed  the  appointment.  The 
whole  military  service  felt  the  inspiring  event. 
Many  of  the  colonels  in  Grant's  army  were 
made  brigadier-generals;  and  promotion  ran, 
like  a  quickening  leaven,  through  the  whole 
organization.  Halleck  also  reminded  the 
Government  of  his  desire  for  larger  power. 
"  Make  Buell,  Grant,  and  Pope  major-generals 
of  volunteers,"  he  telegraphed  the  day  after 
the  surrender,  "and  give  me  command  in  the 
West.  I  ask  this  in  return  for  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson." 
fa*. 
LINCOLN    CATHEDRAL. 
SEAL  OF  THE    SEE   OF    LINCOLN. 
'O  man  by  taking  thought 
can  add  a  cubit  to  his 
stature,  but  dignity  of  car- 
riage and  a  masterful  air 
may  accomplish  many 
inches  ;  —  the  yard-stick 
bears  false  witness  to  a 
Louis  Quatorze,  a  Napo- 
leon, or  a  Nelson.  And  as 
it  is  with  men,  so  it  is  with 
cities.  Canterbury  counts 
twenty  thousand  souls  and  looks  small,  weak, 
and  rural.  Lincoln  counts  only  a  few  thousand 
more,  but,  domineering  on  its  hill-top,  makes  so 
brave  a  show  of  municipal  pride,  has  so  trucu- 
lent an  air  and  attitude,  that  no  tourist  thinks 
to  patronize  it  as  a  mere  provincial  town.  It  is  a 
city  to  his  eye;  and  the  greatness  of  its  church 
simply  accentuates  the  fact.  Canterbury's  ca- 
thedral almost  crushes  Canterbury,  asleep  in 
its  broad  vale.  Durham's  rock-borne  minster 
projects  so  boldly  from  the  town  behind  it  that 
it  still  seems  what  it  really  was  in  early  years  — 
at  once  the  master  of  Durham  and  its  bulwark 
against  aggression.  But  Lincoln's  church, 
though  quite  as  big  and  as  imperial  as  the 
others,  seems  but  the  crown  and  finish  of  the 
city  which  bears  it  aloft  in  a  close,  sturdy 
grasp.  Like  Durham  cathedral,  it  stands  on  a 
promontory  beneath  which  runs  a  river.  But 
the  hill  is  very  much  higher,  and  the  town, 
instead  of  spreading  away  behind  the  church, 
tumbles  steeply  down  the  hill  and  far  out  be- 
yond the  stream.  Here  for  the  first  time  in 
England  we  feel  as  we  almost  always  do  in 
continental  countries  —  not  that  the  cathedral 
church  has  gathered  a  city  about  it,  but  that 
the  city  has  built  a  cathedral  church  for  its 
own  glory  and  profit. 
In  truth,  the  importance  of  Lincoln  as  a 
town  long  antedates  its  importance  as  an  ec- 
clesiastical center.  We  cannot  read  far  enough 
back  in  its  history  to  find  a  record  of  its  birth. 
When  the  Romans  came  —  calling  it  Lmdum
5^4 
LIXCOLN  CATHEDRAL. 
.  making  it  mark  the  meeting-place  of 
two  of  their  great  roads,  and  fortifying  it  as 
one  of  their  chief  stations  —  a  British  town 
s  already  lying  a  little  to  the  northward 
of  the  snot  they  chose.  After  their  departure 
the  coming  of  the  English,  Lindum  flour- 
ished again,  and  still  more  conspicuously 
when  the  Danes  took  and  kept  it.  At  the  ad- 
vent of  William  the  Norman  it  was  one  of  the 
i  '.iicf  towns  in  England,  ruled  in  almost 
entire  independence  by  a  Danish  oligarchy 
of  twelve  hereditary  "  lawmen,"  and  con- 
taining 1 150  inhabited  houses,  many  of 
them  mansions  aecording  to  the  standard  of 
the  age.  William  came  from  the  north  after 
his  eonquest  of  York  and  probably  entered 
by  that  Roman  gate- way  which  still  stands 
not  far  from  the  cathedral;  and  with  his 
coming  began  a  new  and  yet  more  prosper- 
ous era  for  the  town.    In  one  corner  of  the 
PLAN    r,V    LINCOLN 
CATHEDRAL. 
ET    TO 
A.  '.-s    in   West    Front; 
I;    C.  D,  Porches   in    Norman   Front;    E, 
Wings:  F,  Nave; 
■       ing  i:nder  Central 
;    K ,  S, 
- 
."■:,  Chantries;   w,  South-east 
/    '  hapter-house ; 
•    '  hapter-house; 
se  to  Library. 
Roman  inclosure  a  great 
le  soon  began 
to  rear  its  walls,  and  in 
another  corner  the  first 
Norman  bishop  laid  the 
fo  mdations  of  a  vast  ca- 
thedral church. 
This    part    of    England 
had    received    the    gospel 
from  Paulinus,  the  famous  archbishop  of  the 
north,  and  was  at  first  included  in  the  wide 
diocese  of  Lichfield.  In  678  a  new  see  was 
formed  which  was  called  of  Lindsey  after  the 
province,  or  of  Sidnacester  after  the  episco- 
pal town  —  probably  the  modern  town  of 
Stow.  Two  years  later  it  was  divided,  an- 
other chair  being  set  up  at  Leicester.  About 
the  year  870  this  chair  was  removed  to  Dor- 
chester, and  hither  about  950  the  chair  of 
Sidnacester  was  likewise  brought.  When  the 
Normans  took  control  the  chief  place  of  the 
united  sees  was  changed  again,  Lincoln  being 
chosen  because  of  that  dominant  station  and 
that  civic  importance  which  to  continental 
eyes  seemed  characteristic  of  the  episcopal 
name. 
11. 
Remigius  was  the  first  Norman  bishop  of 
Dorchester,  the  first  bishop  of  Lin- 
coln ;  and  about  the  year  1075,  "in 
a  place  strong  and  fair,"  he  began 
"  a  strong   and  fair  church  to   the 
Virgin  of  virgins,   which  was  both 
pleasant  to  God's  servants  and,  as 
the  time  required,  invincible  to  his 
enemies  "  ;  and  he  gave  it  in  charge 
to  secular  canons,  although  he  was 
himself  a  Benedictine.   It  was 
injured  by  a  great  fire  in  1 14 ij 
quickly    repaired    by    Bishop 
Alexander  in    the    later 
Norman  style,  and  then 
almost  utterly  destroyed 
in     1 185    by    an    earth- 
quake which  "  split  it  in 
two  from  top  to  bottom." 
Nothing  remains  of  the 
first  cathedral  of  Lincoln 
to-day  except  a  portion 
of  Remigius's  west-front 
(built  into  the  vast  Early- 
English  facade),  and  the 
lower  stages  of  the  west- 
ern   towers,  which,  like 
the  doorways  in  the  front 
itself,  were  parts  of  Alex- 
ander's reconstructions. 
Bishop  Hugh  of  Avalon  or 
of  Burgundy  —  in  the  calendar, 
St.  Hugh  of  Lincoln  —  began 
the  present  church,  building  the 
choir,  the  minor  transepts,  and 
a  piece  of  the  great  transepts; 
and  his  immediate  successors, 
by  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth 
century,  had  completed  these 
transepts,  together  with  the 
nave,  the  west  fagade  and  its 
turrets  and    chapels,  the  great
EDWARD    TURING. 
made  renders  the  concealment  of  shortcom- 
ings exceptionally  difficult. 
Though  it  is  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  write 
a  history  of  Uppingham,  yet  one  episode  in  its 
later  career  it  would  be  wrong  to  leave  untold, 
unique  as  it  is  in  school  history,  and  illustrat- 
ing at  once  the  energy  of  its  masters,  the 
adaptability  of  its  system  to  new  conditions, 
and  the  loyal  confidence  inspired  by  its  man- 
agement. The  record  is  valuable  also  as 
showing  what  may  be  done  by  a  school  in  a 
great  emergency. 
In  the  autumn  of  1875  an  outbreak  of  fever 
took  place  in  the  town  and  the  school,  and 
some  boys  died.  The  school  was  broken  up, 
and  orders  were  given  to  make  the  sanitary 
arrangements  of  every  portion  of  the  school 
premises  as  perfect  as  possible,  without  regard 
to  expense.  This  was  done  under  the  special 
direction  of  a  government  engineer,  who  cer- 
tified to  the  completeness  of  the  work.  The 
authorities  of  the  town,  however,  declined  to 
join  in  this  attempt  at  perfect  sanitation. 
When  the  school  reassembled,  after  Christ- 
mas, a  new  outbreak  of  fever  proved  that  till 
everything  was  done  nothing  was  done.  It 
was  a  critical  moment.  Already  it  had  begun 
to  "  rain  "  telegrams  from  anxious  parents.  It 
was  plain  that  in  a  few  days  the  houses  might 
be  empty,  the  large  staff  of  teachers  left  without 
employment  or  means  of  support,  and  the 
grand  results  of  twenty-five  years  of  toil  swept 
away  at  once.  A  bold  step  was  conceived  in 
Mr.  Thring's  resolute  mind.  Once  more  the 
school  was  broken  up  for  a  three-weeks'  holi- 
day.   With  the  boys  went  to  their  parents  an 
intimation  that  after  Easter  the  school  would 
reopen  in  some  place  then  unknown,  but 
which  would  at  least  be  healthy.  Meantime 
search  was  being  made  in  many  directions, 
and  at  length  Borth,  a  small  watering-place 
on  the  Welsh  coast,  was  chosen  as  the  tem- 
porary home  of  the  school.  '1  he  large  sum- 
mer hotel  was  leased,  all  the  spare  space  in  the 
village  cottages  taken,  a  temporary  school- 
room erected,  the  stables  turned  into  a  car- 
pentry, the  coach-house  into  a  gymnasium; 
special  trains  brought  from  Uppingham  the 
household  equipments  for  30  masters,  their 
families,  and  the  300  boys  of  the  school ;  and  on 
April  4,  only  20  days  after  the  site  was  secured, 
the  school  resumed  its  work  on  the  wild  Welsh 
coast,  more  than  100  miles  from  its  forsaken 
home  in  the  Midlands.  The  splendid  faith  of  the 
masters  in  their  own  resources  was  rewarded  by 
a  grand  tribute  of  confidence,  when  out  of  their 
whole  number  it  was  found  that  only  three 
boys  had  failed  to  follow  them  in  this  great 
adventure.  The  three  weeks  of  fierce  race  for 
life  were  followed  by  more  than  a  year  of 
quiet  and  excellent  work  at  Borth,  which 
thenceforth  became  famed  far  and  wide  as 
"  Uppingham  by  the  Sea  ";  and  in  April,  1877, 
the  school  returned  to  its  now  purified  home 
in  Rutland,  amidst  the  rejoicings  of  the  peo- 
ple, and  with  numbers  greater  than  when  it 
left.  Among  all  the  splendid  traditions  of 
English  schools  it  may  be  doubted  if  there  is 
any  which  tells  of  greater  faith,  courage,  and 
loyalty  of  affection  than  does  this  year  of  ad- 
venturous exile  in  the  records  of  Uppingham. 
George  R.  Parkin. 
EDWARD    THRING. 
yV6»n**yf 
T HIS  was  a  leader  of  the  sons  of  light, 
Of  winsome  cheer  and  strenuous  command. 
Upon  the  veteran  hordes  of  Bigot-land 
All  day  his  vanguard  spirit,  flaming  bright, 
Bore  up  the  brunt  of  unavailing  fight. 
Then,  with  the  iron  in  his  soul,  one  hand 
Still  on  the  hilt,  he  passed  from  that  slim  band 
Out  through  the  ranks  to  rearward  and  the  night. 
The  day  is  lost,  but  not  the  day  of  days, 
And  ye  his  comrades  in  the  losing  war 
Stand  once  again  for  liberty  and  love ! 
Close  up  the  ranks ;  his  deed  your  deeds  let  praise ! 
Against  the  front  of  dark  where  gleams  one  star. 
Strive  on  to  death  as  this  great  captain  strove '. 
If/iss  Carman. 
Vol.  XXXVI.— 91.
ABRAHAM    LINCOLN:    A    HISTORY.* 
THE    MISSISSIPPI    AND    SHILOH. 
BY    JOHN    G.    NICOLAY    AND    JOHN    HAY,    PRIVATE    SECRETARIES    TO    THE    PRESIDENT. 
THE    MISSISSIPPI. 
a  powerful  supplement  to 
the  Union  victories  in  Ten- 
nessee, the  military  opera- 
tions west  of  the  Mississippi 
!   River  next  demand  our  at- 
s/^  -^\!*    tendon.    Under  the  vigor- 
*  ous  promptings  of  Halleck 
we  left  the  army  of  General 
Curtis  engaged  in  his  trying  midwinter  cam- 
paign in  south-western  Missouri.  He  made 
ready  with  all  haste  to  comply  with  the  order 
to  "  push  on  as  rapidly  as  possible  and  end 
the  matter  with  Price."  His  army  obeyed 
every  order  with  cheerful  endurance.  "  They 
contend  with  mud,  water,  and  snow  and  ice 
manfully,"  wrote  Curtis  under  date  of  Feb- 
ruary i,  1862,  uand  I  trust  they  will  not  falter 
in  the  face  of  a  more  active  foe."  In  the  same 
spirit  he  encouraged  his  officers : 
The  roads  are  indeed  very  bad,  but  they  are  worse 
for  the  enemy  than  for  us  if  he  attempts  to  retreat. 
.  .  .  The  men  should  help  the  teams  out  of  difficulty 
when  necessary,  and  all  must  understand  that  the  ele- 
ments are  to  be  considered  serious  obstacles,  which 
we  have  to  encounter  and  overcome  in  this  campaign. 
.  .  .  Constant  bad  roads  will  be  the  rule,  and  a  change 
for  the  better  a  rare  exception. 
As  already  remarked,  Price  had  kept  his 
situation  and  numbers  well  concealed.  He 
was  known  to  be  at  Springfield;  but  rumor 
exaggerated  his  force  to  30,000,  and  it  was 
uncertain  whether  he  intended  to  retreat  or 
advance.  Reports  also  came  that  Van  Dorn 
was  marching  to  his  support  with  10,000  men. 
Curtis  kept  the  offensive,  however,  pushing 
forward  his  outposts.  By  the  13th  of  February 
Price  found  his  position  untenable  and  ordered 
a  retreat  from  Springfield.  Since  McCulloch 
would  not  come  to  Missouri  to  furnish  Price 
assistance.  Price  was  perforce  compelled  to  go 
to  Arkansas,  where  McCulloch  might  furnish 
him  protection.  Curtis  pursued  with  vigor. 
':  We  continually  take  cattle,  prisoners,  wag- 
ons, and  arms,  which  they  leave  in  their 
flight,"  he  wrote.  Xenr  the  Arkansas  line 
Price  endeavored  to  make  a  stand  with  his 
rear-guard,  but  without  success.  On  February 
18,  in  a  special  order  announcing  the  recent 
Union  victories  elsewhere,  Curtis  was  able 
to  congratulate  his   own  troops  as   follows : 
You  have  moved  in  the  most  inclement  weather, 
over  the  worst  of  roads,  making  extraordinary  long 
marches,  subsisting  mainly  on  meat  without  salt,  and 
for  the  past  six  days  you  have  been  under  the  fire  of 
the  fleeing  enemy.  You  have  driven  him  out  of  Mis- 
souri, restored  the  Union  flag  to  the  virgin  soil  of  Ar- 
kansas, and  triumphed  in  two  contests. 
The  rebels  were  in  no  condition  to  with- 
stand him,  and  he  moved  forward  to  Cross  Hol- 
low, where  the  enemy  had  hastily  abandoned 
a  large  cantonment  with  extensive  buildings, 
only  a  portion  of  which  they  stopped  to  burn. 
It  was  time  for  Curtis  to  pause.  He  was  240 
miles  from  his  railroad  base  at  Rolla,  where 
he  had  begun  his  laborious  march.  Orders 
soon  came  from  Halleck  not  to  penetrate 
farther  into  Arkansas,  but  to  hold  his  posi- 
tion and  keep  the  enemy  south  of  the  Boston 
Mountains.  "  Hold  your  position,"  wrote 
Halleck,  March  7,  "till  I  can  turn  the  ene- 
my." At  that  date  Halleck  expected  to  make 
a  land  march  along  what  he  had  decided  to 
be  the  central  strategic  line  southward  from 
Fort  Donelson,  turn  the  enemy  at  Memphis, 
and  compel  the  Confederate  forces  to  evacu- 
ate the  whole  Mississippi  Valley  down  to  that 
point. 
There  was,  however,  serious  work  yet  in 
store  for  Curtis.  To  obviate  the  jealousies  and 
bickerings  among  Trans-Mississippi  Confed- 
erate commanders  the  Richmond  authorities 
had  combined  the  Indian  Territory  with  por- 
tions of  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  and  Missouri  in 
the  Trans- Mississippi  District  of  Department 
No.  II.,  and  had  sent  Major-General  Earl 
Van  Dorn  to  command  the  whole.  His  letters 
show  that  he  went  full  of  enthusiasm  and 
brilliant  anticipations.  He  did  not  dream  of 
being  kept  on  the  defensive.  He  called  for 
troops  from  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  and  Texas, 
and  ordered  the  armies  of  McCulloch  and 
Mcintosh,  and  Pike  with  his  Indian  regiments, 
to  join  him.  From  these  various  sources  he 
hoped  to  collect  a  force  of  from  30,000  to 
40,000  men  at  Pocahontas,  Arkansas.  Un- 
aware that  Price  was  then  retreating  from 
Springfield,  he  wrote  to  that  commander,  un- 
der date  of  February  14,  proposing  a  quick 
and  secret  march  against  St.  Louis,  which  he 
hoped  to  capture  by  assault.  Holding  that 
city  would  soon  secure  Missouri  and  relieve 
Johnston,  seriously  pressed  in  Tennessee.   He 
Copyright  by  J.  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  1886.     All  rights  reserved.
THE   MISSISSIPPI  AND   SIIIIOII. 
would  not  wait  to  prepare,  but  would  adopt 
the  style  of  frontier  equipment  and  supply  : 
Flour,  salt,  and  a  little  bacon  in  our  wagons,  and 
beef  cattle  driven  with  us,  should  be  our  commissariat. 
Grain-bags  to  contain  two  days'  rations  of  corn,  to  be 
carried  on  our  troopers'  saddles,  and  money  our  pay- 
master's department,  and  sufficient  ammunition  our 
ordnance  department. 
But  he  did  not  have  time  enough  to  ex- 
temporize even  this  haversack  campaign  :  he 
found  his  base  of  supplies  menaced  from  the 
north-east,  and  information  soon  followed  that 
Price  was  flying  in  confusion  from  the  north- 
west. Ten  days  later  we  find  him  writing  to 
Johnston : 
Price  and  McCulloch  are  concentrated  at  Cross 
Hollow.  .  .  .  Whole  force  of  enemy  [Union]  from 
35,000  to  40,000  ;  ours  about  20,000.  Should  Pike  be 
able  to  join,  our  forces  will  be  about  26,000.  I  leave 
this  evening  to  go  to  the  army,  and  will  give  battle,  of 
course,  if  it  does  not  take  place  before  I  arrive.  I  have 
no  doubt  of  the  result.   If  I  succeed,  I  shall  push  on. 
Van  Dorn  found  the  Confederate  forces 
united  in  the  Boston  Mountains,  fifty-five 
miles  south  of  Sugar  Creek,  to  which  point 
Curtis  had  retired  for  better  security.  He  im- 
mediately advanced  with  his  whole  force,  at- 
tacking the  Union  position  on  the  6th  of 
March.  On  the  7th  was  fought  the  principal 
contest,  known  as  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge, 
or  Elkhorn  Tavern.  As  usual,  rumor  exag- 
gerated the  forces  on  both  sides.  By  the 
official  reports  it  appears  that  Van  Dorn's 
available  command  numbered  16,000.  The 
Union  troops  under  Curtis  numbered  only 
about  10,500;  but  they  had  the  advantage  of 
a  defensive  attitude  and  gained  a  complete 
victory,  to  which  the  vigilance  and  able 
strategy  of  the  Union  commander  effectively 
contributed.  Generals  McCulloch,  Mcintosh, 
and  other  prominent  rebel  officers  were  killed 
early  in  the  action,  and  Van  Dorn's  right 
wing  was  shattered. 
The  diminished  and  scattered  forces  of  Van 
Dorn,  retreating  by  different  routes  from  the 
battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  were  not  again  wholly 
united.  Pike  was  ordered  to  conduct  his  In- 
dian regiments  back  to  the  Indian  Territory 
for  local  duty.  The  main  remnant  of  the  Con- 
federate army  followed  Van  Dorn  to  the  east- 
ward in  the  direction  of  Pocahontas,  where 
he  proposed  to  reorganize  it,  to  resume  the 
offensive.  Halleck,  cautioning  Curtis  to  hold 
his  position  and  keep  well  on  his  guard,  speaks 
of  Van  Dorn  as  a  "  vigilant  and  energetic  of- 
ncer";  and  Van  Dorn's  language  certainly 
indicates  activity,  whatever  may  be  thought 
of  the  discretion  it  betrays.  He  had  hardly 
shaken  from  his  feet  the  dust  of  his  rout 
at  Pea  Ridge  when  he  again  began  writing 
that  he  contemplated  relieving  the  stress  of 
Confederate  disaster  in  Tennessee  by  attempt- 
ing to  capture  the  city  of  St.  Louis,  a  will-o'- 
the-wisp  project  that  had  by  turns  dazzled 
the  eyes  of  all  the  Confederate  command- 
ers in  the  Mississippi  Valley;  or,  as  another 
scheme,  perhaps  a  mere  prelude  to  this,  he 
would  march  eastward  against  Pope  and  1 
the  siege  of  New  Madrid,  on  the  Missis- 
sippi River.  This  brings  us  to  a  narrative 
of  events  at  that  point. 
With  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  the  rebel 
stronghold  at  Columbus  had  become  useless. 
Its  evacuation  soon  followed  (March  2,  1862), 
and  the  Confederates  immediately  turned  their 
attention  to  holding  the  next  barrier  on  the 
Mississippi  River.  This  was  at  a  point  less 
than  one  hundred  miles  below  Cairo,  where 
the  Father  of  Waters  makes  two  large  bends, 
which,  joined  together,  lie  like  a  reversed  let- 
ter S  placed  horizontally.  At  the  foot  of  this 
first  bend  lay  Island  No.  10  ;*  from  there  the 
river  flows  northward  to  the  town  of  New- 
Madrid,  Missouri,  passing  which  it  resumes 
its  southward  flow.  The  country  is  not 
only  flat,  as  the  bend  indicates,  but  it  is  en- 
compassed in  almost  all  directions  by  nearly 
impassable  swamps  and  bayous.  Island  No. 
10,  therefore,  and  its  immediate  neighbor- 
hood, seemed  to  offer  unusual  advantages 
to  bar  the  Mississippi  with  warlike  obstruc- 
tions. As  soon  as  the  evacuation  of  Colum- 
bus was  determined  upon,  all  available  rebel 
resources  and  skill  were  concentrated  here. 
The  island,  the  Tennessee  shore  of  the  river, 
and  the  town  of  New  Madrid  were  all  strongly 
fortified  and  occupied  with  considerable  gar- 
risons—  about  3000  men  at  the  former  and 
some  5000  at  the  latter  place. 
General  Halleck,  studying  the  strategical 
conditions  of  the  whole  Mississippi  Valley  with 
tenfold  interest  since  the  victories  of  Grant, 
also  had  his  eye  on  this  position,  and  was  now 
as  eager  to  capture  it  as  the  rebels  were  to  de- 
fend it.  One  of  the  quickest  movements  of  the 
whole  war  ensued.  General  Pope  was  selected 
to  lead  the  expedition,  and  the  choice  was  not 
misplaced.  On  the  22d  of  February,  six  days 
after  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson,  Pope 
landed  at  the  town  of  Commerce,  Missouri,  on 
the  Mississippi  River,  with  140  men.  On  the 
28th  he  was  on  the  march  at  the  head  of  10.000. 
who  had  been  sent  him  in  the  interim  from 
St.  Louis  and  Cairo.  On  the  3d  oi  March,  at 
1  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  he  appeared  before 
the  town  of  New  Madrid  with  his  whole  force, 
to  which  further  reenforcements  were  soon 
added,  raising  his  army  to  about  20,000.  It 
would  have  required  but  a  few  hours  to  cap- 
*  See  communication  from  John  Banvard  in  u  Open 
Letters"  of  this  number  of  The  Century. — Editor.
66o 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
aire  the  place  by  assault  ;  but  the  loss  of  life 
would  have  been  great  and  the  sacrifice  virt- 
ually useless.  It  was  the  season  of  the  early 
spring  floods ;  the  whole  country  was  sub- 
merged, and  the  great  river  was  at  a  very 
high  stage  between  its  levees.  In  addition  to 
irth-works  and  its  garrison.  New  Madrid 
was  guarded  by  a  fleet  of  eight  rebel  gun-boats 
under  command  of  Commodore  George  N. 
Hollins.  The  high  water  floated  these  vessels 
such  an  elevation  that  their  guns  com- 
manded every  part  of  the  town,  and  made 
its  occupation  by  hostile  troops  impossible. 
Had  Pope  entered  with  his  army,  Hollins 
would  have  destroyed  both  town  and  troops 
at  his  leisure. 
Pope  therefore  surrounded  the  place  by 
siege-works  in  which  he  could  protect  his 
men ;  and  sending  a  detachment  to  Point 
Pleasant  on  the  river,  nine  miles  below,  se- 
cured a  lodgment  for  batteries  that  closed 
the  river  to  rebel  transports  and  cut  off  the 
enemy's  reinforcements  and  supplies.  The 
movement  proved  effectual.  Ten  days  later 
March  13,  1862)  the  rebels  evacuated  New 
Madrid,  leaving  everything  behind. 
The  Confederates  now  held  Island  No.  10 
and  the  Tennessee  shore;  but  their  retreat 
was  cut  off  by  the  swamps  beyond  and  Pope's 
batteries  below.  The  rebel  gun-boat  flotilla  had 
retired  down  the  river.  Pope's  forces  held 
New  Madrid  and  the  Missouri  shore,  but  they 
had  neither  transports  nor  gun-boats,  and  with- 
out these  could  not  cross  to  the  attack.  In 
this  dilemma  Pope  once  more  called  upon 
Officer  Foote  to  bring  the  Union  fleet  of 
gun-boats  down  the  river,  attack  and  silence 
the  batteries  of  Island  No.  to,  and  assist  in 
capturing  the  rebel  army,  which  his  strategy 
shut  in  a  trap. 
Foote,  although  commanding  a  fleet  of  nine 
Union  gun-boats,  objected  that  the  difficulty 
and  risk  were  too  great.  With  all  their  for- 
midable strength  the  gun-boats  had  two  seri- 
defects.  Only  their  bows  were  protected 
avier  iron  plating  so  as  to  be  shot- 
pro  af;  and  their  engines  were  not  strong 
enough  to  back  easily  against  the  powerful 
it  of  the  Mississippi.  In  their  attacks 
on  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  they  had 
fought  up-stream;  when  disabled,  the  mere 
1  thern  out  of  the  enemy's  reach. 
Mississippi  this  was  reversed.  Com- 
1  to  fight  down-stream,  they  would,  if 
disabled,  be  carried  irresistibly  directly  to  the 
enemy.  A  bombardment  at  long  range  from 
both  gun  and  mortar  boats  had  proved  inef- 
*  See  the  article  "Sawing  Out  the  Channel  Above 
Island  No.  10"  by  \.  W.  Bissell  in  "Battles  and  Leaders 
of  the  Civil  War"  (N.  Y. :  The  Century  Co.),  Vol. 
I.,  p.  460. 
fectual  to  silence  the  rebel  batteries.  Pope's 
expedition  seemed  destined  to  prove  fruitless, 
when  a  new  expedient  was  the  occasion  of 
success. 
The  project  of  a  canal  to  turn  Island  No. 
10  was  again  revived.  The  floods  of  the 
Mississippi,  pouring  through  breaks  in  the 
levees,  inundated  the  surrounding  country. 
Colonel  Bissell  of  the  engineer  regiment,  re- 
turning in  a  canoe  with  a  guide  from  his  un- 
successful visit  to  secure  Foote's  cooperation, 
learned  that  a  bayou,  from  two  and  a  half  to 
three  miles  west  of  the  Mississippi,  ran  irregu- 
larly to  the  south-west  from  the  neighborhood 
of  Island  No.  8,  the  station  of  the  Union  gun- 
boat flotilla,  to  its  junction  with  the  river  at 
New  Madrid,  a  distance  of  twelve  miles.  An 
open  corn-field  and  an  opening  in  the  woods, 
which  marked  the  course  of  an  old  road,  sug- 
gested to  him  the  possibility  of  connecting 
the  river  with  the  bayou ;  but  between  the  end 
of  the  road  and  the  bayou  lay  a  belt  of  heavy 
timber  two  miles  in  width.*  How  could  he 
get  a  fleet  of  vessels  over  the  ground  thickly 
covered  by  trees  of  every  size,  from  a  sapling 
to  a  forest  veteran  three  feet  in  diameter, 
whose  roots  stood  six  or  seven  feet  under 
water?  Modern  mechanical  appliances  are 
not  easily  baffled  by  natural  obstacles.  Six 
hundred  skillful  mechanics  working  with  the 
aid  of  steam  and  machinery,  and  directed  by 
American  inventive  ingenuity,  brought  the 
wonder  to  pass.  In  a  few  days  Colonel  Bissell 
had  a  line  of  four  light-draught  steamboats 
and  six  coal-barges  f  crossing  the  corn-field 
and  entering  the  open  road.  Great  saws,  bent 
in  the  form  of  an  arc  and  fastened  to  frames 
swinging  on  pivots,  severed  the  tree-trunks  four 
and  a  half  feet  under  water;  ropes,  pulleys,  and 
capstans  hauled  the  encumbering  debris  out 
of  the  path.  In  eight  days  the  amphibious 
fleet  was  in  the  bayou.  Here  were  new  diffi- 
culties— to  clean  away  the  dams  of  accumu- 
lated and  entangled  drift-wood.  In  a  few  days 
more  Bissell's  boats  and  barges  were  ready 
to  emerge  into  the  Mississippi  at  New  Ma- 
drid, but  yet  kept  prudently  concealed.  Two 
gun-boats  were  needed  to  protect  the  trans- 
ports in  crossing  troops.  The  sagacious 
judgment  of  Foote  and  the  heroism  of  his 
subordinates  supplied  these  at  the  opportune 
moment.  Captain  Walke  of  the  Carondelet 
volunteered  to  run  the  batteries  at  Island  No. 
to;  and  now  that  the  risk  was  justified,  the  flag- 
officer  consented.  On  the  night  of  the  4th  of 
April,  after  the  moon  had  gone  down,  the  gun- 
boat Carondelet,  moving  with  as  little  noise  as 
t  The  barges  used  were  coal-barges,  about  eighty  feet 
long  and  twenty  wide,  scow-shaped,  with  both  ends 
alike.  The  sides  were  six  inches  thick,  and  of  solid  tim- 
ber.   [J.  W.  Bissell.    Ibid.  ]
THE   MISSISSIPPI  AND   SHIIOII. 
661 
possible,  swung  into  the  stream  from  her  moor- 
ings and  started  on  her  perilous  voyage.  It  must 
have  seemed  an  omen  of  success  that  a  sud- 
den thunder-storm  with  its  additional  gloom 
and  noise  came  up  to  aid  the  attempt.  The 
movement  was  unsuspected  by  the  enemy  till, 
by  one  of  frequent  flashes  of  lightning,  the 
rebel  sentries  on  the  earth-works  of  Island 
No.  10  and  the  shore  batteries  opposite  saw 
the  huge  turtle-shaped  river  craft  stand  out  in 
vivid  outline,  to  be  in  a  second  hidden  again 
by  the  dense  obscurity.  Alarm  cries  rang  out, 
musketry  rattled,  great  guns  resounded;  the 
ship  almost  touched  the  shore  in  the  drift  of 
the  crooked  channel.  But  the  Confederate 
guns  could  not  be  aimed  amidst  the  swift  suc- 
cession of  brilliant  flash  and  total  darkness. 
The  rebel  missiles  flew  wild,  and  a  little  after 
midnight  the  Carondelet  lay  unharmed  at  the 
New  Madrid  landing.  Captain  Walke  had 
made  the  first  successful  experiment  in  a  feat 
of  daring  and  skill  that  was  many  times  re- 
peated after  he  had  demonstrated  its  possibility. 
The  gun-boat  Pittsburgh,  also  running  past 
the  rebel  batteries  at  night,  joined  the  Caron- 
delet at  New  Madrid  on  the  morning  of  April 
7,  and  the  problem  of  Pope's  difficulties  was 
solved.  When  he  crossed  his  troops  over  the 
river  by  help  of  his  gun-boats  and  transports, 
formidable  attack  was  no  longer  necessary. 
Island  No.  10  had  surrendered  to  Flag-Officer 
Foote  that  morning,  and  the  several  rebel  gar- 
risons were  using  their  utmost  endeavors  to 
effect  a  retreat  southward.  Pope  easily  inter- 
cepted their  movement :  on  that  and  the  fol- 
lowing day  he  received  the  surrender  of  three 
general  officers  and  six  or  seven  thousand 
Confederate  troops. 
As  General  Pope's  victory  had  been  gained 
without  loss  or  demoralization,  he  prepared 
immediately  to  push  his  operations  farther 
south.  "  If  transportation  arrives  to-morrow 
or  next  day,"  telegraphed  Assistant-Secretary 
Scott,  who  was  with  him  at  New  Madrid,  "we 
shall  have  Memphis  within  ten  days."  Hal- 
leck  responded  with  the  promise  of  ten  large 
steamers  to  carry  troops,  and  other  sugges- 
tions indicating  his  approval  of  the  movement 
"  down  the  river."  In  the  same  dispatch  Hal- 
leck  gave  news  of  the  Union  victory  at  Pitts- 
burg Landing  on  the  Tennessee  River,  and 
announced  his  intention  to  proceed  thither, 
and  asked  Assistant-Secretary  Scott  to  meet 
him  at  Cairo  for  consultation.  The  meeting 
took  place  on  the  10th  of  April,  by  which  time 
Halleck  had  become  more  impressed  with  the 
severity  and  the  perils  of  the  late  battle  on  the 
Tennessee;  for  Scott  asks  the  Washington 
authorities  whether  a  reenforcement  of  20,000 
or  30,000  men  cannot  be  sent  from  the  East 
to  make  good  the  loss.  This  conference  proba- 
bly originated  the  idea  that  soon  interrupted 
the  successful  river  operations,  by  withdraw- 
ing the  army  under  Pope.  Reenforeernents 
could  not  be  spared  from  the  East,  and  Pope's 
army  became  the  next  resource.  J- or  the  pres- 
ent, however,  there  was  a  continuation  of  the 
first  plan.  Pope's  preliminary  orders  for  em- 
barkation were  issued  on  the  10th,  and  on 
the  14th  the  combined  land  and  naval  forces 
which  had  reduced  Island  No.  10  reached 
Fort  Pillow.  Its  works  were  found  to  be  strong 
and  extensive.  The  overflow  of  the  whole 
country  rendered  land  operations  difficult; 
it  was  estimated  that  it  would  require  two 
weeks  to  turn  the  position  and  reduce  the 
works.  Meanwhile  information  was  obtained 
that  Van  Dorn's  rebel  army  from  Arkansas 
was  about  to  reenforce  Beauregard  at  Corinth. 
In  view  of  all  this,  Assistant-Secretary  Scott 
asked  the  question  :  "  If  General  Pope  finds, 
after  careful  examination,  that  he  cannot  cap- 
ture Fort  Pillow  within  ten  days,  had  he  not 
better  reenforce  General  Halleck  immediately, 
and  let  Commodore  Foote  continue  to  block- 
ade below  until  forces  can  be  returned  and 
the  position  be  turned  by  General  Halleck 
beating  Beauregard  and  marching  upon  Mem- 
phis from  Corinth  ?  "  Before  an  answer  came 
from  the  War  Department  at  Washington, 
Halleck,  who  had  for  several  days  been  with 
the  army  on  the  Tennessee  River,  decided  the 
question  for  himself  and  telegraphed  to  Pope 
(April  15),  "  Move  with  your  army  to  this 
place,  leaving  troops  enough  with  Commodore 
Foote  to  land  and  hold  Fort  Pillow,  should 
the  enemy's  forces  withdraw."  At  the  same 
time  he  sent  the  following  suggestion  to  Flag- 
Officer  Foote : 
I  have  ordered  General  Pope's  army  to  this  place, 
but  I  think  you  had  best  continue  the  bombardment 
of  Fort  Pillow  ;  and  if  the  enemy  should  abandon  it, 
take  possession  or  go  down  the  river,  as  you  may  deem 
best.  General  Pope  will  leave  forces  enough  to  oc- 
cupy any  fortifications  that  may  be  taken. 
The  plan  was  forthwith  carried  into  effect. 
The  transports,  instead  of  disembarking  Pope's 
troops  to  invest  Fort  Pillow,  were  turned  north- 
ward, and  steaming  up  the  Mississippi  to  Cairo, 
thence  to  Paducah,  and  from  Paducah  up  the 
Tennessee  River,  landed  the  whole  of  Pope's 
army,  except  two  regiments,  at  Pittsburg 
Landing  on  the  22d  of  April. 
The  flotilla  under  Foote  and  the  two  regi- 
ments left  behind  continued  in  front  of  Fort 
Pillow,  keeping  up  a  show  of  attack,  by  a 
bombardment  from  one  of  the  mortar-boats 
and  such  reconnaissances  as  the  little  handful 
of  troops  could  venture,  to  discover,  if  possi- 
ble, some  weak  point  in  the  enemy's  defenses. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Confederates,  watching 
what  they  thought  a  favorable  opportunity,
662 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
brought  up  eight  oi  their  gun-boats  and  made 
a  spirited  attack  on  the  Union  vessels  on  the 
morning  of  May  10.  In  a  short  combat  two 
o\  the  Union  gun-boats,  which  bore  the  brunt 
o(  the  onset,  were  seriously  disabled,  though 
not  until  they  had  inflicted  such  damage  on 
three  Confederate  vessels  that  they  drifted 
helplessly  out  of  the  fight  ;  after  which  the 
remainder  oi  the  rebel  flotilla  retired  from  the 
encounter.  For  nearly  a  month  after  this  pre- 
liminary gun-boat  battle  the  river  operations, 
though  full  of  exciting  daily  incident,  were 
marked  by  no  important  historical  event. 
Mention,  however,  needs  to  be  here  made  of 
a  change  in  the  control  of  the  Union  fleet. 
Commodore  Foote  had  been  wounded  in  the 
ankle  during  his  attack  on  Fort  Donelson,  and 
his  injury  now  caused  him  so  much  suffering 
and  exhaustion  of  strength  that  he  was  com- 
pelled to  relinquish  his  command.  He  took 
leave  of  his  flotilla  on  the  9th  of  May,  and  was 
succeeded  by  Commodore  Charles  H.  Davis, 
who  from  that  time  onward  had  charge  of  the 
gun-boat  operations  on  the  upper  Mississippi. 
THE    SHILOH    CAMPAIGN. 
The  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  hastened,  almost 
to  a  panic,  the  retreat  of  the  Confederates 
from  other  points.  By  that  surrender  about 
one-third  of  their  fighting  force  in  Tennessee 
vanished  from  the  campaign,  while  their  whole 
web  of  strategy  was  instantly  dissolved.  The 
full  possession  of  the  Tennessee  River  by  the 
Union  gun-boats  for  the  moment  hopelessly 
divided  the  Confederate  commands,  and  like 
a  flushed  covey  of  birds  the  rebel  generals 
started  on  their  several  lines  of  retreat  with- 
out concert  or  rallying  point.  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston,  the  department  commander,  moved 
south-east  towards  Chattanooga,  abandoning 
hville  to  its  fate;  while  Beauregard,  left 
to  his  own  discretion  and  resources,  took 
measures  to  effect  the  evacuation  of  Colum- 
bia so  as  to  save  its  armament  and  supplies, 
'lien  proceeded  to  the  railroad  crossings 
of  northern  Mississippi  to  collect  and  organize 
a  new  army. 
It  is  now  evident  that  if  the  Union  forces 
could  have  been  promptly  moved  forward 
in  harmonious  combination,  with  the  facility 
which  the  opening  of  the  Tennessee  River  af- 
forded them,  such  an  advance  might  have 
been  made,  and  such  strategic  points  gained 
and  held,  as  would  have  saved  at  least  an  en- 
tire year  of  campaign  and  battle  in  the  West. 
Unfortunately  this  great  advantage  was  not 
seized,  and  in  the  condition  of  affairs  could 
not  be ;  and  a  delay  of  a  fortnight  or  more  en- 
abled the  insurgents  to  renew  the  confidence 
and  gather  the  forces  to  establish  another  line 
farther  to  the  south,  and  again  to  interpose 
a  formidable  resistance.  One  cause  of  this 
inefficiency  and  delay  of  the  Union  com- 
manders may  be  easily  gleaned  from  the  dis- 
patches interchanged  by  them  within  a  few 
days  succeeding  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson, 
and  which,  aside  from  their  military  bearings, 
form  an  interesting  study  of  human  nature. 
General  Buell,  from  his  comfortable  head- 
quarters at  Louisville,  writes  (February  17, 
1862)  that  since  the  reinforcements  (Nel- 
son's division)  started  by  him  to  assist  at 
Fort  Donelson  are  no  longer  needed,  he  has 
ordered  them  back.  "  The  object  of  both  our 
forces,"  he  continues,  "  is,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, to  strike  at  the  power  of  the  rebellion 
in  its  most  vital  point  within  our  field.  Nash- 
ville appears  clearly,  I  think,  to  be  that  point." 
He  thought  further  that  heavy  reinforcements 
would  soon  be  thrown  into  it  by  the  rebels.  The 
leisurely  manner  in  which  he  expected  to  strike 
at  this  heart  of  the  rebellion  appears  from 
these  words,  in  the  same  letter : 
To  depend  on  wagons  at  this  season  for  a  large  force 
seems  out  of  the  question,  and  I  fear  it  may  be  two 
weeks  before  I  can  get  a  bridge  over  the  Barren  River, 
so  as  to  use  the  railroad  beyond.  I  shall  endeavor, 
however,  to  make  an  advance  in  less  or  much  force  be- 
fore that  time.    .    .    .    Let  me  hear  your  views. 
Halleck,  at  St.  Louis,  was  agitated  by  more 
rapid  emotions.  Watching  thedistant  and  dan- 
gerous campaign  under  Curtis  in  south-west- 
ern Missouri,  beginning  another  of  mingled 
hazard  and  brilliant  promise  under  Pope  on 
the  Mississippi,  beset  by  perplexities  of  local 
administration,  flushed  to  fever  heat  by  the 
unexpected  success  of  Grant,  his  mind  ran 
forward  eagerly  to  new  prospects.  "  I  am  not 
satisfied  with  present  success,"  he  telegraphed 
Sherman.  "We  must  now  prepare  for  a  still 
more  important  movement.  You  will  not  be 
forgotten  in  this."  But  this  preparation  seems, 
in  his  mind,  to  have  involved  something  more 
than  orders  from  himself. 
Before  he  received  the  news  of  the  surren- 
der of  Fort  Donelson  he  became  seriously 
alarmed  lest  the  rebels,  using  their  river  trans- 
portation, might  rapidly  concentrate,  attack 
Grant  in  the  rear,  crush  him  before  succor  could 
reach  him,  and,  returning  quickly,  be  as  ready 
as  before  to  confront  and  oppose  Buell.  Even 
after  the  surrender  Halleck  manifests  a  con- 
tinuing fear  that  some  indefinite  concentration 
will  take  place,  and  aquick  reprisal  be  executed 
by  a  formidable  expedition  against  Paducah 
or  Cairo.  His  overstrained  appeals  to  Buell 
for  help  do  not  seem  justified  in  the  full  light 
of  history.  An  undertone  of  suggestion  and 
demand  indicates  that  this  urgency,  ostensibly 
based  on  his  patriotic  eagerness  for  success, 
was  not  wholly  free  from  personal  ambition.