ABRAHAM  LIXCOLN. 
Mr.  Lincoln,  and  perhaps  more  liberal  on  the 
subject  of  slaverv  than  any  other  border  State 
representative.  He  entered  readily  into  Mr. 
1  incoln's  views  and  plans,  which  were  to  in- 
duce the  legislature  of  Delaware  to  pass  an 
g]  adual  emancipation  of  the  1798  slaves 
which  it  contained  by  the  census  of  i860,  on 
condition  that  the  United  States  would  pay  to 
Delaware,  to  be  distributed  among  its  slave 
owners  in  proper  ratio,  the  sum  of  $400  for 
each  slave,  or  a  total  of  $719,200. 
Mr.  1  .incoln  during  the  month  of  November 
had  with  his  own  hand  written  drafts  of  two 
separate  bills  embracing  the  principal  details 
of  the  scheme.  By  the  first,  all  negroes  in  Del- 
aware above  the  age  of  thirty-five  years  should 
become  free  on  the  passage  of  the  act;  all 
born  after  its  passage  should  remain  free ;  and 
all  others,  after  suitable  apprenticeship  for  chil- 
dren, should  become  free  in  the  year  1893; 
also,  that  the  State  should  meanwhile  prevent 
any  of  its  slaves  being  sold  into  servitude  else- 
where.1 The  provisions  of  the  second  draft 
were  slightly  different.  Lincoln's  manuscript 
explains : 
On  reflection  I  like  No.  2  the  better.  By  it  the 
nation  would  pay  the  State  §23,200  per  annum  for 
thirty-one  years.  All  born  after  the  passage  of  the 
act  would  be  born  free.  All  slaves  above  the  age  of 
thirty-five  years  would  become  free  on  the  passage 
of  the  act.  All  others  would  become  free  on  arriv- 
ing at  the  age  of  thirty-five  years  until  January, 
"  .  when  all  remaining  of  all  ages  would  become 
free,  -ubject  toapprenticeshipforminorsborn  ofslave 
mothers,  up  to  the  respective  ages  of  twenty-one 
and  eighteen.1 
Upon  consultation  with  the  President,  Mr. 
Fi.-her  undertook  to  propose  and  commend  the 
scheme  to  his  influential  party  friends  in  Dela- 
ware, and  if  possible  to  induce  the  legislature 
of  that  State  to  adopt  it. 
One  of  the  drafts  prepared  by  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  rewritten  by  the  friends  of  the  measure 
in  Delaware,  embodying  the  necessary  details 
to  give  it  proper  force  and  local  application 
to  become  a  law  of  that  State.  In  this  shape 
it  was  printed  and  circulated  among  the  mem- 
bers of  the  legislature,  then  holding  a  special 
n  al  Dover.  The  legislature  of  Delaware 
<t  a  large  body;  nine  members  of  the 
Senate  and  twenty-one  members  of  the  House 
"ituted  the  whole  number.  No  record  re- 
mains of  the  discussions,  formal  or  informal, 
which  the  proposition  called  forth.  The  final 
>n,  however,  indicates  the  sentiment  which 
prevailed.  The  friends  of  emancipation  prob- 
ably ascertained  that  a  hostile  majority  would 
62. 
1  Unpublished  MS. 
2  Delaware  Senate  Journal,  Special  Session,  1861- 
3  "Congressional  Globe,"  March  6,  1862,  p.    1102. 
vote  it  down,  and  therefore  the  laboriously 
prepared  bill  was  never  introduced.  The  pro- 
slavery  members,  unwilling  to  lose  the  oppor- 
tunity of  airing  their  conservatism,  immediately 
prepared  a  joint  resolution  reciting  the  bill  at 
full  length  and  then  loading  it  with  the  strong- 
est phrases  of  condemnation  which  their  party 
zeal  could  invent.  They  said  it  would  encour- 
age the  abolition  element  in  Congress;  that 
it  evinced  a  design  to  abolish  slavery  in  the 
States;  that  Congress  had  no  right  to  ap- 
propriate a  dollar  for  the  purchase  of  slaves ; 
that  they  were  unwilling  to  make  Delaware 
guarantee  the  public  faith  of  the  United 
States;  that  when  the  people  of  Delaware 
desired  to  abolish  slavery  within  her  borders 
they  would  do  so  in  their  own  way;  and  in- 
timated that  the  "  suggestions  of  saving  ex- 
pense to  the  people  "  were  a  bribe,  which  they 
scornfully  repelled.  A  majority  of  the  twrenty- 
one  members  of  the  House  passed  this  joint 
resolution ;  but  when  it  came  to  the  Senate,  on 
the  7  th  of  February,  four  of  its  nine  members 
voted  "aye,"  four  voted  "no,"  and  one  was 
silent  or  absent;  and  so  the  joint  resolution 
went  back  "non-concurred  in."2  This  seems 
to  have  closed  the  legislative  record  on  the 
subject. 
Mr.  Lincoln  was  doubtless  disappointed  at 
this  failure  to  give  his  plan  of  compensated 
gradual  abolishment  a  starting-point  by  the 
favorable  action  of  the  State  of  Delaware. 
But  he  did  not  abandon  the  project,  and  his 
next  step  was  to  bring  it,  through  Congress,  to 
the  attention  of  the  country  and  the  States  in- 
terested. On  the  6th  of  March  he  sent  to  the 
Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  a 
special  message,  recommending  the  adoption 
of  the  following  joint  resolution : 
Resolved,  That  the  United  States  ought  to  co- 
operate with  any  State  which  may  adopt  gradual 
abolishment  of  slavery,  giving  to  such  State  pecuni- 
ary aid,  to  be  used  by  such  State  in  its  discretion,  to 
compensate  for  the  inconveniences,  public  and  pri- 
vate, produced  by  such  change  of  system.3 
His  message  explained  that  this  was  merely 
the  proposal  of  practical  measures  which  he 
hoped  would  follow.    He  said  : 
The  point  is  not  that  all  the  States  tolerating 
slavery  would  very  soon,  if  at  all,  initiate  eman- 
cipation ;  but  that  while  the  offer  is  equally  made 
to  all,  the  more  northern  shall,  by  such  initiation, 
make  it  certain  to  the  more  southern  that  in  no 
event  will  the  former  ever  join  the  latter  in  their 
proposed  confederacy.  I  say  "  initiation  "  because, 
in  my  judgment,  gradual,  and  not  sudden,  emanci- 
pation is  better  for  all.  .  .  .  Such  a  proposition 
on  the  part  of  the  General  Government  sets  up  no 
claim  of  a  right  by  Federal  authority  to  interfere  with 
slavery  within  State  limits,  referring,  as  it  does, 
the  absolute  control  of  the  subject  in  each  case  to  the
FIRST  PLANS  FOR   EMANCIPATION. 
State  and  its  people  immediately  interested.  It  is 
proposed  as  a  matter  of  perfectly  free  choice  with 
them.  In  the  annual  message  last  December,  I  thought 
fit  to  say,  "The  Union  must  be  preserved;  and 
hence,  all  indispensable  means  must  be  employed." 
I  said  this,  not  hastily,  but  deliberately.  War  has 
been  made,  and  continues  to  be,  an  indispensable 
means  to  this  end.  A  practical  reacknowledgment 
of  the  national  authority  would  render  the  war  un- 
necessary, and  it  would  at  once  cease.  If,  however, 
resistance  continues,  the  war  must  also  continue  ; 
and  it  is  impossible  to  foresee  all  the  incidents  which 
may  attend  and  all  the  ruin  which  may  follow  it. 
Such  as  may  seem  indispensable,  or  may  obviously 
promise  great  efficiency  towards  ending  the  struggle, 
must  and  will  come.1 
To  this  public  recommendation  he  added 
some  cogent  reasons  in  private  letters  to  in- 
fluential persons.  Thus,  three  days  after  his 
message,  he  wrote  to  the  editor  of  "  The  New 
York  Times  "  : 
I  am  grateful  to  the  New  York  journals,  and  not 
less  so  to  "The  Times"  than  to  others,  for  their 
kind  notices  of  the  late  special  message  to  Congress. 
Your  paper,  however,  intimates  that  the  proposi- 
tion, though  well  intentioned,  must  fail  on  the  score 
of  expense.  I  do  hope  you  will  reconsider  this. 
Have  you  noticed  the  facts  that  less  than  one-half 
day's  cost  of  this  war  would  pay  for  all  the  slaves  in 
Delaware,  at  four  hundred  dollars  per  head? — that 
eighty-seven  days'  cost  of  this  war  would  pay  for  all 
in  Delaware,  Maryland,  District  of  Columbia,  Ken- 
tucky, and  Missouri  at  the  same  price?  Were  those 
States  to  take  the  steps,  do  you  doubt  that  it  would 
shorten  the  war  more  than  eighty-seven  days,  and 
thus  be  an  actual  saving  of  expense?  Please  look  at 
these  things,  and  consider  whether  there  should  not 
be  another  article  in  "The  Times."  2 
So  again,  to  Senator  McDougall,  who  was 
opposing  the  scheme  with  considerable  ear- 
nestness in  the  Senate,  he  wrote  privately  on 
March  14 : 
As  to  the  expensiveness  of  the  plan  of  gradual 
emancipation,  with  compensation,  proposed  in  the 
late  message,  please  allow  me  one  or  two  brief  sug- 
gestions. Less  than  one-half  day's  cost  of  the  war 
would  pay  for  all  the  slaves  in  Delaware  at  four  hun- 
dred dollars  per  head.    Thus  : 
All  the  slaves  in  Delaware  by  the  census  of  i860  are ....  1798 
$400 
Cost  of  slaves   $719,200 
One  day's  cost  of  the  war   $2,000,000 
Again,  less  than  eighty-seven  days'  cost  of  this 
war  would,  at  the  same  price,  pay  for  all  in  Dela- 
ware, Maryland,  District  of  Columbia,  Kentucky,  and 
Missouri.    Thus: 
Slaves  in  Delaware   1, 798 
"       "   Maryland   87,188 
"       "  District  of  Columbia   3>i8i 
"       "  Kentucky   225,490 
"       "  Missouri   114,965 
432,622 
$400 
Cost  of  slaves        $173,048,800 
Eighty-seven  days'  cost  of  the  war   $174,000,000 
Do  you  doubt  that  taking  the  initiatory  ste] 
the  part  of  those  States  and  this  District  would 
shorten  the  war  more  than  eighty-seven  days,  and 
thus  be  an  actual  saving  of  expense?  A  word  as  to 
the  time  and  manner  of  incurring  the  expense.  Sup- 
pose, for  instance,  a  State  devises  and  adopts 
tern  by  which  the  institution  absolutely  < 
therein  by  a  named  day  —  say  January  1,  1882. 
Then  let  the  sum  to  be  paid  to  such  Stite  by  the 
United  States  be  ascertained  by  taking  from  the  cen- 
sus of  i860  the  number  of  slaves  within  the  State, 
and  multiplying  that  number  by  four  hundred  — 
the  United  States  to  pay  such  sums  to  the  State  in 
twenty  equal  annual  installments,  in  six  per  cent. 
bonds  of  the  United  States.  The  sum  thus  given,  as 
to  time  and  manner,  I  think  would  not  be  half  as 
onerous  as  would  be  an  equal  sum  raised  now  for 
the  indefinite  prosecution  of  the  war ;  but  of  this 
you  can  judge  as  well  as  1.2 
It  was  between  the  dates  of  these  letters  that 
President  Lincoln  made  the  most  important 
personal  effort  to  secure  favorable  action  on 
his  project  of  gradual  abolishment.  At  his 
request  such  members  of  Congress  from  the 
border  slave-States  of  Delaware,  Maryland, 
[West]  Virginia,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri  as 
were  present  in  Washington  came  in  a  body 
to  the  Executive  Mansion  on  March  10,  where 
a  somewhat  lengthy  interview  and  discussion 
of  this  subject  ensued,  the  substance  of  which 
was  authentically  reported  by  them.  In  read- 
ing the  account  of  the  interview,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  Lincoln  was  addressing  the 
representatives  of  such  slave  States  as  had  re- 
mained loyal,  and  his  phrases  respecting  his 
attitude  and  intention  towards  slavery  were  not 
intended  by  him  to  apply  to  the  States  whose 
persistent  rebellion  had  forfeited  the  consid- 
eration and  rights  which  the  others  could 
justly  claim. 
In  explanation  of  his  message  the  President 
recited  to  the  assembled  border  State  mem- 
bers the  complications  and  embarrassments 
resulting  from  army  operations  among  loyal 
or  partly  loyal  communities,  and  the  irritating 
conflicts  of  opinion  produced  thereby  in  the 
Northern  States.  Disclaiming  any  intention  to 
injure  or  wound  the  loyal  slave  States,  and 
recognizing  that  the  right  of  emancipation  was 
exclusively  under  their  own  control,  he  had 
proposed  this  offer  in  good  faith — not  as  a 
threat,  but  as  the  shortest  and  easiest  wax- 
to  end  the  war  by  eliminating  its  cause  and 
motive. 
He  did  not  ask  an  immediate  answer,  but 
pressed  it  upon  their  serious  consideration,  and 
hoped  that  after  earnest  conference  and  inquiry 
their  views  of  duty  and  the  interests  of  their 
constituents  might  enable  them  to  accept  it 
1  "  Congressional  Globe,"  March  6,  1S02,  page 
1 102. 
2  Unpublished  MS.
550 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
voluntarily  and  in  the  same  patriotic  spirit  in 
which  it  was  made.1 
It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  his  audi- 
tors were  unable  to  give  him  affirmative  replies, 
or  even  remote  encouragement.  Representing 
slaveholding  constituencies,  their  natural  at- 
titude was  one  o\  unyielding  conservatism. 
Their  whole  tone  was  one  ot  doubt,  of  quali- 
fied protest,  and  ot  apprehensive  inquiry.  They 
had  not  tailed  to  note  that  in  his  annual  mes- 
of  December  3.  and  his  special  message 
of  March  6,  lie  had  announced  his  determina- 
tion to  use  all  "  indispensable  means  "  to  pre- 
serve the  Union,  and  had  hinted  that  necessity 
might  force  him  to  employ  extreme  measures; 
and  one  o\  them  asked  pointedly  "  if  the  Pres- 
ident looked  to  any  policy  beyond  the  accept- 
ance or  rejection  of  this  scheme."  His  answer 
was  frank  and  direct.  Mr.  Crisfield  of  Mary- 
land writes : 
The  President  replied  that  he  had  no  designs  be- 
vond  the  action  of  the  States  on  this  particular  sub- 
ject. He  should  lament  their  refusal  to  accept  it, 
but  he  had  no  designs  beyond  their  refusal  of  it. 
.  .  .  Unless  he  was  expelled  by  the  act  of  God  or  the 
Confederate  armies,  he  should  occupy  that  house  for 
three  years,  and  as  long  as  he  remained  there  Mary- 
land had  nothing  to  fear,  either  for  her  institutions  or 
her  interests,  on  the  points  referred  to.2 
The  day  on  which  this  interview  was  held, 
Roscoe  Conkling  introduced  into  the  House 
of  Representatives  the  exact  joint  resolution 
which  the  President  had  recommended  in  his 
message  of  the  6th,  and  debate  on  the  subject 
was  begun.    The  discussion  developed  a  wide 
1  An  extended  quotation  from  the  abstract  of  the 
Presi  lent's  remarks  as  written  out  by  Mr.  Crisfield, 
representative  from  Maryland,  will  be  read  with  inter- 
est :  "  After  the  usual  salutations  and  we  were  seated, 
the  President  said,  in  substance,  that  he  had  invited  us 
to  meet  him  to  have  some  conversation  with  us  in  ex- 
planation of  his  message  of  the  6th  ;  that  since  he  had 
sent  it  in,  several  of  the  gentlemen  then  present  had 
:  him,  but  had  avoided  any  allusion  to  the  mes- 
.  and  he  theretore  inferred  that  the  import  of  the 
ge  had  been  misunderstood,  and  was  regarded 
is  inimical  to  the  interests  we  represented;  and  he 
had  resolved  he  would  talk  with  us,  and  disabuse  our 
minds  of  that  erroneous  opinion.  The  President  then 
in i cut  to  injure  the  interests  or  wound 
the  sensibilities  of  the  slave  States.  On  the  contrary, 
his  purpose  was  to  protect  the  one  and  respect  the 
t  we  were  engaged  in  a  terrible,  wasting, 
and  tedious  war  ;  immense  armies  were  in  the  field, 
and  must  continue  in  the  field  as  long  as  the  war  lasts  ; 
that  these  armies  must,  of  necessity,  be  brought  into 
contact  with  slaves  in  'he  States  we  represented,  and  in 
other  Stat'  dvanced;  that  slaves  would  come  to 
the  camps,  and  continual  irritation  was  kept  up.  That  he 
mstantly  annoyed  by  conflicting  and  antagonis- 
implaints:  on  the  one  side,  a  certain  class  com- 
plained if  the  slave  was  not  protected  by  the  army  — 
re  frequently  found  who,  participating  in 
these  views,  acted  in  a  way  unfriendly  to  the  slave- 
holder ;  on  the  other  hand,  slaveholders  complained 
that  their  rights  were  interfered  with,  their  slaves  in- 
duced to  abscond  and  protected  within  the  lines.   These 
divergence  of  views  among  representatives. 
Moderate  Republicans  generally  supported  the 
resolution;  even  somewhat  extreme  antislavery 
men,  such  as  Lovejoy  in  the  House  and  Sum- 
ner in  the  Senate,  indicated  their  willingness 
to  join  in  the  liberal  compensation  the  Presi- 
dent had  proposed,  if  the  loyal  slave  States 
would  consent  to  relinquish  their  portion  of 
the  disturbing  and  dangerous  evil.  Since  it 
was  not  a  practical  measure,  but  simply  an 
announcement  of  policy,  the  opposition  was 
not  strenuous  ;  a  few  border  State  representa- 
tives and  the  more  obstinate  Democrats  from 
free  States  joined  in  a  somewhat  ill-natured 
dissent.  The  resolution  was  passed  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  (yeas,  89;  nays,  31).  The  action 
of  the  Senate  was  very  similar,  though  the 
debate  was  a  little  more  delayed.  The  resolu- 
tion was  passed  in  that  body  April  2  (yeas,  32; 
nays,  10),  and  received  the  President's  signa- 
ture on  the  10th  of  April,  1862. 
By  his  initiative  and  influence  Mr.  Lincoln 
thus  committed  the  executive  and  legislative 
departments  of  the  Government  to  the  policy 
of  compensated  emancipation ;  and  there  is  no 
doubt  that,  had  his  generous  offer  been  accepted 
by  the  border  States  within  a  reasonable  time, 
the  pledge  embodied  in  the  joint  resolution 
would  have  been  promptly  redeemed.  Though 
it  afterwards  turned  out  that  this  action  re- 
mained only  sentimental  and  prospective,  it 
nevertheless  had  no  inconsiderable  effect  in 
bringing  to  pass  a  very  important  practical 
measure. 
In  its  long  contest  for  political  supremacy, 
complaints  were  numerous,  loud,  and  deep ;  were  a 
serious  annoyanceto  him, and  embarrassing  tothe  prog- 
ress of  the  war  ;  that  it  kept  alive  a  spirit  hostile  to  the 
Government  in  the  States  we  represented ;  strength- 
ened the  hopes  of  the  Confederates  that  at  some  day 
the  border  States  would  unite  with  them  and  thus 
tend  to  prolong  the  war  ;  and  he  was  of  opinion,  if  this 
resolution  should  be  adopted  by  Congress  and  ac- 
cepted by  our  States,  these  causes  of  irritation  and  these 
hopes  would  be  removed,  and  more  would  be  accom- 
plished towards  shortening  the  war  than  could  be 
hoped  from  the  greatest  victory  achieved  by  Union  ar- 
mies. That  he  made  this  proposition  in  good  faith,  and 
desired  it  to  be  accepted,  if  at  all,  voluntarily,  and  in 
the  same  patriotic  spirit  in  which  it  was  made ;  that 
emancipation  was  a  subject  exclusively  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  States,  and  must  be  adopted  or  rejected  by 
each  for  itself;  that  he  did  not  claim,  nor  had  this  Gov- 
ernment, any  right  to  coerce  them  for  that  purpose ; 
that  such  was  no  part  of  his  purpose  in  making  this 
proposition,  and  he  wished  it  to  be  clearly  understood. 
That  he  did  not  expect  us  there  to  be  prepared  to  give 
him  an  answer,  but  he  hoped  we  would  take  the  subject 
into  serious  consideration,  confer  with  one  another, 
and  then  take  such  course  as  we  felt  our  duty  and  the 
interests  of  our  constituents  required  of  us."  There 
followed  after  this  much  informal  discussion,  also  re- 
ported in  brief  by  Mr.  Crisfield,  for  which  there  is  not 
room  in  this  note.  The  whole  will  be  found  in 
McPherson,  "  History  of  the  Rebellion,"  p.  210  el  seq. 
2  McPherson,  "History  of  the  Rebellion,"  p.  211.
FIRST  PLANS  FOR   EMANCIPATION. 
281 
slavery  had  clung  with  unyielding  tenacity  to 
its  foothold  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  where 
it  had  been  the  most  irritating  eyesore  to 
Northern  sentiment.  Whatever  might  be  con- 
ceded to  the  doctrine  of  State  sovereignty, 
antislavery  men  felt  that  the  peculiar  institu- 
tion had  no  claim  to  the  exclusive  shelter  of 
the  Federal  flag;  on  the  other  hand,  proslavery 
men  saw  that  to  relinquish  this  claim  would  be 
fatal  to  their  determination  to  push  it  to  a  na- 
tional recognition  and  existence.  Hence  the 
abolition  or  the  maintenance  of  slavery  in  the 
District  of  Columbia  had  become  a  frequent 
issue  in  party  politics.  The  prohibition  of  the 
slave  trade  in  the  District  was  indeed  effected  in 
the  great  compromise  of  1850;  but  this  conces- 
sion was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the 
proslavery  gains  of  that  political  bargain,  and 
since  then  the  abolition  of  slavery  itself  in  this 
central  Federal  jurisdiction  seemed  to  have 
become  impossible  until  rebellion  provoked  the 
change.  Under  the  new  conditions  antislavery 
zeal  was  pushing  its  lance  into  every  joint  of 
the  monster's  armor,  and  this  vulnerable  point 
was  not  overlooked.  The  Constitution  placed 
the  District  of  Columbia  exclusively  under  the 
legislation  of  Congress,  and  by  their  rebellious 
withdrawal  from  their  seats  in  the  two  houses 
the  Southern  members  and  senators  had  volun- 
tarily surrendered  this  citadel  of  their  propa- 
gandism. 
President  Lincoln  had  not  specifically  rec- 
ommended abolishment  in  the  District  in  his 
annual  message ;  but  he  had  introduced  a  bill 
for  such  a  purpose  when  he  was  a  member  of 
Congress  in  1849,  and  it  was  well  known  that 
his  views  had  undergone  no  change.  Later 
on,  the  already  recited  special  message  of 
March  6  embraced  the  subject  in  its  larger 
aspects  and  recommendations.  Thus,  with  per- 
fect knowledge  that  it  would  receive  executive 
sanction,  the  House  on  April  1 1  (yeas,  92 ; 
nays,  38)  and  the  Senate  on  April  3  (yeas,  29 ; 
nays,  14)  passed  an  act  of  immediate  emanci- 
pation of  the  slaves  in  the  District  of  Columbia, 
with  compensation  to  the  owners,  to  be  dis- 
tributed by  a  commission,  the  whole  not  to  ex- 
ceed an  aggregate  of  $300  per  slave.  The  act 
also  appropriated  the  sum  of  $100,000  for 
expenses  of  voluntary  emigration  to  Hayti  or 
Liberia. 
President  Lincoln  signed  the  act  on  the  16th 
of  April,  and  in  his  short  message  of  approval 
said: 
I  have  never  doubted  the  constitutional  author- 
ity of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  this  District ; 
and  I  have  ever  desired  to  see  the  National  capital 
freed  from  the  institution  in  some  satisfactory  way. 
Hence  there  has  never  been  in  my  mind  any  ques- 
tion upon  the  subject  except  the  one  of  expediency, 
arising  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances.  ...  I 
Vol.  XXXVII.— 39. 
am  gratified  that  the  two  principles  of  compensation 
and  colonization  are  both  recognized  and  practically 
applied  in  the  act.1 
Certain  omissions  in  the  law,  which  the  Presi- 
dent pointed  out,  were  remedied  by  supplement- 
ary enactments,  which  among  other  safeguards 
and  provisions  added  to  the  boon  of  freedom 
the  privilege  of  education  by  opening  public 
schools  to  colored  children. 
SIGNS    OF    THE    TIMES. 
Before  enough  time  had  elapsed  to  judge 
of  the  probable  effect  of  Lincoln's  offer  of 
compensation  to  the  border  States,  a  new 
incident  occurred  which  further  complicated 
the  President's  dealings  with  the  slavery  ques- 
tion. About  the  middle  of  May  he  was  sur- 
prised to  learn  from  the  newspapers  that 
General  David  Hunter,  whom  he  had  recently 
sent  to  command  the  Department  of  the  South, 
had  issued  an  order  of  military  emancipation. 
Reciting  that  the  Department  of  the  South 
was  under  martial  law,  the  order  declared, 
"  Slavery  and  martial  law  in  a  free  country 
are  altogether  incompatible.  The  persons  in 
these  three  States  —  Georgia,  Florida,  and 
South  Carolina  —  heretofore  held  as  slaves 
are  therefore  declared  free." 
So  far  as  can  be  judged,  General  Hunter 
was  moved  to  this  step  by  what  seemed  to 
him  the  requirements  of  his  new  surroundings 
and  the  simple  dictates  of  natural  justice.  He 
was  a  warm  personal  and  political  friend  of 
President  Lincoln,  was  entirely  free  from  mo- 
tives of  selfish  ambition,  and  was  not  a  man 
who  would  suffer  himself  to  be  made  the  instru- 
ment of  a  political  combination.  Of  strong 
antislavery  convictions,  his  duty  as  a  soldier  in 
the  service  of  the  Union  was  as  single-hearted 
and  as  sacred  as  that  of  a  crusader  sent  to  res- 
cue the  Holy  Sepulcher  from  the  Infidel.  In 
his  eyes  rebellion  and  slavery  were  intertwined 
abominations  to  be  struck  and  conquered 
simultaneously. 
When  he  took  command  of  the  Department 
of  the  South  he  found  himself  surrounded  by 
new  conditions.  The  capture  of  Port  Royal  in 
the  preceding  November  had  been  followed 
by  the  flight  of  the  whole  white  population, 
leaving  the  entire  coast  from  North  Edisto 
River  to  Warsaw  Sound,  a  distance  of  sixty  or 
seventy  miles,  in  the  hands  of  the  captors.  This 
was  the  region  of  the  famous  sea  island  cotton 
plantations,  in  which  the  slaves  outnumbered 
the  whites  nearly  five  to  one.  In  their  sudden 
flight  the  whites  were  compelled  to  abandon 
their  slaves  as  well  as  their  homes,  and  a  large 
negro  population  thus  fell  immediately  to  the 
care  and  protection  of  the  Union  arm}-. 
1  "  Congressional  Globe,"  April  16,  1S62.
Sj 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
The  exorcise  oi  common  humanity  forced 
the  military  administration  o(  the  department 
ad  mere  warlike  objects.  The  commander, 
v        era!    Thomas  W.  Sherman,  issued  an  ad- 
white  inhabitants,  inviting  them 
turn  and  reoccupy  their  lands  and  homes, 
and  continue  their  peaceful  vocations  under 
ces  and  protection  of  the  Government 
e   United  States.    Except  in  a  very  few 
rices  the  friendly  invitation  was  defiantly 
.  1.    They  not  only  preferred  ruin  and  exile, 
lid  such  mischief  as  lay  in  their  power  by 
ordering  their  cotton  to  be  burned  1  and  cir- 
culating among  the  blacks  the  statement  that 
the  Yankees  would  seize  them, send  them  away, 
sell  them  into  slavery  in  Cuba.    Such  was 
the  distrust  excited  by  the  falsehood,  that  a 
month   after  the  capture   of  Port  Royal  but 
about  320  blacks  had  ventured  into  Sherman's 
camps :  nearly  all  these  were  decrepit,  or  were 
women  and  children,  there  being  only  sixty 
able-bodied  men  among  them.2 
For  the  present  the  slaves  made  most  of 
their  abrupt  holiday.  But  their  scanty  clothing 
wore  out,  the  small  stock  of  provisions  on 
the  plantations  was  exhausted.  At  the  time 
of  their  masters'  flight  much  of  the  cotton 
crop  was  still  in  the  fields.  In  the  increasing 
demand  for  this  product  it  became  an  object 
for  the  Government  to  collect  and  preserve 
what  was  left;  and  this  work,  begun  under  the 
joint  orders  of  the  War  and  Treasury  depart- 
ments, set  on  foot  the  first  organization  of  the 
red  population  for  labor  and  government. 
Military  orders  divided  the  country  into  dis- 
tri<  ts,  with  agents  to  superintend  the  plantations, 
to  enroll  and  organize  the  blacks  into  working 
parties,  to  furnish  them  necessary  food  and 
clothing,  and  to  pay  them  for  their  labor. 
Private  philanthropy  also  gave  timely  and 
valuable  assistance.    Relief  societies,  organized 
in   Boston,  New  York,  and  Philadelphia,  col- 
lected funds  and  employed  teachers,  some  fifty 
of  whom  reached  Beaufort  the  9th  of  March, 
.   and   began   a   much-needed   work   of 
combined  encouragement,  guardianship,  and 
instruction,  thus  replacing  the  elements  of  so- 
cial government  which  the  slaves  had  lost  by 
the  withdrawal  of  their  masters  and  mistresses. 
The  control  of  the  captured  and  abandoned 
:i  and  other  property  fell  to  the  Treasury 
rtment,  and  in  this  connection  Secretary 
e,  at  the  President's  request,  gave  the  edu- 
oal   enterprise   his  official   sanction  and 
supervision;  later  on,  the  War  Department  as- 
sumed and  continued  the  work.     Compelled 
1  War  Records. 
2  T.  VV.  Sherman  to  Thomas,  Dec.    15,  1861.    War 
Records. 
3  T.  W.  Sherman  to  Adjutant-General,  Feb.  9,  1862. 
War  Record  •>. 
from  the  first  to  rely  upon  "  contrabands  "  for 
information  and  assistance,  and  to  a  large 
extent  for  military  labor,  it  gave  them  in  re- 
turn not  only  wages  for  the  actual  service  per- 
formed, but  necessary  food  and  shelter  for  the 
destitute,  and  with  the  return  of  the  spring 
season  furnished  them,  so  far  as  possible,  seed 
and  implements  of  husbandry,  and  encouraged 
them  to  renew  their  accustomed  labor  in  the 
gardens  and  fields  of  the  abandoned  planta- 
tions, in  order  to  provide  for,  or  at  least  con- 
tribute to,  their  own  maintenance.  Under  this 
treatment  confidence  was  quickly  established. 
In  two  months  the  number  of  blacks  within  the 
Union  lines  increased  from  320  to  over  9000.3 
When  General  Hunter  took  command  of 
the  Department  of  the  South,  this  industrial 
and  educational  organization  of  the  blacks 
was  just  beginning.  Military  usefulness  was 
of  the  first  importance  in  his  eyes,  particularly 
as  his  forces  were  insufficient  for  offensive 
movement.  It  was  not  unnatural  that,  seeing 
the  large  colored  population  within  his  lines, 
much  of  it  unemployed,  his  thoughts  should 
turn  to  the  idea  of  organizing,  arming,  and 
training  regiments  of  colored  soldiers ;  and  as- 
suming that  the  instructions  of  the  War  De- 
partment conferred  the  necessary  authority,  he 
began  the  experiment  without  delay.  It  was 
amid  all  these  conditions,  which  at  that  time 
did  not  exist  elsewhere,  that  General  Hunter 
issued  the  already  recited  order  announcing 
that  slavery  and  martial  law  were  incompatible, 
and  declaring  free'all  slaves  in  his  department. 
The  presence  of  the  Union  army  had  visibly 
created  a  new  order  of  things,  and  he  doubtless 
felt  it  a  simple  duty  to  proclaim  officially  what 
practically  had  come  to  pass. 
The  mails  from  the  Department  of  the  South 
could  only  come  by  sea;  hence  a  week  elapsed 
after  the  promulgation  of  Hunter's  order  before 
knowledge  of  it  came  to  the  President  through 
its  publication  in  the  New  York  newspapers. 
The  usual  acrimonious  comments  immediately 
followed :  radicals  approved  it,  Democrats  and 
conservatives  denounced  it;  and  the  President 
was  assailed  for  inaction  on  the  one  hand  and 
for  treachery  on  the  other.  Lincoln's  own 
judgment  of  the  act  was  definite  and  prompt. 
"  No  commanding  general  shall  do  such  a 
thing,  upon  my  responsibility,  without  consult- 
ing me,"  he  wrote  in  answer  to  a  note  from 
Chase,  who  wished  the  order  to  stand. 
Three  days  later  (May  19,  1862)  the  Pres- 
ident published  a  proclamation  reciting  that 
the  Government  had  no  knowledge  or  part  in 
the  issuing  of  Hunter's  order  of  emancipation, 
that  neither  Hunter  nor  any  other  person  had 
been  authorized  to  declare  free  the  slaves  of 
any  State,  and  that  his  order  in  that  respect 
was  altogether  void.  The  President  continued :
FIRST  PLANS   FOR   EMANCIPATION. 
I  further  make  it  known  that  whether  it  be  com- 
petent for  me,  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army 
and  Navy,  to  declare  the  slaves  of  any  State  or  States 
free,  and  whether  at  any  time,  in  any  case  it  shall 
have  become  a  necessity  indispensable  to  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Government  to  exercise  such  supposed 
power,  are  questions  which,  under  my  responsibility, 
I  reserve  to  myself,  and  which  I  cannot  feel  justified 
in  leaving  to  the  decision  of  commanders  in  the  field. 
These  are  totally  different  questions  from  those  of 
police  regulations  in  armies  and  camps. 
While  the  President  thus  drew  a  sharp  dis- 
tinction between  the  limited  authority  of  com- 
manders in  the  field  and  the  full  reservoir  of 
executive  powers  in  his  own  hands,  for  future 
contingencies,  he  utilized  the  occasion  for  a 
forcible  admonition  to  the  border  slave-States. 
Reminding  them  that  he  by  recommendation, 
and  Congress  by  joint  resolution,  had  made 
them  a  formal  tender  and  pledge  of  payment 
for  their  slaves  if  they  would  voluntarily  abol- 
ish the  institution,  he  counseled  them  in  words 
of  parental  wisdom  and  affection  not  to  neglect 
tnis  opportunity  of  financial  security  to  them- 
selves and  patriotic  benefit  to  their  country. 
He  said : 
To  the  people  of  those  States  I  now  earnestly  ap- 
peal. I  do  not  argue;  I  beseech  you  to  make  the 
arguments  for  yourselves.  You  cannot,  if  you  would, 
be  blind  to  the  signs  of  the  times.  I  beg  of  you 
a  calm  and  enlarged  consideration  of  them,  ranging, 
if  it  may  be,  far  above  personal  and  partisan  politics. 
This  proposal  makes  common  cause  for  a  common 
object,  casting  no  reproaches  upon  any.  It  acts  not 
the  Pharisee.  The  changes  it  contemplates  would 
come  gently  as  the  dews  of  heaven  —  not  rending 
or  wrecking  anything.  Will  you  not  embrace  it? 
So  much  good  has  not  been  done  by  one  effort  in 
all  past  times  as,  in  the  providence  of  God,  it  is 
now  your  high  privilege  to  do.  May  the  vast  future 
not  have  to  lament  that  you  have  neglected  it.1 
The  "  signs  of  the  times  "  were  indeed  mul- 
tiplying to  a  degree  that  ought  to  have  at- 
tracted the  notice  of  the  border  States,  even 
without  the  pointing  finger  of  the  President. 
How  far  the  presence  of  the  Confederate  ar- 
mies, embodying  a  compact  proslavery  sen- 
timent, had  up  to  that  time  interfered  locally 
with  the  relations  of  master  and  slave  we 
have  no  means  of  knowing ;  we  do  know  that 
before  the  end  of  the  rebellion  the  conditions 
of  war — military  necessity — brought  even  the 
rebel  Government  and  the  unconquered  slave 
communities  to  the  verge  of  emancipation  and 
the  general  military  employment  of  the  blacks. 
But  Northern  armies,  embodying  a  compact 
antislavery  sentiment,  stationed  or  moving  in 
slave  communities,  acted  on  the  "  institution  " 
as  a  disturbing,  relaxing,  and  disintegrating 
force,  constant  in  operation,  which  no  vigilance 
1  Proclamation,  May  19,  1862. 
2  The  first  session  of  the  Thirty-seventh  Congress 
could  shut  out  and  no  regulations  could 
edy.  Whether  in  Kentucky  or  Virginia, 
souri  or  Mississippi,  the  slave  gave  the  Union 
soldiers  his  sympathy  and  his  help;  while  for 
services  rendered,  and  still  more  for  services 
expected,  the  soldiers  returned  friendship  and 
protection,  finding  no  end  of  pretexts  to  evade 
any  general  orders  to  the  contrary. 
From  the  army  this  feeling  communicated 
itself  sometimes  directly  to  Congress,  sometimes 
to  the  soldier's  Northern  home,  from  which  it 
was  in  turn  reflected  upon  that  body.  The 
antislavery  feeling  at  the  North,  excited  by 
the  ten-years'  political  contention,  intensified 
by  the  outbreak  of  rebellion,  was  thus  fed  and 
stimulated,  and  grew  with  every  day's  duration 
of  the  war.  Conservative  opinion  could  not 
defend  a  system  that  had  wrought  the  convul- 
sion and  disaster  through  which  the  nation 
was  struggling.  Radical  opinion  lost  no  op- 
portunity to  denounce  it  and  attack  its  vulner- 
able points. 
Of  the  operations  of  this  sentiment  the  de- 
bates and  enactments  of  Congress  afford  an 
approximate  measure.  During  the  long  session 
from  December  2,  1861,  to  July  17,  1862,  the 
subject  seemed  to  touch  every  topic  at  some 
point,while  the  affirmative  propositions  of  which 
slavery  was  the  central  and  vital  object  were 
of  themselves  sufficiently  numerous  to  absorb 
a  large  share  of  the  discussions.  Leaving  out 
of  view  the  many  resolutions  and  bills  which 
received  only  passing  attention,  or  which  were 
at  once  rejected,  this  second  session2  of  the 
Thirty-seventh  Congress  perfected  and  en- 
acted a  series  of  antislavery  measures  which 
amounted  to  a  complete  reversal  of  the  policy 
of  the  General  Government.  At  the  date  of  the 
President's  proclamation  quoted  above  calling 
attention  to  the  "  signs  of  the  times,"  only  a 
portion  of  these  measures  had  reached  final  en- 
actment; but  the  drift  and  portent  of  their 
coming  was  unmistakable.  In  the  restricted 
limits  of  these  pages  it  is  impossible  to  pass 
them  in  review  separately  or  chronologically : 
nor  does  the  date  of  their  passage  and  ap- 
proval always  indicate  the  relation  in  which 
they  engrossed  the  attention  of  Congress.  The 
consideration  of  the  general  subject  was,  we 
may  almost  say,  continuous,  and  the  reader 
will  obtain  a  better  idea  of  their  cumulative 
force  and  value  from  a  generalized  abstract. 
showing  the  importance  and  scope  of  the  sev- 
eral acts  and  sections  as  related  to  each  other. 
First  One  of  the  earliest  forms  of  the  dis- 
cussion arose  upon  the  constantly  recurring 
question  of  returning  to  slave-owners  such  run- 
aways as  sought  the  protection  of  the  Union 
camps,  and  regarding  which  various  command- 
was  the  special  session  held  in  July  and  August,  1S01. 
under  President  Lincoln's  proclamation.
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
a   ed  such  different  and  contradic- 
rders.   It  has  already  been  stated  that  the 
adent  left  his  officers  full  discretion  on  this 
se  it  fell  properly  within .the  neces- 
3   of  camp  and  police  regulations.    The 
somewhat  harsh  and  arbitrary  order  No.  3,  is- 
sued by  General  Halleckin  Missouri, provoked 
widespread    comment    and  indignation;    and 
gh  the  general  insisted  that  the  spirit  of 
rder  was  purely  military,  and  not  political, 
it  undoubtedly  hastened  and  intensified  con- 
:  action.    By  an  act  approved  March 
1  ;.  1862,  a  new  article  of  war  was  added  to 
the  army  regulations,  which  enjoined,  under 
usual  penalties,  that  "  All  officers  or  persons 
in  the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  United 
-  are  prohibited  from  employing  any  of 
the  forces  under  their  respective  commands  for 
the  purpose  of  returning  fugitives  from  service 
or  labor  who  may  have  escaped,"  etc.    Later, 
ion  10  of  the  Confiscation  Act 1  was  virtu- 
ally an  amendment  of  the  fugitive-slave  law; 
providing  that  the  claimant  might  not  use  its 
authority  until  he  had  taken  an  oath  of  alle- 
giance, and  prohibiting  any  person  in  the  army 
or  navy  from  surrendering  a  fugitive  slave,  or 
presuming  to  decide  the  validity  of  the  owner's 
claim. 
Second.   Xo  less  to  fulfill  the  dictates  of  pro- 
priety and  justice  than  for  its  salutary  influence 
on  the  opinion  of  foreign  nations,  the  annual 
age  of  the  President  had  recommended 
a  recognition  of  the  independence  and  sover- 
eignty of  Hayti  and  Liberia,  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  diplomatic  representatives  to   those 
new  states.    This  was  duly  authorized  by  an 
act  approved  June  5,  1862.     Similar  reasons 
also  secured  the  passage  of  "An  act  to  carry 
into    effect   the    treaty   between    the    United 
States  and  her  Britannic  Majesty  for  the  sup- 
ion  of  the  African  slave-trade,"  approved 
July  1 1,  1862.  That  this  action  betokened  more 
than  mere  hollow  profession  and  sentiment  is 
evinced  by  the  fact  that  under  the  prosecution 
of  the  Government,  the  slave-trader  Nathaniel 
1'.  Gordon  was  convicted  and  hanged  in  New 
York  on  the  2Tst  of  February,  1862,  this  being 
the  first  execution  for  this  offense  under  the 
nited  States,  after  their  enforce- 
ment had  been  neglected  and  their  extreme 
Ity  defied   for  forty  years. 
'///tit/.  'J  he  third   marked   feature   of  con- 
!     antislavery    enactment    was    one 
riod  of  peace,  would  have  signal- 
ized the  culmination  of  a  great  party  triumph 
and  taken  its  place  as  a  distinctive  political 
landmark.    Xow,  however,  in  the  clash  and 
turmoil  of  war  it  was  disposed  of,  not  so  much 
in  the  light  of  a  present  party  conquest,  as  the 
simple  necessary  registration  of  accomplished 
1  Approved  July  17,  1862. 
facts,  wrought  beyond  recall  by  passing  events, 
recognized  by  public  opinion,  and  requiring 
only  the  formality  of  parliamentary  attestation. 
Its  title  was,  "  An  act  to  secure  freedom  to  all 
persons  within  territories  of  the  United  States," 
approved  June  19,  1862.  This  was  the  reali- 
zation of  the  purpose  which  had  called  the 
Republican  party  into  being,  namely,  the  res- 
toration of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  its  ex- 
tension and  application  to  all  Territories  of  the 
United  States,  and  as  a  logical  result  the  re- 
jection and  condemnation  of  the  proslavery 
doctrines  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  the  de- 
mand for  a  congressional  slave  code,  and  the 
subversive  "property  theory""  of  Jefferson 
Davis.  These  were  the  issues  which  had  caused 
the  six-years'  political  contention  between  the 
North  and  the  South;  and  upon  its  defeat  at 
the  ballot-box  by  the  election  of  President 
Lincoln,  the  South  had  appealed  to  the  sword. 
Fourth.  Still  advancing  another  step  in  the 
prevalent  antislavery  progress,  we  come  to  the 
policy  of  compensated  emancipation  so  stren- 
uously urged  by  the  President.  Action  on  this 
point  has  already  been  described,  namely,  the 
joint  resolution  of  Congress,  approved  April 
10,  1862,  virtually  pledging  the  aid  of  the 
Government  to  any  State  which  would  adopt 
it,  and  the  act,  approved  April  16,  1862,  with 
its  amendments,  actually  abolishing  slavery  in 
the  District  of  Columbia,  with  compensation  to 
owners.  The  earnestness  of  Congress  in  this 
reform  is  marked  by  the  additional  step  that 
under  acts  approved  May  21  and  July  n, 
1862,  certain  provisions  were  made  for  the 
education  of  colored  children  in  the  cities 
of  Washington  and  Georgetown,  District  of 
Columbia. 
Fifth.  By  far  the  most  important  of  all  the 
antislavery  laws  of  this  period,  both  in  scope 
and  purpose,  was  a  new  Confiscation  Act,  per- 
fected after  much  deliberation,  passed  at  the 
close  of  the  session,  and  approved  by  the  Presi- 
dent July  17,  1862.  The  act  of  August  6, 
1 86 1,  only  went  to  the  extent  of  making  free 
the  slaves  actually  employed  in  rebel  military 
service.  The  new  law  undertook  to  deal  more 
generally  with  the  subject,  and  indeed  extended 
its  provisions  somewhat  beyond  the  mere  idea 
of  confiscation.  While  other  subjects  were  in- 
cluded, its  spirit  and  object  would  have  been 
better  expressed  by  the  title  of  "An  act  to  de- 
stroy slavery  under  the  powers  of  war."  In  ad- 
dition to  other  and  usual  penalties  for  treason 
or  rebellion,  it  declared  that  slaves  of  persons 
guilty  and  convicted  of  these  crimes  should  be 
made  free  ;  that  slaves  of  rebels  escaping  and 
taking  refuge  within  the  army  lines,  slaves 
captured  from  rebels  or  deserted  by  them  and 
coming  under  the  control  of  the  United  States 
Government,  and  slaves  of  rebels  found  in
FIRST  PLANS  FOR   EMANCJPA  WON. 
2% 
any  place  occupied  by  rebel  forces  and  after-    stantial  objection,  in  this.    It  is  startling  to  say  that 
wards  occupied  by  the  Union  army,  should  all    Congress  can  free  a  slave  within  a  State,  and  yet  if 
be  deemed  captives  of  war  and  be  forever  free. 
Sixth.  Coupled  with  the  foregoing  sweeping 
provisions,  intended  to  destroy  title  in  slave 
property  as  a  punishment  for  treason  and  re- 
bellion, were  other  provisions,  which,  under 
guarded  phraseology,  looked  to  the  active  or- 
ganized employment  of  slaves  as  a  substantial 
military  force  —  which  military  service  should 
in  its  turn  also,  in  specified  cases,  work  en- 
franchisement from  bondage.  Thus,  in  certain 
amendments  of  the  militia  laws1  it  was  enacted 
that  the  President  might  enroll  and  employ 
contrabands  in  such  camp  labor  or  military 
service  as  they  were  fitted  for,  and  that  their 
wives,  mothers,  and  children,  if  they  belonged 
to  armed  rebels,  should  become  free  by  vir- 
tue of  such  service.  Section  1 1  of  the  Con- 
fiscation Act,  however,  conferred  a  still  broader 
authority  upon  the  Government  for  this  object. 
It  provided: 
That  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  au- 
thorized to  employ  as  many  persons  of  African 
descent  as  he  may  deem  necessary  and  proper  for  the 
suppression  of  this  rebellion,  and  for  this  purpose 
he  may  organize  and  use  them  in  such  manner  as 
he  may  judge  best  for  the  public  welfare. 
This  section  allowed  a  latitude  of  construc- 
tion which  permitted  the  organization  of  a  few 
of  the  earliest  regiments  of  colored  soldiers. 
In  tracing  the  antislavery  policy  of  Presi- 
it  were  said  the  ownership  oi  the  I  first 
been  transferred  to  the  nation,  and  thai 
had  then  liberated  him,  the  difficulty  would  at  once 
vanish.  And  this  is  the  real  case.  The  traitor 
against  the  General  Government  forfeits  his  slave  at 
least  as  justly  as  he  does  any  other  property  ;  and 
he  forfeits  both  to  the  Government  against  which 
he  offends.  The  Government,  so  far  as  there  can 
be  ownership,  thus  owns  the  forfeited  slaves,  and  the 
question  for  Congress  in  regard  to  them  is,  ''Shall 
they  be  made  free  or  be  sold  to  new  masters  ?  "  I 
perceive  no  objection  to  Congress  deciding  in  ad- 
vance that  they  shall  be  free.  To  the  high  honor 
of  Kentucky,  as  I  am  informed,  she  has  been  the 
owner  of  some  slaves  by  escheat,  and  has  sold  none, 
but  liberated  all.  I  hope  the  same  is  true  of  some 
other  States.  Indeed,  I  do  not  believe  it  would  be 
physically  possible  for  the  Geneial  Government  to 
return  persons  so  circumstanced  to  actual  slavery. 
I  believe  there  would  be  physical  resistance  to  it 
which  could  neither  be  turned  aside  by  argument 
nor  driven  away  by  force.  In  this  view  I  have  no 
objection  to  this  feature  of  the  bill.  .  .  .  The 
eleventh  section  simply  assumes  to  confer  discretion- 
ary power  upon  the  Executive.  Without  the  law.  I 
have  no  hesitation  to  go  as  far  in  the  direction  in- 
dicated as  I  may  at  any  time  deem  expedient.  And 
I  am  ready  to  say  now,  I  think  it  is  proper  for  our 
military  commanders  to  employ,  as  laborers,  as  many 
persons  of  African  descent  as  can  be  used  to  advan- 
tage.2 
The  number  and  variety  of  antislavery  pro- 
visions cited  above  show  how  vulnerable  was 
the  peculiar  institution  in  a  state  of  war,  and 
dent  Lincoln,  his  opinions  upon  some  of  the  demonstrate  again  the  folly  and  madness  of 
prominent  features  of  these  laws  become  of  the  slaveholders'  appeal  to  arms.  All  the  pen- 
special  interest.  He  followed  the  discussion  alties  therein  prescribed  were  clearly  justi- 
and  perfecting  of  the  Confiscation  Act  with  fiable  by  the  war  powers  of  the  nation  and 
careful  attention,  and  as  it  neared  its  passage  sustained  by  military  necessity.  So  far  the  laws 
prepared  a  veto  message,  pointing  out  several  had  not  touched  a  single  right  of  a  loyal  slave- 
serious  defects,  which  Congress  hastily  reme-  holder  in  a  slave  State,  either  within  or  with- 
died  in  anticipation  by  an  explanatory  joint  out  the  territory  held  by  Confederate  arms; 
resolution.  When  the  bill  and  resolution  were  but  day  by  day  it  became  manifest  that  the 
submitted  to  him  he  signed  both,  as  being  sub-  whole  slave  system  was  so  ramified  and  inter- 
stantially  a  single  act,  and,  to  place  himself  twined  with  political  and  social  conditions  in 
right  upon  the  record,  transmitted  with  his  slave  States,  both  loyal  and  disloyal,  that  it 
notice  of  approval  a  copy  of  the  draft  of  his  must  eventually  stand  or  fall  in  mass.  In  short, 
intended  veto  message.  The  constitutional  the  proof  was  more  absolute  in  war  than  in 
objection  and  the  imperfections  of  detail  in  the  peace  that  slavery  was  purely  the  creature  of 
original  bill  do  not  require  mention  here,  but  positive  law  in  theory,  and  of  universal  police 
his  views  on  emancipation  and  military  em-  regulations  unremittingly  enforced  in  practice. 
ployment  of  slaves  may  not  be  omitted. 
There  is  much  in  the  bill  to  which  I  perceive  no 
objection.  It  is  wholly  prospective  ;  and  it  touches 
neither  person  nor  property  of  any  loyal  citizen,  in 
which  particular  it  is  just  and  proper.  .  .  .  It  is 
also  provided  that  the  slaves  of  persons  convicted 
under  these  sections  shall  be  free.  I  think  there  is 
an  unfortunate  form  of  expression,  rather  than  a  sub- 
It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  discussion 
and  enactment  of  these  measures  proceeded 
without  decided  opposition.  The  three  tac- 
tions of  which  Congress  was  composed  main- 
tained the  same  relative  position  on  these  topics 
that  they  had  occupied  since  the  beginning 
of  the  rebellion.  The  bulk  of  the  resistance 
was  furnished  by  the  Democratic  members. 
1  An  act  to  amend  the  act  calling  forth  the  militia  to     the  acts  amendatory  thereof,  and  for  other  purposes, 
execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrections,     approved  July  17,  1862,  sections  12  and  1 ;. 
and  repel  invasions,  approved  February  28,  1795,  and         -  Senate  Journal,  July  17,  1S62,  pp.  872,  873.
a  86 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
who,  while  as  a  rule  they  condemned  the  re- 
bellion, reiterated  their  previous  accusations 
that  the  Republican  party  had  provoked  it. 
Now  again  at  every  antislavery  proposition, 
no  matter  how  necessary  or  justifiable,  they 
charged  that  it  was  a  violation  of  express  or 
implied  political  faith,  and  a  stumbling-block  to 
iciliation,  which,  against  the  plainest  evi- 
hey  assumed  to  be  still  possible.  In  a 
hopeless  minority,  and  with  no  chance  to  affect 
legislation  affirmatively  even  by  indirection, 
they  yet  maintained  the  attitude  of  an  ill-na- 
tured opposition,  yielding  assent  only  to  the 
ss  ry  war  measures,  while  with  so- 
phistical and  irritating  criticism  they  were  in- 
dustriously undermining  public  confidence  in 
the  President  and  his  adherents  by  every  party 
and  parliamentary  device  they  could  invent. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  this  action  of  the 
Democrats  in  Congress,  in  addition  to  its  other 
pernicious  effects,  served  to  render  the  border- 
State  delegations  more  stubborn  and  intractable 
against  making  any  concessions  towards  the  lib- 
eral and  reformatory  policy  which  President 
Lincoln  so  strongly  urged.  The  statesmen  and 
politicians  of  the  border  slave-States  were  quick 
enough  to  perceive  the  danger  to  their  whole 
slave  system,  but  not  resolute  enough  to  pre- 
pare to  meet  and  endure  its  removal,  and  ac- 
cept a  money  equivalent  in  exchange.  Against 
evidence  and  conviction  they  clung  tenaciously 
to  the  idea  that  the  war  ought  to  be  prosecuted 
without  damage  to  slavery;  and  their  repre- 
sentatives and  senators  in  Congress,  with  a 
very  few  brave  exceptions,  resisted  from  first 
to  last  all  antislavery  enactments.  We  may 
admit  that  in  this  course  they  represented  truly 
the  majority  feeling  and  will  of  their  several 
constituencies;  but  such  an  admission  is  fatal 
to  any  claim  on  their  part  to  political  foresight 
or  leadership.  Indeed,  one  of  the  noticeable 
and  lamentable  features  of  the  earlier  stages 
of  the  rebellion  was  the  sudden  loss  of  power 
among  border-State  leaders,  both  at  home 
and  in  Congress.  We  can  now  see  that  their 
weakness  resulted  unavoidably  from  their  de- 
ion.  During  the  secession  stage 
only  ventured  to  act  defensively  against 
that  initial  heresy,  and  as  a  rule  the  offensive 
and  unscrupulous  conspirators  kept  the  advan- 
.  e  initiative.  Now  in  the  new 
stage  of  antislavery  reaction  they  were  again 
merely  on  the  defensive  and  under  the  disad- 
vantage which  that  attitude  always  brings  with 
it.  Jn  Congress,  as  a  faction,  they  were  sadly 
diminished  in  numbers  and  shorn  of  personal 
prestige.  They  could  count  only  a  single  con- 
spicuous representative  —  the  venerable  John 
J.  Crittenden;  but  burdened  with  the  weight 
of  years,  and  hedged  by  the  tangles  and  pitfalls 
of  his  conservative  obligations,  he  was  timid, 
spiritless,  despondent.  The  record  of  the  bor- 
der-State delegations,  therefore,  during  this 
strong  antislavery  movement  of  congressional 
enactment  is  simply  one  of  protests,  excuses, 
appeals,  and  direful  prophecies. 
Against  them  the  positive  affirmative  prog- 
ress of  antislavery  sentiment  gathered  force 
and  volume  from  every  quarter.  Whatever 
the  momentary  or  individual  outcry,"  it  was 
easy  to  perceive  that  every  antislavery  speech, 
resolution,  vote,  or  law  received  quick  sustain- 
ing acceptance  from  public  sentiment  in  the 
North  and  from  the  fighting  Union  armies  in 
the  South.  The  Republican  majority  in  Con- 
gress noted  and  responded  to  these  symptoms 
of  approval,  and  the  radical  leaders  in  that 
body  were  constantly  prompted  by  them  to 
more  advanced  demands  and  votes.  Anti- 
slavery  opinion  in  Congress  not  only  had  the 
advantage  of  overpowering  numbers,  but  also 
of  conspicuous  ability.  A  high  average  talent 
marked  the  Republican  membership,  which,  as 
a  rule,  spoke  and  voted  for  the  before-men- 
tioned antislavery  measures ;  while  among 
those  whose  zeal  gave  them  especial  promi- 
nence in  these  debates,  the  names  of  Charles 
Sumner  in  the  Senate  and  of  Thaddeus  Ste- 
vens and  Owen  Lovejoy  in  the  House  need 
only  be  mentioned  to  show  what  high  quali- 
ties of  zeal  and  talent  pursued  the  peculiar  in- 
stitution with  unrelenting  warfare. 
To  the  rebellious  South,  to  the  loyal  popu- 
lation of  the  border  slave-States,  and  to  the 
extreme  conservatism  of  the  North,  particularly 
that  faction  represented  by  Democratic  mem- 
bers of  Congress,  President  Lincoln's  proposal 
of  gradual  compensated  abolishment  doubtless 
seemed  a  remarkable  if  not  a  dangerous  inno- 
vation upon  the  practical  politics  of  half  a 
century.  But  this  conservatism  failed  to  com- 
prehend the  mighty  sweep  and  power  of  the 
revolution  of  opinion  which  slavery  had  put  in 
motion  by  its  needless  appeal  to  arms.  In  point 
of  fact,  the  President  stood  sagaciously  mid- 
way between  headlong  reform  and  blind  reac- 
tion. His  steady,  cautious  direction  and  control 
of  the  average  public  sentiment  of  the  country 
alike  held  back  rash  experiment  and  spurred 
lagging  opinion.  Congress,  with  a  strong  Re- 
publican majority  in  both  branches,  was  stirred 
by  hot  debate  on  the  new  issues.  The  indirect 
influence  of  the  Executive  was  much  greater 
than  in  times  of  peace :  a  reckless  President 
could  have  done  infinite  damage  to  the  deli- 
cate structure  of  constitutional  government. 
As  it  was,  antislavery  resentment  was  restrained 
and  confined  to  such  changes  of  legislation  as 
were  plainly  necessary  to  vindicate  the  Consti- 
tution, laws,  and  traditions  which  the  rebellion 
had  wantonly  violated;  but  these  were  suffi- 
ciently numerous  and  pointed  to  mark  a  pro-
FIRST  PLANS  FOR   EMANCJJ'ATfON. 
found  transformation  of  public  policy  in  little 
more  than  a  year.  Under  the  occasion  and  spur 
which  the  rebellion  furnished,  a  twelvemonth 
wrought  that  which  had  not  been  dreamed  of 
in  a  decade,  or  which  would  otherwise  have 
been  scarcely  possible  to  achieve  in  a  century. 
Four  months  had  now  elapsed  since  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  proposed  and  Congress  sanctioned 
the  policy  of  compensated  emancipation  in  the 
border  slave-States.  Except  in  its  indirect  in- 
fluence upon  public  opinion,  no  definite  result 
had  as  yet  attended  the  proposal.  Great  fluc- 
tuations had  occurred  in  the  war  and  great 
strides  had  been  made  in  legislation ;  but  the 
tendency  so  far  had  been  rather  to  complicate 
than  simplify  the  political  situation,  to  exas- 
perate rather  than  appease  contending  factions 
and  conflicting  opinions.  This  condition  of 
things,  while  it  might  have  endured  for  a  while, 
could  not  prolong  itself  indefinitely.  Little  by 
little  the  war  was  draining  the  lifeblood  of  the 
republic.  However  effectually  the  smoke  and 
dust  of  the  conflict  might  shut  the  view  from 
the  general  eye,  or  however  flippantly  small 
politicians  might  hide  the  question  under  the 
heat  and  invective  of  factional  quarrel,  Presi- 
dent Lincoln,  looking  to  the  future,  saw  that, 
to  replenish  the  waste  of  armies  and  maintain 
a  compact  popular  support,  the  North  must  be 
united  in  a  sentiment  and  policy  affording  a 
plain,  practical  aim  and  solution,  both  political 
and  military.  The  policy  he  decided  upon  was 
not  yet  ripe  for  announcement,  but  the  time 
had  arrived  to  prepare  the  way  for  its  avowal 
and  acceptance.  As  the  next  proper  step  in 
such  a  preparation,  the  President,  on  the  12th 
of  July,  1862,  again  convened  the  border-State 
delegations  at  the  Executive  Mansion,  and  read 
to  them  the  following  carefully  prepared  second 
appeal  to  accept  compensation  for  slaves  in 
their  respective  States  : 
Gentlemen  :  After  the  adjournment  of  Congress, 
now  near,  I  shall  have  no  opportunity  of  seeing  you 
for  several  months.  Believing  that  you  of  the  border 
States  hold  more  power  for  good  than  any  other 
equal  number  of  members,  I  feel  it  a  duty  which  I 
cannot  justifiably  waive  to  make  this  appeal  to  you. 
I  intend  no  reproach  or  complaint  when  I  assure 
you  that,  in  my  opinion,  if  you  all  had  voted  for 
the  resolution  in  the  gradual  emancipation  message 
of  last  March  the  war  would  now  be  substantially 
ended.  And  the  plan  therein  proposed  is  one  of  the 
most  potent  and  swift  means  of  ending  it.  Let  the 
States  which  are  in  rebellion  see  definitely  and  cer- 
tainly that  in  no  event  will  the  States  you  represent 
ever  join  their  proposed  confederacy,  and  they  can- 
not much  longer  maintain  the  contest.  But  you 
cannot  divest  them  of  their  hope  to  ultimately  have 
you  with  them  so  long  as  you  show  a  determination 
to  perpetuate  the  institution  within  your  own  States. 
Beat  them  at  elections,  as  you  have  overwhelmingly 
done,  and,  nothing  daunted,  they  still  claim  you  as 
their  own.    You  and  I  know  what  the  lever  of  their 
power  is.  Break  that  lever  before  their  faces,  and 
they  can  shake  you  no  more  forever.  Most  of  you 
have  treated  me  with  kindness  and  consideration, 
and  I  trust  you  will  not  now  think  I  improperly 
touch  what  is  exclusively  your  own  when,  for  the 
sake  of  the  whole  country,  I  ask,  "Can  you.  for 
your  States,  do  better  than  to  take  the  coui 
Discarding  punctilios  and  maxims  adapted  to  more 
manageable  times,  and  looking  only  to  the  Ml] 
dentedly  stern  facts  of  our  case,  can  you  do 
in  any  possible  event  ?  You  prefer  that  the  consti- 
tutional relation  of  the  States  to  the  nation  shall  be 
practically  restored  without  disturbance  of  the  insti- 
tution ;  and  if  this  were  done,  my  whole  duty,  in 
this  respect,  under  the  Constitution  and  my  oath  of 
office,  would  be  performed.  But  it  is  not  done,  and 
we  are  trying  to  accomplish  it  by  war.  The  inci- 
dents of  the  war  cannot  be  avoided.  If  the  war 
continues  long,  as  it  must  if  the  object  be  not  sooner 
attained,  the  institution  in  your  States  will  be  ex- 
tinguished by  mere  friction  and  abrasion  —  by  the 
mere  incidents  of  the  war.  It  will  be  gone,  and  you 
will  have  nothing  valuable  in  lieu  of  it.  Much  of 
its  value  is  gone  already.  How  much  better  for  you 
and  for  your  people  to  take  the  step  which  at  once 
shortens  the  war,  and  secures  substantial  compensa- 
tion for  that  which  is  sure  to  be  wholly  lost  in  any 
other  event.  How  much  better  to  thus  save  the 
money  which  else  we  sink  forever  in  the  war.  How 
much  better  to  do  it  while  we  can,  lest  the  war  ere 
long  render  us  pecuniarily  unable  to  do  it.  How 
much  better  for  you  as  seller,  and  the  nation  as 
buyer,  to  sell  out  and  buy  out  that  without  which 
the  war  could  never  have  been,  than  to  sink  both 
the  thing  to  be  sold  and  the  price  of  it  in  cutting 
one  another's  throats.  I  do  not  speak  of  emancipa- 
tion at  once,  but  of  a  decision  at  once  to  emanci- 
pate gradually.  Room  in  South  America  for  coloniza- 
tion can  be  obtained  cheaply  and  in  abundance,  and 
when  numbers  shall  be  large  enough  to  be  company 
and  encouragement  for  one  another,  the  freed  peo- 
ple will  not  be  so  reluctant  to  go. 
I  am  pressed  with  a  difficulty  not  yet  mentioned 
—  one  which  threatens  division  among  those  who, 
united,  are  not  too  strong.  An  instance  of  it  is 
known  to  you.  General  Hunter  is  an  honest  man. 
He  was,  and  I  hope  still  is,  my  friend.  \  valued 
him  none  the  less  for  his  agreeing  with  me  in  the 
general  wish  that  all  men  everywhere  could  be 
freed.  He  proclaimed  all  men  free  within  certain 
States,  and  I  repudiated  the  proclamation.  He  ex- 
pected more  good  and  less  harm  from  the  measure 
than  I  could  believe  would  follow.  Yet,  in  repudi- 
ating it,  I  gave  dissatisfaction,  if  not  offense,  to  many 
whose  support  the  country  cannot  afford  to  lose. 
And  this  is  not  the  end  of  it.  The  pressure  in  this 
direction  is  still  upon  me.  and  is  increasing.  By 
conceding  what  I  now  ask  you  can  relieve  me  and. 
much  more,  can  relieve  the  country  in  this  important 
point.  Upon  these  considerations  I  have  again  begged 
your  attention  to  the  message  of  March  last.  Before 
leaving  the  capital,  consider  and  discuss  it  among 
yourselves.  You  are  patriots  and  statesmen,  and  as 
such  I  pray  you  consider  this  proposition  ;  and  at  the 
least  commend  it  to  the  consideration  o\  your  States 
and  people.  As  you  would  perpetuate  popular  gov- 
ernment for  the  best  people  in  the  world,  I  beseech 
you  that  you  do  in  no  wise  omit  this.  Our  common 
country   is  in   great  peril,   demanding  the  loftiest
288 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
views  and  boldest  action  to  bring  a  speedy  relief. 
relieved,  its  form  of  government  is  saved  to 
the  world,  its  beloved  history  and  cherished  mem- 
vindicated,  and  its  happy  future  fully  as- 
sured and  rendered  inconceivably  grand.    To  you, 
than  to  any  others,  the  privilege  is  given  to 
.   that  happiness  and  swell  that  grandeur,  and 
k  your  own  names  therewith  forever. 
1;  is  doubtful  whether  the  President  ex- 
{ d  any  more  satisfactory  result  from  this 
-  appeal  to  the  border-State  representatives 
than  had  attended  his  previous  one.  He  had 
had  abundant  occasion  to  observe  their  course 
in  the  congressional  debates;  the  opportunity 
been  long  before  them  and  they  had  not 
taken  advantage  of  it;  amid  the  revolutionary 
impulse  and  action  which  were  moving  the 
whole  country  their  inaction  on  this  subject 
was  equivalent  to  resistance.  This  effort  there- 
ike  the  former  one,  proved  barren :  most 
of  tli em  answered  with  a  qualified  refusal; 
twenty  of  them 1  signed  a  written  reply  on  July 
14.  which,  while  it  pledged  an  unchangeable 
continuance  of  their  loyalty,  set  forth  a  num- 
ber of  mixed  and  inconsequential  reasons 
against  adopting  the  President's  recommenda- 
tion. They  thought  the  project  too  expensive. 
They  said  slavery  was  a  right  which  they  ought 
not  to  be  asked  to  relinquish,  that  the  propo- 
sition had  never  been  offered  them  in  a  tangi- 
ble shape,  that  a  different  policy  had  been 
announced  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  that 
radical  doctrines  had  been  proclaimed  and 
subversive  measures  proposed  in  Congress.  In 
short,  it  was  a  general  plea  for  non-action. 
Seven  others2  of  their  number  drew  up  an  ad- 
<!re>^  dissenting  from  the  conservative  views  of 
the  majority,  and  promising  that  "  We  will,  as 
far  as  may  be  in  our  power,  ask  the  people  of 
the  border  States  calmly,  deliberately,  and 
fairly  to  consider  your  recommendations."  Two 
others';  wrote  separate  replies  in  the  same  spirit; 
but  with  only  a  minority  to  urge  the  proposi- 
tion upon  their  people,  it  was  plain  from  the  first 
that  no  hope  of  success  could  be  entertained. 
lNCIPATION  proposed  and  postponed. 
Military  events  underwent  great  fluctua- 
» in  the  first  half  of  the  year  1862.    During 
the  first  three  months  Union  victories  followed 
other  with  a  rapidity  and  decisiveness 
which  inspired  the  most  sanguine  hopes  for  the 
1    from  Kentucky,  Senator  Garrett  Davis  and  Rep- 
tatives  Henry  Grider,  Aaron  Harding,  Charles  A. 
Wickliffe,  George  W.  Dunlap,  Robert  Mallory,  John  J. 
den, John  W.  Menzies,  and  James  S.  Jackson; 
from  Missouri,  Sena  tor  Robert  Wilson  and  Represen- 
Rollins,  William  A.  Hall,  Thomas  L. 
Price,  and  John   S.    Phelps;   from   Maryland,   Repre- 
sentatives John  W.  Crisfield,  Edwin  H.  Webster,  Cor- 
nelius L.  L.  Leary,  Francis  Thomas,  and  Charles  B. 
Calvert;   from  Virginia,  -Senator  John  S.  Carlile. 
early  and  complete  suppression  of  the  rebellion. 
Cheering  news  of  important  successes  came 
from  all  quarters  —  Mill  Springs  in  Kentucky, 
Roanoke  Island  in  North  Carolina,  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson  in  Tennessee,  Pea  Ridge  in  Ar- 
kansas, Shiloh  in  Tennessee,  Island  No.  10  in 
the  Mississippi  River,  the  reduction  of  Forts 
Jackson  and  St.  Philip  on  the  lower  Mississippi, 
the  capture  of  New  Orleans  in  Louisiana,  and, 
finally,  what  seemed  the  beginning  of  a  victori- 
ous advance  by  McClellan's  army  upon  Rich- 
mond. In  the  month  of  May,  however,  this  tide 
of  success  began  to  change.  Stonewall  J  ackson's 
raid  initiated  a  series  of  discouraging  Union 
defeats,  and  McClellan's  formidable  advance 
gradually  changed  into  disastrous  retreat. 
No  one  noted  this  blighting  of  a  longed-for 
fruition  with  a  keener  watchfulness  and  more 
sensitive  suffering  than  did  President  Lincoln. 
As  the  military  interest  and  expectancy  gradu- 
ally lessened  at  the  circumference  and  slowly 
centered  itself  upon  the  fatal  circles  around  the 
rebel  capital,  his  thoughts  by  day  and  anxiety 
by  night  fed  upon  the  intelligence  which  the 
telegraph  brought  from  the  Union  camps  on 
the  Chickahominy  and  the  James.  It  is  safe 
to  say  that  no  general  in  the  army  studied  his 
maps  and  scanned  his  telegrams  with  half  the 
industry — and,  it  may  be  added,  with  half  the 
intelligence  —  which  Mr.  Lincoln  gave  to  his. 
It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  before  the 
catastrophe  finally  came  the  President  was  al- 
ready convinced  of  the  substantial  failure  of 
McClellan's  campaign  as  first  projected,  though 
he  still  framed  his  letters  and  telegrams  in  the 
most  hopeful  and  encouraging  language  that 
the  situation  would  admit.  But  aware  of  the 
impending  danger,  he  took  steps  to  secure  such 
a  reenforcement  of  the  army,  and  provide  for 
such  a  readjustment  of  the  campaign,  as  might 
yet  secure  the  final  and  complete  victory  which 
had  lain  so  temptingly  within  McClellan's 
grasp.  A  part  of  this  programme  was  the  con- 
solidation of  an  army  under  Pope.  The  culmi- 
nation of  disaster  doubtless  came  sooner  than 
he  thought  possible.  McClellan  himself  did  not 
seem  apprehensive  of  sudden  danger  when  on 
June  26  he  telegraphed  : 
The  case  is  perhaps  a  difficult  one,  but  I  shall 
resort  to  desperate  measures,  and  will  do  my  best  to 
outmaneuver,  outwit,  and  outfight  the  enemy.  Do 
not  believe  reports  of  disaster,  and  do  not  be  discour- 
'2  From  Missouri,  Representative  John  W.  Noell ; 
from  Kentucky,  Representative  Samuel  L.  Casey ; 
from  Tennessee,  Representative  Andrew  J.  Clem- 
ents ;  from  Delaware,  Representative  George  P. 
Fisher  ;  from  Virginia,  Senator  Waiteman  T.  Willey 
and  Representatives  William  G.  Brown  and  Jacob 
B.  Blair. 
3  Senator  John  B.  Henderson  of  Missouri  and  Rep- 
resentative Horace  Maynard  of  Tennessee.
FIRST  PLANS  FOR   EMANCIPA  TJON. 
aged  if  you  learn  that  my  communications  are  cut 
off,  and  even  Yorktown  in  possession  of  the  enemy. 
Hope  for  the  best,  and  I  will  not  deceive  the  hopes 
you  formerly  placed  in  me.1 
This  was  the  language  of  a  man  still  possess- 
ing eourage  and  faith,  but  the  events  of  the 
two  days  following  robbed  him  of  both.  Early 
on  the  morning  of  the  28th  he  sent  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  his  memorable  telegram  already 
quoted,  which  was  a  mere  blind  cry  of  despair 
and  insubordination : 
I  have  not  a  man  in  reserve,  and  shall  be  glad  to 
cover  my  retreat  and  save  the  material  and  personnel 
of  the  army.  ...  If  I  save  this  army  now,  1  tell 
you  plainly  that  I  owe  no  thanks  to  you  or  to  any 
other  persons  in  Washington.  You  have  done  your 
best  to  sacrifice  this  army. 
The  kind  and  patient  words  with  which 
President  Lincoln  replied  to  this  unsoldierly 
and  unmanly  petulance,  and  the  vigorous  ex- 
ertions put  forth  by  the  War  Department  to 
mitigate  the  danger  with  all  available  supplies 
and  reinforcements,  have  been  related.  The 
incident  is  repeated  here  to  show  that  the 
President  and  Cabinet  promptly  put  into  exe- 
cution a  measure  which  had  probably  been 
already  debated  during  the  preceding  days. 
The  needs  of  the  hour,  and  Lincoln's  plan  to 
provide  for  them,  cannot  be  more  briefly  stated 
than  in  the  two  letters  which  follow,  the  first 
of  which,  written  on  this  28th  day  of  June, 
he  addressed  to  his  Secretary  of  State.  It  was 
evidently  written  in  a  moment  of  profound 
emotion  produced  by  McClellan's  telegram, 
for  nowhere  in  all  his  utterances  is  there  to 
be  found  a  stronger  announcement  of  his  de- 
termination to  persevere  unfalteringly  in  the 
public  and  patriotic  task  before  him : 
My  view  of  the  present  condition  of  the  war  is 
about  as  follows :  The  evacuation  of  Corinth  and 
our  delay  by  the  flood  in  the  Chickahominy  have 
enabled  the  enemy  to  concentrate  too  much  force  in 
Richmond  for  McClellan  to  successfully  attack.  In 
fact, there  soon  will  be  no  substantial  rebel  force  any- 
where else.  But  if  we  send  all  the  force  from  here 
to  McClellan,  the  enemy  will,  before  we  can  know 
of  it,  send  a  force  from  Richmond  and  take  Wash- 
ington. Or  if  a  large  part  of  the  Western  army  be 
brought  here  to  McClellan,  they  will  let  us  have 
Richmond,  and  retake  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  Mis- 
souri, etc.  What  should  be  done  is  to  hold  what 
we  have  in  the  West,  open  the  Mississippi,  and  take 
Chattanooga  and  east  Tennessee  without  more. 
A  reasonable  force  should,  in  every  event,  be  kept 
about  Washington  for  its  protection.  Then  let  the 
country  give  us  a  hundred  thousand  new  troops  in 
the  shortest  possible  time,  which,  added  to  McClel- 
lan directly  or  indirectly,  will  take  Richmond  with- 
out endangering  any  other  place  which  we  now 
hold,  and  will  substantially  end  the  war.    I  expect 
1  McClellan  to  Stanton,  June  26,  1862,  12  m.  War 
Records. 
2  Unpublished  MS. 
Vol.  XXXVII.— 40. 
to  maintain  this  contest  until  successful,  or  till  I  die, 
or  am  conquered,  or  my  term  expil 
or  the  country  forsake  me  ;  and  I  would  publicly 
appeal  to  the  country  for  tin's  new  force,  were  it 
not  that  I  fear  a  general  panic  and  stampede  would 
follow,  so  hard  is  it  to  have  a  thing  understood  as 
it  really  is.  I  think  the  new  force  should  be  all,  or 
nearly  all,  infantry,  principally  because  such  can  be 
raised  most  cheaply  and  quickly.2 
This  letter  was  of  course  not  needed  for  the 
personal  information  of  Mr.  Seward,  but  was 
placed  in  his  hands  to  enable  him  to  reassure 
those  who  might  doubt  the  President's  courage 
and  determination.  The  other  letter,  written 
in  advance  and  dated  the  30th,  was  addressed 
to  the  governors  of  the  loyal  States.  It  ran  as 
follows : 
The  capture  of  New  Orleans,  Norfolk,  and  Cor- 
inth by  the  National  forces  has  enabled  the  in- 
surgents to  concentrate  a  large  force  at  and  about 
Richmond,  which  place  we  must  take  with  the 
least  possible  delay  ;  in  fact,  there  will  soon  be  no 
formidable  insurgent  force  except  at  Richmond. 
With  so  large  an  army  there  the  enemy  can  threaten 
us  on  the  Potomac  and  elsewhere.  Until  we  have 
reestablished  the  National  authority,  all  these  places 
must  be  held,  and  we  must  keep  a  respectable  force 
in  front  of  Washington.  But  this,  from  the  dimin- 
ished strength  of  our  army  by  sickness  and  casual- 
ties, renders  an  addition  to  it  necessary  in  order  to 
close  the  struggle  which  has  been  prosecuted  for  the 
last  three  months  with  energy  and  success.  Rather 
than  herald  the  misapprehension  of  our  military  con- 
dition and  of  groundless  alarm  by  a  call  for  troops 
by  proclamation,  I  have  deemed  it  best  to  address 
you  in  this  form.  To  accomplish  the  object  stated, 
we  require,  without  delay,  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men,  including  those  recently  called  for  by 
the  Secretary  of  War.  Thus  reenforced,  our  gallant 
army  will  be  enabled  to  realize  the  hopes  and  expec- 
tations of  the  Government  and  the  people.-2 
Armed  with  these  letters,  Mr.  Seward  pro- 
ceeded hastily  to  New  York  City.  The  brief 
correspondence  which  ensued  indicates  the 
progressive  steps  and  success  of  his  mission. 
On  this  same  30th  of  June  he  telegraphed 
from  New  York  to  Secretary  Stanton : 
Am  getting  a  foundation  for  an  increase  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand.  Shall  have  an  impor- 
tant step  to  communicate  to-night  or  to-morrow 
morning.  Governors  Morgan  and  Curtin  here,  and 
communicate  with  others  by  telegraph.  Let  me  have 
reliable  information  when  convenient,  as  it  steadies 
my  operations.  .  .  .  Will  you  authorize  me  to 
promise  an  advance  to  recruits  of  %i^  of  the  %\oo 
bounty  ?  It  is  thought  here  and  in  Massachusetts 
that  without  such  payment  recruiting  will  be  very 
difficult,  and  with  it  probably  entirely  successful. - 
To  this  the  Secretary  of  War  replied  on  the 
following  day : 
The  existing  law  does  not  authorize  an  advance 
of  the  bounty.  .  .  .  Discreet  persons  here  si  fj- 
gest  that  the  call  should  be  for  500,000  men, — 
double  the  number  you  propose, —  as  the  waste  will
2  9  o 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
be  large.    Consider  the  matter.    The  President  has 
>me  into  town  yet  :  when  he  arrives  you  will 
receive  his  answer. 
c  in  the  day  he  added  to  the  above: 
The  President  approves  your  plan,  but  suggests 
aoo,ooo,  if  it  can  be  done  as  well  as  the  number  you 
mention.1 
It  is  probable  that  a  further  discussion,  and 
perhaps  also  further  information  of  the  disaster 
and  despondency  on  the  Peninsula,  brought 
more  fully  to  the  minds  of  President  and  Sec- 
.  of  War  the  gravity  of  the  crisis  and  the 
need  of  decisive  action;  for  Mr.  Stanton  sent 
a  third  telegram  to  Mr.  Seward,  saying : 
Your  telegram  received.  I  will  take  the  responsi- 
bility of  ordering  the  $25  bounty  out  of  the  nine  mill- 
ions [appropriation]  at  all  hazards,  and  you  may  go 
on  that  basis.  I  will  make  and  telegraph  the  order  in 
an  hour.    The  President's  answer  has  already  gone.1 
Mr.  Seward's  answer  to  this  was  all  that  could 
be  desired  under  the  circumstances : 
The  Governors  respond,  and  the  Union  Commit- 
tee approve  earnestly  and  unanimously.  .  .  Let 
the  President  make  the  order,  and  let  both  papers 
come  out  [in]  to-morrow  morning's  papers,  if  possi- 
ble. The  number  of  troops  to  be  called  is  left  to 
the  President  to  fix.  No  one  proposes  less  than 
200.000;  make  it  300,000  if  you  wish.  They  say  it 
may  be  300,000  if  the  President  desires.  Get  the  $25- 
advance  fixed,  and  let  the  terms  be  made  known.1 
Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of  July  2  there 
appeared  in  the  newspapers  a  formal  corre- 
spondence, purporting  to  be  the  voluntary  re- 
quest  of  eighteen  governors  of  loyal  States  to 
the  President, 
that  you  at  once  call  upon  the  several  States  for 
h  numbers  of  men  as  may  be  required  to  fill  up 
all  military  organizations  now  in  the  field,  and  add 
to  the  army  heretofore  organized  such  additional 
numbers  of  men  as  may,  in  your  judgment,  be  neces- 
sary to  garrison  and  hold  all  of  the  numerous  cities 
and  military  positions  that  have  been  captured  by 
our  armies.  .  .  .All  believe  that  the  decisive 
moment  is  near  at  hand,  and  to  that  end  the  peo- 
ple of  the  United  States  are  desirous  to  aid  promptly 
in  furnishing  all  reinforcements  that  you  may  deem 
needful  to  sustain  our  Government. 
J  0  which  the  President's  reply  announced : 
Gentlemf.s  :   Fully  concurring  in  the  wisdom  of 
the  views  expressed  to  me  in  so  patriotic  a  manner 
by  you   in  the  communication  of  the  28th  day  of 
June,  I  have  decided  to  call  into  the  service  an  ad- 
rial  force  of  300.000  men. 
"  It  was  thought  safest  to  mark  high  enough," 1 
Mr.  Lin<  oln  in  a  private  telegram  to  Gov- 
ernor Morgan  of  New  York  :  while  in  another 
private  circular  to  all   the  governors   he  ex- 
plained his  desire  a  little  more  fully. 
1  Unpublished  MS. 
1  should  not  want  the  half  of  300,000  new  troops 
if  1  could  have  them  now.  If  I  had  50,000  addi- 
tional troops  here  now,  1  believe  I  could  substan- 
tially close  the  war  in  two  weeks.  But  time  is 
everything  ;  and  if  1  get  50,000  new  men  in  a  month 
I  shall  have  lost  20,000  old  ones  during  the  same 
month,  having  gained  only  30,000,  with  the  differ- 
ence between  old  and  new  troops  still  against  me. 
The  quicker  you  send,  the  fewer  you  will  have  to 
send.  Time  is  everything;  please  act  in  view  of 
this.  The  enemy  having  given  up  Corinth,  it  is  not 
wonderful  that  he  is  thereby  enabled  to  check  us 
for  a  time  at  Richmond.1 
It  was  doubtless  the  sudden  collapse  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  Richmond  campaign  which  brought 
President  Lincoln  to  the  determination  to 
adopt  his  policy  of  general  military  emancipa- 
tion much  sooner  than  he  would  otherwise 
have  done.  The  necessity  of  a  comprehensive 
rearrangement  of  military  affairs  was  upon  him, 
and  it  was  but  natural  that  it  should  involve 
a  revision  of  political  policy.  The  immediate 
present  was  provided  for  in  the  call  just  issued 
for  300,000  volunteers ;  but  he  had  learned  by 
experience  that  he  must  count  new  possibilities 
of  delays  and  defeats,  and  that  his  determina- 
tion, so  recently  recorded,  to  "  maintain  this 
contest "  to  ultimate  triumph,  compelled  him 
to  open  new  sources  of  military  strength.  He 
recognized,  and  had  often  declared,  that  in 
a  republic  the  talisman  which  wrought  the 
wonders  of  statesmanship  and  the  changes 
of  national  destiny  was  public  opinion.  We 
now  know  that  in  the  use  of  this  talisman  he 
was  the  most  consummate  master  whose  skill 
history  has  recorded.  We  are  justified  in 
the  inference  that  his  foresight  had  perceived 
and  estimated  the  great  and  decisive  ele- 
ment of  military  strength  which  lay  as  yet 
untouched  and  unappropriated  in  the  slave 
population  of  the  South.  To  its  use,  how- 
ever, there  existed  two  great  obstacles- — prej- 
udice on  the  part  of  the  whites,  the  want 
of  a  motive  on  the  part  of  the  blacks.  His 
problem  was  to  remove  the  one  and  to  supply 
the  other.  For  the  first  of  these  difficulties 
the  time  was  specially  propitious  in  one  re- 
spect. In  the  momentary  check  and  embar- 
rassment of  all  the  armies  of  the  Union,  gen- 
erals, soldiers,  and  conservative  politicians 
would  tolerate  reprisal  upon  rebels  with  for- 
bearance if  not  with  favor ;  and  for  their  con- 
sent to  the  full  military  employment  of  the 
blacks  he  might  trust  to  the  further  change 
of  popular  sentiment,  the  drift  of  which  was 
already  so  manifest.  The  motive  which  would 
call  the  slaves  to  the  active  help  of  the  Union 
armies  lay  ready  made  for  his  use  —  indeed, 
it  had  been  in  steadily  increasing  action  from 
the  beginning  of  hostilities  till  now,  as  far  and 
as  effectively  as  the  Government  would  per- 
mit.
FIRST  PLANS  FOR   EMANCIPATION. 
20  1 
McClellan's  change  of  base  occurred  about 
the  ist  of  July,  1862.  Lincoln's  final  appeal 
to  the  border  States  took  place  shortly  after- 
ward, on  July  12  ;  and  his  vivid  portrayal  of 
the  inevitable  wreck  of  slavery  in  the  stress  of 
war  doubtless  gathered  color  and  force  from 
recent  military  events.  Already,  before  the 
border-State  delegations  gave  him  their  written 
replies,  he  knew  from  their  words  and  bearing 
that  they  would  in  effect  refuse  the  generous 
tender  of  compensation ;  and  he  decided  in  his 
own  mind  that  he  would  at  an  early  day  give 
notice  of  his  intention  to  emancipate  the  slaves 
of  rebellious  States  by  military  proclamation. 
His  first  confidential  announcement  of  the  new 
departure  occurred  on  the  day  following  his 
interview  with  the  border-State  representatives, 
and  is  thus  recorded  in  the  diary  of  Secretary 
Welles  : 
On  Sunday,  the  13th  of  July,  1862,  President 
Lincoln  invited  me  to  accompany  him  in  his  car- 
riage to  the  funeral  of  an  infant  child  of  Mr.  Stanton. 
Secretary  Seward  and  Mrs.  Frederick  Seward  were 
also  in  the  carriage.  Mr.  Stanton  occupied  at  that 
time,  for  a  summer  residence,  the  house  of  a  naval 
officer,  I  think  Hazzard,  some  two  or  three  miles 
west  or  north-westerly  of  Georgetown.  It  was  on 
this  occasion  and  on  this  ride  that  he  first  men- 
tioned to  Mr.  Seward  and  myself  the  subject  of  eman- 
cipating the  slaves  by  proclamation  in  case  the 
rebels  did  not  cease  to  persist  in  their  war  on  the 
Government  and  the  Union,  of  which  he  saw  no 
evidence.  He  dwelt  earnestly  on  the  gravity,  im- 
portance, and  delicacy  of  the  movement;  said  he 
had  given  it  much  thought,  and  had  about  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  it  was  a  military  necessity,  ab- 
solutely essential  for  the  salvation  of  the  nation,  that 
we  must  free  the  slaves  or  be  ourselves  subdued, 
etc.,  etc.  This  was,  he  said,  the  first  occasion 
where  he  had  mentioned  the  subject  to  any  one, 
and  wished  us  to  frankly  state  how  the  proposition 
struck  us.  Mr.  Seward  said  the  subject  involved  con- 
sequences so  vast  and  momentous  that  he  should 
wish  to  bestow  on  it  mature  reflection  before  giving 
a  decisive  answer ;  but  his  present  opinion  inclined 
to  the  measure  as  justifiable,  and  perhaps  he  might 
say  expedient  and  necessary.  These  were  also  my 
views.  Two  or  three  times  on  that  ride  the  subject, 
which  was  of  course  an  absorbing  one  for  each  and 
all,  was  adverted  to,  and  before  separating,  the  Pres- 
ident desired  us  to  give  the  subject  special  and  de- 
liberate attention,  for  he  was  earnest  in  the  conviction 
that  something  must  be  done.  It  was  a  new  depart- 
ure for  the  President,  for  until  this  time,  in  all  our 
previous  interviews,  whenever  the  question  of  eman- 
1  War  Department, 
Washington,  July  22,  1862. 
First.  Ordered  that  military  commanders  within  the 
States  of  Virginia,  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Florida, 
Alabama,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  Texas,  and  Arkansas 
in  an  orderly  manner  seize  and  use  any  property,  real 
or  personal,  which  may  be  necessary  or  convenient  for 
their  several  commands,  for  supplies,  or  for  other  mili- 
tary purposes  ;  and  that  while  property  may  be  de- 
stroyed for  proper  military  objects,  none  shall  be  de- 
stroyed in  wantonness  or  malice. 
cipation  or  the  mitigation  of  slavery  had  been  in 
any  way  alluded  to,  he  had  been  prompt  and  em- 
phatic in  denouncing  any  interference  by  the 
eral  Government  with  the  subject.  This  was,  I  think, 
the  sentiment  of  every  member  of  the  Cabinet,  all 
of  whom,  including  the  President,  considered  it  a 
local  domestic  question  appertaining  to  the  States 
respectively  who  had  never  parted  with  their  au- 
thority over  it.  But  the  reverses  before  Richmond, 
and  the  formidable  power  and  dimensions  of  the  in- 
surrection, which  extended  through  all  the  slave  States 
and  had  combined  most  of  them  in  a  confederacy  to 
destroy  the  Union,  impelled  the  Administration  to 
adopt  extraordinary  measures  to  preserve  the  national 
existence.  The  slaves,  if  not  armed  and  disciplined, 
were  in  the  service  of  those  who  were,  not  only  as 
field  laborers  and  producers,  but  thousands  of  them 
were  in  attendance  upon  the  armies  in  the  field,  em- 
ployed as  waiters  and  teamsters,  and  the  fortifica- 
tions and  intrenchments  were  constructed  by  them. 
Within  the  next  four  days  Congress  finished 
its  business  and  adjourned,  the  Confiscation 
Act  being  an  important  part  of  its  final  work. 
The  President,  as  we  have  seen,  signed  the  bill 
with  its  amendatory  resolution,  and  the  Gov- 
ernment was  thus  brought  face  to  face  with 
the  practical  duty  of  enforcing  its  provisions 
through  military  directions  and  orders  in  fur- 
ther detail.  It  has  been  explained  how  the 
Confiscation  Act  and  other  laws  broadened  and 
multiplied  the  forfeitures  of  title  to  slaves  for 
the  crimes  of  treason  and  rebellion.  We  have 
the  evidence  of  the  President's  written  com- 
ments that  he  considered  these  penalties  just 
and  the  imposition  of  them  constitutional.  In 
the  administration  of  the  laws  thus  enacted 
there  therefore  remained  to  be  examined  only 
the  convenience  of  their  practical  enforcement 
and  the  general  effect  upon  public  opinion  of 
the  policy  they  established. 
We  have  no  record  of  the  specific  reasoning 
of  President  Lincoln  upon  these  points.  We 
only  know  that  within  the  five  days  following 
the  adjournment  of  Congress  (July  17  to  July 
22, 1862)  his  mind  reached  its  final  conclusions. 
The  diary  of  Secretary  Chase  contains  the  fol- 
lowing record  of  what  occurred  at  the  Cabinet 
meeting  at  the  Executive  Mansion  on  July  21 : 
I  went  at  the  appointed  hour,  and  found  that  the 
President  had  been  profoundly  concerned  at  the 
present  aspect  of  affairs,  and  had  determined  to  take 
some  definite  steps  in  respect  to  military  action  and 
slavery.     He  had  prepared  several  orders,1  the  first 
Second.  That  military  and  naval  commanders  shall 
employ  as  laborers,  within  and  from  said  States,  so  many 
persons  of  African  descent  as  can  be  advantageously 
used  for  military  or  naval  purposes,  giving  them  rea- 
sonable wages  for  their  labor. 
Third.  That  as  to  both  property  and  persons  of  Af- 
rican descent,  accounts  shall  be  kept  sufficiently  accu- 
rate and  in  detail  to  show  quantities  and  amounts,  and 
from  whom  both  property  and  such  persons  shall  have 
come,  as  a  basis  upon  which  compensation  can  be 
made  in  proper  cases;  and  the  several  departments  oi
!02 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
o\  which  contemplated  authority  to  commanders  to 
5t   their   troops  in    the    hostile   territory ;    the 
,i.   authority  to  employ   negroes   as   laborers  ; 
the  third,  requiringthat  both  in  the  case  of  property 
taken  and  c\  negroes  employed  accounts  should  be 
with  such  degree  of  certainty  as  would  enable 
compensation  to  be  made  in  proper  cases.    Another 
ded  for  the   colonization  of   negroes  in  some 
A   good  deal  of  discussion   took 
place  upon  these  points.    The  first  order  was  uni- 
ted.   The  second  was  approved  en- 
tirely,  and  the  third  by  all  except  myself.     I  doubted 
the  expediency  o\  attempting  to  keep  account  for 
the  benefit  of  the  inhabitants  of  rebel  States.     The 
I  zation  project  was  not  much  discussed.      The 
Secretary  of  War  presented  some  letters  from  Gen- 
eral Hunter,   in  which  he  advised  the  department 
that   the  withdrawal   of  a  large  proportion  of  his 
troops  to   reenforce  General   McClellan   rendered  it 
highly  important  that   he   should   be   immediately 
authorized  to  enlist  all  loyal  persons,  without  refer- 
ence to  complexion.    Messrs.  Stanton,  Seward,  and 
myself  expressed  ourselves  in  favor  of  this  plan,  and 
no  one  expressed  himself  against  it.   (Mr.  Blair  was 
not  present.)     The  President  was  not  prepared  to 
decide  the  question,  but  expressed  himself  as  averse 
to  arming  negroes.1 
This  Cabinet  discussion  came  to  no  final  con- 
clusion, and  we  learn  from  the  same  diary  that 
on  the  following  day,  Tuesday,  July  22, 1862,— 
which  was  regular  Cabinet  day, —  the  subject 
was  resumed.  Further  conference  was  had 
on  organizing  negro  regiments,  but  Lincoln 
decided  that  the  moment  had  not  yet  arrived 
when  this  policy  could  be  safely  entered  upon. 
Writes  Chase : 
The  impression  left  upon  my  mind  by  the  whole 
discussion  was,  that  while  the  President  thought 
that  the  organization,  equipment,  and  arming  of 
negroes  like  other  soldiers  would  be  productive  of 
more  evil  than  good,  he  was  not  unwilling  that  com- 
manders should,  at  their  discretion,  arm,  for  purely 
defensive  purposes,  slaves  coming  within  their  lines. 
•  on  the  kindred  policy  of  emancipation  the 
lent  had  reached  a  decision  which  ap- 
pears to  have  been  in  advance  of  the  views  of 
his  entire  Cabinet.    Probably  greatly  to  their 
surprise,  he  read  to  them  the  following  draft 
of  a  proclamation  warning  the  rebels  of  the 
and  penalties  of  the  Confiscation  Act, 
and  while  renewing  his  tender  of  compensa- 
tion to  loyal  States  which  would  adopt  gradual 
abolishment  adding  a  summary  military  order, 
(    iftimander-in-Chief,   declaring   free    the 
ill  States  which  might  be  in  rebellion 
on  January  1,  1863.   The  text  of  this  first  draft 
of  the    Emancipation    Proclamation   is   here 
printed  for  the  first  time: 
-iment  shall  attend  to  and  perform  their  ap- 
riate  parts  towards  the  execution  of  these  orders. 
•der  of  the  President, 
Edwin  M.   Stanton,  Secretary  of  War. 
1   Warden.  "  Life  of  S.  P.  Chase,"  p.  439. 
In  pursuance  of  the  sixth  section  of  the  act  of 
Congress  entitled,  "An  act  to  suppress  insurrection 
and  to  punish  treason  and  rebellion,  to  seize  and 
confiscate  property  of  rebels,  and  for  other  purposes," 
approved  July  17,  1862,  and  which  act  and  the 
joint  resolution  explanatory  thereof  are  herewith 
published,  I,  Abraham  Lincoln,  President  of  the 
United  States,  do  hereby  proclaim  to  and  warn  all 
persons  within  the  contemplation  of  said  sixth  sec- 
tion to  cease  participating  in,  aiding,  countenancing, 
or  abetting  the  existing  rebellion,  or  any  rebellion 
against  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  to 
return  to  their  proper  allegiance  to  the  United  States, 
on  pain  of  the  forfeitures  and  seizures,  as  within 
and  by  said  sixth  section  provided. 
And  I  hereby  make  known  that  it  is  my  purpose, 
upon  the  next  meeting  of  Congress,  to  again  recom- 
mend the  adoption  of  a  practical  measure  for  tender- 
ing pecuniary  aid  to  the  free  choice  or  rejection  of 
any  and  all  States,  which  may  then  be  recogniz- 
ing and  practically  sustaining  the  authority  of  the 
United  States,  and  which  may  then  have  volun- 
tarily adopted,  or  thereafter  may  voluntarily  adopt, 
gradual  abolishment  of  slavery  within  such  State 
or  States;  that  the  object  is  to  practically  restore, 
thenceforward  to  be  maintained,  the  constitutional 
relation  between  the  General  Government  and  each 
and  all  the  States  wherein  that  relation  is  now  sus- 
pended or  disturbed  ;  and  that  for  this  object  the 
war,  as  it  has  been,  will  be  prosecuted.  And  as  a 
fit  and  necessary  military  measure  for  effecting  this 
object,  I,  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  of  the  United  States,  do  order  and  declare  that 
on  the  first  day  of  January  in  the  year  of  our  Lord 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-three,  all 
persons  held  as  slaves  within  any  State  or  States 
wherein  the  constitutional  authority  of  the  United 
States  shall  not  then  be  practically  recognized,  sub- 
mitted to  and  maintained,  shall  then,  thenceforward, 
and  forever  be  free.2 
Of  the  Cabinet  proceedings  which  followed 
the  reading  of  this  momentous  document  we 
have  unfortunately  only  very  brief  memoranda. 
Every  member  of  the  council  was,  we  may  in- 
fer, bewildered  by  the  magnitude  and  boldness 
of  the  proposal.  The  sudden  consideration  of 
this  critical  question  reveals  to  us  with  vivid- 
ness the  difference  in  mental  reach,  readiness, 
and  decision  between  the  President  and  his 
constitutional  advisers.  Only  two  of  the  num- 
ber gave  the  measure  their  unreserved  concur- 
rence, even  after  discussion.  It  is  strange  that 
one  of  these  was  the  cautious  Attorney-Gen- 
eral, the  representative  of  the  conservative 
faction  of  the  slaveholding  State  of  Missouri, 
and  that  the  member  who  opposed  the  meas- 
ure as  a  whole,  and  proposed  to  achieve  the 
result  indirectly  through  the  scattered  and  di- 
vided action  of  local  commanders  in  military 
departments,    was    the    antislavery    Secretary 
2  The  indorsement  on  the  above  paper,  also  in  Lin- 
coln's own  handwriting,  is  as  follows  :  "  Emancipation 
proclamation  as  first  sketched  and  shown  to  the  Cabi- 
net in  July,  1862."  The  diary  of  Secretary  Chase  shows 
the  exact  date  to  have  been  July  22,  1862.
FIRST  PLANS  FOR   EMANCIPATION. 
of  the  Treasury,  Mr.  Chase,  representing  per- 
haps more  nearly  than  any  other  the  abolition 
faction  of  the  free  State  of  Ohio.  All  were  as- 
tonished, except  the  two  to  whom  it  had  been 
mentioned  a  week  before.  None  of  the  others 
had  even  considered  such  a  step.  .But  from 
the  mind  and  will  of  President  Lincoln  the 
determination  and  announcement  to  his  Cabi- 
net came  almost  as  complete  in  form  and  cer- 
tain in  intention  on  that  memorable  Tuesday 
of  July  as  when,  two  months  later,  it  was  given 
to  the  public,  or  as  officially  proclaimed  on  the 
succeeding  New  Year's  Day,  an  irrevocable 
executive  act. 
A  fragmentary  memorandum  in  the  hand- 
writing of  Secretary  Stanton  shows  us  distinctly 
the  effect  produced  upon  the  assembled  coun- 
cil. The  manuscript  is  here  reproduced  as 
nearly  as  the  types  conveniently  permit.  The 
very  form  of  the  record  shows  the  Secretary's 
strong  emotion  and  interest  in  the  discussion : 
Tuesday,  July  22. 
The  President  proposes  to  issue  an  order  declaring 
that,  all  Slaves  in  states  in  rebellion  on  the   
The  Attorney-General  and  Stanton  are  for  its  im- 
mediate promulgation. 
Seward  against  it  ;  argues  strongly  in  favor  of 
cotton  and  foreign  governments. 
Chase  silent. 
Welles    
Seward  argues   Thatforeign  nations  will  inter- 
vene to  prevent  the  abolition  of  slavery  for  sake  of 
cotton.  Argues  in  a  long  speech  against  its  imme- 
diate promulgation.  Wants  to  wait  for  troops. 
Wants  Halleck  here.  Wants  drum  and  fife  and 
public  spirit.  We  break  up  our  relations  with  for- 
eign nations  and  the  production  of  cotton  for  sixty 
years. 
Chase   Thinks  it  a  measure  of  great  danger,  and 
would  lead  to  universal  emancipation   The  meas- 
ure goes  beyond  anything  I  have  recommended. 
The  omissions  in  this  bit  of  historical  manu- 
script are  exceedingly  provoking,  but  some  of 
them  are  supplied  by  President  Lincoln's  own 
narrative,  recorded  and  published  by  the  artist 
Carpenter,  whose  application  for  permission  to 
paint  his  historical  picture  of  the  signing  of  the 
Emancipation  Proclamation  called  it  forth  : 
"  It  had  got  to  be,"  said  he  [Mr.  Lincoln] , ' '  midsum- 
mer, 1862.  Things  had  gone  on  from  bad  to  worse, 
until  I  felt  that  we  had  reached  the  end  of  our  rope 
on  the  plan  of  operations  we  had  been  pursuing ; 
that  we  had  about  played  our  last  card,  and  must 
change  our  tactics,  or  lose  the  game.  1  now  deter- 
mined upon  the  adoption  of  the  emancipation  pol- 
1  Carpenter,  "Six  Months  at  the  White  House," 
pp.  20-23. 
2  On  this  point  the  President  is  reported  as  saying: 
"  Secretary  Chase  wished  the  language  stronger  in 
reference  to  the  arming  of  the  blacks."  (Carpenter, 
"  Six  Months  at  the  White  House,"  p.  21.)  If  these 
were   his  words,  his  memory  was    slightly  at   fault. 
icy;  and  without  consultation  with,  or  the  knowl- 
edge of,  the  Cabinet,  I  prepared  the  original  draft  of 
the  proclamation,  and,  after  much  anxious  thought, 
called  a  Cabinet  meeting  upon  the  subject.  . 
All  were  present  excepting  Mr.  Blair,  the  Po-.tmas- 
ter-General,  who  was  absent  at  the  opening  of  the 
discussion,  but  came  in  subsequently.  I  said  to  the 
Cabinet  that  I  had  resolved  upon  this  step,  and  had 
not  called  them  together  to  ask  their  advice,  but  to 
lay  the  subject-matter  of  a  proclamation  before  them, 
suggestions  as  to  which  would  be  in  order  after 
they  had  heard  it  read.  Mr.  Lovejoy  was  in  error 
when  he  informed  you  that  it  excited  no  comment 
excepting  on  the  part  of  Secretary  Seward.  Various 
suggestions  were  offered."  1 
At  this  point  we  interrupt  the  President's 
relation  a  moment  to  emote  in  its  propel 
quence  the  exact  comment  offered  by  Secretary 
Chase,2  as  recorded  in  his  diary : 
I  [Chase]  said  that  I  should  give  to  such  a  meas- 
ure my  cordial  support,  but  I  should  prefer  that  no 
new  expression  on  the  subject  of  compensation 
should  be  made  ;  and  I  thought  that  the  measure 
of  emancipation  could  be  much  better  and  more 
quietly  accomplished  by  allowing  generals  to  organ- 
ize and  arm  the  slaves  (thus  avoiding  depredation 
and  massacre  on  one  hand,  and  support  to  the  in- 
surrection on  the  other),  and  by  directing  the  com- 
manders of  departments  to  proclaim  emancipation 
within  their  districts  as  soon  as  practicable.  But  I 
regarded  this  as  so  much  better  than  inaction  on  the 
subject,  that  I  should  give  it  my  entire  support.3 
The  President's  narrative  continues : 
"Mr.  Blair,  after  he  came  in,  deprecated  the  policy 
on  the  ground  that  it  would  cost  the  Administration 
the  fall  elections.  Nothing,  however,  was  offered 
that  I  had  not  fully  anticipated  and  settled  in  my 
own  mind  until  Secretary  Seward  spoke.  He  said 
in  substance,  'Mr.  President,  1  approve  of  the  proc- 
lamation, but  I  question  the  expediency  of  its  issue 
at  this  juncture.  The  depression  of  the  public  mind, 
consequent  upon  our  repeated  reverses,  is  so  great 
that  I  fear  the  effect  of  so  important  a  step.  It  may 
be  viewed  as  the  last  measure  of  an  exhausted 
ernment,  aery  for  help  ;  the  Government  stretching 
forth  its  hands  to  Ethiopia,  instead  of  Ethiopia 
stretching  forth  her  hands  to  the  Government.1  His 
idea,"  said  the  President,  "was  that  it  would  be  con- 
sidered our  last  shriek,  on  the  retreat.  [This  was 
his  precise  expression.]  '  Now,'  continued 
Seward,  'while  I  approve  the  measure.  I  sugg 
sir,  that  you  postpone  its  issue  until  you  car. 
it  to  the  country  supported  by  military  success,  in- 
stead of  issuing  it,  as  would  be  the  case  now.  upon 
the  greatest  disasters  of  the  war.'"  Mr.  Lincoln 
continued  :  "  The  wisdom  o\  the  view  o\  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  struck  me  with  very  great  force.  It 
was  an  aspect  of  the  case  that,  in  all  my  thought 
upon  the  subject,   I  had  entirely  overlooked.    The 
There  was  nothing  in  the  proposed  proclamation  of 
emancipation  about  arming  the  blacks.  That  branch 
of  the  discussion,  while  it  occurred  at  the  same  time, 
had  exclusive  reference  to  the  military  order  quoted 
on  page  291,  also  then  under  consideration. 
3  Warden,  "Life  of  S.  P.  Chase,"  p.  440.
MINC"—A    PLOT. 
I  was  that  I  put  the  draft  of  the  proclamation 
.  i  your  sketch  for  a  picture,  waiting 
•  reclamation  thus  laid  away, 
E     i  as  issued  three  days  after,  simply 
ng  the  warning  required  by  the  sixth 
m  of  the  Confiscation  Act.    The  already 
ed  military  order  to  make  seizures  under 
ct  had  been  issued  on  the  day  when  the 
proclamation  was  discussed  and  postponed; 
meanwhile  the  Government,  by  its  new  military 
arrangements,  sending  reinforcements  to  Mc- 
Clellan,  organizing  a  new  army  under  Pope, 
and  calling  Halleck  from  the  West  to  exercise 
a  superior  and  guiding  control  over  a  com- 
bined campaign  towards  Richmond,  seemed  to 
have  provided  the  needful  requirements  for 
early  and  substantial  success. 
/fTf 
"MINC"— A  PLOT. 
By  the  author  of  "  Two  Runaways,"  "  Sister  Todhunter's  Heart/'  "  De  Valley  an'  de  Shadder,"  etc. 
fflgjgfegftgHEtrim  little: steamboat  that 
'    plies  Lake  Harris,  the  love- 
liest of  all  Florida  waters, 
emerged  from   the   pictur- 
esque avenue  of  cypress  and 
trailing  moss  called  Dead 
River,  which  leads  out  of 
Eustis,    and    glided    as    a 
shadow  betwixt  sea  and  sky  towards  its  harbor, 
fourteen  miles  away.    It  had  been  the  perfec- 
tion of  a  May  day,  and  the  excursionists,  wea- 
ried at  last  of  sight-seeing,  were  gathered  upon 
the  forward  deck.     The  water-slopes  of  the 
highlands  on  the  right,  with  their  dark  lines 
s    -trees  and  their  nestling  cottages,  lay 
,]  in  the  evening  shadow  fast   stretching 
out  towards  the  boat,  for  the  sun  was  dipping 
.-  the  horizon  with  the   stately  pines  in 
houette  upon  his  broad  red  face.    "Home, 
:  ime,"  u  Old  Kentucky  Home,"  and 
I  Folks  at  Home"  had  been  rendered  by 
ingers  of  the  party  with  that  queer  mixt- 
f  pathos  and  bathos  so  inseparably  con- 
cession songs,  and  a  species  of 
■to-be-done  silence  settled  over  the 
group,  broken  only  by  the  soft  throb  of  the  en- 
and  the  swish   of  dividing  waters.    Sud- 
.-  began  a  dissertation  upon  negro 
.   and   by   easy   stages   the  conversation 
drifted  to  negro  stories.    Among  the  excursion- 
ists sat  a  gray-haired,  tall,  soldierly  looking  gen- 
n  whom  i:\-try  one  called  "  Colonel,"  and 
whose  kindly  eyes  beamed  out  from  under  his 
soft  felt  hat  in  paternal  friendliness  upon  all. 
"  It  is  somewhat  singular,"  he  said  at  length, 
when  there  had  come  a  lull  in  the  conversation, 
"  that  none  of  the  story- writers  have  ever  dealt 
with  the  negro  as  a  resident  of  two  continents. 
Why  could  not  a  good  story  be  written,  the 
scene  laid  partly  in  Africa  and  partly  in  the 
South  ?  I  am  not  familiar  enough  with  the  lit- 
erature of  this  kind  and  the  romances  that 
have  been  written  about  our  darkies  to  say 
positively  that  it  has  not  been  already  done, 
but  it  seems  to  me  that  the  opportunity  to  de- 
velop a  character  from  the  savage  to  the  civ- 
ilized state  is  very  fine  and  would  take  well. 
Victor  Hugo  has  a  negro  in  one  of  his  West 
India  romances  whose  name  I  forget  now  — 
the  story  used  to  be  familiar  —  " 
"  Bug-Jargal,"  suggested  some  one. 
"So  it  was.  But  in  this  reference  is  made 
only  to  the  man's  ancestry;  and  I  never  thought 
the  character  true  to  life.  Hugo  did  not  know 
the  negro." 
"  But,  Colonel,  is  it  not  true  that  these  peo- 
ple were  the  veriest  savages,  and  would  it 
not  be  too  great  a  strain  upon  the  realistic 
ideas  of  the  day  to  venture  into  Africa  for  a 
hero,  especially  since  Rider  Haggard  has  ideal- 
ized it  ?  " 
"  I  don't  think  so.  We  have  no  way  of  ascer- 
taining just  how  much  the  imported  slaves  really 
knew,  but  it  is  a  fact  that  a  few  were  remarka- 
ble for  some  kind  of  skill  and  intelligence.  They 
were  not  communicative,  and  soon  drifted  into 
the  dialect  of  their  new  neighbors,  forgetting 
their  own.  I  had  a  negro  on  my  plantation 
who  undoubtedly  came  from  Africa.  I  was 
present  when  my  father  bought  him  upon  the 
streets  of  Savannah,  becoming  interested  in  his 
story  soon  after  he  was  landed.     His  mother
ABRAHAM    LINCOLN:     A    HISTORY.3 
THE    ANNOUNCEMENT    OF    EMANCIPATION. 
BV   JOHN    G.    NICOLAY    AND    JOHN    HAY,    PRIVATE    SECRETARIES    TO    THE    PRESIDENT. 
POPE  S    VIRGINIA    CAMPAIGN. 
N  order  to  understand  the  unfor- 
tunate consequence  of  the  long 
delay  of  McClellan  in  moving 
his  army  from  the  James  to  the 
Potomac,  a  few  words  of  retro- 
spect are  here  necessary.  On 
June  26,  1862,  General  John  Pope  was  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  Vir- 
ginia, consisting  of  the  corps  of  Fremont, 
Banks,  and  McDowell.  Fremont,  having  re- 
fused to  serve  under  his  junior,  was  relieved 
of  his  command,  and  his  place  taken  by  Gen- 
eral Franz  Sigel.  McDowell  and  Banks,  who 
might  with  much  more  reason  have  objected  to 
the  arrangement,  accepted  it  with  soldierly  and 
patriotic  promptness.  General  Pope,  though 
still  a  young  man,  was  a  veteran  soldier.  He 
was  a  graduate  of  the  class  of  1842  at  West 
Point,  had  served  with  distinction  in  the  Mex- 
ican War,  and  had  had  a  great  success  in  the 
capture  of  Island  No.  10  in  the  Mississippi 
River  in  the  spring  of  1862.  He  had  made  a 
very  favorable  impression,  not  only  upon  the 
President  but  upon  most  members  of  the 
Cabinet.  He  remained  in  Washington  for  sev- 
eral weeks  after  having  been  assigned  to  his 
new  command,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Gen- 
eral Halleck,  the  new  General-in-Chief,  and 
only  left  there  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  his 
troops  on  the  29th  of  July. 
In  the  latter  part  of  June  the  President, 
being  deeply  anxious  in  regard  to  the  military 
situation,  and  desiring  to  obtain  the  best  ad- 
vice in  his  power,  had  made  as  privately  as 
possible  a  visit  to  General  Scott  in  his  retire- 
ment to  ask  his  counsel.  The  only  record  of 
this  visit  is  a  memorandum  from  Scott  approv- 
ing the  President's  own  plan  of  sending  Mc- 
Dowell's command  to  reenforce  McClellan 
before  Richmond,  a  plan  the  execution  of 
which  was  prevented  by  Lee's  attack.  It  is 
probable  that  at  this  same  interview  the  ap- 
pointment of  Halleck  as  General-in-Chief  wTas 
again  suggested  by  General  Scott.  Secretary 
Chase  says  in  his  diary  that  so  far  as  he  knew 
no  member  of  the  Cabinet  was  consulted  in 
regard  to  it.2    The  appointment  when  made 
was  received  with  general  approval.  Halleck 
was  not  McClellan,  which  was  sufficient  for 
the  more  vehement  opponents  of  that  general ; 
and  he  was  not  a  Republican,  which  pleased 
the  other  party.  In  fact  he  shocked  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  by  saying  at  the  first 
Cabinet  meeting  he  attended,  "  I  confess  1  do 
not  think  much  of  the  negro."  If  Halleck 
never  fulfilled  the  high  expectations  at  first 
entertained  of  him,  he  at  least  discharged  the 
duties  of  his  great  office  with  intelligence  and 
fidelity.  His  integrity  and  his  ability  were  alike 
undoubted.  His  deficiencies  were  rather  those 
of  temperament.  In  great  crises  he  lacked 
determination  and  self-confidence,  and  was 
always  more  ready  to  avoid  than  to  assume 
embarrassing  responsibility. 
General  Halleck  had  arrived  from  the  West, 
had  taken  command  of  all  the  armies  of  the 
Republic  on  July  23,  and  started  at  once  on 
a  visit  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  After  his 
return  from  the  James  the  question  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  removal  from  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  much  discussed  in  Admin- 
istration circles.  The  President  himself  was 
averse  to  it.  Secretary  Chase  was  the  most 
prominent  member  of  the  Government  in  its 
favor.  He  urged  it  strongly  upon  General 
Halleck,  thinking  it  necessary  to  the  revival 
of  the  credit  of  the  country.  Halleck  agreed 
with  him  in  condemning  McClellan's  military 
operations,  but  thought  that  k'  under  his  or- 
ders "  McClellan  "  would  do  very  well."  Pope, 
in  conversation  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury, said  he  had  warned  the  President  that  he 
could  not  safely  command  the  Army  of  Vir- 
ginia if  its  success  was  to  depend  on  the  co- 
operation of  McClellan,  for  he  felt  assured  that 
his  cooperation  would  fail  at  some  time  when 
it  would  be  most  important.  But  the  resolu- 
tion was  taken,  upon  Halleck's  report,  to  with- 
draw McClellan  with  his  arm)-.  On  the  30th. 
as  we  have  seen,  McClellan  was  ordered  to 
send  away  his  sick.  On  the  3d  of  August  he 
was  directed  to  move  his  army  to  Aquia  Creek. 
Reiterated  orders,  entreaties,  arguments,  and 
reproaches  were  all  powerless  to  hasten  his 
2  Secretary  Welles  says  Scott,  Stanton,  and  Pope 
favored  Halleck's  appointment. —  Lincoln  andSei 
1  Copyright  by  J.  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  1SS6.     All  rights  reserved.
>.S 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
to  bring-  him  to  the   Potomac 
ess    than    three    weeks.     His   first   troops, 
.  >lds's  division,  joined  the  Army  of  Vir- 
n  the  23d  of  August. 
In  the  mean  time  Pope  had  begun  his  cam- 
pi  with  an  error  of  taste  more  serious  than 
!  rror  o\  conduct  he  ever  committed.   He 
had  issued  an  address  to   his  army  containing 
a  few  expressions  which  had  made  almost  all 
ers  o\    the   Army  of  the  Potomac  his 
This  address,  which  had  no  other  purpose 
than  to  encourage  and  inspirit  his  men,  was  re- 
1.  to  Pope's  amazement,  with  a  storm  of 
.  ridicule  which  lasted  as  long  as  he  re- 
mained in  command  of  the  Army  of  Virginia, 
and  very  seriously  weakened  his  hold  upon  the 
confidence  of  his  troops  and  the  respect  of  the 
public.  As  a  matter  of  course  it  rendered  im- 
possible any  sincere  sympathy  and  support  from 
General  McClellan  and  those  nearest  to  him. 
It  may  even  be  doubted  whether  there  had 
been  from  the  beginning  any  probability  of  a 
good  understanding  between  them.  From  the 
moment  Pope  arrived  from  the  West  he  was  re- 
garded with  jealousy  by  the  friends  of  McClel- 
lan as  a  certain  rival  and  possible  successor. 
In  the  last  days  of  June,  when  McClellan 
made  his  first  intimation  of  a  change  of  base, 
Pope  had  suggested,  and  the  President  had 
conveyed  his  suggestion  to  McClellan,  that  it 
would  be  better  for  the  latter,  if  forced  to  leave 
the  line  of  the  Chickahominy,  to  fall  back  on 
the  Pamunkey.  The  source  from  which  the 
suggestion  came  was  sufficient  to  insure  its 
rejection  if  there  had  been  no  other  reason. 
Pope  had  taken  great  pains  to  establish  friendly 
relations  with  McClellan,  writing  him,  as  soon 
as  he  assumed  command,  a  long  and  cordial 
letter  giving  him  a  full  account  of  his  situation 
and  intentions,  and  inviting  his  confidence  and 
sympathy  in  return.  McClellan  answered  a 
'ays  later  in  a  briefer  letter,  in  which  he 
clearly  foreshadowed  an  intention  to  resist  the 
withdrawal  of  his  army  from  its  present  posi- 
tion. Handicapped  by  this  lack  of  cordial  sym- 
pathy for  him  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
left  Wellington  on  the  29th  of  July  to 
1  his  work,  the  first  object  of  which  was 
lake  a  demonstration  in  the  direction  of 
Gordonsville  to  assist   in  the  withdrawal  of 
McClellan's  army  from  the  James.  In  pur- 
suance of  this  intention  Generals  Banks  and 
Sigel  were  ordered  to  move  to  Culpeper  Court 
House.  Banks  promptly  obeyed  his  orders, 
arriving  there  shortly  before  midnight  on  the 
8th  of  August.  Sigel,  from  some  mistake  as  to 
the  road,  did  not  get  there  until  the  evening  of 
the  next  day.  By  that  time  Banks  had  gone 
forward  to  Cedar  Mountain,  and  at  that  point, 
with  a  force  of  less  than  8000  men  of  all  arms, 
he  attacked  the  army  corps  of  Stonewall  Jack- 
son, consisting  of  E well's,  Hill's,  and  Jackson's 
divisions,  with  such  vigor  and  impetuosity  that 
he  came  near  defeating  them.  He  inflicted 
such  a  blow  upon  Jackson  as  to  give  him  an 
exaggerated  idea  of  his  numbers ;  and  hear- 
ing two  days  afterwards  that  Banks  had  been 
reenforced,  Jackson  thought  best  to  retire  to 
the  Rapidan. 
By  this  time  General  Lee,  having  become 
convinced  that  McClellan  was  about  to  leave 
the  Peninsula,  concluded  to  concentrate  a  large 
force  upon  Pope's  advance,  to  attack  and  if  pos- 
sible to  destroy  it.  On  the  13th  of  August  Gen- 
eral Longstreet  was  ordered  to  the  Rapidan 
with  the  divisions  of  Longstreet  and  Jackson, 
and  Stuart's  cavalry  corps.  General  Lee  dis- 
posed of  an  army  of  about  55,000  men.  Pope, 
finding  himself  so  greatly  outnumbered,  wisely 
retreated  behind  the  Rappahannock,  where  he 
established  himself  without  loss  on  the  20th  of 
August. 
Thus  far  Pope  had  made  no  mistake.  He 
had  succeeded  in  checking  the  advance  of 
Jackson,  in  withdrawing  such  a  force  of  the 
enemy  from  Richmond  as  to  leave  McClellan's 
retreat  unmolested,  and  had  established  his 
army  in  good  condition  on  the  north  bank  of 
the  Rappahannock.  Under  orders  from  Gen- 
eral Halleck  he  held  the  line  of  this  river  for 
eight  days,  repulsing  several  attempts  of  the 
enemy  to  cross,  in  hope,  as  the  General-in-Chief 
said,  "  that  during  this  time  sufficient  forces 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  reach 
Aquia  Creek  to  enable  us  to  prevent  any 
further  advance  of  Lee,  and  eventually,  with  the 
combined  armies,  to  drive  him  back  upon 
Richmond."  2  Baffled  in  his  repeated  attempts 
to  cross  the  Rappahannock  in  front  of  Pope's 
position,  General  Lee  resolved  upon  a  flank 
movement  to  the  left  and  intrusted  it  to  Stone- 
1    .   .   .    tl  e  to  you  from  the  West,  where  we 
have  always  seen  the  backs  of  our  enemies;  from  an 
army  whose  business  it  has  been  to  ;eek  1  lie  adversary 
and  to  beat,  him  when  found  —  whose  policy  has  been 
attack,  and  not  defense.  ...  I  presume  that  I  have 
been  called  here  to  pursue  the  same  system  and  to 
lead  you  against  the  enemy;  and  it  is  my  purpose  to 
.  and  that  speedily.  ...  I  desire  you  to  dis- 
miss from  your  minds  certain  phrases  which  I  am 
sorry  to  find  much  in  vogue  amongst  you.  I  hear  con- 
stantly of  taking  strong  positions,  and  holding  them; 
of  lines  of  retreat,  and  of  bases  of  supplies.  Let  us 
discard  such  ideas.  The  strongest  position  that  a  sol- 
dier should  desire  to  occupy  is  one  from  which  he 
can  most  easvly  advance  against  the  enemy.  Let  us 
study  the  probable  lines  of  retreat  of  our  opponents, 
and  leave  our  own  to  take  care  of  themselves.  Let  us 
look  before  us,  and  not  behind.  Success  and  glory 
are  in  the  advance;  disaster  and  shame  lurk  in  the 
rear.  .  .  .  [Pope's  address  "To  the  Officers  and  Sol- 
diers of  the  Army  of  Virginia,"  July  14,  1862.] 
2  Halleck,  Report  of  Nov.  25,  1862.    War  Records.
THE  ANNOUNCEMENT  OE  EMANCJ/'A  77 ON 
4*9 
wall  Jackson.  The  latter  executed  the  task 
with  amazing  audacity  and  swiftness,  marching 
round  the  left  and  rear  of  the  Union  army 
through  the  villages  of  Amissville,  Orlean,  and 
Salem,  pouring  his  forces  through  Thorough- 
fare Gap  in  the  Bull  Run  Mountains  and  strik- 
ing Pope's  line  of  communication  and  a  valu- 
able depot  of  supplies  at  Manassas  Junction. 
Jackson  retired  from  this  place  and  took  up 
his  position  in  the  morning  of  the  28th  of 
August  just  north  of  the  Warrenton  Turnpike, 
near  the  old  battlefield  of  Bull  Run.  Long- 
street's  corps  was  so  far  behind  Jackson  that  a 
rapid  change  of  front  and  concentration  of  all 
the  troops  at  Pope's  and  Halleck's  disposal 
ought  to  have  destroyed  Jackson,  isolated  as 
he  was  from  the  rest  of  Lee's  army.  But  his 
position  was  not  ascertained  as  soon  as  it  should 
have  been.  Owing  to  causes  which  have  led 
to  infinite  controversy,  the  Union  forces  were 
not  brought  together  with  the  energy  and  celer- 
ity required,  and  therefore  it  came  about  that  in 
the  morning  of  August  29  Pope's  main  army 
confronted  Jackson  on  the  Warrenton  Pike  at 
Groveton ;  Porter  was  some  three  miles  on  the 
left  near  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  and  Long- 
street  was  on  the  march  from  Thoroughfare  Gap 
to  effect  his  junction  with  Jackson's  right.  There 
was  still  an  opportunity  to  win  a  great  victory. 
General  Fitz  John  Porter,  when  at  Warren- 
ton Junction  on  the  evening  of  the  27th  of 
August,  had  received  an  order  from  General 
Pope  to  march  at  1  a.  m.  to  Bristoe  Station ; 
but,  in  the  exercise  of  his  own  discretion,  he 
did  not  march  until  dawn.  This  delay,  how- 
ever, had  as  yet  no  specially  disastrous  results, 
and  would  probably  never  have  been  brought 
into  such  prominence  as  it  afterwards  assumed 
had  it  not  been  for  the  light  which  it  was  sup- 
posed to  cast  upon  subsequent  events.  Porter 
was,  however,  in  his  place  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th,  with  his  splendid  corps  in  fighting 
trim  some  distance  from  General  Pope's  left 
and  a  little  in  rear  of  his  line  of  battle.  He  had 
been  ordered  to  Centreville  the  night  before, 
but  his  orders  had  been  changed,  early  in  the 
morning,  to  proceed  to  Gainesville  instead.  No 
time  had  been  lost  by  this  change,  as  his  new 
order  found  him,  on  his  march,  at  Manassas 
Junction,  whence  he  pushed  out  his  column  on 
the  Gainesville  road  to  a  little  stream  called 
Dawkins  Branch,  where  he  halted. 
About  9  o'clock  General  Pope  issued  to 
McDowell  and  Porter  a  joint  order  x  directing 
them  to  move  their  commands  towards  Gaines- 
ville, and  to  establish  communication  between 
themselves  and  the  main  body  on  the  Warren- 
ton Turnpike.  General  McDowell  relates  in 
his  testimony  before  the  general  court-martial 
of  Fitz  John  Porter  that  he  met  General  Porter 
1  War  Records. 
near  the  little  stream  just  mentioned,  about  five 
miles  from  Manassas  Junction  arid  three  miles 
from  Gainesville.  They  had  some  conversation 
in  regard  to  the  joint  order,  and  Mr  i  Jo  well 
communicated  to  Porter  a  dispatch  he-  had  just 
received  from  General  Buford,  to  the  efieet  that 
a  considerable  body  of  Confederate  trc 
was  approaching  from  the  direction  of  Gail 
ville.  Concluding  from  this  and  other  circum- 
stances that  there  was  immediate  need  of  the 
presence  of  one  of  them  on  the  left  flank  of 
the  main  body  of  the  Lnion  army  then  en- 
gaged with  the  enemy  at  Groveton,  McDowell 
resolved  to  take  his  troops  in  that  direction. 
On  leaving  General  Porter  he  said  to  him, 
"  You  put  your  force  in  here  and  I  will  take 
mine  up  the  Sudley  Springs  road  on  the  left  of 
the  troops  engaged  at  that  point."  McDowell 
reached  Pope  about  5  p.  m.  and  reported  to  him 
with  King's  division,  commanded  by  Hatch, 
as  King  was  suffering  from  a  severe  illness. 
The  battle  which  had  raged  all  day  between 
Pope's  and  Jackson's  armies  was  ebbing  to  its 
close,  neither  side  having  gained  any  decided 
advantage.  McDowell's  men  were  put  in  at 
the  left  of  the  line  for  the  last  sharp  hour  of 
fighting ;  they  lost  heavily,  but  fought  with  the 
greatest  gallantry.  They  finally  retired  in  good 
order,  leaving  one  gun  in  the  hands  of  the  en- 
emy, which  had  "  continued  to  fire,"  says  the 
Confederate  Colonel  Law,  "  until  my  men  were 
so  near  it  as  to  have  their  faces  burnt  by  its  dis- 
charges." At  4:30  Pope,  who  had  waited  all 
day  for  Porter's  flanking  attack  upon  Jackson's 
right  and  rear,  sent  Porter  a  peremptory  order 
directing  him  to  push  forward  into  action,  keep- 
ing his  right  in  communication  with  Pope's  left. 
There  is  much  discussion  whether  this  order 
was  delivered  at  5  or  6  o'clock.  Captain 
Douglas  Pope,  who  bore  it,  says  it  was  de- 
livered at  the  earlier  hour;  General  Porter 
claims  that  it  was  an  hour  later ;  but.  at  all 
events,  Porter,  who  had  found  indications  of  a 
strong  force  in  his  front,  waited  in  position  till  it 
grew  dark  and  then  retired  in  the  direction  of 
Manassas  Junction.  That  night  General  Pope 
in  deep  exasperation  sent  an  order  to  Porter, 
couched  in  harsh  and  peremptory  terms,  direct- 
ing him  to  report  in  person  with  his  command 
on  the  field  for  orders.  Early  next  morning. 
August  30,  Porter  reported  with  all  of  his  com- 
mand but  one  brigade  ;  and  on  this  day  one  of  9 
the  most  sanguinary  conflicts  of  the  war.  the 
second  battle  of  Bull  Run,  was  fought.  It 
was  a  battle  which  General  Pope  was  under 
no  necessity  of  fighting.  He  might  easily  have 
retired  behind  Bull  Run  and  waited  until 
Franklin's  corps,  which  had  been  moving  from 
Alexandria  with  inexplicable  slowness,  had 
joined  him  and  replenished  his  supplies.  But 
the  reports   of  a  retreat  by  the   enemy,  the
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN 
admirable  fighting  qualities  oi  his  troops  dis- 
played on  the  29th  before  his  eyes,  and  the 
that  on  the  30th  he  had  Porter's  magnifr- 
rps  under  his  immediate  orders,  and 
more  than  all  perhaps  the  temperament  of  the 
.   who   was   always  ready   to   fight   when 
e  was  a  fair  chance  for  him,  determined  him 
-     .   where  he  was  and  to  risk  a  new  bat- 
tle on  that  historic  held.     He  made  a  mistake 
ipposing  that  the  principal  foree  against 
him  was  north  of  the  Warrenton  Turnpike. 
1  Ee  placed,  therefore,  the  bulk  of  his  own  army 
that  side  and  attacked  with  great  energy 
earlv  in  the  afternoon.  Porter's  corps  fought 
with  its  old-time  bravery ;  but  his  troops  having 
tome  within  the  range  of  the  enfilading  fire  of 
Longstreet's  guns,  the  attack  failed  on  the  left. 
ngsl  reel  advanced  on  the  Confederate 
_  .:.  A  furious  struggle  took  place  for  the 
i  don  of  Bald  Hill,  west  of  the  Sudley  Springs 
road;  and  later  Sykes's  regulars,  successfully 
defending  into  the  night  the  Henry  House 
Hill  from  the  assault  of  the  Confederates,  cov- 
ered the  retreat  of  the  Union  army  across  the 
Stone  bridge  to  Centreville.  On  both  sides  it 
was  one  of  the  hardest  fought  battles  of  the  war. 
The  day  after  the  battle  General  Lee  made 
no  attempt  to  pursue  or  molest  Pope's  army; 
but  on  the  evening  of  the  1st  of  September  he 
essayed  his  usual  flanking  experiment  with 
Jackson's  corps  upon  the  Union  right  wing  at 
Chantilly.  Pope  had  foreseen  this,  and  pre- 
pared for  it,  and  a  very  severe  action  took 
place,  beginning  at  sunset  and  terminating  in 
the  darkness,  in  the  midst  of  a  furious  thun- 
der-storm.  Jackson  had  gone  too  fast  and  too 
far.  He  was  readily  repulsed,  but  the  Union 
army  met  with  a  heavy  loss  in  the  death  of 
jrals  Philip  Kearny  and  Isaac  I.  Stevens. 
There  were  few  men  in  the  service  more  able, 
industrious,  modest,  and  faithful  than  Stevens; 
and  Kearny  was  an  ideal  soldier  —  brave, 
cool,  patient,  and  loyal. 
On  the  morning  of  the  1st,  Pope,  who  seemed 
far  more  dispirited  and  discouraged  by  the 
evident  hostility  towards  him  existing  among 
1   Wi  r 
•   A   board  of  three   general    officers  appointed  by 
lent    Hayi  amine    the   case    acquitted 
rter  of  nil  blame  except  for  indiscreet  and 
unkind  criticism  of  his  superior  officer.     A  bill  was 
restoring  him  to  the  army,  but 
•  it  was  vetoed  by  Presidenl  Arthur,  who,  however,  re- 
continuing  disabilities  by  an  Executive 
>  of  Pre  ident  Cleveland  the 
hill  was  once  more  pa      d  s  nd  this  time  approved  by 
Qt,  nn'l  General  Porter  was  restored  to  his 
place  in  the  army  and  honorably  retired. 
3  In  a  letl  ,  t  27th  to  Burnside  from  War- 
renton Junction  he  says  :  "  I  find  a  vast  difference  be- 
tween thesf  dour,.  ...  I  hear  that  they 
are  much  demoralized,  and  need  some  good  troops  to 
heart  and,  I  think,  head.  We  are  working  now  to 
get  behind  Bull  Run,  and  I  presume  will  be  there  in  a 
the  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  than 
by  any  of  his  losses  in  battle,  had  telegraphed 
to  General  Halleck  his  opinion  that  the  army 
should  be  withdrawn  to  the  intrenchments  in 
front  of  Washington,  and  in  that  secure  place 
reorganized  and  rearranged.  "  When  there  is 
no  heart  in  their  leaders,"  he  says,  "  and  every 
disposition  to  hang  back,  much  cannot  be  ex- 
pected from  the  men."  1  These  orders  were 
given  the  next  day,  and  the  army  was  brought 
back  without  molestation. 
General  Pope  attributed  the  failure  of  this 
campaign  to  General  Porter's  inaction  and  his 
disobedience  of  orders  upon  the  27  th  and  29th, 
and  in  this  opinion  many  officers  of  the  highest 
rank  and  integrity  agreed.  The  general  court- 
martial  by  which  the  charges  were  considered 
found  General  Porter  guilty  and  sentenced  him 
to  be  cashiered.  He,  assured  of  his  own  integ- 
rity, persistently  protested  against  the  injustice 
of  this  sentence  and  sought  in  every  possible 
way  to  have  it  reversed.2  It  became  in  a  certain 
sense  a  political  question ;  and  when,  a  quarter 
of  a  century  later,  the  Democratic  party  had 
gained  control  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
and  the  Presidency,  General  Porter  was  restored 
to  his  former  position  in  the  army.  With  all  the 
testimony  adduced,  it  is  probable  that  Porter 
would  not  have  been  convicted  had  it  not 
been  for  his  own  letters  written  during  the 
progress  of  the  campaign.  These  show  a  spirit 
of  contempt  and  scorn  for  his  superior  officer 
which  go  far  to  explain  his  behavior  on  this 
occasion.3  It  was  these  letters  which  fur- 
nished the  theory  of  the  prosecution  of  Porter : 
that  he  sincerely  felt  the  good  of  the  army  and 
of  the  country  required  that  Pope  should  be 
deposed  from  the  command  for  which  he  hon- 
estly believed  him  unfit,  and  that  McClellan 
should  have  his  old  army  back  again.  His 
magnificent  courage  and  conduct  on  other 
fields  have  a  tendency  to  blind  the  eyes  of  just 
criticism  in  this  matter ;  but  there  seems  no  re- 
semblance between  this  languid  soldier  of  the 
29th  of  August  and  that  son  of  thunder  who 
at  Beaver  Dam  and  Gaines's  Mill  withstood  the 
few  days  if  strategy  does  not  use  us  up.  The  strategy 
is  magnificent,  and  tactics  in  an  inverse  proportion.  .  .  . 
I  would  like  to  be  ordered  to  return  to  Fredericksburg. 
...  I  do  not  doubt  the  enemy  have  a  large  amount 
of  supplies  provided  for  them,  and  believe  they  have  a 
contempt  for  the  Army  of  Virginia.  I  wish  myself 
away  from  it  with  all  our  old  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
so  do  our  companions.  ...  If  you  can  get  me  away, 
please  do  so."  Later  he  indulges  in  a  pardonable  pleas- 
antry at  the  expense  of  his  commander's  magniloquent 
address  to  his  troops  :  "  Our  line  of  communication  is 
taking  care  of  itself,  in  compliance  with  orders."  On 
the  morning  of  the  29th  he  wrote  :  "  I  hope  Mac  is  at 
work  and  we  shall  soon  be  ordered  out  of  this.  It  would 
seem,  from  proper  statements  of  the  enemy,  that  he 
was  wandering  round  loose ;  but  I  expect  they  know 
what  they  are  doing,  which  is  more  than  any  one  here 
or  anywhere  knows."
THE   ANNOUNCEMENT  OF  EMANCIPATION. 
onset  of  Lee  and  his  army  from  noon  to  night 
of  a  long  summer's  day,  with  the  same  men 
and  guns  who  were  idling  in  the  shade  that 
afternoon  by  Dawk  ins  Branch.  What  he  gal- 
lantly and  gladly  did  for  the  glory  and  honor 
of  a  commander  he  loved  and  admired  he  was 
incapable  of  doing  when  the  glory  and  honor 
was  to  inure  to  the  benefit  of  a  commander 
whom  he  hated  and  despised. 
General  Pope  regarded  the  inefficiency  of 
McClellan  in  forwarding  reinforcements  to 
him  from  Alexandria  as  another  important 
factor  in  his  failure.  He  says  in  his  report  that 
Reynolds's  division,  which  joined  him  on  the 
23d  of  August  at  Rappahannock  station,  and 
the  corps  of  Heintzelman  and  Porter,  about 
18,000  between  them,  which  arrived  on  the 
26th  and  27th  at  Warrenton  Junction,  were 
"  all  of  the  91,000  veteran  troops  from  Har- 
rison's Landing  which  ever  drew  trigger  under 
my  command."  Franklin  and  Sumner  with 
20,000  effectives  reported  to  him  at  Centre- 
ville  too  late  to  redeem  the  campaign.  It  is 
a  fact  not  without  significance  that  the  last 
troops  which  joined  him  before  the  hard  fight- 
ing began  did  so  before  McClellan  took 
charge  at  Alexandria.  General  Sumner,  that 
brave  old  warrior  who  considered  it  a  per- 
sonal injury  to  be  kept  from  any  battlefield 
within  his  reach,  broke  out  in  hot  anger  when 
he  learned  that  McClellan  had  said  his  corps 
was  not  in  a  condition  for  fighting.  "  If  I  had 
been  ordered  to  advance  right  on,"  he  said 
afterwards,1  "  from  Alexandria  by  the  Little 
River  Turnpike,  I  should  have  been  in  that 
Second  Bull  Run  battle  with  my  whole  force." 
He  was  made  to  waste  forty-eight  hours  in 
camp  and  in  a  fruitless  march  to  the  Aque- 
duct bridge. 
In  the  matter  of  Franklin's  corps  the  cor- 
respondence of  General  McClellan  himself 
furnishes  the  most  undeniable  evidence  that 
he  did  not  think  best  to  hurry  matters  in  re- 
enforcing  Pope.  Halleck  on  the  27th  had 
telegraphed  him  the  probability  of  a  general 
battle.  "  Franklin's  corps,"  he  said,  "  should 
move  out  by  forced  marches,  carrying  three  or 
four  days'  provisions."  This  order  was  repeated 
later  in  the  day  in  more  urgent  terms,  that 
"  Franklin's  corps  should  move  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Manassas  as  soon  as  possible."  Mc- 
Clellan answered,  not  that  Franklin  had  started, 
but  that  he  had  sent  orders  to  him  to  "  pre- 
pare to  march."  He  afterwards  discovered 
that  Franklin  was  in  Washington,  and  gave 
orders  to  place  the  corps  in  "readiness  to 
move."  In  the  afternoon  he  sent  dispatches 
indicating  his  belief  that  it  might  be  better  for 
Franklin  not  to  go,  and  questioning  whether 
1  Sumner's  testimony.  Report  of  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 
Washington  was  safe;  and  in  the  evening  of 
the  same  day  this  conviction  had  gained  such 
strength  in  his  mind  that  he  squarely  recom- 
mended that  the  troops  in  hand  be  held  for 
the  defense  of  the  capital.  On  the  mornm 
the  28th  Halleck  telegraphed  direct  an  1 
to  Franklin  to  move  towards  Manassas,  but  at 
1  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  General  McClellan 
replied,  "  The  moment  Franklin  can  be  started 
with  a  reasonable  amount  of  artillery,  he  shall 
go."  At  4:  ro  o'clock  he  added:  "General 
Franklin  is  with  me  here.  I  will  know  in  a  few 
minutes  the  condition  of  artillery  and  cavalrv. 
We  are  not  yet  in  a  condition  to  move ;  may 
be  by  to-morrow  morning."  Halleck,  in  de- 
spair at  this  inertia,  had  telegraphed  at  3  :  30 
o'clock  :  "  Not  a  moment  must  be  lost  in  push- 
ing as  large  a  force  as  possible  towards  Ma- 
nassas so  as  to  communicate  with  Pope  before 
the  enemy  is  reenforced."  To  this,  after  the 
lapse  of  an  hour,  McClellan  answered  : 
Your  dispatch  received.  Neither  Franklin  or 
Sumner's  corps  is  now  in  condition  to  move  and 
fight  a  battle.  It  would  be  a  sacrifice  to  send 
them  now.     .    .    . 
At  night  General  Halleck,  with  vehement 
earnestness,  ordered  — 
There  must  be  no  further  delay  in  moving  Frank- 
lin's corps  towards  Manassas.  They  must  go  to-mor- 
row morning,  ready  or  not  ready.  If  we  delay  too 
long,  there  will  be  no  necessity  to  go  at  all ;  for  Pope 
will  either  be  defeated  or  be  victorious  without  our 
aid.  If  there  is  a  want  of  wagons,  the  men  must  carry 
provisions  with  them  till  the  wagons  can  come  to 
their  relief. 
At  last  McClellan  answered  that  he  had  or- 
dered Franklin  to  march  at  6  in  the  morning 
of  the  29th.  He  then  enumerated  the  force  he 
had  in  hand,amounting  to  about  thirty  thousand 
men,  and  added,  with  a  naivete  which  in  view  of 
Halleck's  urgent  telegrams  for  two  days  would 
be  comical  if  the  consequences  had  not  been 
so  serious,  "  If  you  wish  any  of  them  to  move 
towards  Manassas,  please  inform  me." 
On  the  29th  of  August  he  got  Franklin 
started,  but  still  protested  against  the  order  to 
move  him,  and  continually  through  the  day 
sent  dispatches  suggesting  that  Franklin  should 
go  no  farther,  until  at  last  Halleck,  even  his 
excessive  patience  giving  way,  replied  at  3 
o'clock,  "  I  want  Franklin's  corps  to  go  far 
enough  to  find  out  something  about  the  enemy. 
.  .  .  I  am  tired  of  guesses."  At  a  quarter  be- 
fore 3  in  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  General 
McClellan  sent  the  following  extraordinary 
dispatch  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  which  to  do  him  jus- 
tice must  be  given  entire  : 
The  last  news  I  received  from  the  direction  of 
Manassas  was  from  stragglers,  to  the  effect  that  the 
enemy    were    evacuating   Centreville   and    retiring
43- 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
towards  Thoroughfare  Cap.      This    by   no   means 
;  am  clear  that  one  of  two  courses  should 
:   first,   to  concentrate   all  our  available 
communications  with  Pope ;    second, 
ve  Poj  e  to  get  out  o\  his  scrape,  and  at  once 
II  our  moans' to  make  the  capital  perfectly  safe. 
\  i    middle  ground   will   now  answer.       Tell  me 
what  you  wish   me  to  do  and  1  will  do  all  in  my 
accomplish  it.     1  wish  to  know  what  my 
-  and  authority  are.  1  ask  for  nothing,  but  will 
-  you  give.  1  only  ask  a  prompt 
.  that  1  may  at  once  give  the  necessary  or- 
!t  will  u.ot  do  to  delay  longer. 
There  can  be  no  mistaking  the  transparent 
menace  of  this  dispatch.    Of  the  alternatives 
__   sted,  ho  meant  but  one.    By  his  pro- 
>f  the  last  three  days,  as  well  as  by  his 
ns,  he  had  clearly  shown  his  disinclination 
tempt  to  open  communication  with  Pope. 
There  is  but  one  course,  therefore,  left  which 
commends  itself  to  his  judgment;  that  is,  to 
leave  the  Army  of  Virginia  to  its  fate.  This  dis- 
patch was  sent  directly  to  the  President  in  an- 
swer to  a  request  from  him  for  news,  and  the 
President  replied,  one  must  confess,  with  more 
of  magnanimity  than  of  dignity: 
I  think  your  first  alternative,  "to  concentrate  all 
our  available  forces  to  open  communication  with 
Pope."  is  the  right  one,  but  I  wish  not  to  control. 
That  I  now  leave  to  General  Halleck,  aided  by  your 
counsels. 
During  the  two  entire  days,  the  29th  and 
30th,  while  Pope  was  engaged  in  his  desperate 
struggle  at  Bull  Run  with  the  whole  of  Lee's 
army,  the   singular  interchange  of  telegrams 
i  lalleck  and  McClellan  continued  — 
the  one  giving  orders  growing  more  and  more 
peremptory  every  hour,  and  the  other   giving 
ses   more   or  less   unsatisfactory   for  not 
obeying  them.    But  late  at  night  of  the  31st 
A  :  _  1st,  when  the  fighting  was  virtually  over, 
i  lalleck,  upon  whom  the  fatigue  and 
•  :ment  of  the  past  week  had  had  a  most 
ssing  effect,  suddenly  betrayed  that  weak- 
of  character  which  so  often  surprised  his 
friends,   and    sent   to    McClellan    a    dispatch 
thing  discouragement  in  every  word,  in 
1,  saying  that  he  was  "  utterly  tired  out," 
he  begged  McClellan  "to   assist  him  in  this 
>  with  his  ability  and  experience."  To  this 
ral     McClellan     re-plied    with     unusual 
promptness   a  few  minutes  after  receiving  it, 
sking  for  an  interview  to  settle  his  position. 
In  a  letter  an  hour  later  he  gave  his  decided 
opinion  that  Pope  had  been  totally  defeated 
and  that  everything  available  should'  be  drawn 
in  at  once  :  he  thinks  such  orders  should  be 
sent  immediately  ;    he  has  no   confidence   in 
Pope's   dispositions;    "to  speak  frankly,"  he 
says. —  "and  the  occasion  requires  it, —  there 
appears  to  be  a  total  absence  of  brains,  and 
I  fear  a  total  destruction  of  the  army."    He 
falls  back  again  into  his  sententious  strain : 
The  occasion  is  grave  and  demands  grave  meas- 
ures. The  question  is  the  salvation  of  the  coun- 
try. ...  It  is  my  deliberate  opinion  that  the 
interests  of  the  nation  demand  that  Pope  shall  fall 
back  to-night  if  possible,  and  not  one  moment  is  to 
be  lost. 
The  same  advice  was  repeated  by  Pope  the 
next  morning,  and  Halleck  at  once  gave  the 
necessary  orders.  On  September  1,  General 
McClellan  visited  Washington  and  conversed 
with  Halleck  and  the  President.  Mr.  Lincoln 
had  been  greatly  distressed  and  shocked  by 
the  account  Pope  had  given  of  the  demorali- 
zation of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  in 
his  opinion  proceeded  from  the  spirit  of  hostil- 
ity and  insubordination  displayed  openly  by 
some  of  its  most  prominent  officers.  He  re- 
quested McClellan  to  use  his  great  personal 
influence  with  his  immediate  friends  in  that 
army  to  correct  this  evil.  McClellan,  while  not 
crediting  the  report  of  Pope,  nevertheless  com- 
plied with  the  request  of  the  President,  and 
sent  a  letter  to  Porter  urging  him  and  all  his 
friends,  for  his  sake,  to  extend  to  General  Pope 
the  same  support  they  had  always  given  him, 
to  which  Porter  replied  in  loyal  and  soldierly 
terms.  On  the  next  day  (September  2),  Mr. 
Lincoln  placed  the  defenses  of  Washington  and 
the  command  of  the  troops  as  they  arrived 
from  the  front  in  the  hands  of  General  Mc- 
Clellan. There  is  no  other  official  act  of  his  life 
for  which  he  has  been  more  severely  criticised, 
but  we  need  not  go  far  to  find  a  motive  for  it. 
The  restoration  of  McClellan  to  command 
was  Mr.  Lincoln's  own  act.  The  majority  of 
the  Cabinet  were  strongly  opposed  to  it.  The 
Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  agreed,  upon  the  29th  of  August,  in 
a  remonstrance  against  McClellan's  continu- 
ance in  command  of  any  army  of  the  Union. 
They  reduced  it  to  writing;  it  was  signed  by 
themselves  and  the  Attorney-General,  and  after- 
wards by  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior.  The 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  concurred  in  the  judg- 
ment of  his  colleagues,  but  declined  to  sign  it, 
on  the  ground  that  it  might  seem  unfriendly 
to  the  President.  In  the  Cabinet  meeting  of 
the  2d  of  September  the  whole  subject  was 
freely  discussed.  The  Secretary  of  War  dis- 
claimed any  responsibility  for  the  action  taken, 
saying  that  the  order  to  McClellan  was  given 
him  directly  by  the  President  and  that  General 
Halleck  considered  himself  relieved  from  re- 
sponsibility by  it,  although  he  acquiesced  and 
approved  the  order.  He  thought  that  Mc- 
Clellan was  now  in  a  position  where  he  could 
shirk  all  responsibility,  shielding  himself  under 
Halleck,  while  Halleck  would  shield  himself 
under  the  President.    Mr.  Lincoln  took  a  dif-
THE   ANNOUNCEMENT  OE  EMANCIPATION. 
4.33 
ferent  view  of  the  transaction,  saying  that  he 
considered  General  Halleck  as  much  in  com- 
mand of  the  army  as  ever,  and  that  General 
McClellan  had  been  charged  with  special  func- 
tions, to  command  the  troops  for  the  defense 
of  Washington,  and  that  he  placed  him  there 
because  he  could  see  no  one  who  could  do  so 
well  the  work  required.1  The  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  in  recording  this  proceeding  does  not 
disguise  his  scorn  for  the  lack  of  spirit  displayed 
by  the  President,  and  on  a  later  date  he  adds  : 
It  is  indeed  humiliating,  but  prompted  I  believe 
by  a  sincere  desire  to  serve  the  country,  and  a  fear 
that  should  he  supersede  McClellan  by  any  other 
commander  no  advantage  would  be  gained  in  lead- 
ership, but  much  harm  in  the  disaffection  of  officers 
and  troops. 
Mr.  Lincoln  certainly  had  the  defects  of  his 
great  qualities.  His  unbounded  magnanimity 
made  him  incapable  sometimes  even  of  just 
resentments.  In  regard  to  offenses  committed 
against  himself  he  used  laughingly  to  say, 
"  I  am  in  favor  of  short  statutes  of  limitations." 
General  McClellan's  worst  offenses  had  been 
committed  against  the  President  in  person. 
The  insulting  dispatch  from  Savage's  Station 
and  the  letter  from  Harrison's  Landing,  in 
which  he  took  the  President  to  task  for  the 
whole  course  of  his  civil  and  military  adminis- 
tration, would  probably  have  been  pardoned 
by  no  other  ruler  that  ever  lived;  yet  Mr. 
Lincoln  never  appeared  to  bear  the  slightest 
ill-will  to  the  general  on  account  of  these  af- 
fronts. He  did  feel  deeply  the  conduct  of  Mc- 
Clellan towards  Pope.  He  was  outraged  at 
McClellan's  suggestion  to  leave  Pope  to  his 
fate.  He  said  to  one  of  his  household  on  the 
30th  of  August,  "  He  has  acted  badly  to- 
wards Pope ;  he  really  wanted  him  to  fail  "  ;  2 
and  after  he  had  placed  him  again  in  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  he  repeated 
this  severe  judgment,  but  he  added,  "  There 
is  no  one  in  the  army  who  can  man  these 
fortifications  and  lick  these  troops  of  ours  into 
shape  half  as  well  as  he  can."  Again  he  said, 
"  We  must  use  the  tools  we  have ;  if  he  cannot 
fight  himself,  he  excels  in  making  others  ready 
to  fight."  In  the  interests  of  the  country  he 
condoned  the  offenses  against  Pope  as  readily 
as  those  against  himself. 
It  may  perhaps  even  be  said  that  McClellan, 
so  far  from  suffering  at  the  President's  hands 
for  his  unbecoming  conduct  towards  him, 
gained  a  positive  advantage  by  it.  It  was  not 
alone  for  his  undoubted  talents  as  an  organizer 
and  drill-master  that  he  was  restored  to  his 
command.  It  was  a  time  of  gloom  and  doubt 
in  the  political  as  well  as  in  the  military  situa- 
1  Chase's  Diary.     Warden,  p.  456  et  seq. 
2  J.  H.,  Diary. 
Vol.    XXXVII.  —  59. 
tion.  The  factious  spirit  was  stronger  among 
the  politicians  and  the  press  of  the  Demo< 
party  than  at  any  other  time  during  the  war. 
Not  only  in  the  States  of  the  border,  but  in 
many  Northern  States,  there  were  signs  of  sullen 
discontent  among  a  large  body  of  the  people 
that  could  not  escape  the  notice  of  a  si 
man  so  vigilant  as  Lincoln.  It  was  of  the 
greatest  importance,  not  only  in  the  interest 
of  recruiting,  but  also  in  the  interest  of  that 
wider  support  which  a  popular  government  re- 
quires from  the  general  body  of  its  citizens,  that 
causes  of  offense  against  any  large  portion  of 
the  community  should  be  sedulously  avoided 
by  those  in  power.  General  McClellan  had 
made  himself,  by  his  demonstration  against 
the  President's  policy,  the  leader  of  the  Demo- 
cratic party.  Mr.  Lincoln,  for  these  reasons, 
was  especially  anxious  to  take  no  action 
against  McClellan  which  might  seem  to  be 
dictated  by  personal  jealousy  or  pique;  and 
besides,  as  General  Pope  had  himself  reported, 
there  was  a  personal  devotion  to  McClellan 
among  those  in  high  command  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  which  rendered  it  almost  im- 
possible for  any  other  general  to  get  its  best 
work  out  of  it.  General  Hitchcock,  one  of 
the  most  accomplished  officers  of  the  old 
army,  gave  this  as  the  reason  for  his  declining 
the  command  of  that  army. 
It  is  difficult  to  regard  without  indignation 
the  treatment,  however  necessary  and  justifi- 
able, which  the  principal  actors  in  this  great 
transaction  received.  McClellan,  whose  con- 
duct from  beginning  to  end  can  only  be  con- 
demned, received  command  of  a  great  army, 
reorganized  and  reenforced,  and  with  it  a 
chance  for  magnificent  achievement,  if  he  had 
been  able  to  improve  it,  which  no  officer  be- 
fore or  since  ever  enjoyed  on  this  continent. 
Pope,  who  had  fought  with  the  greatest  brav- 
ery and  perseverance  a  losing  battle  against 
Lee's  entire  army  all  the  way  from  the  Rapi- 
dan  to  the  Potomac,  encouraged  at  every 
point  with  the  hope  of  reinforcements  which 
only  reached  him  too  late,  and  finally  by  his 
misfortunes  adding  a  new  illustration  to  the 
prestige  of  his  rival  and  enemy,  received  dim- 
ply the  compliments  and  congratulations  of 
his  superiors  and  was  then  removed  to  a  dis- 
tant department  of  the  frontier,  to  take  no 
further  part  in  the  stirring  scenes  of  a  war  in 
which  he  was  so  well  qualified  to  bear  an 
honorable  part.  McDowell,  a  perfect  soldier, 
among  the  bravest,  ablest,  and  most  loyal 
officers  of  the  army,  who  had  done  his  whole 
duty  and  much  more,  who  zealously  went  be- 
fore and  beyond  the  orders  of  his  superiors, 
always  seeking  the  post  of  utmost  danger  and 
toil,  was  found  at  the  close  of  this  campaign. 
of  which  he  was  the  true  hero,  with  his  reputa-
434 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
smirched  and  tarnished  by  senseless 
and  malignant    calumny  that  he   was  never 
during  the  war  considered  available  for 
those   high    and   important   employments   for 
h  he  was  better,  equipped  than  almost 
any  of  his  comrades.  A  court  of  inquiry,  it 
is  true,  vindicated  him  completely  from  every 
ge  that  malice  or  ignorance  had  invented 
rim;  but  the  two  disasters  of  Bull 
Run.  in  successive  summers,  for  neither  of 
which  he  was  to  blame,  remained  in  the  gen- 
eral mind  in>eparably  connected  with  his  name. 
General  McClellan  himself  never  appreci- 
ated the  magnanimity  with  which  he  had  been 
treated.    In  fact,  he  thought  the  magnanimity 
all  upon  his  side.  As  time  wore  on  he 
continuallv  exaggerated  in  his  own  mind  the 
services  he  had  rendered  and  the  needs  of  the 
i  mment  at  the  time  he  had  been  placed  in 
Kind,  until  he  created  for  himself  the  fan- 
tastic delusion  that  he  had  saved  the  Adminis- 
tration from  despair  !  In  the  last  lines  he  ever 
wrote,  shortly  before  his  death,  he  gives  this 
absolutely  new  and  most  remarkable  account 
of  the  visit  which  Lincoln  and  Halleck  made 
to  him  on  the  2d  of  September  : 
He  [the    President]    then   said  that   he  regarded 
ington  as  lost,  and  asked  me  if  1  would,  un- 
der  the  circumstances,  as  a  favor  to  him,   resume 
command   and    do  the   best   that   could   be   done. 
Without  one  moment's  hesitation,  and  without  mak- 
any  conditions  whatever,  I  at  once  said  that  I 
I  accept    the  command  and  would  stake  my 
life  that  I  would  save  the  city.     Both  the  President 
and  Halleck  again  asserted  that  it  was  impossible  to 
save  the  city,  and  I  repeated  my  firm    conviction 
that  I  could  and  would  save  it.   They  then  left,  the 
President  verbally  placing  me  in  entire  command 
of  the  city  and  of  the  troops  falling  back  upon  it 
from  the  front.1 
It  is  possible  that  in  the  lapse  of  twenty 
neral  McClellan's  memory  had  be- 
'listorted  by  constant  dwelling  upon 
:ied  wrongs  that  he  was  at  last  capable 
of  believing  this  absurd  fiction.    It  was  a  fancy 
adopted  in  the  last  years  of  his  life.    A  year 
after  his  removal  from  command  he  wrote  a 
voluminous  report  of  his  entire  military  history, 
filling  an  octavo  volume.    He  wras   then  the 
!     favorite    of    the    Democratic 
.  tin:  j predestined  candidate  for  the  Presi- 
dency in  opposition  to  Lincoln.    He  embodied 
in  that  report  every  incident  or  argument  he 
could  think  of  to  justify  his  own  conduct  and 
*;idemn  that  of  the  Government.    Yet  in 
this  interminable   document  there  is  no  hint 
that  Lincoln   or  Halleck   thought  the  capital 
was    lost.    He  apparently  never  dreamed  of 
such  a  thing  while  Lincoln  lived ;  he  gave  no 
1  Tin.  Century,  May,  1886.   <<  McClellan's  Own 
Story,':  p.  535. 
intimation  of  such  a  charge  while  Halleck  sur- 
vived, although  their  relations  were  frankly  hos- 
tile. Only  after  both  these  witnesses  had  passed 
away,  and  a  direct  contradiction  was  thus  ren- 
dered impossible,  did  it  occur  to  him  to  report 
this  conversation  between  his  patriotic  heroism 
and  their  craven  despair  ! 
There  is  another  proof  that  this  story  was 
an  after-thought.  In  a  letter  to  his  family, 
written  on  the  2d,  the  very  morning  of  this  pre- 
tended conversation,  he  merely  says : 
I  was  surprised  this  morning,  when  at  breakfast, 
by  a  visit  from  the  President  and  Halleck,  in  which 
the  former  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  troubles 
now  impending  could  be  overcome  better  by  me 
than  by  any  one  else.  Pope  is  ordered  to  fall  back 
upon  Washington,  and  as  he  reenters  everything  is 
to  come  under  my  command  again. 
When  we  consider  that  in  these  private  let- 
ters he  never  omits  an  opportunity  for  heroic 
posturing,  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  if 
Lincoln  and  Halleck  an  hour  or  two  before 
had  been  imploring  him  to  save  the  capital,  he 
would  not  have  mentioned  it.  The  truth  is,  Mc- 
Clellan himself  has  left  evidence  of  the  fact 
that  he  thought  Washington  in  danger.  He 
wrote  to  his  wife  : 
1  do  not  regard  Washington  as  safe  against  the 
rebels.  If  I  can  quietly  slip  over  there  I  will  send 
your  silver  off. 
If  it  was  worth  while  to  cumber  these  pages 
with  the  refutation  of  a  calumny  so  transparently 
false,  we  could  bring  the  testimony  of  a  score 
of  witnesses  to  show  that  Mr.  Lincoln,  during 
the  first  days  of  September,  was  unusually  cool 
and  determined.  Grieved  and  disappointed  as 
he  was  at  the  failure  of  Pope's  campaign,  his 
principal  preoccupation  was  not  at  any  time  the 
safety  of  Washington.  It  was  that  Lee's  army, 
as  he  frequently  expressed  it,  "  should  not  get 
away  without  being  hurt."  On  Monday  morn- 
ing he  said  :  "  They  must  be  whipped  here  and 
now.  Pope  must  fight  them ;  and  if  they  are 
too  strong  for  him,  he  can  gradually  get  back 
to  these  fortifications."  At  the  time  McClel- 
lan falsely  represents  him  as  hopeless  of  saving 
Washington  he  had  no  thought  of  the  safety 
of  that  place  in  his  mind,  except  as  a  second- 
ary and  permanent  consideration.  He  was 
making  ready  a  force  to  attack  the  enemy.  On 
the  3d  of  September  he  wrote  with  his  own 
hand  this  order,  which  sufficiently  shows  the 
mood  he  was  in  : 
Ordered,  that  the  General-in-Chief,  Major-Gen- 
eral Halleck,  immediately  commence  and  proceed 
with  all  possible  dispatch  to  organize  an  army  for 
active  operations  from  all  the  material  within  and 
coming  within  his  control,  independent  of  the  forces 
he  may  deem  necessary  for  the  defense  of  Washing- 
ton, when  such  active  army  shall  take  the  field.
THE  ANNOUNCEMENT  OF  EMANCIPATION. 
43; 
This  order,  countersigned  by  the  Secretary 
of  War,  was  delivered  to  Halleck  by  General 
Townsend,  and  the  work  of  preparing  the  army 
for  the  offensive  was  at  once  begun.  Mc(  lel- 
lan,  under  Halleck's  direction,  went  heartily  to 
work  to  execute  these  orders  of  the  President. 
He  had  none  of  the  protecting  airs  he  gives 
himself  in  his  memoirs ;  his  conduct  was  ex- 
emplary. "  McClellan,"  said  Lincoln  on  the 
5th,  "  is  working  like  a  beaver.  He  seems  to 
be  aroused  to  doing  something  by  the  sort  of 
snubbing  he  got  last  week."  The  work  he  was 
now  engaged  upon  was  congenial  staff  work, 
and  he  performed  it  with  great  zeal  and  effi- 
ciency. It  suited  him  in  after  years  to  pretend 
that  he  was  acting  without  orders  and  without 
communication  with  the  Government.  It  was 
his  favorite  phrase  that  he  went  to  Antietam 
with  a  "  halter  about  his  neck."  But  his  letters 
written  at  the  time  contradict  those  assertions. 
He  wrote  from  Washington,  on  the  7th  of 
September  : 
I  leave  here  this  afternoon  to  take  command  of 
the  troops  in  the  field.  The  feeling  of  the  Govern- 
ment towards  me,  I  am  sure,  is  kind  and  trusting. 
ANTIETAM. 
As  soon  as  General  McClellan  was  replaced 
in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  he 
began  to  put  the  forces  in  order;  and  the  ease 
and  rapidity  with  which  this  was  accomplished 
show  that  both  he  and  General  Pope,  with 
very  different  intentions,  had  equally  exagger- 
ated the  state  of  their  demoralization.  The 
troops  were  not  in  so  bad  a  condition  at  Cen- 
treville  as  Pope  imagined,  and  the  army  that 
Mr.  Lincoln  handed  over  to  McClellan  at 
Washington  was  both  in  numbers  and  morale  a 
formidable  host.  Its  morning  returns  show  an 
aggregate  of  over  100,000  men,  and  General 
McClellan  himself  reports  that  he  had  at  An- 
tietam 87,000.  But  the  vast  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  force  on  paper  and  the  effectives  in 
battle  gives  a  margin  of  which  writers  some- 
times avail  themselves  according  to  their  preju- 
dices or  prepossessions.  General  Palfrey,  who 
took  part  in  the  campaign  and  who  has  since 
examined  the  reports  on  both  sides  with  scru- 
pulous care,  says  that  in  this  single  instance 
McClellan  overstated  the  number  of  his  troops 
in  action,  and  that  70,000  would  be  nearer  the 
mark.  It  is  true  he  could  afford  it,  as  in  the 
same  estimate  he  very  nearly  doubled  the  num- 
ber of  the  enemy.  The  Confederate  rosters 
show  some  forty-five  brigades  of  infantry,  ex- 
clusive of  cavalry  and  artillery.  Lee  says  in 
his  report  that  he  commanded  at  Antietam 
about  40,000  troops.1 
McClellan's  time  for  training  and  drilling 
1  War  Records. 
his  recovered  army  was  brief;   for  within 
days  the  news  came  that  \  am  had  cro  sed  the 
Potomac  into  Maryland.    There  was  no  time 
now  for  indecision,  and   Lincoln's  stern  and 
constantly  repeated  injunction,"  You  must  find 
and  hurt  this  enemy  now,"  had  to  be  oh 
General  Lee  has  given  in  his  own  report  a 
sufficiently  clear  statement  of  what  he  hoped  to 
accomplish  by  his  invasion  of  Maryland  The 
supplies  of  rich  and  productive  districts  were 
thus  made  accessible  to  his  army,  and  he  wished 
to  "prolong  this  state  of  affairs  in  every  way 
desirable,  and  not  to  permit  the  season  for 
active  operations  to  pass  without  endeavoring 
to  inflict  further  injury  upon  the  enemy."  He 
also  makes  an  acknowledgment  which  shows 
that  he,  in  common  with  others  at  Richmond, 
had  been  grossly  deceived  by  the  accounts 
which  rebel  refugees  from  Maryland,  and  their 
sympathizing  correspondents  at  home,  had 
given  of  the  oppressive  tyranny  of  Lincoln, 
and  the  resentment  it  had  caused  in  that  com- 
monwealth.   He  says : 
The  condition  of  Maryland  encouraged  the  belief 
that  the  presence  of  our  army,  however  inferior  to 
that  of  the  enemy,  would  induce  the  Washington 
Government  to  retain  all  its  available  force  to  pro- 
vide against  contingencies  which  its  course  towards 
the  people  of  that  State  had  given  it  reason  to  ap- 
prehend. At  the  same  time  it  was  hoped  that  mil- 
itary success  might  afford  us  an  opportunity  to  aid 
the  citizens  of  Maryland  in  any  efforts  they  might 
be  disposed  to  make  to  recover  their  liberties.  The 
difficulties  that  surrounded  them  were  fully  appre- 
ciated, and  we  expected  to  derive  more  assistance 
in  the  attainment  of  our  object  from  the  just  fears 
of  the  Washington  Government  than  from  active 
demonstration  on  the  part  of  the  people,  unless 
success  should  enable  us  to  give  them  assurance  of 
continued  protection. 
In  a  hasty  note  he  informed  the  Richmond 
Government  of  his  purpose,  and  took  the  ini- 
tial steps  to  execute  it  with  great  promptness. 
He  crossed  his  entire  army  between  the  4th 
and  7th  of  September  near  Leesburg.  and 
camped  in  the  vicinity  of  Frederick.  He  took 
it  for  granted  that  our  force  at  Harper's  Ferry 
would  be  at  once  withdrawn ;  thereafter  he 
intended  to  move  the  army  into  western  Mary- 
land, establish  his  communications  with  Rich- 
mond through  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and 
then  to  move  into  Pennsylvania  and  draw 
McClellan  from  his  base  to  fight  in  a  field  of 
his  own  selection.  If  all  his  surmise?  had  been 
correct,  if  Miles  had  been  withdrawn  from 
Harper's  Ferry,  if  Maryland  had  risen  in  re- 
volt, if  McClellan  had  allowed  him  to  range 
through  western  Maryland  at  his  leisure,  the 
plan  would  have  been  an  admirable  one  and 
the  results  of  it  most  fruitful :  but  all  these 
expectations  foiled.  After  two  days  at  Fred- 
erick he  found  that  Maryland  was  contented
43<5 
ABRAHAM  LIXCOLN. 
with  the  oppressor's  yoke,  and  that  Miles  re- 
mained at  Harper's  Kerry.    He  therefore  con- 
essary  to  detach  a  large  portion 
under  Jackson,   Me  Laws,   and 
surround  and  capture  the  garrison 
at  that  place :   the  rest  of  the  army  withdrew 
k  to  Boonsboro'. 
Meantime  McClellan  was  slowly  approach- 
'.  [e  fell,  of  course,  the  need  of  more  troops. 
With  an  army  about  him  so  enormous  that,  as 
he  says  in  his  report.1  it  would  occupy  fifty 
mile-    ot    road    in    marching    order,    he    still 
ed  on  the  nth  to  write  to  General  Hal- 
leek.  !  for  reenforcements.     He  first  as - 
him  that  the  capital  is  in  no  danger  and 
that  all  the  troops  there  may  safely  be  sent  to 
him  :  but  in  order  to  guard  against  any  pos- 
rejoinder  he  adds,  "  Even  if  Washington 
should  be  taken  while  these  armies  are  con- 
fronting each  other  this  would  not,  in  my  judg- 
ment, bear  comparison  with  the  ruin  and  dis- 
which  would  folio w  the  defeat  of  this 
army,"  an  opinion  which  has  no  especial  value 
pt  as  showing  what  General  McClellan's 
judgment  was  worth  in  such  a  matter.    Except 
when  he  was  in  Washington,  he  always  re- 
ed  its  possible  capture  as  a  trifling  affair. 
But  his  demand  was  complied  with  :  Porter's 
•  was  ordered  to  join  him,  with  a  kind 
ige   from  the    President,   which   he  ac- 
knowledged courteously,  and  then  —  asked  for 
orps  I  He  was  in  no  haste  ;  he  ordered 
his  officers  beforehand  to  avoid  collisions.  He 
attempts  in  his  report  to  account  for  his  tardy 
marching  on  the  ground  that  the  authorities 
at  Washington  wished  him  not  to  go  too  far 
from  the  capital.      General  Halleck  says  that 
no  order  capable  of  bearing  this  construction 
ver  given.    Pie  says: 
!:-graphed  him  that  he  was  going  too  far,  not 
from  Washington,  but  from  the  Potomac.  .  .  . 
I  thought  he  should  keep  more  upon  the  Potomac 
and  press  forward  his  left  rather  than  his  right,  so 
as  more  readily  to  relieve  Harper's  Ferry,  which  was 
nt  then  in  most  danger.2 
'    two  days  after  the    above-mentioned 
■    asking    for  reenforcements,   McClellan 
.  ed  information  which  was  enough  to  put 
i  ill   of  enterprise  into  the  veriest  laggard 
that  ever  breathed.    There  never  was  a  gen- 
Clellan,  "  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  p.   188. 
tirnony.    Report  Committee  on  Con- 
duct of  the  V 
;;  I'alf.  Vntietam  and   Fr<  mrg,"  p. 
J   He  telegraphed  to   the  President:  "  I  have  the 
whole  rebel  force  in  front  of  me,  but  am  confident,  and 
no  time  shall  be  lost.    .    .    .     i  think  Lee  has  made  a 
mistake,  and  that  he  will  be  severely  punished  for 
it.    ...    I  have  all  the  plans  of  the  rebels,  and  will 
them  in  their  own  trap  if  rny  men  are  equal  to 
'    [War  Records.] 
~>   If  he  had  thrown  forward  his  army  with  the  vigor 
era]  so  fruitlessly  favored  by  fortune  as  Mc- 
Clellan, and  never  was  such  a  piece  of  good 
luck  offered,  even  to  him,  as  that  which  fell 
into  his  hands  on  the  13th  of  September.  He 
had  been  advancing  in  his  leisurely  manner 
from  Washington  on  parallel  roads,  making 
only  about  six  miles  a  day,  when  on  the  13th 
he  arrived  at  Frederick  and  one  of  his  officers 
brought  to  him  Lee's  special  order  of  the  9th, 
that  a  private  soldier  had  found,  containing  his 
entire  plan  of  campaign.  By  this  he  learned 
that  his  enemy  was  before  him,  a  day's  march 
away ;  that  his  whole  force  was  inferior  to  his 
own ;  and  that  it  was  divided  into  two  portions, 
one  in  camp  near  Boonsboro'  and  the  other 
besieging  Miles  at  Harper's  Ferry.  It  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  his  enemy  had  been  de- 
livered into  his  hands.  After  he  had  read  this 
order  the  contest  between  him  and  Lee,  other 
things  being  equal,  would  have  been  like  a  fight 
between  a  man  blindfolded  and  one  having 
use  of  his  eyes.  He  not  only  knew  of  the  di- 
vision of  his  enemy's  army  in  half,  but  he  knew 
where  his  trains,  his  rear- guard,  his  cavalry, 
were  to  march  and  to  halt,  and  where  the  de- 
tached commands  were  to  join  the  main  body.3 
He  seemed  to  appreciate  the  importance  of 
his  discovery,4  but  it  was  not  in  his  nature  to 
act  promptly  enough.  Franklin  was  at  Buckeys- 
town,  about  twelve  miles  east  of  South  Moun- 
tain, a  prolongation  northward  of  the  Blue 
Ridge,  beyond  which  Lee's  army  lay.  Instead 
of  giving  him  immediate  orders  to  march  with 
all  possible  speed  to  Harper's  Ferry,  he  wrote 
at  his  leisure  a  long  and  judicious  instruction 
directing  him  to  march  to  that  point  the  next 
day.  The  weather  was  perfect ;  the  roads  were 
in  good  order.  McClellan  knew  there  was  no 
enemy  between  him  and  Crampton's  Gap. 
Every  possible  consideration  urged  him  to 
make  use  of  every  instant  of  time.5  The  pre- 
cious opportunity  was  neglected,and  it  was  noon 
the  next  day,  the  14th  of  September,  when 
Franklin  stormed  the  crest  of  the  mountain 
after  a  brilliant  and  easy  victory  over  General 
Cobb's  detachmentofMcLaws's  division,  which 
had  been  left  to  guard  the  pass.  The  Union 
right  wing  spent  the  whole  of  the  same  day  in 
a  stubborn  fight  for  the  position  of  Fox's  and 
Turner's  Gaps,  some  six  miles  farther  north. 
used  by  Jackson  in  his  advance  on  Harper's  Ferry,  the 
passes  of  South  Mountain  would  have  been  carried 
before  the  evening  of  the  13th,  at  which  time  they  were 
very  feebly  guarded ;  and  then,  debouching  into  Pleas- 
ant Valley,  the  Union  commander  might  next  morning 
have  fallen  upon  the  rear  of  McLaws  at  Maryland 
Heights  and  relieved  Harper's  Ferry,  which  did  not 
surrender  till  the  morning  of  the  15th.  But  he  did  not 
arrive  at  South  Mountain  until  the  mornin  g  of  the  14th, 
and  by  that  time  the  Confederates,  forewarned  of  his 
approach,  had  recalled  a  considerable  force  to  dispute 
the  passage.  [Swinton,  "Army  of  the  Potomac,"  p. 
202.]
THE   ANNOUNCEMENT   OF  EMANCIPATION. 
437 
After  sharp  fighting,  in  which  General  Reno, 
an  officer  of  the  highest  merit,  was  killed,  and 
Colonel  Hayes,  afterwards  President  of  the 
United  States,  was  wounded,  advanced  po- 
sitions were  secured.  At  neither  Crampton's 
nor  Turner's  was  the  victory  pushed  to  advan- 
tage. Franklin  did  nothing  to  relieve  the  be- 
leaguered garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  the 
force  at  Turner's  Gap  rested  on  the  ground 
that  they  had  won  until,  when  the  mists  of 
the  morning  cleared  away  on  the  1 5th,  they  saw 
the  enemy  had  retreated  from  their  front. 
Much  valuable  time  had  been  lost,  and  more 
than  time ;  for  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
15th  the  blundering  and  bewildered  defense  of 
Harper's  Ferry  had  ceased  by  the  surrender  of 
the  garrison,  its  unhappy  commander  having 
been  killed  after  he  had  displayed  the  white  flag. 
But  McClellan  had  not  yet  lost  all  his  ad- 
vantage ;  and  the  sacrifice  of  Harper's  Ferry 
would  have  been  amply  compensated  if  he  had 
moved  at  once  with  all  possible  speed  upon  Lee, 
who,  with  only  Longstreet's  and  D.  H.  Hill's 
troops,  had  taken  up  his  position  at  Sharps- 
burg.  Jackson  was  still  south  of  the  Potomac. 
He  had  no  fear  of  night  marches,  and  was  mak- 
ing all  possible  speed  to  join  Lee  through  the 
day  and  night  of  the  15th.  The  force  of 
McLaws  got  away  from  in  front  of  Franklin, 
and,  though  making  a  long  devour  and  cross- 
ing the  Potomac  twice,  still  joined  the  main 
army  at  Sharpsburg  on  the  17th.  All  this 
time,  while  the  scattered  detachments  of  Lee 
were  moving  with  the  utmost  expedition 
to  join  their  main  body,  making  two  or  three 
times  the  distance  which  separated  Lee  from 
McClellan,  the  latter  made  his  preparations 
for  an  attack,  as  if,  to  quote  Johnston  again, 
"  time  was  of  no  especial  value  to  him."  On 
the  15th  he  marched  down  to  Antietam  Creek 
and  placed  his  soldiers  in  position.  He  rode 
from  end  to  end  of  his  line,  enjoying  one  of  the 
grandest  greetings  ever  given  by  an  army  to  its 
commander.  The  thunder  of  cheers  which  met 
him  at  every  point  showed  that  there  was  no 
lack  of  morale  in  that  mighty  army,  and  that 
they  were  equal  to  any  service  their  beloved 
commander  might  choose  to  require  of  them. 
It  seems  almost  incredible,  as  we  write  it,  and 
it  will  appear  inexplicable  to  such  readers  as 
may  come  after  us,  that  McClellan  made  no 
movement  during  the  afternoon1  of  Monday, 
the  15th,  and  did  nothing  during  the  entire 
day  of  the  16th  but  to  advance  a  portion  of 
his  right  wing  across  Antietam  Creek,  and 
this  while  the  ragged  legions  of  Lee  were 
streaming  in  from  across  the  Potomac  to  take 
up  their  positions  for  the  impending  conflict. 
1  McClellan  in  his  memoirs,  p.  586,  blames  Burnside 
for  the  slowness  of  the  march  on  the  15th. 
2  Lee  to  Davis,  September  iS,  1862.     War  Records. 
Every  minute  which  he  thus  let  slip  was  paid 
for  in  the  blood  of  Union  soldiers  next  day. 
Never  had  McClellan's  habit  of  procrastir 
served  him  so  ill  a  turn  as  during  the  v. 
day  of  the  16th.  Lee's  error  of  dividing 
army  would  have  been  fatal  to  him  if  ev< 
the  morning  of  the  16th  McClellan  had  ad- 
vanced upon  him  in  force.  The  loss  of  the  af- 
ternoon of  the  15th  in  that  case  would  scarcely 
have  been  felt.  The  reduction  of  Harper's 
Ferry  had  taken  a  day  longer  than  Lee  ex- 
pected, and  when  night  fell  the  divisions  of  Mc- 
Laws, Anderson,  A.  P.  Hill,  and  Walker 
still  beyond  the  Potomac.2  He  would  have 
been  compelled  to  withstand  the  attack  of  Mc- 
Clellan's whole  army  with  nothing  but  the  di- 
visions of  D.  R.  Jones  and  D.  H.  Hill  on  the 
right  and  center,  and  of  Hood,  Ewell,  and  J.  R. 
Jones  on  the  left.  But  before  noon  of  the  17th 
most  of  Lee's  forces  were  on  the  ground,  and  the 
rest  arrived  during  the  battle.  McClellan  had 
rejected  the  proffered  favors  of  fortune.  His  de- 
lay had  given  back  to  Lee  all  the  advantages 
afforded  McClellan  by  the  separation  of  Lee's 
army  and  the  discovery  of  his  plan  of  cam- 
paign. Lee  had  had  unbroken  leisure  for 
forty-eight  hours  to  study  his  ground  and  the 
dispositions  of  his  antagonist,  which  had  been 
made  in  plain  view  under  his  eyes.  Lee's  ad- 
vantage of  position  was  fully  equal  to  McClel- 
lan's advantage  of  numbers ;  and  it  was  there- 
fore on  even  terms  between  the  two  armies 
that  the  battle  of  Antietam  began. 
The  ground  was  highly  favorable  to  Lee. 
In  front  of  him  was  Antietam  Creek,  the 
high  wooded  ground  affording  an  advanta- 
geous position  and  cover  for  his  batteries. 
There  was  little  field  for  maneuvering,  and 
little  was  attempted.  From  daylight  till 
dark  of  the  17th  the  battle  went  on.  There 
was  nothing  of  it  but  sheer,  persistent,  brutal 
slaughter.  McClellan's  plan  was  to  throw  for- 
ward his  right  wing,  the  corps  of  Hooker 
leading,  supported  by  that  of  Mansfield,  and 
by  those  of  Sumner  and  Franklin  if  neces- 
sary; when  the  battle  became  well  engaged  on 
the  right,  the  left  wing,  under  Burnside. 
to  cross  the  lower  bridge  to  try  to  turn  the 
enemy's  right.  On  this  simple  plan  the  battle 
was  contested.  Hooker  advanced  early  in  the 
morning  and  fought  until  his  corps,  giving  and 
receiving  about  equal  injuries,  was  shattered 
to  pieces,  and  himself  borne  from  the  field. 
severely  wounded.  General  Meade  succeeding 
him  in  command,  Mansfield  came  to  his  as- 
sistance. His  corps  also  did  heroic  service, 
and  its  veteran  commander  was  killed  in  the 
front  of  his  foremost  line.  His  corps  was  led 
during  the  rest  of  the  day  by  General  A.  S. 
Williams.  As  our  left  remained  entirely  in- 
active, Lee  was  able  to  use  most  of  his  force
•^ 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN, 
on  our  right,  and  his  resistance  was  so  obsti- 
nate that  Sumner's  corps  was  drawn  into  the 
conflict,  where  it  met  with  heavy  losses;  Rich- 
ardson, one  of  the  best  division  commanders 
in  the  army,  received  a  mortal  hurt,  and  Sedg- 
wick was  twice  wounded.  Before  the  battle 
I  on  the  right  even  Franklin's  corps,  which 
it  had  been  intended  to  hold  in  reserve,  was 
drawn  into  the  whirlpool  of  blood  and  fire. 
-  by  corps,  division  by  division,  one  might 
almost  say  brigade  by  brigade,  those  brave  and 
devoted  troops  were  hurled  in  succession,  with- 
out intelligent  plan,  without  any  special  concert 
.  g  inst  Lee's  left.  The  carnage  was 
frightful,  the  result  in  no  proportion  to  the 
terrible  expense.  It  was  afternoon  before 
the  left  wing,  under  Burnside,  began  its 
of  the  work.  The  lower  bridge  was 
:    ssed  about   i   o'clock  and  the   west  bank 
:  d,  but  no  farther  advance  was  made  by 
Burnside  until  after  3.  He  then  moved  forward 
his  forces,  under  General  Cox's  command, 
upon  the  enemy's  right,  making  good  progress, 
until,  late  in  the  afternoon,  as  if  good  fortune, 
weary  of  having  her  favors  rejected  by  General 
McClellan,  had  turned  to  the  other  side,  the 
1 1  Division  of  A.  P.  Hill,  which  had  marched 
;.teen  miles  in  seven  hours,  arrived  on  the 
held  from  Harper's  Ferry  and  made  a  vigor- 
ous attack  upon  our  extreme  left,  killed  Gen- 
eral Rodman,  and  threw  his  division  into  some 
disorder.      This    unlooked-for    demonstration 
ked  the  advance  of  the  Federal  column, 
and  it  fell  back  a  little  distance  to  the  hills  on 
the  west  of  the  Antietam.  Night  came  on,  and 
the  long,  desperate  battle  was  at  an  end.  The 
tactical  advantage  was  with  General  McClellan. 
On  his  left,  his  center,  and  his  right  he  had 
gained  a  little  ground.  Both  armies  had  suffered 
5  which  it  shocks  the  sense  to  contemplate. 
They  were  almost  equal  —  over  12,000  killed 
and  wounded  on  the  Union  side,  over  11,000 
on  the  Confederate ; l  but  Lee's  loss  was  more 
than  one-fourth  of  his  army,  wrhile  McClellan's 
was  only  one-sixth  of  his.  In  his  report  Gen- 
eral McClellan  says  : 
The  night  Drought  with  it  grave  responsibilities. 
ther  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  1 8th  or  to  de- 
even  with  the  risk  of  the  enemy's  retirement, 
was  the  question  before  me. 
There  could  be  little  doubt  of  his  decision 
of  the  question.    He  was  keenly  alive  to  the 
1  On  the  Union  side  12,410  at  Antietam  and  15,203 
in  the  campaign,  not  including  the  losses  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  which  were  12,737.  J  he  closest  estimate  that 
can  be  inn/1  0      of  about  1 1,1  72  to  the  Confed- 
erates at  Antietam,  and  of  13*964  during  the  campaign. 
[cClellan,  "Army  of  the  Potomac,"  p.  211. 
■J>  It  is  hard  to  say  whether  these  words,  from  a  let- 
1  General  .McClellan  on  the  18th,  are  more 
comic  or  pathetic:   "Those  in  whose  judgment  I  rely 
sufferings  of  his  army.  He  loved  them,  and  was 
loved  by  them  in  return.  The  piled  heaps  of 
the  slain,  the  thousands  of  wounded  and  dying, 
the  wreck  and  havoc  of  the  conquered  held, 
all  impressed  his  imagination  so  powerfully  that 
he  was  unable  to  conceive  the  worse  condition 
of  the  enemy.  There  rose  before  his  mind  also 
an  appalling  picture  of  the  consequences  that 
would  ensue  if  he  risked  another  battle  and  lost 
it.  He  saw  Lee's  army  marching  in  triumph 
on  Washington,  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  and 
New  York,  the  country  ravaged,  the  cause 
lost.2  Every  impulse  of  his  heart  and  con- 
science forbade  him  to  assume  so  enormous  a 
responsibility.  He  would  not  absolutely  decide 
which  course  to  adopt,  but,  after  his  habit,  con- 
cluded to  wait  until  the  19th  before  making  a 
final  decision." 
The  occasion,  however,  would  not  wait  for 
him.  General  Lee  knew,  if  McClellan  did  not, 
that  his  army  was  in  no  condition  to  risk  an- 
other battle.  The  straggling  of  McClellan's 
force  was  one  of  the  reasons  that  induced  him 
to  delay.  No  doubt  there  was  a  great  deal  of 
it  in  his  command.  One  day  President  Lin- 
coln, exasperated  at  the  discrepancy  between 
the  aggregate  of  troops  he  had  sent  to  McClel- 
lan and  the  number  McClellan  reported  as 
having  been  received,  exclaimed  in  a  simile  of 
concise  grotesqueness,  "  Sending  men  to  that 
army  is  like  shoveling  fleas  across  a  barnyard ; 
not  half  of  them  get  there."  But  the  case  on 
the  other  side  was  worse  still.  Lee  reported 
to  Jefferson  Davis  on  the  21st  of  September 
that  the  efficiency  of  his  army  was  "  paralyzed 
by  the  loss  to  its  ranks  of  the  numerous  strag- 
glers."4 "On  the  morning  after  the  battle," 
he  says,  "  General  Evans  reported  to  me  on 
the  field,  where  he  was  holding  the  front  posi- 
tion, that  he  had  but  120  of  his  brigade  present, 
and  that  the  next  brigade  to  his,  that  of  Gen- 
eral Garnett,  consisted  of  but  100  men.  Gen- 
eral Pendleton  reported  that  the  brigades  of 
Generals  Lawton  and  Armistead,  left  to  guard 
the  ford  at  Shepherdstown,  together  contained 
but  600  men.  This,"  he  adds  feelingly,  "  is  a 
woful  condition  of  affairs."  But  of  course  Gen- 
eral McClellan  had  no  personal  knowledge  of 
this;  and,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  course  of  this 
narrative,  he  was  utterly  destitute  of  those  intu- 
itions of  the  situation  and  the  intention  of  his 
enemy  which  we  find  in  all  great  commanders. 
The  fight  of  the  day  before  had  been  so  terri- 
tell  me  that  I  fought  the  battle  splendidly  and  that  it 
was  a  masterpiece  of  art.  .  .  .  God  has  been  good 
in  sparing  the  lives  of  all  my  staff.  Generals  Hooker, 
Sedgwick,  Dana,  Richardson,  and  Hartsuff,  and  several 
other  general  officers,  wounded.  Mansfield  is  dead,  I 
fear. "  On  the  20th  he  wrote  :  "  I  feel  that  I  have  done 
all  that  can  be  asked  in  twice  saving  the  country." 
["McClellan's  Own  Story,"  p.  612.] 
4   War  Records.
THE  ANNOUNCEMENT  OE  EMANCIPATION. 
ble  in  the  struggle  and  carnage,  he  had  made 
his  personal  influence  so  little  felt  on  the  field,1 
he  had  gained  so  little  advantage  in  compari- 
son with  his  frightful  losses,  that  it  would  be 
unjust  to  expect  to  find  in  him  on  the  morning 
of  the  1 8th  that  alacrity  and  elation  of  victory 
which  would  have  impelled  him  in  pursuit  of 
his  shattered  enemy.  Beaten  as  Lee  was,  his 
promising  campaign  brought  to  a  disastrous 
failure  by  his  own  error,  he  was  still  less  affected 
by  it  than  was  McClellan  by  his  victory.  He 
even  thought  for  the  moment,  before  twilight 
had  settled  on  the  battle  on  the  17th,  of  exe- 
cuting with  his  usual  instrument  his  usual 
movement,  of  sending  Stonewall  Jackson  by 
the  left  to  attack  the  right  flank  of  McClellan's 
army.2  He  opposed  a  bold  front  to  his  ill  for- 
tune, and  closes  his  description  of  the  battle  by 
saying  that  he  deemed  it  injudicious  to  push 
his  advantage  further. 
McClellan  was  almost  alone  in  his  decision 
not  to  continue  the  battle  on  the  18th.  General 
Burnside,  who  commanded  on  the  left,  testified 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War  3  that  he  thought  the  attack  should  be  re- 
newed at  early  dawn,  and  gave  this  opinion  to 
McClellan  the  night  of  the  battle.  General 
McClellan  said  he  would  think  the  matter  over 
and  make  up  his  mind  before  morning,  and 
a  staff-officer  of  Burnside's  was  kept  in  waiting 
through  the  night  at  McClellan's  headquarters 
to  learn  his  decision. 
General  Franklin,  in  command  of  the  cen- 
ter, also  testified  that  he  showed  McClellan  a 
position  on  our  right  of  great  importance,  and 
advised  an  attack  on  that  place  in  the  morn- 
ing. He  says  there  was  no  doubt  that  we 
could  carry  it,  as  we  had  plenty  of  artillery 
bearing  on  it.  He  thought  that  by  this  means 
the  whole  left  flank  of  the  enemy  would  have 
been  uncovered.  When  asked  what  reasons 
were  given  for  rejecting  this  plan,4  he  repeated 
McClellan's  customary  fatal  excuse  for  delay, 
that  he  would  prefer  to  wait  for  reinforcements. 
Hooker;  who  had  commanded  the  right  wing, 
was  also  of  the  opinion  that  the  attack  should 
be  resumed,  although  his  wounds  would  have 
prevented  his  taking  part  in  it. 
But  it  was  too  much  to  expect  of  General 
McClellan  that  he  should  follow  such  advice. 
He  had  had,  it  is  true,  a  moment  of  el 
on  the  morning  of  the  15th  after  the 
merit  at  South  Mountain.    To  atl 
in  position,  and  drive  him,  was  to  McClelL 
new  a  sensation  that  he  was  evident1 
exhilarated  by  his  success  at  Turner's  Gap.    1 J  <: 
reported  Lee  as  admitting  "that  he  had  been 
shockingly  whipped"  and  "making  for  Shep- 
herdstown  in  a  perfect  panic."  B    But  after  the 
terrible  conflict  at  Antietam  the  cold  fit  came 
on,  and  his  only  dispatches  to  Washington  . 
of  his  heavy  losses  and  of  holding  what  he  had 
gained.    He  evidently  thought  more  of  b 
attacked  on  that  day  than  of  attacking.    '• 
battle,"  he  says,  "will  probably  be  renewed  to- 
day.   Send  all  the  troops  you  can,  by  the  :. 
expeditious  route."  6   It  was  therefore  with  feel- 
ings of  the  greatest  relief  that  he  saw  Lee's  rear- 
guard disappear  across  the  Potomac,  and  in  the 
forenoon  of  the  19th  he  joyfully  telegraphed  to 
Washington,  "  Our  victory  was  complete.    The 
enemy  is  driven  back  into  Virginia.    Man  'land 
and  Pennsylvania  are  now  safe." " 
The  President  received  this  news,  as  was 
natural,  with  mingled  gratitude  and  disappoint- 
ment. He  was  glad  and  thankful  for  the  meas- 
ure of  success  which  had  been  achieved,  but 
the  high  hope  he  had  entertained  of  destroying 
Lee's  army  before  it  recrossed  the  Potomac 
was  baffled.  His  constant  entreaty  to  McClel- 
lan, from  the  time  he  put  him  in  command  of 
the  army  up  to  the  day  of  the  battle,  was,  "  Please 
do  not  let  him  get  off  without  being  hurt."  8  It 
was  with  this  hope  and  purpose  that  he  had 
given  McClellan  everything  he  asked  for.  in- 
fusing his  own  indomitable  spirit  into  all  the 
details  of  work  at  the  War  Department  and  the 
headquarters  of  the  army.  It  was  by  his  order 
that  McClellan  had  been  pushed  forward,  that 
Porter  had  been  detached  from  the  defense  of 
Washington,  that  the  militia  of  Pennsylvania 
had  been  hurried  down  to  the  border.  He  did 
not  share  General  McClellan's  illusion  as  to 
the  monstrous  number  of  the  enemy  opposed 
to  him ;  and  when  he  looked  at  the  vast  aggre- 
gate of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  by  the  morn- 
ing report  on  the  20th  of  September.  i;  93.149 
present  for  duty,"  he  could  not  but  feel  that 
the  result  was  not  commensurate  with  the  ef- 
forts made  and  the  resources  employed. 
1  He  did  very  little  in  the  way  of  compelling  the  exe- 
cution of  the  orders  which  he  did  give.  He  passed  the 
whole  day  till  towards  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  when 
all  the  fighting  was  over,  on  the  high  ground  near 
Fry's  house,  where  he  had  some  glasses  strapped  to 
the  fence.  .  .  .  He  made  absolutely  no  use  of  the 
magnificent  enthusiasm  which  the  army  then  felt  for  him. 
[Palfrey,  "  The  Antietam  and  Fredericksburg,"  p.  1 19.  J 
2  While  the  attack  on  our  center  was  progressing, 
General  Jackson  had  been  directed  to  endeavor  to  turn 
the  enemy's  right,  but  found  it  extending  nearly  to  the 
Potomac,  and  so  strongly  defended  with  artillery  that 
the  attempt  had  to  be  abandoned.      [  Report  of  General 
Lee.    War  Records.] 
3  General  McClellan  in  his  memoirs  contradict?  this 
testimony. 
•i  Franklin,  testimony.     Report  Committee  or. 
duct  of  the  War. 
5  War  Records. 
6  McClellan    to    Halleck,    Sept.     iS.    1S02.      War 
Records. 
7  McClellan  to  Halleck.     War  Records. 
S  Lincoln    to    McClellan,    Sept.     12.    iSor.      War 
Records.