|; Only Ho-lium Murder ¢jaj/. cOrmer greasy spoon can engage in HY 50955 Bocld: 32473630 | By Russell Baker} The gangsters Sam Giancana and John Roselli who were associated with _ the C.LA, in a scheme to dispatch Fidel Castro have now both been’ mur- dered after discussing their C.LA. en: - ' terprise with the United States Senate, and the police have pronounced: the incidertts “gangland-style killings."" The phrase “gangland-style killing” has the cozy resonance of “home-style . cooking,” perhaps because both sug- gest the intimacy of hearth and fire - with nobody but us family gathered round and nobody else welcome, Jack, These family affairs are, of course, meddled into by the constabulary, but rarely with much enthusiasm. |. This may be because police success at nabbing perpetrators of “gartgland- Style killings” has never been such as to get them into the world series of detection, with the result that inces- sant failure may have dulled. their ' appetite for. the hunt, “4 Or, it may be because policemen . believe the subjects of “gangland-style killings” aren't worth working over- time for. I don’t know, artd-I certainly don’t mean. to impute either ljanguor, "timidity or indifference to America’s - homicide squads. 1 simply point out that once a murder has been called “gangland-style,” apprehension of ithe perpetrator almost invariably ‘fails: to occur. na This raises the. question’ whether “gangiand-style” murders’ might pos- sibly be catching among people who don’t come from’ gangland. Consider the Roselli case. The body is found’ in _the customary barrel, with the cus- tomary weights, in the. customary ‘water, It bears the customary builet holes. Roselli’s publicized Standing in gangland seems to leave an open-and- shut case, which the police will quietly Shut as soon as possible. == If you and I know this, reader, does it not follow that it is also known by, let us say, some hot-tempered waiter whom Roselli has been:.consistently “ undertipping for years? - oa If that waiter wanted to. take his revenge and get away with it, is ‘it not logical that he would do it “gang. ’ land-style,” so the police could forget - it, rather than by. scalding Roselli to death in public with a tureen.of lobster bisque? oes ‘ This is not to suggest that the police ought to be giving - Roselli’s waiters the third degree, but merely.to point. -. ‘that there is no misunderstanding, I want to assure them that I haven't . ' the heart to swat a fly, myself, and, “what's: more, I've never beert-any good _ «With concrete, nF out that gangland can have no monop- oly on “gangland-style killing.” Any- |: . body with a barrel, some concrete and a capacious expanse ‘of water. can. . engage in jt, just as readily. as your atte 2e Page 461 “homeestyle cooking.” The one special requirement ig a Victim who is a bona fide citizen of — gangland, Obviously, a. philandering husband cannot do in a loyal wife of . 40 years “gangland-style” and the police not to lift an eyebrow. Une - less the subject is the real ‘gangland : thing, it won't work, The corollary of this fact’ ty that gangland people are peculiarly vulner- able to “gangland-style” murder by. ‘devious non-ganglanders, who have no ‘Tight to get away with it. This must be infuriating to them. Imagine that You are an- eminent._ Statesman of gangland, and the vexa- tion becomes manifest. You are’ en- tirely prepared to be sent off “gang. land-style” by your colleagues, Those | are the rules of the land, Moreover, if they complete the job, you wouldn't dream of telling the po- . lice who did it, even if you could, That would violate the rules of the sports. . manship governing gangland. In gang. _dand, good sports don’t tell, oe But to have some alien from the outer world—some straipht-Jake cous in who. wants his share. of your ‘will. SSeS . OBSERVER. |.” Prematurely, some barber who hates your sideburns——to have. somebody like _ this do the job on you and gét away | _ With it because it’s done “gangland. . Style’—-Ah, my friend; ‘that must seem @ cruel injustice. “ Such a bad: egg as that you: would surely betray to the cops. How infuri- ating it would be if they looked at the - barrel, the .concrete, the water,. the _ bullet holes and closed the case with - @ quietly murmured, “Just another . Bangland-style killing.” - You-will have been the victim, -not only of murder, but also of discrimina- tion, for it is only your membership in gangland that prevents. the police from extending themselves: to bring your persecutor to justice, ‘ ' ~ [do not know how policemen feel about nonmembers of gangland killing | gangland’ members “gangland-style," but my hunch is. that ‘they ‘take a Sterner view of it than they do of gangland men bumping off each other. The average cop probably thinks ‘it. is - -- fot the kind of thing decent people - ‘ought to be doing. : : I know very well that gangland folks don’t approve of it, and to make sure
Terrorist Activities Charged to Cubans, By Police in Miami| WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI)}: —Militant pro-Castro and anti-|! {Castro groups in the Miamil! area are engaged in terrorist|& activities both in and outsidelt the United States, according tole testimony given before a Sen- ate subcommittee and released|R today. : . ¥ The testimony came last May/rt before a Judiciary subcommit-|w -jtee on internal’ security headed|g: Democrat of Mississippi. It saidiri: 1{that as many as 50 Cubani — groups of various shadings hadjtl been operating in Miami at anyla one time, many of them en-|T gaged in violent plots involvingir local actions and activities injr Mexico, Central and South!v America and Cuba itself. s Lieut. Thomas Lyons, who!D has been with‘the Dade Countylo Public. Safety Department forlh more than nine years, and Raullc J. Diaz, of the department's or-/d ganized crime, terrorist and se- curity unit, told of efforts to/C track down terrorist elements/p in the greater Miami area. a e ¢ ‘ e ‘ ‘ c = Lieutenant Lyons said most Cubans in the area were hard- working and industrious; but some individuals “use Dade County as a base for interna- tional terrorism’ ‘against allied governments of Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purporty. ed Communists and individuals): who take a stand against their terroristic-type tactics.” : During the last two years, Lieutenant Lyons said, there have been four homicides “with strong indicators on each that the motivations. were political} in nature and terroristic by de- sign.” ‘ . Mr. Diaz'said that some. Cas- tro groups had infiltrated exile were plans to assassinate Latin- American diplomats and for- eign ministers, . Lieutenant Lyons said his junit received Information from|* a confidential source early this|¢ year that ‘there-~vwout i attempt on the life of Secretary = a of State Henry A.°.Kissinger 5 during his February. visit: toj 4. f~ ' ICosta Rica. = HW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page 462 by Senator James O. Eastland,|ar- _ The Federal Bureau of Inves-| _{Ugation and the Secret Service were notified, he said. A well. known fugitive exile, Orlando Bosch, was jailed after illegally entering Costa Rica. There ‘no incidents during the Kissinger visit. ° ; : ; He did not mention the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency's ef- forts to use Cuban exiles in Florida and American gangsters : to kill Prime Minister Fidel Cas- Two weeks ago, the body of ‘Jan underworld figure, John Roselli was found Stuffed in a chain-weighted, 55-gallon drum floating in q bay near Miami, Mr. Roselli had testified last Cubans to kill Mr. Castro. Mr, Giancana was shot and killed by unknown bersons last year} Just before he was testify be- fore the Washington Panel. me ( Couey
tne Hoston Glove Monday, August zg, lyib , ae Depe : - : ; Convicted in 1968 of Shelling a Polish freighter With a, JACK AN DERSON aot _ i “200ka while jt Was moored in Miami. He Jumped Fede | Parole ang fled to Venezuela in 1974, . e ; Months later, he Was reported to be in Curacao, pr P] t E i ; | tected by Chilean gunmen. He bragged, according to ¢} ; Q Q (] . ; . feports, of his “money, friends and Protection.” ! . ge Cu vt K 6 @ . ; - ties throughout Latin Americs. In early 1976, the County's I & Sk iger 4 terrorist expert, Lt. Thomas Lynch, Picked UP some electri. . . fying news, . : a ee “He told the Senate Subcommittee about it in Secret tess ae ; ' imony “We received information from confidential sourc. a es," he Swore, “that there was 80ing to be an attempt on the O C ce ne 1. dife of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. We passed the a 4 Do . information ‘ON to the FBI, and they ha iv yl information, and we Notified the Secret Service, ag they | ; ‘ . > have the Protective duty for the Secretary of State, aa WASHINGTON — A reported plot to 38Sassinate Sac. retary of State Henry Kissinger in Costa Rica six months . The plot Was linked to Kissinger's two-day Stay in Cog. , ago was blocked by US and Costa Rican authorities four’ , ta Rica, and Bosch was Picked up and uestioned. He was ays before jt Was supposed to be carried out. - 2 Neld ona false Passport charge until Kissinger was safely Out of the country, ; . Vs We have Pleced together the Story from Secret testimn. ; — ae ; i. HY before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and ; Bosch later insisted: “My only crime was entering the from interviews with Cuban exiles and US intelligence ey country with a false Passport, Certainly, it was never. . sources. ee i i Proved in Court that he hoped to knock oft Kissinger, He ig Now at large Somewhere in Latin America, We reported part of the Story two years later after a lengthy investigation in Miami. In columns on Sept. 1 and Ov. 12, 19 4, we Warned that anti-Castro terrorists -. active in the anti-Castro underground jn Miami's little avana, But he later Te-defected to Cuba where he Bave a . fascinating interview, “T have known Privately Since 1972," he Said, (about) the plan to @Ssassinate the US Secretary of State.” He said the plot had! taken “certain form” by 1973 and had been “actualized” by 1974, ; Then, ‘in @ reference tg Our 1974 Columns, he added: f~ “This fact Which, I repeat, [ye known Privately, has been ‘ corroborated by the US journalist Jack Anderson," . ~ | e 463 | $55 Bocld:324273630 Pag HY 40
- Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death — ofoal Ve | eal 2 4 By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern. "’ Washington Post Staff Writers Long before his recent murder, . John Rosselli, the CIA’s underworld — recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Cas- tro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retall- ation, were involved in the assassina- | tion of President John F. Kennedy. Rosselli’s belief in a Cuban connec: tion to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Ed- ward P, Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime’ associ- . ate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA. : ; ’ An FBI “blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan - dated March 21, 1967, was included, without ROSSELLI, From Al | i “Were the sources of the testimony that j pPuggested a Cuban role in. the Ken.** * }nedy murder. po ‘Morgan’s account, according ‘to a.’” ssumMary of the FB} interview, was - «that Rosselli had reached his conelu- -; ssion about a Cuban connection to the ‘ 7 Kennedy ' 48sassination - from.;' *“teedback” furnished by Sources close" ~ ato Castro who were involved in the CIA {plots to assassinate the Cuban leader... & » “His (Morgan's) clients were aware ' . 4ot the identity of some of the individ. puals who, came to the United States sfor this Purpose and he understood that tvo such individuals were now in: the state of New Jersey,” the FBI in. yterview Suminary stated.” “who was _interviewed Separately by. % A long-time associate .of Rosselli. | “He wag positive: he was Sure,” said. . the associate, who knew Rosselli wells: ” “and was in contact with him before — : does not want to be identified pub. . ‘Nely, is scheduled to he interviewed ; this week by Dade County, Fla., homi- cide detectives, He Was & party to Rog.. :' . ' gelli’s contacts in the early 1960s with “i. ! CIA case officers overseeing the at. | pi ane mpts to assassinate Castro. : Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all officiay | 1U.S. government investigations into ' ‘the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and ‘the CI[A—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government ar anv of ite atente N¥ 50955 Docld:3242363 0 Page 464 idow ification of the interviewee, in last June’s Senate Intelligence Com- mittee’s report on the role of the in. teligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation. Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had in- formed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and “thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dis- patched to the United States for the : putpose of assassinaling Mr, Ken- nedy.” Because neither Morgan nor Ros- sclli was identified in the Senate re- port, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was dis- counted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli’s disappear- ‘See ROSSELLI, A8; Col. 1 « However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro Was not divulged to the Warren Com- mission, and knowledge of them was tonfined until 1967 to a small, elite ‘circle of the U.S. intelligence commu. Nity. President Johnson apparently | first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the: late Drew ‘Person, - which prompted. Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode. ; - ‘. ; Fullsdetails of the ClA-underworld | ’ gollusion in the" plots to kill Castro Hid not surface publicly until the pub- , cation last yeat of the Senate Intelli- gence ‘Committee's asSassination re- port and the ensuing report last June $n the ‘possible role of the intelligence agencigs in the Kennedy assassination and ingestigation rs re , The body of Rosselli, who lived’ fiamboydntly in a world of mobsters, 1 politicians ‘and Playgirls, was found ‘two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum . Weighted with chains but buoyed: by / gases ‘from decomposition on the’ ‘ @cean’g surface off thecoast of Miami, - a The specific cause of death was deter. - . mined by an autopsy to be asphyxia- tion. 3° 2 Lastiyear, an underworld colleague at Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, yho algo} hed, begn recruited by the ;. TA inf theleffort to kill Castro; Was! found. shot:te death in ‘his Chicago ! home iniwhat police described as a . highly professional job by assailants ; ‘'; Who penetrated the mobster's - per. | donal security screen. Giancana was ‘due to testify before the Senate Intel. gence Committee ‘shortly after’ his emise, . : { Neither murder has been solved. ' 4 The possibility that Rosselli’s mur- der might have been related to his” Senate testimony on the CIA schemes — fo kill Castro hag brought the FBI into the investigation at the request ‘af Attorney General Edward H. Levi. eo. .
Gamerpally Santos  Trafissaate Campa, Fla, whose one-time Havana Ve det oe . : Lday Lowel with: gombling enterprises fell hos i Presi hat the Ee f \ ee " SES stage in i resident had fe true th at the ; rae haat to the Cuban revolution—in plots interview (Nor ny ‘ea that the FBI J >? 1b lo ae auains Castro had been aclosely held Knowledge he 3 ht have rega ing ” vere within the top echelons of the the assassination of Pre sident Ken | “) CHA and FBE until recently, nedy.” _itesigent: Ken: | uw Ke DeLoach toll aed . The tangled chronology. «The Ez gy of suppres. yon and eventual disclosure. although ievatted in the June report, has rTe- goived Tittle public attention. Rossel- : ‘ er adds significanc quent ; gniflcance to those \ _ . ; : t yetteres is the sequence,| pieced toe! 5 r from the testimony given to are intelligence invéstigators: » Columnist. Drew Pearson went to Je ‘Valsun that it . peared Morgan “id nat want to be in, vervicwed, and «oan if he was inter- he would probably not di the identity of his sources . wae ‘son persisted, however. " ‘Under the circumstances,” . ces, . hoaeh concluded in a Memo for the f les, “it appears that we have no als, ernative bul to interview (Morgan) * and then furnish the results to Wat- sonia blind memorandum form.” ‘ ne interview was assigned to t wo W agents from the FBI’s General Investi- lawyer had confided to him that one gative Division. which the S of his clients said the United States . committee concluded was “ ie , “had attempted to assassinate Fidel . because it was the Domestic Intelli | Castro in the early 8 and Castro gence Division which had been as- the ears of th tion's higt , hod decided to re iate. . _ signed responsibility for investigating " enforcemer t thorities Le . Warren declined Pearson's sugges- - Possible foreign involvement in the ns be rl an tha Rosselli ) tion that he see the lawyer, who the satneirinanals on serious Y ual problems at the ti ne Edward Morgan. Warren referred the Neither agent was priv - 3 eatened to matter to then Secret Service Direc- _ knowledge. confined tor Hoover and dep nt bim £0 ti : ing in the Uni =n tor James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, ns top aides, of the CIA’s assassina- | ’ States under an assumed am unless | 1967, aire oe hi iret fleet ue ion plots against Castro. Both agents | " he cooperated’ in an vavestigation of aver. informing him of the allegatio 5. = oO , | | : , Be — the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Hoover sent the Rowley tee ve testified eight years later that they. = Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA see ur TI , ord £ FBI “were “surprised” when Morgan al- “contact from the anti-Castro conspit’ 4 only” basis. There is no record of tuded during the interview to U.S. at- acy days, CIA security director Col $ meetings or discussions of. those alle- i oo Sheffield Edwards, who informed ihe ; i Eis te Castro. ions, At that point the sensitive let- tempts to assassina : gations. A pol wphese agents stated that they. FBI that Rosselli wanted to “keep / square with the bureau” but was* ter bounced back and forth in the i 3. higher reaches of the FBI pureauc- » could not evaluate the lawyers. ! a -| (Morgan's) allegations or question him, aac that the mob might kill him for «- é talking. ~~ | & racy. ; : The job of responding to Rowley’s -° in detail on them, since they had not kit i * been briefed on the CIA assassination | In 1967, after he was arrested for + re the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January. 1967, and told him that a Washington “It was not clear then—nor is it to: y ; day-—why Morgan came forward at. ' that time to being Rosselli’s story tot | letter was assigned to the supervisor y of the FBI’s General Investigative Di- syision who was given responsiility for , the overall assassination investigation © in March 1964. ot This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been ine: formed of what Hoover and his closest ’ circle of confidants in the FBI learned ! 4 ? _ lished a column on Mareh } : 2 early In 1962—that the CIA was ; deeply involved in assassination © - attempts against Castro.-and promi- - nent American underworld figures, in- |, cluding Rosselli and: Giancana, ‘had [: been recruited for the attempts. ae So on Feb. 15, 1967. the FBI official. prepared a draft reply to the : letter for his superiors saying vestigation uncovered, no, evidence in- ‘dicating Fidel Castro officials of the | Cuban .Government were involved with Lee’ Harvey Oswald: in the‘ assas¢¢ sination of President Kennedy. This - “gur ine «: bureau is not conducting any investi-' . this’ matter.” The “s gation regarding FBI official added in Jater testimony. > that “everyone in. the higher echelons ¢ read this...” Drew Pearson went ahead and pub- erring to reports that’ CIA schemes | against Castro’s life ‘iy 1963 “may | have resulted in a counterplot by Cas- . tro to! assassinate President Kenne- dy.” yee . HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 465 Rowley .° ° * ypon by a 7, 1967, ref-- (, dent Kennedy.” efforts,” the served. . F On March 21, 1967, the FBI’s Wash: ’ ington Field: Office sent headquarters « ten copies of a blind memorandum ; summarizing the interview with Mor-* gan. - summary of the FBI interview. yan was reported to have acknowl-° they faced “possible prosecution in a crime not, related to 96 + ° Morgan said his clients “were called ” gist in a project which was said have the highest government proval. The project had as its purpose | the assassination the infiltration of the . within key posts in Cuba.” Morgan aiso told to the summary, _ Cast : ployed ‘deams of. individuals who iy were dispatched to the United States " for the purpos¢ of assassinating Presi- | In a Senate Intelligence Committee ¢ - Mor: +" al ap: “4 governmental agency to as- “| Senate committee ob-- gambling fraud at the Friars Club in’, Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his ~ former CIA case éfficer, William Har ~ . _vey, who sought unsuccessfully: to in- ;~ ’" tercede in the prosecution. . the assassination ,}.: of Fidel Castro. -— ' Elaborate plans were made, including - Cuban Govern: : ‘* ment and the placing’ of informants { Tt was against this background that : | Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson,’ - and then the FBI, with Rosseili’s sen- : . gational allegations of CIA plotting °- ‘against Castro and the Cuban counter. | ‘edged that his clients were “on the, ° espionage directed against President: fringe of the underworld” and that . ‘Kennedy. ; Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no rec i oliection of either receiving informa- | tion that Castro retaliated. against‘ President Kennedy or of having dis-: cussed it with Morgan. This meant ei- - ther that Rosselli suffered a dramatic - the FBI. according F that Castro had em-—
t wa a pare invention, a Serious risk > established Washington pyc fou ittee source could exp ain (has Fe noe, and Morgan declined be monifirmy that Rosselli was the client in ayestion or to discuss either Ms allegations against the Cuban govern ment om his recent testimony. ile internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was. sen slie headquarters with a vane ae saying: “No further inves gation, Is being conducted by the Ww sani ton field office unless it is advised cohtrary by the Bureau. at ' The Senate intelligence commit ee in commenting on. this position, sa d ‘ that “had the interviewing ; age ts known of the ClAunderworld 4 ots inst Castro, they would h aware that the lawyer had clients wo - had been active in the assassinati $F Pee March 21, FBI headquarters for- warded the Washington fie\ oe memo to the. White House, ator’ general and the Secret Service. ; did Sot recommend any further < vestigation of wane ot 5 allegati ee the eveni 8 day. President Johnson called maar ‘rector Richard M. Helms to the Vhite, House. The next morning, Marcel 2. Helms ordered the CIA inspeee aan repare a repor sativement in the assassination noe —Operation - Mongoose-—-of wai i Helms had full knowledge at the me T they ecuted. . ; : ae, May 22, Helms briefed President ‘Tohnson on the results. Tere ts. pow ever. no evidence that Helms S63 «the President on the November, 63, " plot—one of eight major’ schemes on 7 Castro’s life from 1960 to 1965—to as sassinate the Cuban leader throug the employment of an agent with ne eryptonymn AMLASH. His identity " was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA “recruit” with close access Oh oneratives turned over assassi- nation equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—° i killed the day President Kennedy was in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation -that the mercurial an talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by. Cuban : intelligence. During the later days of his presi- *, Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorpo rated” targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement une . doubtedly was the CIA inspector gen- eral’s report he ordered Helms to have ., ° d. . . . p Within the past year, Rosselli and ‘two of his co-conspirators in the cas. tro assassination schemes have die : Giancana at the hands of a Be es- sional hit man and Harvey as tne sult of “massive heart attack” la fy aio, William Harvey. the widow of the deceased CIA. official, said a ; suspected no-foul play in her : band's death. She did, however, : ed HW 30955 Docld: 32423630 Page 466 > t : The . Washington. Post: that she re- '; ceived.a call after Rosselli’s disappear. "ance in late July warning her that Cue «. |; bans appeared to be attempting to ‘| wipe out all those who participated in | the anti-Castro plots, ° i The call, she said-came from an old i friend who was acquainted with Ros- : Selli’s ‘sister, whose name is Edith Dai. ' gle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle — i told the mutual acquaintance that the | Rosselli family had received a tele. phone threat from unidentified Cu- | bans prior to Rosselli’s disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to ; meet the Cubans in an effort. to pro- tect his family. - . Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sis- ter of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings, ; Uarvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine opera. | tor are ‘both legendary and controver. ‘sial within the agency, testified to the ; Senate ‘Intelligence Committee. He | had. become Rosselli’s case officer in- -| Operation Mongoose and supplied the “| Mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat. radar for transmission ‘toh anti-Castro Cuban agents. » dn ; .probe of the Harvey and ay Cae ; s - Rosselli, a CIA superior testified .to the Senate committee, “developed a - close friendship.” _, Another: CIA ‘official who’ worked ’ with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether. the agency ‘transmitted information’ to the mob- . 8ter on possible Cuban involvement in ’ the Kennedy assassination. He'replied — i that he was out of the country at the ~ time Kennedy was ‘Killed, and had no further comment. 6s, 4 Two months before.the Kennedy as- . sassination: Lee Harvey Oswald, who " Was identified by the Warren Commis- sion as Kennedy’s Murderer, had trav- ‘eled to Mexico City in an attempt to + gain entry to Cuba. According to the ” Warren Commission, Oswald repre- sented himself as the head of the New . Orleans branch of the Fair Play for -Cuba organization and 4 friend of the Cuban Revolution. oO Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would them. Selves not be safe. , coe A US. government committee coor- dinating ‘policy: toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some. fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S, by attacking. U.S, lead. ” _ ers. ; ' On the same day Kennedy was as. SasSirfated, a CIA officer met with a “high-ranking Cuban official, who had Said he would kill Castro, to tell hi the U.S. would provide him with ex. plosives and a poison pen device. While the Senate Intelligence Cong. mittee said {t found no evidence suffi- cient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy,. it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assag- sination or tell the Warren Commis. - sion about the CIA plots on Castro's life. . “There fs no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community,” the Sen- ate committee said, ; According to a former FBI official charge of key aspects of the FBI's Kennedy murder, the FBI never Satisfactorily detérmined . E what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he-had done in Russia, . '
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 62-116395 February 24, 1976 U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC) Reference is made to SSC letter to the U. S. Department of Justice dated January 14, 1976, requesting access to certain material and delivery of other material maintained by the FBI, Pursuant to request item numbered 17, we currently have one abstract covering the areas of inquiry available for review at FBI Headquarters by approved personnel of the Committee. Pursuant to request item numbered 18, we were not able to locate a copy of a cable dated on or about November 28, 1963, from Director, FBI, to Director, CIA, regarding interrogation of witnesses concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City. We are, -however, furnishing a copy of an FBI to CIA teletype dated November 27, 1963, captioned “Lee Harvey Oswald," which advises that the interrogation of Oswald between ‘his arrest and murder had not extended to his travel to Mexico or his contacts with Soviet establishments. The teletype, classified "Secret," also contains details from an Oswald letter to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D, C., which were obtained from a highly - sensitive source. SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED 5s HW 50955 . Docld:32423630 Page 467
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC) We are also furnishing 3 Bureau memoranda in response to the latter part of request item 18 asking for all memoranda prepared between November 22, 1963, and December 30, 1963, which relate to the interrogation of witnesses concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, including his visits to the Soviet Embassy and Cuban Consulate. , : HY 4S0954 Docld: 32423630 Page 466
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL. WASHINGTON, B.C. 20530 FEB 26 1976 Honorable Frank Church, Chairman United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities Washington, D. C. 20510 Dear Senator Church: Transmitted herewith is a memorandum with SECRET enclosures prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request in Items 17 and 18 of a letter 1976, from Mr. Paul: Wallach of your MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR. Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination dated January 14, Committee staff. ao nts => ( dna, | ene a f ty f . : . oe . ree] goetion penicay 4 %, ug yw 774.972 Docld:32423630 Page 469 HY 50955
Ride Tarp. G3 mtancy | a ” = vi STOR Ron MEXICO CiTy. 2 i t i ji G cnoM, WH. . (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY Si LOTTED. ATs 1535 25 NOY or “r) rm Le we cL, ‘. j= Cia ee oS, : iAFO a bop, Ch, ci/crs, Fl, “SA Ty SAS 8, YR * Gi af th z fi a U0 Hn) ti ys) ey 7) tay oy C3 “Wh ot gras 84 ay ow. Sade tol, oe eee e. + ib eee wee melen  PTS a 7 G op ET 2519382 : iP é rer x ext 6863 Can Geode) * H ACCORDI} NG LIF IRE DIP COURIERS REF LEFT MEXT. FoR CUBA 12 Noy: Via . ari GUBANA 465, “RETURNED MEXI 18 NOV Via CUBANA. ACCORDING LIENVOY,, ga tusy PROBABLY LEFT FOR NEY YORK. ON 23 NOV via AERONAVES FLT a ; : 451. AN AN YEV, (PHONETIC? OF Sov CONSULATE. NEW YORK. PHONED. SOVENS =. mee piles Noy ‘ASK (ING FOR" INFO ON WHICH FLIGHT COURIERS TAKING. CONNENTs . LED ry AES OnbE INF REQUENTLY ogcurs. ASST CONSUL KOSTIKOV HANDLED THE HE or oe rap iM NEW YORK. . : 7 oe i a - hy mewn * atbnsey PAPKOV AND VALENTIN PONGMAREV, SCN.DIP COURIERS ARRIVED ~ MEX TONOV, 7 : . oe LY CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-_ 2792 DO NOT DEsTRoy HY 50955 ° BDocld:32423630 Page 470
Hiv ‘ROO55 ? . - mint fs § NT iva /S /Mexico C INGEN ce 2 CRE T t 7 Toren 20 CeNO INDEX = ne Ce DATE : 09 Cetiid IN CS FILENO, 290-525 BT 10 iFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - FROM: ECRRa&eeak CSNTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONF: WH 8 Oo ROUTINE INFO: DOP, Ci, Ci/OPS, SR 7, SAS 8,-VR TO | -¥BY . 2 NF - — CITE DIR ; SECRET/NO | FOREIGN DISSEE - : 8 5 6 78 | SUBJECT: | “TRAVEL, oF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS Le | REFERENCE is MADE Ta YOUR TELETYPZ oF 8 HOvnMBSR 1963 | c CONCERNING: THs TRAVEL ‘To ‘MEXICO OF SOVIET DIPLONATIC COURIERS VALENTI Ao CERUANOVICH PONOKAREY AND. ALEESEY NIKOLAYEVICH POPEOY.. Bahn es ae Be. ACCORDING ‘To om REPRESENTATIVE Wm MEXICO CITY, "PONOMAREY | : AND POPKOV LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR ‘CUBA ON 12 - NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA 465 _ AND RETURNED TO HEXICO ‘CITY ON i3 NOVERBER VIA CUBANA. 3.0 OA. USUALLY. ‘ESEIABLE, AND SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THSY PROBABLY LEFT MEXICO CITy FOR NEW YORK. oN 23 NOVEMBER VIA. AERONAVES | Fut: 451. THE SAMs SOURCE . REPORTED | THAT ONE "ANE ANYEV" (PHONETIC) OF 7 | THE SOVIET. (CONSULATE In NEW. ‘YORS CONTACTED THE SOVIET EUBASST IN MEXT: > CITY ON 23 NOVEMBER AND. REQUESTED INFORMATION ON WHICH FLIGHT THE COURIERS: WERE ‘TAKING. “ASSISTANT CONSUL VALERIY VLADINIROVICH KOSTIXO | PROVIDED THS INFORMATION On BEHALF OF THE SOVIET’ EMBASSY IN MEXICO cr RECEN > aon ace JAN 23 1976 RELEASING “OFFI COORG I STING OFFICERS vant? te : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED, Copy No. — Doold: 32493630 Page 471
Poi ne G Ors: : : Urat : ( INDEX ; SECRET . : ' EXT 3 (] NO INDEX Le ee’ ed i _ DATE: _ OF FILE IN CS FILE NO. eet allem FROM: DIRECTOR - page 2 . . . . 4 Ste ae me A a CONE: , . See Sanitised File ff , DEFERRED. ~ : Tamber , vy mare . ROUTINE “INFO : Fer sterile copy of this cecumeni. oa SE RS ats mo ae = CITE DIR | ee 70 i - “INFO , a GS 7 4... “ANANYEV" Is PROBABLY. IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEORGIY ANANYEVICH RNAETET oF THE SOVIET MISSION TO ‘THE UNITED NAT IONS - BASED OM: : Ex’ 7060 a 67652) Sah edn cormpnstals f a 4 a. . ot nT bela tm - a H a H : en - wets 8 oar ee me “eee ae ’ a ~- - Ris ae ~ te . « : ~ : & ce h ms Tm ice 3 > om "  GOCRDINATENS OFFICERS ! cen? 1 7 ; : | Exeiuded fram autsmath eS TRA . 2 PT | ISE ISS UING, OFFIC. PROHIBITED. Cozy No, AUTHENTILATISG OFFIUER . Geclassificz ting , recensn§ , fle _ REPRODUCTION 5 OTHER THAN THE HW 50955 Docld:32423630° Bage 472
Hiv 50955 THE WHITE HOUSE ~ WASHINGTON SECRET. - EYES ONLY | January 9, 1964 MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine con- tinuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are: (1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier; (2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor; and } (3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters,, All of these operations would-have been approved three months ago, and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While itis always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it — seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed, in your first review Co of the Cuban problem). , \ The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we call them off, he will know it, ‘and so will the Russians.’ . We thus have an opportunity to choose. I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone. I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never likedit and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced, SECRET. - EYES ONLY | pol : Copy’ lyndon 8. Johnson Library | Docld:32423630 Page 43s ~~ aa ne re cng te RE RR pr ne Sata
HW 50955 SECRET - EYES ONLY -2- Jan. 9, 1964 ‘ but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position I would stop sabotage attacks .on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union. McG, B. be SECRET - EYES ONLY | | Copy” | “Lyndon B. Johnson Library Docld: 32423630 Page 474
| Ana MEMORANDUM —_ - TO: oo Senator Hart (Colorado). and d Senator ‘Schveiker FROM: Jim Johnston - ' Dan Dwyer Ed Greissing DATE : January 27, 1976 | SUBJ: Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation | of JFK Assassination Background . -) . The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the Amlash operation might have had some effect on CIA's response to. the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. On January 9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and after a delay which was not explained, the staff was “permitted to review the file on January 23 and 26. y Summary of Amlash File : a _ . Amlash initially contacted by: CIA in 1961 met occasionally with case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instruc- tion in secret writing and explosives. Interest in Amlash continued. after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA agents: until mid-1963. Why’ there was a year lapse in contact with Am- lash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash. In any event, DIR 48198” to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that Auwhip , a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of an “activation effort to reluctant dragon. "Presumably, Amlash was “reluctant dragon" and was, iby this letter, asked to recontact CIA. In. late August, “amlash: traveled with a large contingent of Cuban officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil. He cabled Amwhip about his arrival on August 29. This cable apparently was the signal that he was prepared to meet Amwhip in Porto Alegre. Amwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre between September 5 and 8. The two case officers have testified to the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of meetings which they viewed essentially as a get acquainted session. CIA messages tell a different story. Porto Alegre 0704 to DIR 6f 7 September stated that Amlash told Amwhip he felt’ there were only two ways of getting rid of Castro. The first was an invasion by U.S. forces which. Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was an "inside job.'"" Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action. He referred to the explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier as "too cumbersome" for his purposes. *  DIRs are messages sent from Langley. ‘(00 3.3.) | | ay LU NTL HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 475 noes
de alt lle |! At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters cabled on 9 September that, based on what little feel Headquarters had, Amlash appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer and should be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own co- horts. He should be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage and more serious matters on an orderly basis. (DIR 67110 to Porto Alegre, JMWAVE and Rio.) On ll September, Porto Alegre 0708 to DIR summarized the intel-- ligence information Amlash had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying ‘all IRBM and bombers had been removed. By this time Amlash had left Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe. - |! A document in the file dated 16 September and marked OFPA 72775 appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means. There is no indication as to where the conversation takes place, but it F Probably is in the Cuban Embassy in -Paris. - “Mary : I don't want. to imagine ‘things but this thing of Amlash. ‘Moreno: It is either a tremendous secret or a ~. top secret matter (unreadable)then the word "treason" or "reason"). Betty: I believe it is a top-secret matter." By letters of September 14 and September 16, Amlash. stayed in contact with Amwhip. Paris station apparently was picking up responsi- bility for Amlash at this “time, since Paris 0706 to DIR dated 19 September asks for some background material on Amlash. On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group as well as a communist group. The message also notes that Fidel is allegedly aware of the two groups and acts as moderator between them in order to maintain cohesion in the Government of Cuba. Nevertheless, Amwhip is asked to continue to work with Amlash and is assigned to accompany him around Europe. According to Paris 0934 to DIR dated 7 October, Amlash met with case officer O* on 5 October. Case officer 9 sat and listened permitting Amlash to get everything off his chest. Amlash seemed to be complaining about the -low level espionage matters that had been discussed at the September meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role. Case officer 0 "provided. necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)‘ “With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash con- __, * The files do not accurately identify these case officers. Fe Gqumiie and , however, were the principal case officers. HW 50955 Docld:32423630— Page 476 ne nee meemennttiaee age eR PN EST
32 FOPRAVIER 8S siderably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating his desire return Cuba to undertake 'the big job:*" On October 15, London 5224 to DIR states case officer O met with Amlash and Amwhip on 13 October. Although. the case officer had been forewarned by Amwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's request for a high level meeting. '"Amlash convinced that if such meet does not take place at this time it will be almost impossible come out again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite decision. Also finds it difficult to believe why RFK who receives many Cubans would refuse to see a major" such'as Amlash. The message notes the fact remains that Amlash does “have excellent entree to highest target level which believe we cannot afford overlook." | This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's role. DIR 75683 to London ‘on 15 October directed case officer 0 to return headquarters. soonest for discussions of all phases of the case. The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative of RFK. He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR, that the U.S. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti- communist Cuban group which succeeded in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and which assumed significant control to invite the U.S. to render assistance. He emphasized that U.S: support could come only ~ after a successful coup. Amlash responded by saying that without Fidel, the military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime would disintegrate. He also said he was satisfied with the policy discussion but desired to know what technical support he could get. Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was asked about Amlash's reaction to the meeting. His reactions are . summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 Novem- ber. Amwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.S. government. While Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operation plan as he saw it. Amlash could not under- stand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. Amlash had accepted the fact he had to work with the CIA, but CIA might lose him if it continued to procrastin-» _ "ate. Amlash talked about going to thé Trench térrorist organization, the OAS, but realized that was not feasible. The memorandum ends with what apparently. is the author's conclusion: “It is hoped that he does realize that Havana.must first be taken. .-..or failing that, a truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which ‘could be true rallying point." (EPPO Oy . DWE I HY 50955 . Docld: 32423630 Page 47? ; cee eet eee ee cee een
In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case offi i the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash. “Amlash was fo. be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup. . He would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November. 18 and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters had approved giving Amlash scopes and rifles and other equipment. The memo ended by stating that’ "'C/SAS* requested written reports on Amlash operation be kept to a minimum." Pari 1564 to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called on the night of November 20 and had agreed to postpone his return to Cuba in order to see case officer 0 “if it something interesting." The CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but -that it was to be a meeting which Amlash had requested. (Obviously, CIA wanted to give Amlash the ‘technical support" he felt he had not been promised in the 29 October meeting.) . es . Case officer O flew from the U.S. so as to arrive in Paris on the morn-_ ing of November 22 for this meeting. Pari 1607 to DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23 November is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the meeting had taken place. It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that day. The file contains no outgoing cable to Paris on November 23 or any other time telling Paris to break contact with Amlash.** On 25 November, a contact report was prepared. There is reason to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages and reports the 22 November meeting with Amlash. The first two pages have dark type as though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon. The type on the third page is much lighter as though prepared on a “typewriter with an old ribbon. Itimade no mention of the passing = | of a poison pen to Amlash. | re On November 27, Pari 1669 to DIR reports information obtained in October possibly by clandestinely listening devices. A source com- plained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they denigrate the revolution.. The source said she wished she had a con- cealed tape recorder to record these conversations. She named Amlash as. one of these visitors. * Desmond Fitzgerald ** In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent but could not be found. HW-58955—Docld:32429630— Page 478— ores see [ Sm co Sows paws ae
HY 50954 On 3 December, Headquarters furnished JMWAVE some details on the Amlash meeting including the fact that he had been promised "full U.S. support if he is successful in a real coup against the Castro regime." He was also promised arms which will have to be furnished through JMWAVE's operations. a A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and JMWAVE on December 6, 7, and 8. Apparently, Headquarters first gave JMWAVE authority to drop a cache of arms in Cuba. Then Headquarters called off the operation. In DIR 87615 of 7 December, it is noted “major top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which should provide basis: for decision." he JMWAVE complained about the change in orders in a cable of 8 December. JMWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher. author ity but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be de- layed and not run in December. | t . oe | ; . : | Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure was to present infiltration operation plans to "higher authority" even though there is a reasonable chance operation may be postponed or delayed as was case with the scheduled operation. 'This procedure will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirma- tion needed when previously relaxed. operation finally mounted." Head- quarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating objectives against risk factors for Amlash and others. "Believe by January, CIA should be in position better evaluate status of internal assets." . By Pari 1914 of 13 December, Paris reported that Amlash left Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case officer. DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio on 2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December. - The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December 1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information relevant to the October-November activities. Nevertheless, in red pen on the cover page appears: "Dec 1963 Not to leave this office on Nestor's (Sanchez) orders." followed by initials that appear to be ''GM." One later document in the Amlash file contains’ more information about the November 22, 1963 meeting. That. document, a rough draft of a biographical information sheet on Amlash (no final draft was found) appears to have been preparediin 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest for a later plot against Castro. It states: "22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him every- thing he needed. (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted). The situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the méet- ing to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this ANVIL, ~Bocld: 32423630 Page 479
Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and it-would not aid subject in his attempt. This included the following. _"We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro." The same document states this message was communicated to Amlash in November 1964 by Mr. Sanchez. . Despite this decision,’ the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966. . Later documents on Amlash are also relevant to, the September- _ November 1963 Amlash operation. Several such documents report informa- tion received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of Amlash's plots against him. For example, Amlash's one time Cuban mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to be with Cuban intelligence. Pari 8242 to DIR in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective may be known to too many Cubans. And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intel- - dligence. He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban exiles who was knowledgeable-of a number of the most important opera- tions. Nevertheless, Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any detailed analysis of these possible penetrations of. the CIA's Amlash operation, although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one re- port rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro. _ One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given | ' a poison pen for self-protection. That document reports that Amlash, and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for self-protection throughout their travel in Europe. Finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible CIA files to determine what other operations Castro might have been re= ferring to in his September 7 statement, the Amlash file indicates that some coastal landings of supplies in August were 'the only other CIA operations conducted against Cuba in this time period. HW 30955 Docld:324273630 Page 460
“y HY 50955 Scenario for B-9 the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live with a Castro/comunist regime in Cuba which continues its present course of ‘Subversion and aggression in Latin This doctrine is based on the proposition that America and that we. are determined to take appropriate action to put an end to these acts. 1. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before the OAS hold out for a “plank check" resolution. Settle ! for a 13 vote majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian, or Chilean support. , 2. If, despite l. above, OAS waters down resolu- tion, vote against the watered-down version. 3. If "blank check” resolution passed, proceed to 5. below. 4 #«&If watered-down resolution passed over our protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents an adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the United States. mst unilaterally declare (see 5. below). | Se Declare publicly that further aggression and subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable to the United States and, in the event of a new act on the part of Castro of the nature and magnitude of the Venezuelan ot . Copy” es Lyndon B. Johnson Library | aa Doclda: 32473630 Page 481 —
HW 50955 t , 2 ‘arms cache, the U.S. win take such measures against the Castro/communist regime in Cuba as it deems appro= | priate in the circunstances. 6.. Explain carefully through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union that the United States finds the present behavior of the Castro/communist { regime in Cuba intolerable, that Cuba's activities in Venezuela prove this to ‘be so and that further acts of violence of comparable danger or potential danger on the part of Cuba will cause the U.S. to feel no longer bound by any inhibitions against invasion or other appropriate action. Urge the Soviet Union, in: order to reduce tensions dn the Caribbean and permit the U. Ss. ‘to live peacefully with the Castro/communist regime in Cuba, to assure that Cuba is restrained from repeating its dangerous practices. Make it plain to the Soviet Union that further behavior of this sort ' by Castro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic measures. Point out to the Soviet i (Union the physical vulnerability of Cuba as well as the effect a failure to resolve the Cuban problem will have _ the U.S. has pursued of jon the traditional policy which not exerting pressures upon the ‘Soviets! European satellites. Make it plain that the U.S. desires peace in the caribbean and expects the Soviet Union to achieve good behavior on the part of castro. Docld: 32423630 Page 482 Lyndon B. Johnson Library ee
7. Decide upon the type of action on the part of Castro which would trigger action on the part of the “U. 3S. A rule of thumb could be: such action as would : represent serious, realized or potential, danger to the stability of a Latin American state, By this criterion ' 20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger, whereas the same effort by Castro in a Central Anerican country might. The judgment can be unilateral and subjective on the part of the U.S. | - 8. Formulate a program for a post-Castro Cuba giving full weight to the real changes which have taken | ( —_—_ place there during the past five years and, full recog- | nition to the need for channeling Castro's unfinished | ‘Yevolution into constructive lines. | | The above scenario should net be commenced unless it 19 recognized that, although these actions are ‘primarily designed to deter Castro from his present course, he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such circumstances the U.S, having publicly embarked on the | doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences, Le sgt cate cao ater Narigpes ve ame a _ Copy” an “Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library” owe? HW 50955 Docld: 32423630 Page 483
‘HW 50955 Bocld: 32473630 Page 464 ' Advantages "| “ Disadvantages a. Propably feasible | a. Does not attack prine within OAS, cipal problem o? 3 Castro's subversion b. . Surveillance com. | in Latin America. pletely legal and i low noise level. a b. Castro may return to policy of noneshipment it of arms. { 7 c. Probably will not result in apprehending arns carriers, dad... Expensive. 6, In addition to actions in 3., 4, and 5. above, engage in soft sabotage: operations by supporting “autonomous” exile groups and continue to encourage internal acts of sabotage by means of radio, press and leaflet campaigns. Advantages oo . Disadvantages a. Some economic advan. a. Results commensurate tages and limited with limited skills of encouragement to exile groups. anti-Castro senti- . 4 ment. b. Though fact of U.S. support carefully b. Deniability by U.S. guarded, Castro will as U.S. soil and 4 blame U.S. anyway. personnel not used, | . . c. Some noise level. 7. j%®In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5. and 6. above, engage in soft sabotage operations employing CIA-controlled Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced intervals, | Advantages 8 |. . -. Disadvantages a. Constant danger of proof of U.S. involvement, a. More professional operations that are. targetted and con— trolled. Copy” “Lyndon 3. Johnson tibeary”
Improvement of morale b, among internal anti-= Castro elements, Bettsr domestic poli- tical position as result of increased : . noise level, 8. In addition to actions in 3, Continued exacerbation of Castro without chance of delivering a , mortal blow, , 4e, 5., & and 7, above, relax the present policy panning independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air U, 3. territory. ‘Advantages Improvement of exile a. morale and internal resistance spirit. B. Matanzas power plant, SES emplo Can't Live with Castro strikes against Cuba rom Disadvantages General ineffectiveness against targets, Obvious employment of U.S. soil, Air strikxeg however ineffective begin to arouse Soviet response. | | (It is assumed that ‘maximum intelligence colléction will be continued,) 1, Engage in ClA-controlled as well as "autonomous" covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact but higher risk targets such as Santi Fi only. BW 50955 Docld: 324279630 Page 485 Advantages _ Thig essentially minimum a, pian evolved June 1963, but never permitted to’ develop, having some b. chance to overthrow Castro, ; ; Ce Measurable economic impact and strong encouragement. to anti-Castro elements, ; aoe 7 te ory *, . we tow lee obey . antiago refinery, ying Cuban personnel Disadvantages High risk of capture and exposure, — High noise level, Possibility of some Soviet response, ii i a Copy” : nies ee Library” gos “ot ee acim sete ge Se He
WW 50955 Es a8 2. Institute an economic denial program based upon the establishment of a "Proclaimed List" under the Trading with the Enemy Act together with al overt and covert, to deny to Cuba items critical to its economy. Advantages a, Considerable increase in Cuba's difficulty in procuring key imports. bd. U.S. obviously “doing something about Castro." 3, Engage in sabotage operations as in Bel. above using not only Cuban but other nationalities including U.S. soldier of fortune teans, — Advantages . Improved operations and greater economic damage, - 4, Engage in violent large-scale non-deniable sabotage activities, using U.S. service personnel where necessary, such ag@ mining Cuban harbors, attacking Cuban shipping on the high seas and in the harbors using drone surface craft, sneak air attacks on key installations, etc. Docld:.32423630 Page 466 b. C. b. Advantages Much more effective opcera- a. tions and real economic damage. b. Cc. emt fa j Lyndon B. Johnson ‘Library Disadvantages  Loasa of trade. . ‘throw of Castro, . Very high noise ievel, . 32 does not result . other reasgible actions, Multiplication of U.S, problems with major allies including possible loss of allies’ support of U. s. dollar, Will not assure overthrow of Castro. Disadvantages Technical deniability only and very high noise level, Will not assure over= Disadvantages No deniability. rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of eriticisa, Borer meme ere amen ~ ae me . ee Ce ee Lo ae rarer oe Bape v 8 : _ Copy”
or nls elu ep 7 quarantine of Cuban . 5. .U.S, unilateral close-in Shipping, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing export of arma to Latin Anerica with the aim of humi- liating and degrading Castro, Advantages Disadvantages ~~ Proof of U.S. intention a. Will probably not catch to stop Castro, contraband, — b. If vigorously pursued against all Cuban Shipping, may provoke . Soviet response, fy ¢. Very expensive without ‘ assuring fall of Castro, 6. Cutoff of all communications (except radio) inte and out of Guba including a clandestine cutting of the Jamaica cable, Advantages _ Disadvantages: Will at least for a a. Considerable outcry period disrupt Cuba's diplomatie ana economic offensive and hinder subversive efforts, from Europe and Latin America, b. Not fatal to Fidel. a a | Presidential public declaration making clear that the U3, considers the continued présence of the HW 50955 Very effective inside. Cubs Castro regime ag intolerable, barring any rapprochement with it and encouraging anti-Castro/communist dissident Disadvantages ——— Scherrer ata Must be followed by some and encouraging to Latin form of effective action, Anerica, a Lyndon B. Johnson Library 6 Dacld: 32493630 Page 467 Spee rst < oS RETR Rl Oe 7 z en et fe
HW 50955 Docla: 32423630 ot nw td 3 a ine at . t wy. in - 8, An official declaration that should Castro engage in certain specified proscribed actions the U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation inside Cuba (the "Rostow Doctrine”). Advantages a. May force Castro to fe a. stop his subversive actions. b. Whether retaliation by the U.S. is required) d. or not, it will have’. profound effect on || . anti-Castro. morale. 7 : Ce action taken, Difficulty in pinning down clear-cut viola- tions by Castro, Digficulty in avoiding _Givilian casualties. 9. Announces ublicly and inform the Soviet Union through high Level diplomatic channels that furtner sub— version by Castro in Latin America is intolerable and that if Castro persists in his present course the United States will no longer feel bound by any inhibitions against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as it deens appropriate. | Advantages a. Proper basis for. a. future actions. b. Possible deterrence | b. of Castro. 7 c. Best method of minie mizing Soviet reaction. 10, , See Annex A, Disadvantages _ Difficulty of clear - proof. Possible Soviet: . reactions. After having established the appropriate. basis” for such action, impose a. total blockade of Cuba Advantages The most effective nethod of bringing down Caatro.' { rity og f ioe | cme ras oer Page 488 . Disadvantages Possible Soviet reactions. Botnet visadvantages lay provoke Soviet 7 response either before. or after retaliatory a Lyndon B. Johnson Library poe
bE say eitind | | fs 9 : C _ : ee . ll, After having established the appropriate basis for such action, invade |Cuba. } Advantages - Disadvantages Will bring down Castro. a. Possible Soviet , reaction, bb, Probable heavy casualties on beth sidea,. . c. Increased difficulties in post-Castro Cuba. f’ . a AEANTT a. $e Bere et en cet te ee OR pt aaa Satie ee _ Copy! “Lyndon. B. Johnson Library HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 489
799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3,N. ¥.  ORegon 48293 \ to a mimeo, machine to prepare public material if ‘you are going to operate. A B00 urpelr tae is essential and above all pepple that wild carry out the million and) one mechanical functions necessary=-to make it a going operation, ( Note?! when you contact people by mail we recommend that only first class be . ue used and that no full name go on the return address on the outside of the envelope, | ca] i You will notice how we work ourts here on the natidaal jevel. Many people will re spond better with this type of protection against nutty neighbors and over curdlous amt postmené | ‘These may sound like ‘small things to yous but .I can assure you that we tae! Serer gone throu: sh thi a thousand and more time the Length and breadth of the country ax p eine have learned a great deal over the last three years; through some bitter experience _ Na turally, I would like to communicate with you a great deal more concerning Ute yourself so that we can get to know you and possibly be of some assistence to yu @t as we get more information. effec: We Aspe to hear from you very goon in this regard and are looking forward to & good working relationship for the future, Please, fell free to discuss this gata quite thoroughly with Mes Fraternally, . . Ve. Te lee, | F ; National a ; .- V.T. Lee Exhibit3 Lee (Vincent T.) Exutpir No, 3—Continued
Accepting as valid the Attorney General's statement that there is no point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the United . States to live with Castro, the following possible courses of action are listed under the headings "Can Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither of these headings is absolute; the courses of action listed under each are indicative of degrees of accepta- bility of the Castro regime or conversely the urgency to overthrow it. ee COURSES OF ACTION A. Can Live with Castro | (~~ i 21 February 1964 7 | SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WIiTa RESPECT TO CUBA 1. Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards full recognition of his regime and unlinited trade etween @ Onited Statas an Be @ negotiator of the detente would endeavor to secure from Castro com- mitments not to engage in subversive activities in Latin America and not to engage in polemics against the United States. He would also endeavor to reduce - or eliminate, as a result of our concessions, Soviet presence in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine to one compatible with the requirements of a peaceful Latin American island republic. : No covert activities would be undertaken and intelligence operations would be of a nature compat~ ible with our relations with a neutral power. rs Lyndon B. Johnson Library” . | amt ere eee a moe Re aa’ wl ew Hy 50955. Docld: 32423630 - Page 491
‘ HY 50955 DBocld:32423630 Page 492 Advantages 7 If the plan works, thia a. would represent a satis~ factory solution of the Cuban problem, especially if the Soviet presence — could thereby be eliminated, b. t e { | 4, \ r te ' 7 Disadvantages | As plan almost: sure not to work, it would have grave consequences throughout Latin America as well as serious. domestic political repercussions, — Even if plan ultimately | successful there would be short term domestic political losses and short term weakening U.S. position in Latin America, 2. Do nothing. No specific efforts will be made to arrange a rapprochement with Fidel but we would. remain receptive to any. advances made by him, No covert operations would’ be undertaken and intelligence operations would not include black maritime operations into Cuba. It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing the good faith and good. will of the new Administration, would make his own advances leading towards a satis~ factory detente, 7 . Advantages — 4s in 1, above, a. be Disadvantages As in 1, above but less short term domestic and Latin American losses, Even less chance of success, 3, The present level of intelligence operations, including U=-2 overflizhts would be continued, Black maritime ingiltrationg and oxfiltrations of agents and caches of intelligence gear would continue but no: action operations would be conducted, Lyndon We would be "keeping an eye on” Fidel both in Cuba and abroad but would be making no effort to hinder his internal development, =: t ee one Seen Eo oak Bel lad alt | . Copy~. B. Johnson Library nee ne F on
Hiv 50955 Maximum effort, would be made to increase the countersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign target countries. — A Advantages: a Disadvantages We would be maintaining a. Evidence of American a clean hands attitude | inaction would be domestically assailable, would be quickly sensed by Latin American coun- tries and would further demoralize the exile community. towards Castro and our |) policy would be more | compatible with that of' our major allies. v b. We would be in effect as helping Castro to cone solidate his position ay at home and establish i his image abroad. 4, In addition to) intelligence collection as in 3., we would engage in la "persuasive" economic denial program employing diplomatic eiforts and the coopera tion of U.S. corporations. Covert subtle sabotage against selected Cuban jimports Ce. g- contamination of lubricant additives). | Advantages : Disadvantages . A carefully targetted We will remain at odds with denial program with effec-_ our allies on Cuba trade. tive subtle sabotage ia capa- We may delay but not prevent ble of at least disrupting Castro's progress, the timing of Castro's if - economic efforts. It may ‘have a measurable effect on Cuba's one domestic i source of economic strength sugar. 5S. In addition to actions in 3. and 4. above, engage in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft > carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilateral | agreements with individual countries in Latin America, ' guch surveillance to be accomplished without the use of force in international waters and the use of force in “national » waters. Pct vee wee — Copy” ae | Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library Bocld:32427630 Page 293
ll fe esiT ow ef VOY bag afigey ac Wee. yee a yo BS Eyer ve 3 ey | . . WY, Sacer ats 4 : i 4 Me “ 799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3,N. Y. OBegoa 46293 ~4og a Me : i take i, Gswald | 4 : i L/G wagazing Street ” : i Je £ 7 “arleans, Louisiana : | 4 i contac Lown Friend: : L ; : - I ori Thank you for your prompt reply. Enclosed are your card and receipt, slong ; with our thanks! and welcome. tt . | : : > ! emeriec Your interest in helping to form an FPCC Chapter in New Orleans is gratedully | vee’ i . : received. [ shall try to give you some basic information now so that you may have i , a cotter nict wure of what ‘this entails. For one thing, I.am enclosing a copy of our Constitution and By-Laws for ail 80 do 7: chapters and Student Councils. You will note that there is considerable autonony , which i it for an‘organization our size. We try and let all Chapters operate.according to the een for. i Local requirencnts. Naturally, there a minimul regulations which must be move “re In é AlL chapters can. receive Literature in bulk at a discounted rate and resell at 7 1 4s our 3 the retail nrice and usa the proceeds for further Chapter activities: credit is ° . “ “ wered t: z extended and payment is not requirad with the order. te do expec payment within a ; . P for 3 ; : reasonable period so that we may continue our end of the operation. : : “ : _ peanizat: It wold be hard to concieve of a chapter with as few members as scem to exist Y  prud Move in the New Orleans area. I have just gone throush our files and find that Lousiana ~ 4 sceedure scons somewhat restricted for Fair Play activities. Hovever, with what is there kporters, perhaps you could build a larger group if a few people would undertake the disciplined ;  cassny ue responsibility: of concrete org ganizational works A {forte - . Ye certainly are not at all adverse to a very small Chapter but certainly would dierate in a expect that there would be at least twice the amount needed to conduct a degal executive ‘ve wil board for the Chapter. Should this be reasonable. we could readily issue a charter te the lees. “} . ooo V.T, Lee Exhibit 3 a Co Lee (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No.
opie te according to the ipog which aust be mot. gO : equnted rate and resell at 2P activities, Sredit is a0 e “st payment within & 4 Opera wONe tow menbers ag seem to exist files and find that Lousiana sever, with what is there would undertake the disciplined ; 4 L Chapter but certainly would aded to conduct a legal executive ‘id readily issue 4 charter te =xa r No 3 Fey on o/ sated 2 | t 3 , } a 4 of ; re V.T. Lee Exhibit 3 ce os Zz Lee (VINCENT T.) Exuisrr No. 3—Continued’ : o. _proceedure helps prevent many unnecessary incidents which frighten away prosoective [799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3,N. ¥. _ORegon 4.8293: : at A . . nt st & “ew vrleans Chapter of FPcc. In fact, we would oe very, very pleased to see this taxe place and would like to do everything possible to assist in bringing it about. | Ye feel that the south-east is a very difficult area to work because of our lack of contacts. Our only southeastern Chapter right now is that in Tampa, Florida which I originally organized vezore coming up to.work in the National. Office. I for one am convinced of the possibility of such an enterprise but now from exnerience that it is quite a-problem and requires sane sacrifice on the part of those involved. You mist realize that you will cone under tremendous prassures with any attennt to do FPCC work in that area and that you will not be able to operate in the manner which is conventional here in the north-east, Even most of our big city Chapters have been forced to abandon the idea of operating an office in public, The national office here In New York is the only one in the. country today and the ‘New York City Chapter uses our office too so it is the only Chapter with an office. Most Chapters have dis= covered that it is easier to operate semi=-privately out of a hone and maintain a P.O, / 30X for all mailings and public notices. a P.O. Box ig a must for any Chapter in the organization to guarnatee the continued contact with the national even if an individmal in should move or drop out.)/ We do have a serious and often violent opposition and this - : ' : supporters. I definitely would not recomend an office, at least not one that will be easily identifyable to the lunatic fringe in your community. Certainly, I would not . recommend that you engage in one at the very beginning but wait and see how you can ‘ ‘ onerate in the community through several public experiences. Ye will be able to give you some assistence from here, but not much. It is up 4a the lecal Chapters, to hondie their om afta Se You shaould have at least access
DEIEEETE I PLOod Geeog AA 6% afea | Includes $5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in June 1963, “15 December 1963 oe 2 eee — ern, eran. O , CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Deputy Director (Plans) Cost of Cuban Operations Fiscal Years 1960 - 1964 Supporta/ Covertb/, Covert Action¢/ Fiscal Year Collection , Pos t=Invasionl/ . __PA/Propd/ — Paramilitar 1960 $319,534 $131,063 - $1,677,161 $318 ,409 = $2,446 ,167 1961 6,293,580 457 ,633 3,168,584 30,164,698 $1,627 ,824 43,712,319 1962 3,599 ,274 793 ,8248/ 6 444,098. | 2,975,635 4,176,000 . 17,988,831 7 1963 5,343,973 1,738,977£/ (3,786,797 2,038,880 _. 3,899,830 21,808,457 1964 (est.) 5,030,000 767,500 «3,520. 000 9317 ,5002/ 565 , 000 20,290,000. a Tetalb oo - 20,586 361 4 888,997 __ 22,396 ,640 47 815,122 10,268,654 106,155,774 administrative . administrative a/) Support: Lneludes staff salaries, purchase o€ feqeipment and supplies, rental of bropetttes an facilities, ete.. a a b/ Covert Collection: Includes foreign intelligence collection operations and counter-intellipence ' operations involving the use of classic agent operations, ‘audio and other technical devices, use of third-country intelligence and security services, refupea debriefings, ete. c/ Covert Action: Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities encompassed by NSC 5412... : , — af PA/Prop: Includes political action and Propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers, . mapazines, other publications, radio, television, ete, : an | e/ _Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardware, the formation, development, and dispatch of groups in paramilitary operations. £/ Brigade Support: Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in action, medical and rehabilitation costs of released Brigade members, direct payments to- Brigade members, ete, oO 7 : Lo Oo - g/ Includes a total of $345,000 for the operation of the inter-Apency Caribbean Admissions Center at Opa Locka, Florida: $95,000 for Fiscal year 1962 and $250,000 for fiscal year 1963, h/ Copy. | teahbwean Pihraev :; oF 28 ee oe
HW 350955 r Ae agement Con. . Z pa ede from automatic ‘ No. of a * Copies, cuties “fe —_d _ 20UP 1 ‘g@ and : cation DEGRA LD Be RILVS , tht fs 7: REVIEW OF CURREAT PROGRAM OF | . Su pp COVERT ACTION ACALNST CUBA tT. - ‘ite Corrent Situation in Cubs “paring 1963 the situation in Cuba steadily vorzen ed. Tha economy continued its decline and Castro was net able to halt: ‘the downward curve. Hurricana Flora intensified Cuba's economic probiezs. Disiliusioment and apathy axong tha great majority a of ths population contimied to grow, and enthusiasa was increasingly | restricted to a hard core. Az popular suoport waned, coercion and _ terror were exoloyed more and more to maintain the rezime's control. . Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype .. eaused increasing disillusioment among his original followers. His stature in the eyea of many Cubang and Latin Americans suffered .:- with the realisation, in the aftermath of the October missile crisis, that Cuba hed seen a pawn sad Castro a cupe of Soviet policy. : Respite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to-— step acta of defiance against his regime. Guerrilla activity, although scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontaneous. 5 -: | &ets of sabotage are cosmon throushout the island, At creat . ae risk refugees still elude his security forces and sca natrols  ¢@ eseape from Cuba. In this atrosphera, externally mounted — ' gadidg against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of frustration and helped sustain hope anong the many Cubans dise illusioned with his regis. Daring 1963 Cuba's International situation geened alsost 2 a3 pad ag the domestic, Although chinks appeared in the wall, the U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba vas a holding ep fairly well. Soviat-Cuban relations clearly vere wider | a etrain, Castro scored no foreign policy victories to providaa -:. mich needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimlate Castro-type armed uprisings throushoukt Latin America failed to ae disrupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potentially © embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely ta. Venezuela. These internal and international trends and develop~ awe - ments’ brought Cuba to a low point during 1963. - ae _ Withia the past few veeks, hovaver, f five developments have given the Castro Tegins an important politiesl-psycnalogical Docld:32423630 Page 497
. . . cece emreierrin teen “eet NA EEC ECE NA SD eet ete enna HW 50955 Atte ENERO a Nee tet ot EE Sheeran te t + arte na nh gs ens sons! tin ( Dheon ee he te eT ee ie whe etmek ant, < ' y Pd i ‘ mea f SEVKETeserSarivs — Ak, aw - “ates. They ere: ’ j tae pee sen a Re en ny me i Ll. The realization in the Cabsa Goverment that “the continuing high sugar prices in the world market | have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible currercy tezerves frem about $20 million to almost $100 million during the year. 2. 7 The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1564, signed on Jamary 11, and the Khru shchevassurances of : January 22, demons trated a Soviet willinzness te. miintsin its aid and trade progzaa at a very substantial level end to support Cuban sucar prices. ‘tha protecol calls for CubaneGovict trade to increase by 22 per cent over 1953. Coavict ' exports, about 40 pez cemt of whieh will te on » exedit, will increasa by at least 10 per Cont « The distinct possibility that the United States policy of econcmic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba © = may not be able to stand in the face cf increasing . __ " pressures £rem Western countries to expand trade with Cuba, extending credit if necessary, The Eritish tue deal, with payment spread ever a | = five-year period, is an isportant political and psychological trixzmmph for Castre. Its eresive effests on porential ¢ Cuba suppliers are already — : . clear, The recent rioting and wiolence qa Panena, ga which Castro had some hand, wlll injess new revolutionary URS A fervor into Cagtroits activities. In addition, Panema and its afternath will take the play away £rom the ineideat of the Venezuela ams cache. ; * The revolt in Zaaziber, in which Castrea alee had a hand, is teend to impress Latin America as well ag other unstable areag with the ienzth of Fidel's on ra _ama and the potency of his doetrine. . Docld: 32423630 . Page 498 SUCRST-SENSITIVE
. - - ” emt Sov aeeslct mee Le mm oO ae we este else nina AG SO a ge oe ee Sa ee ere LN none tthe. a : oer . . ( . . . ( . my : 1+. wore. ' ‘ . 4 on | CP BAR TT By EG TEE Sh, Bey ln, O itp , Ao These recent dovelopnents have provided tha upward | - political and psychological thrust Castro's regizne badly ge By * needed, Ue now has a fimer base for his repeated claims INT UR, that Cuba has survived the full brent ef a major Uaited Statea 40:  effort-to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to in oe ‘press many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition, . Gastxo now haa the pessibility of producing some tangible evidence | jj. that his regime can restore forward momentum in the ecomomy. “. Consequently, the general position of the Castre regime is a ” -- gach iaproved over that of three or four months azo. - ae toe bee eet ; \ o 4 i - = Current U. 5. Polley and The altisate U.S. objective is the replacement of the te , preseat govermment in Cuba by one fully compatible with the ve - goals of of the United States. 7 Te attain this objective, ve ara trying, by exerting  gecxizamm pressure: through ali means short ‘of the use of mille 5 . . "tase Zorce, to create a degrea of disorganization, uecertainty ot “™ '-- @nd dizesatent in Cuba which will (a) predispose elements in 90) 2. | _. © ¢he military and other power centers of the xregice to bring 0: \ gbout the overthrow of the Castra/Comumist group end tha a . elimination of the Soviet presence in Cubas (b) weaken the. -. Base for subversion in the Honisphere; and (¢) assist in : +. genvincing the Soviets that they axe backing : a Josing and _ Sapensive horses i a In order to ereate tha eptizm situatioa Sust desertded, aaee .. we have teen carrying out a program of 4Zategrated, mitually =... o., kednforeing and catually dopentent courses of + Beton. “These the ks cr <) Dental of feonmorld markets ard sorsss. of ce Pf es  " geeagis to Cebas wa nave undertakes a variety os be of de of overt and covert activities desisncd to ae ee |, Thaace free-world trade with Cuba and, especially, | a ee be to > eeny Guba acess3 to » commodities eritical to _ 7 HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 499
Pe oe ee «if Be, gy. oo gy. WW 50955 Docld: 32423630 Page 4500 _ fying these activities are now being presented. political eosts and risks that are cutailed, | The reduette en of Freneusrid shincines in the Cura measures we have endeavored ta domonstrate the economy. Proposala for expanding and intensi- The execution of these additional aeasures depends |: , basically on a decision to incur the csnsiderable .. hie trades We have iintained diplosatic pressures on frae-world nationg to reduce and eventually eliminate their ships in the Cuba trad he have denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ehaips in the Cuba trade (KSA4 220, as amended). nde To the game general end, wa have exployed oxisting . legislation, and the threat of additional legise- me daticn, restricting economic and allitary assiste 2. | anve to countries with ships in the Cuba trade, _ The reduetion of free world, and the cantainment OF ef Soviet Bloc. ain sesvica to Cubas ke have era ny atte zed ciplomatie pressures on free-world tries having, or wishing to establisa, air oe sexvice to Cuba. We are invokiag resent legise ot: | istioa cenying assistance te countries whose snips and alrerafe carry comiodities to and fron Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic - pressures on f{rceeevorld countries to deny their ~~ facilities to Sovist Blos and Cuban airlinea = serving or trying to serve Cuba, or bazags | eucan airlines. at a Zhe Tinatestion of Frea-uerld divleeitie relations Saucer Saga veep eens benneaaApepESeRene spore mempemmNarTemnicisher eamasarane ae metec mae with Cuts; As cpportumity has offered, we havea 9 is: 0 esexrted pressure to perscade iree-world countries -.:' _to break diplecatic relations with Cuba er te mr@vent the establisieant:ef such relations with Efforts to tmderming the Castro imace a abroad end oh to frustrate Cvban attercts to erhancs that in: can By meoma of diplemacie, propaganda and covert: weakness, fallaresa and betzayals of the Castro meats . = 7 steve onan vt oe oe tt = .- 2) gponer.sausrrry: a . , : Ie Sane Lyndon B. Johnson ‘Library oe
PECAN NG on Vet eee DC ene re i oe ra et 2 eccs seN  taincen Boneh ene ay, ee ee ene ee we ed Oe ee ar ors te “ai - OSgde oho. Bitaiermensemss ery aH B, Defense ecainst Castro-Commemist Subversion ~ ol _ —_ | oF von 2. Rbthin cubes As indicated abeva, all cur effocta i ta bring abcur disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba ere intended toe weaken the a Cudan base for Castro/Comamis® subvereion. 4. Outside Cuba: ae &. Multilateral: We bave scusht, through the CAS, 5: 7 to obtain geneva] Latin Anerican recognition of the serlousness of the subversive threat and approval of recommendations of measures <5... to limit travel to and from Cuba, and the 7 _ transfer of fonds and propaganda, <At the “ present tine, ve intend to expand and intensify “this effort threugh actions to be taken by the . - vo oh O48 on the basis of the Verezuelan complaint 7 fo ' against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the eae oF 1.) pe have made cpecial efforts with the Centzal  - unorvicdn countries and Psnama to hava then - |. tighten controls om the activities end moyonent_ Cy ef subversives, to deveicp inlend aad inslorvea or surveillance capabilities, to qreute effective « os, _ 7 tatelligence organizations and to establish a vo systea of intelligence exchange. cae s ea ot ae ae oe Ge ete tne ett ate eta ten ne Si SHO a = ° .: be: Bilateral: Tarcugh training, material essiate i vn ante and exchanza of intellicence, we have 7 worked ta imorcva the internal cacusity se capabilities ef individsal countries. . or . as Unilareral: In addition to mitilateral and =. . bilateral | BEASUTESs we have continued to- “Ns maintain our surface patrols im the vicinity — of Cuba, ta isorcve | cus own courenications : systans and to davelop cur own intelligence ., capabilities ogainae subversive activities «; , NW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 501° ce “Lyndon B. Joh ison Li brary”
SlVAS Teoh sOaT LVS - . ws . ” i ue ne ex ke oo ailite 3 gnce ir a gt Seas We bave maintained diplomatic pressure on the Soviets |. to continues troop:withdrawals and we have warned the | f°): _. Seviets that we will not. telerate the use of Sevlet =. forces in Cuba to suppress popular uprisi | fhe collection of inteliieerce © We have saintained and improved our overt and covert gcollestion of intelligence to meet not only U.S. mail! strategie requirecents but also operational requires =! - ments commected with our covert activities within Cuba. | We have miintained periodic high-level overflighta af suppleuented on a few occasions by low-level flights. + .: We baye warned the Soviets and Cubans p against inter ference with these Elignts. Covent opezstions te wealeen and wad or | A detatied | discussion of the covert elesonts og or | e me “ka stat ed above, all the $e courses of 2etion interact and Bo ‘ ” awe “theesdepondene, Fot ¢simple, our covert econenia denial os! | _- @peratloas are cesimed to reinforsa and ba reinforced by On De re oe " gwert measuzes of economies pressure, Both types of activities © ¢ | One ov o~. @dvested against the econemy are intended to aggravate existing . a rn nf: @eomente difficultics and thus te incrésse the level of dla- - | | . ¢.' @€fection not only in the porular mass but particularly in : on “lo. th power eenters of the ragize, This disaffection enhances “he |. que ability to establish meaninsful contect with flisurea in ce “Fr Bhe military and other power centers and to develap intelli- — oe - 2 -" pemee sources. Thia disaffection is in turn inteselfled by | a the evidence of vulnerability to outside attacks provided fy che success of covert sabotage and harasement ectivities.— oS etd an s q HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 502
4: eerie as we ow 1 - ~ tr ete Mie eine, A enter Smee A etl ae be oh bet td need co 8 ee 1 & ' . hi : . = . t : ‘ | - * “Ve ‘ ‘ ' : SEGRYT<@S"“NSLTLYS og By the sane token, the failure or elintnation of one oft these “ : mutually supporting courses of action jecpardizes the others ' caer aod thus couproaises the entire program. | re < f es Tareush 1963, these courses ef action wera having a messurem : ; o yn able positive impact. Wa are now confronted, however, by a seh Ra -«. “gepies of developments, described im Section I, which threaten |; “hi. gg ayrest of even reverse our forward movement, The situation 5 oo de par ticularly acute with respect to the maintenance of cur ~ . @eononic pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert me opssations: particularly timely and important. os tM. Concept of the Covert Action Prozraq = aaa! The CLA covert action program aims at maintaining all ot feasible pressires.on Cuba and at creating and exploiting o _s  gituations in Cuba caleulated te stimulate diesident elements 9°30: ’ q@hthia the regime, particularity in the arsed forces, to carry UR pal . _ Out @ coup. The objective of the coup would be to remove a, _ | la» - the Cagtvo/Comamists frem the regime and to eliminate the 9 95: ~ entire Soviet presence from Cuba, Recognizing that the U.S. 699) + - 48 enzgeged in a race against time with Cuts end its Sevier =|: ally toe obstruct the cancoli idation of Castro's rezina at henge 7 and to prevent bin: from achieving his echitions in Latin PE  Admexgica, we set the time frame for this program at about . @ighteen meaths from June 1363. - nae Aa originally conceived and approved in June i963, the -.) @gverk action program was based on the assumption that U.S. policy precludes a military invesion or a full blockade of '... Gaba which cculd lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. : 2 "+." Jn addition, the covert action program was and is predicated i! Oo  @m the thesis that its chance of success would dep mend beavily - oo 4» @@ @ sustained aad intensive effort in ether sector S, partie . om ~o.” @ylarly the overt econonle dental and political isolation cau | Lo programs, by all elements of the United States Govermment. 960 aan “4 Tkeg, the inter-action of the overt and covert effort against oidas Jl.” Cuba is regarded as a vital acd irreplaceable factor if there vet ae is to be any hope of  Becompiiching the overall mission. wo armen . a tae oe HW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 5093
| | | | ee Clits integeated covert action progran consists of the : following intercependent courses of action: Covert collection of intellicense te meet U Se. rational security requiresents and to support — current and plamed cavert operations. It sheald "be noted that clandestine maritime ecperations ara oa integral part of intelligence collection, Prenagends netiana to stimilate loverls’ sim le sabotare and other forms of activa and passive (randetance: again3gt the resime. Economie denial actions in support of governsent= wide overt official US- econcale Eoghan | SB SuTesSe Exploitation and st polation of disaffection ia the Cuban armed forces and other mrsor eootore of ree the racine to encourase these elements to caxry cut . Lope, a coup against the Castro/Comumist factions, CIA...) 24-0. . dg identifying, contacting and attempting ta ese oe ta channels of commmnication with these indl= §. 0+... Coneral eakatocn and horasscent 33 an econexte weapon and 429 2 stimulus to internal resistence, Asam 8) momnle weapon, it is desiened to supplement and oar Sige suport the overall econcsic e denial prozran by BY danazing econgaically important installations and to ©. @dd to Castro's eseconic probless by fereing hin ta 25. | divert money, manpoues and resources from econemie ei, | to internal eecurity activities, Aga stimius to <= -. resistance, sabotage and physical haressucnt operationg | provide visibla and dramatic evidence of the existence - and expability of organized resiatance asaliast the . regima; To the extent that these cperaticns ara execessisl, they also demonstrate to the Cuban population and elite groups the vulnerability of. the regice to militant actica, It is recogaized that no sie: - gingle act of eabotage by itself can waterfally aft ect a a | the seoncny or stimulate resistances, but wa believe =. - that tha: : sg ECRET-SUISITIVE . Be > HW 50955 DocId: 32423630 - Page 504
: that the exmulative psychelocical and political : | dmpact within Cuta of sustained sabotage cperations coat. _ 4s a necessary element in the * accouphisinsat e€ our Suapert ef extonences onti-Castro Cuben exile oo grows. These operations are intended to provide -@ deniable activity, a@ means of supplementing | and expanding our covert capability end a mens ef taking =...” . @dvantage of untapped political and resistance resources <:, ' . o£ the exile esecumity. The pregram new includes two ia '. autenomous groups whose credibility as to autonony : is - strengthened by the fects thats . yt They are led by men whose promfaenca and status ~~. fa the Cuban exile community makes plausible their - access to fmds, equipment and manpower quite ine cependent of the U.S}  $oth are based in the Caribbean area cutaide of U.S. territory; Both have naturel, willing allies in power in , severah Latin 4cerican countries; Beth are Cuben and exploy Caban nationals . exclusively; Every iten of financtal and logistic support hago been bandied 1a a mamer as to provide mazimm | a : - protection against Proot ef CIA oz U.S. parti- Soaks elpation.. The initial ain of thase creraticns is to ) strengthen | the will to resist by inereasing the tempo of cube. vexsicn and sabetage largely maintained mmtil now ror : by CIA; the eventcal aim is to take the fight i.) fron ‘the coastline to the interior cf Cuba. The disadventaze of our autoncncus’ ‘cporations is | _. that ie is nceessary to accept a lover order of efficiency and cantral than would be considered - . acceptable in CT Amma .C perations.. WW 50955 Doold:32493630 Page 505 — .
Se ate conte Fm Pte gee re or DB ERee Esk OD CED B & 8.0 Me - 10 - y mer) 2 ene wena awa se, mB mae of the foresping interlocking courses of action, items og “@ end (2) are in train and no policy problema resarding thea - /@re expected. Item (3) ts the cubject of ancrher paver which © dg being presented for concurrent consideration. Item (4} a _ ds the essence of cur prosran and is dependent gor its success » @@ the resulecs of a1] other overt and covert courses of action,’ “a. Ltem (5) haa been the subject of continual review since tha ro iz ineeption ef the program and is the primary subject of this ey “> paper. Cansideration of Item (6) (autoneccus operations) should © 20> take place with a discussion of eabotaze and harassment (Itoan se or oT". These latter tre itens ara ciscussed in more Getail in Section v. : 7? oar ner Pos ‘IV.. The Sabotare Prosran in Retrosmect “OP. Ge knew of at least 30 acts of internal sabotage aad 60» .. @mmed clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents. .* gimee 2 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not - oo part of @ coordinated prograns they are sects of individual Bok: oor.) ge gmall gro group defiance, Tscy are stimulated by uony factors, §::: “saad ng one £ facter can ba assigned entire credit. Sabotage : » dneidents, which includes a hish prosortion of sumer cane oa birnings, have a tendancy to be seasonal, a fast thich further =~ : ' ebseures statistical analysis. Althsuch it is trues that from 21° - - @ lew point in sabotaze incidents ducing the summer of 1963 _.,.' there wos a heavy Increase during the fall (following the CS AN Cemoncesent of our raiding activity}, we believe that cleerer ~. -".. Ytghte is shed on the effects of our harasszent precram by the gtatements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba - ce aan by the acts of the Cuban re gle itself: ; ' Since 1 Aveust 1953, five sabotase raids have been. we attempted. ‘All were successful. There was substantial a damage to the terget; all participants were safely recovercd — . <., Gad the plausible “deniabiiity of the operations , waa not SS ad . ey : i. "Amex +g _sentaina a brief review of these operations. ee ~ Lyndon B. Johnson Library” HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 506
- oe * s . a . “4h 7 8 etree ponent | Rivest, ewe cas tains teh sgh ts peatland Matas eat Br ee ata cane ate mt ete 1S ae ne nome oy HW 50955 Wee a #11ltp to its morale.” | Bocld: " eredited to the Agency. " eheeats point up his acute sensitivity to Internal resistance © : . wailnerability te such a camaicn due to the "Low ebb" of  gnthusissa for the Castvo regime among the people. Ha also 32493630 Page 507 - SECRET-SENSITIVE —_—— ~~ | - the lack of proof of U.S. invelverent did not prevent | Castro from charging the CLA with respensi bility. indeed, _@leost every act of defiance against his regine has ‘been Castro's exational reaetions to real or resored security | nd gsuzsests that he feels his regime to be far from secure . from external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, | hag reacted to the sabotage raids with much lees vigor and blaster than we anticipated. Thaels only sharp reaction, _ / aside from the ezpected propaganda, followed a sories of air ' waids ducing a4uguat and Septenber sponsexed by Cuban exile groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had =) responsibility. They did no real damage, tmr they did - demonstrate that che Cuban air defense systen could be = ~ Deeachad, and they added eubs tantially to the peychalogtcal - impact of ous Eirar two raids. . The Agency sabotage raids produced some very npectfic -esulta: For exzrole, in the political and psycuological realm, Canadian ‘chasaador Kidd reported in late August hat rhe incidents that conth, including the Santa incla _ and Casiida eperations “disturted the i eeling of ecnsoli- | " dation and treneaility which the Castro regive had suceeeded | £m ereating in recent months." He reported that tne Cubang were uncertain and epprehensive over the pessibiliry of A000, US. campaizn of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba! Be, . gtated that the raids had Ncoised hopes of those opposed to the regime” and that , Stspizited oF pponition bad xeceived | os Va Ya a Septenber report, Anbagsador ida stated that che Moose jepediate effect of such attacks is the paycho~~ " Jegical blow dealt to the stability of the Castro reine: ith consequent beost in opnpesitione” isy morala a and _ Selection, a the a countorrevolutionary, 2 Franks of sone months _— AROg ok *, » * Vadon apa,
Porat Oe OE ee ER De 8 | BED th b OL MD de A dG a wba . wee “age, be said, “nas given way to a wave of optinian that the Maximum Leader ig no lonzer necessarily a permanent fistre.” Ambassador Kidd also reported that Che Guevarrea bad indicated . ee eoncern that the raida would divert such reeded manpower eget aad eesources from the economic to the military sectote On 4 September a reliable clandestine sourea in Cuba ; _ reported that the reaction of the averase mon oa the street in. ‘ Havana to the newa of the artdcks on Casilca ang Santa Lucia was Waatounding.” Prier to the Cuban government's cmoumces >< ow ment of the raids, the averase man on the street seemed ;, apathetic, depressed and in a lew state of morale. Following | “ ehea amtcuncenmet their mod changed to ome of pleacure, joys aed kove,. The observations cf this source ware seinforeed by the statements of Cuban refugees who errived ia the U.S. », Shortly after the Cuban announcement of the raids. A former ator in the Cubah Rebel Azcry who broke with 7 - Castro reported after his exzfiltration from Cuba in Janmary 9 2200) 1966 that the 23 December Slounnea raid which cestroyed a : a ie PeG patrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected _ Gabans. A Cuban Lawyer with exteriive connections axong Cuba! < government officials end in the Western comumity in Bavana 0)! ' Bas just reported that the "morale effects of the recent 0 Lf). a | sabotaga operations axe good among anti-resima scoucnts of 7 Me : “the population. Scech acts, to them, indicate that the cutside - ; * world ie cot forestting the Cuban people, that the Light cone _ tinves and suggests & possible prelude to some military action . ‘S > against Castro. Coposite morale effects are noted among the i teeth segnents who have tended to remain notably quiet | _ Sdout the resize eiter successful sabotas 2 operations. ek * A Cabana commmications technician euployed. by the Cubes on poverncent reported on 1 January thar tha “art of sabotage ous | against the corpedo boat on the Isle of Pines was very succcss~< . €al in. the opinion of the pesple and, fox sure, public opinion -- — jRMeeded something to stimilate it, What happened at La Sigummea had cach an effect. Although at times failures ere suffered <. | which depress the people, they are  Srixtous for sccathing to HW 50955 pocta:32423630 Page 508° Lyndon B. Johnson Li brary oe i
‘DEURBIONEMDLTSYE © ‘aE AeA ea ES ele TE ARSE EE - 13 « mags The raids also had an fmpact on the Cuban military and oo." gumsaeley forces, Certain areas and ports vere placed on “ gpeci2i alert status. Forees are often mshed to czfensive 4S positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are fr cquently i. Coll": daumehed or intensified; and defensive poziticns in industrial sis ge agrieslouxal complexes area minned to maet tha real or ==: ‘dmagined threats. The raidg interfere not only with routine © - training but also with work on construction and ‘agetcultural projects which use military personnel. Baul : Castro personally investigated the Siguanea incicent. ,: .° Tm addition, Castso expanded bis coast watching network | -  €pem 46:obsexvation posts at the end of June to 103 as the. ofan Ts -.. @nd of October. These posts hava radio communications and ar@ =~ | “oo gamed by 10 to 25 fulletine personnel. Ina further effort Z ae '. 0) tg geal Cuba's shores, at least 10 surface search radar stations =. have been established since Tunde + and we have evidence tentae  --! fe vi eas ~"” gastrots tour of rising dtasidenca end insurgency ia nae :/ peflested in his initdation of a wide varlety of repressive  <! .| ggasuxes. Hasy are bound to have adverse political, psycho= | .. .* Legics] or economia repercussiona inside Cuba. Ee has com= 4). -. @geted almost constant anti-insurgent operations involving = ..:: : os gmgte of up to 2,500 men. Alr, naval and cround force | CRG (. » @lementa bhava been put on special alert, either cn a lecal ae _° of dsland-wide basis, on at least 35 cccaaions curing 1963 o> gs a result of remored or actual maritine operations. Resti- 2: “:- denta in areas of guerrilla activité have been forcibly eG ‘--. g@located, and restrictions have beea placed ca transportation er -"? ds suspect areas. In August 1963 a new internal ac curity oo feree, the Lecha Ceutra Fivatas, waa forz ned to attexpr ta oU. gope with of £esbora raiding parties. In September now training - “|S equmses were indtieted fox comand cadyes of “Popular defense -| ja |. °-, °° *smdira." ‘The perpose of these anita 1s to organize the people - “a - “"<l. tg defend thenselves against enemy attack and to protect a a industrial centers and installations frea. sabotage. og So Despite. these measures to inerease Cuba's defensive : - _eapadit ity againat raids, we have continued to improve cur » oO own infiltration techalauee and are stili able to penetrate | ‘ ra me So te Cee “Lyndon B. Johnson Library HW 50955 Docld:32493630 Page 509
ee ee, 7" . @saba’s defenses with goed regnlarity. Raiding operations of | “*; this sort, kewever, aluay3 present risk and we mist assume 0 + that captared Cuban agents will ravesl U.S. involvement asa thay J ..- S Ihave dona in the past “giving Castro the cppertimity te make 9 2. woelfereus propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition, _  @lthough Ehrushchev has not mace Agency harassing raids the © | subject of special protest (as he did in tha case of the a . @zile ais raids in August and September}, a major stepeup . 4a the grequency or scale as, for instance, an attack on .) @ major economic targer such ag Matanzas or Santiaco, might =<: _- bring about a Sovist protest. The chance of a Bi sysical - fatallaticn by Castro as, for lastance, on attack: upon & :, U.39- Lastallation in the Caribbean, althcugh unlikely, oe | chant be entirely discounted. 7 = “te Castro is te be brought dows without overt J ilttary . ao ~ ‘action the main effort will Lave toe coma from inside Cuba, ‘1. We believa that there is sufficient evidence to show that anaes 5" gabetage raids, cespite the risk involved, are a necessary = i: cl @timilas to intemal action which will neod to be continued for ' @ considerable pez slod to permit the tempo of internal acts te eo - | Faach : a. point whese ad ean becume solfe-sustained. ee ge : et my is Because of the gisthte and dramatic nature of sabotage ay _ &perations, theiz cessaticn vould soon be noted by all . 0 Ree ' {mterested parties to and ebservers of U.S/Cuban relations. =. - The cessation of thesa raids, bovever, disclaizabis by tha 2 + / "YS, the raids thenselvas may be, would probably bs inter= =. ae . Prated in Latin America and certainly inside Cuba a3 a switch © i 2S g£.U.S. policy from one of diccreet encouragement and support -. os . Of ageressive action against the Castro recime to ona of we a “coexistence acd eventual accommedation with a Castro/Commmist + We - Gaba. Without constant and visible signs of offensive actica - : against Coba, a weakening precesa would be set in motion ate Fo : which cculd well! lead the countries of Latin America to draw . a . their om conclusions from these indicators and embark om oon! | gecompdation policies of their om. Those goverrments in - = Latin deerics already threatened by “Castroites in their own ~: + *'goharrdes arollikely t to be sabjectad to evea atrong ger Gomeatis : wd pressures. |: pea . TAO & é ECRET-SE SLITS. HW 50955 Docld: 324273630 Page 510
1 . Ma. .- wn « f i &S Bres TES “1S Oe & A BY Bie toy tte f.oe °°" Ag ghts belief spreads, Western European and othet Erea o2. : “' world countries eager to trace with Cuba will cone to feel. - ~ ther they may safely ignore end evade, to an even greater 2". @gtent than they co now, U.S. appeals for the econsaie and 9-05) 2". “political isolation of Cuba. An inportant additional econonle oa .) gffect would be the relesse into normil economic activity of 9 cs "iI gmpower and funds wow tied up in defense against raids, S| Finally, and most important, this development in tice ~.~ <j bound to have a severe denoralizing effect on the internal © _'." geaistance against Castro. The Cuban exila comunity and . ' -. particularly its militant and articulate elements would be . ‘“:. @ately senaitive to 8 cessation of raids and can ba expected :. gg react vociferously. Judging from past exzperieace, we : : @&M expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on - ys the part of the numerous Cuban exiles whe have political Ey eonnections within the U.S. ae a mil 2, En the event that it is decided to terminate CiA=] Re °' @emtrolled sabotage and harassment operations, it cannot be 4. gasumed that the autonomous groups, despite tha greater - ). denfabiliry of theis actions, could take over entixely the th  gission of furnishing proof of visible resistance to Castro - OE _ end inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks ‘} “" gecegsary to sst a coup in retion, Autonomous groups are *. @s yet untested tn their capability to couduct successful - gabotage aad harassment sperationa on a sustained basis. es Je 43 ultkely that im the next months the autonocous groups + ~'; o: -t will develop the ability to match GlA-controlled operations, <i::°C ol. @dther da quantity or quality. mo a ER Oo | =e sabotage and harasszent operations were to be temicated:' >? S Soe the autonomous excups as well as for the Agency, ite 9 a oo.) @eppert to the @azonesous groups must alse be terminated oaks wif). 4 gempletely as otherwise wa would not be in a position te — Le =i." dmeuae that they would disccatinue gaids and sabotegs. : ~ 4 ‘0: Sach ternination would cossound the effects of ths cessation ~ . . °" 9f guy own raids, particularly 4n those sress in the Caribbean 3.1%). . 4" whewe the autonomeua groups have been mast actives a “SECPET-SENSITIVE§ 7 ~ = ». wes oe sft ite gs Rta HW 50955 Docld:324235630. Page 511
BSaVALTL"ORGD L LLY i cP 3. WE, The Residual Program it" Ja the event’ it la decided to abandon the core of the ~~ covert program, we will be obliged toe fall back cn easentlally “g@yert courses of action which are already operating but which Y-ean be refined and intensified, provided the political risks | - @ad costs ara judged acceptable and we receive atequate ae ee ‘seeperstion from our aliles. Laowt «Bq Action seats free-vorld 4 econonte ties with cuba ay _ Because of the recent erosion of cur efforts in thi« - pector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to a. - expand Cubaa econonis relations with the free world, a serics . 7 o£ reecemendations to intensify this course of action has been 3 ’ sivgade and 4s now being presented, The basic issue in the ar . weeemmendations is our ability and willingness to incur the * political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure . ’ would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted a, ; = . _gompletely, we could have no real assurance that our attemits =. ' .. €g exrtail Cuban-free world economic ties would be euccegafule <= On tha other hand, ig the actions and commitzents included - . dn the vecousendations are not adopted, it is a near certainty | . thae; under present circomstunces, cur econemis pressures will - be reduced to ineffcctiveness. In any case, it must be Clearly © recopnized that no amount of ecenomle pressure can by itsel£ | , © briag dcoun the Castro sovernment, at least aga long as the se Soviets ere prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy, Tha - ; eartalinent and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the ’ €xe@ world can only contributes, and then only over time, to ! “@he creation of the optimm situation we ara trying to develop, Tha effectiveness of this contribution would be at icast " gharply dapaired by the relexation of the pressure created wh _Yy covert operations. Zeyond these considerations, va can re | waver bave ascuxance that a forelgn goverment cooperating a « $m the economic progran will not pull out and virtuazlly : | eallapse the programs. Entire or even isportant reliance. _ : oa econonic pressure as a substitute for the covert progreén ~ - would be to deliver the fate of cur policy fate the pneertain | ~bands of governments which do not share our convictions end . - sens of Besog?ey: wita respect tf Cubs.’ a? HW 50955 Docld: 32423630 Page 512
Py As a ‘result of the Venezuelan chaxces asatnst Cuba arising | " fvom the ams cache discovery, we hava been considering a scrles | }, ef measeres which we would seek im the OAS, It should be noted . "that the atzespkere for O15 adoption of strong measures ats ae = Saterdarated as a result of the Panamanian crisis. =. Wak oo bbs. 5 _— pi - measures which we have been studying includes ea dye. A bresis in diplomatic relations . The principal effects of this measure, which would oo ‘ mean action by five countries, including 2razil, “ “ Gaila and Hexico, would be to provide rather dyamatis ~ “.  gwiderea of Castro's isolation and te deay the Cuban | 4 . . wagima subversive facilities offered by its remaining - co missions in Latin Averica, The measure would meet (os oP heavy vealatance kro Mexico, Chile aad particularly - Past eo o nes 7 Trasil.; fe | | GRE oS 2s A breals tin economic relations pos : - _ 1 TES Although this would have little practical effect | ooh a eo. economically, 4e¢ would have some utility as a meando | actos... g& moral preasure on other fzee~sorld ecuntries wowed | oy. 7 trading with Cuba, | oat A brea: _ air and euefaece coommnication Over bine this would lead te a raductios ia the Cuban ability to move subversives to and from Latin © foerica. It would be useful as a means of moral : pressure on other frea-vorld countries having, or wishing to establish, alr services with Cuba. On. - tha nezative side it would mean the temporary loss: ‘o£ intelligence Facilities and would have an adverse :, efiect oa Cuban exile morale by closing en oats ting ; escape route: for. F parsons inside Gubag : “SECRET -SEISITTvE Lyndon ‘B. HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 513
eer a ret Cr ro. ih, fect ie wnt iene Senet 2 Soy | The singis most dazasing OAS action ta Castre would, be: m am authorization for the usa of force in connection «- “with the movement of arma and men. The chances of getting a politically acceptable majority for such ana wag estimated to be less than even before the eventa in Panama and the prospects have dimingshed . since then. Such OAS actica would alzeost cextalaly -" . @vamatize the Cuban issue domestically and inter a .. wmattonally. At the present ting, it appears that the | survetllance systoa which might be authorized by the | ~ CAS would involve the use of force only in the . territorial waters of the comtrias for which the - 7. . offending shipments ara destined. Thus the question i” = 02 0&3 authorization for the use of force ca the . Biga seas wil not arises: This would he 8 pro forma fora action, with oly Aateed = ' psychological force. a eaffireation of mreviows CAS mensrres aa Coban an-based end susrorted subversion : This would be of value es a means of reinforcing a “ - gemexal effort in this sector (see € below). le day ae however, a purely cefengive MeGSUTS a a PES Ye BUD, this series of OAS measures would certainly be a “ hetpfal. and would constituts important multilateral PLOEKESS 6 | The see eonts however are prinarily Peyenological and - . ae re Zacreased efforts ae, ainst, sntsrerston . “ in!” We'eaa probably increase and expand cuz “paletisteral, _ bilateral and unilateral efforts te increase. the ability of 8 Latin America to resist subversicn. Such efforts ure eaeely _ Setensive and external te Coba, “Eo: certain results ean be. wl SECAET-SESITIVE nS aon BR HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 514
SECRET-SENSTTIVE. “"E = 13 « -... | gMvanteed, In any case, if the Cuban base were to be’ [chi @trengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures. or by vy) the weakening of econonic pressures, we will be fighting et ° De Increased psychological and prosazanda efforts | Wa can intensify cur measures in this sector, including | wi), Major policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other . os gentor officers of the Goverment. The efficacy of such '. @fforta la entirely dependent, however, spon the substance © behind then. A propaganda offensive would be productive s | omly Lf there were credible evidence that our words wera |_| 3 /) > bedng accompanied by successful actions im other sectors. > 1° The resides] program set out above ts substantially ; * |... .'. £ow attaining cur ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/ Dorset SS “| Commmist regine, which have been by no means certain even. Ree --. . gnder the present program, would be very measurably diminished =: | . tmcer the residual prozrem. The elimination of the core of 4 . the present covert program, especially 1£ accempanied by 2 A .. wejection or fatlure of tha proposed expanded means of econcale |! :', pressure, would raise in sharp terma the question of the necd- * _ te exmaine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or - ? ’ an a | VIII. Recommendation ‘That the covert progran ba continued in at east irs ", _ i 4 : A + cy — a 2 JE *'s far “FF 8 te ff _ os ernie sf . Aes : es Ben ‘ * % . Johnson Library.” ta DEG f wait Lyndon Be HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 515
Pentre seen stim Sat SP Ado we AateitE. BE My 7H! ssbare:wttnetarescediaeay. § On 18 August the POL storage tanks ar Casilda, Las Villas Province were attacked asing 4.2 sortara, -\.: One tank car waa destroyed and one sterage tank - . _ *breached, causing considerable Siva danage. ! —~On 19 Aceust the sulphurie acid plant at Sant lacia, Pinar del Rio Province waa attacked. |... There was considerable fire damace and fuel . lines wera broken, he hava reports that < found its way inte the turbines aa 4 result of the raid causing additional damaga. Cn 30 Septesber a lunbermill at Bahia de 7 'Maravi, Orienta Province, a minor installation - * @£ local economic importance, was 70 per Cank -\ destroyed by a raiding party. ‘On 22 October an underwater demolition team attacked a dredze in the harbor at La Tsabela;,. | “Las Villas Province. The vessel wag suck. . Ca 23 December an underwater demolition team ; attacked a Cuban naval Pe6 patrol beat in tha . Sdgnanea, Isle of Pines, naval base. The . ’ ° patrol bear waz seriously damaged and may have, c  - guak. Three Cuban naval personnel were killed» rls aad 13 others injured in the omplasione ' . . ty te : . mt “tis fae a sibs * gon gM og EEE TE mee moran rts ME Eee a uy “Lyndon HW 50955 Docld: 32423630 Page 516
tive. " Second question: What does the American vov- ernment expect to gain from the blockade? Is. the economic isolation of Cub aa punishment or a political maneuver? Kennedy’ s reply: “Are you suggesting that the polit- ical effectiveness of the blockade is uncertain [smile]? You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not. In any case, we can’t let‘ Communist subversion winin -the other Latin American countries. Two dikes are needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on the other. This is the problem i ina nutshell. Both battles are equally difficult.” (Silence.) Then, a last comment: “The continuation of the blockade depends on the con- tinuation of subversive activities. The interview was over. I did not really wish to sug- gest anything, since I had never been to Cuba and, on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing to their isolated-economic situation. But I could see plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and Was s secking a way out. That same evening I recounted this conversation in detail to an American colleague - an intimate friend of President Kennedy, through whom | had obtained this interview ~and to the editor of The New Republic. Both my confidants, who knew the President a thou- sand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedy had never before expressed hisrteriso specifically and with such feeling on his ‘understanding of the first. phase of the Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw "any political conclusions from his remarks. However, they were .not surprised at Kennedy's ‘invitation to. come and see him again when I returned from Cuba. In effect, John Kenned y displayed two basic charac- teristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming degree of empiricism and realism. -A man without a particular doctrine, he reacted decisivel y to events, and only to events. Nothing but the shack of collision with a problem was sufficient to make him come to a deci- sion, and because of this, his decisions were unpredic- table. At. that point he had a consuming need for information, and this need had increased a great deal since experience had taught him not to rely solely on official channels. _ After this, I went to Havana. Night Session ‘rc \\ In the “ “Pearl of the’ Arellese rum-perfumed and steéped in triumphant sensuality,” as Cuba is described in those American tourist folders still ying. about in the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and intensive weeks, but thinking all a along that T. would , Never get to meet with Fidel Castro: I talked with farm- “HW 50955 BDocld: 32423630 Page 517 ers, writers and painters, militants and counter-revo- lutionaries, ministers and ambassad@®s ~— but Fidel re- mained inaccessible. | had been warned: he was snowed under with work; as a result of the hurricane, the Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole planning program; and then, above all, he no longer had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all Western newsmen. I had practically given up, hope awhen, on the eveni t was £2 be my depar lane links Hay “not leave the next day after all), Fidel came to my hotel. He ha m interview “with th ent. We went up-to my room at to in the evening and did not leave until 4 in the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John F. Kennedy's remarks. Fidel listened with devouring and passionate inter- est: he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist’s beret dawn over his eyes, adjusted his maqui tunic, all the while making me the target of a thousand maliciow. sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do battle; as though T myself were in a small way that intimate enemy in the White House whom Khrushchev described to Fidel as someone with whom “Yt is pos- sible to talk.” Three times he had me repeat certain re- marks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Ken- nedy showed his imp. atience with the comments attrib- uted to General.de Gaulle, and lastly those in which Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war fatal to all humanity. - When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion. Instead, | was treated to a lengthy silence. and, at-the end of that silence, to a calm, composed, often humor- ous, always thoughtful exposition. I don’t know wheth- er Fidel has changed, or whether these cartoons. cari- caturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the Western press perhaps correspond to'a former reality. T only know that at no time during the two complete days I spent with him (and during which a great deal happened), did Castro abandon his composure and poise. Here too, let Castro speak for himself, reserving only he possibility of correcting certain judg- ments on these two political leaders based on my own experiences in Cuba. I believe Kennedy is sincere,” Fidel declared. also believe that today the expression ofTtiiis sincerity could have political significance. I’ll explain what | mean. | haven't ‘forgotte t Kenne is I shail electoral campai 7 al i of firmness toward Cuba. | have not forgotten the Ma- chiavellian tactics and the equivucation, the attempts at 47
pre ‘Agency, whose aduministrutors were humiliated by athe - - the new situation in Cub . Tue tiew Repusiic ins Iepressures, the blackmail, the organiza‘iuen of a counter-reyolution, the blockade an , above ev ry- were imposed before, long bef etext and alibi of Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult situation; I don’t think a President of the United States is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present. feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe he now understands the extent to which he has been misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I als Lalso - think bois a realist; he is now registering that it Ts im- possible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the explosive situation. throughout Latin America, to dis- appear. Why the Missiles Were Installed “There is one point on which I want to give you new information. right away. I have refrained from doing this until now; but today an attempt is being made to frighten all mankind by propagating the "dea that Cuba, and in particular I, might provoke a nuclear war, so I feel the world should know the true story of the missile emplacement. “Six months before these missiles wer Cuba, we had ceceive i of information warning us thal a new invasion of the island was being ared under sponsorshigeas the Central Intelligence Bay_of Pigs disaster and by thewspectacle of being ridiculed in the eyes of the world apd berated in LIS government circles. We also knew that the Pentagon was vesting the CIA preparations with the mantle of its authoritv, but we bad doubts as to the attitude of theLresident. There were those among our informants wh sulfice to alert the President and giv j ats acer rto arre Bec ordberations Then one day Khrushchev" s son-in-law,- Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to Washington at the invitation of Kennedy’s associates. Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei had been received by the American Chief Execulive, and their talk centered particularly on Cuba: A week after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of | Adzhubei’s report to Khrushchev. It was this report which triggered the whole situation. ‘What did Kennedy say to Adzhubci? Now listen to this carefully, for it is very impor was intolerable for the Unit- wm d States, that the American government fad decided it would uot tolerate it any longer; ye had said that peaceful coexistence was seriously compromised by the fact that ‘Soviet influences’ in Cuba altered the balance of strength, was destroying the equilibrium agreed - 18 WW>§09 5 Docld: 32423630 Page 518 ant: he had said that - SIS RS upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his’ state- ment by pronouncing each systmele separately] Ken- nedy reminded the Russians that the United States had uot intervened in Hungary, which was obviously a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word _avasron wns Hot mentioned and—Adehubeatthe time, lacking any back draw the same conclusions as we did. But when we communicated to Khrushchev all our previous informa- tion, the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy- Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to the source of our information. By the end of a month, the Russian and Cuban governments definite conviction that an invasion place from one m his is the tryth. “What was to be done? — could we prevent the invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned about the same things that were worrying us. He asked us what we wanted. We replied: do whatever is needed to convince the United State Sabdbimleeds U8 is the sanie as ayattack ibd n. And how to realize this objective? All our thinking and discus- sions revolved around this point. We thought of a proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid. The Russians explained to us that their concern was twofold: first, they wanted to save the Cuban revolu- - tion (in ‘other words, their socialist honor in the eyes of the world), and at the same time they wished to avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conven- tional military aid was the extent of their assistance, the United States might not hesitate to instigate an invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this ° would inevitably touch off a world war.” At this point [I interrupted to ask how Cuba could have been.absolutely certain of Soviet intervention. After all, I said, Stalin certainly “let down’ Markos, the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because such help would have conflicted with prevailiny zones * of influence. “T know,” Castro replied, “but the two situations cannot b& compared. ’ Then he continued: “Russia was much too deeply committed to us. More- over, since then we have had every proof of the im- mense. solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders. You can see for yourself how clearly this solidarity is manifest here. Then there is. something else, specifi- cally apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and athers, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev for taking a more conciliatory stand4han Stalin toward the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several ex- amples, which [I will not repeat to you, illustrating the prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me - and I believe him = that Stalin would never have em- placed missiles in Cuba.
“Tt is true that it was said then by other factions that. the real reason for installing the missiles was because certain.internal problems were driving the Rus- sians to use us to provoke the United States. | am here to tell you that the Russians didn’t want and do not today want war. One only ‘need visit them on their home territory, watch them at work, share their eco-. nomic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the workers’ standard of living, to understand right away that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (be- cause of their commitments and their position in. the socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked; or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing to retreat before the missiles, would not give up the at- tempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity and the risk of war. SO “Under these circumstarices, how could we Cubans have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It was, in the final analysis, a question of honar, don’t you agree? Don’t you believe that honor plavs a role in politics? You think we are remantics, don’t you? Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplace- ment of the missiles. And I might add here that for us: Cubans it didn’t really make so much difference whether we died by conventiona! bombing or a hydro- gen bomb. Nevertheless, we werd@® gambling with the peace of the world. The United States was the one to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat of .war to stifle revolutions. ; “And so in June, 1962, my brother Raoul and Che Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in three weeks. The United States was able to find out - that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it took them two months to discover that these weapons were guided missiles. Two months... in other words, longer than we had éalculated. Because, of course, we were seeking intimidation, not aggression,” ‘Alliance for Progress The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Prog- ress. “In a way,” Castro said, “it was a good idea, it marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be said that it . was: overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the moment, under constraint... despite all that fam awill- '. ing tovagree that the idea in-teH cnstituted an effort to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in ‘he papers this morning - did you see the: news? That Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Areen- Ne : } oS tine government! Do you realize what that means? This A NW_50955 Docld: 32423630 Page 51 “Deceemorer <4, 1065 will cause more commotion on the aay York stock exchange than Castroism! The Catholic and military, conservatives of Argentina, the factions mast closely . linked with’ American interests! There is talk of na- tignalization of industries there, of agrarian reform there... well and pood! If the Alliance for Progress provokes these developments, then it’s not doing so. badly; all these things are consonant with the aspira- tions of the people. I can look back to the days of Eisenhower, er rather of Nixon, and recall the furore which broke out when the United States and Cuba to- gether decteed an agrarian reform which was to apply, mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,c00 hectares! Yes, 2e0,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin American countries, because the Communist banner is used as a bogeyman, the reaction of the American - trusts is shrewder. They are going to choose strawmen, - so as to rule indirectly, But there will be difficulties. “This is why Kennedy’s good ideas aren't going to vield any results. It is very easy to understand and at “this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy ~ not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon ~ has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who tries to support the interests of another class (which ‘has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the various Latin American countries the impression that the United Sates no longer stands behind the dictators, and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revo- lutions’ What happens then? The trusts see that their interests are being a little compromised (just barely, ~ but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strate-_ gic bases are in danger;. the powerful oligarchies in all the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or alleyedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instru- “ments of the new policy are ‘swept out of office, like Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he has become one. “In view of all these things, how can the American. government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is at the root of explosions taking, place all over the” South American continent? In Venezuela, fos,example, are you familiar with the situation there? DoVou think the Venezuclans need us to understand what's going on in their courtry? Do you think we don’t have enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only one thing: Leave us in peace to better our country’s . economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to 19
HH 50955 PHL Nk. This doesn’t mean we do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling and suffering, like the Venezuelan people. But it is up to those nations to decide what they want, and if they choose other regimes than ours, this ij isn’t our business.” educate our young compancras, Ve Have Always Lived with Danger” .T asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will the situation develop? Even if the United States uses against you what you call the alibi of Communism, it still remains true thet you have chosen Conmuiisn, that your economy and vour security depend on the Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior mo- tives in this, association, still the United States considers that you are part of an international strategy, that you constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of in- fluence. “T don’t want to discuss our ties with the Soviet Union,” Fidel Castro cut me short. “T find this indecent. We have none but feelings of fraternity and profound, total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own policies which are perhaps not always the same (we have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to dwell on this point, because asking me to say that I am not a pawn on the Soviet chesstsegpeglis something like asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square that she is not a prostitute. “Tf the United States. sees the problem as you have posed it, then you are right, there iS no way out. But who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried everything against us, everything, absol utely every- thing, and we are still alive and getting better day by day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to cele- brate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1, 1964, the fifth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution! The United States’ policy of isolating us economically is less effective with each passing day; we are increas- ing our trade with the rest of the world. Even with Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 300,000 tons of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from’ discouraging us, the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmos- phere we need to stiffen the country’s backbone. Are we in danger? We have always lived ‘with danger. To say nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many friends. one discovers in the world when one is perse- cuted ed by. the United StataapawN ide truly, for all these reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. Vi tell you something else: since the rupture and the blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply don’t think about the US. When I I think of the problems 20 Docla: 32423630 Page 520 ee PUBLIC ' i i i ' which dip slomatic relatiens with the United States would pose! The Swiss Ambassador presenting the US at present, I prefer to do business with him ‘than with 200 members of an Embassy among whom surely some spies | would be spotted. “T have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary. But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and from this viewpoint I believe the United States is too important a country not to have an influence on world peace. I cannot help hoping, therefure, that a leader will come to the fore in North America (why not Ken- nedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth and, most important, let the various nations act-as they see fit. IT ask nothing: neither dollars, nor assist- ance, nor .diplemats, nor bankers, nor military men -- nothing but peace, and ta be accepted as we are! We are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation, the Latin. American countries will choose what they want. All’the same, at a time when the United States is selling wheat to the Russians, Caiada is trading with China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be ” impossible to make the Americans understand that. sacialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to co- existence? Why am | not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because the Russians have never done us any injury such as the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained of in the past, and because the Americans have never given us any of the benefits for which these two nations congratulate themselves today. “As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in Latin America through Cuba’s. subversive activitic:, this is just attributing to others one’s own desire to ‘dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago tha: the Russians have had enough of their Cuban involve- ment. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speak- ing from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force nations to turn to the Russians for help. Really, it seems to me that 4 man like Kennedy is capable of secing that it is not in the United States’ interest to pursue a policy, which can lead only to a stalemate. So far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sover- cignty.’ In conclusion, Fidel C Castro said to me: “Since you are going to sce Kennedy again, be an emissary of | peace, despite everything. 1 want to make myself clear: { don’t want anything, [ don’t expect anything, and as a revolutionary the present situation does not dis- please me. But\as a man and as a statesrfft:n, it is my duty to indicate what the bases for understanding could be.” All this was said two days before President Ken- nedy" S death, CISA: The New Republic and Jean Daniel
Teg aed QE9LEPEEPIOOG Ccé0c AND tion of Pres. Kennedy" written by ‘Jose|I. LASAGA of Miami, Fla, This “speculative re : E fs. oy ‘the; time OSWALD visited the Cub Con lin Mexi, fe BORRELL knew nothing concerning any visit - _ January. 19, , 1964 | Vo a | Ly ° a | sd — MEMO te Bodnetirh, od to COS from LEGAT} Subject: OSWALD - It is to be noted that the \hite GEA House was. in receipt of a paper entitled "Possible Psychologicnl Motivations in the Assussina- “VN 4 nar attemprec o establish that the a motiv: acion of -OSWALD-in “thea assassination of Pres Kiwas Fidel UASTR ae for a CASTRO agent and thet OSWALD was motivated during his trip to Hex KL between OT and -2.0et 63. The paper alleged that OSWALD held an extended interview wlth the Cuban ook in. ““Mexi whom he met ina restaurent on the outskirts of Mexi from which restaurint aaa bouh later left‘iin the Amb's car for a talk} without being overheard, / Sour2z2 of this lattzr info ; was alleged to be Salvador DIAZ Verson. -fhis individual wes interviewed at Mieni., i: stated that while in Mexi 29-29 Nov 63. attending. the Congress of the Internetional raderavion’ of Professional Newspaper Organizations, he was at.the offices of the newoparer Excelsior on -the night of 25:Nov G3. ‘There he learned through the Mexi press that the ies gov Lad ar one Silvia ‘DURAN; that DURAN. allegedly’ had OSWALD as a guest in her, hou 8 daving 3 fist to Mexis and thot DURAN placed OSWALD in contact with officials of <he Cue Uo ir klal. / DIAZ Verson went. on to claim that he wes & told by Dr. BORRELL Novarvcs, en exiled wcuLan- vat “ newspaperman., employed by Excelsior, that OSWALD and DURAN on the dey follows: CSWALD'S arrdiyvct 7 . in Mexd went to-a restaurant called the Cabello. ‘Blanco or possibly the Cavalio Baye whore they mat an official’ of the Cub.Emb, DIAZ Verson claimed that he knows pot: ving about OS /sLD and " _ the Cub. official leaying; the restaurant together in a car, / It was wtcertatued thai Dr! _ Eduardo RORRELL! Naverrp, :@ former Cuban Cabinet Minister who on occusion writes Peavarg — articles for the Mexi City Excelsior, currently | rasides at 1503 Homero £t., Arart B01. Mexd, aden Navarro[was. dnteryiewed - ron: livdan. at. which: ‘time. he furnished the tollowing ruts mh . . Salvador DIAZ Verson! was’; in Mexi. as claimed: and discussed OSWALD vith BORNELG and ocher Cuban . _exdles|, . DIAZ Verson! also visited BORRELL in BORRELL's home, / BORRSLL did not tell the story ©. credited to him|by DIAZ Verson concern ng the visit to.e Mexi City restaurans by CSWALD anc Silvia: DURAN, BORRELL.had never heard |this' story or any similar stoz befor: / Wow! G hiss e Sata oe” of no meeting between OSWALD and Cub Eq officials other thon the nee Sd neS VWnich oesurrcd | : by ee to ‘the hone of (DURAN. / ‘7 4 to be noted that DURAN was anestions by Meal au trowthea bes . aeeed walennenens sant se coer Sie il i te in on 23 ‘Nov 6. 2 that. time “she confirmed that. OSWALD visited: ‘tie ‘Cub iim “th Moxd “during th a] ‘time he: was in Mexi! from, 27 Sept to 2 Oot, | She: ‘alleged that the purpose of hia visits to the Ao . Cuban Emb WAS to obtain a Cuban visa, .| She ‘atated she hed given him a telephono number to use! in calling: her ‘concérnink the visa, but donied that he had ever visited in her hom. / On | - “17 Jan 64 4 source, /,. advised that he; had been} unable to locate a Caballo Blano restaurant a in Mexi, but stated jthere is a Caballo; Bayo restauraht located on’ outskirts, of Mexi.: “Source went to restaurant, shoved ' ‘photos of former Cub Con Eusebio AZCUE B Lopez, who was in -! “charge of Cub Con'at the time of OSWALD's visitithere, of Cub: Amb HERNANDEZ Armas, of Silvig _ (9 mem, ate sane ees am eo Bo ' DURAN ‘and gf OSWALD |to employees of restaurant and conducted extensive ‘interviews of these - a a sieitee cunovens i tial ag waable to find anyone “Qmiong ” ‘the Spirent? oould | recall ‘any of thes : persons as i top i t se rid b, : ona Feoteurent, ef Ve z
SECRET - SENSITIVE | ~ 12 -— BOX 4: MISCELLANEOUS -From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely to contain relevant information. Therefore, the files in this box were not examined. SECRET - SENSITIVE PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE VAS Ci “a A) are) WW 50955 Docld: 32423630 Page 522
SECRET - SENSITIVE ‘ 4h : : | MC CONE PAPERS | NOVEMBER 24, 1961 - DECEMBER 31, 1964 REFERENCES TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS, WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS _ BOX 2: MEMORANDA FOR RECORD File: November 29, 1961 - April 5, 1962 December 5, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - “Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 12. December 27, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - “Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 5. January 22, 1962, “Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - Reference to a "Lansdale paper" to be discussed by the 5412 Committee plus Robert Kennedy. April 5, 1962, Memos on Special sroup/Mongoose Project - -General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba. File: April 7, 1962 - August 21, 1962 (40) - April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that Attorney General upset that Perrez was apparently telling people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney General. Cardona was to meet JFK that day. (61) - July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General - included a short discussion of “Reuther plan" for labor operations apparently ‘in Italy. (86) - August 21, 1962, ‘meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy ~- a general discussion of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's are discovered in Cuba: "McNamara expressed strong feelings’ that we should take every possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabo- tage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans “and do such other things as might be indi-~ cated to divide the Castro regime. (emphasis added) SECRET - SENSITIVE | prone iy uF G4509 THE welts iAse es AW 50955 Bocld: 324273630 Page 5293
SECRET - SENSITIVE File: August 24, 1962 ~ December: 31, 1962 (97) - October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy : McCone wanted to be more activist toward Cuba - Bundy was more conservative. (No specifics) (118) - December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING] [Apparently not a meeting or phone.call] (Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder) (119) - December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING] ; (120) - December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING] File: June 1, 1963 - February 9, 1963 (12) - January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and Eisenhower (transcript) about Cuba. . (No mention of assassination.) : File: February 9, 1963 - April 9, 1963 (36) - March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney General [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED] {According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen, ] (38) -—- March 7, 1963, ‘Memo of conversation with Attorney General at Hickory Hill [No one to see without DCI permission] _ [DESTROYED] (52) - March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and Lundahl on “current status of Cuba” [DESTROYED] File: April 15, 1963 - June 4, 1963 (68) - Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for. use by representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains the following: , , SECRET - SENSITIVE. . : PROPERTY OF THF WHITE EOUSE OFFICE HW 50955) Docld:32429630 Page 324 -
t ‘ j t t SECRET - SENSITIVE A 1 i ~ 3- "I agree with the. ONE estimate that Castro's political position will in-— prove within the next year (barring assassination) ." The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not proposing this. - (77) - DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this statement: "Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassi- nation, will survive the iefforts of internal opposition elements..." Context indicates DCI was not proposing or considering assassination. (61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/ Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" _ [DESTROYED] (62) - April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about: "Helms/Angleton Project..." [DESTROYED] File: June 5, 1963 - July 20, 1963 : Nothing Relevant File: July 23, 1963 - November 26, 1963 ; 7 (133) - August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan, © Tom Ross of Chicago Sun Times [MISSING] , (138) - September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group” [MISSING] . : . (138) - September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING] (138) - September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at Justice Department [MISSING] (158.5) - October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy ‘lunch at Kennedy's house [MISSING] (168) - November 26, 1963, DCI and Bundy on message about ' Kennedy assassination _ IMTSSING] ft. i SECRET - SENSITIVE HY 50955 Bocld:32423630 Page 525
HW 50955 i 4 i SECRET - SENSITIVE (168) - November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk: Sukarno had said that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI said no... File: November 27, 1963 - December 31, 1963 [Entire contents of file missing.]- From titles, nothing here appears relevant. File: January 1, 1964 - February 11, 1964 Nothing relevant. File: February 12, 1964 - April 5, 1964 [Entire contents of file missing.] (25.5) - February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald: "White House Meeting - Situation Room ~ Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED] (36.1) - March 14, 1964, Meéting of DCI, Bundy, Helms [DESTROYED] (46) - April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk: “EYES ONLY - NO DISTRIBUTION - FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan; Republican Platform of 1960." [DESTROYED] File: April 6, 1964 - July 8, 1964 . (49) - April 16, 1964, Meeting with: DCI, Justice Warren, Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject: "Met in DCI's Office" [MISSING] | (58) - May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms - Subject: “Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms). Helms saw commission , transcript and returned it to.the commission." "No MR expected" [MISSING] , (69) - June 12, 1964, DCL, Mr. ‘ana Mrs. Henry Luce: "Memos used at lunch're: Cuban article in TIME" = NO DISTRIBUTION - nothing on assassinations SECRET - SENSITIVE | PROPERTY OF Boclda: 324273630 Page 5276
i SECRET - SENSITIVE bog : File: July 8, 1964 - August 12, 1964 (No file under these dates.) File: August 12, 1964 - September 10, 1964 Nothing relevant. File: September 11, 1964 ~ October 31, 1964 (138) ~ October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich ~ "NO DISTRIBUTION - discussion re Walter Jenkins' matter." [DESTROYED] (143) - October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy: "In Presidential Suite, NYC - Personal discussion EYES ONLY JAM ~- NO DISTRIBUTION" [DESTROYED] File: November l, 1964 ~ December 31, 1964 Nothing relevant. BOX 8: .MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT File: October 25, 1961 - July 31, 1962 (B) ~- December 14,.1961, at a meeting with the President and General Taylor, DCI advised Kennedy that there were possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassi- nation attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and Venezuela, which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of. (6) - February 11, 1962, :at a meeting with the President, Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one ‘Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life magazine on some subject related.to Cuba. Apparently, the article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published. (12) - May 7, 1962, at a'meeting with the President and Taylor, ‘DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail. No mention of assassinations. , ’ ae SECRET - SENSITIVE , aoe g 8 04510 7 que ws HW 350955 Docld:32423630 Page 527
HW 450955 SECRET - SENSITIVE -~ 6 - File: July 3 1962 - November 29, 1962 [actually covering through Dec. 18, 1962] . ~ (28) = July 20, 1962: Ata meeting with.the President, Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed. No mention of assassination. . (52) - October 26, 1962: At a meeting of NSC Executive Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose. _No mention of assassination. (55) - October 30, 1962: "Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups; estop Alpha 66; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press." [MISSING] (70) - November 29, 1962: Ata meeting of the NSC Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination. File: January 1, 1963 - March 31,. 1963 (7) - January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President, DCI, and Helms." No memo present. Listing does not indicate whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally indicates when memos were not prepared. Secretary's note of 1/27/72 (MB) notes: "No MR in file" ‘ (8) ~- January 23, 1963 (4:45 p-m.): Meeting between DCI and President - missing memo; same situation as #(7) above. (28) - March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI “reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance intelligence at selected embassies and foreign residences within the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk’ with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter. File: April 1, 1963 - July L, 1963 . (33) - April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President, DCI discussed two methods of dealing with Castro: (1) "Working on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2).Pressuring USSR to remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be:developed after the removal of Soviet troops..." No mention of assassination. SECRET ~- SENSITIVE | . PROPERTY OF THe WHITE HEE we LO rLAr GA ake Docld:324273630 Page 523°
SECRET: - SENSITIVE (27s (43) - May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were discussed. No mention of assassination. . (50) - June 19, 1963: In meeting with the President and others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against Cuba, including “external sabotage." Vague memo of record by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of -assassination. File: July 1, 1963 - November 12, 1963 _ (74) - November 12, 1963: At a meeting of the President, DCI, and others, ‘McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these [Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and- forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking." (This was in a general discussion of covert actions against Cuba; no mention of assassination.) File: November 23, 1963 -— December 31, 1963 ee (1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City. DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City: "...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald." (4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed "contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent inves- tigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed the DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report. (4) November 29, 1963: In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B. Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald. A list of "late developments" is in file, to be used. for this purpose. (Obtain copy.) a File: January 1, 1964 - April 2, 1964 Nothing relevant. SECRET ~ SENSITIVE | AAT PERTY OF THE WHITE HOUS? HW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page 529 _
SECRET - SENSITIVE col ; - : File: .April 3, 1964 - May |20) 1964 i . (19) - April 7, 1964: Meeting of DCI, President, and others re Cuba Covert Action. | © _ Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963: "The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power|centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba." (emphasis added) [OBTAIN COPY] i File: May 21, 1964 - October 5, 1964 September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to discuss “Warren Commission | ‘Report - (to set up Presidential Committee)" - No memo indicated to have been prepared. File: October 6, 1964 - |Decenber 28, 1964. as i | BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY , SPECIAL GROUP, CHRONO (1962) | Nothing Relevant. File: 303 - January - pécember 1963 Several sets of minutes. Lave the following notations after paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations: "See special minutes for additional items." ~ No such "special minutes" appear to be contained in this file.* However, this same nota~ tion appeared in connection with other subjects. This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem. Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of ‘Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination. . Nothing else relevant. File: January - December» 1964 Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to “explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in the immediate future.” (May 12, 1964) *Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone. SECRET - SENSITIVE | | | ants ae | ayo poverty of | HW 50955 Docld: 32423630 Page 330
of - gnealen ~- SENSITIVE® The minutes of the June 1/8, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964) contained the following: | [OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup) "A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. | Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then under- take prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General’ s attention as a matter of law enforcement.” , ‘ ' t i Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same information. [OBTAIN COPY] It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders. This memo apparently had been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General. [OBTAIN COPY] McCone's memo contains the following: "ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility. of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally.' The official minutes! of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report) contain no mention of assassination or even Of Cuba. _Mr. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had only the following reference to Cuba: ! "Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August were approved and ithe July operations were noted." - File: Counterinsurgency | c January - June, 1962 Nothing relevant. ot f SECRET - SENSITIVE Y of proreR acct yur ee HW 50955 Docld:324273630 Page 531
SECRET — SENSITIVE = 10 - BOX 7 - MISCELLANEOUS Envelope - “Cuba Loose Ends" . Much information on Mongoose. No mention of assassination. Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled "Communism and the Negro! Movement ~ A Current Analysis" - contains comments on Dr.:King's personal life. Relayed hy J. Edgar Hoover to McCone. ‘ File: "Cuba - Background Material" This file contains only material relating to the Cuban: missile crisis. It contains no references to any assassinations. ‘ @ File: “White House” : - oo. . This file, covering 1962} and 1963, contains correspondence to, from, and of interest to the White House. a | SECRET - SENSITIVE 43. PROPERTY OF eer waeeaTe LAC e erecrae i | | ‘HW 50955 Docld:32423630 Page 532
] | | SECRET - SENSITIVE -~ ll - BOX 5: MISCELLANEOUS — : The file entitled "Cuba package" does not appear to be in this _ -box. The name of this file, however, appears on the page which -_purports to list the files in the box. File: Cuba 1962 | Nothing relevant to assassinations. File: Cuba 1964 | | February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect to Cuba.“ This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible courses of action which the U.S. Government could take with respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces. It, however, contains no méntion or reference to possible assassi- nation of Castro. | | BOX 6: MISCELLANEOUS | File: Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964 Nothing relevant to assagsination. File: "M" File | Nothing relevant to our subject of interest. File: "D" File. a | This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirément. There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested. File: owe File a | Nothing relevant. | | SECRET - SENSITIVE PROPERTY OF | | AG YS c WHITE are sheas arcics | g41519 ™ : . HW 50955 Docld: 32423630 Page 5333
WW 50955 | 4 prak. | " Nien Castro Fi dt was around t:ra in the afternoon, Cuban time. “We were having lune in the living room of the modest summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magni- ficent “’aradero Beach, 120 kilometers from Havalna. For at feast the tenth time, I was questioning the Cuban ieader on details of the negotiations with Russia before the missile installations last year. The telephone rang, a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr, Dor- caneeeaalle ticds, President of sent -communicati Fidel wicked|up’ the phone and [ heard him say: “Coma? Un atentado?" , (What's that? An attempted assassination?”’) He then turned tous to say that Kennedy had just been struck down in Dallas. Then he went back bo the telepl 1one and exclaimed in a loud voice “Herida? Muy grave- viente” (“Wounded? Very seriously?”) | He came back, sat down, and repeated three times che words: “Es una mala noticia.” (“This is bad news 5") He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another gall cowith further news. He remarked while we waited that there was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in Amer- scan society and that this deed could equally well have ve ~ he work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The ~vcond call came through: it was hoped they wou Id! tbe © abie to announce that the United ‘States President was “4ll alive, that there was hope. of saving him. Fidel Castro's immediate reaction was: ready re-elected.” He pronounced these words with , satisfaction, i This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had acld on a previous ev ening and which had turned into an all-night session. To ‘be precise, it lasted from tolin the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part lof the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted to him of an interview which President Kennedy granted me this last October 24, and about Fidel Castro’s reactions to these impressions. During this nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself fof «relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in, the . recent past Washington had had ample opportunity to normalize its relations with Cuba, but that instead it had tolerated a CIA program of training, equipping , | and organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me saat he wasn’t in the least fearful of his life, since. - “TF they can, he| is danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become : 1 victim of the United States this would simply en- ha. his radius of influence in Latin America as w cll as throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he said, from the viewpd#it of the interests of peace jin - Docld:32423630 Page 534 ‘his re-election. Personally, | path the American. CONtINGEts ackmeachieve this godt, a leader would have'to arise in the United States capable of un derstanding the explosive realities of Latin Amer- ica and of meeting them ha iiway. Then, suddenly, he had taken a Jess hostile tack: “Kennedy could still be this man. He still has the possibility of becoming, in the eyes of history, the greatest’ President of the United States, the leader who may at last understand that there can be coexistence between ca apitalists and socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await consider him responsible for everything, but I will say this: he has come to understand many things over the past few. months; and then.too, in the last analysis, I’m convinced that anyone else would be worse.” Then Fidel had added with a broad and boyish grin: “TF you see him again, you can ‘tell him that Vsiesgglling to declare Goldwater my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!” This conversation was heid on November 19, Now it was nearly 2 the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio. “Commandant Vallero, his physician, aide-de-camp, and in, Vallero intimate friend, was easily able to get the broadcasts from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came would translate it for. Fidel: Kennedy wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin: murder of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: Presi- dent Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to “ome: “Ever rything - is changed. Everyt hing is going to change. The United States occupies such a position in world affairs that the death of a President of that country affects millions of people in every corner of the globe. The cold war, relations with Russia, Latin America, Cuba, the Negro question... all will have to be rethought. I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed. This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter,” After the quarter-hour of silence observed by all the American radio stations, we once more tuned in on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a re- broddcasting of 'the American national anthem. Strange indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymna ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in thé midst of a of worried faces. “Now,” Fidel said, “they will haw to find the -assassin quickly, but very qu sickly, circle 7 o'clock and we got up from.
otherwise, you watch and see, | know them, they wil try te put the blame on us for this thing! Bat tell how many Presidents have been assassinated? Eur: This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has bees assassinated. ¥ cnow, when we were hiding out Sierra there were some : other) who wanted to Kill Batista. They thought they could do away with a regime by ecapitating it. I have always been violently opposed to such nicthods. First of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, be- cause so far as Cuba is concerned, if Batista had been killed he would have been replaced by some military - figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is repellent to me.” —_ ! , The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy was having in getting tid of her bloodstained stockings. Fidel exploded: “What sort of a mind isi this!” He re- peated the remark several times: “What sort of a mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations after all. Are you like this in Europe?| For us Latin Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes de- cency, dignily, respect. There are even istrect urchins who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally, this reminds me of something else: if:you write all those things I told you yacmaday against Kennedy's olicy, don’t use his name now; speak instead of the policy of the United States government. Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we must try to put our time to good use inspite of it. He wanted to accompany me in person on a visit: to a granja de pueblo (state farm), where he had been en- gaging in some experiments. His present obsession is agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers, - and the possibilities which will give |Cuba. enough sugar cane by 1970 to achieve. economic independence. “Didn't L Tell You || We went by car, with the tadio on. The Dallas police were now hot on the trail-of the assassin. He is a Russian spy, says the news commentator. Five minutes later, correction: he’ is. a spy married to a Russian. Fidel said: “There, didn’t I tell you; it'll be T_my.turn next.” Butwwsh yaa. The next ‘word was: the assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man who was a member of the ‘Fair Play for Cuba Com- mittee,” that he was an admirer of Fidlel Castro. Fidel declared: “TE they had had proof, they would have said | | Nee BLE he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In saying simply that he is an admisgs, this is just to try and make an association in people’s minds between the name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda device. It’s terrible. But you know, I’m sure this wall - all soon blow over. ‘There are too many competing policies in the United States for any single one to be able to impose itself universally for very long.” We arrived at the granja de pueblo, where the farm- ers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker announced over the radio that it was now known that the assassin is a “pro-Castro Marxist.” One comren- tator followed another; the remarks became increas- ingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then excused himself: “We shall have to give up the visit to the farm.” Weawenton toward Matanzas fromushere he could telephone Prssiceniidanticas, On the way he had questions: “Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy? With Khrushchev? What was his position at the time of the attempted invasion of Cuba?” Finally and most important of all: “W it ercise over.the CIA?” Then abruptly he looked at his watch, caw that it would be half an hour before we reached Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to - sleep. After Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before, he said to me that it was an irony of history for the Cubans, in the situation to which they had been ‘re- duced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of a President of the United States. “After all,” he added, “there are perhaps some peopie in the world to whom this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine, Madame Nhu!” - I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming captions HALT, MR. KENNEDY! CUBA I$ NOT ALONE. . - a I thought of all those who had been led to associate their deprivations with the policies of President John F. Kennedy. ! At dinner I was able to take up all my questions. What had motivated Castro to endanger the peace of the world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to envisage relations between Cuba andthe United States along the.same lines as those between Finland and the Russians?’ How was the transition made from the ‘humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an explanation for everything. Then he questioned me G0 Page 535
TA ttt ted le ne ay, once more an Kennedy, and ‘ intellectual qualities of Awakened the keen The Cubans h that cruel intimacy so Familj with their colonizers. Nevert] In that Very seize turned-in the evening, a with Marxist slogans have re 7 toothpaste dillboards, in the the where “Robert Frog: adhere fo need this , By Saturday night, even the out by attempt and failure an Bave over to a succession of 'Mns and the Windows House and of the shado in Springfield tive city of TT and the corne ws of the great Lincoln head and to a voice SONA ena ants ata : Deecenen each time | culogized thie 45Sassinated President, 1 est interest jn hin, . + \L ave lived with the United ar to me of the tates in colonized Ieloss,- ib was an intimacy, WIAA townich we re- nous sisnboards aced the Coca Cola and oF - Soviet exhibits the lumi pl midst rele So years Aso, it~ to live for it, to spend SPUTE oven more thany television seemed worn d ceased to comment and photographs of the col- - rs of the White reciting “Oh, Ca pfain, My Captain.” It is to be, then, the grand style. But the ship h but because he j Mr. Lincoln an image of t time iS personal, not histori before many of us will day Mr, Kennedy was ca want shot? The news of thle President's by a taxi driver to three gent] “on Arlington Street in Bos around and hurried back insi vestments. Packed With stud shuttle pl Permission to take off when intercom: “Folks, up here on ¢ listening to the news and the was only time to hear one woman Say, ful” before three men went Specifications, A college stud pe" x9 visible attention. One in-.e.” The plane took off, the money and st tain was back agdingthey ha HW 50955 aS. Not weathered every not Abraham Lincoln: not because he is more ar | = 4 remembered he plastic arts ane from Baston to arted to serve drinks. The storm; Mr. Kennedy is ess, physical presence and - One’s own L. Just how long will it be fo read a book about the ASSASsination was given wy left a hotel They turned right aiond to their emen as if ton. de to in- ents and | a. Washington Waited for the Captain came-on the he flight deck we've been President js dead.” There “How dread- USIMESSmMen back to discussing plan . u ent reading Agamemnon of his nates read, “| the stewardess collected n the cap- d been listening to more Ovo. ' Docld: 32423630 Page 536 f i 7 Hotty Hotnnig ; ; , neniselves on th, to dip “wenton through this, and stopped onl !n scale and if the Many of us who must h 71 1963 a certain American emo- lion vibrated in the almosphere, compounded of re. sentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of everything, of a Mysterious almast imperceptible rap- Prochement, After all, this American President was able to reach accord with our Russian Friends during his lifetime, Said a young Cin *Ellectual tO me asf was. taking my leave. It was amast as though he were apolo- for nat rejoicing at the 48S4SSination. JEAN Dantey and Czechoslovakian trucks, Sizing Is trire except as a may OF MIEN for it.’ We lONCY OF instititions OF Agreements” —JOun F. Kenn EDY, November 18, 1963 News, that is trying to listen to News because their real job was to hear flight control, There had been a gun battle in Dallas; a patrolman was Killed: the police had taken a Man in Tkbeerie theater. Vice President Johnson was now the President. The talk of business y when the cap- ay that the new President had aircraft. A fey laughed, fain again interrupted tos been sworn in aboard an They ask toa much of us when they ask us to act y to the grand style. We are not an emotionally affluent people. And yet some of us always complained that Mr, Kennedy cid-not seem quite emotionally commit. tec enough. But Now someone remembered with special alfection a moment late in the 1960 campaign, Mr. Kennedy Was in a motorcade and the Democratic gov- ernor who was with him said how wonderful if was to feel the lave with which these crowds pressed forward to feel the touch of their candidate. “Oh, dry up,” Mr, . Kennedy said. It seemed now somehow a special grace in him that he used only the real jn emotion and ab- stained from fabricating the expected. He had too much respect for the rand style to counterfeit it: how much truer to him nueht we have been if we had come down ave remem- bered the lines from Cymnbeling had thought them proper to speak “Fear no more the heat of the sun/Nor the furious Winter’s rages, ; Thou thy worldly task hast done/Home. art thou
Flash from Dallas Just as Secret Service men reacted instinctively, rushing to protect the presidential party, reporters reacted instinctively to get the news—sketchy as it was at first—to the world. United Press International's Merriman Smith, dean of the White House correspondents, describes on pages 32-33 his frantic rush to call the Dallas UPI bureau. Reproduced here is the result of Smith's first efforts—the actual Teletype copy that almost immediately clacked out of hundreds of UPI machines in newsrooms, radio and television stations, pressrooms, and business offices all over the world. "" DETECTIVES WERE THERE AND THEY °ASKED HIM TO LOOK IN THERE (THE SRIEF- CASE) FOR SOMETHING. ®. ; TRE CASE WAS OPENED AND AN ENVELOPE WAS FOUND CONTAINING 44 $100 pILLS, THE WITNESS SAID. THE STATE HAD SAID IT ¥OULD PRODUCE THAT PIECE OF EVIDENCE BUT IT HAD NOT LISTED IT AS ONE °OF THE SEVEN LINKS." THE DEFENSE HAS IMPLIED IT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT CAROL'S DEATH AFTER A SAVAGE SLUDGEONING AND STABBING IN HER HOME WAS THE "RESULT OF AN ATTEMPTED _ MOREDAL254PCS UPI ATN DA PRECEDE KENNEDY DALLAS, NOV. 22 CUPL)-~THREE SHOTS WERE FIRED AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MOTORCADE TODAY IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS. JTISS4PCS. UPT AGN HX 2ND ADD 2ND LEAD THOMPSON MINNEAPOLIST BUOS HO UPHOLD DA IT YRS NX UPI ASN Ad DAY CORRECTE BUOS UPHOLD<-NX UPI ASN DA URGENT LST ADD SHOTS, DALLAS CA7TN) XXX DOWNTOWN DALLAS. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED. “ : THE INCIDENT OCCURRED NEAR THE COUNTY SHERIFF*S OFFICE ON MAIN STREET, JUST EAST OF AN UNDERPASS LEADING TOWARD THE TRADE MART WHERE THE PRESIDENT WAS TO HA- FLASH FLASH KENNEDY SERIOUSLY WOUNDED PERMAPS SERIOUSLY PERHAPS FATALLY BY ASSASSINS BULLET : _ ‘dt1239PCs §0955 Docld:32423630 Page 537 At 12:34 the Teletype was | supplying copy ona Minneapolis murder trial. The Dallas bureau, alerted by Smith over radiotelephone from the press car as it careered toward the hospital, sends out the first sparse news. Minneapolis starts to add more details on the murder trial. The New York bureau, knowing , that ace reporter Smith is covering the President’s trip, tells all bureaus to “uphold” —get off the wire. “Dallas, it’s yours.” Atlanta tries to interrupt, but is quickly squelched by the New York bureau. _The Dallas operator begins sending the rest of Smith’s account from the press car. , At the hospital, Smith sees the President’s limp body in the car and races toa telephone. At | 12:39, nine minutes after the shooting, the grave news flashes over the wire. ,
UPI ON a Now reporter Smith is dictating a | BULLETIN Moots IST LEAD SHOOTING . pereee DALLAS, NOV. 22 CUPID--PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GOV. JOHN B. CONNALLY _ story ready for printing. OF TEXAS VERE CUTDOWN BY AN ASSASSIN'S BULLETS AS THEY TOURED | DOWNTOWN DALLAS IN AN OPEN AUTOMOBILE TODAY. _ MORESTIZ41PCS UPI AION DA 7 . . 1ST-ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING DALLAS (ON DALLAS AX TODAY. Smith rolls on, swiftly and THE PRESIDENT, MIS LIMP BODY CRADLED IN THE ARMS OF HIS WIFE, WAS. , : . : BUS ne eS RLAND HOSPITAL. THE GOVERNOR ALSO VAS TAKEN TO PARKLAND. fluently, adding fresh details as CLINT HILL, 4 SECRET SERVICE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MRS. KENNEDY, SAID pandemonium” breaks out 4E°S DEAD," AS THE PRESIDENT WAS LIFTED FROM THE REAR OF A WHITE HOUSE : . . in the corridor outside his ,OURING CAR, THE FAMOUS “SUBSLETOP™ FROM WASHINGTON. - HE WAS RUSHED TO AN EMERGENCY ROOM IN THE HOSPITAL. ; OTHER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WERE IN DOUBT AS THE CORRIDORS OF THE HOSPITAL ERUPTED IN PANDEMONIUM. ; THE INCIDENT OCCURRED JUST EAST OF THE TRIPLE UNDERPASS FACING A PARK IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS. . REPORTERS ASOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE HEAR ‘ MORE [44PES telephone niche. Searching his mind for UPI ALIN DA ; QND ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING (9% DALLAS) XXX DALLAS. : . . impressions of the shooting, REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS SEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE HEARD WHAT WOUNDED LIKE THREE SURST OF GUNFIRE. - Smith adds alll ; SECRET SERVICE AGENTS IN A FOLLOW-UP CAR QUICKLY. UNLIMBERED THEIR mith adds all he can remember AUTOMATIC RIFLES. . . . : THE BUBBLE TOP OF THE PRESIDENTS CAR WAS DOWN. to the story. The shaken wire THEY DREW THEIR PISTOLS, 93UT THE DAMAGE WAS DONE. operator stumbles in the THE PRESIDENT W4S SLUMPED OVER IN THE BACKSEAT OF THE CAR FACE second line DOWN, CONNALLY LAY ON THE FLOOR OF THE REAR SEAT. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL aT ‘ MORE L45PES UPI AIL2N DA , As yet nothing is known of the IT WAS IMPOSSISLE TO TELL AT ONCE WHERE KENNEDY waS HIT, 3UT BULLET sniper, what kind of weapon WOUNDS I¥ CONNALLY’S CHEST WERE PLAINLY VISIBLE, INDICATING THE GUNFIRE MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE COME FROM AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON. he used, or where the THERE WERE THREE LOUD BURSTS. : DALLAS MOTORCYCLE OFFICERS ESCORTING THE PRESIDENT QUICKLY LEAPED. FROM THEIR BIKES AND RACED UP A GRASSY HILL. . shots came from. MORE 146PES UPTAILSN DA HW 50955 Docld: 32423630 Page 536 *
. . ae 4 . : : te eet “ po, pen | ance: Aap. Toghieus Tos +..s4ane pate ; i Leo ~ sow Me ar . . ar reer ete . ote ye 44 “Lay eenit Bot me te jete in ealling tim, .2b Ove= oe 2 u ro. Oyo J Nia ane, i? DOS TOG Gog so eae ota gs ak er or ee ee cage tab Page Papeete Wive tabs re to RE AGG OM Ay thing inpjertoan ‘ yO 4 - tay ve ye eos : oe i oa mpage + to rpra. bo naeo & Leal yo ATA G Diewte Beh Tee bet ET A ae eelLoaith raouece. to ely ete how OS arate r the concrete point wiich you asked 1:2 avout, ca Ul: there was no offer of acy ‘ind’. Dorticos:. “Who eed wasatt asking about en offon". Urvaandes Aris: Wan, LT nod « 2 3% * at / a] w wpote 2 oye tye unders boo’. that with the conafusica of the... _omsade woctner they had threatened per SO that She Wadd PERG Hh S hed oom given money to the man... thes American. 1 ucdes tend?" Bernences Armas: “ah, no, no, 10, not at any moment", Dorticos: toytning of that?” dernes ndez Armas: “ilo, no, that nothing ebsolutely was given to her. . -2 aihar they (enderezar - straightened cut?) 7 -av4 the ; . the. interrogation..." Dorticos: "then we can. 59. along, 3a version of == your | oo \l no information?” Eernandez Armes: yes, Sr. Pres- “onte, of course”. Dorticos: "then '! —_ nothing more of. “Emportance?” Se -lemande Armas: na, nothing important. - <5 any wey s & . 2a stat t subait socn a araft of all. the actaiis, baczuse there are obher details i of. minor . iaportance, ‘and. ‘others of none at all, out contained ‘in the statements. oo and a nave| asked her to. make me & coomi=n draft a3 prolific as possible to submit it at the ‘fizst omportunsty”. ee arr ee a re ada i oo . 1} 1 Ed a TN HW 509 Lsorassensett we a3 : \
Deputy Deputy Attorne He said he had just comp Under Secretary of State. y General Katzenbach telephoned at 10:50 a.m, leted talking on the telephone with Alexis vohnson, ‘hose Johnson told Katzenbach that insofar as , on , moa anne ee . This docmment ig prepared t- respons “9 your request and ie dune. hy . : natir utsida wour Cammitice, fs 1.048 Pnii ee a OFLC ee BOS OS « net ‘2 aid the con cnt may not oe disclosed to unauls. sited yersou- si punadthire , } tee ven ey Mr. Belmont DATE: November 27, 1963 beets woe vat Sullivan 7 Me - Z sovel we : &- . totter 7 FROM C. A. Evans atl : ae Resm . oe a Olmes oo SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY He 3 the investigation of this matter in Mexico is concerned, the State Department —_ felt this should be coordinated and directed by the FBI. State took the position that the President's directive to the FBI extended to any activity outside of the United States, as well as within the country. Insofar as the | | Ambassador in Mexico is concerned, Johnson believed he should be Kept 1 EE sae: informed of any pertinent developments but that the Ambassador should not :' - = be running the investigation, je’ an ’ ‘As to current developments, Katzenbach said that the last thin: ‘“. ae he would want would be for the FBI to take Agents away from their investiga- ! tive duties to prepare reports. He requested, however, that if there were’ - 3 at, any, pertinent_developments.he be orally. briefed, po i i With further reference to his conversation with Alexis Johnson, ~~ - ae Katzenbach said he had been asked whether the State Department should make: at a formal inquiry of the Soviet Government for information concerning Oswaid., pr and his wife, particularly as to their activities in Russia. He asked that thissy: we , question be considered by the Director, as Katzenbach felt his views most... *: — ci important. Se — A fer E . In thinking about the matter himself, Katzenbach noted if we A: a did not ask the Soviets for information there would 3e no answer should the i: [> question of Oswald's stay in Russia be raised, other than to admit we had x I made no inquiry. On the other hand, he observed that we could not place i I any reliance on anything the Soviets said. ee i I : * - Lilp i ti wy oie AG 5 ; _ ., After conferring with Messrs. Belmont.and Sullivan, the | a 1 -Mr. Mohr YET ae FROM ee | 1 - Mr. DeLoach Vi | banca _ ae 1 - Mr. Rosen Ro ¥SR0%, 3 a7 4G ~ OES} @ i853 iz “aayl - Mr., Sullivan 27 163 eT one CAE:vap (8) oo ur me w HW 450955 DocId: 32423630 wae 4 no oma oe > Page 540, . . » 4
tae ane mee na ce onan pemorandum to Mr. Belmont! € 1 following recommendations are submitted with reference to the points Ai raised by Mr. Katzenbach: _ . . 1. Insofar as making a formal approach to the Soviet Government, we believe this undesirable. Such a formal request from the United States will enable the Russians to put out an official statement entirely favorable ier. to them. The United States will have to acdget this, 7 to our formal request, and we won't be in a position to disprove it. The e State Department has responsibility here and we Should not dictate the position they are to take, but our views Should be stated . since it is in response i 2. In connection with the investigation in Mexico recommended Katzenbach be informed tha — : & o. po 2 Bar on _ ff approved, Katzenbach will be so advised, Y gn Jnr jag | HY 30855 Deacld:32423630 Page 541
; | Oh A tipcatin a pumps 4 Pop 20 LE ae, — Ay taro, nal pratt eset de nat on Vit pe, ele WE a) a ee 1 donde. _— ke petit aid est —_ — eit tod_piraraatl _ de eel fr th bat oh se inte pf | > oo “yoy 24 igs _— | mate Da, Pree > Aw 1964 oe the api ae ' oe | ce eee ete mo Tle wilind’ oy _O : a © IATIOHAL ScCUANY aa oe < sgn 02202. aa — tisclosure Subject to | 1 decia seitiza tle che of £0 oo . 11852 : exempt “du ip Ai a, . foe! : ¢ O. ( # ; Crimiagal Sanctiuns. 3 ae ae | ben rs sy eel ed on merhere | bie Sat este Oem
SECRET ot ore cabal a cnoplth, aki soil pean Ales =
eo wt oN a arson tery “aged ejatbienbiliia s - oa ott _ aetatiolat , 2 Pee 0 eee yo ne te ae ae ata eae ene ene mean CO -)}-——- | ee joie wats — ay cee x HW -p0955° papa: 32423630 Paye 544
) hacb itil) mor, porta polls potbie 7 to nme telat Ad, ee . ca) Pr ww bpateoaeh, (i fevuphele) Cette pap). uel tepervicea a he Eb Ce pe Broder grees Hh Meg) tp reat IL creeped sect pe are mk ohh 2B: daa poh |. i tach typ? 2 pl ek oho dees dill bas. _ dL Aa ohauth "Tee els ya od: pees a | | 4 2. Paar tent to as Patho wharchtasky (an pep wc bite Aenyens te - — fae Aer. oppresele DB Hea Aw. o Bgteeleo a Co A teal, Nabeb, wnt foal poicet foc ent, | _ eel tianige 5 00ee offecrig, 2% = pa csatics : ; : ! ‘ : { : : 1 || Tle my i. en ee, B Ppl ; ee rs of Oe -fertn, pucreesa. (f cope). ental, hace. ole | —p a a beacon ( Mens hates). coment bred ith i _ tg vl iat a whe et Fos me ne mae RINE NATE cee Pine eEe ee =e eal ane te ue 50955 pocta;¥2423630 Page” 545, j
_ asx on, Lentaceien., ete sen pe emtvcslon tte « or eagle eho Ley ob Pent G Ss tas beeen eee | ana oo Le a ‘ "Alls slat alin : : a Ss Lee pe: wt beget. anvibisde, ogee doe dN _. an, AMeveorL feel. nw, Cade, a burs | iL Pe PO Beals penne a. cole, OO ‘+ | i 7 a Ne mobidy whe aw mevey bat fonsaley pthegee. _ soll wet: be ance of. pw ow. cesar. fact. eck | = 4, p Met ase party 26) tp ) tb Lusiiop Hes, 2ef. 7 a Penne Herein. forged bachdalid. Fete Ms _ 184 1 uel , eek. ef. oh Bho. lor the selier _ ee ___ Aloartherte. ne -RECE? oy FRU i 4a chia ee re on ete meee on a ete A em OTT A tee crete eaten wen : . ’ nts wae # eee yess uate ge ae ea ort a Se he ate aan ~ Ne on woo Ma a HW 50953... poota: 12423630 Page.5467 ~
' i . L “Ot ™“s we RET yeh ot seis tla v Plamen eeu ltt. Nahant gully Gy 1 bowrmael witcha bey rumble cede. - Abang, oh. Lorupcle pbzretize, oi One feel ed assert, cota, Hous ys C2 othe 4 =, has hott duels prod
east oye a Lt0 eta lees GF Va v-2 | | Lan ene a es an [ ee ee nm hued Os fertsctne Lon Pe laces! — ernst ——- “7 2 . TEES a oe. PLC ty. ra w H¥ 50955 Wacla:
"A . 4 he othe one weet C a ~ | : ; Le an, i Cnece, . My Ope tom “x y LS? Ot thes fod) /- iF | | - | CG an eck halo Oe. .. 7 eet a _. ; Mo, a ake a. ned Ct _ REC att Sid i 2 ree teen aren Seen stn teene ttege nteree tee nn “tik
HW 50955 Docld: 32423630 Page S51. . . January. 28, 1976 The Honorable Otis Pike, Chadian House Select Committe? on-Tatelligenca, Rayburn Houge Office Building, — Washington, D.C. 20515 t Dear Congressman Pikes Congratulations on your. Committee's groa% servica to the American elec torate in removing some of the mask of secrecy from the domestic eover operations and funding of the CTA. So reoy protested countorprodustive and indefensible caver operations for tucenty-seven ¥tar3d, The light of oxposure and cleansing Ls now enhancing our countists security. The. publishing of your sxcollont report over GIA and White House ob sections 43 an ect of courage the cleéterate will goon apprecicte. . er ¢ q “ Me Reliance, however, by any Congressional committee on Tandvuts from the CIA itself, ig like an investigative reporter compllire his story frosa government press releases, Neither is doing the job Hs Guployer paid. it to do. 7 ‘Finding the hidden CIA budget2 for. threes or four tines the billions of dollars adaitted to the electerate is a coarendable ahhievenent., But what would your investigators Nave achieved if a law ms alroady in fores inposing criminal ponalties upen CIA employeos vio leaked inror- mation to you? The CIA proposed secrecy law is a blacsiail Weapon » eoreey combing to constitute autoeratiec power Intelligence, money and se in our sceiety. ‘The Congress enjoys no intelligence s:rvien of its om. I% enjoys no-offsetive control. over apending of funds hidden in the budgets of non-~CiA departments and agencics, If & surrondars to the doctrine of secrecy 1% is powerless indeed. To Steongthen Conprenst powsr I orfer you my om counterintelligence service ir place, . Tho sources have been carefully tested and accumulated site 1949. Tue problem.is. not leaking intelligence out of Committsc; it is leaking independent intelligence luto it. Starting exactly ome year ago today I launched penetration offortsy with a 19 page report aidressed to "Chairman and Members, Select Committees on Intelligenwe Cperations. I hand delivered this report to every comnittee member's office. My wife Nancy recorded the date, hour and person deliverct to, | . On June 25, 1975 Edward Roeder III of your staff receirted for -103 7 pages of counterintelligencc:on CIA. This -representeda distillation of a quarter century of intslligence gathering. CIA catrol of the Watergate breakin and coverup and CIA's investigation ¢ my penetration of their secrets is covercd. The avplication to the U.S. Attornay and three U. S. Special Prosecutors requesting investigatia and prosecution of mumter of American citizens within the U.S.A. is dinyour files, - - Nevertheless, none of this intelligence leaked to recogiition or inves- tigation within the executive departments or your Committees, *
HY 0955 3 (2). On July 30, 1975 Bnily Sheketoff! of your staff recekpts ed for a one page notification dis tributed to chairmen and members thah Anne P. Commandu- ras, an employes of CIA's domestic assausination oeeeee had bsen mur- dovad in her ceortnent houge swimming pool by CLA as “w3Sin Eugene Hale Bréedinge ‘Ionow enjoy the addithonal intelligence that Cormnanduras was executed with a CIA davt gun auch as that dizplayed to nevs cameras by a member of the Senate Intelligence Cormmittes, the dntclligence weapon fires a Sliver coated with shellfish tozin that killa within seconds, dissolves and leaves no mavk, Tho CIA preserved neler enolifish toxin supply in direct contravention of on order of the President. Your Cennittese filed this raport widnout actlon along with over 200 addltional counterintel- higence. Is this secrecy that protccts national security? Conzgre: asman Pike ; you have exposed $10 billion of CIA funding mostly . hidden in another budget. TLL you go for mors? Then. exanine the State Da epar Brenly Trecnucy Departaent, Justice Nepartment, ‘alte House ond Congress appropriations. All of thess support personnel accepting orers for covert domeatic operations from CIA, You have uncovered CIA operations in the media, Investigate police dcpartaents thvcughout the nation funded by LEAA that are responsive to CLA orders, In the Fairfax County, Virginia, polica departzent alone a GIA ussassin hans twice employed the badge of the doparteont as cover to gain entrance to domiciles to perform exccutions. : fee command your Conanittes for regis ting the pressure for secrecy n publishing your report. I dsplore your resistunce to the leaking of intelligence into your Cornittce. The latter confines your Com- pittea!s intelligence to official and unofficial leaking channels of the CIA. Pleaza concede that thore are other citizens as concerned for the security of America as you are. I respectfully request opportunity to confer with you, Congressman Pike, or with your capable, diligent and honest staff chief, A. Saarle Field, Iowant to assist your Comvittes in reeennending remedial legislation ba sed upon ary fears of dcfining. the problem, Ra pectfully submitted, Love. Ey OY cewek, Amos E. Heacock LhlO Czlethorpe, Apt. 708, Ryattsville, Md, 20781 - Telephone 864-5353 Freel: Letters to Senator Abrahaa Ribicoff and to ‘Senator Frank Churche Docld: 32423630 Page 552
ve é Ce Es FO SESTFI LAY Ou BDENESIVE LTE hl = CENCE DILISION CLA me PERETANTIVY 2 WON H- a AGRAHAM RISICOFF, CONN., CHAIRMAN SFE } : : SC ELAANE Eby . . Le gt A ea. JOHN Li MCCLELLAN, AUC. CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL. OLME CH ALANA ES OF CEH TF PMO CECMTER AAW ET A? cept Boi gst HENRY M, JACKSON, WASH, - JACOB K, JAVITS, MY. ay SB. , EE, ‘ . - ees EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINZ WILLIAM VW. ROTH, Jf, OL. = oe 7 KEG : LE. Le LEE METCALF, MONT, SILL BROCK, TENN. vote . — CCE ge JAMES B, ALLEN, ALA, LOWELL #. WEICKER, JR.. CONN, ; ‘ LAWTON CHILES, FLA. . “a ( hd JOHN GLENM, O11G . ‘ te es ¢ © RICHARD A, WEGMAN CINEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20519 March 8, 1976 Mr. Amos E. Heacock a ) = 8. 25I¢- HEI | Hyatcoville, M 184 /e@, Che La, EEO .. , FEL, , ~xy Pee Dear Mr, Heacock: CD SEY 5975 Thank you for writing to me regarding your knowledge of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. I understand that you have discussed these questions at length with members of the Committee staff. On March 1 the Committee reported S. Res. 400 creating a Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities. The legislation which was before us concerned only the establishment of a new congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that. would significantly modify the Structure or the powers of the CIA it- self. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further- more, we were under instructions from. the Senate. to report out a. formal recommendation in the form of legislation by March l. I am, however, deeply concerned with the charges you have made because, if true, they represent grave examples of corruption and criminality. It is my hope and intent that the new committee created by the legislation we are considering, once it is established, will have the jurisdiction and the re- gources to explore the kind of issues which you raise. I assure you that the entirety of the information you have submitted to my committee will be made available to the new Congressional oversight committee. I am sure you understand the constraints on the Govern- ment Operations Committee which prevent us. from undertaking the investigations you suggest, but I shall forward the material you submitted to the new committee as soon as it is established. |. ‘For your information, I am enclosing a copy of S. Res. 400 and a copy of the committee's report on this measure, Sincerely, Abe Ribicoff Enclosures (2): MW 50955 Docld@:32473630 Page 553 —