243e i } an At Punta: del Este ‘last year the Foreign Ministers “oo “verified, to use ‘the wording of Resolution I, “that ffensive of ‘communi st governments, the, subversive’ 7 “their agents and. Hs oibintéataane which \ they control “has. increased. in: “intensity. a . a Concerning this offensive @ they said: "The purpose of this offensive is the destruct - ion of democratic institutions and the estab- lishment of totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental powers. ‘The outstanding facts in this intensified offensive ‘are the declarations set forth in official documents of the directing bodies of the international communist. movement, that one ' of - its principal objectives is the establish- “ment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped countries and in Latin America; and the existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the communist powers.” — I want to note that this assessment was unanimously approved, with the sole. exception of the Cuban delegation. Based on this finding the Foreign Ministers | _ established OAS procedures for assisting the governments to meet the challenge, They directed the Council of “the OAS: | | oo mL .to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the _ purpose of warning against any acts of. aggres- Sion, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of . Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the governments of the . member states with regard thereto."  At.the same time they made provision for the establish- - ment of the SCCS, composed of experts on security matters, to Hi ‘5az14 DocId: 32424094 Page 151
HW 54714 Docld: 32424094 Page 152 448 to advise the Council and the member governments, upon reauest,, on ‘technical problems in this field. a The sces was. organized last spring ‘and has | formally met in three series of sessions since that - times. to prepare an anitial general report. on. communist subversive activities, to advise the Dominican Government on now to deal with communist subversion, and to assist in the preparation of studies on subversion for the Council. The Council meanwhile has established a special committee of its own, composed of governmental repre- sentatives, to carry outits vigilance responsibilities. Both groups in recent weeks have been working together on special studies requested by the Foreign Ministers — at their informal meeting in Washington Last October 2. 3. Ab this informal meeting of Foreign Ministers, | considerable time was devoted to the problem of sub- version, as. is reflected in the communique issued at the ‘end of the meeting. The Foreign Ministers found that at the present juncture the most urgent of the problems confronting the hemisphere was “the Sino- Soviet intervention in Cuba as an attempt to convert the island into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of democratic institutions." , \ They expressed the desire that in the ideological struggle against communism “the resources and methods inherent in the
HW 54714 peoples to. realize fully the differences between the. democratic system. should be mobilized to pring the i totalitarianism and democracy" “They also agreed "that it iis necessary for the sountries, im accordance with their laws and constitutional precepts, to intensify measures to prevent agents and groups of international communism from carrying on their activities of a subversive nature." In this connection they asked that studies be made in the three areas where Cuba appeared to'be concentrating its effort: the transfer of funds to other American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base fo training in subversive activities. I have earlier described in some detail the scope of | cuban activities in these fields. The sccs has just completed its preliminary study of these three. topics, “setting forth its conclusions and making specific recommendations for individual and cooperative action by..governments. . The Council's Special Committee received the. ‘report in Spanish last Monday. After it has been “translated and circulated among all the members of the. Council, the United States hopes it will be made public. : Tie Special Committee is- scheduled to meet this afternoon | to consider this point. i. Docld: 32424094 Page 153
HW 54714 Tr should add. that. ‘the ‘sccs report is a. technical study prepared by” experts acting in their individual capacity. It is to be used ‘by the Special Committee "composed of goverhnental representatives. in ‘the preparation of a report to the Council setting: forth recommendations for measures which governments may wish to adopt to strengthen their capacity to counter subversive activities in these three fields. ae also ‘want to mention the fact that the Inter-_ American Defense Board : has established an Inter-American ‘y ‘Defense College which began its first course for senior off *cers from ‘the armed forces of the various American Republics in October 1962. “The College is “located at Fort McNair. ‘The purpose of the College is to conduct courses of study. on the inter- American system and the military, economic, political and ‘social factors ‘that are essential components to the defense of our free. societies. 5 Problems of, control of subversive action Before leaving. this aspect of the problem T would ‘like to say sonething about the difficulties in curbing subversive activities. ‘The very nature. of clandestine. action makes it difficult to deal with. In free. societies where subversive elements: take advantage of. ‘the { \ Docld:324274094 Page 154
AW 542714 the safeguards, of democratic processes and where govern- ments feel themselves inhibited by. respect for constitu- tional | norms, the problem is even more complicated. Aaa |, te this. ‘the lack of adequate, administrative nachinery, : and ‘internal security. capabilities which: exists in. many. en - Latin American countries, ‘anid you can: see “the dimensions — of the problem. For’ example, coastlines are extensive and thinly . populated and frontiers for the most part. run through rugged terrain difficult to patrol. Effective control of clandestine shipments of arms and men becomes a most difficult task under these conditions. Besides, there are plenty of arms available in most countries for a. price and no need for special efforts to ship them in. The. ease with which money can be transmitted poses a serious problem even for governments with the most elaborate security machinery. Propaganda which comes over the radio can be jammed but only at.great ‘expense cand effort and. even then without complete success... The - “control of. the entry. and departure of travellers and surveillance while they are in the country is’ another task requiring large. numbers of trained personnel and . substantial funds. I mention this’ solely to give you eo Some idea of what we and our Sister republics ‘are up against in trying to develop our capacity to deal with the problem. of subversion through individual and collective effort. DoclId: 32424094 Page 155
HW 54714 a Ud SECURITY EFFORT So. far I have talked about US and ‘OAS programs to deal ‘directly with the subversive effort. It would be a mistake to close without a few words on the Alliance for Progress. tin ‘the critical, ‘last week of October, when we confronted the Soviet Union bluntly and directly over ‘the missiles in . Cuba, the Finance Ministers of the 20 member countries of the Alliance for Progress met in Mexico City. President Kennedy sent a message to that conference which established the clear and direct relationship of their work to our ‘and the hemisphere’ s security. He said to the ‘Alliance conferees? "Your. meeting is a vital reminder that the central task of | this generation of Americans is not, merely the avoidance of conflict. It is ‘the construction of anew comminity of American nations in which all our citizens can live not — _only free from fear but full of hope...Just as the unyielding - determination of today is essential if we are to realize the future. promise of the Alliance for Progress, the future success ‘of ‘the Alliance for Progress will be the final vindication. of: . the. resolute ‘course we are taking. today." The: Alliance | was not undertaken as a response to Castro.” But i do not think there is any doubt that ‘the threat of Castroisn gave us a sense of urgency - about the economic and | social underdevelopment of Latin oe | America and the resultant political tensions and dangers ~ | that ! DoclId: 32424094 Page 157
batho ee dee eg etnae et rae ote HW 54914 “tha “we did ‘hot have. Before. We have engaged in this” "program. because it is right aga: because it is in our national interest to live in a world of independent “ys . and. secure countries.” By doing 505 however, we also _ va seeke to: provide for Latin. America: a democratic alternative wW to Castro- ‘communism, reflecting. another statement by "President ‘Kennedy 2 “Ie peaceful evolution proves eo: impossible, “violent: revolutions will be inevitable." ; Theoretically, we could put vast ‘amounts of arms and riot equipment, into Latin American: hands today to stamp of rebellion and to shoot down the Commnist leaders and followers. But in whose hands would we put these arms? How can we be sure that the riot quellers of | today will not be the rioters tomorrow? | What good are arms and security con- trols ina permanently unstable society? a In. practice, we are providing aid to. our sister republics in public. ‘Safety and anti- subversion efforts,. conscious of the fact that. these efforts are meaningful only in the frame- work of a longer- term program. ‘That program is the Alliance. We are helping our. sister republics to maintain order and ‘strengthen democratic institutions so the fruits of ‘the Alliance may have a chance to ripen. Some of them ripen fast: - schools; health centers, pure water systems, low . “income homes, school ‘feeding, farm-to- market roads. Others take time to produce results! new industries, road and rail BoclId: networks, modernized agricultural economies. We: do the first “ind, 32424094 Page 158
ad dy again, ‘to: make ‘possible the second kind. “What we aim at ois, over. the next ten years, to develop skills,. attitudes - aind material foundations on the basis of which Latin America | ean go forward to self- sustaining growth, , What we aim Paty | 542714 ~ simaltaneously, is: ‘the production. of. sufficient: evidence | for a large enough number of. people. that our: way, works so ‘as to deter them from following the, false but alluring a ‘promises of the Castroites and Communists: 46 Are we succeeding? . We cannot /ahswer this question { with certainty. What we do ‘know is. that we are ‘getting — under the Castroites' and the Communists’ skin. The Alliance for Progress is” a constant object of their ~ scorn and their attacks. If that be a measure of the threat 4t poses’ to their goals, then we have reason to be hopeful about its appeal to the peoples of hatin America: and its chances of success. Let me quote just a few. examples. Peking Radio on August 25th last year. quoted the ~ “Mexican Commnist: organization which calls itself the National Liberation Movement as follows! "The AlLiance for Progress is. nothing ‘but a hoax which could ‘not deceive the people". It goes. on to say? "Nobody can arrest the: ' advance of history, whether by violence or ‘threat, a "propaganda, DoclId: 32474094 Page 159
54pd4 propaganda or “the 20 billion dollars, a United States promise connected with the Alliance for Progess program. " Cuban Communist leader Blas ‘Roca in an article in ~ Cuba Socialista in May of last” year mentioned the Alliance, no less than six times in ‘two pages. He says the | Alliance "gives no adequate or effective answer to the ery of the peoples of Latin America." The reason for this, says the Cuban Communist chief, is. that it-will not - and I quote again "liberate Latin America from Yankee rule, but...strengthen it." The burden: of his article, translated into plain language, is that the : Alliance would create a satisfactory and healthy - relationship between the United States and Latin ‘America and thus must be fought like poison by the ‘Communists. Castro's hope for’ the defeat of the Alliance Was: expressed in an interview with some Western reporters on June first, when he said that the American. economy cannot afford the Alliance: He Said, hopefully no | doubt, and I quote from a Reuters dispatch in the © . New York Times: “They. (the Americans) shave neither the gold reserves nor the organization nor the men to ‘make it work.” We do not need to concern ourselves too much with challenges thrown out by Fidel. Castro. The Docld: 324274094 Page 160
7 53. a ES | The challenge we face’ is self- imposed, not only by. us “ain the. United States but by all 20 Alliance members. - It is to end hunger, disease and illiteracy in Latin, america, to, make these republics a better place to live of - - : ‘cor their people and thus ‘to make the hemisphere a | better place to.live for the United States. And it | is a point to remember. that Castro, Khrushchev ‘and © “Mao Tse-Tung would rejoice if we gave up on the | ; | | ; premise of the Alliance for Progress. ‘They are right, | of course, in ‘being concerned . about the Alliance, not only for the long- term future, but. more immediately. . For. .one factor in the unanimous agreement in the Hemi sphere on) what to do about the missiles and in the failure of the Communist program of protests was the new hope of peaceful | change brought by the’ Alliance and the new view of the US resulting from our leadership in this effort. , We see the Alliance as much more than. a program : ee erence eee enna ah alee en nee nent ce pe ee Nn ar of economic and social. progress. , We- see it as a. ; political and | ideological program as well, depending - “on its success .as much on. the development of Latin . America’ Ss “human, resources, the. reshaping of public and leadership attitudes and institutions as ori the ne building of roads, factories and hospitals. “The charter of Punta del Este calls for more than a collection of separate projects paid for. By American . public funds. “It envisages the modernization. of society | throughout — “HW 54214 DoclId:32424094 Page 161
pee on nme nti nent ata, cena eee eens nett HW 54214 mee a a throughout Latin. ‘America. This includes the harnessing of the intensive craving ‘for a nat ional renaissance to. the constructive goals set forth in the Charter. It - -Weans the aévelopment of wise and responsible political : ‘Leadership; ‘the. broadening of opportunities for the increasingly frustrated and impatient young generation, particularly in the universities, and the channeling of vast ‘intellectual and physical energies into the pursuit of national strength and independence in each member country of the Alliance. The pbuilding of a stronger “and proader economic base must go hand in hand with the development of an. open and vigorous society in which there is room at _¢he- top and near the top for all those whose talents and dedication entitles them to play a. more meaningful . and self-fulfilling role in the conduct of their nation' Ss: affairs. if, ‘Latin American succeeds ‘in this | quest, “if its youth finds the opportunity to plot. ‘solutions. instead. of revolutions, ‘to demonstrate results “instead of just demonstrating, the death imell will have sounded. for. the pessimism and the ninilism that are Castro’ s ‘most valuable assets. The pursuit of these objectives also entails a new ‘dimension for our own Latin American policy and the ‘resetting of sights on the part of all Americans» Oe epbotal’ Docld: 3274274094 Page 162
official and private, active in. the region and in hemisphere affairs. This reorientation of ‘our own 7 ~abbitudes 3 is not an intellectual, exercise. It. is. a "requirement 4 for. the ‘successful ‘conduct of. our: “new.. Woche lay fe Latin: Anerican policy. our own. aestiny is eee : “pound - up with “the “aevelopment, of. a hemisphere-wide: . | "-penewal which is long overdue. ‘The alternative is a series of convulsions whose consequences ‘cannot be _ foreseen but which are more Likely to serve the _ objectives of our adversaries than the interests of Latin America and the United States. | In this. sense, the Alliance for Progress. is a policy of both national and hemispheric security which, regardless of the: frustrations anid. “disappointments ( we may. experience, must be pursued steadfastly until - | the common goal is: achieved. i i HW 54214 Docld: 324274094 Page 163
i WW 54214 ‘In concluding. this presentation I want to draw : a few “tentative conclusions, tentative because we are “dealing with oe . unusually unpredictable. forces: | 1. “The peoples. and governments of the Americas face ‘a serious problem in communist subversion. Assessments of the degree of danger to particular countries will vary, though no country now seems likely to succumb in the foreseeable future. ‘No one can deny, however, that it isa real and continuing problem as far as the peace and security. of the hemisphere as a whole is concerned. Further, we cannot dis- _ regard the fact that terror and violence create conditions - which make it far more difficult for public or private enterprise to achieve the economic and social progress | ‘essential to the ultimate defeat of subversion by the success of the Alliarice for Progress. ae ‘During the months ahead. we may well witness a step- a up of the. tactics of violence as the communists, impatient to score successes to. recoup their. prestige in Cuba and in * the. hemisphere, resort to terrorism, sabotage and guerrilla . activities in an attempt to get publicity, ‘unseat | governments and ‘seize power. 3. . The nature of subversive action places the primary” _ responsibility on each country to adopt necessary legisla- ‘tion Docld: 324274094 Page 164
- $e 7 Y develop sufficient internal security forces to meet any ‘situation which may arise. “But such formal steps are not enough. Will and skill and courage are also required. And | ultimately governments can only succeed if by their policies for promoting political, economic and social development they | are able to command the active support of the great majority of their peoples. . 4, It is-no less true, however, that the effectiveness of the measures taken individually can be measurably increased vy or decreased by the degree to which the governments, ineluding the United States, cooperate with one another, bilaterally or in larger groups. like the OAS, sharing resources, experience ana intelligence. 5e Without. being complacent, we. in the United States can derive. certain satisfaction that asa result of actions of the United States ‘and other American governnents , working individually and collectively, some headway is being made to reduce the influence and capabilities of Cuba and the bloc and . an controlling local subversive | activities of all kinds “in. each country. Current United States actions may be. "summarized as reducing the appeal and capabilities of the Cuban regime, spreading knowledge. of what a Castro-communist regime does for a people's freedom and well- being, providing i ; ‘WW 54214 "equipment . Docld: 324274094 Page 165 co Ds De tion, establish required adminfstrative machinery, and 7
ce ne ae -. cat lt nan eee metre el tt mn tt A Rh eA AOI AA WW 54214 te neet the highest needs and aspirations of the peoples is ‘equipment and training to Latin American’ military and ‘police forces to deal with riots and guerrilla actions, working | ‘through. the OAS to stimulate individual and collective "action on the. problen, and through. the- Alliance ‘for Progress helping our partners attack the basic discontent on which subversion feeds. 6. The activities of all U.S. agencies must continue to be vigorous: and be closely integrated into a single ‘program which, in turn, is appropriately related to the particular problems and programs of each country on the one | hand, and the OAS on the other. 7. Further deterioration of the prestige and “influ- ence of the present regime in Cuba, and its eventual replace- “ment by a government freely chosen by the Cuban people, will. contribute materially to reducing the threat but will not "eliminate it. To do this, we must all work continuously on many fronts, positive and negative, individually and together, until the strength ‘of our free democratic system a "_ unnistakably proven 1 to ‘all and the Alliance for Progress has” Soe achieved its goals. DocId: 32424094 Page 166