system told a Committee Staff memebr that this notation was the symbol for the CIA component known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum dated__, the CIA has adopted the following postion regarding debriefing Report No. 49. (Quote Barbara's memo.) The Committee has questonef A-1's case officers regarding additional information that A-1l may have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch, when interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did snot have contact with the Warren Commission and:does not know what information derived from A-l's de- briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also Interviews of Hildago & Piccolo) Healso stated that | | he does not recall that A-l provided any other information
- 8] - on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 as discussed herein. (Ibid. ) In a further effort to clarify the substance of information that A-l provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted to locate A-1. The CIA ‘has also attempted to locate A-1, whose employment with the Agency was terminated in 197_, but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts. The CIA's inability to locate A-1 has been a source of concern to this Committee particularly in light of his long association with the Agency. Thus, gaps do exist regarding information A-1 may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. However,with the exception of the Calderon episode and on the basis of the CIA's written record it appears that the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1l information of investigative significance. A separate question remains however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commision that A-l was present in the Washington, D.C. area and, under controlled
~ 82 - conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-I's | status was not disclosed prevented the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility of exercising this option. In light of the establishment of A-l's kona fides , his f° proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, this option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission. The AMLASH Operation During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an
- §3 - Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967 | pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). Asa result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid., pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks. (tbid. pp. 104-106) During 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against’ Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid. pp. 107-110). . In its examination of the AMLASH operation the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p. 80)