Date : 06/25/98 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION eleased under the John . Kennedy AGENCY : NSC lssassination Records RECORD NUMBER : 145-10001-10200 collection Act of 1992 RECORDS SERIES : (44 Sc 2107 Note). AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 206 ase#:NWU 54214 Date: wn re re ee eer HSLOS 2 GbR -- DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : FROM : THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS TO : THE SPECIAL GROUP TITLE : DATE : 08/13/63 PAGES : 7 SUBJECTS : SUPPORT OF AUTONOMOUS ANTI-CASTRO GROUPS DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/24/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION HW 542714 DBocld: 32977073 Page 1
HW 54714 ye Y - 18 Buu 1963 FROM THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS TO THE SPECIAL GROUP SUBJECT : Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups REFERENCE ; Memorandum for the Standing Group of The National Security Council, dated 8 June 1963, SUBJECT: Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba. 1. Submitted herewith for consideration and approval is a covert program for the support of an autonomous Cuban exile group. This program is an implementing measure of the previously approved course of action F in reference memorandum, which calls for support of autonomous anti-Castro groups as part of the integrated program of action towards Cuba. 2. It is proposed that non-attributable support in_ the form of funds, materiel and guidance be furnished to the action element of a Cuban exile group known as Comandos L which is an offshoot of the exile action gro originall known as Alpha 66. This support would only be furnished if a mutually acceptable modus vivendi can be agreed upon which does not conflict with current U.S.G. policy. Comandos L have been conducting fund drives and the money collected DoclIda: 32977073 Page 2?
appears to have been properly handled and applied to anti- Castro propaganda and action operations. The group's present primary action program calls for maritime operations, ¢€.8., attacking shipping in Cuban waters and making coumando-type attacks on targets in Cuba. To date they have conducted at least one such operation in Cuban waters; in this operation which took place in March 1963 the group fired on an unidentified ship (which turned out to be a Russian freighter) in the Cuba harbor of Caibarien. The group has been relatively inactive _ since the recent restrictions were placed on the movement of certain Cuban activists and their boats but recent reports ¥S\gnd may already have sent | |. several boats and some personnel to the base. There are also reports that several factions of the action element of Comandos L have had discussions with Luis Somoza of Nicaragua and are considering operation out of Nicaragua if Somoza will support then. | 3. The general lines of the proposed program would be as " follows: | A. OPS CONCEPT: —_— The conduct b Comandos L of a series of anti-Castro HW 542714 DBocld: 32977073 Page 3
HW 54714 maritime operations along the north coast of Cuba; particularly during the Light of the moon period when unilateral CIA maritime operations are not being con- ducted. These operations would provide valuable support to the CIA operat ions by wearing down Cuban coastal defenses and by preventing the establishment of any dis- cernible operational pattern. The successful execution of these operations wuld also make a significant con- tribution to the objectives of reference program in that such operations will stimulate internal resistance and weaken Castro/Communist efforts to consolidate the position of the regime. B. SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE: No more than two operations per month would be con- ducted with the targets being Cuban patrol vessels and/ or Cuban owned shipping in Cuban harbors a@ waters and coastal installations such as docks, warehouses and other such facilities. The selection of targets for proposed operations will be reviewed by the Cuban front (and thence covertly by CIA) for conformance with whatever policy framework may obtain at the time. Any deviations from approved proposals will be dealt with on an ex post facto basis in line with paragraph 3F below. DoclIda: 32977073 Page 4°
HW 54714 Once a Base is obtained, members of the Comandos L would depart legally from the United States to a Caribbean country where they would board fishing vessels, provided by the Cuban front, which would then t ake them to the Caribbean Operations Base, From the Operations Base, strike boats would be towed to close proximity off the North Coast where they would then be released to carry out their mission. After completing a mission, the strike boats would rendezvous with the fishing boats and then return to the operational base. Upon completion of an operation, appropriate relatively low-key publicity releases will be made outside the U.S. in consonance with guidance furnished covertly by the CIA. D. OPERATIONAL BASE: ——E EE A British Island, in the Bahamas or one of the Cayman Islands would serve as Caribbean Base for Comandos L. The Island would be leased by contacts of the Cuban front or Ilo the American cutout under a suitable cover story. We would not plan to inform the British of the activities of the group or of U.S. involvement. ===" gp, CIA SUPPORT: We estimate the initial capital investment of approxi- mately one hundred thousand dollars would have to be made Docld:32977073 Page 6
nen to provide, through appropriate cover, for the establish- ment of the Base camp, procurement of fishing and strike | boats, and other required materiel and services. It is estimated that operating costs would be « ebout $15,000 monthly based on approximately 20 men with two fishing and two strike boats. To the fullest extent possible, Comandos L personnel or the Cuban front will accomplish all their own procurement and other required activities. Any specialized equipment or guidance which must be pro- vided by the CIA will be non-attributable and accomplished by appropriate covert mechanisms. F. U.S. INFLUENCE: It is felt that an acceptable degree of U.S. Government influence can be exercised over the Comandos L action operations by having the Cuban front it clear that any actions not in accordance with the agreements (which CLA will stipulate through the American cutout), will not only result in all support being immediately terminated but in addition such actions would undoubtedly result in U.S. (/and/ "J 2 or..British | authorities a maximum effort to restrict future Comandos L activities. In addition, we believe that Comandos L leadership realizes that unless its operations are conducted within the geners framework of U.S. Policy a . HW 54714 Docld:32977073 Page 7
in terms of foreign bases, appropriate targets and acceptable publicity releases, they will not be able to operate effectively against Cuba. | 5. It is requested that approval be granted for the CIA to proceed with the implementation of the program as outlined above. HW 542714 Bocld: 32977073 Page &