. og ae (tod-10232-10079 % = . * * y w ‘ DISPATCH nect Te WARAED FCM LA Sey Chief of Station, IMWAVE,. RO NOL aI RELA EED NEO . ONLY QUALITD WEADQUARTERS Cet . Can HATA TRUS FRuA RN rasteecr Chief, WH Division “SIMZIP/Operational - Contact with Dr, MIRO Cardona BCTION RQUIRGD REFEHENCES For your information, transmitted herewith is a report of contact with Rubject written by Theodore F, PASSAVOY, and a memoof WH/4 comments. (END OF DISPATCH) Copy an Anew tLe 7 a DATE TYPtO " 19 Oct 6) CawalCee SYMBOL AND MUMDER UFGW-606 Attachment - 1 Vchoss 3 LFERENE FQ HEADQUARTERS FE NUMBER 19-124-25 ee mm ee me oe
14-00000 iG Cetodvor 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Meoting with Dr, MIRO Cardona on 6 Cetober 1, Dr, MIRG arrived sbout 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had sot at 30:60; avain ho waa driven by hia secretary whom ho introduced. As during the ({ret meeting, she remained outside in the car. Cur ““mesting lasted untl! 12:09 noon, 2 Firet, De, MIAO handed me a aote in longhand Hating the topics discussed with me on 5 Vctober, These points ara: a. Groups conductiag propayanda, ete. with Arency suppert abould receive thely support and be courdinated through the Council. b, A propaganda campaipn sahauld be waged by the Council aimed at: (1). Cuba, via a long wava radio statton in Key W eet, (2) Cubans fa Miami and other U, 3. areaa by: (a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas. ' (>) Contracting for time on radio atationa. (3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Cperacios Grieta, "' e, Underground ictivities. (1) Provision of ronthly funda te Council for procuring Cuban pesyva to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through rellable channels (auch as previously sent through|
TB-00000 CLL (2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to ine on 6 Cetober,. 3. Commando Plan Then Dr, MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by hie military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (inu) MONTEAGUDO, Me stated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners. With reepect to the pian for clandsstine operations ia Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for coramando action, past of them here, part in Cuba, He reiterated that a commando operation was easential to bolater morale arnung the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile ag well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime, He gaid that for this opera tion U.S. help would be neceasary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He propossd that if this plan was considered to have merit, that [arrango to have somacne meot with his military men to work out the detaile, Altor all preparations had been made and material provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair, (NOTE: Pian turned over to Thompacn at our os cting at 15:39 on 6 October for tranamiasion, } 4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Eacambray Dy.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro ingurgents in the Racainbray, but to date had heard nothing rolative ty the request. He commented wryly, “Tack but never hear an anaweor.'' He said that the fishtera there should be oupported, Dr. MIKO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and @ means for delivery of the arms, Cevaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Eecambray group. | COMMENT, Hae anything been done about thie request? 8. Iinforroation on Arms Received by Castro Repime Dr, MIRO handed me a long report which he said wae brought to him by the Argentine Av:bassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. af the time of Hresident FRONDIZI's visit.” He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, “You will know, '' * Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October, 2
( . ; 7 me aT i Dr. MIRO sald there waa no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc, received from tha Soviet bloe {and aly and Canada) but even if-the {iguros were exaggerated 100 por cont, they would atill ba impressive, , He added that Castro is daily boconiing stronger milltarily with weapone and with a large militia of close to 300, 060 being trained to use them while the econumy coutinues to deteriorate, Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is siseable, Fhus, he said, the langer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castre, the greater will be the task, ‘We muat act soon, vigorously and effectively, to ingure victory. Another defeat would be disagtroua and would make Cubans, Latin Americaue and others bolleve Castro to be Javincible, Thea would corae accommadationsa and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed rayiinas in the hemisphere. And the U. 5, would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and “guilt of interference," eon “in tha UN no nation would stand beside the u. 8, & Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soll concreteness Cement tag eae anna TE A A Dr, MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propacands, the sabota.e, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating etonomy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a Rove rnne at-lr exile for nuthing would c: me of it, that the only solution far defeating the . Gastro regime was fer the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and estab- lish & yovernment oa Cuban soll, aak recognition by all friendly countties and military aasistance of ita primipal ally, the U. 5., and that the u.8, be ready to intervene immediately with {ts Forcea, ‘This would all have to take place in a rautter of 48 huurs, otherwise it would fall. 1 recognise that this la a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There wlll be many riske, many may be killed. As for inyoelf, I don't care iC idie. Lhave lost all my personal posseselona and my Son ig a prisoner,’ He reiterated that all mast be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must preceed rapidly, Firet. a commands raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Cuantaname, and irame- diately the members of the Council 0 ashore, proclaiin a provisional government, broadcast by radic te all nations an appeal for recognition {and cablee prepared in advance wrald algo be aent aut), request U. 3, asaistance, andthe U. 3. should furnish ouch assistance at ones in ade~ quate atrength to ensure victory.
Before such an action fa undertaken, the enemy rust be aoftened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, aud the mags of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through-propayanda, increased kagwledge of the Council and ite unifying efforts. Cr, URS asked oe what thought of this project; did 1 think that Castro could be overthrown in any uther way. Jl admitted that strong military action appeared necesuary. I stated further that of course hia plan would have to be studied at the highest eovernment levela. He proposed that he nicht elaborate a plan with nie military collaborators, and I auy seested that he do thie so that it might be examined and considered. Dr. MIAO declared that he was convinced that thia Counrmuntat dagror in the gide of the Statea could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blarned for al! ant{-Castro propa; anda, sabotage, ste. and that enemy states will denwance It for intervention in Cuba, but that ifthe U. &. goes to the ald of a (riendly revolutionary regirae established in the country and helsa it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud, “LThave no personal political arnbitlons, declared LiIRO, "lL merely am trying to chair the Counell, whose clesion is to unify the anii-Castro alemente inside and outside of Cuba, If the team isn't cone sidored effective, then change the pitcher. Gut l believe the Council must eatablish itself on Cuban aull, and soon, Time is against us.""The untae del Fete agreeinent will backfire ayainat the U. 5. Uf Gastro is allowed to remain in Cuba. ina year, after tha politicos of the countries ree ceiving U, 3. sid have gotten their hands on U. &. gold, they will say, ‘fhanke te Castre, we got thie,' And they will epead it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the paople.” 7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers T queried Dr, MIRC ae to his viewe relative to tha judges and lawyers and their future statue, He said he hoved that they could all reunite and that they could be given uasiztance as in the past. He de- elared that Dr, ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was @olag nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRC and VARGNA. Dr. MIRO declared that ha, ag Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro geverurment, had named -LABAU to the
#4-00000 wad alle Supreme Court, but that now be considered 4LABAU unfit to hold any judicial position, 6. Members of the Revolutionary Council Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 Cetober. I asked what elements now composed it and what he pre- posed te add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo: Rescate 30 da Noviembre MRR Accion Democratica 20 de Mayo , AAA Independiente MDC Montecriati He said he had invited to join: MRP Unidad Revolucionaria and awalted their reply. He would alse like to have the Workers, Studenta, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, otc. } come into the Council. He bee lieves Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, bet that all other groups ghould ba brought together under the Council. He contends that all antl-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by mombers of the Council, but that the oxcepted activities should be known only to him (hIRO). ®, Probabie Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDU) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit), that VILLANUEVA, 8 Secretary of the Argentines Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night
. one (. a Brnale bie ‘ from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO . to go to Buenos Airea to arouse anti-Caatro sentiment of the poople, inasmuch ae aomeée Argentine action against Cuba appeared timminont. (FERNANDEZ said he had aleoady written MIRC© a letter.) MIRO oaya, “Of course, Teannot go. Ihave the Consejo meeting on the 10th, Furthermore, lam going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sceleded Interamoricana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutoe to addréss the mooting. ” 10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACE RDA {Brazilian who Precipitated QUADKOS' regiynation) on Cctober 15 Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (alter 1] and 12 Cctober SIP mecsting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil, MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark ef hie location. : I commented that | would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plane, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if ao, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark. hl. Propaganda Commission Tasked Dr, MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and atructura of tha Propaganda Commission. He atated that it te out- side the Consejo and net undor his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CAR RILLC had rosigned as head of Propaganda and that ho would like CONTE AGUERO te handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda, 2, MIERO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized aa tHead of a Provisional Guvernment Tasked Dr, MIRC if he believed that there were many anti- Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Lr, MIRO declared that the revolution ia a fact, and that practically nobody. wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would rosist any such possibility, He do- tte
14-00000 nounced PRIO's activities ayainst the Council and ita efforta to unify the anti-Castro elemants. He said that the veople should be given an opportunity to elect their chico! of state after Castro's overthrow and Feoatablishment of order in the island; 13, C¥fices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO eald, “The business phone is aleo In my house. [have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfforson 2-4680). So uae the other phone (JELfergon 4-2751) whan you wish to call me," " need to have a amall office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wile ¢rasy. I waat to find something modest $0 that no accusation can be made of ostentation = morely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meatings, of the Council, ete. The FRD had a place but at that piace also waa the pross, the refugee center, otc. It would not be satisfactory, The FRD le now practically dead, It was the forerunner of the Consejo ag the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance." . 14, MIRO'a Views on Coordinating the Activities af Cther Exile Groups After Dr, MIRO reiterated hia view that he should be the channel for funds and cocrdinating the activities of groupa outside the Consejo such as tho Students, FORD (Labor), ete., {said that I ander- atood that some of these slemeate were unwilling ty function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he considor that an Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate fram each of thease groups and under the chairmanchip of a member of the Consejo, Thia would serve to coordinate their activities, give ther a tHe-ia with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to R. Dr. MIRO replied that thia would merely eet up another Consejo outside of and parallel to tha existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not haviag enough background of these organisations to be able to ciecass the matter effectively. 15. Telophone Conversation with MIRO oa 7 October a Before my departure from Miarni for ashington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr, MIRO [rem the airport. He appreciated the call and aeked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yeaterday by ag?
14-00000 ware the ALABAU Lawyors' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chiaf justicos in exile) as "President of Cuba at War," He ex- pressed his indignation at this unilateral "political move by ALABAU and his adhereats among the exiled lawyers and judges. Ho added his beat wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October llth or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana do Prensa) meeting. I replied that [ would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, uf this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would ba known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied Hkewise te me. 16. Comment During these firet two meetings I endeavored to establish mysolf favorably with Dr, MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his apecifice proposals, lL listened, acked various questions, and he talxed at length. In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him apecific igsues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, aa may be required.