BIOGRAPHY BORIS DIMITRY TARASOFF Boris Dimitry Tarasoff was born on 2 November 1908 in Yekaterinoslaw,. Russia. He emigrated to the United States. He worked for the Central Intelligence Agency from circa 1955 to October 1970. He was stationed . in Mexico City from June 1963 to October 1970. Mr. Tarasoff's main task oo during this period ‘was translation/transcription of Russian language | . tapes. ‘He is currently retired and living at the Rancho Contento; Guadalajara, Mexico. ANNA TARASOFF | Anna Tarasoff was born on 5 May 1923. ‘She is the wife of Boris © : | Dimitry Tarasoff. She worked as a part time CIA contract officer. She | _ assisted her husband in the translation/transcription of the Russian language tapes. HW 55923 Docld:32277225 Page 7
Cc HW 55923, GOAL #1. To determine the Tarasoffs knowledge of, and participation in, the Central Intelligence Agency's surveillance activities in Mexico ‘City in 1963. Docld: 32277225 a) ») c) d) e) d) e) f) ) h) background. . assignments. awareness of surveillance operations. duties. (translation/transcription). procedures... ‘other duties. personnel involved. files. nature of transcripts. nature of assistance in duties if any. Page 6
HW 55923 FACTUAL BACKGROUND. Boris and’ Anna Tarasoff were stationed in Mexico City in 1963. They were the Russian translators used to translate and transcribe the Russian language portions of surveillance tapes. Hence, they have actual knowledge of a portion of that operation. In an interview with members of this staff the Tarasoffs said that the tapes and Spanish language transcripts would be delivered to them on the morning of ‘one day by a person who worked on this_ operation. The next "day the Tarasoffs would return the tape, Spanish transcript and the completed translation/transcript of the Russian language portions. The Tarasoffs said. that they made an original copy and two carbons of every transcription. The original and one copy was retained by the Tarasoffs. One carbon was. turned over to their contact. Mr. Tarasoff also said that he was responsible for trying to identify, | by their voices, the Soviet Embassy personnel involved in conversations which he transcribed. The Tarasoffs, by the nature of their involvement in the operation, should have some knowledge of some of the other individuals involved in this oper- ation. | | | The Tarasoffs said that the transcripts they prepared were literal _ transcriptions as opposed to summaries. They said that. they made no ‘marginal comments on the body of the transcripts. Mr. Tarasoff was assisted in translating and transcribing the tapes by | his wife, Anna Tarasoff. ‘Docld:32277225 Page 9
“GOAL #2. To determine the nature and circumstances of the monitoring of Lee Harvey Oswald by CIA surveillance in Mexico City in 1963 and the nature of the Tarasoffs' involvement in that monitoring. a) the first conversation. b) the second conversation. ¢) nature of circumstances surrounding the delivery and trans- cription of the conversations. _ d) any subsequent conversations transcribed. e) exhibits. HW 55923 DBocld: 32277225 Page 10
C | GOAL #3. To determine if the Tarasoffs ever did voice comparisons in an attempt to identify Lee Harvey Oswald's voice or the voices of the people with whom he spoke. HW 55923 DoclId: 32277225 Page 11
23 February 1978 Highlights from Tarasoff interview by Booten and Blackmore. Full Name: Boris Dimitry Tarasoff. DOB: 11/2/08 POB: Yekaterinoslaw, Russia. Present Address: Ranch Contento, Guadalajara, Mexico. Sent to Mexico on 5 June 1963. | P. 6. Worked as a translator/transcriber outside Embassy at 312 San Puerta Ave. Robert Zambanardi at times delivered tapes to him. (7) Also remembers another man who delivered tapes Rudy (LNU) possibly Bruno. (7) William Bright also delivered tapes to him (9) Charles Flick supervised the intercept operation (12) also repaired tape recorders, got new ones etc. (12) .17+ transcription operation description: “got tapes with Spanish transcripts. This transcript would indicate where the Russian language parts were, Tarasoff would run the tape to that point and would then translate and..transcribe simultaneously. Ann assisted Boris with conversations. that were partially in English. P 19+ Oswald tape: ¢ Remembers that a major portion of his.conversation (9/28) was in English and his wife worked on it. . 4 was rather short. remembers that all he was doing on this conversation was trying to make contacts to get into the Russian Embassy. Did not ID himself in this conversation. Second conversation: Note came with the tape giving conversation reference and asking them to ID the caller. Instruction was that if this was done they were to contact .immediately “ their CIA contact and deliver the transcript to him. "this was top priority" "It was very important to them" This conversation was long, two pages. | It was delivered with the usual batch of tapes but this one was singled out and given priority. This conversation was also largely in English. LHO IDed himself in this one. They notified contact and it was immediately picked up. We aaa oinie kad eby mehr Ss Tid ry bec definitely remember that he was seeking financial aid from the Cubans and Russians. to get to Cuba/Russia. Does’ not remember him offering information. He did tell them he was broke. Do not remember him asking anything about a visa. Typed on Government Bond with two copies. (33) P. 38 Tarasoff contacted his "emergency" contact to turn over the 2nd LHO transcript. He declined to give this contact's name. this was done on the same day as he recieved the tape. HW 55923 DBocld: 32277225 Page a2
HW 55923 Page Two _ They would be able to recognize the original transcript if they saw it. (40) hey transcribed tapes verbatim, adding nothing and leaving nothing out. P.43 T.never saw the transcript again or heard the tape. Tarasoff was never recontacted about the Oswald tapes and transcripts. Anna..Tarasoff: DOB 5/5/23 "I filed according to the date of the reel and the reel itself had a number and then following that each conversation had a number and. I that would be the original copy that I would file as it is in whole. Then the carbon copy would be also kept in its original state and the second one I would sort. of scan it over and just delete what was not pertinent like it was a conversation with somebody saying, well tomorrow I'm going downtown....But it it had to deal with two poeple and especially if there names were mentioned, this was cut out and it was pasted on'a piece of paper.and it was turned over to our contact." normal procedure was to turn over previous batch of transcripts when new batch of tapes were delivered the next morning. (54-55) 71 Dan VOGEL picked up the equipment and files from the Tarasoff's when they retired. Doclda: 323277225 Page 13
}. MEMORANDUM 12-5-76 TO: Richard A. Sprague FROM: Kenneth E. Brooten, dr. IN RE: Mexico 1. I Initially met with William Calderhead, Deputy Chief of Mission U. S. Embassy, Mexico City and advised him of the following: a) I had received information from the Committee Staff indicating that someone had contacted them advising that the Cuban Embassy personnel in Mexico City would be willing to meet with us and provide us with the information which they had on Lee Harvey Oswald. b) I had not been advised of the source of the information by the Committee Staff and I did not know the reliability of the source. c) I had discussed the matter with you for "instructions" and had been advised by you that I should take the matter up with the Ambassador. Mr. Calderhead suggested that we make a formal contact through the Department of State and have them go through the Swiss, since the Swiss represent the interest of the U. S. Government in Havana. 2. I met with Ambassador Jova at his residence on December 2, 1976, and advised him of the foregoing. I also advised that while the Committee would be most interested in obtaining any information we could from the Cubans we were very much aware of the complications which could arise should the information prove to be erroneous. I further advised the Ambassador that we did not want to do anything which could cause embarrassment to the U. S. Government or the Congress and that we wanted to proceed with his consent and advice. The Ambassador advised: a) The official U. S. position is that there are to be no official : contacts with the Government of Cuba. b) He knows the Ambassador from Cuba on a social basis and could make a discrete approach and inquiry. c) . He would have to get "instructions" from Washington to make an approach and inquiry from the Cuban Ambassador. d) He very much appreciated our consulting with him since it was a very delicate matter. . ‘I suggested that possibly the C.I.A. could have some source either direct or indirect which could verify whether or not the Cubans wanted to meet with us. Docld: 32277225 Page 14
“MEMORANDUM 12-5-76 | Page 2 | ; ; ® ee JEK Act 6 (1) (B) ted that he had-not discussed our visit with but-with my consent would do so. He offered to have come to his residence or have us meet him at his residence. 3. I met with Thomas Polgar| ss SSS—S—~—~S=s an advised him of the situation and requested his assistance and judgement. He ° advised: a) That some of his people had informal contacts with the Cubans and could make an inquiry to see if a"responsible official” a - of the Cuban Embassy would meet with us. To do so he would have to get "instructions" from C.I.A. Headquarters - but at my request he would proceed to do so. b) He said that the Cubans would probably have to go to Havana for "instructions" before they would reply. He further stated that most of the information would probably be in Havana. Cc) I asked if he had any other method of determining the validity of the information and he said that he was not prepared to confirm whether there were wiretaps at this time. Later in the conversation he said as a result of the story - a copy of which is attached that the Cubans had been saying less on the r ; phone. d) We agreed to meet with the Ambassador the next day to discuss how to proceed. 4, On Friday, Décember 3, 1976, I again met with the Ambassador and Mr. Polgar. Mr. Polgar had not yet received a reply to his request for "instructions," from C.I.A. Headquarters and again advised that the Cubans would most likely go to Havana for "instructions" before «replying. , Ambassador Jova said he would seek instructions from State on making an informal social contact with the Cuban Ambassador but suggested that that would take time. He said the most proper method would be to go through the Swiss and State here in Washington. I advised that while we certainly wanted to obtain the information that we wanted to use the most conservative approach so as not to create an incident. The Ambassador again expressed his appreciation for our sensitivity to a "delicate situation." 5. ACTION TO BE TAKEN: \ a) Contact C.I.A. Headquarters to follow up on Polgar's request for "instructions." @ b) Contact the Department of State and request that they go through the Swiss with a formal contact to the Cubans in Havana and follow , up on Ambassador Jova's request for instructions. HW 55923 DBocld:32277225 Page 15
MEMORANDUM 12-5-76 Page 3 Cc) Both of these follow up actions should, in my judgement, be initiated immediately. d) If we can confirm the contact with the Cubans it will be necessary for me to return to Mexico City, and I would purpose to do so as soon as we receive a confirmation. 6. Jonothan Blackmer accompanied me to each of the meetings .:2 its: HW 55923 DBocld:32277225 Page 16
HW 55923 ‘Committee on Assassinations -have been sent to. Mexico to _ verify a report that, the. CIA,; - for: unexplained “reasons,:; retired CIA officer who was | Soviet Union. ' Lee Harvey Oswald fromthe: the time, also has recalled < It was r rot clear what ete ‘ cording “to - Associated.‘Préss* offer. ; reports from ‘Washington~.. re ET : “spokesmen; | : _ investigators. : will : interview _ who reportedly heard Oswal . offer a deal to Soviet officials « in Mexico City less than: two. -months- before: ‘the. . John F, Kennedy.’ “STREET STAND PRICES (IN PESOS) Day: Sunder: : ~ Mexico City, Cuernavaca, San Miguel, Puebla ooo... cece . ays | | Guadalajara, ‘Chapala ¢ - : Baas ea ecto sees ences Sac ee eee THE NEWS. Mexico City a _ Wednesday. December-t, 1976. rcaaiiendiaaicnikacaiemriadts and: Soviet embassies were not. “identified ally: nd. “transcribed by. the” two” >» recalled. ‘that. Oswald. offered =. gency employes. . os unspecified*: ‘information: in » David "A. Phillips, a now=” Inv estigators: ‘for: the House return for: a-free: trip to the withheld information. about stationed. in Mexico. City at. . Warren . Commission, ac--. Oswald . making - “such an this “version” of .. Oswald's. a - ‘conversation would have had | Phillips. and. the “ig on, the Warren ‘Commission, rmer agency. emploves, avho AP. said or ‘Quoting - committee *, “AP? isaid: “the.” two retired agency. employes * assassination. OF ; President | . The. Washington. Post ‘nas : reported that Oswald’ s.voice | was . picked. up. through ; ; electronic surveillance of the j Docld:32277225 Page i7T
HW 55923 MEMORANDUM DATE: December 5, 1976 TO: Richard Sprague FROM: Jon Blackmer SUBJECT: Specific Inquiry into the Identity of the Person with whome Oswald spoke in the Two Phone Calls Intercepted by the CIA in Mexico City and Transcribed by Mr. and Mrs. Tarasoff. On November 30, in Guadalajara, Mexico, Ken thought it best that I ask some specific questions of the Tarasoff's as to the identify of the person or persons Oswald may have spoken with during the two telephone conversations that were intercepted by the CIA and trans- cribed by the Tarasoffs. I thought I should inquire of the Tarasoffs about their knowledge of the voices of the various employees of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and the identity of the various KGB men, including the dispute over the "Kostin" identify appearing in the letter Oswald wrote to the Soviet Embassy in Washington on November 8, 1963. The following is a brief report on the substance of that interrogation. After three sessions with the Tarasoffs prior to the taping of the session for transcription, we learned that Mr. Tarasoff had been assigned to the Mexico City Docld: 322777225 Page 18
desk for the express purpose of translating and transcribing conversations in the Russian language going into and out of the Soviet Embassy by telephone. In the course of their employment, the Tarasoffs became familiar with the voices of the Russians and could instantly identify the names of many of the Russians within the embassy when their voices were heard. Mr. Tarasoff even went’ so far as to put together his own scrapbook with pictures and newspaper clippings of his "Russians" so that he could become as familiar as possible with their identity and background, deemed essential by Mr. Tarasoff to under- stand the content of the conversation by the voice inflection. That is to’ say, knowledge of the region these various Russians came from would aid greatly in identifying the context of the conversations when various idioms and colloquialisms were used. In short, Mr. and Mrs: Tarasoff did their jobs well and in many cases were innovators —— always toward the goal of proficiency. Mr. Tarasoff came up with the idea of voice sample tapes to be indexed by identity for use whenever the need might arise to compare voices or a dispute as to identity of voices. But all voices whether identified or not were indexed. Mr. Tarasoff brought this up with Herb Mannell and was given permission to make these identity tapes. HW 55923 DBocld: 32277225 Page 19
HW 55923 Mr. Tarasoff knew the voices of Yatskov, Kostikov, Kanstantinov among others. He did not, however, know of any of these men's proficiency in English, but felt that only Kostikov and Kanstantinov could handle English well enough to speak it in a cursory fashion. Based on this they formed the opinion that Kanstantinov was more than likely the person to which Oswald spoke, unless there was another individual not known to the Tarasoffs, with whom Oswald may have spoken. It is of interest to note that while the Russians almost exclusively spoke Russian with each other and many Embassy employees spoke . Spanish, very few, Boris believes probably only Kostikov and Kanstantinov spoke English well enough to get by. Additionally, because of this fact, Boris was not as~ proficient at identifying his Russians when they spoke English since the voice sounds entirely different, almost mechanical when the Russians were speaking English.: They do not believe Oswald spoke with Yatskov or Kostikov on the occasion of the two telephone calls transcribed by the Tarasoffs. One thing is certain, Mr. Tarasoff was the expert on the station in Mexico City when Oswald called the Soviet Embassy from the Cuban mbassy. Mr. Tarasoff succeeded George Misko who waS in Mexico City in the same function as Mr. Tarasoff, -Mr...Tarasoff.was.nevér asked/who Oswald Docld: 322377225 Page 270
HW 55923 spoke with, never identified. the person with whom Oswald spoke, nor ever was asked anything about the incident. Mr. Tarasoff had on other occasions been asked to identify voices, and has had tapes returned to him on other occasions for..that .purpose-«.... Both ‘the -Tarasoffs feel the information contained in the October 16, 1963 memo was not the complete and relevant as to the substance of the telephone conversations. that the Tarasoff's transcribed. Thus we are faced with the issue of why when Boris was the expert, heard the tape pursuant to his function, was the best person qualified to identify the Russians _ by their voices, why was he never consulted by anyone before ‘or after the assassination as to the substance of the phone calls and the person with whom Oswald spoke. Yet the Warren Commission Report states that Oswald contacted Kostikov or Yatskov and based on this other information (presumably from Duran) and in answer to the questions posed by Oswald's letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington in which Oswald mentions having contacted Kostin. The Tarasoffs do not feel Kostin is the short form of Kanstantinov or Kostikov.nor do they know a Kostin. Boris knew Kostikov and Kanstantinov and Yatskov were KGB and knew the voices of Yatscov and Kostikov and Kanstantinov. When the Docld: 322777225 Page ?1
first call came in Boris was notified that the station was extremely interested in the identity of the caller. That when the second call came, the tape was rushed to Boris and when Oswald: was identified the contact (probably Bright) seemed extremely interested and excited. Tarasoff typed transcripts verbatim, since at one point, unlike Misko, his predecessor, Tarasoff made a summary of a meaningless conversation and made his own comments to that - effect, and was jumbed on by Bill Bright for so doing. Tarasoff did not make comments on transcripts except for using M.I. for man inside and M.O. for man outside ‘when @ they were readily identifiable. Boris feels that if at the time had he been asked about the Oswald calls, he would have been able to supply much more information, but 14 years has dimmed his memory and no one, not even Bright, his contact, discussed the subject with him. In a separate interview with Mr. Tarasoff on November 30, 1976, I learned that the photographic expert on station in Mexico City in 1963 September to November was Bob Zambernardi. Zambernardi's UFK-Act 6 (1) (B) “Zambernardi was probably the man in HW 55923 Docld: 32277225 Page 22
charge of photographing the activities of both the Cuban and Soviet embassies in 1963. Having a copy of Coup d'etat in America with me. I thought I would ask the Tarasoffs if they could identify any of the photographs in the book. Specifically, photographs of the bums arrested in Dallas on the day of the assassination. Three photographs of Howard Hunt, two photographs of Frank Sturgis. I asked whether the Tarasoffs knew any of these men either professionally or socially. The Tarasoffs were unable to identify any @ of the photographs, nor could they recall seeing any of the individuals in Mexico City or anywhere else. However, I got the feeling that Boris indicated a faint glimmer of recognition when I showed him the picture of Eugene Edgar Bradley which appears:.on page 222 of the text. TI don't know whether Boris knew this man and as he stated he did not and as his credibility,’ in my opinion, is very high, I think the man probably resembles someone Boris might have known. They could not recall having known Howard Hunt in Mexico City nor having seen him. These photographs came from pages 208 through 223 of the above book. We also went over photographs of the mysterious man © leaving the Soviet Embassy. The Tarasoffs had their own copies of these photos supplied by Ron Kessler. While the Tarassofs thought ‘they were all of the same man on HW 55923 DBocld: 32277225 Page 23
HW 55923 two different occasions, they could not positively identify them. Mr Tarasoff felt the man was Russian, and that he was wearing clothing one would wear on a fishing trip. Mr. Tarasoff noted the Russians were crazy about fishing. He felt the first photograph was blocked: in such a way as to make the man appear much heavier than he really was, but in comparing all the photographs with his personal file of photos and newspaper clips, he could not match them. The first photograph we were referring to is the one that just shows the head and shoulders of a man in a dark sweater. He did however feel that one photo looked a lot like Alfredeyev, Soviet KGB, but felt the mystery man was much heavier. I have no photo of Alfredeyev, but he looks a little like the french film star Yves Montand. I would recommend following this lead by first interviewing Charles Flick, then George Misko, then Bill Bright, then Robert Zambernardi, then’ Clark Anderson, then Herb Mannell, and then possibly,Sylvia Duran to | pick up the thread. Docld: 32277225 Page 24
HW 55923 MEMORANDUM TO: FROM: IN RE: Richard A. Sprague Kenneth E. Brooten, dr. Mexico City Trip -- Brooten-& Blackmer 11-28-76: to 12-4-76 We initially had reservations to depart on an American Airlines Flight at 7:15 a.m. on Sunday, November 28, 1976. Jonathan had - called American to confirm the fact that we only had to show our official passports to get a tourist visa for Mexico. We arrived at the airport at 6:30 a.m. and were advised that they could not issue Mexican Tourist Cards on Official Passports. I called the operations desk at the Department of State who said the Official Passport was proof of American Citizenship and that should be sufficient. American. Airlines employees would not accept that so rather than create a confrontation as to who we were we took a later flight and traveled on our personal passports. Upon our arrival in Mexico City werwere met by William J. Roche, the Chief of Security for the Embassy. The Embassy had reserved rooms for us. On Monday, November 29, 1976, Mr. Roche made airline reservations for us to Guadajalara -- it is a 1 hour flight and approximately 355 miles from Mexico City. He arranged to have us met by Mathias Ortwein the Consul General. Mr. Ortwein made arrangements for our hotel and offered us the use of his personal vehicle. We made initial contact with Boris Tarasoff at approximately 3:30 p.m. His wife was not at home and had been in Guadajalara for 5 or 6 days at their daughters taking care of her sick children. Our interview with Mr. Tarasoff lasted until approximately 9:00 p.m. when we went to Guadajalara to meet with his wife. We interviewed her until approximately 11:00 p.m. Following our telephone conversation on Tuesday, November 30, we taped the formal interview which is transcribed. Jonathan is preparing a separate Memorandum on the specific areas of inquiry which I asked him to make. We returned to Mexico City on Thursday, December 2, 1976, and took up the matters at the Embassy which are the subject of my separate Memoranda. We returned to Washington on ‘Saturday, December 4, “1976. Docld: 32277225 Page 25