, Siete aby sn SA aa ada ea Gt mine a batalla taNn Sigeebebadeet fi [04-10210-10020 eget os TOP SECRET 1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB 4 Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review. , 3 : ; 4 ‘ 2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto. ‘ 3 3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A ; and Attachment when your review has been completed. Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278 . I i o ft a AI : : Ry 5 H 281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and 4 357 WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340 be by . TOP SECRET te ere nent ca PRLS ATES NION LY ge EE «ee MET E yam PF REEL ALE “RC ORME OROBS RICE Reef ITE TR LE MERAH NO IN RESERPINE FP zs ona os eR sate ati he te Me Ton betnaret ant oe oe
< isin 28 ine eee sella toes nine Rear ealatacsnaee asi aE ieee ed pe se REE oP aati ae = 4 . . , . _ o So ce ‘Top Secret | CONTENTS . j PACE ’ WIITL SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964) ~ } : (Cont.) . . = i Deputy Chief of Seventh Department b (Jyly 1962-January 1964) 291 : KGB Operations 292 : 5 Recruitment of 292 ; ae : Investigation SF -SLTESINCER” 293 ; ; vi i Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN 295 3 A : GRU Agent SHUBIN 296 (4 : Arrest of BAKGHOORN : 298 “ (wd Investigation of OSWALD 303 4 ey Residence in USSR ‘ 303 : Request to Return to USSR. 3605 . ; Post-Assassination Review of KGB File 307 am ‘ y The CHEREPANOV Papers 309 i 3 Contents . io" 314 4 : NOSENKO's Travel Document 318. ‘ : Return to Geneva (January~February 1964) 316 3 : Purpose of Trip 31? 4 : Visits to KGB Legal Residency 315 ‘ Availability for Meetings with CIA 318 4 . NOSENKO's Written Notes 319 i 4 3 NOSENKO's Defection 320 i? 2 The Recall Telegram 324 3 é Knowledge of Other Seventh Department I" si ue Operations 325 4 Operational Activities (July 1962- ‘i : January 1964) 326 ; a KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among . i ro § American Tourists. 326 , - FS Information Furnished the KGB by - . +f a George BLAKE 327 ; ” KGB Study of American Intelligence ee Tourist Operations 327 1 NOSENKO‘'s Information 330 " Summary 331 : Summary and Conclueion 331 E- Y : x ete. G & we . so 7 ve - — . ; ia vi) AT A AS ap REE A A - ee ws ' ow nt
ae ae fod ESTES TR (ATM EN pI NA ie ATIC PAPA SVE PRINS OR RH EES HOE HEE LI seer i A A Lon 4 ere eo Top Secret : : ‘ CONTENTS . : IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE 335 65. : : . : Relationship with General GRIBANOV ; ' 335 ; ob. ne Pee otaee Communist Party Status 338 ‘ . 3 Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 342 ’ i Awards and Decorations 345 - Sourcing . 349 ae em mee Ranks 350 . . X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMEN “355 ; KI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 357 ‘ Annex A ~ Statements of Soviet Officials About i 4 NOSENKG 361 4 Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text 399 “ ‘ + etal, i Index of Personalities : 437 aoe & et nye Erde alg ABA Tt EO aubige sas AoC Ati EE EY i t fo ed y (vit) TS No. 197124 . . ; i a . 4 Co WO wm oe ..: Top Secre? PY eG : aie ae — a aE a AS ARE PL oe RSS RPT eet BED MRNAS Sw A ASANO Fomine “hoy
some ane wt cca: Spassioren, Rennie sean, As AAR Oe RUE ALG Sh RAANA TNO VEEL PRO AUTOR VA he CN NG AORN R ED SLi rod bY ad yahtaues ao ~ Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS GF ROSENKO'S CLAIMS) Soviet Officials’ Statenents About NOSENKO The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet cffietale' statements abuut hin since his defection coin- cides markedly with NOSLNRO's seti-description. According to the comments cf Soviet officials, principally intelli- gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased sfinister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his persunal shortconings were overcome througn the patronage of KG3 General GRIBANOV, and in connection wita vuperations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the dargest department in the xey Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage “for years to came" to tne KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treacaerv prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the cecall of many others from abroad, tne virtual suspension of KCB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him. These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A. oy Copy Se secteeemeeen amt tartare I, Mette DN "TS No. 197124, > NETS he emt Arta YT A thn akg ether se COON a ER IONE Taos saingatsemalin alte! TTA AR ce atm Beene whe ; ; st i a 4 ped Bebe Sete tes” RO ear starreen sR ger e ~ cremeenergre rimerinnete presse! te Ay ot Staten peyote = Se AR AER
Top Secret a ; ee : a - | \PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY) _ _ a Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. + In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow ° Special Naval School required prior completion of the : 4 Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he ' - 4 and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he . i t completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned ; to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the ; Moscow Speciai Naval School (then in Euybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall os. 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku). i H i oe | 4 i‘ : After just six months in Baku, without completing the : : “ Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returred to Moscow. a ve eet us Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran i away and fought on the front at Tuaose, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku l : and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the i { i Ste Craton om wg tht ay % we BT ee! Frunze Higher Naval School, tne equivalent of Annapolis. He.has retracted both assertions. Cee SoC aes Shed oe NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval , - Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku,.he ; , resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO , a received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school. Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidently shoot him- a sensitive source s@ : : ar : the effect that NOSENKO shot nimself to avoid’ being sent to the front while attending: a naval college in 1942. H t £ i ¥ eo. i: & g : i r g 3 i 3 g a bd ¥ F = a = e 7 a z ; _ Tov Se Secret 7 _ 7 vate ss A fy te o ee ee. Ae ERS cS Lea adhtios RubbosFbad ahaa ES oly A do Uae ee ms are,
Eka fi Ct emit ioe et eee ae nay POLL NDS eh RENN AN ay ORRT TAD WN Nee Tep Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY) Comment: (Continued) After NCSENKO's defection was publicized, Sovjet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volurteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval scnool in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946. NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Srip- building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Mcscow Institute of International Relations that summer. Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where- abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time cf his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended. Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO‘'s Claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life uatii 1945 are accepted as true. : : ee ¥) 7 Top Secret (4° vemeneernts0 Sinai spot} ee ree SmaI eg i : Pag EEE Ree ne IEDR ONE RIE EER A LON Crventet cet cemnmnreenty St a ately 1. TS No..197124. Copy iN and & fed, Satan dlinr hae Tach Sans 2 ek
ie ae cree meine oe 8 ere TN ET BEN B0 abt atl ee emcunee SOU State Te a tue Re Deres ae . “Top Secret (PRE-4GB BIGGRAPHY) A NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute : course was of four years’ duration and that he entered the ‘ Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years duration and thas Lecause he failed a state examination he WAS graduated raters in 1950; that it was of five years! Guration and he gvaduated In 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years! duration but “he failed an cxamination which delayed his graduation for three months. Comment: See p. 307 £or report that NOSENKO joined the KG" pon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSLUFO's completion are material to i “2 the plausibility of his claimed Naval PU service, : a which ne said followed almost immediately upon | 3 his departure from the Institute. " ° } 3 Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953) | - NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far Fast and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully “transferring” to the KGB through the intervention of nis father's friend, KGB General KOBULOY,. A sensitive source Bis the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According tog@ mom, NOSENKO attended ™his the Military-Diplomatic Academy and tnen served in the RU source Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGR through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Recorts) : Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments. - + ’ - TS No. 197124 $: ne r
3 : i 3 4 i 4 4 4 i 7] ... Top Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY) A sensitive source two - : fee has cuoted /KG3 officers at respectively, as stating NOSENHD joined the- KGB in “1947 or 1449. e = The significance of NOSENKO’s RU service is the fact chat be claims it launched his tntelligence.career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the HGR after once having been rejecred. The two or more years he claimed to have servec in the RU represent a significant :period of his adult .tife. for which he should have ro difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KG3 service can Le judged credible NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings th CIA in 1962. After his 19€4 defection, it was the terpics on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. Ife subject of his Naval RU Service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. Nowever, throughout these interrcgations, challenges of nis assertions abecut his RU service prompted - adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of enzry into the KGB, just as challenges” on those latter tepics prompted amended: state- ments with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and centradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966. NOSENKO'S Infermation-19 NOSENKO. finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and imrediately reporte? for duty with the RU. {He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In SeptemLer 1950 he was offered 2ssignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, anzt he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's ~ . position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan*® (on the Soviet coast opposite tees Sakhalin), where he collected Grder of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in 56 o Top. Secret .. ck eeaeeneremmer tear rata EA an Dh 3 Ms Ae Penis oA RBM g Vettel a |g TS No. 197124 aren Abe wissen ttars we madatee way ahd Bats Sods « Miyt Zante west Hatt anne B
14-00000 : : | . | Top Secret ot esy ee ge i otent < iat ties’ 4 - aon ie G¢ .Y | - (SEVENTE DEPARTMENT - January 1262-January 1964} ” | i , ma, F : ‘3 FRIEPEL was a.veax ageniz “he wus afraid and gave practi- : "cally nacthing." “OEh.nO said that alf‘éagh he had recruited : ; Dim, "nenestly speahii.sc, FRIPPEL was not an agent." ‘The KGE : nevertheless hoped tha. FRIFPEL would be reassigned to Mos-- 3 - cow at some future cate. (See p.137 for details of the : Re - PRIEPEL case.) - { ‘a : i 3 - i i Comment: FRI one Bp a $ with NOSENKO tha t they met twic in tre JSSE in 1963. SNSowever, FRIDPEL asserts ' : a an oaess ain February 1962. i lw denie FRIPPEL is known : travel to the Soviet Union . tnere igs no apparent reason 2 zalse cReeoe en this matter. Sy, FRIE whe is now v a current | vtarget of the Soviet intelligence service, De , po te cea Bade @ Sensitive source \ a ae | ep i Jchannes PREISFREU! joo pss ; The KGB ccnsidered PREISFREUND corpromised to American | { : Intelligence after GOLITSYx's defection {in December 1961] and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em bassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISPREUND with nim when he transferred to the Seventh De- partment. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but ¢id not-use him in any operations. th te 4 . Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he | was no lorger a KGS agent after the STOPSBERG operation (see p.175) Loan eeaeeuae ., . aNd that aithough he saw NOSENKO on his frequent - a eae 1 return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSEUKG sought a cozrpanion for wenching and : - drinking. TS No. ian whe Copy
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) who was ferroneousiy) considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV “mavbe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1 but KOSENMKO did not know the substance of it. A counte intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.i. GOLUBEV, hid once been on a cGelegation vith. SHAKEOV and he had noted “little cena ls". While SHAKHOY was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated fas an agent] by KGB officers who hal submitted a report stating that SHANHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. in that KGB report he was depicted as "not gocd” and ‘not wanting to work as an agent’. AR L, G “ ia NOSENKO stated chat SHAKHNOV had served with the Ministry ef Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAZHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected cf being an American agent, because he belonaed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and “the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad'. “There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAMHCY was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB cfficer. Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United : States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at- tended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had at- tended a number of sessions cf the UN General AssemLiy. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Missicn to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV 1:¢en- tified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, ae @ identified him as “an emplovee of the KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKEOV's face “was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a “pure diplomat” and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity. until that time. TS No. 197124 10. Or nn nn greeter ang nara
14-00000 PONY dS eee vee ae Mottin seas ertmnazes 5. te st mg Sc aos a Ate Se pee a Sawaal A Sheba “{SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) . “utnebonarmmeece rn ons oer renme Top Secret NOSENKO described the varicus ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOVY in Geneva. He guve SHAKUOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks. during a meeting by WNOSLNKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKG revealed to SHAKHOY the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially crepared materials empiaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's ecnclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspacion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he re- : turned to KG3 Headquarters fron Geneva. tl 1 4 } bite adllatate wade Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHC7 is still j “under suspicion"; according to @geze SP a sensitive source, ‘ 3 Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94- man Soviet dclegation to the Disarmament. Conference and as. such he was responsible for the security ard behavior of the entire delegation. [kGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and H.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.) To assist him in carrying out his security funeticns, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENNO has never re- ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him. ] NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his cays and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he . ve pe apcrent? pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs . officer, and ne could absent himself from conference meetings - Sob? at any time. . : ce - | 278 oa coe 7 baa Te eS TS No. 197124 “Top Secret © = Cony stasis Ste fort Sgnicsewt™ eri nee shee anmirewe Saale
tieas Teo Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962@-January 1964} Yu.i. GUK ms an . * 3 implying that their friendship was..of long standin, i NOSESZO related in 1662 that he and GUK were together nearly . every day in Geneva,-where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consegtence, NOSENKO was granted acress tc the residency and was able to elicit information arcut sore of GUK‘s operations in Geneva. He described his “bic. big friend" GUK as the Uepucy Legal Revident in Geneva and the af ite only “strong officer" in the residency. ‘ r Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access , -to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to a CUR. According to several sources (sea Annex A’. os o ca because of his friendsnip with NOSENEC, GU was . a Gismisscd frea the KG3. } M.S. TSYMBAL i at : , Ri In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and 3 identified hin as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the 4 KGB First Chicf Directorate. He alluded to having ssoken with him, but placed no particular. emphasis on their reiationspis. In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for. some candidates for recruitment and came across some whos? back- ground would have made them suitable for the Special [Lllegaisi Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head- quarters and ISYMBAL had asked him several times te transfer to the First Chief birectorate and suggested that he might be 5 assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL hadi . ‘ dinner together several times a week, sometines accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964. , ‘ Fy ea ee sgh te V j on vee Bote Teg h Oe ek Lee ge me a ey ta eye vem Boe TE a Ta Bene ce ppt sat nnd alae e TS No, 197124
a , Meare rR a east tt EN EIT LY ETE A INN MST GS IETS BEANE BPs ote Oa he tan 8 care Ten o : Re EAS a recat LIDS Ke Ri AR, aw te: i agg 2% eae Ce oh ser hejonsinincane Pada teat te *e tip ose caetahciael Heh Baran cnt ‘ . Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964) NOSENKO’s Information SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number cf Soviets who visited has store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union. several times. Learning SLESINGER planned ‘another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that “he might make some contacts or do something interesting” while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to solve its suspicions’ that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, md a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. 4M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo- graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to beccme friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa-to visit relatives, and DVORKXIN. directed: the Odessa KGB to “surround” him with agents. who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication. of intelligence activities, the KG2 would have attempted. to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times. A sensitive source See Shad reported to the FBI that the KC3 suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI “plant” and that KGB officer = 9 "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity.® NOSENKO's information was substantially Comment: cee o. + 1. @OKrxect. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, ', xeported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Cdessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited “intimate |. / knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had “ever been bothered by the FBI." 294) ‘TS. No. 197124 Top Secret “, - _ Copy i fi th ae a ares cee. awem enn aenbies PA ee HEM Bets oR So 8 wae tne t : a a ?
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964) Comment: (Continued) In 1966 SLESINGFR- reported to the FBI that... he was .in touch with a Moscow photographic wont shop proprietor, and he described evidence, of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1362. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been-in contact with a number of Soviet officials from tac Unites Nations. HNOSENYO was not speerfiec in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, «ho may represent a Pirst Chief Directorate case. : [arrest and the KGB Agent GaRuE NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almastat once. NOSENKO identified the case as that of Ses avovel who had been a OMOSeRUAl CHATGES In Kiev. NOSENKO ‘said that was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's nane, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with GReai ah a “KGB S&T agent@ identified earlier con the basis a: a May 1962 report from && .4 sensitive source. - NOSENKO's Information [| __[hes a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a-frequent visitor after the Second World War | to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, ‘particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreiqners' contects with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has- frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, roth First and Second : Directorates had concluded that might be a “provocation. . agent” planted in or recruited from the ranks. of the ; Communist Party in the United States. . - 295 oe ee oie ATS No. 197124 ve Top Secret fo Fs -Copy LO 10 wi a et . is :4 sy z tS AEE Mae 4 Z =
aidan S car ena Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) HOGRNKO's Information SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex- traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who-.nad visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1953 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of @uty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the. target of Seventh department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was’ placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance cbserved SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the Mnerican. “They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the xnGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent. In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Sovict Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according te another version, SKOLOV's office was advised by others}. SOKOLOV’s office eventually apologized for having failed oarlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN. ) a@ sensitive source ‘ Comment: Earlier, G2 ‘ddentifted a agent apparently identical with SHUBIN ; and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963. SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a. further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have ne noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department. - at the time. ~ OTS No. 197124 < Copy _10_
74-00000 conn mmnrems ema Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTNENT - January 1962-dJanuary 19€4) NOSENKG went ta Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHPRE- PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, “vhere a person could los: himself for life" On the seventh Cay CHEREPANOV vas located and arrested in “waku, where ne was on his way to the Iranian border. A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. PEDOSEYLV and several other American Department of £i- cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, a interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confassed , i to having given the documents to the Americans. When askec why, he said he was “angry at the KGR, very angry", and besides, he theugnt he might ask the Americans for some | money in return for the documents. We confessed that on 4 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist a who was a@ librarian interested in Russian bocks. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreian Affairs, the bu:lding in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also houscd. Eh ut tee Because CHEREPANOV he.’ eluded the KGB Letween the two of fixed surveillance posts wnich had been established, the —— Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not outting. CHERMPANOV under full,.round-the-clocz. Surveillance. CHEREFANOV himself, however, told the XGn that if ne nad detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest i g against “such an indignity, such persecution", and then - seit want St would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt. sensitive sources, Comments Other sources, including Seis Sein . have also reported various aspects Of the CHERNPANOV incident. . NOSENIO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to -“i >. sue. =. His claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time. re eas TOS ee oF" Ata ee TS: No. 197124 . CORY iv. me = ~ "Top Secret ” oS ok | suerte = a nr tea PRR Annona see tin remiaal Sopa Ae. Steraniie ee yee: reo tices 2 ts ee
14-00000 .- The Recall Telegr3: . ; HOSEEKO's Information — : so re oes Cn 3 February 1964, MOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB oH Legal Residency once during the mornina before he ret with - a Cr\ and again that evening after 1300; there were at those times no KGB telegrans concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messaacs for him. Later in the morning : of 4 February, hovever, after attending a session of the ° Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram fron KGB Headquarters had arrived, i instructing him to return to lMcscow immediately to partici- 3 pate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thence- forth in CIA custody. af tee i ldavel 2nd ate ate anal 2 Satan the. ot wa tala, “ Peer erat Comment : wee. Tote ant Meee 4
14-00000 Top Secret : es (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1°62-January 1964) NOSEEYNO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Teiccram Hos iOSHPUKRO maintained throughout sis interrogations ir, 1964 an 1965 that there was the receéll telegram anc that i it prompted nis defecticn, In Gctober 1956, however, whilo . being questioned again, NOSUENSO stated that there hal bee: : ‘ a no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, end h | signed the following statement: : ‘ah ' "On 4 February 1964, I told ny CIA centact i : in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in i a i Noscow had Leen received in the KGE Resideney in , 4 Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. 1 said Q t the time that this telegram said that I was Tneatas ad ea be WD oe recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throuchout subsecucnt interviews and interrogations by American authcrities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. i admit that the stor, was a lie. I myself inventzd this teie- gram in order to hasten my Cefection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelli- ; gence might be noticed." . NIE Re ane ce tee o erepeer eee magi gnarnt sete ata ed a ¢ mag Knovlecge of Other Seventh Department Cperations i ! ! 3 The notes NOSENKO brought to. CIA in Geneva in 1¢64 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen cther KGB operations conducted ayainst what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1563 period. for reasons cited ; | in the descrintion of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service ae -. an 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British L ai ae “ | , Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief cf the Seventh . Department. , ‘ * > - 3 yaa + & , By -- ** Top Secret Copy 10. mee Pe tn inibeamhome @ 1th, SeteeM inven ret Hg mtn a aan i i eerrennertnrenen? }-mmemtartemnna nemesis mand saatsnarase sa eH oA NE AANA 7 Peavey
00) seheaps i 4 — “tcc wittic<. oh apap sent re ap meni Hee, a ae eRe Sg a AIS ON aa ie a eames ° : sy, TREN Seale eA eR RA SSL TL SRIRAM SAR ANT Ab thom et ALOR A gmineeer ti Se a a * jomeecaas © | ‘ a Top Secret (SEVENTH CEPARTMENT = Jaruary 1962-January 1964) Operetional Activities ~ July 1962-January 1964: Summary To substantiate his claims to havinae served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Lepartment during this period, NOSENKO Gescribes MGB peu ment in the recruitment of the arrests of and BARGHOORN, and the investirgaticns Gf SLESINGER, OSWALD, and cf former KGD officer CHEREPANOYV, his discovery that SHUBT!) was a GRU agent, and his aasignment to Geneva. Even if HCSENLO learned cf the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substan- ‘y tial reasons why they might have been ccenducted by KGS : elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical . with respect to NOSENKO's coun description of Seventh Deparc- . ' ment cperaticns. They do net accurately characterize, as NOSENNO claims, KGB counterirntelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department ! service, NOSENKO's explanaticns for his assignment to , Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier ‘a assignment there in 1962, NOSENKO has asserted that he was 4 not a lieutenant colonel as the temporesy duty authocization 7 indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy ha Chief of Department and cone from which he presumably would 4 have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGS positions ‘a have h SEES PE Te KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists ; 1962-1963 _ Because of his positicn as a Deputy Chief, then First >. Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed cl awareness of what the KGA posture was with respect to ‘TS No. 197124 Copy. : SEixdistien Sanpete Eh eames ton § a
14-00000 s * £ a | _ Top Secret (OTESR ASPLCTS OF NOSPUKO'S KGB CARSER) Other Sources - 1964 and 1965 a sensitive source AS indicated in Annex A, € . SSG Jrenor tes several itens of informition he stated ne obtainee rom various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBMIOV was @xpelled frem the KGB as @ consequence of NOSENAC's defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to Le fired because he had Leen NOSUNLO's friend and patron, that GRiBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his Protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENNO's assionment te Geneva in 19¢4 despite xnowledge of facts making NOSENEO ncligible, that GRIBAINOV was a long time friend of HOSINC's father, that LOSENKO had Leen a deputy to a bepartment Chiesé d< spite his junior rank L-ecause of GKIBANOV's influence, and that GRIDALOV was Gismissed from the KGA and Party Lecause he willfully withheld information about NCSLEN¥XO's i procuring women for parties which he ane the General arranged. NOSENKG's Information = Post 1964 Iimnediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which : touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB’ service. Under interrogation, hewever, NOSENKO could not sustain shis claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is scen from the following examples exce ted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRISANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.): recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO {(Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit- ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied d etabehedco das oD Ca Coe IES He by LS ads ree a cede ale teeny 3360, - . . TS No. 197124 aA Parenen ae ae pov Seana tree ad aha the te aed ail wang eidde ise le fs 4 iy
SUMMARY OF CONC sUSTONS CONCERNING ROSENKO'S SCNA FIDES HOSPNLO claims that he served for a decade in the XGB in ucceysively seniors positions of authority from which he eerive d extensive raowledge of the scope, character, and. results of “G8 operations against Arericans in the Soviet Unien in the period 1353-1953. To suxstantiate his clain, he provides an impressive array Of information about ¥GB personne., organiza rLiom and operations which, to the extent that it Las been contirméd, i8 presumptive evidence of his Lona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli- eence ofricers, have qeneraliy corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some ci these sources, NOSENKO was « senior KGS offiecr who occuried a series of sensitive positions, «no enjoyed consizerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered Ly Soviet Intelligence", peralyzed the work of siti? G3 beara: Tare Peng GEE Wie Soe el Ree oe Bead ae The examination has corpared each element of NOSENKO's bicgraphy relevant to his claimed KG3 service with known facts. and reasonabie surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherenc and consistent with known fact, and «hether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he ciaims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his: own accounts? Fhe wel AL Eee = 357 TS.No. 197124 _ Copy 10 err ecmaraae emanate caste eaters as andere . . &: san seein tate “rath ft mee ett RT seinen arnanin * oat 4 H wi i % wey Dees ees