HW 53244 55 sit here and start to hink about this, Califano was one of them. It seems to me Lansdale, who had been successful in this kind of operation out in the Far East was brought in for a while." (2) ‘Possible Assassination Plans . Ambassador Helms testified that he did not recall “any plans that were approved or that were viable specifically directed at eliminating Castro, but that there were conversations about it, I haven't the slightest doubt." "The business about the assassination of Castro, I have read about this in the papers. I have heard about it from associates. It has been kicked around whether this was a viable proposition or not. I have no doubt it was written into various plans as one of many options but I don't recall any successful effort that was made in this direction and since Castro is alive and apparently well in Havana, the extent to which this was serious I have never ascertained." Ambassador Helms said he did not "recall ever having heard anything about poison pills or any of that." He did recall that "at some juncture" a decision was reached "that it would be advisable to brief Robert Kennedy as the Attorney General " about “various things that the Agency had had to do" with certain Mafia members. He did recall that DoclId:32105829 Page 59 AMWdaIT Quod °Y aIwugo FHL WOU AdODOLOHA
HW 53244 56 the Phase II case officer had taken over the plans but he did not "recall any special basis being used to try to get them to do an assassination." i. The August 16, 1963 Memorandum to John McCone about Phase I According to John McCone, the first time he learned about the existence of any assassination plans was on August 16, 1963, when he was given a copy of the May 14, 1962 "Memorandum for the Record" prepared for Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The particular events underlying the disclosure to Director John McCone appear to have started on the evening of August 15, 1963. Stanley J. Grogan, an assistant to the Director in charge of press relations, received a telephone call at his house from a man who said he was Sandy Smith, a reporter for the Chicago Sun-Times. According to a memorandum for the record prepared on August 16, 1963 by Grogan, Sandy Smith "said he was working on a story as a follow-up to the revelations by Joe Valachi, who is under close guard at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, who had named a man Giancana as the head gangster in Chicago. The man in Chicago recently went to court to have the FBI cease surveillance of him and his house and lost the decision. DocId:32105829 Page 60 u GIWaaS AHL WOT AdODOLOHA AUWdAIT aquoa
57 He said the Chicagoan reportedly at one time was used by CIA to find out what was going on in Cuba, but provided no information of value. Smith said he stated this to the Department of Justice and they would neither confirm or deny." | | On August 16, 1963, the front page of the Chicago Sun-Times contained a story by Sandy Smith with a headline "CIA Sought Giancana Help for Cuba Spying." The story started with the following paragraphs: "A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang boss Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central Intelligence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Times. "Tt was a weird gangland spy case in which, government official said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro regime came into power in 1959. "What the CIA accomplished--if anything~-~by negotiating with the 53-year old Chicago rackets chief is one of many unexplained mysteries of the matter." Richard Helms gave John McCone on August 16 a memorandum (dated August 16) under the subject "Sam Giancana" which stated: "Attached is the only copy in HW 53244 DocId:321058629 Page 61 a GIWadIS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA AMVdGIT aqyog
58 the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year." Richard Helms, when interrogated by the Commission staff, testified he did not have any recollection of the specific events. However, when he was shown his memorandum of August 16, 1963, addressed to John McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, he remembered that he had delivered that memorandum to Mr. McCone, Helms did not recall whether or not he had seen the May 14, 1962 memorandum for the record sent to the Attorney General before the date he sent it to John McCone on August 16, 1963. HWW 53244 Docld:32105629 Page 62 AWWdaIT GuYOI "Y AIWUaS AHL WONT AKdODOLOH.
59 4, Miscellaneous 1963 Schemes According to the 1967 Inspector General investiga- tion report, during 1963 several miscellaneous schemes were developed inside the Agency for possible use against Fidel Castro. Helms testified he was vaguely aware of some of these schemes, which he called "hairbrained." There was no showing that any of the schemes extended beyond the discussion stage. One of these schemes involved discussions inside the CIA about trying to have General Donovan, who was negotiating with Fidel Castro for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, give to Fidel Castro a contaminated skindiving suit. It was known that Fidel Castro liked to skindive. The CIA plan was to dust the inside of the suit with a fungus producing madera foot, a disabling and chronic skin disease, and also contaminating the suit with tuberculosis bacilli in the breathing apparatus. There is no evidence that General Donovan knew of any such schemes developed inside the Agency. The scheme was dropped because Donovan on his own volition gave Fidel Castro an uncontaminated skindiving suit as a gesture of friendship. HW 53244 Docld:327105679 Page 63 AMWdaTT ayod °Y GIWYaS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA
60 During this period of time there were also discussions about preparing a booby~-trap spectacular seashell which would be submerged in an area where Castro often skindived. The seashell would be loaded with explosives to blow apart when the shell was lifted. After investigation it was determined that there was no shell in the Caribbean area large enough to hold a sufficient amount of explosive which was spectacular enough to attract the attention of Castro. Also, a midget . Submarine which was anticipated to be used for the emplacement of the seashell did not have a long enough operating range. 5. The Phase III Plan - 1963 - 1965 In 1963 a CIA employee who was fluent in Spanish ud aqiwaddS GHL Woud KdOOOLOHG was assigned on temporary duty with the Special Operations Group on Cuba. The employee is hereafter referred to as the Phase III case officer. The task assigned to him "...was to collect intelligence and to try to organize a group of KaWdaIT aoa military officers inside Cuba who were opposed to the Cuban regime-the Castro regime.” In the latter part of 1963 while on a trip abroad, he met a Cuban with whom CIA personnel had been in contact since 1961. At this first 1963 meeting the Phase III case officer said there was no discussion about any possible assassination of any Cuban leader. HW 53244 DocId:32105829 Page 64
61 Originally, the Cuban contact had been a Castro supporter and had been a member of one of the groups that overthrew Batista. However, "he became disenchanted with Castro" shortly after Castro took over because of "the harsh police state policies that were being carried out." At a subsequent 1963 meeting, which took place in Europe, the Phase III case officer said that the primary discussion concerned "getting into more detail on the organization of a group inside Cuba which could be used in an internal coup against the Castro government. "The subject of assassination was. never raised by me. It was never discussed in that context. In discussing the coup and how a coup would be carried out, this particular contact did raise the possibility and in his mind the very real possibility that there would be bloodshed, and that somebody would be killed. Their, or his, opinion was that to even get the internal revolt, a coup, underway that the leadership~-the top leadership--would have to be neutralized. Specific assassination of any of the people, it was not discussed in those particular terms.” According to the Phase III case officer, the. Cuban contact held a relatively high position in the Cuban government. The Cuban "requested a meeting...a high HW 53244 DoclId:32105829 Page 65 AUWdGIT Quod -Y GIWUaD aHL WOUT AdODOLOHA
HW 53244 62 level policy maker in Washington, specifically mentioning Robext Kennedy as one of the people with whom he would Like to talk, to get some assurance that Washington. was serious about proceeding with this type of an operation.” The Cuban also said "that they would need some help in-arms probably-in getting started, in kicking off the coup." The Cuban mentioned high powered rifles and scopes and said "they felt that they could capture sufficient arms to carry on once they started." Subsequently, a senior CIA officer travelled to Europe to meet the Cuban and "assured him...that the U.S. Government was serious about this operation..." and "that the U.S. Government was prepared to support the coup and that when they launched the coup as soon as they established themselves in any reasonable manner inside Cuba that the U.S. Government would support them." The next meeting took place on November 22, 1963 in Europe. The Cuban contact had requested "some type of esoteric gadget with which he would be able to defend himself" if there were a confrontation directly with Castro. "He had in mind some sort of a pellet pen or anything | that was not a hand weapon that he could carry with him" into any conference with Castro. DoclId:32105829 Page 66 AUWdHIT Guod *y QTWaa5 AHL WONX AdODOLOHAd
63 Although the Agency did not develop such a device, it did develop a ballpoint pen which had a hypodermic needle inside that when you pushed the lever, the needle came out and poison could be injected into someone. The Phase III case officer showed the pen to the Cuban contact on November 22, 1963. The Cuban contact declined the gadget "because of the close proximity with which he would have to get to a person if anything developed in the form of a confrontation with him." Instead, the Cuban asked for weapons, and the case officer told the Cuban "that a cache of weapons would be put down for him in Cuba." One or two caches of weapons, including high- powered rifles with scopes, were subsequently placed down in Cuba. In addition, according to the Phase III case officer, he delivered money to help the Cuban contact with his living expenses, while in Europe. "It was around $1,000 at one time, no more than that." ‘The Phase III case officer broke off contact with the Cuban in the latter part of 1964 and was reassigned to another task in early 1965. The Cuban contact then was turned over to a Cuban exile group. HW 53244 Docld:3271056279 Page 67 Y QIWYaIS AHL WOUd AdODOLOHA AMVdaIT aod
64 According to the 1967 CIA Inspector General investigation report, CIA support was withdrawn from the Cuban in 1965 because too many people knew about him and his plan. In March 1966 a Cuban leader was arrested and confessed to receiving rifles with telescopic sites from the CIA to be used for the assassination of Castro, according to a "Prensa Latina” news release. The man said he received $100,000 toward this plan. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State after this news story appeared, the CIA said that the contact was recruited to collect intelligence of military activities and objectives in Cuba. The Agency said: "There is no truth to the allegations that the CIA paid $100,000 or any other sizeable sum of money" as claimed in the Cuban newspapers following the confession of the contact. The Agency also said "the Agency was not involved" with either of the two men arrested by Cuban authorities "in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro as claimed in the Prensa Latina news release, nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act..." The-memorandum to Secretary Rusk was signed by Richard Helms and was dated March 6, 1966. HW 53244 Docld:327105679 Page 66 a aIWadS FHL WONT AdODOLOHA AWWdGIT aqyod