wn = 5 a ~ “ ! ww P w fo) a N : c 7 iN / — “~ = a = N : a © 7 a = i = pans i ot < = 4 . 12 S 2° 4 = 'd = = = ta ot Soe 2 i) a = ; = ols => ~~ wn 17 = a ’ £ is wa = 19 ~ J c 30 o ‘Z A 21 | BOS ay mae aes sn a) N\ Ww ta Docld: 32277215 Mr. Goldsmith. conversation?in any way? Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Goldsmith. i | | | i late? i heavy. really was. Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you say Mr. Scelso. this’ information about. Oswald's 9-27 contact a little bit that? 1-88 Do you. remember the substance of the s Mr. Scelso. It was the daysafter the assassination at 4:00-something in the afternoon and. I did not feel the least bit bad about it. We were getting the stuff in hot. and! In fact, the overall performance of the Agency in this thing was the only bright light in the U.S. government. It Because we had had advance information that! we had disseminated on Oswald's. activities which we had properly disseminated to the other U.S. government agencies which might, have led them to act other than they had. Do you think that they would have paid more attention to Oswald if they had received additional { . Mr. Goldsmith. | | information, his Cuban contact as we Mr. Scelso. Conceivably, yes. the Bureau acted in it, though, I am After all, we notified them. He was intelligence officer. { t ‘| i u 4 if nt CrPgs : ALSSRSON RESORTING CO Page 69 11? In the light of the way not sure they would have. in touch with MeSaLY the Soviet 001869 Do you remember being upset at receiving: { | | | | | ! ( t
be w ws on Qu D.C. 2002h (202) $5%-2345 O WASHTUGTON , REPORTERS SUTEDING, JW, Ss 390 VU STRELT, oO a 29 We in Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. What is your impression, turning to another area now, of the manner in which the Agency handled the Ugarte issue? i A | | ' { Ugarte was a Nicarguan national who came in and reported having seen Oswald with some other people at the Cuban Embassy? Mr. Scelso. I think in the overall handling of it, it was proper, especially since I wasithe architect of that handling. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way were you the architect? Mr. Scelso; I wrote almost all the cables that went out of Headquarters and decided what. they should say. There were some, in the heat of reporting Mexico City did overlook certain things that they might have told us. For instance, they did not give us certain background. There was some information, a statement, Lee Oswald saying he was getting $3,000 or $6,000 or. some such amount for doing the job on Kennedy or doing the job on somebody, and the Mexico station indicated that there were reports that Lee Harvey Oswald had a savings: account in this amount in Dallas. What they did not tell us, for which I later chided them, was that. this rumor had been on | the radio. in Mexico Cit and everybody in Mexico City believed it. It was not on the. radio up here and we did not know what the origin of this rumor was, nor were we therefore alert to the fact that this ugarte could have heard it on the radio. Gee! ALDESSOM REPORTING COmeaNy 001870 Docld:32277215 Page 90 ; t i ; ! i i } ! | | ¥ 1 4 i
Ww 3 4 3 ws = 3 a Pe) ™ i a wa fs) ~ ~ ' a 7 — ow a ce ~ lod ™N : a ran) vd S = {¢ s S = oi a Soot is ona = e 13 = = 4 Ja} = m= ots my is = te > n \v - = 13 a = 19 = Ce] call 21 ay) a4 ooo Docld: 32277215 Page 91 activities. But my memory on. this was very weak. He was You know, I might have called him to get information about this 27th thing, because we might have learned it from the Bureau in the meantime. Mr. Goldsmith. How would the Bureau have heard it? Mr. Scelso. From the Mexico station. They were getting | briefings, and so on, right along the line, because the Mexico | | | FBI office was doing very extensive investigations in Mexico | with the police through which Oswald's movements in.Mexico were traced. - Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever. have any evidence that Ugarte may have been. a CIA agent? Mr. Scelso. Not in the sense that we call a person a CIAj agent. I think he was a Nicaraguan intelligence agency being | i run by somebody in the Nicaraguan Embassy in Mexico City ~-and 1 b i I think, if my memory is not tricking me, that we may have been in touch with the Nicaraguan who was handling hin. We may have been, at that time or in the past, or per- haps our Nicaraguan station was indirectly monitoring their “never an agent of ours in the sense that he was directly | handled by us or that he was handled according to instructions: which we were passing. i i Mr. Goldsmith. It is possible that if “his Nicaraguan | case officer was cooperating with you in some way, he may have: been using ‘Ugarte, this would have been without your knowledge? eg ECRET 001871 ALDERSON REPORTING comMPanyY
wa = e | = - N™ ; ! = i o. » | wn fo} | a “ 4 c ! ~ | n 2} o a : i ~N 4 4 . = 4 o 7 i a i | ‘0 | t BULEDING, VASUTHGTON, rat) REPORTERS Bt bn wT) a s “ 7 - : id a ~~ 1 = 19 1 S . S 29 | a tT es 4 @ @2 2 e = az 3 ash ! ri 3 tt y \ 1-91 Mr. Scelso. I am not sure about that. It:could be ‘that we had known in the past that Ugarte was a Nicaraguan agent working against the Cubans. It seems to me that I think we did. Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that Ugarte's Nicaraguan case officer was considered by the Agency to be a trusted. asset? Mr. Scelso. As I recall, he was either an agent of ours or liaison contact that we used as an asset. Mr. Goldsmith. What. was his impression of Ugarte's reliability? . Mr. Scelso.. As I remember, Ugarte had not been a very productive agent. He had not. accomplished much at all and was evaluated accordingly. Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at number 241. Would you please-that cable. (Pause) Does that statement accurately reflect the scope of the photosurveillance coverage, refierring to the first two paragraphs? Mr. Scelso. There is nothing in here. Mr. Goldsmith. ‘I am sorry. Does that paragraph accurately indicate the. hours of the Embassies? Mr. Scelso.. I have no recollection of those hours at 001872 Stgeet Docld: 32277215 Page 92 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
all. I would say it is probably correct. Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware of the hours in which the 4a | ‘| 1 Soviet and Cuban Embassies were under photo-surveillance? Mr. Scelso. During the daylight hours, but the coverage, ta | | 1 was by no means complete. It never is, in cases of photo- oe | surveillance. | : | Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you say that? Mr. Scelso. Well, the cameras are manually operated Oo N.C, 20024 (202) S54-2345 ave 4 | and it is just impossible to find operatives which will be | ' | so dutiful as to snap every person coming and going. Mr. Goldsmith. My understanding was that Scott was an extremely demanding man and ran a very efficient station. 390 7TU STREET, So. REPORTERS BUTERTING, CASIINCTON, | SE Mr. Scelso. That is true, but, if you have a couple -- is aman is away a part of the time and the wife is away and she has to go into the kitchen to prepare meals or she has to rZ i . * e : . . A : : ié | go to the bathroom, it is simply impossible day in and day | out, in a practical sense, to get total coverage. 18 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if there was coverage on _ 19 : week-ends? | 7 Mr. Scelso. No, I do not. know. : Mx. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at -- a Mr. Scelso. This is based on my experience with evalu- ey iy ils 7x ra ho i 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at CIA 249. Would > Fe ' { } 22 ating these things worldwide. i you please take a look at the first two paragraphs. peodel oo AD RSE = tm™e N ashy Docld:32277215 Page 93 censor” EPORTING COMPA 001879
(Pause) Mr. Scelso. That is right. ' Mr. Goldsmith. This indicates that the photographic a> ~ i saeevees ey coverage was of a continuous nature during daylight hours and = : | also, as you indicated, it does not indicate that that does i 5 4 not mean that everybody is picked up, necessarily. | g 2 Mr. Scelso. Yes. : : | Mr. Goldsmith. You stated a moment ago that,your | ; $ : experience, based upon your knowledge of worldwide operations | : - | : ol was not everyone would be picked up. | g ' Mr. Scelso. That is right. | = { . i = 1 Mr. Goldsmith. What percentage of people would be : > 1 \ Y Z 13 picked up? | , = i! z 1a Mr. Scelso. I would like to say first that the operators : | come to recognize the regular Embassy staff and visitors who. | : te frequently come and go and do not attempt to photograph them = - every time. Otherwise, they attempt to get pictures of new ! z . visitors. Even this is not. practical. It just does not work, | ae | = | and that is because it is extremely difficult to get people | : | to do this kind of work. at. all. It is a deadening, boring and’ a to get people who are clearable to do itis very, very diffi- ! Se , 223 3. i} cult. 3 3! Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, what percentage of | ~ ' people do you think you would manage to get? Mr. Scelso. I would have to make a wild guess if I were: 001874 Docld:32277215 Page 94
DoctId: to answer that. or Consu- having the . visits 001875 ‘| 4 | Mr. Goldsmith. I would not mind taking a wild guess 3 : from you, Mr. Scelso. 4 | Mr. Scelso. I would think you would get at least half = 7 of the people, or even more. 5 . Mr. Goldsmith... Certainly if it got less than-half it \ : S 7 would seem to me that the operation would not be at all worth- | : | while, if you got one quarter or one fifth. “ | Mr. Scelso. You have to crank into this the fact that : a the many people entering and leaving these installations 2 | en 1) | ‘deliberately conceal their faces; and-that. they’ approach Z 2 | the installations so they would not be photographical from : a 4 | any vantage point. 5 al - Mrs Goldsmith. My next question is sort of a difficult | : one. The Agency's records document that Oswald made an zi \s | appearance at the Cuban Embassy and Russian Embassy, ‘ 7 | tate, a total of six times, five or six times. Yet, z 4 |made five or six visits somehow he managed to escape = | = .y | surveillance coverage, even though those five or six E sa | were spread over three different days -- really, definitely | fa days, possibly three days. ee? 22 | Is there any way that that can be explained? 23 Mr. Scelso. Simply the. fact that. these photo-operations | 4 laze not set up, really, primarily to photograph and, identify 2s | unknown people entering and leaving the Embassy. They are set : SabAsI 30977215 page 95 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPSNY . ‘
1-95 primarily to get good photos, recognition photos, of the Soviet personnel or Cuban personnel in the place so that this | aw can be shown to our surveillance teams, you see, and to other | 4 | { i . 6 | require a constant surveillance operation if you were just that Oswald managed to avoid being photographed? i | | people of operational interest to us. | ". | “ Oo | z Mr. Goldsmith. Well, it would not seem that you would | % | wo | ~ if S 7 interested in the personnel of the particular government. | ~ | = woe | & a Mr. Scelso. You also get visitors. You are able, for gc example, to identify visiting Cuban or Soviet intelligence e | | ~- 10 personnel. 2 | = 1} | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you regard it unusual, nevertheless, 3 i | } Mr. Scelso. Yes,. I do. And the possibility is that NULEDING, Oo REPORTERS Bs he was extremely furtive. After all, he was not a novice at | this sort of thing. . Mr. Goldsmith. It I could just use your wild guess, Wy s 1 as you put it, and I want to have you understand. that I am not holding you to that estimate, but assuming for the moment the camera gets one~half the people that enter and say he gna 7 STREET, Oo | i | ie | . wo ‘ . ee 29 || makes five visits and not six, the chances of a person missing) i { 1 i , eae * being photographed, making five visits, if the coverage catches @ Ee? 22. | half of the people, would. be 1/2°, so it. is b/32.. And yet, : ! Oswald is our one case in 32. He managed to avoid being Are you certain that the Mexico City station never 901876 wo tan y 24 |) photographed. | - _ SEGRET Docld:32277215 Page 96 ALDERSON nResonTING COMPARES
iFRS Oe obtained any photograph of Oswald? ir) n So aS ee Mr. Scelso. I never heard that they did. I never heard} of their concealing it, nor could I conceive that they would Coe) : 1 1 : t. i 1 t i have concealed it. = ¢ The thought. that they might have:gotten it, that the 5] Agency or the station might have surpressed it deliberately to s 7 cover up their omission to send it to Headquarters, or some- | z 2 | thing like that is to me, that is inconceivable. I never ; 3 | heard it. And in view, of course, of some of the disclosures : Ke Bureau did with Oswald's threatening letter, you can conceive WASH LHG TON, | | | ‘ { that have been made in the Senate investigation of what»=the | ( ' | | | of anything. t | Mr. Goldsmith. That is why we are here today. Mr. Scelso. Yes. I never heard it. In view of the fact that Winn Scott dn REVORTELS BUTEDING, WwW. were plent of people in the station who hated his guts, it 8. ~ | | ! 12 | in his own station was not a noncontroversial figure, there | | | E a would have probably had leaked out. = a Oswald, being a defector and so on and. leading a sort : : 20 | of conspiratorial life, he was perfectly capable of so approach- at! ing the Cuban Embassy or the Soviet. Embassy that his face | could not be photographed. In other words, if this is the Soviet Embassy and our vantagepoint is over. here, he can walk under the window and walk straight. across the street. 3304 Mr.. Goldsmith. You would have to know. | i Docld: 32277215 Page oT ALDERSON sable COMP aR
1-97 Mr. Scelso. You:can figure where it is. It can only 4 | be in a certain number of places. | - ! Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to the question of Ugarte i | | @ 4 for a moment, I willsask the question, to your knowledge; .was | $ «| he employed in any way by the CIA? | Be . z 7 Mr. Scelso. No. He was not carried by us as an agent, | S | as far as I recall. ot think we did have knowledge, or our | z | Nicaragua station did have knowledge that he existed and was | ; ; being used against. the Cubans. = al Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying he: had no» relationship | : 7 whatsoever to the CIA? | | 2 7 Mr.. Scelso. Of course, in the laws of agency, you | © 2 a know, he was somewhere out on the end of the line, like the ! S fT hi | 3 ba agents of all the liaison services that we liase with, and | we i | help train, and whose operations we systematically monitor. | E |, | Sither superfiéially or intensely. oo . ~. | I do not recall that we were in any way giving him | E |, | instructions indirectly, or that we placed any importance on I a | operation. But. we count as agents of ours people who : : xo | axe responsible to our guidance on a day to day basis. . : nl Mr. Goldsmith. In that sense, as you define it, was | xe £7 +» | he an agent? Mr. Scelso. No. | Mr. Goldsmith. Was he an asset or a source? nd oe / a5 i Mr. Scelso. Not of ours, but of the Nicaraguan service.’ ,  gtpgey 001878 | ho 4 az Docld: 32277215 Page 95 A LOESSON REPORTING COMPANY
, me i Mr. Goldsmith. What control did the Agency have over | the Nicaraguan service? , . 3 | - Mr. Scelso. Almost none. We did not attempt. to direct IQ nn oe ne eee ‘ | their operations anyplace in the world. Our relations with 5 7 Nicaragua,:.our political pelations and U.S. political relations & r) | and ours aS an agency was to talk to them, attempt to improve g 7 their political posture in their own country, to améliorate : S 3 their brutality and their repressive tactics. We -had no | : | charter to overthrow Samoza, so we kept in contact with him : a . : z | on a local basis so that we could monitor what they were ! : He doing. | S i2 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware of SHmoza's support of | @ 2 i3 the anti-Castro Cubans? | ! = ; : | a i Mr. -Scelso. Where or when? | Bis Mrs Goldsmith. 1963. : = rat Mr. Scelso. I do not recall any specific operations | = a ; i ” 7 | of his supporting anti-Castro Cubans, but I could well conceive : 7 of it. | | = i = a Mr. Goldsmith. What about support given to anti-Castro 5 12 | Cubans by the Nicaraguan intelligence people? | ; ; i an Mr. Scelso. What do you mean, financial support? | © ga 22 Mr. Gotdsmith. Financial support, military. | oe Mr. Scelso. To Cuban. exile groups that were anti-Castro? © 34 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.. : Ww ta Mr. Scelso. I do not.recall;having known of any such CLARET 901879 ads cree Docld:32277215 Page 99 ALDERSON REFORTING COMBAIKLY
thing because it would have been, to us, a trivial matter. > . What we were concerned about with Snmoza were his acti- a | vities inside of his home country, principally. . | de | _ Mr. Goldsmith. If hes had been giving support to anti- wa Castro Cubans, you would have considered that as. trivial? Mr. Scelso. Sure. ~ 2002% (202) 554-2345 reat | Mr. Goldsmith. Why? not have predicated any operations based on it.. We would not ‘pn. c. Oo have attempted to recruit agents to monitor his support of anti-Cuban operations, anti-Castro groups or anything like VASTITUCTON , | | | } | Mr. Scelso. Not a matter -- in other words,.we would | | | | | | | | that. | | We would have received and disseminated any information ; | | which came our way. al Mr. Goldsmith. It would seem to me that it would be . REPCITEPRS BULLDERS , in the intersts of the United States to become aware of all wu, the anti-Castro activities. Mr. Scelso. Oh, sure. I say our station would have known it if it had been going on, and our Headquarters, but 390 Jr STRENRT, S 290 | I just dosnot recall it. You see, :.Smmoza . was» active | : | against Costa Rica. His diplomats were engaging in smuggling : money for the U.S. Mafia. He was assassinating people, ris brutalizing the population, conducting guerrilla warfare. nn) 5 i He was at odds with the government of Honduras which harbored anti-Samoza groups and so on. . i 001880 Ww to Docld:32277215 Page 100 ALDESSON REPORTING COMPANY
1-100 | If he was also in left field supporting anti-Castro © 2 groups, this was one facet of his operations and would not have been of any significance to us. We would have dissemina- | { | 4 ted it to the State Department. _ : | | z 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware that J. C. King supported | z P | anti-Castro groups out of Division funds? | S 7 Mr. Scelso. Sure, through Miami, yes. ; = 3 | “Mr. Goldsmith... Were you aware that that was done = | S 3 separately from SAS or from Task Force W? : : 19 Mr. Scelso. Well, let me think. The various stations | é 1 had contact with anti-Castro groups at. various stations in | E 2 Latin American and may have financed them. Whether J.C. King | . i | @ 2 13 may have done this -- I would not have put it past him. He ; | : rs did all serts of personal operations. E all Mr. Goldsmith. Would that have been unauthorized? | g eo Mr. Scelso. He could authorize it himself as Bivision : = 1T | Chief. | : = a Mr. Goldsmith. Might. he have done that with the groups | 3 in Nicaragua, the anti-Castro groups in Nicaragua? é 0 | | Mr. Scelso. Sure he might have. It seems -- well, noting is too farfetched for him to have done. He went personally into Columbia, or someplace, and went up into the organization that had been murdering people right and left ; 25 when he was Division Chief. ; 2 ~~ ' 901881 ! : 23 hills and personally met the leader of some great guerrilla | 4 | | Docld:32277215 Page 101
1-101 i Mr. Goldsmith. What was the nature of the types of | 3 | stoves that J. C. King was supporting? | 3 Mr. Scelso. As I can say, I do not know he ran any | 4 | personal operations supporting any groups outside of this frame- = 5 | work of division operations run through the stations and | F b branches. | S 7 Mr. Goldsmith. It is conceivable to me that he was, a 3 but you have no direct knowledge. 3 | Mr. Scelso. No direct knowledge. : "9 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if he is still alive today? ! S , : rr | Mr. Scelso. No, I do not.. When I was here a.year ago : = 1 $ 12 on vacation I heard that he was dying, or he was very senile: | - © 2 13 | Mr. Goldsmith. How about Mr. Herbert, who you mentioned = i 2 ta H before. | : 1s Mr. Scelso. Yes? | ¢ i : 7 Mr.. Goldsmith. Is he alive today? | tr Mr. Scelso. As far as I know. He was in Argentina. | Mr. Goldsmith.. Do you think he would know about Jd. C. = 19 | King's operations? € 20 | Mr. Séelso. Very probably. Mr. Herbert was in Argen- eet | tina. You are not at a loss as to his whereabouts, are you? | @ ° oe 22 Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency will make him available to | 23 | us. Excuse me for a moment. ; : (Pause) - Did Headquarters station ever criticize, in any way, = «BE Docld:32277215 Page 102 ALDERSON RE: ws tn , 901882 T COMPANY t +
1-102 ‘ : the manner in which they handled the Oswald case prior to the | © 5 H assassination? | i i I ' 3 , Mr. Scelso. Not that I know of. Mr. Goldsmith. What about the assassination? i Mr. Scelso. Not that. I know of. ta P You pointed out that they admitted to doing certain H J 2002" (202) S54~2345 ~y , | to disclose the contact with the Cuban Embassy. cS 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Also the fact that Oswald was applying 10 | things. My position has been that they did, of course, fail | | | | | | for a visa. ~~ _ . | i | | | | i H _.4 go through with you. I do not know how long it will take Sy! Mr. Scelso. Yes. = a | - Mr. Goldsmith. I have another line of questioning to. ° Pires Wy HYHS aesdy. Mea, : me. If you would like to break for lunch, you may do so. = : Mr. Séelso. I leave it up to you. I can stay all day : 2, long. “ 4 (Whereupon at. 12:30. the Executive Session recessed to S 1a reconvene, at.1:30 peMe) e-waste Ag te a a | = i wa A H =. o13 1 a : : 4 = h : ‘ —— 4 . : - : i" ‘ ag i a a+ 4 - as a ao Y i , : as bo fe ke A Sa EL I PP a ee Sot heii 23 ; : x 001883 t fr 4 i Docld:32277215 Page 103
DoctlId: ~ oe) — ai 7 } ' { bat 2 | > 2 il = t “ n . i ws 8 tl a H ‘li sees a 7 | — Fa , | ina co coma e ' “N i ee +o a - a = 1G | S t Zz i pad prot ed po —_ iH 2 | =. : Hy = 2 3 BUCLDING, baa te | co = z = 2H = iS . it ~ ut an i} : ~ } ia V7 if . i s 18 | = \ in Ht ol = 17 if ied 1 i ¢ i 4 = 29 | | 31 — aa IQS Paar wees iD ae 32277215 Page 104 1-103 __AFTERNOON SESSION (1:40 p.m.) '. TESTIMONY OF JOHN SCELSO -- Resumed © Mr. Goldsmith. Two general questions pertaining to this morning. I think you could probably sense from the thrust of the questions that the Committee is disturbed about what it as a failure by the Mexico City station to communicate timely manner all of the information that it had to Headquarters. . Is there any explanation that you can think of for that failure on the part of the Mexico City station? 001884 _ SEGRET AiLoOzascsr REPORTIN So roMe oh ALDZASS*
1-103-A Mr. Scelso. I can hypothesize an explanation. Mr. ped Phillips -- you have talked to Dave Phillips? ree) Mr. Goldsmith. Yess Mr. Scelso. He should know. He was down there. But to ree i eEpeel RSON REPCRTING COMPANY Z § me, it would seem that in. screening the information, they did t ' 1 # 6 | not attach any importance to the added information. In other | 5 7 : words, it. was not earthquaking. | 3S 2 Mr. Goldsmith. We agreed that it was important, in fact, : 7 it was sufficiently important to warrant sending a cable : : He : instead of a dispatch. | : 1 Mr. Scelso. Almost always things like that were cabled | S 12 : in, but the added information gained from the other: meetings, | @ : 12 from the monitoring of the other telephone calls and Oswald's : | : ul other visits, it was not regarded as sufficiently .important : : is | to warrant dissemination. : = te | In.other :words, here you have a kook, you see -- to | a i7 | follow the line of thinking, a kook -- who had defected once i - 2 13 | and had come back. and now wanted to defect again. You see, : : 193 | possibly, this is not -- in the scale of values, you see, 5 29 | was not then of any great significance. woe : . i come 2! Mr. Goldsmith. Even thoughtthis: particular kook hap- T 3 rand 22 i pened to go not just to the Soviet Embassy but also,to the | 22 : Cuban Embassy? | @ 4 Mr. Scelso. Well, the contact was: obvious, you. see. | : He wanted to get a visa and, from there, to Russia. Docld:32277215 Page 105
1-104 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any reason at all why the Mexico City Station did not communicate in a timely | ~ Ly manner Oswald's contacts with the Embassies on September 27th? | i @ 4 Mr. Scelso. Overwork.. | Es S| Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of the assassination, ‘the 4 ! 2 8 | Mexico City station was sending materials pertaining to the | 7 | contact on September 28th and October lst. | & 2 Mr. Scelso. They sent the one on the 27th in last. J "| Mr. Goldsmith. That is right. . | s | ; = ic | Mr. Scelso.. In the. rush of events, you see, they came ie | across that transcript somewhere in the stack and sent it. : a } 2 12 | I do not think they were suppressing it for any reason. I | 2 | cannot conceive. why they would have been. Mr.. Goldsmith. If the Agency had a taperecording of da Oswald's voice, where would it be today? Mr. Scelso. “In. Registry. REPORTERS BUTEDIENG, Oo. | i | Mry Goldsmith. Which Registry? | | : 3 | Mr. Scelso. The central Registry. : a Lo | E 19 | Mr. Goldsmith. That is the name it goes by, the | E 26 | Central Registry? | a Mr. Scelso. That is what it used to be called. | Mr. Goldsmith. What is the Central Registry used ® for? , an Mr. Scelso. That is where all our records are deposited. i Mr. Goldsmith. With the 201 files contained in the : : __s eRe Ty 001886 . ue ALDER: aoe NG a ME ORLY Docld: 32277215 Page 106
1-105 Central Registry? _ a w SII LE Mr. Scelso. Yes. | Mr. Goldsmith. I thought the 201 file was the file that is . i was maintained by DDO? | 4 | Mr. Scelso. I think it could contain operational infor- 23 ? z 65 Mr. ‘Scelso.. Yes, but there are 201 files in the ! I = i t 2 az Registry, too. Some of them are maintained on the desk and ~ | a. | & 7 | other ones are in the Registry. | = | S 7 I would assume, since the Oswald case is a defunct case, 3 | you see, that his 201 would be in the Registry now.. As long | < | 7 | ~ !0 | as it were active, it would be on the desk. = | = nn Mr. G6ldsmith.--Howsmanynéopiestare theré of a: particular 4 = iz | 201 file? © az ih Mr.=Scelso. There Sight be. one in Central Registry | = Ho, = ta | and another one on the desk. where the case is active. ba is 4 Mr. Goldsmith. Would these files be duplicative, > 4 i = 14 completely, of each other? , . = i “ 7 | Mr. Scelso. Not necessarily. The Registry would put — | , a : . ; { : 18 | in only the documents which they get, you see, and the desk = H i tt ! i = "| might have additional inter-office memorandum, and.so on, c He: . bat 70 | which they would keep. pee 2! t Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that that 201 file contains Sa ~ : . . . ’ . t wa a2 i only biolgraphical information? ; | i | i ~ mation, too. i eo ‘ i Ww in ‘Mr. Goldsmith. What is the routine manner in which t 4 Hi} tt t QT PRET | | | SECRET 001887 ALDESSON RESORTING COMPARLY ' a Docld: 32277215 Page 107
1-106 information is maintained in files? \ 2 | Mr. Scelso. It is usually kept in project files. Our "| systemized activity abroad is done under the name of projects | 4 | : for. budgeting and management purposes and to keep an opera- = | tional, work in an operational file. ow 6 | Mr. Goldsmith. If you wanted to find out which opera- n . 4 . : ! & 7 tions that particular agent had been involved in, and you did : = é not know the names of the operations, how would you. go about | “ 4 G7 making that determination? = io Mr. Scelso. Usually an agent is in a project, you See, e oT and his cryptonym, like LIENVOY and LITENSOR will. indicate ae) | Son | | “te | the project he is in, so all the information he is in is in | T a iF i that project. _ In addition, you can trace his name through Central. | = iS 3 Registry and get back all the references which might be in ! j an other files. . “ H Mr. Goldsmith. So Central Registry will.indicate what | = il = '* | projects he has been involved in? 5 Fy Mr. Scelso. Yes. They would send you a list.of items, €. Ss 29 | | H } a1! . oS Mr. Goldsmith. There could be hundreds, though. LO 4 | © WR ~ | Mr. Scelso. Indeed.. 23 Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the most. expeditious way | | to find out what operations an agent has been involved in? Mr. Scelso. Go to the desk and ask them. ed; ae i ALOESSON REPORTING COMPANY r [cabtes and dispatches, referring to him. | { | | Docld:32277215 Page 108
1-107 . i | Mr. Goldsmith. Which desk, now? i 2 Mr. Scelso. The area desk that was responsible for hin. | | | [ ae) | If he is still in the Division, they will have-a.-complete file; | on him on the desk. =z 3] Mx. Goldsmith. Would that file be the 201 file, or sone | 3 é other kind of £ile? : ~ | = 7 “Mr. Scelso. It probably would be a project file. If | a ) he is a security suspect, you see, it would be a 201 file. 1 : 3 he is an agent of ours, he would be in. a.project file. : : 10 Mr. Goldsmith. Bet us say that, over a ten-year period, | £ | an agent has been involved in a dozen. operations. How would | a t ' = 2 you find out which operations he had been involved. in? | © S 12 Mr. Scelso. He has a cryptonym, you see, and.there is : = : z | a file on that cryptonym and in that would be all correspon- | 2 i . : is | dence, dispatches and cablés relating to that cryptonym. ! = ip ‘ ; ! z 14 So all of his activity would be reflected in that. ; - 4 4 Ta Mr. Goldsmith. Agents do not keep the same cryptonym : : 8 over the years, do they? | : 3 | Mr. Scelso. That is right. Then you might have to | < 12 | 100k in several different projects. . | | oa Mr. Goldsmith. You would not know which registry to | @ va’ 22! look into unless you knew the cryptonym in advance? > w Mr. Scelso. Well, this file would indicate if there > was a change of cryptonym. ee s a Mr. Goldsmith. Which file, the 201 file? | 4 ALDESSON Sw in a ‘NG feo scany Docld:32277215 Page 109 EEESSS! °
te in A EAS 1-108 Mr. Scelso. The 201 file and the project file, as \ well. Agents rarely change cryptonyms unless the old crypto- | \ eo | il 3 | nym has been compromised. @ 4 i ~- Mr. Goldsmith. - My understanding is the cryptonym is. is) } . . . ¢ e A * z S| given to an agent at the beginning of his involvement ina. | ‘ i : e 4 | particular project. | ! : 1 ~ | S 7 For example, let's take AMLASH, and the "AM" would \ “ a | pertain to the particular project, would it not? | Pa 2 | Mr. Scelso. ‘Yes. That would mean Cuban. ~ 0 | Mr. Goldsmith. Say he starts working on a project ina | = 1 | completely different area, Czechslovakia. Would he still | = iH i 3 1 = # retain the cryptonym AMLASH? ! BU ELI ENS oO REPORTERS 2 | Mr. Scelso. . He would. ordinarily keep the same cryptonym| | Cuban agents worldwide have the AM eryptonym even though they | | | | | | ig | may be stationed in Poland, or something like that. | | Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, you are saying that | a, Cc boy “4 the most expeditious manner to find out what files an agent : 8 | as been involved in would be to go to his 201 file, determine. : a what his cryptonym is, and from there look up his cryptonym | ‘& 20 | ana bring your. references, I guess in a particular index.of | a cryptonyms. That would give you a reference to the projects ! aad ‘ — vy > i he has been involved in, or all correspondence pertaining. ia. Qe / branch he worked under, each nation, each nationality has the , - t | 22 4 Mr. Scelso. .From the cryptonym, you could tell which i | 1 two letters which designates the nationality. You can go to ; : | Stpeet 001890 ALDERSON REPORTING CCMPSALY Docld: 32277215 Page 110 _—
wa = . A Pe) ™ ' vi) A wi ~ ~ ™~ ' cS = 7 — a R e co) pan ™ . a ro) Y a - tA = Wy S ad 5a) = ty ed at a a = i7 wr = = = = ta “- “ = - 1s = tw os =z 14 ia ~ ~ “17 =~ Pe r * ig al an = 1 = 9 ~ = + Co Ss 29 ‘A Sr ona) 434 ioe “— 2) AN 4 23 au ae Se . _. :™ b= Docld: 32277215 Page 111 1-109 the desk and ask them. Mr. Goldsmith. How would they know? Mr. Scelso. They would have a file on that.. Mr. Goldsmith. On that cryptonym? we eee ee Mr. Scelso. That cryptonym. If it were active, it would be in Registry. Sometimes it does take a lot of research. They will wheel out sometimes | in a cart, like a supermarket cart, only it's two-storeys, weet we a ee — this many, twice as many files. Mr. Goldsmith. As a rule, the information, cperational information pertaining to an agent will be contained in the project files? Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true CIA case officers do not have! cryptonyms? Mr. Scelso. Well, staff case officers who are staff employees like I was a staff employee, just has pseudonyms. Agents have cryptonyms. Mr. Goldsmith. An agent is not somebody who you would consider to be a CIA employee? i I i irelationship of some kind. This is a myth, of course, because | : Mr. Scelso. That is right. He is in a contractual i 1 ithere is not any contract, really, but there is an agreement. | There are certain types of high-level agents who are staff ,;agents, who have staff status, but they are not employees. : Santa] 001891 ALDEASON REPORTING COMPANY a st a]
1-110 | For instance, if I had been sent abroad under cover as - a private individual, leaving the office in McLean, going Ww abroad as a businessman or something like that, I would have become a staff agent and I.would still have a pseudonym. roe - 5 -We have what:.we call. principal agents abroad who work | 2 A for us full-time who have pseudonyms and others who have ~ | 7 | | | ¢ 7 i cryptonyms. When a man gets into something approaching an | S. 2 | employee relationship with. the U.S. government and has survivot- ns t | 3 3 | ship rights, pension rights, he usually gets.a pseudonym so | ~ iG | that he can sign papers, vouchers and so on. = 1] | Mr. Goldsmith. A pseudonym is distinguishable from an = yO . ! = a operational alias, is it not? @ = 13 | Mr. Scelso. It is different, but it is not distinguish = ts | able by looking at it. | = a Mr. Goldsmith. Understood. 2 i , = i ; . | & is | Mr. Scelso. It is different. = i | “a IF | Mr. Goldsmith. If the case officer has a pseudonym he Ps al uses for correspondence, that is not a name you would use as < 20 | Mr. Scelso. A case officer -- I used to use a different ; t . : i vem @) |} name with every agent I ran. OLS i . . ted 22 Mr. Goldsmith. How would you remember which name to | use? Mr. Scelso. I had a pretty good memory. I would look Ww tn an operational alias dealing with the agents? | | 1 | 3 t ; at the file. I might be. running twelve agents in the station. | : etPRET a 001892 Docld: 32277215 Page 112 - os
wn i = si o ~ } “ , t } wt i _ | ~ - | ¢ = 7 | ~ | a ~ i = ‘ N t i . at re) 7} . 1 NS a i = iG! ° ! Se tly a | =z i -_ 19 | ca La i = : - t = i = i fo ; o ri c : a \ = i = 4 a i>! ey _* i he 13 & 13 an | _ | = 19 | ~ < | oe =, | 5S 20 | : \ 21 | uM it it Docld: 32277215 Page 113 i I had no trouble remembering it. In later years I did when I ran into some of these people on the street. i I { 4 | name is Maurice Bishop? i 8 | used the name Maurice Bishop as an operational alias or a | pseudonym? ( | period, what. responsibilities, if any, did you. have, with | ' | regard to the CIA's investigation of the assassination? | | j " tion, Mr. Helms called a meeting of a lot of important people, | | including Angleton; the Chief of our Division, Mr. Karamessinag; jt think somebody from the Cuban show, and told them that I | | was in charge of the investigation and gave me broad powers | and so on. | “Mr. Goldsmith. Why did he pick you? my balliwick anyway and because he had known me for. years as a polygraph operator and as a man who had successfully inves- tigated a number of very, very big operations and security problems. 1-111 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know any CIA case officer whose Mr. Scelso. I do not recall any such person. . Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Dave Phillips ever | Mr. Scelso. I.do not know that.. Mr. Goldsmith. Turning now to the. post-assassination i i 1 Mr. Scelso. I think it was the day after the assassina- { j i Mr. Scelso. He picked me primarily because it. fell into i Mr. Goldsmith. When you say it fell into your balliwick | 001893 ALDERSON RESORTING COMESAY ; ,
eo wy 2 s ! ae] ~ i ~ | - a . | w oy Si | = ow 7 ad a a: Pod Loma) = t 2 | = i = 04 S Ss 4 = 32 | re | = , \ = 13 | = i = i S- ta yy ia i S re i Y too pa y = 3 = wn 7 . i Ps a = 13 = fond Cc oe \ 3 La ‘ APs sf o4 124 . Ren i gs? i a Z aa i i i i 4 ia | } | 21 i ; | if i ul 4 yt ‘| i Docld: 32277215 Page 114 i-11l2 anyway; for the record, what was that balliwick? Mr. Scelso. I had a Branch then that included Mexico, and the Central American countries and Panama. Because Oswald had been in Mexico, he gave it to me. Mr. Goldsmith. Oswald had also been to Soviet Russia. Mr. Scelso. That is right. Mr. Goldsmith. Any reason why that person was not chosen? . Mr. Scelso. Helms had a way of doing things like this, particularly in my case. I had investigated the disappearance of the Chief of the West German Security Service in 1964 and | I had investigated a number of other giant operations of absolutely critical importance for him over the years, and | had come up, you know, with the right answers. Mr. Goldsmith. What was Helms' attitude towards the man on which the investigation was to be conducted? Mr. Scelso. Helms wanted everything. done right that -- he did not give me any detailed instructions. : Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever push you one way or another’ towards finding conspiracy or no conspiracy? Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Goldsmith. Did he ever pressure you, in any way, ; to get the job done within certain time limitations? Mr. Scelso. No. ' What. happened was -- as I say, Angleton kept on seeing 001894 SEGRE ALS ERSON Secont" ING COMPSAY
1-113. i I : the FBI and he also saw members of the Warren Commission, which | | | > f i Was in direct violation of Helms' instructions. Helms . | if invite me to these meetings. I called this to Mr. Helms' an Hee to make him stop doing this. Angleton would ‘not | attention. | So I worked as fast as I could with the material that I had and prepared a summary report of the events in Mexico rer) | and other things we knew about. Oswald, which was, in light C. 20024 6202) S5u~2345 oe] oO n. | of later events, very sketchy. | | Then, after a number of weeks -- I think it was around | Christmas, but it may have been in mid-January, Nicholas Uns tH Tan , | 12 | Retzenbach notified us that the Bureau's report had. been | given to him and asked the Agency to send people over to read it. So Birch O'Neal and I went over and read it. and it con- tained vast amounts of information which we had not known. . REPORTERS BUTELDTNG, | Mr. Goldsmith. Why was Birch O'Neal still involved in ! : vj enter | : a Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal was still involved in it 3 = : 1 | pecaue the CI stafi was helping with the investigation. | 5 | It had answers, for example, to the letter intercepts | i : ; ! a that went various places. They were the repository of letter. | I oe? 2243 . e oN intercepts Mr. Goldsmith. You said that the EBI report. contained a 1 Mr. Scelso. That is right. Just a lot of vital information Ww LSTy ! | © 24 \ lot of information that you did not know about? | erpRe T 7 001895 F ALSERSON REPORTING COMPA DocId:32277215 Page 115 ; ALSERSON OR omen
i that they had not disseminated to us. Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give some examples of that? 3 | Mrs Scelso. Yes. | e : | _ Details of Oswald's political activity in the United : | z ¢ | States; the pro-Cuban activity; the fact. that he had shot at. | 3 5 General Walker; the fact that diaries and biographical sketches, g y | autobiographical sketches of himself had been found among his FS 2 effects; and so on. . 5 | And so, in just about everything, the Bureau had deluged, a is { = 0 | us with hundreds, if not. thousands, df reports of people giv- | : 7 ing fragmentary bits of information, you see, and kept us a i i = i2 busy tracing the names and researching it, and so on; but : : | © : 12 | these vital things had never been communicated to me. Maybe | ; ta they were communicated to Angleton, but not to me. ; : is | It so happened that my report, my initial report #- | = 1s | actually I wrote an initial report about two days after the : 4 7 | assassination, which Mr. Helms took to President Johnson, the : 18 gist of which was, as far as we could see, Oswald was the | z a assassin and there was no indication that we had. that there | é 7 were other participants in the assassination; and there was ms eae no indication, visible indication, that he was a Soviet or a ! Cuban agent, even. though the possibility could not be exclu- | ded. And my later. report was more comprehensive, but was obviously, completely irrelevant in view of all of this Bureau gnformation. PRET 001896 COMPANY Docld: 32277215 Page 116
1-115 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a tension between the Agency and the Bureau by virtue of the Bureau having a much more \ ! | i i i { 4 if complete report than yours, and apparently not having given | you all. the information that had existed? | i | 2 ; | Mr. Scelso. I did not see any. I did not. see any 5 5 tension. : Everybody felt that this was the Bureau's case | S 7 | because they were in charge of watching over Oswald. That e f was their responsibility,i»not ours, and therefore we are not | ; 7 gging to harrass them, or anything like that. | . | : ‘| I personally felt a little put out when I discovered | S i g A that they had all of this information and had not. passed it | 2 2 | to me. Knowing the Bureau, I did not get upset about. this. i . i | © : 1 I was glad to have all of this information.and just at the : : - time that my report was. submitted, L had circulated it to : : |; | the important people, including Angleton, and a meeting was | = | calles and everybody was to discuss this case, discuss my 2 ; 7 | report. : z | I think that the day of the meeting, or the day before ! = ‘ , $ : 4 | the meeting, I had read the. Bureau's report in Katzenbach's | ¢ 1» | office and made a few notes and came back and said my report ! oy is irrelevant in view of all the added information, this thing | nos . ° = now takes on an entirely different dimension. Whereupon, | Helms -- Angleton started to criticize my report terribly.-- without pointing out any inaccuracies, it was so full of Tr aN ils AS ire) ia wrong things,. we could not possibly send it to the Bureau, and | : | SEGRE! Lo ‘ALRERSON REZORTING COMPANY Docld: 32277215 Page 117 ,
1-116 I just satuthere and I did not say a word. This was a typical | nN \ | | Angleton performance. I had invited him to comment on the wo report and he had withheld all of his comments until he got to ie the meeting whereupon Helms turned the operation, the investi- z 7 gation, over to Angleton's staff. 2 S| Meantime, I was up to my neck in Panama demonstrations : : and so on. i Mr. Goldsmith. Is the name Ann Egerton familiar to you? : : Mr. Scelso. Yes, it is. I've heard the name. : a Mr. Goldsmith. She was a woman who was a CIA analyst. Z 7 Mr. Scelso. Yes, sir, on Angleton's staff in Mexico. S 12 / Mr. Goldsmith. With Birth O'Neal? @ Z 12 Mr. Scelso. That is right. : is Mr. Goldsmith. She was the woman who opened up Oswald's : '¢ | 201 file. Did she have any involvement in the investigation = tof the assassination? 4 17 | Mr. Scelso. I suppose she did in Birch O'Neal's office, z \8 | probably Kept..the books for him and so on. i z a Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, you have no information | = | about that? | | an Mr. Scelso. No. i POW “XS ) my Mr. Goldsmith. What. about Charlotte Bustos? What involvement did she have? Mr. Scelso. Charlotte Bustos supported me in handling: Ww dan all the details of the. investigation, running traces on all ne pn cy 01898. Docld: 32277215 Page 113 ALSERSON RESORT! MS COMBONY py ra
1-117 the people that came up, and keeping track of the files, and | so on. es co) 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. We have been told -- the Committee has sy been told by two different sources formerly with the Agency = 7 that shortly after the assassination Charlotte Bustos found a . 4 | photograph thought to be of Oswald. . Do you know whether, in E | fact, such a photo was found? e . Mr. Scelos. I do not’recall any such thing... : 7 Mr. Goldsmith. If she had found it, would you have : | been the person she would have shown it to? : | Mr. Scelos. Absolutely. 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. You never saw such a photograph? | Mr. Scelos. Not that I recall. You are reasonably sure that it is not the unknown man? Mr. Goldsmith. That is correct. I will qualify my REPORTELS BOTEDENG , Ve S ~ | as | \s | answer and -say I am not reasonably sure of anything. I am basing my question upon testimony we have received from other. | 7. Mk. Scelos. It is possible that. she found a photograph | JOA Te STRERT, RS ig) individuals. | || Of him, that. the ONI. may have sent later. I do not think | there was anyone in our files. I do not recall one being i found. 23 | Mr. Goldsmith. You said shortly after the assassination 23 ithe report, in substance, said Oswald did it alone and we have : j + Y 24 | you wrote a report that. was submitted to the Presidént and i if | 001899 Docld: 3232377215 Page 119 ALDERSON Ree HS COMPAR
1-118. nothing to indicate to the contrary. 5 2 Mr. Scelso. Yes. 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think it was premature a point | to be issuing a report of that kind? | Z :| Mr. Scelso. No, because the President wanted it. He i i | : S| wanted a rundown on what we had and thought. The thing was 5 7 couched in such terms, we hedged. & 7 Mr. Goldsmith. is a copy of that report still available : 7 in Headquarters?| y : a | 1 = 1G | Mr. Scelso. It should be someplace. I gather that : a | the Church Committee did not find it either. It should have ! a i] . s 2 | been in Helms' files, or something.. ; Yd] = 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it uncommon for reports to get lost | 2 a at Headquarters? i : is | Mr. Scelso. Memoranda of this kind -- this was a = 1 memorandum, you see, about a page and a half, or two or : 4 "| three pages long. I. frequently had to write things like this | a to go to the White Houses Either J. C. King took them or | a | \ : 7 | Helms took them -- with my new electric typewriter. | S 20 | They wanted to know -- the President wanted something. . ! Koes Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. -- : re Is it common for things like that to get lost? tm ce] Mr. Scelso. Yes, it would be very uncommon. .I had a - file on the case, my own file in my own safe and it should HS AS ad ts be in there. And it should be in. Helms' files. 001900. Docld:32277215 Bage 120 ALDERSON RESCRT.