JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : NSC RECORD NUMBER : 145-10001-10180 RECORDS SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 68 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : NSC FROM : GORDON CHASE & Date : 06/25/98 Page : l Released under the John . Eennedy Wes5asgsination Records ollection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note}. ase#: NW 54214 Date: WO-10-2017 TO : TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, 12/19/63-10:55 AM DATE : 12/27/63 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : CUBA DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : 1B CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/10/98 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS NOJOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION REQU! CONCURRENCE OF HW 542714 DBocld:32977052 Page 1
THE WHITE HOUSE WAS SHINGTON, —pOP-SECREF—SENSIFIVE- December 27, 1963 | MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT - December 19, 1963 - 10:55 A.M. SUBJECT: Cuba Others Present: Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompson; Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; Assistant Secretary Martin; Jokn Crimmins; Acting Secretary Gilpatric; Secretary Vance; General Wheeler; Secretary Dillon, Director General Carter; Richard Helms : eputy Director Wilson; McGéorge Bundy; ers; cee Reedy; Gordon Chase. William The primary purpose of the meeting was to brief the President in depth about some of the basic Cuban issues. Essentially, the discussion described where we have been since January, 1963, where we are now, and where we can go. (An. outline. which was prepared for the discussion is attached. ) * 1. A large part of the meeyag wo : 2 Trent: oy ond on the U.S. and a general discussicn on@ C prc Government's economic der ‘Program. Essentially, 18 part of the dis- cus sion covered 6 areas. asd in Cuba, some of U.S. origin, reaches the island | yn Canada and Great Britain, HW 54214 DoclId:32977052..Page.2
2 ae __- ee eee wee u | intense = OER A td ae ae - TOR SECREF~SENSITIVE -2- The group agrecd that this is not an casy problem; Mr. Ball said that our allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have always had a diffcrent view of Free World/Bloc trade than we have had. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our efforts and that there are still things we can do. First, Mr. Crimmins noted that we could consider ways in which the new amendment to the Foreign As sistance Author- ization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry .commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program. Second, Mr. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive items would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on December 20; later, Mr. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World gov- ernments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities in- wolved in Free World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Home and Pearson. % (a) , identi FOP SECRET SENSITIVE —_ “ Aa ee i ei GRE OE he Re tt cae ene tteimennicitonninesnsoeTNNA RAHN LAP TANTS HW 54214 Docld: 329770
so aut there are a nurnbcr of disadvantages to eed plant attack. Firgt, Mences of total success (e.g. target destroyed, no one caught) are | hile the chances of partial success (target destroyed, peopl ewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caug) y admit their CLA connection. (General Carter belie his point was weak %& we get blamed for everything that happens in Cubaganyway.) Third, such an atta@k will be highly visible and will have a high nol vel. in this regard, Mr. finger in our direction. Fourth, M allsaid that it might 21 of Soviet troops from Cuba. Fifga; Ambassador Thompson said that the timing sé@med bad -- the Soviets now a red to be in a situation where they may be thinklieg of cutting back aid to C They will draw a lot of conclusions from the firlyt acts of President Jo n. An attack on a big Cuban target could give Cast® important leverage in his negotiations for more Sovict aid. oe ns 4 General Wheeler thought that, to i ‘tot ry to ae the Matanzas power plant have already been some free-lance rai that an air strike might cause retaliatj cause of the Soviet dimen risk sabotage efforts develop an air strike described CLA‘s program in aiding t% which wilt be operating from outside the’ One group, sta Rica and Guba. Both ill send ace Cuba to conduct internal sabotage and to establish contdg¢t with dis- Mr. Sites rele added that there are some disadvantage in Whese oper~ control, derriory See groups. Ce COPY Hw 54214 Docld: 32977052 Page. 4
oes esc a em Me # ca 8 oc aeneenmeineiestnmsasimnsion stich Ah hs = rc 2. Mr. Bundy gave a very quick briefing on some other aspects of the current Cuban Situation. (The group paused to read the attached CLA situation brief.) (a) With respect to Soviet/Cuban military strength on the island, Mr. Bundy noted that one of our primary objectives is to ensure that there is no reintroduction of offensive missiles. The camera is our best inspector and, so far as we know, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy added thet we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about mid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully. As for the Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly. (ob) Mr. Bundy noted, in passing, our anti-subversion efforts. The key to the problern is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American countries to counter the threat. Our efforts in the field of controlling travel between Letin America and Cuba are also important. : (c) Mz. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal contacts we have established with Castro himself. The initiative is on Castro's part and we are esser:ially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are ~~ - prepared to listen to what Castro has to say. Mr. Ball noted that such U.S. I Cuban contacts could kave an unsettling effect on Soviet/Cuban relations. 3. Mr. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses of action we : can take in the future to meke life difficult “ir Castro. . (b) Mr. Bundy s2id that we can take further unilateral shipping measures -- e.g. close ports and deny U.S. financed commodities to lines engaged in. Free World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through past experience that bilateral measures are more effective in reducing Free World shipping to Cuda. At the same time, we should not deceive ourselves. i ek SN a om. ESR A tag wat ca AE * Se ee * # § a 54214 Docld: 32977052. Page.5
HW 542714 2 ee ee ocr ere eee ee tte -5- We should recognize that the Soviets are capable of handling all Cuba's shipping nceds cven if we are able to eliminate Free World shipping to Cuba. (c) Mr. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in the near futuré, taking a more vigorous line than we have in'the past. He noted that in his November 18 speech, President Kennedy made two points about Cuba -- the first was designed to encourage anti-Castro elements within Cuba to revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in the Hemisphere. (d) Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures against Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be a high priority target. NOTE: At this point the President left the: room and there was a brief discussion ‘about the exiles in Florida. Mr. Crimmins said that resettlement remains our basic policy. It is true that the exiles feel that the pressure for their resettle- | ment is intense. In fact, it is no more intense now than it has been for some time. 5. On the President's return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduced the subject of _ the discovery in Venezuela of the Cuban arms cache. _ (a) Mr. Helms gave a graphic presentation of the link between the arms cache and a plot to upset the elections in Caracas. a (b) Mr. Martin explained the status of the OAS investigation of the arms eache. The evidence is convincing in showing that the arms were from Cuba. The OAS investigating team is still working on its report. Hopefully, it will be able to tie the arms cache into a general plot to subvert Venezuela. The. report | should be ready by about January 10. , (c). Mr. Bundy described the types of action we can hope to get in the OAS as a result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the surveillance action where we have essentially two basic choices -- we may want to push for a system which involves search and seizure of Cuban vessels on the high seas; this implics the possible use of force. Or we can push for a system involving the search and seizure of Cuban vessels in territorial waters; this evades the issuc of force. Mr. Bundy added that it is still too early to know how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force against Castro. We have put out feclers. 6. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of lifting travel restrictions on Americans who wish to goto Cuba. Mr. Ball noted that a great number of students want to DoclIda: 32977052 Page 6
~6- go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department recommends that we lift our travel restrictions. If we don't, we will probably - be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be embarrassing. Mr. Ball added that the State Department is tentatively opposed to lifting the travel restrictions because of the effect it will have on Latin American countries. We have beentrying to get the Latin Americans to impose restrictions on travel to Cuba; if we lift our own restrictions, our position will be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting with the Attorney General later in the day to talk about the subject. Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel restrictions anda policy of selective prosecution. Gordon Chase Oe mew e Oe ame ee me eres & eemmeeen—ne - HW 542714 DBocld: 32977052 Page *