“-54~ had had to do" with certain Mafia members. He did recall that the Phase II case officer had taken over the plans but that he did not "recall any special basis being used to try to get them to do an assassination." <——} He said that he did not recall “any plans that were approved or that were viable specifically directed at eliminating Castro, but that there were conver- sations about it, I haven't the slightest doubt." Gn response to a question concerning "Who might have been the driving forces from the White House in efforts to do -something about Castro" Helms responded, "Well, the principal driving force was the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. There isn't any question about this. Involved in this was” a group of individuals who were sort of hired and pulled together by Kennedy and Rusk and McNamara and McGeorge Bundy and ail those people to get on with this job and as I sit here and start to think about this, Califano was one of them. It ‘seems to me Lansdale, who had been successful in this kind | of operation out in the Far East was brought in for a while." z a “According to John McCone, the first time he learned about the existence of assassination plans was on August 16, 1963, when he was given a copy of the May 14, 1962 "Memorandum ‘for the Record” prepared for Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 34214 DoctId:32112745 Page 55
-55- - ee Cone particular events underlying the disclosure to. Director John McCone started on the evening of August 15, 1963. Stanley J. Grogan, an assistant to the Director in charge of press relations, received a telephone call at his house from a man who said he was Sandy Smith, a reporter for the Chicago Sun-Times. according to a memorandum for the record prepared on August 16, 1963 by Grogan, Sandy Smith "said he was working on a story-as a follow-up to the revelations by Joe Valachi, who is under close guard at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, who had named a man Giancana as the head gangster in Chicago. The man in Chicago recently went to court to have the FBI cease surveillance of him and his house and lost the decision. 5 | He said the Chicagoan reportedly at one time was used by CIA to find out what was going on in Cuba, but provided no information of value. Smith said he stated this to the Department of Justice and they would neither confirm or deny." Cine next morning the front page of the Chicago Sun- ‘Times contained a story by Sandy Smith with a headline "CIA Sou Giancana Help for Cuba Spying". The story started with the following paragraphs: "A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang boss: Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central intelligence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Times. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 56
Ore was a weird gangland spy case in which, government official said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro regime came into power in 1959. Cuwhat the CIA accomplished--if anything-~—by negotiating with the 53-year old Chicago rackets chief is one of many unexplained mysteries of the matter." Con August 16, 1963, Richard Helms gave to John McCone a memorandum dated August 16 under the subject "Sam Giancana" which stated: "Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year." - Richard Helms, when interrogated by the Commission staff, testified he did not have any recollection of the specific events. However, when he was shown his memorandum of August 16, 1963, addressed to John McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, he remembered that he had delivered that memorandum to Mr. McCone. Helms ‘did not recall whether or not he had seen the May 14, 1962 memorandum for the record sent to the Attorney General before the date he sent it to John McCone on August 16, 1963. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 37
-57- As previously noted, Lawrence Houston testified that when he first learned about the Phase I operation, which he said was in 1962 shortly before the May 7, 1962, briefing of the Attorney General, he told Colonel Edwards "that I thought the only thing to do was to go and tell the whole story to the Attorney General. So with the approval of the Director at that time--, well, it was '63, it must have been McCone." According to the CIA Inspector General investigation in 1967, the actual person with whom Houston discussed the matter was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General carters However, General Carter had no recollection of any discussion of assassination plans in the long distance telephone inter- view in which hypothetical questions were asked relating to newspaper charges. 3. Phase III -- Miscellaneous 1963 Schemes According to the 1967 Inspector General investiga- tion report, during 1963 several miscellaneous schemes were developed inside the Agency for possible use against Fidel Castro. Helms testified he was vaguely aware of some of these schemes, which he called "hairbrainea". There was no showing that any of the schemes extended beyond the discussion stage. One of these schemes involved discussions inside the CIA about trying to have General Donovan, who was negotiating with Fidel Castro for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, give to Fidel Castro a contaminated skindiving suit. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library _ AW 54214 Docld:32112745 Page 58
-58- It was known that Fidel Castro liked to skindive. _ The CIA plan was to dust the inside of the suit with a fungus producing madera foot, a disabling and chronic skin disease, and also contaminating the suit with tuberculosis bacilli in the breathing apparatus. There is no evidence that General Donovan knew of any such schemes developed inside the Agency. The scheme was dropped because Donovan on his own volition gave Fidel Castro an uncon- taminated skindividing suit as a gesture of friendship. Garing this period of time there were also discussions about preparing a booby-trap spectacular seashell which would be _ submerged in an area where Castro often skindived, The sea- shell would be loaded with explosives to blow apart when the shell was lifted. After investigation it was determined that there was no shell in the Caribbean azea large enough to hold a sufficient amount of explosive which was spectacular enough to attract the attention of Castro. Also, a midget sub- marine which was anticipated to be used for the emplacement of the seashell did not have a long enough operating range. “a. The Phase IV Plan - 1963-1965 In 1963 a CIA employee who was ‘fluent in Spanish was assigned on temporary duty with the Special Operations Group on Cuba. The employee is hereafter referred to as the Phase IV case officer. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:37112745 Page 59
—-59- “The task assigned to him "...was to collect intelligence and.to try to organize a group of military officers inside Cuba who were opposed to the Cuban regine-the Castro regime." Gn the latter part of 1963 he met, on a trip abroad, a Cuban with whom CIA personnel had been in contact since 1961. At this first meeting the Phase IV case officer said there was no discussion about any possible assassination of any Cuban leader. | . Gta subsequent meeting, which took place in Europe, the Phase IV case officer said that the primary discussion concerned "setting into more detail on the organization of a group inside Cuba which could be used in an internal coup against the Castro government. Othe subject of assassination was never raised by me. It was never discussed in that context. In dis- cussing the coup and how a coup would be carried out, the, this particular contact did raise the possibility and in his mind the very real possibility that there would be bloodshed, and that somebody would be killed. Their, or his, opinion was that to-even get the internal revolt, a coup, underwav that the leadership--the top leadership--would have to be neutralized. Specific assassination of any of the people, it was not discussed in those particular terms." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 60
-60- Gecording to the Phase IV case officer, the Cuban held a relatively high position in the Cuban govern- ment. The Cuban "requested a meeting...a high level policy maker in Washington, specifically mentioning Robert Kennedy as one of the people with whom he would like to talk, to get some assurance that Washington was serious about proceeding with this type of an operation.” s ao . . The Cuban also said "that they would’ need some help in-arms probably-in getting started, in kicking off the coup." The Cuban mentioned high powered rifles and scopes and said "they felt that they could capture suf- ficient arms to carry on once they started." Gubsequently, a senior CIA officer travelled to. Europe to meet the Cuban and "assured him...that the U.S. Government was serious about -this operation..." and "that the U.S. Government was prepared to support the coup and that when they launched the coup as soon as they established themselves in any reasonable manner inside Cuba that the U.S. Government would support them." @he next meeting took place on November 22, 1963 in Europe. The Cuban contact requested "some type of Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:3271127745 Page 61 —
‘-61- of esoteric gadget with which he would be able to defend himself" if there were a confrontation directly with Castro: "He had in mind some sort of a pellet pen or any- thing that was not a hand weapon that he could carry with him" into any conference with Castro. Gia . . Although the Agency did not develop such a device, it did develop a ballpoint pen which had a hypodermic needle inside that when you pushed the lever, the needle came out and poison could be injected into someone. The Phase IV case officer showed the pen to the Cuban contact on No:':mnber 22, 1963. The Cuban contact declined the gadget "because of the close proximity with which he would have to get to a person if anything developed in the form of a confronta- tion with him." Instead, the Cuban asked for weapons, and the case officer told the Cuban "that a cache of weapons | - would be put down for him in Cuba.” | on. One or two caches of weapons, including high- LO powered rifles with scopes, were subsequently placed down in Cuba. In addition, according to the Phase IV case officer, he delivered several hundred dollars to help the Giban contact with his living expenses, while in Europe. Te was around $1,000 at one time, no more than that." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327117745 Page 62
~62- Originally, the Cuban contact had been a Castro supporter and had been a member Of one of the groups that overthrew Batista. However, “he became disenchanted with Castro" shortly ater Castro took over because of "the harsh police state policies that were being carried out." @he Phase IV case officer broke off contact with the Cuban in’the latter part of 1964 and was reassigned to another task in early 1965. The Cuban contact then was turned over to a Cuban exile group. ‘According to the 1967 CIA Inspector General investigation {report, CIA support was withdrawn from the Cuban in 1965 because too many people knew about him and his plan. Gn March 1966 a. Cuban leader was arrested and confessed to receiving rifles with telescopic sites from the CIA to be used for the assassination of Castro, according to a "Prensa Latina" news release. The man said he received $100,000 toward this plan. | cha memorandum. to the Secretary of State after ‘this news story appeared, the CIA said that the contact was recruited to collect intelligence of military activi- ties and objectives in Cuba. The Agency said: "There is no truth to the allegations that the CIA paid $100,000 or Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 63
.-63- any other sizeable sum of money" as claimed in the Cuban newspapers following the confession of the contact. The Agency also said "the Agency was not involved" with either of the two men arrested by Cuban authorities "in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro as claimed in the Prensa Latina news release, nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons. to attempt such an act..." The memorandum to Sec- retary Rusk was signed by Richard Helms and was dated March 6, 1966. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 64
—-64- DRAFT GRAY/sin 5/22/75 E- The Dominican Republic -l. Summary and Conclusion ; In late 1960 and 1961, the United States, having a . abandoned its policy of nonintervention in the Dominican Republic, sought to bring about the overthrow of the regime of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo and the establishment of a moderate successor government. To accomplish this result several.measures were undertaken on the diplomatic level and the Special Group (predecessor of the Forty Committee) approved a program of covert action as well. At their direction the CIA encouraged a group of internal dissidents along with several exile organizations. On May 30, 1961, members of the internal. group assassinated Trujillo. | There was no direct American participation in the assassination. The idea originated with the Dominicans; | they acquired some of the weapons on their own; and they did the detailed planning. They were never subject to \ American supervision or control. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 65
—-oo- On the other hand, CIA-and State Department officers in the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the plotters before the assassination, and they were well aware of the group's lethal intentions. The CIA had told the group of practical problems with several earlier assassination plans; it had offered to train a member of the group in the use of ~~ 8 explosives to kill Trujillo. As a gesture of American support, three revolvers ané three carbines, along with limited supplies of ammunition, were passed to the plotters about two months before the assassination. One of the carbines was reportedly left at the scene of the crime. Four submachineguns were also sent to the Dominican Republic by diplomatic pouch. They were with- held from the plotters because of last-minute State Department objections. It appears that high-level State Department and White House officials first learned guns had been provided to potential assassins some six weeks after the transfer, and | about two and a half weeks prior to Trujillo's death. A state- ment of policy was prepared and approved by the President, reading "we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations." The preparation of this message, and the required coordination, Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 66
consumed about two weeks. There is no evidence of any effort during this period to recover the weapons or other- wise interfere with the assassination plans. The policy statement was cabled to the Dominican Republic on May 29, the day before the successful assassination attempt. Both the Consul General and the CIA Station Chief in Ciudad Trujillo promptly protested this change in the policy which they had followed in the belief it had been approved by appropriate authority. Before these cables were received “in Washington, Trujillo was dead. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 67
-67- 2. (Proposed) General Conclusion and Recommendation The Comission concurs in the position taken in the policy statement. We have concluded that there was an- jmproper level of American involvement in the death of Generalissimo Trujillo. That is so even though the assassins might have been able to procure equivalent weapons from other sources. We also conclude that despite the apparent good faith of the persons concerned, there was inadequate consideration of the risks of such involvement and inadequate supervision and coordination of the operation. . We recommend that in the future, weapons should be supplied to plotters of a coup or revolution only ir the rarest .of circumstances, if at all. In passing on such activities the approving authority should consider carefully the potential damage to the foreign relations of the nation ana the feelings of the American people i£ such activities become known. In our judgment eventual disclosure is inevitable. The procedures of the CIA should be modified to re- quire the concurrence of the Department of State before weapons, ammunition, explosives, and similar items are transmitted by diplomatic pouch. The treaty obligations of the U.S., including particularly those under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relation should be observed and fulfilled in good faith. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 66-
. "067 3- The Chronology a. The Background Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Re: public in 1950. . By 1960 he was notorious because of the corrupt. ; regressive nature of his regime, because of his systematic use of torture and murder as tools of government, and because of his intervention in the affairs of other nations. The country was in considerable turmoil as the result of several attempts to overthrow the government, sponsored by other ‘Latin American countries. ° The policy of the United States at the beginning 1960 was to refrain from actions which would hasten Trujillo's downfall but to identify, develop, and encourage a moderate group which would take power in the event of Trujillo's death, flight, or overthrow. This policy of non-intervention, although clearly required by treaty, convinced many Latin Americans that the United States supported and maintained the Trujillo regime. Leaders such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, whose support the United States badly wanted in connection with operations against Castro, conditioned their support on U.S. assistance in toppling Trujillo. In April the President approved contingency planning for a more active U.S. role in the event’ the political situation in the Dominican Republic continued to deteriorate. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 69
/-69- b. The Rifles In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican R . public returned to Washington for consultations. Both State Depa ment and CIA files indicate that he reported the dissidents needed weapons, particularly a "small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses." The Ambassador has no present recollection of any such request. He is confident that he made no serious effort to obtain them. Nevertheless, the request went forward. Near the end of June, according to CIA files, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- “American Affairs approved the provision of "a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene," and requested that they be supplied at the earliest possible moment. Neither the CIA officer who obtained this approval nor the Assistant Secretary, now both retired, has any recollection of this meeting. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 70
- =70- c. Explosives “On June 24, 1960, Trujillo sponsored an unsuccess attempt on the life of the President of Venezuela; as a result the United States and other OAS countries severed diplomatic relations in August. Consular relations were retained. | The Commission Staff interviewed the foreign serv officer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission before the severance of relations, and as Consul General thereafter.. it was his recollection that the. dissidents had no definite “assassination plans in mid 1960, although they did speak of that course as the only way out of the conditions under which they lived. Tt was not until early 1961, as he recalls, that the dissidents began formulating specific plans to kill .Trujillo. The cables and memoranda of the period tend to confirm this recollection. — | Nevertheless, the CIA continued at intervals duri ‘1960 to discuss with the dissidents means for the assassination of Trujillo: |A memorandum in October 1960 reflects that the dissidents planned to kill Trujillo with a bomb, dctonated from a remote point, and then to take over the nation by means of an armed uprising, coordinated with other paramilitary action. A more detailed proposal along similar lines appears to have been provided by the dissidents in December. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld: 32112745 Page 71
On December 29, 1960, the Deputy Director for Pl; presented the Special Group with a program for covert action to bring about Trujillo's overthrow. A portion of the program called for Agency and consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo to continue to work with the internal dissidents to promote an uprising and the establishment of a moderate pro-U.s, successor to the Trujillo regime. The plan, as initially approved by the Special Group, contained no provision for- supplying arms or explosives .to the internal dissidents. ‘ Two weeks later, the Department of State, on its ‘motion, obtained Special Group consent to have the internal dissidents furnished "limited supplies of small arms and other equipment," meaning explosives, subject to the condition that these materials be provided to the dissidents at a point -outside the country itself. The internal State Department memorandum which led to this proposal stated there would be © no thought of toppling the government by any such "minor measure," but some sabotage potential would be placed in the. hands of the pro-U.S. opposition with a corresponding boost to their morale and their opinion of the United States. The station and the consulate were informed of .the Special Group action on January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower Administration. ‘President Kennedy was informed of the Special Group action not later than mid-February. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 72
-72- The Commission finds no reason to believe that a3 member of the Special Group intended to authorize the furnish- ing of assassination weapons. However, those CIA officials who had been involved in dealings with the dissidents very likely believed that the Special Group had authorized support of the‘ planned assassination and armed uprising. aed as Revolvers. During the early months of 1961 the CIA Station and the consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo kept in close touch with the dissidents, and they were aware of their various schemes to assassinate Trujillo. Although these officials apparently took no active role in the development of plans, they did on occasion discuss and criticize plans developed by the Gissidents. In mid-February, two members of the dissidents' © "Action Group", which was to carry out the actual assassination, came to the United States, They met with both CIA and State Department officers. During these meetings they stated repeatedly that the key to the success of the plot would be the assassination of Trujillo. The evidence is insufficient to permit a conclusion how far this knowledge went within the State Department. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page T3
73-. In March matters took an active turn. In a cable on March 4, a letter on March 16, and an airgram on March 22 , the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans for Trujillo's assassination were coming to a head. He requested additional authority to supply the pro-U.S. | dissidents with weapons. | | Similar requests were made by the CIA Station Chief of his headquarters. Three times headquarters responded that it could not comply with these requests because the restrictions imposed by the Special Group precluded the introduction of arms into the Dominican Republic by Americans. . On March 22, the CIA Station Chief renewed his request ‘that headquarters send him three .38 calibre revolvers anc ammunition by diplomatic pouch. He stated that without some show of support the United States would lose the dissident group entirely, while if it supplied weapons it might have some control over the timing of their use. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 74
HW 542714 -74- On the same day, March 22, representatives of the CIA met with the State Department officer who served as their point of contact with the Department's Bureau of Inter- American Affairs. .Three days later, on March 25, the Deputy Director for Plans cabled: the station setting forth United States policy with respect to the Dominican Republic and stating that the revolvers and ammunition would be sent by diplomatic pouch in the near future. There is nothing in either CIA or State Depart- -Ment files to indicate whether the Department was consulted on th decision. The memories of the participants are hazy on the matter, but there are indications that the CIA did discuss the introduction of handguns into the Dominican Republic and believed it obtained approval. The then Deputy Director for Plans testified that as the territorial restriction on delivery of weapons was initially imposed at the request of the Department of State, he would have considered the State Depart- ment's willingness to waive the restriction as adequate authority and probably would not have returned to the Special Group for formal approval. He observed that the members o£ the Group or their staffs might have been advised informally. \ Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library DoclId: 32112745 Page 75
The use of a diplomatic pouch to send weapons for such purposes was prohibited by regulations of the CIA's — Clandestine Services, and it is also illegal under inter- national law. The Deputy Director of Plans approved the waiver of the internal regulations. There is nothing to indicate that the Department of State was informed of the use of the pouch, and the fact that the March 25 cable instructed the Chief of Station not to advise the Consul General of the use of the pouch suggests that the CIA acted unilaterally in this regard. The CIA files. indicate that the revolvers were ‘passed to the dissidents, and the Department of State files in- dicate that one was passed by the Consul General and the other two by Agency officers. Neither the Consul General nor the former Chief of Station has any particular recollection of the matter. | e.  Carbines . On March 26, the day after CIA decided to fur- nish the revolvers, the station cabled that it had found three M-1 carbines in the consulate, left ‘behind by departing naval personnel. It requested magazines for the weapons and permission to pass them to the dissidents. On March 29 the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans responded that’ he was pouching the magazines, and that headquarters was "inclined to Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:3271127745 Page 76
' =76- favor" passing the weapons and ammunition. Another meeting was held with the Department of State on March 31. The State Department memorandum makes no mention of any discussion either of the furnishing of ammunition or of authority to pass the weapons, but the Deputy Director for Plans granted. authority to pass the carbines the same. day. Both the State Department liaison officer, who prepared the memorandum of: the meeting, and the Consul General are clear in their recollection that the State Department in Washington did not learn of the pass of the carbines until the Consul General was in Washington several weeks after the pass took .- place. Nothing in CIA files indicates that this decision was coordinated in advance with the Department of State. It is possible that the CIA understood its initial authorization with respect to the handguns to extend to the carbines as well. It is also possible that CIA decided the Special Group restriction on importation of weapons did not apply, as the carbines were already inside the Dominican Republic. CIA cabled its Station Chief on April 5 to reques the Consul General not to comment in his correspondence with the Department that the arms and ammunition, were being passed. A reassuring reply.from the Consul General was received two Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page Ti
days later. The CIA Station Chief, who would not have Leen involved in any coordination at the headquarters level, speculated that this injunction may have been designed to keep the State Department from knowing "officially" that the weapons were being passed. | It is clear that the coordination on the deci- sion to. provide the carbines was inadequate. It is impossible ‘to determine from-this evidence where the fault lies. £. Submachine Guns f As early as March 20, the consulate and the sta- tion in Ciudad Trujillo had been informed: that the assassins in- tended to kill Trujillo when he visited his mistress--substantiall the plan followed some two months later. Although the plan | :,0riginally called for Trujillo's dispatch inside his mistress! residence using silenced weapons, the group requested five M-3 submachineguns and 1500 rounds of ammunition for self defense in case the assassination plans went awry and there was a firefight with Trujillo's security forces. In its March 25 cable, headquarters replied that it was prepared to provide these weapons when the dissidents developed the \ Capacity to receive them at sea or in a cache on the coast, Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 7é
~78— but that for security reasons they could not be sent by pouch. “The Chief of Station returned to Washington for consultations in early April. He was able to convince his superiors that the pouch was the only feasible and secure means of getting the weapons into the Dominican Republic for delivery to the dissidents. The Deputy Director for Plans approved on April 10, and the pouch was sent on April 14 but with the restriction that the weapons not be passed without further approval. The files show that there was ‘no coordination with the “spartment of State in Washington. - Because of the Bay of Pigs landing on April 17, the station and the consulate were never given authority to supply the weapons to the dissidents and they never did so. On May 2, as the result of repeated entreaties from the station and the consulate, the Deputy Director for Plans approved a cable for the DCI's release, stating that as it appeared the Action Group was prepared to act whether or not the submachineguns were provided, the station was authorized to pass them for the additional protection of the group. Apparently someone decided this decision should not be made without the consent of the Department of State, for on May 3 Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library Fad HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 7T9
~ =79— the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division met with Professor Adolph Berle, Chairman of the Interagency Task Force on Latin America. According to Berle's memorandum of the interview, confirmed by one of the witnesses, the initial presentation stated the group wished the arms in order to overthrow Trujillo. After some examination, Berle determined that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo, and that the guns were wanted for, that purpose, Berle responded that he ‘could not care less for Trujillo, but that the United States did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination piots anywhere, any time. The Agency officer, who had been ina supervisory position with respect to this effort for approximately a year, told Berle he felt the same way. It may be that the CIA tried to get Berle over-— ruled; on May 5 a cable informed the ‘station that a high-level “State Department decision on the submachineguns was pending. | Nothing in the files indicates what this cable might have referred to. In any event on May 8 the station was informed that the State Department had disapproved passage of the submachineguns, and this ended the matter. \ . wee Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DocId:32112745 Page 30
~6GU- g- The Policy Statement In mid-May, as a result of increasing indications | that events in the Dominican Republic were reaching a climax, . ! the White House requested situation reports and contingency plans. This exercise was overseen by a member of the National Security Council Staff. A CIA briefing paper prepared for this purpose stated that the three revolvers and the three carbines had been passed to the dissidents for their use in personal -defense "attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize ‘frujillo." The report implied that both the revolvers and “the ammunition had bezn in the consulate with the carbines, and therefore the limitations on the Special Group authorization technically did not apply. The CIA liaison officer at the State Department called to his superiors' attention the fact that weapons had. al- ready been passed, and apparently submitted a memorandum outlining the reasons why the United States should not be involved in this activity. | Among them were that the United States Government should not lend itself to direct political assassination, that the moral posture of the United States could ill afford further tarnishing in the. eyes of the world, that the United States would have encouraged the action, Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:3271127745 Page 61
supplied the weapons, effected the delivery, and then turned over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen, and that the United States could not afford a precedent which might convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons. On May 15 a joint CIA-State Department memorandum was sent the President's National Security. Adviser informing him that the plans of the pro-U.S. group were well advanced in the direction of ousting Trujillo "by any means." This memorandum did not call attention to the fact that the United States had supplied weapons to the group. In the midst of these discussions, the Consul General, who had been in Washington for consultation, cabled on h: return to the Dominican Republic that the dissident group planned to "execute action against Trujillo" that evening. The Department replied that it would consider this timing particularly unfortunate in view of the juxaposition of the Consul General's return from Washington to the Dominican Republic and the inferences which might be drawn therefrom. This exchange of cables was furnished to the NSC staffer. The state of the covert action program in the Dominican Republic was. discussed in the Special Group on May 18, and again on May 25. The Commission has not had access to the minutes. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 62
-82- On May 24, the State Department liaison officer provided the Under Secretary with a draft cable, stating that. the need to dissociate the United States from obvious inter= vention, and even more so from political assassination, overrode the need to secure credit with the Dominican dissidents and with Latin Anierica generally. This draft was approved at high levels in the CIA and the State Department, and was sent to the White House for Presidential review. After some redrafting in the White House, the final version in another hand, stated "We must not run risk of U.S. association wit political assassination, since U.S. as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassination." This version was | approved by the President in Paris and cabled to the Dominican Republic. It arrived the day before Trujillo's death on May 30. on June 1 the State Department instructed its Consul General, if he could do so "most inconspicuously", to destroy any records concerning contacts with the plotters and any related matters. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 63
F. Conclusion resident Ford has firmly announced that assasSina- tion is not and should never be a tool of United States policy. The Commission joins in this statement. It is against the. ‘@eéustitutional and moral principles for which this republic stinds for there to be any direct or indirect participation of any agency of the United States Government in any plans involving the assassination of any person in peacetime. . Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page é4