Page Seven (Comment: The observations quoted above of the 1967 I.G. Report are extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill modus operandi originated with Gian- cana, not the Agency, a point which is crucial to the final _conclusions presented below. Secondly, Trafficante is. -identified as ‘having access to and providing’for the putative assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent whi¢h his self-serving | role description of "interpreter". His ability to recruit Orta apparently was directly tied to his former gambling empire associations which formed a constant pattern for all. his alleged conduct both during and after his Cuban days.)° (See Trafficante profile.) (Comment: Speculation concerning Orta's role. arose during the Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank Sturgis, written by Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News. Sturgis was quoted as Saying, "the third (assassination) schete involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had access to the Prime Minister's office," Sturgis said, "I knew Fidel's! private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy." (American Embassy in Havana). What was disturbing to the writers of the 1977 Report was the fact that Orta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the. Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Sturgis with Trafficante and with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante's, Norman Rothman. (See Rothman profile) Coupled with Sturgis' alleged mob rela- tionships is the allegation that Sturgis had a role in inspecting | the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government. and could have developed an interest with Orta in receiving gambling kickbacks. A second aspect of Meskill's news series concerned a Claim of Marita Lorenz that she had acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 in attempting to poison Castro, which dovetailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Giancana's electronically | surveilled conversation in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a "pill' in some drink or food of Castro's". (Memo, Hoover to DCI A.H., DD 10/18/60) | The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows: rn" (p.21) It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be HW 53060 developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities..,.” Additional considerations: Docld: 3227727935 Page 13 >
HW 53060 Page Eight 1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own .. prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been on-going, when CIA reactivated plan in 1962, April. 2. Syndicate operators could have had activities 7 such as these in New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976. 3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of the syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate. 4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He pro- bably knew Orta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Orta assumed role of assassin. ; oo If there was an earlier operation with Orta, it was not CIA; could have been earlier operation of syndicate. Sturgis could have known or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Orta returned there. Neither the 1967 I.G. Report or the SSC. Interim Report can pinpoint the precise date on which the Agency processed the poison pills which O'Connell delivered to Roselli. ‘(In- terim Report, p. 80) The chain of custody, according to the 1967 I.G. Report was for the lethal pills to be delivered from Roselli to Trafficante. Although the next intervening steps remain a mystery, Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba in late February- early March 1961. (Interim Report, p. 27; Interim Report, p. 80) (Comment : The Senate Interim Report ‘reported the version of Joe Shimon whose memory was that the money and pills for the _ Operation were delivered at a meeting at the Fountainbleau Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by "Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante and the Cuban." (Interim Report, p.81) Shimon's story is filled with vivid details, which are documented on p. 82 of the Report, but his credibility is subject to serious question as his account is not shared by anyone else connected. with the plan nor is his relationship with Roselli, Giancana, or Trafficante appear as "cozy" as he would lead one to believe. It is also apparent that Shimon was a. source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971, which fixed the date of the passage of the poison at the Fountainbleau by Roselli as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few weeks later. Docld: 32272935 Page 14
HW 53060 . could or would not attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently .. Page Nine The real problem with Shimon's story is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Orta “y unknown to” Shimdtibefore his "leak" to Anderson and his Senate testimony.) “5°. vito ti te FFE of ip pile! unl. a ghee “ bY ¥ fe ae tele fa (Comment: One additional fact concerning Orta's in- ability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Orta "lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington"...It would seem though that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his access to Castro. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27) With the failure of Orta to produce the desired results, the project was at a standstill until, once again, Santo Trafficante assumed command. Roselli told O'Connell that. "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement might be able to accomplish the assassination. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 29; Interim Report, p. 80) (Comment: The exile leader was, of course, Tony de Varona, who was the subject of speculation in an FBI memorandum of 18 January 1961 associating him with receiving financial aid from American gangsters for anti-Castro activities which pre-dated the CIA operation. , At the time of his introduction into the CIA-mob plots, de Varona was already being funded by the Agency through the Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in CIA planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion which was imminent. Interest in de Varona was also being expressed in 1960-61 by Mike McLaney whose advertising agency was engaged in promoting Varona's image in collaboration with McLaney's_ friend "Chirri" or "Chilli" Mendoza (Mendoza is described in Trafficante's FBI files as a’close Cuban associate.)) Completing the picture of support for Varona is the _ promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini, McLaney and . Lansky business associates, who were reportedly working through a Washington, D. C. public relations firm, Edward K. _Moss and Associates. Moss had previous CIA associations and was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini benefactors with the understanding that this group would have "privileged treatment 'in the Cuba of the future.' Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 30) Docld: 32272935 Page 15
HW 53060 Page Ten The Lansky influence using the Cellini brothers as a "front" is particularly interesting in light of Varona's admission that Jorge Pujol arranged a mutiny in Miami in approximately 1960 wherein Meyer Lansky offered to financially "back" Varona's efforts to "educate the American people about Castro, which may be a euphenism for anti-Castro plots. (See Varona transcript.) The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency organized crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Varona, pro- bably independently, as an individual who had the potential of uniting the multitude of exile groups who were in a continual internecine turmoil. De Varona was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. Government and criminal syndicate to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors. (See Varona testimony). Although de Varona has no specific memory of meeting -‘Trafficante, the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an "interpreter" in several meetings attended by de Varona, “Roselli, Giancana and other exiles. These meetings were ar- ranged by Rafael "Macho" Gener, a Trafficante gambling partner from Havana who continued to serve Trafficante in Miami during the 1960's. Trafficante claimed that Roselli had previously recruited Gener, but this appears unlikely in view of Traf- ficante's. long-standing friendship with Gener in Cuba, and Roselli's admission to O'Connell that Trafficante would pro- vide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Orta, who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961. (Comment: Paralleling the situation at the Senate hearings during 1975 when Roselli's description of Trafficante's role changed from his "courier" characterization in 1960-61 as reported by the Agency to Trafficante's "interpreter" state- ment, is the recent interview with Gener who agrees with Trafficante's Committee testimony that he was an intermediary with de Varona only for Roselli. The net result in both instances is to minimize Trafficante's exposure. (C£. Fonzi interview with Gener, May , 1978 and Trafficante testimony, October 7, 1977.)) If ambiguity. exists as to the specifics of the intro- duction of de Varona into Phase One of the Castro assassination plots, more confusion surrounds de Varona's actual. participa~ tion prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I.G. Report indi- cates that de Varona attempted a second poison nr; before the Cuban, invasion but Roselli was positive that only one at- tempt torta's) was made. He was also positive that he delivered Docld: 322727935 Page 16