14-00000 “@* Each time NOSENKO gave CIA the story of the recruitment of (ix) CARDELLA ’ NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was an admini- strative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA. The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO could say nothing more about hin. , a a CIA files show that Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. Other than the fact that a microphone was discovered in CARDELLA‘'s Moscow Em- bassy office in 1964, no significant collateral information concerning him is available. (x) VAN LAFRTHEM NOSENKO identified George VAN LANSTHEM as an Assistant Air. Attache at the U.S. Embassy against whom an operation was at- tempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that during this period a, Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquain- tance with VAN LAETHEM which could be followea up in Moscow. She succeeded in meeting him end gave him her address-and tele- phone: number. Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said tnat he had heard about this from P.P. PANKRATCV, the case officer handling LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case officer respon- sible for VAN LAETHEM, as he was for all members of the Air At- tache's office at that time. NOSENKO knew of no other interest or activity concerning VAN LAERTHEM. CIA records show that VAN LALTEEM was not an Assistant Air Attache but an Assistant Army Attache, serving in Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953.* As cryptographic security officer and officer in charg? of the Embassy code recom, he had super- ‘wisory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant Roy RHODES until the latter's departure from Mos- cow in January 1953; VAN LAETHEM‘s duties also carried respon- sibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy. ** He was again in Mescow from 19 March to 19 May 1955 (at a time when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for U.S. Army Attaches). Although this trip was always intended to be -, only a TOY, it was represented to the Soviets as a PCS Assistant Army Attache assignment because of the extremely sensitive na- ture of his’ business there. He was project officer for the en- tire electronics program at the Embassy, and went to Moscow to review the operations including the planned use of the new ’ electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE, and . a STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (see above). -® “Although VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in March 1953, just at the time NOSENKO said he: entered the KGB;: he was succeeded in his post by Walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed full responsibility. - Thus, the fact of his osi- e nt - tion as Assistant. Army Attache_and MULE’S. predecessor would - ‘presumably be available to NOSENKO. - . a pene ee nce edn FO < PANDREY® in the June 1962 meetings, he related it to Roy RHODES. ‘Bach reference to Roy RHODES was followed by a statement that <*""%¢-was through RHODES that the KGB learned of the existence of , special electronic equipment :in the U.S. Embassy. RHODES had no access to such information. coe, ce TE sa mate tiabie ite gibin LMI bea ct hy eaede cde nrebtee AE hee Seamaul, co eed nd iadlttbaa
‘ waS created to cperate with and against foreign travellers. 2. Soviet Homosexual Agents 107, D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department) 1. introduction | By his account’ NOSENKO served in the American-Canadian-: British Section of the Tourist Department,* KGB Second Chief Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly after, the department in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in that directorate in January 1960. He was.a case officer | until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958. In statezents made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimed to have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 1966 he said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection. NOSENKO has described his personal and- direct partici- pation in the section’ Ss activities as consisting of:. t i -Recruitment of two Soviet nationals as homosexual i agents,** with NOSENKO their handler from the outset until 7 ot i Ban Lahr asbbninide s+ they were dropped in 1962 or 1963. ~Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents tar- getted against American tourists; their number varied from eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist. i | | -Operations involving :4 foreigners who visited the USSR for various lengths of time. { vn cna Robb od 0 -Recruitment and handling of the American Express Com- pany representative in Moscow, whom NOSENKO continued to meet following his reassignment in January 1960. ~Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB, and subsequent par- ticipation in the KGB investigation of OSWALD's activities in the USSR. Each of these categories is discussed separately below. Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner ina public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some operational value. The KGB therefore mounted an operation which verified this possibility in 1987:. A homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked. VOLKOV into a compromising ‘situation... Then VOLKOV, who had - . previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated; ° ve en Was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interro- - te cated him, he admitted his” homosexuality and agreed to ; ” *These components | are also known as the. First’ Section: and - . '; Seventh Department, respectively. : .  **This term refers te agents whose homosexuality. is ex- . ploited py the KGB against certain male targets. .
i «tee a. a i to specific targets, they had the general assignment of recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your i never used against targets in the U.S. Embassy; but, NOSENKO : two agents participated was: during January - 1962. .:M“mable to tell. where they livéd in Moscow, their family NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year. to-recruit a hozo~ sexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not. recalled}. ‘ YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the pur- pose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents: "Although I am a chief of section there 1 have all sorts of.agents. I have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls,  . ; nO oa beautiful giris, whom I can use as I like--anything you is want. I have homosexuals, pederasts, and, in particular, I have one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both : you and the British. I permitted this pair to work in. i H i 3 3 + general [without specific assignments]. 1 send them.out to. look on their own. I give them money and tell them te go " 4 out. *Stroll about. Here are theater tickets. ‘Look around, . i 3 but only Americans. Look for American pederasts.' They are i 4 & couple, that is, they love each other, They are able to do anything desired, cither active or passive, anything. They call me at ‘night: ‘Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister : i so-and-so here. He wants to go to bed with us.'' I say: : : "Well, let him. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next i day they go to a special hotel room. Wo make photographs. ; : Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it? : Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not-- . depending on his position, what he can give, what he can ' tell. If he can give something, I say: ‘Well, let's have a go figrat'|. After this, I speak to these boys: ‘Well, go to bed with him again, one or both of you, as you wish. Do whatever is wanted. All this is seen [observed by the KGB]. The [hotel] administrator enters. ‘What are you doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is drawn up. ‘Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the Chief arrives: ‘What's up. Aha, I see.' Well, then a con- versation begins: ‘Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of at abe oe apres Sag hate ad at friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they help but find out?..." —~ reamneren| < . - sree ve, j¢ Pare ROCCO TS USNS oe) When NOSENKO moved from the Tourist Department to the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They were mo said, the Tourist Department “used to call me on homosexual prospects.” VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB . agents until some time in 1960 or 1961, after which they Boe reese 8 eould not be used further since they had become too well known, and NOSENKO finally retired their files to KGB archives in 1962 or 1963. The last operation in which these 4 fag aa ase eats os Jutg wee During interrogation on these agents, NOSENKO has been “ situation, or other such details. He said that he never a be met either in a safehouse (always on the street) and never - > met either of them alone, without: the other being present...
“109. NOSENKO has described eleven KGB 5 approaches’ to. Americans © . based on compromising evidence obtained with the assistance . OF VOLKOV and/or YEFREMOV and several other cases in which Americans. were suspected of béing homosexuals on the basis tion of these two. Additionally, [I at least. six Americans, not reported on by ave had contacts with one or both of these agents _ _in Moscow. : "With one or possibly two exceptions, all the contacts of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported by NOSENKO. or other sources took place during the period from April to” November 1959. The known exception was the KGB approach to W.E. JOHNSON in January 1962; the possible exception was | the contact with the American psychiatrist, which took place in 1959 or early 1860 but cannot be dated precisely. Finally, NOSENKO has described the contacts between VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, and the American Robert BARRETT in the. summer of 1959 but does not know of their contacts in the summer of 1961, shortly before BARRETT was approached on the basis of con- ' promising information obtained in 1959. ** “3, Other Soviet Agents The Tourist Department, just established when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid--1955, had no agent network for operations against American and British tourists. Conse= quently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case (officers had to “start from the beginning." e As a first step, NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow officer to a number of “trusted persons" in Inturist;: these were not agents, he explained, but "just persons known to the KGB so that a KGB mana could approach one of them with guestions about somebody or something." NOSFNKO began to collect information on these individuals and others with the aim of formalizing their recruitment; by the end of 1955, he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all of then Inturist interpreters. During the following four years, thé number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied: Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another, . Some would leave Inturist, and “things were sort of changing ‘@ll the time, back and forth." In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about 12, in 1958 about . ‘eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return to the American Department) he had approximately 12 to 14. -NOSENKO has provided information on five of these agents, all of whom he says he recruited from within Inturist during» 1855. These were: — ave «Larissa SOBOROVA: An: Inturist interpreter and. one of the first Inturist agents recruited by. NOSENKO. SOBOROVA — was NOSENKO’s agent until 1959 (when she married and retired) and reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as af, * ‘an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO in the operation *8ee Part - Vs Fy ‘. as enteen meen epee eeuatintar erate ere 2. tUtahalitan detiasinmedebiads st rennet des * seatntetatii ab beatin seb vicnite sr ceeded Zot lope Bvbbeth: Da + nicl sabia Sut Se cart aehsins ait
“> against PRR wei enezeenn the summer of 1957. * “" " WOSENKO reported epecifically on her possible sexual involve- ment with two otner tourists, one American and the other British. during 1957-1959. NCSENKO.mentiored at one point that he “even told Larissa about his last name." . _ ~ Viadinir MUROMTSEV: KS3 cryptenym “LESEDEV," recruited in 1955. (NOSENKC has also said that MURONTSEV had been a Second Chief Directorate ayent "since 1958.") MUROMTSEV was _e@alled into the Army in about 1959 and was sent to some Soviet Air Force academy in Central Asia, where he worked as an inter- preter for Syrian students studying there. During this period, . his file was hela by the local KGE in Central Asia. Later he . a returned to Moscow and was reactivated by the Second Chief ; Directorate. - Nikolay ROGOV: KGS cryptonym "“Gzero,” recruited in 1955. . | 4 ROGOV had formerly been 2 “confidential contacc” of the KGB, He worked in the central office of Inturist which assigned interpreters to British ana Americen citizens visiting the Soviet Union. evs dnulaet Sicha Ratt Relies Bn a € wt . , - Natalya SHULGINA: Recruited by NOSENKO in 1955, ar Inturist interpreter. Shown SHULGINA's photsccraph on 6 February 9064, NOSENKO failed to recognize it: when he was given her nene, -* ~ howevec, ne sale that this was a Second VNrer Directorate agent. on whom boris RELITSXIY had reported to C1A,** NCSENKO's only ° other statement on SHULGINA was made on 17 April 1964, when discussing the agents he acquired in 1955. He said: “So, for example, I had this SOKUROVA. then 1 had HUROMTSEV, I recruited him. Who else? Natalya SHULGINA, KUNGAKOVA. Well, enyway, during this short period. during 1925 until the end of ‘§5, I had about eight pesple, all of them translators from Inturise." NOSENKO therefore.said he handled SHULGINA and implied that be recruited her. (Information from other sources indicates that SHULGINA worked for two ycars as secretary/interpreter for the NBC correspondent in Moscow, Irving R, LEVINE. who arrived in the Soviet VYnion in July 1955. Although there is no evidence that SHULGINA was directly involved, the KGB attempted to re~- eruit LEVINE an Kovember 1955, She has travelied abroad twice, the first time to Paris in i956 and the seccnd time as an inter- preter at the Brussels Fair in the sunmer of 1958. As NOSENKO <o indicated, BELITSKIY reported on SHULGINA, who he said was a close friend, BELITSKIY said that she was directly involved, : probably as the principal, in a sexual entrapment operation, i ‘in the recruitment of a member of the British Parliament. : BELITSKIY reported to CIA on SHULGINA in October 1962; NOSENKO . said his last connection with the BELITSKIY case. was in Geneva ‘an the spring of 1962.) Coo ce neebs 18 sa Ped cbeberi a ot Sone + etndtiee va cb eebeth Shans SA ace wee web canny ett ~ Tamara KUNGAROVA: Inturist interpreter recruited in eee i 1955 (according to NOSENKO's statement in April 1964 - see - above on SHULGINA). In October 1964, NOSENKO said she was trans- i ferred as an agent to the Tourist Department by the British 4 are discussed in Part V.D.4.4. ‘**NOSENKO reported ‘in 1962 that the KG3 controlled BELITSKIY, a source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.)..- 0.2 th 3 sea
- Commonwealth Department in 1957 or the beginning of 1958. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a sexual compromise ' Operation against an American professor, which did not “"-yeaeh the point of a recruitment: approach. Between 1957 . or 1958 and 1560 she was working against an American tourist ‘named Philip NIELSEN who was suspected of connection with CIA and who was under study for recruitment. by the KGB.* — -KUNGAROVA later married NIELSEN and the two “lived “in tn +: England. The KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at the time NOSENKO left the Tourist Department, but NOSENKO be lieved there was no recruitment, Mrs. NIELSEN died in 1965. Besides those in Inturist, NOSENKO has named several other agents whom he recruited or was given while in the Tourist Department. These included tha following: ~Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV: KGB cryptonym "TOMO," @ cane didate member of the Academy of Sciences USSR and a special. ist on Japan and Thailand. DMITRIYEV speaks Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese exhibition in Moscow. NOSENKO did not indicate how. DMITRIYEV was used cperationally or how he was connected with the American-Canadian-British target.. : _-(fnu) IVANOV: A lawyer employed by the Institute of Foreign Trade in Moscow. NOSENKO did not personally re. eruit this agent. IVANOV moved to Moscow from the Baltic area and his previous handlers there notified the Center, suggesting that the ugent might be of use in the capital. NOSENKO contacted IVANOV and later turned him over to the British Commonwealth Department of the Second Chief Direc- torate whicu, NOSENKO believed, “planted him in the British Trade Mission or something like that." -Marina RYTOVA: KGB cryptonym “KRYMOVA," born about 1923 or 1924 and educated at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, a special school which also had Communist students from foreign countries. There she studied military subjects as well as foreign languages. She speaks English and Greek well. NOSENKO could not recall who recruited her, but she was turned over to him by IT.a. KONSTANTINGY, a Tourist Department case officer, in 1956 or 1957. At that time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian . ; Permanent Exhibit in Moscow and continued in this job until - about 1960, when she became an instructor ip the Greek language school of the Institute of International Relations.:. ‘She reported to NOSENKO any information which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the Exhibit in Moscow. As she was often invited by the Ministry ‘of Agriculture to interpret during meetings between Soviet officials and delegates from America, England,,and Greece, she. also reported this information to NOSENKO. RYTOVA served several times as an interpreter for EKHRUSHCHEV and. .- . Once participated in a conversation he had with Iowa farmer GARST. In 1959 or 1960 she was sent. as interpreter with a. . 8m@ll delegation which visited GARST's farm in the United _ States and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington, a ot midiaitet elds ing idee . ditty
D.C, to report on observations enroute and while there. - _. touch with MALIA) when RYTOVA is married to a man who works in cne of the military. offices in Moscow and is a captain or a major. They have -. one daughter, approximately 14 years old. _ #=Yevgeniya ("Jane") DANKO: KGB cryptonym “OKSANA." She worked in the American Express Company office in Moscow for Arsens FRIPPEL and later for FRIPPEL's successor, Michael JELISAVCIC.* DANKO. was handled by I.A. KONSTANTINOV from about 1955 to 1957.and was then turned over to NOSENKO. She reported on JELISAVCIC, who was not approached, according to NOSENKO, an ; toe 4. Operations with Forcign Visitors NOSENKO said he participated in 14 operations with foreign visitors to the USSR while a member of the American- Canadian Section of.the Tourist Department. Nine of these operations resulted in recruitments (excluding one who later was recruited by another element of the KGB, but including another whom NOSENKO classified as a borderline case). of the remaining five operations which did not end with a re~ . cruitment, no approach was contemplated by the KGB in one case, one target rejected NOSENKO's proposal, the KGB was unable to obtain compromising material for an approach to @ third, and for political reasons the KGB decided against approaching the final two. Although the information from NOSENKO on the timing of these operations does not always agree with that from other sources, these cases can be grouped chronologically as follows: 1955 ~ one; 1956 - one; 1957 - three; 1958 -— two; and 1959 «= seven. The operations in 1955, 1956 and, with. one exception, 1959 were homosexual provocations. The re=- cruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959 was based on heterosexual compromise. These fourteen operations are summarized briefly below in the approximate order in which the cases began. For each case, NOSENKO's information is followed by a summary of the results of CIA investigations. The description of the BURGI case is more detailed than the others, for reasons in- dicated in the text. a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955) - -NOSENKO's Information: Martan MALIA, a graduate ‘student, spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was sus- pected of having connections with American Intelligence. foward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually obtained, a.confession that he had had. homosexual relations, with MALIA. After. NOSENKO. had arranged . for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a.KGB homosexual agent, — the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow; NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in the introductions were made in a . See Part V.D.5. for further details on FRIPPEL and JELISAVCIC.- ss Aten nigee es 1 eanhabihombts isuecsibealaticy foe eee COTE esc ee ae aetyghate 3 on ee Rice BST odd Deira AAS aishiaindeneeialbste,, = i i 4 ‘ins cleats nowatenente
Moscow reataurent, and from an observation point in a neigtboring hotel room he watched the KGB agent and MALIA having relaticns. With MALIA insisting on the lights being’ cose turned off, however, .it was impossible to obtain compro- los", mising phctegraphs (the KGB did not yet have infra-red . : photographic equipmont, NOSENKO said) and therefore no ree ; @Yruitment approach was made to MALIA. During this and a + later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was “very cautious," and the KGB never again succeeded in exploiting MALIA’s homosexuality for a recruitment approach. a Investigation Results: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence an officer during World War 11, has visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and twice tn 1962. While buying books for the Library of Congress and. several universities in 1955, MALIA | - ¥ os ' travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, which was | “4 4 sufficiently unusual at the time to attract press publicity. ‘ in 1955 and 1962 he nad contacts with dissident Soviet ; citizens and clandestinely brought to the West Literature i for publishing abrord. In December 1963 MALIA was the subject of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that during 1962 he had "spent his time in Moscow looking for dissension jiotbo—ranks of young intellectuals at drunken - { debauches,"! | i ‘ | in Cine Spring or Tuy Ne Cliined to have . Had RO Involverents with blackmarketeers, homogexuals, or | females itunide the Sowiet Union at any time. ile made a sinilar statement toRigRyee in October 1963. MALIA has - | not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's informa~ |} tion about him. eat nla Cela le nds ot b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956) ; ; ; NOSENKO'sS Information: At the first meeting in 1962 and despite his stated fear for his own security and his i determination to discuss only the two leads he wished to sell ne CIA, NOSENKO deseribed his recruitment of Yale Professor Richard BURGI on the basis of a homosexual provecation oper~ ation which began in Moscow and culainated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956. NOSENKO reported that he received a detter of commendation (plagodarnost') and a bonus of one month's pay for this recrultient, but in 1966 he retracted this claim. The BURGI case was the first operation in which NOSENKO had direct contact with a foreign target of the KGB, and NOSENKO said he counted it as a turning point in his ' personal and professional life: It was with this success- ful operation, NOSENKO stated, that he "began to grow" from - &® spoiled playboy into a responsible and effective counter- intelligence officer. The BURGI operation was the first recruitment carried out by the Tourist Department after it was created in 1955, according to NOSENKO. In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, had also taken part =. in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was .the ‘responsible . : case officer. In August 1965, when asked’ who. had recruited a BURGI, NOSENKO’ replied: "KOZLOV and NOSENKO." Asked who- Lo - wecruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOY, naturally, He ‘ — . Wags the Deputy Chie? of the Department. The collection of -i ..... ;* the materials [in preparation for the approach} was in the .- hands of Gase Officer NOSENKO." Because of the personal and general significance ascribed to this operation by NOSENKO, it is discussed in detail here: 200 0000 0 lots) ug Shee,
14-00000 FP LES REY CTR Pan Ok neat oem 7 iden eee Re Se a In August 1365 NOSENKO reported that at the time of BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application (anketa), “maybe” an excerpt from a cable sent by the Soviet Eubassy in the United States saying that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI's anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the Soviet Union, and the results of traces of the general KGB Archives and of the First Chief Directorate archives. NOSENKO himself ran the traces, which proved to be negative; there was no information on record concerning BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the material available on BURGI, no other traces were made. The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact that he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefvre had con- tact with students who might some day work for the U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and other target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested an attempt to recruit nim. , When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were placed in the unofficial file maintained by NOSENKO.* NO- SENKO could not recall in 1965 how many such agents there may have been, their names, or what they might have reported concerning BURGI. (BURGE had an Inturist interpreter but KOSENKO did not know whether he was & KGB agent.) From some source, name forgotten by NOSUENKO, the KGB obtained indica tions that BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain the grounds for recruitment by homosexual con- promise, NOSENKO therefore approached Yu.A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the Britis Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use his agent in setting up the compromise. After permission had been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the fact of mutual homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was invited to BELANOVSKIY'’s hotel room where homosexual acts took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the adjoining room and dirceted the compromise. He did not meet BURGI at this point, however, As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the com- promising photographs were ready by the following day. A veport of the compromise and a request for permission to ‘attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors. The request came back with the approving signatures of 0.M. GRIBANOV and A.S, FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Depart. ment of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using BURGI in the United States. BURGI's itin- erary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there the day before to prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next morning and | was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist *HOSENKO explained that no official files were kept on tourists until 1960--only "collections of materials." re PERU UR eet One ene te A mpeenceenen! RinteRIPem Mt aa mrocbicaraiel sane abated tes hiatal sear amptearaery meecnineteanferounnenspies on er eeee ce serra og ees ee Ee Chad btn Look ae ee ee ek
PI RRR REAR NR EERE RCO EEE OEE IAIERED 8 SE F4-00000 cover. NOSENKO was unable to recall how the car was ace quired, whether it was a KGB or Iniurist vehicle, who the driver was, whether he was in the empToy of the local KGB, or other details. In accordance with the operation#1 plan, the local KGB officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels in Kiev were full at the moment because of various confer~_ ences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day in a private apartment in the center of town; a he would be moved to a hotel aS soon as possible. When the . ear arrived at the apartment building on Kreshchatik Ulitsa in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer, and (fnu) KASTYKAITE. a woman housekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO could not remember how or whether he intro- duced himself to BURGI. The recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSELKO," but NOSENKO had for- gotten by 1965 who said what: ‘I don't remember what I talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things were discussed. It started with how he Liked his stay in:the Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded to say how unfortunate it was that information had been re- : ceived about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable under Soviet law according to article. so-and-so of the criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no : ; diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court ac- : cording to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused, | upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to | say that all that could be smoothed out, but, you understand, the basis was prepared for the man to say: ‘All right, I agree to help.'... We showed him the pictures. He was embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the basis: ‘You have a noble task. You teach; you have stu- dents; the students might become future specialists on Russia or might work as diplomats, etc., but many of these students could be used by intelligence. They might be sent somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who among the students is preparing for government service, how they are distributed, etc.’... During the first conver- sation everything was made completely clear... He was not at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He was told that he must understand that in this case ‘helping Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I remember that J told him: ‘Understand, nobody is going to ask you that you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subver- sive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.' After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to Italy, to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this school. He told us a bit about the Russicum and we asked him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the . professors who teach Russian subjects..." According to ' NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end, BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed "to assist ; . ; the organs of Soviet Intelligence." NOSENKO first said that Looe it was he who took this statement from BURGI but later said Pe he could not remember whether he or KOZLOV did this. BURGI was then taken to a hotel. sabatheis, sistelt hudirovink i fetal obey utd toe dan anne ie tee a ecete ne smmpeemtmmmnp tet mr noe te Nee ae tle — | fz — aoe enn ec a dara thane eee eo ‘ ‘ pV RONOED . poten 2 arate tenes ened . '
This was the first time NOSENZO met BURGI. Following the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor ‘ above PURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI's stay in Klev ' became his constant companton and guide, An attempt was ; ” mnade"te smooth out all the dirty business that had teen brought up during the recruitment talk." NOSENKO took ~ _' BURGI to an old cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO : they visited a kolkhboz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in . nearby Kaniv. The “stfject of homosexuality “as not raised i again. From Kiev, BURGE went directly to the West, without , returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the Americun Department of the First Chief Directo- rate and had arranged with its chief, VEKLISOV, for 2 res contact plan in Mew York City should RURGI be reeruited. Before he left BURG] was briefed on these arranyements, which called lor a first meeting in the New York Public wt watt aE By ohetlds nam eel Abe hin Library. PURCI was given a recognition sizna) end a XGB | eryptonym, but the latter was not discussed with Him. : » About five days after returning to Moseow, NOSENKO j turned over all his materials on the BURGI speration to the ; Farst Chief Directorate. Soncwhat later Sergey GUSKOV, i a Chief of the Anerican-Canadian-British Tourist section, i i KOZIOV, and VGSENHO visited FERLISOV in the Firet Chief ! j Directorate and oxpressed an interest in further cuvelop- i ments in the cease, FEKLISOV told then that BURGI hed ar- ' a rived for his first meeting, but the KGB had not established contact, the first meeting in New York City took place the second or third time BURG] appeared and the New Yor’ Legel Residency continued to meet with him until the Revolution -in Hungary in late 1956, NOSENKO Later heard from semeone in the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case was closed. For their roles in this first reeruitment cf the Tourist Department, NOSENKO suid in 1965, he and : KOZLOV received letters of commendation and ponuses of one month's pay by order of KGB Chairman SEROV: PETRENKO was given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendatton, In Octcber 1966, however, NOSENKO said his only KGB award was for his lcengevity of service. BURGI was first intervieved on his rerruitinent by the RCE, Investigation Results: We CML : coterie mae ascent heme at cme
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14-00000 erie BURG when continued to Wesrribe the caw inder of his. NOSES KOS neeGuns’s). i udoev teserally Perce ine oes oF} PE LPUCS By. oh cia nes ae : OE OPT oly os SOAS I ay nag et eae, Se ee PE Pte ert ee , ef ae AT e: & a *Hgle « ay id Sette. ieee 4 i wait . : ‘ 3 4 ° 4 ? i: a = 4 3 : ; i “4 4 a pproach to i ) 4 NOSENKO's infurmation: SCS ; recruitment aoproach ia 1957 to € — 2D, oy n the basis of ovest in cone Ori, enatly. IkKiNof oo. | & section , oo, ign seamen. |. ' oR ge Lanuing Ene Fesponrsibie the Sixth Seetion ‘or che Youraist veopartment; ‘was then responsible for operations i Since VEWENIKIN spoke no German and : known to : * gpoak English, SOSENEO was selected to = he approach : oa, because he “knew English a little." When asked why a German- : speaking KCB case officer eas not used, NUSENNO arsverad: "The higher-ups said ‘po work «i this case, * and that was ‘all.” After beirg rebuffed by < LET.KG saw hin . - Several more times. during the if , but when 3 ‘+ = "KOSENKO attempted te rence contact usin & Doreturn to revo Ss “the Soviet Uaton in 1958, the latter refurci ss vee him, ey ose G macrenzal activities an tase of @teer hi eV wage ryt a “Investigation Results: Q@gpaes s- interviewed Mn on 12°July 1965, and, white scuocraiiy unceomerative, So deseribed atinild approach" in Mosco. duriag 2956 or 1957-00 geo lo. .Which:may be. the one. described by. NOSENKO. | (le wes pot oo. " questioned on the identities of the Sovicts involved.) ~ : Te TTT Tt eet a : . bce ee cree wanes tt OE he Saletmeeetetanmieens ————
ues. te have cvatensive- guiness ecantacts a onc we Sevaek COoWmMerCEa. roprescitetives, Gn Wout “orkaay sad, “+ gas peeenthv renortod to have nego ciated sivallé shiroing eontyuck with the Suviet- afters 7 coett ts a . i * + tf * z v »* ? — ae 7 j . ~ 4 : i a Fy : cs z 4 $ . . 4 t : Py «4 4 aa : ; 4 H y toe Ga. uiiment of Cfaw?. dad . : . 4 . - : : 4 a : : SOVEEL UbOw Sar. 43 ok H ati Tadeo fw atest hi Moeomd Chicf BPirectoraua * officer, S.A. ARKHIFOV, made : acquaintance ana handled the entire operation asa: hits, bat SOSENRO Pine self playec a role. It had somehow been determined that Gad a fondness for girls. “OSENKO therefore presented ; . Rimscif to iim, using the maac USVERNoOV" or "SERGEYEV" and “- -o posing as a painter, and told that he could find women - ". * for him. A party was arranged, witn « KGB agent as *See ‘Part, V.0.8 for more discission ‘of this. point. = ‘incident. is describe “eetnis
‘asked 122. date and a Second Chic? Directorate: secretary as. NOSENKO'S.— Late i, the evening SOSENKU and dite datelexcised theuselves, _ and & het sevual celatiurne with the temals agent s Photegrap wosecae were takin by. tie ROD ‘i SENKO and & aw oca@ another the mow day. nounced. thai uw: nad sone artictss, ceneres acd that he want to -cll cn the Dies iworket. NOSENEO ot?ered to arrange the Sule asd took te @ dines section OQ} ¥oscuw. AS they avadved befvor. 2. smabi house. NODENKO vo give fize the things iovhe seld, Ar this ter Ofiiser pocing a6 2 milatiaann aporenened and the tie for blackaneketeqring, At ghe ilitia ; was recvuidted:iy Ku. GOUHAS, Chee Chief ef pa¥tment, under threat of imprisonncat. ' ‘2 previous m ment 3 arrested station,. the Tourist su (it was DUSAD wee bad bad the photopripis tarcr evening.) Thera was no fecthor contect with avter he left the USSR, however, beouuse of bis revurn iy Oslo he publichced an crticfe is watch he deserthod jis experiences, ob aee ‘hut not all of then. invertization Meteits: F f. NOSEEKO'’s Information: “OSDNAY in ISA® reeruited Gisella HARRIS, aa exployce of the Americana “xpress Conpany in Sale Lake City, based on ber romantic and sexual involvenent vith a Soviet citizen. The Seviet told HARRIS that he was in trouble with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accespany him to the police. HARRIS agreed to meet and cooperate with the Soviets if they estabJished contact with her in Salt Lake City, but the case was turned over to the First Chie? Directo- rate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her. sauna tes 1 temic rear wee 1 fat btin s apedl + abe Bony Tete tennig oad Levtwhnabiten aed ide
| NOSENNO's Information: Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the. “Chicago area, visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958, and NOSEMZD was acsiqned to bo the responsible case offi-: cer. During an earlier trip to the USSR, ithe KGS had learned, KRAFT had beén intimate with a Seviet woran. NOSENKO arranged for her to come te Moscow from hiey, waera 3.2 Was living in 1957 or 1958, in oréer to compromise FRAMT. Although his wife was accompanying him in Moscow, KRAFT and the Soviet woman were intimate in the latter's recom im the Gr-nd Hotel. HOSENKO was present at the time supecvising the operation, Photegraphs were taken, Then wilitiazen broke into the room, -finding KRAFT and the woman in the nude; 4 recruitment. approach was then made by DUBAS, the Chief of the Tourist Department. -(NOSENKO had been the case ofZicer and had handled the operation thus far, but he tock no part in the confrontation cr recruitment approach “because DUBAS wanted it for himself.") Although the recruit- A ment was not firm, KRAFT and DUBAS "hau an agreement" that ; 4 nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not ‘ 7 criticize the Soviet Union in lectures about his trip there : A whic he was to give in the United States. DUBAS again con-. i d tacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963, end after this his ; a file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO : recalieé that the First Chief Direc-orate "said that KRAFT was . not in a good reyion of the United States, Ard also it smelled 3 “like he had spokan of the approach ade to nin.” Therefore, 3 NOSENKG concluded, he probably had not Leen contacted in the 4 United States. - 4 vweetigation Results: ‘ i RCT Fe ‘ | | 4 i. 4 } “2 ~ereemnmeen tenet eFEgRI ar h. Recruitment of DREW (1959) : _, || NOSENKO's Information: Gecrge DREW, an American who ; r visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 3959, had originally: — _ been the respensibility of VM. IVANOV, a case officer of the , a section dealing with American and Canadian tourists. By chance, however, DREW became involved with NOSENKGO's homesexual agents ce tee ecunfls wont VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part v.D.2), and they reported this epee to NOSENKG, then the deputy ehief of the section. NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the section chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the approach. {IVANOV ‘was not considered to be sufficiently ex- — _ perienced and his English was not good.} NOSENKO arranged for . - .. DREW to be compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homo- = co. is-gexual agent of the local KG handled by a Leningrad officer, (fnu) PERELETOV. Using the aame "Mr, SEKGEYEV,”® NOSENKO
Gy ep eubsequently ‘ “24. alone. .reéruited DREW in an office of ‘the hotel. The KGB First t es ‘Chief Directorate was interes¢ud in CREW's recruitment ke- cause he might be able te spot other honcsexucsis, pussibly some in the U.S. Government. - Recruitment of poss To Mie, NOSENKO'S Inforhation: In we or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited a Qos subject", @2gT Ren tems pe eget . in a room of the Hot@P"™ Astoria in Leningrad urrer iyy nud seen compromised by NOSENEO's homosexual agants VoOL- snd YEFREMOV (see Part V.0.2.). The case was then surned £ the British be- partment of the Firsi Chier Dilrecto.at NCSELUKO furnished no more infermation on this case and did not fnew its current etetus, but he believed the 4G has not been in contact with KOV ever to Ye. A. TARABRIN; at that time Cahier c Tavestication Results: eae j. Recruitment of @imie (135) NOSENKO'sS Information: Ey himself NOSEUKO recruited ear weet wey in the Uova Moskovonaya fnow the Bucharest) if 53 Hotel imioscew in July 12l9, afte. @BgR had been compromised LKOV ox YEPREUCV, nls homosexual agenis (see Part e . Yee cs a - SR is a Geli a my cltasen ana his caso was also ® TARABRIS NOSENKO's Information: eruited the Moscow representative of ¥~HOSENKO explained his involvement with British nationals _by saying that, after 1988, the Tourist Department had two geographic sections, one dealing with U.S. and UK citizens was involved in the first o . . Cd to me.' f these, canetainncineapealbn'e- nit. and the other with tourists from other countries. NOSENKO © "so they“assigned them 4 4 t a welea tear te Seen a vt oh sacs tithe 5 Sed
“225. SSENPRO did not precz Ro Ve ate : tay at the _. pol in Moseca# during the cuter of 2999, gco.sibly in Augugt. The “ = eee ee] 2+ re eT e. : : uep : ve approach wie based cn hisoseaxuas, compres ing NOSENKS's ° ; of geo Part Wiu.2ebe. ie enar Selb be neneceat dede he athened one & wwe dic bn t wade jot tibia os iids dues nat Peer! ees Mowers ¢bah }) . . i a foruntzon: when Garces wig Lted the q 4 —. Sevier Un Qfoxual agents noinm Guiy er Auguse | VOLECV and YEPSEeM { Lgrinent to bes - } eome saquadniusd D, accidentally i to NOSENKC, authority : recruit- case to of Awad. taken of . two separate treayelioad to Gsnagorod as mijitiagmen) while cmcal acent of opera- tional contact from Cdcss2. NOSENKO arranged by rnone to bring this homosexual to Uehccrod; he did not recall his name, but suppiie@ CIA with a physical deseriptien.  (NOSENEO could give ne background on the asked why not, said an he “wasn't interestcd.”}) MER?TFNS was thon brought before 4 NOSENKO, who recruited hin during a session lasting APDrOXxL=- _Mately five hours. SOSENKO later traveliecs with MERTENS when nek 4 “. 0 met HEAPENS in Moec KOSEMRO wrete to take covorcuisl ment zpprcach, him, VELITSEIY, another homusexual relaticrs occasions in Moscow. he wes “arrested” hy HOB officers he was engne:d in relsriens with a aay sate thdineamdininsteatiiien + “y ay a! uot he visited Lvov and Mi before leaving the USSR. NOSENKO name “George” ‘vit: MERTENS, but he st name he had given nin. | + said that he had used + -could not recall what 1 _®7NOSERKO explained that the Tourist Department in 1959 had a secticn dealing with commercial representatives, which. : was responsible for the man, but had asked NOSENKO's section for help. “they said they didu't have any agents .. or anything and didn't know what to cc. So. sonebody said, gg "Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section? ce . He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange every- ~ . thing for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARA- BRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said 1 should report to him.” In-this passage NOSENKO seemed to de:referring. to himself, although he said he was jteputy chief of the | section; the chief cf thé section at that time, M.A. LEONOV, . is not known to have participated in operations stemming. from the homosexuality of the prospective agents. .
eau Ye 4 bellp ‘Be Compremi se of DARAETD. (1984) : HOSENKO's Infermation: orci HARELTT, a giide at the U.3. Exhibition in Mencow in 1459, head wecome frieniiy #ith the herece sexual agents VCLIOV atl YRFREICMOVY (seca Part W¥.0.2.), whom he met at the fairground. Although BAMBETT wae nor a honesexual, VCLEOV succueced--after a long period of develormentecin invoive ing him in homosexual acts, which were phetsgraphed by FGh persennel from an adjoining hotel recn. AS C58 efficer for VOLKOV and YEFRIMOV, NOSENKO was responsibie for arranging the corpromise, was present when the ohoyrapag warn tanen, and has cescribed the occasion in cerail Mare had Been much con eiins iecause of the ‘plaining among the photographic tecant amount of time they were forced to spond icin: for VOLKOV to ' succead in his mission, and NOSEV4C recalled at he “had te troac them well” because “they provide them with drinks and tr were a big help" to him in this cperation. The photographs were good, but the Koi was unable to use them in 1359 because of a general ban placed by SHELEPIN on tau recr tment of U.S. exhibition guides due to toe possible renercussions on KHRUSH= CUEV's planned visit to the United States.* (NOGENKO report-:d, however, that BARKE?T was recruited on the basis of the 1959 phetography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961. whigs recruitment was caraied out sy arotier component of the KGB Second Chief Virectorate, and NOSENKO had notching to do with it.**) 5: CME EPID Poth ae " LERFORD case, below, for addi- tional information.on SHELEPIN's prohibition. f""See the discussion of the WIL '  # .## In 1961, shortiy before his recruitment, BARPETT had osten- ‘7 30> -gibly accidental contact with YOLKOV and YEFREMOV in Moscow. , . NOSENKO has not mentioned this. Me beak ' i ES oo net cain oak liter 5 sideadlles teed ended emit Maree en ees oe x. a ag E 4 4 ‘§ 4 4
Bee roommate during the 195% «: Was a tak Compromise of WIL ERPCRD 127. NOSE KO's: Tnformetion: Frederick WILLERPOPD was ” BARRETT 'S Vibition in Moscow. Initially he fet of the lecal 8G cryanization for the city cf Moscow, Which believed WILLERFORD to Le-an PEL ayent and had been collecting materials on him. At the same tiwe and, with- out knowing of the jaterest of the leval organization, VOLKOY and YEFRENOV had made WILLELFORD's acquaintince, and OSENKO had arranged for cémpromising photagrupis of WILLERSORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. | NOSENKO watehad WILLERPORD and YEFR2MOV through a two-way mirror and was able to-describe the scene in detail. It was only after this compromising mater- jal hed been obcained that NOSENKO learned cf the local KGB's interest in WILLERFORD, SOSENKG's department and the local .%GY unit thea made a joint reguesc for operational appreval to approach WILLERPCED, but permission was refused because of the general ban on recruitment ipprouches’ at this time; —the-case ftTe we did not know whether WILLERFORD hag been approached subsequently. was retained by the Moscow RCS” ‘organizatfsn, and NOSENKO Note: There is a simi -larity between NOSENKO's dessrip- tien of the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which prevented the Tourist Department fron taking advaatage of its compromising photography of BARFETY and WILLER} FORD, and information provided by the earlier de¢ ector, eee GOLITSYN reported that an American employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual com- “premise during 1959 and 1966. According to information he said he iearned from U.s. Embassy Section case of fi- cer, G.I. GRYAZNOV, the KGB had vchotegraphs of the American in various stages of a homosexual act, and there was no questicn about the recruitment being achieved: "The only question was to where." At the time, however, © SHELEPIN had just become Chairman of the KGS and was: stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. He was shown these particular ghetograchs but decided that ‘an approach on their basis wovld be too crude and that another way should be found. Although SHELEPIN did not exclude the use of these phctographs some time in the future, according to GOLITSYN, he had reservations against using them at that time for fear of the propaganda reper~: cussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed pub- licly. GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was subsequently carried out. The essential differences. beé- . tween this account and that of NOSENKO are. that GOLITSYN impiied the ban was in effect at least into 1960 and that GOLITSYN appeared to be speaking of a general prohibition, _ epee Seo UEETN tvetemee = wie omc ACen tniedich Blac 0 Liebe &
and to recruit. whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to ‘the U.S. Exhibiticn at Sokeolniki Park which ended on 4 September 1959.* gece onacptnete cnt EES STE In speaking of the 1959 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park, Moscow, 3& a 4 that both the... KGB and the GRU launcned an” to recruit Americans employed at the Exhibition. ALL officers at GRU Headquarters were assigned to this task, and some were used by the KGB in an attempt to compromise the Americans; V.A. GRUSHA (identificd by NOSENKO as a KGB officer special- izing in American operations of the First Chief Di rectorate) directed many of these KGB activities in which GRU person- nel were involved. As a resuit of this endeavor, "more than one American" was recruited, and BRpeeeas indicated | -that the technique of compromise--such as “bed pictures® m= was employed. When questioned on this subject 4 Se ’ reported that to handle the Exhibition, the CPSU Central Committee issued a special directive to form a committee headed PY the KGB (GRUSHA was in charge of cne a Its purposes were two- fold: protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to dis- rupt presentations, and to conduct - counterintelli qence;. recruit | 4q ahs GRE bette Wh bine sacle ba. ! sat Baisden L >.
“5. ‘the FRIPPEL Case (1929-1963) As a member of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO in 1959 rpersonally took part in the reeruitment of the Averican Express ‘Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued to be one of this ayenc's two KGB hamwllers after trunsferring -to the American Separtrent in 1960, aad FRIPPSL was asked to “report on the U.S. Embassy as well as or two-Enbassy offtcials in particular. FRIPPEL left the Moscow joo in 1961 but returned on’ trips to the USSR in 1762 and 1963, when NOSPENKO met him, The enly recruited American WHOA NOSENED ever handled a re~ ae = A ; ee chee 3ts 4. a of this operation by NOSENKG anc FRIPVEL uiitor in several de- t 4 tceils, but both agree that FRIPPEL provided the KGB with neo : 4 significant information. ‘These twe versions are presented scpa-- : 4a rately below. a . I re } a a. NOSENKO's Information : NOSENKO first mentioned PREPPEL luring the third meeting : 3 in Geneva in 162 while cascussing KGB successes in tioscow: i ; “There was another agent [KGh erypronuym) TARPUR,' He was not } a correspondent. ie knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanuvicn, and 4 my last name as NIFKOLAYEV. He was a pormanent representative, i i : Mot in the Fmbassy, but cf the Anerican xpress Company in Mose J . “cOW. PRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPRL. But he also has the cryptonyn ‘ARTUR.’ He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly i } attracted to women. JI provided him with veantiful women... Well, 4 we decided to have a talx with him. Why? “hat could he give? . ‘ d He new works in the American Express Company {main office in | a New York City]. A new department has now “sen Organised for ~ the Soviet Union and the Pecp@s' Democrucies. And he is chief ' 3 of the department... He is no longer in Mescow, but he was here ‘ two and a half or three years. We hope that he will return. : : We are waiting for him te come back. We know that the company : 5 very well, He is, in fact, an emigre, this FRIPPEL. And he also did a gcod and intelligent job of establishing relations with Inturist. He had very good relationships with ANKULINOV, the Chairman of Inturist, and with other pcopie, both the chiefs and the low-level workers... But, why was PRIPPEL recruited? .I was interested in knowing precisely by whem, by name, and how . i approaches were being made to our deleyations [in the United ; States], i.e., I was interested in him from the point of view. '. of counterintelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of approaches are taking place to our people in America and by : whom? This is what interested us. But he didn't know anything. . oa age “He couldn't say anything. He provided only superficial infor- ~ mation, nothing more." wants to send him’again, because he knows the Russian language : fs i » NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been useful for coverage ,of.Americans visiting the Soviet Union. | He replied that the KGB had already had great success in this ie a by other means and launched into a long description of the nS methods of covering foreign tourists in the USSR.” : ba i ond tee . NOSENKO was present in the adjoining room when FRIPPEL was ~» Compromised by a Soviet female agent, Klara Konstantinoyna - nS, GORBACHEVA. NOSENKO described the compromising scene in detail .. ‘as well as the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pice — tures of these activities through a two-way mirror, and the “confrontation with the militiamen who broke .into the room eam ne Be ae
ER Tg ROC PAE UII SS et ee After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent’ debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following additional statemehts concerning the FRIPPEL case: ~ Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he did not do so élone; Col. V.0. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Tourist Department, was present; he and NCSENKO “carried out the recruitment together” in early September':1959. NOSENKO was, hewever, FRIPPEL's _ . case officer. .-°- ; ; : - NOSENKO attricuted his involvement. in the FRIPPEL - ae recruitment to the following: “In 195%, after 1958, ; when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area. of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the ; 4, tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of _ the section and 1 had my own little area--for example, the permanent representative of the American Express Company, i and besides that I heygan to collect all the material on | all American tourist firms which have anything to do with i Inturist and who send tourists to the USSR." t 2+ pre nari, coer erro Bote « saettheadiedletaa de suttibaldiocd se ~ FRIPPEL never provided any information of value to Soviet tourist operations. i ~ When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1%60, he took FRIPPEL with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Ameri- i cans at the Embassy. NOSENKO was asked to question FRIPPEL about the U.S. Embassy and such Embassy officers as George WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything along this line.* PSS ee eee eee Se ~ FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during NOSENKO's two meeting’ with him in 1962 and 1963, when FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide. ~ NOSENKO met “pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL during the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had diriner at FRIPPEL’?s home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent, n and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover a for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL. ithcugh unusual for 7 KGB Seconé Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents ; in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that ’ ; . he went because he "was invited," and CHELNOKOV went “be- . . Gause he was also involved in the recruitment," os ~ First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost’. invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: “Perhaps one time I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with 3 . | . “¥ Bee Part ViE.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in the U.S. “oS... Embassy Section. os . + 14 POSE ttate prec wtb te Top Ge ey Lhe NORE oe ea Seo te Rate Relies Stn et arimmixrs
131. . - CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange these: meetings with FRIPPEL at CHELNOXOV's request and the two continued to meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, be- cause they “kept hoping he would give something.” In a different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOY, NOSENKO ex- plained: “You see, never-mind if you are a chief ora deputy chief of a department, you must havé one, two, or three agents. GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forget how to work. The Chiefs of the [Second Chief] Director- ate do not demand that they have 12 or 13 agents, but they | OS ~ must -have two or three. They will have important agents i or those in leading positions." ~ NOSENKO continued to act as FRIFPEL's case officer . “4 after FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENXO had wo 3 been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy : 3 Chief of the Tourist Department. He met twice with FRIP- - PEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the — i ; Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foréign visitors. Both of these meétings were handled by NOSENKO alone, with- out CHELNOKOV. , - The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had returned to Mescow from Geneva. FRIPPEL had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some Ameri- : can journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the compo — : sition of the journalist group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Sov- . det Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what ; questions the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice required visiting journalists to submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing to Soviet authorities prior to interviews. After the ar interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction. of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader. NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction te the KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were . “satisfied.” Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL, ; NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether ‘ any of the journalists might have joined the group at the last moment in the United States, which might suggest intelligence connections on their part.* seme ie MELTS. am 9 nate ae ~ NOSENKO met. FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for — tourists aboard the ship “Olympia,” which stopped for a day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Mos- — . "ys ste oss = GOW and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where es the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away eS ee i € NOSENKO had earlier said on- several occasions that one of 7 the things KGB sources in foreign tourist companies abroad i et were instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minute poor additions to a tour group to the USSR; this might signify . 4ntelligence affiliation. ; oo
from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's = hotel rcon, and the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had | given FRIPPEL a bottle of vocsa as a gift, and FRIPPEL gaid he wanted to give NOSENKO some whiskey in return.: They drove in NOSENKO's car ts the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while FRIPPEI, went aboard for the whiskey. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.) When FRIPPEL returned. he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (iInturist}) on the spot. The three returned te the hotel ané Granz Some more, everyone getting _drunk., During this contect, FRIPPEL reported “nothing of importance,“ and his most interesting news was that he might again we 1aassigned to Moscew in Decerber 1963 as the Americen Express Company representative. * - On 3 February 1964, while reviewing tne CHEPREPANOV papers** in Geneva, NOSENKG wis asked about the following passage which eppearod in the AGS operational plan against Boybrt, dated Tebruary 1965 end signed by V.A. KUSKOV cr the.U.S. Embassy Cectien: “He (HOWDEN) shewed himself to be an indiscceet person... ircnically, cne uay as though by chance, he [BOWDEN] hlurce:) out to our agent SHMEPOVA {the fact of} "ARTUR's” affiliation with Ameri- can Intelligence."*** ROSENKO confirmed that the "ARTUR" of the CHEMEPANOV papers was PRIPPEL, but he said he "gould not say" whether FPIiPPEL had any affiliation with American Inteliigence, «"—""OSBIRO Said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow; this report was submitted by — V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a membkcr of the KGB Legal Residency and overtly an Inturist cmployve in New York City, wlio waS a former Second Chief Uirectorate colleague of NOSENKO. ae The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part VI.D.7.C. a, . kat While in the Soviet Union in August 1962 and shortly be- fore his recruitment on homosexual grounds (see Part VI.D.2.), the American Spencer ROBERTS was approached .on the beach at Sochi by a young Soviet male. ROBERTS and the Soviet, who spoke French, soon became friends, and ; . -the Soviet told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent - > in several cperations against French-sp2aking foreigners “ in the USSR. One of these was FRIPPEL, the Soviet said, adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an American Intelligence agent. NOSENKO, who has provided ‘much detail on the ROBERTS case, did not mention the . > unidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing - PRIPPEL. = = oe, Co 1+ A nepetemcrsntemmr ste enren =f many + cbs tetate a ‘ 3 4 H dete ead ere BE ke eg
oe wt he Tee 7 + . ote coe vos ‘ wigs LS FRA L Vs b Gel gy Yuu GS Sher ene ne tonencemarnemieetteeranrmtteae: Melee de erties ee la Tat a eee race nena are! WAAR Sinab edt woe: welaebiadssiweg!” “ib atalino Rina ste + ene near emereserenatttenteriet att we ¥- Goa Fare iii. 2), Which describes during the 16:2 meetings to 2 i > + emghautic refusal ve
ae In February Lo¢S NOSENFoO denied ths Department of State re rorads snow ion PEL applied for a new passpore im iewtaud phat -¢9 Gepart the United “Os PS eras: eh woud 4 ie the 3 “Olympia” fora c ie is meeteng took pla ‘Novenker L961 FR abeart Soyres Union. bL vas ques- NCKOYV. he intended the ; I i i : t ssdiaanak sabely taal aercetaee Poeren ts eee ed Bede
ae eer ent ng tent nn . ‘ns ROSENKO Said it was “impossible"™ that he sheuld have to request permission to board the vessel. In February 1965, KOSENKO did not recall having told FRIP- PEL these details of his life and said that, if he had done so, it was while he was drunk. *; On, tet
6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963)... As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was:.involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his ‘assignment to the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate (1955- 1960 and 1962-1964).* While Deputy Chier 6f the American- British-Canadian Tcurist Section, NOSENKO had a direct hind in the decision in October 1959 that OSWALD was of no oper- ational interest to the KGB And should be returned immediately to the United States. Before President Kennedy's assassi- . nation in November 1963, when NOSENKO was again in the | Tourist Department as its Deputy. Chief, he was present. at the time the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned of OSWALD's - ~ application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter. the USSR, After the assassination, he also played a role in the KGB investigations of OSWALD's activities during residence in the Soviet Union from October 1959 until June 1902, Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he may have had with Soviet intelligence, is meager and indirect. It derives almost entirely from indications cf primary interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in every defector to the USSR, and from inferences which may be drawn from certain entries in OSWALD's “Historical Diary" and certain statements made by his wife, Marina, during inter- views on behalf of the Warren Commission. After President Kennedy's death, the Soviet Government provided the United States with official documents and letters pertaining to OSWALD's defection to the USSR, his suicide attempt, his marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union. This information from the Soviet Government generally agrees with the information from NOSENKO. The materials furnished by the Soviet Government make no mention a2 any Soviet Inte]- ligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSWALD. In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique: It was and remains the only such information available on the 32 months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.** NOSENKO'’s access to w-For continuity of presentation, botn pericds of NOSENKO's alleged involvement, 1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in this part of the paper, .** {[ndependent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 5 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) con- * . tact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet =. Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Tourist De- partment Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head- quarters from the KGB legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, -. which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. requesting permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with. '. Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only. . oh 2 ald con we Wester wad bed a. seep we ee te Lathan vase) Habit tive sisntleth lol at tala,
wee information on ¢Ci invelvement w at tine of OSVALD's request to rerain z as oo o> =. .elusively froa the Claimed fect that ne, s Deputy | Chief ef the KGB Section”  cealing with irists at thet tice. He scid he hne. cf later developcent’ bocause £ his position as Penucry Chief of tre Tourist Ururrs dent Crom mid-1952 until lsed. The veatral iheme of NusUNESts ine formation, us given to CiA aed the FET, is pias the NYS determined ag carly cs 16 Gctoser 1559, when OSHALD acta his first declacation of intent to reacin an the USoh, "Art he wes “not nortal™ and there:pen “washed its hands” of Vin eatirely. According te O05 ere BOY had no operational taterest in (7NALD aad mada ne atteagt to receuit es uve: to debrief him during ihe: time he spent in forces ond Hanok or Guring his trip to sacico saerily betire kiliiag tae President. a. Statemeits aaamennap ene ab» iE A + seinen Ts 0 a 4 won eld Lads Mestad,
; i gore. ted ta renounce his U. hip at.the y om 3) Ucicber, three cavs arter leaving the hospital, Fren his Jdiarv, the Narren Ccoamission concluded he reccived permission to reside in -thesccviet Union on;a year- to-year basis about = January “i982, appr tely the tine jaseabt fone wa be Beak sas Atha! + eee mer eeatttemenernnne enti: mena diatbetnemnbetlunteannts © tolbb tee.
“*& In October 14 EWOCENEO Tater to.g Cis On one vccasicn char ne “oaty skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his pos- session avout 20 minutes. in October i:$6 he again sai tnat he read the file aid that while doing so he saw « picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKC. added that. he never met OSWALD personally. et re ; § NOSENKO said he leained that OSWALD was a peor shot from ViV.KRIVOSHEY, a fellow KGB officer who had been’ told this while visiting Minsa. , . e : tale Set eee corepenesnnwes Pinta ste
mm  eeerene panama” b, Statements to CIA On the basis cf the FBI interviews of NOSENKO and the similar information which he had previously proviced CIA, further debriefings were conducted by CIA on 3 and 2? July 7964, Now and explanatory infcrmation received during these debriefings is presented below. (i) KGB Interest in OSWALD . Until CSWALD mentioned to the Inturist guide his desire to remain in the Soviet Union, he WES treated routinely by the KCB, When OSWALD mide his request, this was reported imaediately to the Tourist Department, and it was from this moment that the KGB began to pay attention to hin, All available materials on him were inereupon collected and examined--the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters’ reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of e check of KGB Archives. KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his desire. Although the KGB con- sidered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility as “this would be done after the person is sllowed to stay in the ~ Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an inter- esting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD wa’s never questioned on his past nor asked to write an autobicgraphy.** From the ¥-ROSENRO provided details on this point to CTR (see below) and ni made a similar statement when asked in 1964 why KGB agent Tamara KUNGAROVA had been permitted to marry an American (her own developmental target) and then emigrate to England; See Part V.D.5. &*® When he appeared at the U.S. Embassy to renounce his citizens. ship on 31 October 1959, OSWALD told the counséllor officer that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had teld a Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information concerning the Marines and radar which he possessed. CO ee ee wth Bs Abate ae ane
- "materials and reports. immediately available it was decided - “leave the USSR when nis Visa expired, OSWALD's suicide interest or contact with. OSWALD after the initial assess- _dmportant. The KGB never considered recruiting her as an “ would probably tell the Americans, based on the assessment W"NOSENKO subsequently defined this KGB reservation about == that something wes not quite normal about OSWALD, and the. KGB therefore had Inturist tell him that he would have to =. . attempt supported the Tourist Department's feelirg that | it had been right in deciding te refuse OSWALD's request Hs” for citizenship, particularly as the hospital also re- ported that he was not normal, and the Tourist Department decided: "We will do nothing; we don't want to know hin." Inturist was suusequently told: "'There is no KGB interest in him. Do. what ycu want'... The KGB thought that he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he was. not normal, and that he should leave the country." The Tourist Department and the KGB in general thercupon "washed their hands" of this matter. 4 ae oad “3 there anything in OSWALD's file to indicate that the KGB attempted to debrief him on his past service in the U.S. Marine Corps or other matters; this was because "he is a very little person and also it is felt that he is not nor- mal, so the KGB is afraid to do this with him."* The GRU was not informed of OSWALD's defection. Neither was any attempt made to exploit OSWALD for propaganda purposes in Moscow or in Minsk. In short, there was no intelligence . L There was never any operational use of OSWALD nor was ae we sated olatmabe, ment of abnormality. nek AReateade eR NES eee aR hee» (ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD , ee The XGB had no knowledge or interest in Marina (nee PRUSAKOVA) until she and OSWALD applied for permission to register marriage, In fact the KGB did not know that she was a friend of OSWALD until this point, for there was no surveillance on OSWALD to show that he knew her. When the KGB learned of their relationship, checks were made of the Archives of the Minsk KGB as well as neighborhood checks and checks at her place of employment. The people where she lived and worked and went to school considered her a simple girl, not very clever, only fair in her studies, not an active member of the KOMSOMOL. She was a simple “philistine,"” an uncultured girl more interested in gossip than in anything sitadddibatily ab pelea cea A the Ste cat. igi informant on. OSWALD “because it was considered dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband," Nor was it con- sidered to recruit her for use after she arrived in the United States, "because she would tell him ard also. she oe of the type of person she was." “(4ii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR a ore ye bef vee 28 ; NOSENKO was asked why there were so few difficulties in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her departure from the Soviet Union. lie replied: "The Soviet law allows any Soviet citizen to marry a foreigner. It was 2 bk ee te OSWALD as fear of becoming involved with an unstable per- -
74-900900 * assy n this case because OSWALD was already living and: - working in the Soviet Union, It would be sore difficult, of course, with tourists or others who are in the Soviet ‘Union only for a short period and Want to. marry Soviet . Citizens."* Asked whether itis not. unusually difficult | £or Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union, NOSENKG - explained: "In this. case it was easier because Marina . Was already married to a -foréigner."  NOSENKO was HWExt asked what Office or level of the Government or Party _ ‘must make the final decision regarding Marina’s marriage to OSHALD. He described the procedure as follows: "They would come to the Regional Registration Office to apply to register their marriage, {There] they will be told that they will have to wait a week or two while they think it over to be sure they Went to get marriec. During this period the necessary checks are conducted, The Regional. a Office would cal] the Militia, and the Militia would call i { the Minsk KGB, The Minsk KGB said that it is all right for them to get married--that the KGB has no objection. But it is the law that allows them to be Married, There are no formal approvals necessary," . eA athe Blan aval iar Concerning the decision to permit the ccuple to leave ; the USSR, NOSENKO said on 3 July 1964 that the decision : would be made cn the local level, in Minsk, and that there i is no need to check in Moscow. On 27 July 1964 he corrected ! this statement to say that, while local authorities make : the decision, it must be approved in Moscow by, he thought, : the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP), i Civ) OSWALD's Visit to Soviet Embassy in Mexico Asked whether he had any information on OSWALD's. visit to *':xico in September 1963, NOSENKO said that he knew oniy that OSWALD had applied at the Soviet Embassy there to come _ to the Soviet Union. The Mexico €ity Legal Residency of the KGB reported his visit to Headquarters by cable, requesting inforr:*ion; this was the first that the KGS First Chief Directorate had heard of CSWALD, M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of Service Number Two (KGB counterintelligence abroad), thereupon phoned V,K, ALEKSEYEV, Chief of the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department, whom TURALIN knew personally, to ‘learn whether any information was available. NOSENKO believed that ALEKSEYEV then came to V.D. -CHELNOKOY or A.G. KOVALENKO -to. ask about OSWALD, and NOSENKO thought that he himself was present at the time, ALEKSEYEV was given the background on ‘ OSWALD, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he - “Was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to re- enter the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV then telephoned TURALIN to relay this message. NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD - ; .,... bad spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew } W'By the time OSWALD applied for permission to marry, he had . &@lready written the American Embassy in Moscow, through Soviet i mails, of his desire to return to the United States. The letter, 4 . dated & February 1961, was mailed’ from Minsk’ aad was received by the Embassy in Moscow on 13 February, The OSWALDs - were married on 30 April 1961. BR ay, al baaied woe weabedadie ety maa atom erent rmmteee e dno seatdebiiion Wh Ws Bas Fuad ode eaters hte nt ERNE ERICA oy Sait dh sae
ofeno-contacts“between OSWALD’ and“Cutans* or” representatives”... . @£ the Cuban Government there or elsewheres = | a (v) NOSENKO's Comments on’ Possible KGB Involverent in the | Assassination When first discussing the OSWALD case with NOSENKO on 23 January 1964, a CIA case officer commented: “It isa very un- fortunate thing that these prior events occurred in the Soviet Union." (NOSENKO apparently misunderstood the case officer's intent, which was not to imply that the KGB was behind the assassination, dy that the fact of OSWALD's "defection" placed the USSR under probadt Uplousded suspicion.) NOSENKO's immediate résponse to this remark was: "That is not correct, This is putting a false color to it, I am your friend. I1 am completely with you, and I will continue to work with you and against the Soviet Union in all resvects, But the truth should always remain the truth. No matter how I may hate’ anyone, I cannot speak against my convictions, and since I know this case I could unhesitantly sign off to the fact that a ‘ the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this in any way, I say ¢C this bccause I know they were frigntened of this man [OSWALD] and that everything should havé zen said to him or that he should have been in any way worked on, in any was. [by the KGBI -°God forbid!.,. I know this because I sat on this matter for i several days after the tragic matter occurred to the President. ' _To_investigate. in detail if anything had been done, particularly | by the local authorities, that is, by the local KGB in - Belorussia..., I had to make a complete investigation and ; + | even sent several workers down there to investigate-«not ; i trusting official papers, Even without specific orders I had ‘ to make a complete investigation on my end of things because - : this is a serious matter when the head of a government is. ; assassinated.., If you want to know, it would be a greater — ‘ advantage to the Soviet Union :f the President were still. Kennedy because he was a personage who was a realist and looked at many things in the eye boldly... In the. history of any intelligence service there have been assassinations of cone -kind or another. I can say this: That in our organization, not even speaking of myself, many persons were shocked by the assassination--to think that this should happen in the twentieth century and in, of all places, the most powerful government in the world," ere Beata a5 forte oth cra ntint ovations wee
Se ea ee LS ee a Information from NOSENKO _ ‘In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the. Tourist 4 Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section, .which had theretefore concerned itself with operational. activity . ‘against foreign tourists from all countries, was broken down into” separate sections; one section.dealt with tourists from the United. States, Canada; and Great Britain, the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO said that he was promoted at this time to the position of Deouty Chiefs ef the first of these new sections. NOSENKO's involvement in at least one major case, Lee Harvey OSWALD, sters entirely from his having held this position. It is also on this basis that he was able to claim awareness of all recruitments from among American tourists from mid-1958- until he returned to the American Department at the beginning of 1960. His knowledge about recruitments is based additionally, he ‘said, on the fact that some time between May and October 1959, during the tourist season, he was ordered by Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV, * GRIBANOV' 8 secretary, to gather facts for GRIBANOV concerning th use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations during the period from 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO gathered this material from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talk- ing | with various case officers in the department. * on the basis of his general and supervisory experience in the Tourist Department as well as his research for this paper, NOSENKO had the following to say about Tourist Department opera- tions pricr to 1960 (taken from the protocol he signed on this subject on 25 February 1965): “Operations against tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by the KGB about the use of tourism by American Intelligence at the time I wrote the report in 1959. No agents were definitely uncovered among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959 and, until 1960, no tourists were ‘caught in the act' of mailing letters, servicing deaddteps or contacting. agents, except one whose name I remember as McGUIRE. I do *Questioned on this paper in February 1965, NOSENKO said he did not remember whether he discussed it with GRIBANOV, nor Gould he recall any examples of the material he included in dt, what the paper said about ‘CIA tourist operations, or [what other U.S. Intelligence organizations were using tourism as ‘an operational cover in this period. He did remember, how- ever, that it incorporated statistical data on the growth of foreign tourism. are rite emeerttitnt nein te nett os Aten ES See eae ot 4
rae oy greeny EE pee eR, AT EE i TR not. know any details concerning the operat ional activity. Which led to the discovery of McGUIRE's letter mailing. * ; “I know of no case in which an American tourist was | definitely uncovered as an agent of American Intelligence and thereafter approached for recruitment by the KGB during | this period. a, P . "E do not know of any such American tourists who were CIA agents, and who were recruited by the KGB during this ‘ period. : “In addition to McGUIRE, the Seventh Department de- veloped suspicions concerning a number of tourists, but didn't learn of any specific intelligence connections. } Some were taking pictures, others were disseminating : literature. Although various operacional measures were , : taken against them, including vyemka (covert baggage : search) end the use of KG3 agents, none of these tourists received real operational developmenc. Teeth ae ade eek Hiab de During the first week of June 1959, a three-day meeting was held in London, England, between representatives of CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly referred to as MI-6) on the subject of ‘legai-cravel* intelligence operations against the USSR. At the conclusion of this meeting there was drawn up a 19 page document summarizing what had been discussed at the meetings. This summary spelied out CIA operational doc- trine pertaining to tourist operacions, including agent-spotting techniques, criteria for agent seiection, agent assessment, agent training, and tasks to be carried out by tourist agents during the coming (1959) tourist season. It stressed CIA's reliance on tourists for the spotting, recontacting, assessing, and communicating with clandestine assets in the Soviet Union. A copy of the document as weil, presumably,as other British docu- + ments relating to the joint meetings was given to George BLAKE, who has admitted having made a phorographic copy which he passed i to the KGB. He gave the KGB this information in the summer of 1959. ONVabe abel so bten yd .. ™ One Robert Alan MCGUIRE, a former: staff employce of CIA, . oO uo travelled to the Soviet Union as a tourist during April and” st May 1958. Although he was debriefed on his return, he had no connection with CIA in preparation for this trip and -- _ Mailed no letters for CIA inside the USSR, While in the Soviet Union, McGUIRE was approached on numerous occasions by Soviets seeking blackmarket deals., American girls, and i. assistance in defecting to the Americans. While en route to : . Leningrad, his brief case was. overtly searched by a customs Poa employee, who confiscated a Radio Liberation script. McGUIRE : reported that he was compelled to sign a document which stated — that the script had been confiscated, but the reasons for the i action were left blank. NOSENKO. who has reported none of. i - - =: these details, appears to have confused MCGUIRE with Edward en MCGOWAN, a CIA agent who mailed a letter in Minsk in August io. 4... : 1958 and was detected doing so by the KGB; NOSENKO said | MeGUIRE mailed a letter in. Minsk in 1959. .
oint meetiny on this Save Subject ‘took’ pace am. - iets si tted providing the KGB with a copy of the 2i-pa the sessions.* re , i ge summary of | * @. GOLITSYN'’s Tourist Document WKhen he defected to CIA in December 1961, GOLITSYN brought with him a top secret MGB docunent dealing with the use by hRmerican Inteiligence of tourists fcr espionaye inside the Sov- det Union and with KGB ccuntermeasurcs.** This study relied heavily upon the two ducuments supplied to the KGB by BLAKE, and although it purports to be a study of American tourist cpera- tions during 1960, it cites as examples many cascs which occurred in earlier years. In these examples, the American agents de-. tected by the KGB are named and their ooerational roles accurately Gescribed. (AS noted above, NOSENKO said that McGUIRE/HCGOWAX - was the only American definitely determined to have intellicence connections prior to 1960.) Cited belcw are excerpts from the | 4 GOLITSYN document, along with additional information ‘ we Loecure tes: "MoGOWN, Edward, born 1935 tear a thoreugh check [for surveillance] sént an espicnage letter containing secret writing. Further investiga- t tion of McGUWAN showed that he specialized for a long perioda of j time on Russian and Polisn questions | i d al 1 ee tattle nailed ead snettee beteles touinas O18 adaes ode WORGTS Cecurred ata time that NOSUNKO claims to nave been in the American Deparimeni. buring the 1962 meetings in Geneva, when NOSENEO said he was Chief of the American Tourist Section, é was asked about BLAME. He replied only that BLAKE had been an agent of the fritish Department of the Second Chief Sirec- orate” and that iz was not nearly as valuable as the Canacian ‘Pnbassado fr cr "the other Englishman" (VASSALL). - t the time of his defection, NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the entire Vourist Department. Askea about BLAXE after his defectioa, !0SuuKO replied: “Who's BLAKE?" During the February 1965 interrogaticns, NOSENKO was first asked | whether the KGB had received any significant information con- ‘ cot i | i cerning the use of courism as operational cover by CIA during | 4 14 iy 1°60 and 1961, wnen ne was in the iunerican Department, and was then asked specifically whether the KGB obtained docu- mentary information on this subject from an agent source. He _replied "no" to both questions. —. ‘ &#* This document was transmitted from KGB Headquarters in Moscow to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 7 April 1961. In content it is similar to the general description of the docu- ment which NOSENKO said he himself wrote. NOSENKO said in 1964 that he knew GOLITSYN had passed CIA this report and that gt had been written in the Tourist Department. . « : . ’
During h 8 ‘trip to the Soviet Union. i in the summer. Of 1958,. MCGOWAN mailed in Ming an operational letter containing secret: ‘writing. In the CIA debriefing upon his return to the United. ¥ States, McGOWAN described a number of incidents in the USSR. - on! 26 August 1958, for example. while staving at the Metrondl Hotel - in Moscow, McGOWAN met fel- low Americans, and the : Ye preecrtojrapne ya sure veillance team when leaving the hotel. Within several days of his arrival in Moscow, McGOWAN found he wes incempatible with his female Inturist interpreter/guice and succeeded in having her replaced. lifts new guide was V.L. ARTEMO™, who assured that” McGOWAN had female companionship for the remainder of his visit. ws The document from GOLITSYN also states: "SIMARD, Lionel, born in 1939, a college instructor, expressed an abnormal inter- est towards military literature of the USSR; he made contact with Soviet citizens and attempted to slip into the area of ship- building factories in Leningrad. Later it was recorded that this ‘pedagogue’, while in Moscow, sent espienace letters containing secret writing. The letter contained the ccordinates of a dead- Arar FO A IMO RAI ALEK TAB ceed Another part of the document supplied by GOLITSYN says: "An American, Whitmore GRAY, born 1932, an assistant professor at Michigan University, sent three espionage letters containing secret writing, while in Kiev. In Stalingracé he was detained while he was photographing a military factory ¥ "NOSENKO reported on a 1959 trip to the Soviet Union by but said he was not aware of earlier ones. ** This is the same ARTEMOV identified by NOSENKO as a fellow case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American De~ partment and as the man with whom he worked on the BELITSKIY case in Geneva in 1962. ARTEMOV appeared again in operations against American tourists in 19593 when he was assigned as nturist cuide/internmreter for a group of Americans [ On one occasion, when,.this o urned unexpectedly to his hotel from the’ theater’ to‘which | ARTEMOV had escorted him, he caught ARTEMOV searching his hotel room. NOSENKO has not mentioned these contacts of ~~ ARTEMOV, which took place at the time he said he was Deputy” Chief of the section dealing with American tourists. In © * October 1966, in answer to a specific question, NOSENKO stated that ARTEMOV never had any connection. with the American Section a of the Tourist Department. Section of the American Department, but has not described her: earlier activities against tourists. ne ag ate eee  NOSENKO has identified IVANOVA as an’ agent of ‘the U. S.- Embassy t bee iia Se ctabdaidi ensia ie mn divided Peta alas
‘sgimilar overtures. GRAY was’also approached by blackmarketeers "group, John Milton FRANCIS, born 1934, an instructor of Russian at a college of Yale University; when in Odessa with a group of detacted surveillance dally thereafter until @ left Kiev and later in Yalta. .He. was approached on’ 17 Novem~: ber in Saku by. an attractive woman who persistently offered ‘her.-. services despite his refusal, and on.18 November by a girl in Tbilisi who occupied a seat next to his in a theater and made and by purportedly disaffected yoting men. -On 13 November he wag arrested in Stalingrad while. photographing ‘industrial in« stallations and was réleased after interrogation .and- confiscation of his film. NOSENKO made no references to GRAY. see oo ee era oe net The KGB document elsewhere states: "A guide of a tourist tourists-~American students--separated himself from. the group - and. travelled through the city alone. Ina notebook which was lost by him, notes and sketches were found which pointed to the fact that hu utilized his trip for the purpose of selecting suitable places for the placing of deaddrops, or for checking those deaddrops which were earlier selected by American agents. In Moscow he selected. routes which were used.to check and dis- discover the existence of surveillance, utilizing passable backyards and following skillful methods. At the present time FRANCIS is ~ the chief interpreter of the State. Department, servicing Soviet delegations in the USA," FRANCIS did have such a mission in 1958 and brought back a notebock with sketches of the sites he selected. He did not mention losing his notebook. In 1954 ard 1955 FRANCIS was in frequent contact with V.V. KRIVOSHEY in Berlin; KRIVOSHEY, who served there until the late 1956's, has been identified as a KGB First Chief Directorate officer who later became an officer in the Correspondents Department, KGB. Second Chief Directorate. * FRANCIS was also a student of Richard BURGI at Yale in 1956, the year that NOSENKO was involved in BURGI's recruitment (see Part V.D.4.b.). NOSENKO has not mentioned the FRANCIS case and did not recognize his name. WRKRIVOSHEY was a participant in the Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON case to which NOSENKO provided the, lead. (see Part VI.D.3.¢.). eee Pe Joh Py gprs cee. : 2 oe gare We ona meet one ovate rr enemirggaer tam mais fe eet ew mene cememeper rene » i uxt ene dtd halts eee set ei. 6 rec cadanne nein thc Edo dans fits Sibi ctie aa suse iisiett Baed a
TDY's to London (3957 and 1953} NOSENKO reported that his first oificiil cray ‘cl outside ‘the Seviet Union occurred in the fall of 2 of caen he was selected to accompany a group of athletes .i3 nad been invited) to visit London, As he explained on B abril 1904, it is necessary for a sécurity officer to access. way such dele- ; - gation, and the Eleventa Departnent of the Jecoud Ghief Ubiree- . torate, respousivle for recruitin; Second Uaiel Jirectorate ‘ officers for this purpose, telephoned Ree vel ey Cade fe of the Tourist Departzent, to request aa co licey who spoke English, DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether be vawiss te ake tie . trip. NOSENKO replied: “why not? 1 ive never besa abroad Of yet.” NOSENKO consequentiy travelled te Lonacu, using th , alias Yuriy lvanovich NIKULAYEV anc posing us “Lie uevuty chief’ of the delegation, ile was specifically lustructed to observe one menber of the delegation, a vouin mimes HYARDMYAYE, & whose father ha! been killed in a Soviet prison aid whose | political reliability was uncertain, Additionally, xc had : the general task of watching ali sembers of taue-delegaticn i for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. ‘the de.e- | gation consisted of approximatoly 99 persons ane te help him in Carrying out these duties, BUSENEO was assigned three or four agents and several operaticnal contacts aaond the deie gation members, He was the only starl security off icer making this trip. cae Chae ' tot The second trip to London teck place a year Inter, in : the fall of 1958, again as a security watchlog. ‘Tnis time he accompanied 2 delegation of ll or 12 boxers, and again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy chief of the delegation, NCSENKU was the only sccurlty o7f- i ficer with the delegatisn, and he had two agents aad two | i operational contucts auong the boxers. His assignment vas general; novody in particular was kept under observation, and the KGB had no derog gatory informaticn concerning any members of tne delegation, within wpb EE dee ants Se NOSENKO has associuted his use of the NEKOLAYEV alias in London with the use of the same name with the Sritish ; subjects % and GRE (see Part V.D.4.d.) shortly before i the first of these two trips, On 17 Aprii 1964 NOSENK plained this situation as follows: “With @ I used the nume NIKOLAYEY, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to ingland, : I was forced to yo there as NIKOLAYEV. I was forced to, : And again under the cover of the Ministry of Culture,  Be- ; - Cause {of this] I went as the assistant head of the dele- i ogaticn, representing the Ministry of Culture, I didn't a go under my own nance because it was decided that when : these people STEIN aa) came back to England, they Te ob would tell who they were with [report their contacts in the USSR]. They would probably question G35 especially as one who usec to work in intelligence... 4.g@@@)would-say: ‘There was this ma from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV,. . He was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with oo ; | use’ So they would say: 'How does he look (what docs he oa ee - leok like]?' Ue would say: ‘lie locked so-and-so.' So, : ao an a
I-would’ go. ‘there the same year. I'd go.théere, and. _they would look at me and say: ‘How come this’ man--his name is: i: -NOSERKO, ana-yet he is.:very similaz’.to the one Ccescribed by +. 0) That was why it was decided I have to go again under the nama . ‘“NIKOLAYEV. Just.a.matter of conspiracy. Since I already hecanze known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable.”
site og a merlin tcrenpesinsieet isan oeettns' oactann ony @ a ween of ccurse, I would go there the same year, _f'u go thera, ana they would look at me and Say: ‘iow come this man--his name i NOSEMKO, and yet he is verv similar to the one cescriked by That was why it was. decided J have to go again uniler the noma NIKCLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already berace known a8 NIKOLAYEV to the Eritishers & fers, this would be noticeable.® | hd RBar Eabeatin teen Ratthegercte be. debts cabsbibinad s ' { : t ‘ it 4 2 ‘ + i i x t } 4 . 1 q -—eeererementtrtasimgerees
weretlite © newts we ‘BE. January 1960 to January: 1962 (American Department) 7 ~ 1. Introduction . . | ‘against “the most important counterintelligence target in the “gonnel with Soviet citizens; second, to evaluate information — ne: ‘for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers  — | ; -targeta and attempted to become thoroughly familiar with -ach: *—Tn debriefing and interrogating NOSENKO, CIA placed partic- ote a? NCSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Départment, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first’ days of January 1962.* This section, in his. words, was working ~ Soviet Union," the permanent Anerican representation in Moscow, It regarded every Américan stationed there as a possible spy - and, simultaneously, as a target for eventual compromise and recruitment. n wwdthe sche beae a The functions of the U.S. Embassy Section were described by NOSENKO as being, first, to control all contacts by Embassy per- collected from all possible sources on American Embassy employees; and third,. to use this information as a basis for planning and carrying out recruitment approaches. The Americans' personal. ities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis oe dasemctrte be sSirtiatb Baines directed and debriefed large numbers of agents and informants, including the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts; the officers also assigned tasks to and assim- dilated the reports from the numerous surveillance teams at their ; i disposal, and they read and tried to-exploit materials from tele-— phone taps and microphones placed in the offices and homes of the Americans. Each officer had a limited number of American annually, they submitted detailed operational plans to exploit the knowledge they had gained of their target. During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, special emphasis was placed within the section on “identifying intelligence officers at the Embassy and active development of them, the acquisition of ciphers, and the detailed and painstaking study of code clerks, creating the conditions on the basis of which they can be recruited." | Beara ewe ee webbntte Mab Dotan sash abbas ane iibdlentet As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO has said, he had access to all information concerning its activities: “Nothing was hidden” from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB did not recruit any Americans associated with the Embassy, that no Americans assigned to the Embassy were being handled in Moscow as KGB agents in this. period, and that, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American Embassy personnel since "ANDREY."** From continuing friendships with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO has also claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the ; ies time he left the section in January 1962 until the January 1964 , trip to Geneva. . 1 BenscaiPaigel ARR IMOE Deyo 6 3 j } ular emphasis on his activities during the period January | 1960 to January 1962, since this information was of special importance to U.S. Government security. Y See Part VI.D.3.b. for a discussion of the case of the KGB_ / agent “ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), whose recruitment ‘has been variously dated by NOSENKO | between the years 1949 ) and 1953.
_-: - meanwhile, “no ”one” Fé placed NOSENKO' Us Deputy" Chief ofthe _.  fourist Department's American Section because (as he explained. -- * con 29 January 1965) the Tourist Department, which had earlier’. -# operated against members of delegations and various other tae eategories of foreign visitors, was being reorganized in January. 1960 for work against tourists alone and the Deputy Cnief slot. was eliminated.* With the exception of A. A. DMITRIYEV, Marina RYTOVA, and the homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, NOSENKO turned over all of his agents to another officer in the section named. TIMOFEYEY. NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 that he had two. separate files on his agent Arsene FRIPPEL, a developmental file _and an operational file, and that he turned the former over to TIMOFEYEV. and the latter to V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the”. Tourist Department. During later.interrogations, however, NOSENKO hag said that he continued to handle FRIPPEL while in the U.S. Embassy Section and was the case officer during FRIPPEL's visits ‘¢o the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.** 26 NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the American-Britisn-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO learned from K. N. DUBAS, the department Chief, of plans to transfer him to the U.S. Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in the Tourist Department: "I was used to it there and wanted to i continue. I wanted to stay in the Tourist Department. \This {the transfer/ was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there. But, of course, its more important there. The American Department is, of course, the most important. But here I was working against American tourists. This is also important. Furthermore, I showed {had proven/ my- self there in '55, '56, '57, '58, and ‘59 and was considered to be not a bed case officer. And here, in the American Department, I must show /prove/ myself with new pecple." NOSENKO therefore ' asked DUBAS in December 1959 to "please fight for me to stay.” I ; 4} Be ee with hat doe 2 DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief Directorate Chief 0. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued. . | ain ob adie said atsenny . A it F On the day NOSENKO reported to V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report to GRIBANOV's office. To GRIBANOV NOSENKO again expressed mis- givings about the change of assignment. GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him about this but that he, GRIBANOV, “had his own plans and that was all." GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that ry iiRieidcus * There was no change in the functions of NOSENKO's section, however; as before, it continued to be responsible for operations against tourists from the United States, England, and Canada. #*  FRIPPEL has reported that NOSENKO continued to meet him until he left the Soviet Union. in January 1961 and again when he returned as a guide to tourist groups twice in 1962 and once again in 1963; see Part V.D.5.
14008DRS BR es re, Ss a Co : es aS tO iar 6 35.8, A ‘he thought NOSENKO could bring.“fresh air" to the U.S. Embassy _ Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention . tO operations against American code clerks, the “number one _ target."* Neither GRISANOV nor KLYPIN told NCSEXKO why he had been selected. for this position.or who had recommended him for it. _NOSENKO was asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section. He replied: "Nobody." He was then asked to identify the persons from whom he had assumed certain of his duties as Depury Chief of the section (these are ciscussed in detail below). “OSENKO said that he took the responsibility for rmrintaining the section file on the security of the U.S. Embassy from the Chief of the section, Ve. M. KOVSHUK,** Regarding his responsibility as case officer for the Security Officer of the Embassy, NOSENKO explained that be- cause former Security Officer Russell LANGELLE nad been declared persona non grata in GctoLer 1959 end because his successor John ABIDIAN was not to arrive until March 1960, no ore in the section had this responsibility when he, NOSENKO, arrived in January ; i 1960. Asked who had been LAIGELLE's case officer, NOSENKO re- ; - plied: “LANGELLE was handled by several people - by /A.S./ MALYU- ‘ GIN, then after that by /V.A./ KUSKOV, then by KOVSHUK, then eRe tia + tal atl dacadrsrere 4 it sa cape ol titedew wham ded _*® In late December 1961, GOLITSYN also commented on this subject te his CIA handling officer: "The task of strengthening of wor’: against the Americans has been a standing requirement, co both in the past and most particularly at this time. This work was particularly intensified after the appointment of SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other countries... This question of intensifying work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB, Thereafter, there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensifi- cation of work against the American cipher-clerks." votes das Mir, tlie D sonia **There iS an apparent contradiction between NOSENKO's desig- 4 nation of ROVvSHik 2s—Chief—of—the. tirar U5. Embassy) Sec- _ass0 tion iff 1960 and information earlier supplied by GOLITSYN, 4 GOLITSYN told CIA of a conversation he nad with KOVSHUK in i oo, January 1961 in Moscow (see Part V.E.3:c.2. concerning a. i ; - . wecruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORS- a | . BERG) but at that time described KOVSHUK only as an American —_ 2 ‘ic-/" .. - Department officer, without indicating his position. The rth pea Ra ge ‘ only time that GOLITSYN has given a position for KOVSHUK was : i in the context of questioning concerning KHRUSHCHEV's "Secret Loe Speech" denouncing STALIN in 1956; ,GOLITSYN: said that ac this time KOVSHUK was Chief of the American Department (sic) of roe" +. ‘tthe Second Chief Directorate. On 16 February 1962 GOLITSYN i Stes identified Vladimir PETROV as.Chief of the. “section concerned roo... . with the American Embassy of the American Department of the . «.: Second Directorate"® in 1960., NOSENKO had identified PETROV ‘as Chief of the Second Section of the American Department, ‘which was concerned with the penetration of U.S. intelligence “Operations inside the Soviet Union. .
Rah apentahewe meenenentilbin wine = te cenne 2 ‘He ig an Armenian. His Deputy -is Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV." preeaegien ty N. Yes. ~ GELL efore my € ime i 5 t is on 24 Jtine 1964, NOSENKO stated: “In'1959 and. possibly in 1958, Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of ‘the U.S.° Embassy Section. I replaced him in this position in 1960 and | he went to the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department as Deputy” - Chief."* On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO volunteered for. the first time that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief of the. section, had been _ the case officer for LANGELLE. Under interrogation in early — 1965, NOSENKO added’ that BAKHVALOV had 2lso been responsible for ~ . 4 maintaining the file on the security of the U.S. Embassy. At ee this time he explained his earlier statement by saying that BAKH-. © . VALOV had left the section before his arrival and had given the - og file to KOVSHUK to hold for his successor. The file continued to s- be charged officially to BAKHVALOV, however, even though he. was ft no longer in the section, and NOSENKC arranged for the official change of custody shortly after reporting for duty (see Part V.E. 3.£.). NOSENKO said further, in January 1965, that BAXHVALOV had shared responsibility for supervising code clerk operetions with KOVSHUK before NOSENKO arrived to assume these duties him-. self, NOSENKO had been given a number of opportunities prior to 24 June 19664 to identify BAKHVALOV as his predecessor, bu he did not do so. These are summarized below: . ve RU a eee lle 25 January 1964: In a discussion of the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said: "“‘he Chief of this department is Colonel Artem DAVIDYAN, tinedbatath 0 27 February 1964: NOSENKO was shown a photograph of V.A. ALEKSEYEV, a Soviet who was in Japan from July to September- . 1961 as a member of a trade delegation, NOSENKO immediately os recognized the face as that of the Deputy Chief cf the Fifth Department of the Second Chief Directorate. He said that he did not know this person's last name, but that his first name and patronymic were Mikhail Fedorovich. shen shown the last name ALEKSEYEV, NOSENKO recognized it as an alias, but pro~- vided no further information concerning his true identity or earlier service in the American Department. or ee eal il ae cat 10 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list in writing the names of KGB officers who had received various awards for their service. He wrote: "The following got either the Order of the Military Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star, I'm net sure which: Mikhail BAKEVALOV, Deputy Chief of a section in an unremembered department of the Second Chief Directorate." 18 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list all the . ade i Officers who had been assigned to-the American Department ee 4. for each year since he joined the KGB. He named the chiefs ok I and deputies of the U.S, Embassy Section from 1953 through no 1956. When he came to 1957, however, he said that he could ot RL bea ate not provide accurate information as to which officers were Pe ee | assigned to the section for that year through 1959 (he was va ~ aith reference to the Fifth Department, NOSENKO has _€urnished only one other item of information: he re- ported. that in 1958, or as late as the fall of 1959, 2: the Israeli Section was transferred to. this department: __ after having been a.component of the American Depart- .
yoocog coat eo, sO . So te at . B wet ee TR ae Loot, ’. allegedly in the Tourist Department. in this period) and could ' not deseribe their functions. On this basis: NOSENKO was then asked to list the officers who had joined the section between. - + 3,°.1956 and January.1960, when NOSENKO said he had returned. He- | provided 14 names, but BAKHVALOV's was not among them. Asked ;..€® name the officers who had lef+ the section in the same period, - he named five, again omitting BAKHVALOV, ; sees went eaheank tly 4 Haw hteain + whe Serr eens OC Sere Om
ae Introduction. Shortly after reporting for duty in ‘the U.S. ‘Eabassy Section and following his. short discussion with GRIBANOY, NOSENKO met with Department Chief KLYPIN. and. Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in. Q i the section, Repeating what GRIBANOV had already said, 5 oo t KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single respon-. _ So | ety mya sibility. in the section would be supervision. of all KGB en operational activity against American military and. State Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for..the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for super- vising operations against State’ Department personnel and | NOSENKO would Supervise work against che Arny, Air Force, i and Naval attaches and their assistants.* NOSENKO was also made respansible for maintaining certain files in the section. On 19 February 1965 NOSENKO signed an interrogation proto~ col. which he agreed contained a listing of his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It read in part: wuibbbiaclitaith a "During’ the eptire eriod in the First [U.S. i Embassy] Section, 7irst | American] Department in ; 1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. My responsibilities were the following: 4 q H -General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, : Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of pean. Section in his absence. i -Immediate supervisor for the operational work i against American code clerks. In this capacity I i closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV. -Case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer, John ABIDIAN. | -For about the first six months of 1960, super- ae visor of the work against the offices of the U.S. Mili- | ee. tary, Naval, and Air Attaches. «dob amsadabea d ~I maintained the file on American Embassy security. -~i maintained the log books for the reports sent ‘to the First (U.S. Embassy] Section by the Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information: obtained from all the microphones installed in the American Embassy. 1 read all the reports and gave the ; pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in : na the Section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUE or GRYAZNOV.** — *NOSENKO mentioned his responsibility for supervising at- ; tache operations for the first time in 1965. These functions’ _ are discussed below.  _ _ oe ak +The final sentence was added at NOSENKO' 8 yequest at the time the protocol was signed.
Ct “‘#During this period I was the agent handler for — oe “<< ‘agents 'SHMELEV’, 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', ‘ARTUR’: and "SARDAR® CO RE Oe . “Throughout this entire period I sat in room 618 nis a of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzhershinskiy” © ..>  - # ° | Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this.of-~- -.: : ; fice with me throughout most of this period, " b. Functions as General Deputy and Acting Chief of Section: fi) Access Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under re- peated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with the responsibility of taking over in KCVSHUK's absence, he had acces. to all information on the section's activities - ho and was obliged to keep current. on this information. On this basis he has been able to assure his questioners that the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to re- cruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to section files and his discussions with section officers made it certain that there were also no successes from 1953 to i 1960 and from January 1962 to January 1964. His statements ‘ ‘on this subject during the Februgry 1965 were distilled in : a protocol which NOSENKO Signed on 20 ) February (quoted in ; ; full): eV Massa SER Ends « A Vales ete ae) 4 ve ML. As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOV- SHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my func. oo, 2 tions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to . assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform this function I had the right and the obligation of knowing the details about every important activity of the section against the American Embassy and its per@ sonnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from ne. octet "2. As Deputy Chief of the Section I know defi- nitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy oh. were agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in Poo any way to the KGB during my service in the Section. I : There were no approaches or recruitments made by the ‘Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962 against personnel of the American Embassy, including ; personnel of the State Department, the offices of the i 7 Military Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department “| 7 ° ; of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants, State Department code clerks and Army code clerks except against STORSBERG | and KEYSERS, both un- successful approaches... ; . *VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Johan PREISFREUND, FRIPPEL, and > mrespectively, who are discussed: in other parts d OS pape At other times NOSENKO has named additional agents | i4rasy-- be handled in this period; they are discussed below. Biba cee
A008 Qo. ‘Gii) Duties made. against any employees of the United States ‘Government who were assigned to the American Eabassy on temporary duty during this period. I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct.” “3. There were no approaches: or recruitnents + On 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was questioned concerning his supervisory duties.as Deputy Chief of the section, pare ticularly his function of supervising activity against code clerks. Question: Answer: o 3p 8 . were necessary. ° The transcript of this discussion is ‘quoted here: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you have to devote the most time? I don't know. What was the most important? Everything was important. Whom did you supervise in the American Embassy Section? GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, [ Vladimir] DEMKIN, and later [ yevgeniy] GROMAKOYSKIY who worked with DEMKIN. Then there was [N.A.] GAVRILENKO, [1I.Ya.] KURI- LENKO; and BELOGLAZOV: working with the Attaches. They were all in the First Section? Yes. What were their responsibilities? ‘'GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had all the code clerks: . DEMKIN was charged with all persons living in ; Americas House, except code clerks. GROMAKOVSKIY helped him. GAVRILENKO had the Air Force Attaches and [their] assistants, and also he had the plane of the Ambassador. He must think about watching the pilots who were living in a hotel. KURILENKO-- Army Attache and assistants; BELOGLAZOV--Navy | ; Attache, assistants, and Marines. What is your understanding of the meaning of the word ; “supervisor"?, Persoraily 10 be at the head, to direct. So, 3: > ‘er “aesponsisisities of supervising all tlh. work a:aics. aa! ine code clerks, this meant that ca. ete the bead of this work, that you were direc:ing Lats work, that you. were participating:. in discussio s'concerning this work, and in these discussions you were talking about what measures LVF waited TEP SERSEy fie aris on. ~ sw er genapaes reefing eta ome arenes ee eiceneememta win oh se renege ape ee ne Oe Som F . a i eerste Ueates  aatts 4 a tretearibbe Riere we tae be demty bent { 3 4 on ae Raver
7 wl “Yittle questions which the case officer must de-. ‘cide himself... When it was necessary. = we And. participating personally, when nec ‘knew how Inga was afraid of intelligence. SVerPupt ing 7)" wien Wevesaanry “because there” a essary? What sort of case officer questions were you answer ing? All kinds. If I couldn't answer them, if ny authority isn't enough for this, it is necessary to discuss them with KOVSHUK. I was discussing with KOVSHUK, with KLYPIN, with [KLYPIN's suc- cessor as Chief Of the Amcrican Department, S.M.] FEDOSEYEV, Several tines, not once, we were discussing questiuns with GRIBANOV. Also, concerning measures, concerning future steps. When it was necessary. What other duties did you have as a supervisor? I told you. When it was necessary I was going to agent meetings with case officers. When it was necessary. Or, besides, I net personally with "PROKHOR" [PREISFREUND| or @355%g See" “PROKHOR" was working agninst STORSDRKG, "SARDAR" against ZU3JUS. I was working nyself with then. You personally worked agents "PROKHOR" and "SARDSR"? Yes. When did you find it necessary to go to an agent mecting with a case officer? Well, for example, DEMKIN would come to me and say: "You krow Ella [UMANETS, an agent in America Youse]. Ella said that MORONE had looked at her and was smiling." This is just an {hypo- thetical| example....Okay, I am going with hin, hearing Ella myself,. {to learn] what happened, jwhether] it is possible to make something or not. You met Ella and talked with her? Yes, with DEMKIN. Very, very difficult to say, why and how we are going. When it was necessary to go. , As a rule did you try to make it a practice to visit the agents of the section who were working against the American target? Yes, I am telling you. There was such an‘agent, Inga [VARLAMOVA]. GRYAZNOV was meeting with her. It might be necessary to go to meet her. But, we And, you see, they don't like it when a new cas6é offi- “cer appears. But, maybe, for the sake of the file, ~ + i : i ; : i : d q 3 4 J oxtiet cs ate soe fa eaten ite 0 Se oe
1400000 . Pl . - + . + woe ~ vo 7 Poe ETL a re at was necessary to. go, to hear her. Not because ne ‘you do not believe GRYAZNOV. No. But, you see, —. . ' to hear from the source ( emphasized|, directly, ; . what is going on, and how it is going on, to get = *> : . wot _.- , @ feeling. Because the source will tell the case- — , ; officer, then the case officer will tell you. Maybe sometimes he will not give you every detail, every intonation. But in some cases, it is neces- sary to feel this. But, of course, it depends on the agent, on the target, whether you will go or not go. It's very difficult, again, to say. Ses “cu rdaat Racehdte ated Q: Could you say that you met 50 per cent of the section's agents? 3 As No, I can't say. . 4 Q: Fifty per cent or 75 per cent? | 5 A; I can't answer you. . io 3 Q: What about your functions as a supervisor in re-# gard to safehouses, to "K.K.'s" and "Ya.K.'s",* : A: Oh. I myself had a file on my flat, a yavochnaya ; , % kvartira, which I brought from the Seventh : " TYourtst Department]. It was my own. GRYAZNOV i had his own yavochnaya kvartira. KOSOLAPOV had also his own yavochnaya_kvartira. And not one of t us had a conspirative apartment. : And you took the "Ya.K."' from... .. oe Ag (Interrupting.) Which I had from the Seventh. And, by the way, when I was leaving the First [ American] Department, I took this file again to the Seventh. Q: And not one of you had a conspirative flat. AS No, because the section had only--how many?-— [p.1.] MASSYA had one conspirative. [V.P.] FEDYANIN had one conspirative, and then there was one conspirative flat, where, in fact, an agent was living. In the First Section there were i . three or four conspirative flats. : if . Qs. But among you, GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV there was ; j i : . a none? ES As Only "Ya.K.' | . . ns 4 \ i i i ! i | *& "KK." Ukonspirativnava kvartira--conspiratorial apart— went) is defined by NOSEXKO as a safehouse ‘or apartment. owned and maintained ‘by the KGB, A "Ya.K." (yavochnaya kvartira-~ Cos meeting apartment) is an apartment occupied by a@ tenant who . on is perhaps subsidized-by the KGB and absents himself when a .. there is a need to use the apartment for meetings or other :. getivities. The "K.K." is used for more sensitive operational — -. QSurposes, he said.
ee oe gpitens sme > © > © > © > O° ‘162. as Who kept a record of these The case officers. / Where was your "Ya. Ki"? Vorovskogo Strect. And where was GRYAZNOV's? GRYAZNOV's was on Kachalogo Street. And KOSOLAPOV's? Don't remember. Don't remember. (Pause.) It was in the vicinity of the Suvorovskiy Boulevard. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. In the region. of Arbat Square. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. KOSOLAPOV's. DEMKIN's I don't remember. And you didn't have any responsibility for super- vising the activity that went on at these flats? I don't understand. Was there some central control of the use of. the "Ya.K.'s''? What kind of control? Who would be using them, when they would be using them, undcr what conditions? No. The case officer who was working with it decides how to use this flat or how not to us¢é it, et cetera, et cetera. Besides that, very often we were using rooms in hotels. So GRYAZNOV would take any of his operational activity to his "Ya.K."? He would also mect with his agents, with his operational contacts in hotel rooms. KOSOLAPOV was meeting his agents in his own "ya. K.‘'s NO SENKO was meeting his agents or operational con- tacts in his own "Ya.K.". Could GRYAZNOV or KOSOLAPOV ever’ use these "Ya.K.'s" - without your knowing about it? Of course. It's their own flat. 7 ts But you're supervising their work? .Must I kéep them like a/ little, little child? __ No,’ no. They don't have to report to me: “Today I go to meet my agent at my flat." They can use them whenever they like without checking - with you as supervisor? Of course, ef course. They are meeting their own agents. So , . ee A Be aa vie eet bik LA whbea ine ade. me ecethl feeee Perret i 3 a i
| | | . t . , You have no idea who. they ar _they-are meeting them? © @ meoting, or when. When. they are mevting an active development agent, they tell me afterwards. They are telling “this, this, this, this" and I am answering "this, this, this.” But usually they are going to meet maids ‘or they don't have to report. There is nothing. active and there is....The file is going on. What about operational vehicles? Automobiles? You see, we had one automobile for the whole department. Besides this, we could apply, when- necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second Chief Directorate and he would give a car, bee~ - cause he has a number of cars at his disposal.: Approximately how much of your time did you spend supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?. I can't say. ‘Was it the most important function? -Yes, it was important. All work in the First Section was important. This was the most impor- tant. But one day I could devote the whole day to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day, maybe two hours in the day. The rest of the day I will be absent. I will be meeting with KLYPIN, or I will be having a meeting with surveillance, or I will be at ancther place. The third day, again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it. No, I can't tell you. It depends on the situa- tion. (i411) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence As Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of NOSENKO's responsibilities was to serve as Acting Chief when KOVSHUK was absent from the office. NOSENKO recalled -¢hat he fulfilled this function during KOVSNUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember when this leave occurred in those years. He also served as Aeting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was ill again.. ’ NOSENKO was unable to recall any operational or. inspection trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other speéific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent was for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in _ 1960. NOSENKO's description of his duties in KOVSHUK’s ab- ; aoen. wag summarized in a protoco : .*f do not remember any particularly important ; operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Sec- _ tion, nor any unusual things that happened during 1 which he signed on 9, March a =f OES URTE De 1) CN Tw a Sb he tee (Midian tenddd wae dete ame Sal ate See fo tence bone os. fe + norrtitdgn Sib cas iebead ates «
these times. The only- specific: responsibility KOVSHUK “” . hed. which I handled in his absence was tc report to-  —- the Chief of the First Department about all mail going . out of the First Section. I did not meet any of. KOV-  .— rr SHUK's agents during his absences because there was.no necessity to do so. His only Russian agent whoa 1’ - remember was Ilya GLAZUNOV [|.KGB cryptonym "VRUBEL"], whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I thisk. The only other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I remember was the correspondent Edmund STEVENS.* The only. thing that was ‘different for me as Acting Chief of the Section was that I had to go every day tv see the Chief of the De.~- partment. c. Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations (i) Introduction Among the numerous KGB activities against American code clerks in Moscow which NOSENKO has discussed are five opera- tions wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches for recruitment/defection ‘purposes. According to NOSENKO, none was successful... The five major cases are reviewed separately below, one of them in tae context of duty trips abroad by NOSENKO's subordinate KOSOLAPOV, ** KNOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for supervising operations against American code clerks, he found a very “difficult situation." Prior to the assignment of KOSOLAPOY to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, all operations against code clerks had been handled by 4.8, HMALYU- GIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort. there had beer no operational approaches and no successes. When *The Edmund STEVENS case is. discussed in Part V.C.2. **GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identitied KOSOLAPOV's photograph as that of a veteran KCB officer with whom ke was personally ‘acquainted. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGB in about 1952 and had served for two or three years as a member of the First [American] Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City; subsequently he had worked for two or three years in the First Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters, According to GOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGB Second Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line with... 'a KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad. As of 1960, GOLITSYN said, KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerks stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow. He added that KOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English. Prior to GOLITSYN's identification, CIA had no indication of intelligence acti- vity on KOSOLAPOV's part. Between February 1953 and April 1955 he was assigned to the United. Nations Secretariat Trans-.. lation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been an interpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detectidn; | in September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip to the United States (see Part V.E.3.d. which desoribes the role of NOSENKO's target. John ABIDIAN in connection with the ., KHRUSHCHEV trip). KOSOLAPOV's English is flawless, ee, oe ae yp Beinn catmepreces merimae osu stare onere™ ate z - es . Fe a Sis ¢ 3 sad 4 i a anbaMeleemtde ht te nw ae tennw falllateds Maitatnderees wnat mre nn dgingy cath os Anta Hh ae. LE Ot es pill oe UG hones 0 6
14-90000 deena marries wes taeen tbe KOSENKO took Ove? tisen were no active developzental opera~ operational contends segny used against thes were poorly educated maids Aiol aepépesces, none of vhon had accomplished anything of Atporteae. 0 Ne Poreizn agents were ting used in operations @eotent eodersom personnel, and at the tine NOSENKO had nv @pent. af his oon in America Houss, or in tne Embassy, win THEE be teed in these opers£tions. In Jasuary wi ees, ; $0 GRYAZNOV® was assigaed in his code cl<ie «tivities, From this point on, NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and Ch¥s/coy phered the sane KoB Headquarters office (Roca 61:4), Ynore ali KGB files on Ancrican code clerk: , as welt Bea dpe fileg on agents available for work against them, were essed ty one large svfe, accessible to all three officers, xogiszo supervised all of the section's work along theo Vitae, and no provocations, compromises, recruitment atlewts, or secrurtments could have been planned or carried out wlth tis yrior knowledge and agreement a oeaad *GOLITSYN fart seoq GRYAZNGV ax 2 case officer of the American Departs: , Necond Chier Direstorate, on 31 Decene ber 1961. lie eat w+ that cime that he had been personally acquainted with Gittiznoy wince 1945 and that, eas of the epring of 1960, unife.oy wes "working oaly against code clerks of the Auerieven Embassy in Moscow.” GRYAZNOV had. travelled to tha ts tenq ste n the past, tes at same time GOLITSYN added. #7, f SPare sade BRC EF p Pik § Jun 1962 taut is ras teld ¢ 1A th an =e . lassmate of GRYAZNOV dufice tot and 1946 at the "SMFRSiI" counterintelli- gence school 1 Morn; he described GRYAZNOV as & specialist in operations adise+ American code clerks, saying that GRYAZNOV was “Very +<perienced" and had had “some successes." AS an example, hu tita of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in the epring of 1960 witi., he, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S. Embassy Section wf én Amertean Department in connection with his forthcorini andivnment as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligenes spttcer in Helsinki. GOLITSYN had com— plained to GAYAYNUs that the KGB had no U.S. assets in Helsinki at the tine, aid ty CIA he quoted GRYAZNOV as replying: “Maybe we will holy you. According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV went on to explain phat he was handling an agent, a code clerk in the U.H, fmbassy in Moscow, wio wes about to be transferred, pertups to Helsinki; he told GOLITSYN that the RGB had received information from this American code clerk and classified hin ae an “real agent." NOSENKO has not - mentioned such an gyent (who has yet to be identified) and ‘has denied that ths yon had any agents in the U.S. Embassy. at this tine. GOLITSYN identified @ photograph of G.I. LAPIN, who travelicd with the Maiseyey Dance troup to the United “States and Canada 4j; 1958, as being identical with GRYAZNOV. CIA had no prior thdication of intelligence. activities by ‘in true name. Leet! : GRYAZNOV, under the alias LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZKNOV wee a ee ee esate ees AT ORF GHEY PIPE ELIS? EOP GS tL UAE lt TENE, La TT fadcdivahe gly. 4 ste. weeeitee TH wrasse eta bbe Oa yak lakedas tale
when he was in Moscow. IP KOSENKO went avay on MENS os said, he would‘have been told ‘about any such activity i hw hig return. Ba — y Ube When NOSENKO took over responsibility for Heerab ay | against code clerks, he read available files an tare sd ‘ agents, discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, teuKyao? Rieei U.S. Embassy Section case officer responaivle far thy Se. of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and repay identa findings and recommendations to his supertors, KOVSLD hides KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, in ingen ducing a new program for the work of the sectign, Koa Ye vig Tete tin tna suggested the use of third-country nationals (Cit Aah tey 4 | a 4 a 2g “4 and not Sovict) for agent work against code elerig: (7 emesis t ; with this suggestion, be persuually vecrultcd 4 Aiding, (1he po : tary officer, Gainer asesdcryptonym "SARDAR"), rete nt H A him against the Amcrica House, (Afta@ his first fouy Vee ted Spas specifically targetted against militar, cod betty Matthew ZUJUS.) 4nether such agent directly heuwhtog ptbeek SENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFuninias, wh tha figured in the case of the military cede clerk Jemag ernie BERG, NOSENKO also suggested initiating activily aaj. i clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and PDOLLT A ae yy tite ; proposed that operational measures be undertakon ap Vie 'y operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, th. mt through which most of the code clerks passed on thea, ‘ ¥ i to Moscow. » Way 4 Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the Oper aby against code clerks was successful during the two Yeu, "tim spent as Deputy Chicf of tho American Fabassy Heathou. > hee did the KGB have aay success between January 105% wud ye ary 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva, ie tikny vite { j 4 j that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any succengfy] anon had taken place during this latter period. “UDP tae bees (11) Approach to STORSBERG | ” i From the start of his association with CIA, NOS Va jeyy Ay emphasized that the primary mission of the U.H, Fubes.. fas eon : tion in 1960 ond 1951, during his incumhency ag Depivy? pens : 4 of Section, was the recruitment of an American militg) | Ube i grapher. He has explained the cpecial stress pinced yh hry pton ‘ requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of Stata Dopay yt, Ses code clerks) by saying that, while the KGB had brokuy We U.S. State Department cipher systems and could read 2, ("tein messages up fo and Inéluding those classified “gaase,h" lered . had been no such success with American military ciphs,., here et «+ -emained secure in this period. NOSENKO also hag asi _ repeatedly that the KGB had not been able to reeruit , iB ean code clerk, cither State Department or military, HY Ameria the years since the recruitment of "ANDREY" in 198g: gh ing *See Part VI.D.3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY" egg 4
erie mninnniynittinesanes On the several operations ageinst milicary code clerks which. NOSENKO has described and in which he has claimed a personal role, his greatest detail and emphasis has been given to the case of James Harry STORSBERG. In 1962 NOSENKO said that, in line with GRIBANOV‘s instructions thet he pay parti- cular attention to code clerk operations, ne Gevoted most of his time for almost a year to the STORSBERG operation, and played a persona. role in the unsuccessful KG approach; he descrited in the first person his conversation with STCRSBERG, During tre 1954 to 1966 period, NUSENKO denied not only that he had personally participated in this way but also that he jad ever claimed to have done: he continued to say, however, that he supervised the operation from beginning to end. Ac- cording to NOSENKO, =his operation got under way with the re- “eruitmert of a third-national agent (Johan PREISFREUND, a Finn) sore time in the farst half of 1960, The specific aim .in using this agent was to involve SIORSBERG 1n compromising detivities, which would then form.the basis for the approach. The operation dregged on through 1969 ana until the spring, summer, of autumn: of 1961; ac this time N.5. SKVORTSOV, a KGB officer, was introduced in the guise of a wealthy French busi-~ nessman to contince the development of compromising informa- tion. BREISFREUND was then withdrawn from the operation, Several weeks later STORSEERS wa: approached, principaily on the basis of his financial need, but he rejected the KGB bid and the cperatior. was over. NOSENKO was certain that STORS~ BERG had not reported the epproach and said that the KG3 would use this fact as an additional element of pressure should STORSBERS again re posted outside the United States. NOSENKO also kr.e« that GCLITSYN had reported to CIA concerning KGB modus operandi in this case as well as PREISFXEUND's part in it. GOLITSYN in early 1962 had, in fact, told CIA about PREISFKEUND having been used by the KGB in an operation again an American stationed in Moscow, Contrary to NOSENKO's infor} mation.—La said that this American hed been épproached--and @Cruited--by the KGB “at the end of 1960. oneness setDNntiansat =r. res . . ; A second item from GOLITSYN may also relate to the STORS~- BERG operation: GOLITSYN told:of hearning in the spring of . 1960 that the KGB had developed a military code clerk in Mos- cow to the point that recruitment was virtually assured. Ac. cording to U.S. Army records, only two military code clerks were stationed there at that time, STORSBERG and his superior William S. HURLEY, the military communications officer who additicnally performed cryptographic duties. NOSENKO has - said that there was no. KG operation against HURLEY, and ‘HURLEY has reported no approach. | In addition to the detailed information given by NOSENKO on this case, the FBI and Army Intelligence have Laterviewed " STORSBERG (who confirmed NOSENKO‘s account and denied recruit-— ment) and CIA has talked to the KGB agent PREISFREUND (who “also generally. confirmed the information given by NOSENKO but. did not know thé GUtcome of thecase). The results of _ these interviews, together with information from GOLITSYN and — /€com other sources, are summarized in this order below. | a £ “4 ; q “hanya tbe pe vinan weBiveec cand fete al ean Fn arate tor é 4 i ;
74-00000 7 - / ete - : . aA o i orn PE NR MERE OIEIOC TE REAL Ree ee te Be ei eh RE Zea iran garner hee ~ January 1960: STCRSSERG arrived in Moscow (this date was suppiied by the interrogator and was eccepted - by hOSZNKO as accurate, which it is). sath ie ut KN shoot neta Bo tle Ss Early 1960: PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSEUK. (This was con nsistent ath easl- er statements, and NOSEMK ne first met PREISFREUND a we or recruicment, On 21 Octo- : rer 4 KO said that he and ‘ PREISSRE: un the middle of 1960, ; in tne si He subsequently stayed : with the cen 1@far Gare mid-19€0_') : Summer 19659: PRELSFREUND i oles somam to STCRSBERG, Early 1961: Comprom BERG and a at the Hotel About May ai thdsaen from the operation 1961: ana SKXVORTSOV, alias MITHAUD, was introduced. (NOSEIXO dated this by seying it was about three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG,) ch to STORSBERG in the . (Earlier on 20 October thac the aporoacn was made & 2a half before STORSBERG hat STORSBERS was reassigned ‘ in November 1961, SRO said that the approach was in ‘June 1961, five months before STORSBERG'’s departure date. STCRSSERG has re- ported that ihe approach was in Gctohker 1961; see below.) June 1961: Unsuccessful RGE a Leningrad Ho 1966 NOSENKO a s "a ronth or a mont left Moscow." Tol fF NOSENKO was questioned further con the STORSSERG case later ‘ in the October 1966 interrecations. He asserted on 21 October that he had first met PREISFREVND in the summer of 1960 and that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity j after the unsuccessful approach to STORSHERG. He saw PREIS- FREUND most recentiv. he seid. in Moscow during 1963.  NOSENKO also explained how PREISFREUND first came to know his true name: Initially NOSENXO was introduced to PREISFREUND only by first name and catronymic. Yuriy Ivanovich; on one occasion, however, NOSENKO was visiting PREISFREUND's hotel room in Moscow and “lost his XGB certificate’ there. Thereafter PREISFREUND knew him as NOSENKO, On 25 October 1966, NOSENKO i repeated his earlier statements that the STORSBERG case was . the only one in which PREISFREUND participated, although he may have reported casually on other Americans he met during his visits to America House. For the first time he specific- ally named GRYAZNOY as the case officer holding the operational £ile on STORSSERG, He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO, gupervised the operation against STORSBSERG, Pot Te ~ [ne t* Pree 4 4 ce id
14-00000. + 2 Ee c 44 at yy ae ba a is . 7 gee Basta oe. Sel Det OF 4 ictal’ re. cow t6.-L ~ Se See i
tab iad Mur Pk roe tip Sane hw ee yh te tabi did et Cr St te om dete F ety .t that PREISFFEUND _¥7GHIs is in reterence to NOSENSO's statement - invelved STORSBERG in speculation which PREISF2UEND also SS ; Claimed; sec also GOLITSYN's second lesi, discussed below.
14-00000 ote Poem oy Dobe Thoms demands made of PREISFREUND by the KGB. PREISFREUND added:  - #™™Recording to NOSENKO, this was Irina LEBEDOVSKAYA, an fe agent of the U.S. Embassy Section who was. handled by A.V... 179. (c) Information from PREISFREUND CIA initially interviewed PREISFREUND on 8 July 1965 in Helsinki. (NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.) During this first meeting with him, PREISFREUND correctly identified photo~ graphs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG. He maintained, how- ever, that his relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO was strictly on a business level, that he had never had anything to do with : the KGB, and that he did not know what the initials "KGB" stand for. Toward the end of this meeting, PREISFREUND allowed that he may have been unwittingly involved in some activity acainst STORSBERG and agreed to tell the “entire truth" the following day. On 9 July 1965 PREISFREUND described how he had been caught in a blackmarket operaticn in Moscow and was, on this basis, re- cruited by KOVSHUK “either at the end of 1959 or early 1960.” Several weeks later, he said, he was approached by NOSENKO who explained that KOVSHUK was unavailabie and that the KGS wanted him, PREISPREUND, to arrange an introduction between STORSBERG and a Soviet female, Irina, the daughter of a Soviet general. * PREISFREUND then left Moscow, and when he returned about two months later, he took STORSBERG to the Peking Restaurant, where the introduction was effected. PREISFREUND, STORSBERG, Irina, and another girl then went to PREISFREUND's hotel, where STORS- BERG and Irina were intimate. PREISFREUND said on 10 July 1965 that he was fairly certain his recruitment took place in early 1960, probably in March or April. At the time KOVSHUK had refused to explain what: the KGB wanted him to do; he said only that they would talk about it later but assured PREISFREUND that he would not be asked to undertake anything detrimental to Finnish interests; nor did KOVSHUK establish any means of communications with PREISFREUND, telling him only that the KGB would know where to find him. PREISFREUND subsequently visited the USSR on several occasions, but no contacts were made. Just as he was beginning to believe - that the affair had been forgotten, NOSENKO contacted him at his room in the Berlin Hotel in Moscow. Asked to explain his earlier statement that NOSENKO first met with him two weeks after the recruitment, PREISFREUND said he could not remember exactly how long it was, but that it was definitely on another trip to Moscow and that it was probably several months later. PREISFREUND was asked how he had first met STORSBERG. . He first replied that it had been at America House and recalled. that NOSENKO had simply told him to go there and "find Jim;" i4 was only with some difficulty that he finally managed to strike up an acquaintance at the bar. On second thought, PREIS- _PREUND said, he may have first met STORSBERG at the sauna in the Finnish Embassy in Moscow through a mutual Finnish acquaint=- ance. Throughout this initial period, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK made repeated promises that once the introduction of STORSBERG to the Soviet female had been accomplished, there would be no more mere setae nte panei mene ania « t 4 ; age 8 : Stotudscsbctty abba aM ‘ Fem hae ae 2 oan atest 002 thawte =
: i i i od i i at 1 i i : 4 -.* Ne about helping me out in my cusiness “and. S0.0n,. but they never - did a damn thing for me. -On tho. contrary. Tne only promise they: “kept was that I would not. be asked todo anytaing except the signed visas. ile was told this was correct and was asked for *¢he true name. PREISPREUND replied: “GOLUB? Yes?® ‘that the Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in comiag trip.*** he said that he was particularly concerned about "Both. NOSERKO and FOVSHUK: used to make. all. ‘sort® of. promises ‘to STORSBERG job. But, as for the rest of it, they didn't nelp me: 0s at all.” ee . , PREISPREUN 'D was eventually succesaful, he said, in introduc- ing STORSBERG to Irina as NOSELTO wished and the three of then returned to PREISFRECLO's hotel room on a summcr evening. PREIS= FREUND slept in the nocel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina shared his bed. lie told his CLA interviewers on 16 July 1965 that at one point during the evening he caught a glimpse of Aron —epy orange mire ee etagtange m9 i NOSENKO in the corricor wearing a rubber. apron and frem this de- ; duced that NOSENNO had been teking survepts tious photographs of t STORSBERG and Trins “sogether.? On orders from NOSENKO and nOV~ SHEEG, ** SHUK, it was the lasi time he suv scan: rateBee asbaice Toward the end of the 19 DERISERELN! said that about six nontisa el recruitment and the beginnine of his involvement witl. REBEPG. “The joo," he said, "dragged cut a lony iime. i cffirmed that this was the only operation in-waich he parcicipoted and taat he aac teid to the beet of his ability all he Knew of it. He admitted that he was a heavy drinker and said thot for thiz reagon ke could not be sure abcut his dates. PREISFRUUND added that he would not have forgotten, however, if he had performed other services for the K&B. a “Vegan eto = hatew tits 8 PREISFREUNG was shown GOLLYTSYN's photograph and remarxed: ‘wag he here [in Finland]? I don't knew nim." Shown the photo- graph during a later meeting, he said that he had once invited a large group of Soviets to go fishing with him in Finland and that this pergen may have been acong them. When given the name KLIMOV, which GOLITSYN used in Finland in 1960 and 1961, and told that it was an alias, DREISFSEUND asked whether KLIMOV had At the close cf the 10 July 1°55 meeting, PREISFREUND men- tioned to his interviewers thit he was planning to travel to Leningrad by automobile with his family for about five days, beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned from his business contacts in Moscow and from hotel personnel there NOSENKO's defection and was therefore apprehensive of the forth- * NOSENKO has not mentioned this. te ‘PREISFREUND could not date this ‘occasion precisely; he said 7 it was probably before the time he. ete caused a ‘ a Moscow. hotel which Was ae as PREISFREUND was. *working “auring. his frequent. visits. to the caviet Union. CHEKALOV. told the. representative of them pservice. that PREISFREUND' is considered te be an Agent:
74-90000 . rd a ~ what his response should be if the KG3 accused him of confessing to American Intelligence and asked his interviewers to brief 2 him in this regard. During the final CIA meeting on 13 July 4 1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situation i was too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all. : Reliable information shows, however, that he did go to the Sov- j \ iet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July yt ; 1965. : ‘ i : : : i 5 i j i i : i rf i 7
7400000 ca aaa |\\ J SECRET + watemase de nil yyrtaR TAL nei tigi ne ote SA lea Rath ae i ' ae a i 1$2. (d}) Information from GOLITSYN GOLITSYN, who had server the KGB most recently as a counter- intelligence officer in Helsinki during 1966 and 1961, reported separately two possibly related leads to operations against Am- erican personnel assiqned te the United States Ernbassy in Moscow. One of these was a developmental operation against a military code clerx which the KGB felt was aimost certain of success, the. other a recruitment approach to an Empassy employee which GOLIT- SYN was told had beén successful. GOL?@TSYN learned these two items of information from different Kou Second Cnief Directorate officers at different times. GOLITSYN provided the first of these leads on 23 December 1961, when he reported information he said ne Learned during conversations with his perscnal friend GRYAZNOY at KGR Head- quarters in Moscow some time between April and Guly 1960.* At that time GOLITSYN was visiting the American Departihont of the Second Chief Directorate in connection with his sreparations for assignment in Helsinki as a Pirst Chief Cirectcrate counter- intelligence officer. GRYAZNOV told GOLITSY: that he, GRYAZNOV, had personally prepared an cperation involving 2n American mili- tary code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the recruitment approach to this code clerk would be suc- cessful. GOLITSYN subsequently narrowed the time of his conver- gation with GRYAZNOV down tc “April or May 196C" and quoted GRYAZNOV as saying that the KGB "is certain that the recruitment is preparea and will be successful." GOLITSYN also said that the recruitment plan for this operation “evidently involved a woman," but could provide no further details. During these same talks, according to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV said that although tne KGB had earlier recruited U.S. Department of State code clerks in Moscow, this would be the first recruitment of a code clerk in the office of the American Military Attache since the estab- lishment of the Second Cnicf Directorate'’s American Department {in the 1940's). GOLITSYN reported on the second operation on 26 February 1962, while discussing the KGB agent PREISFREUND. GOLITSYN said that he first met PREISFREUND when the latter went to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in connection with an application for travel to the USSR. On several later occasions, GOLITSYN said, the two men had drinks together in Helsinki cafes. According to GOLITSYN, PRELSFREUND had been used in the recruit- ment in Moscow of at least one American who “could have been a code clerk or a diplomat." He also knew that the recruitment had been accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960" and that PREISFREUND, having met the target at America House in Moscow, had helped to set up the target for the recruitment approach by involving him in speculatory activities and by arranging his introduction to various KGB female agents. GOLITSYN thought that PREISFREUND had dropped out of the case after “he had helped to create the circumstances" and had not taken a direct part in a ¢ According to NOSENKO, he himself was GRYAZNOV's superior at this time. NOSENKO did not recall visits by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960. t i ; boot batt ol 6 abe abbas ee bd. - ren aren
183. the approach, which was made by KGB officers. + view by the | FBI on 28 June 1962, GOLITSYN REN SAG Ty am Thie second lead, GOLITSY said, stemmed frem his conversa-~- tions with KOVSHUK whom he said was the "assistant" (chief) of -~¢the American Department,* while GOLITSYN was temporarily in Moscow . during “December 1960."** GOLITSYN related that he had visited H the american Department to request permission to use PREISFREUND : | operationally in Helsinki. This request was refused with the } explanatien: “You see, he (PREISPREUND) helped us in one recruit~ ment now, and it is necessary to ke careful for about six months 4 . o i a wasabi nia satieead od. * GOLITSYN could mean either Pemoshchik (assistant)or Zamestitel' (deputy). The CHEREPANOV papers snow that KOVSHUK was Deputy Chief of the Department as late us 1959. NOSFNXO said that, as a result of a drinking incident, HOVSHUK was demoted from De- puty Chief of the american Department to Chief of its American Embassy Section in 1959 and held this position until early 1962. GOLITSYN said the had known KOVSILUK for ahout ten years and i characterized him as a capable officer with about 15 years of i KGB experience, at least ten of them in the American Department, : Seconé Chief Directorate. In about 1956, according to GOLITSYN, ' KOVSHUK was handling KG& agent Henry SHAPIRO. CIA records show | that in addition, KOVSHUK was involved in the Moscow and Wash- . ‘| i ante Ietivad ington phases of the "ANOREY" case (he was identified by Dayle SMITH; see Part VI.D.3.b.) and in the development in Moscow of CIA officer George WINTERS (who identified his photegraph; see Part VI.D.7.c.}). According to NOSEWKO, KOVSHUK took personal part in the recruitments of Roy RHODES ard Dayle SMITH, in the approach to Army Attache walter MULE, code clerk Louis MANNHEIM, State Department Officer Richard HARMSTONE, and code clerk James STORSBERG, and in the interrogations of CIA officers Russell LANIGELLE and Richard JACOB. t i i & 4 q j **GOLITSYN's passport and travel records held by CIA confirm that | GOLITSYN travelled only twice to the Soviet Union after his . arrival in.Helsinki on 20 July 1960. The first of these trips | _ was on 19 January 1961, when he flew directly from Helsinki to Moscow; he returned to Helsinki by rail a week later, on 28 January. GOLITSYN's second trip to the Soviet Union was from - .  . 9 to 15 April 1961, when he appears to have spent all or most a re “oo "“" of this period in Leningrad. A Finnish national, whom GOLITSYN nena ais had been developing in Helsinki, has reported that he met with ; GOLITSYN in Leningrad on a daily basis from 10 through 13 April 1961. Moreover, GOLITSYN has never mentioned being in Moscow during this time. Since GOLITSYN remained in Helsinki from . April until December 1961, when he defected, it appears that he erred by one month in reporting the date of his conversa- * tions in the American Department and that he learned of the 7. gecond lead some time during the week of 19 January 1961. This __ “fa the same conversation of which NOSENKO spoke several times ~~ ‘dn 1962 and subsequently (see above). NOSENKO has always ‘maintained that’ he was out of Moscow on leave at the time of | “-GOLITSYN's visit and that this was in the summer of :1961. When > he was told in February 1965 that GOLITSYN was in Moscow. in: . - January i961, NOSENKO replied that. CIA was either wrong or | was attempt ing to deceive him. NOSENKO. declined to: change. his story of the summer leave. . * rene pene numba es rcepnite name> ts.
tepreneteereheeOORA Nes SE LA I TASES rte Ho ars {e) Information from other Sources ary Information available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of* ‘che three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that, except for overlapping assignients during periods of turnover, there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the _ Embassy at any particular time. This military code clera was responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all : three niilitary services. In practice, at least one other men- ber of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic clearance and has been trained and has performed the function ~ of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability to per- form his functions for other reasons. ‘ STORSBERG was the only military code clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his prececessor, Everett HOBSON, was reassigned, until September 1961, when his successor, Mathew ZUdJUS, arrived. STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961. ' During the pexiod of STORSBERG's tour in Mosccw, back-up cryptographic duties were performed by the Military Communica- tions Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed these duties on a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to STORSBERG, and he could be loosely termed a code clerk.* Addi- tionally, he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy. HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly before: STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962. The only other person performing official functions in the military code room during the 1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the Air Attache. From February until mid-April 1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer. He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low , * Rithough WOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's func- tion as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties as “mili~ tary code machine mechanic,” he said on one occasion that he considered both to be within the general category of “military code clerks." NOSENKO reported that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY. : . ee reer gent pent aie osetia an caaghingngtin et tee 4 § settee dibaen gabia ciabatta cranes wabatleab RANT. puineiiadls Lee eda i. ‘. fein
bbls ok aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from Moscew kecause of reported homosexual activities.* ] a) wt pebadtere =o #”NOSENKO has described an cperation against KEYSERS (see | | ° below), but because of the date of KEYSERS‘* arrival in Moscow, i he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GOLIT- SYN's two leads discussed above. On the basis of available information, it appears that the subject of this lead must have been either STORSBERG or HURLEY, the only two "military code clerks” in Moscow in the spring of 1960. The subject of GOLITSYN's second lead could have been STOPSBSERG, HURLEY. ox, in fact, anyone else at the Enbassy, although GOLITSYN suggested that he might be a code clerk and mignt be a mili- tary man. Sy his statement that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, together with his description of the opera- tion against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and his (and PREISFREUND's) assertion that PREISFREUND took part in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG-- ‘NOSENKO has said in effect that beth of GOLITSYN's leads were ; to the STORSBERG operation, which ended in failure. This con- ce uso €liects with GOLITSYN's report that PREISPREUND was involved nn ; in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960. There are . also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads ; as regards the progress.of the operation. -GOLITSYN reported nosy _. that recruitment of a code clerk was "99 per cent" assured in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISPREUND describe ae “am operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that ; time. GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the -: s .. @peration in which PREISFREUND participated culminated “in an ‘+ #77. late 1960;" NOSENKO’ reported that the only operation in which Do . PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to Ma in “mid-1961" or,..on_ other occasions, » in. "autumn. . 1961.° © i i i see needa ee ad
a , the pe . ; (iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases: | (a) —-s Introduction - : 7 ke —  e a . According to NOSENKO, the U.S. Embassy Section officer . pa KOSOLAPOV travelled only once to Helsinki, and KOSOLAPOV at. ee that time succeeded in his mission of accompanying~-~together. : 7: with a KGB female agent--a suspected American code clerk, Paul Prancis JENNER, by train to Moscow. (The KGB later learned that JENNER was nct a code clerk but a pouch clerk who also met couriers at the Mcscow airport, NOSENKO said, and this KGB iden- tification of JENNER's specialty is confirmed by U.S. Department | of State files.) The report by NOSENXO on KOSCLAPOV is contra~ t t ecg saitestieb ges. ad Gicted Ly two sources, travel records available to CIA and the KGB defector GOLITSYN. eb arijlees wht sien Statements made by JENNER in 1960 and 1962 parallel those 3 Of NOSENKO in 1964 and 1965 to the extent that two young Soviets, ‘ aman and a woman, did converse with him on the train, and later : JENTER did encounter the same woman at a Moscow airport. Never- , a theless, travei records contradict NOSENKO's statement that KOSOLAPOV was the Soviet male aboard the train with JENNER on the ‘ ‘24-hour journey. , Although NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV was on a single TDY to Finlanc, in early 1960, travel records show that KOSOLA- POV (under a different identity) went to helsinki in both the spring and fall of 1960. Travel records on the second Helsinki TDY Sy KOSOLAPCV, on which NOSENKO has not reported, are borne out by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV, in order to lay the groundwork for a future relationship in Mcescow, accompanied a U.S. Embassy code clerk by train from Helsinki about November 1960, or perhaps as late as the beginning of 1961. Again on the basis of travel records, it has been determined that on 16 November 1960 KOSOLAPOV was a fellow passenger of an American code clerk named John W. GARLAND on the daily train from Hel- Sinki to Moscow. "ad bak a The following discussion of the TDY's of KOSOLAPOV is divided into three parts: KOSOLAPOV's false identity for travel, the early 1960 TDY, and the November 1960 TOY. Each part incorporates the information from all sources, ineluding NOSENKO. : wed tba tite Sdsalbeleeiidé Basins (b) Palse Identity for Travel Vadim Viktcrovich KOSOLAPOV was born in Perm’ on 19 Febru- ary .1928. According to travel records, one Viktor Dmitriyevich . a KOLOSOY, born in Perm’ on 19 March 1927, was in Finland from 31 March to 2 Asril 1960, in Finland from 12 to 16 November 1960, -and in Denmark from 25 October to 1 November 1961.* In July 1965, Johan PREISFREUND (see Part V.E.3.c.ii.,on STORSBERG operation) identified for CIA a photograph of KOLOSOV as that of a KGB offi- cer named Vadim (last name unknown) who approached him in Moscow 4 ian BLED AE toe we “- 9" NOSENKO reported that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen in : - 1961 to recontact the YOUNGERS, an American man and wife who “ were arrested for espionage and recruited by the -KGB while | ' touring the USSR: in 1961 (see Part VI.D.2.Fe20 °° 7 bg
in the fall of 1964 to ask whetlier ne knew anything about NOSENKO's defecticn. ‘Shewn KOLOSCV's photograph -in Octcher.1966, NOSENKO. irmediately icentific ar Ain ‘as: ‘ROSOLAPOV. S 4 Pope ae eae sequent! y Can preps re: . signed, corroborating its accu-. rotoce!, Wis racy. This Srotecol. reais: *“¥ do net xnew about this trip of KOSOLAPOV's to Helsinki in Novemker 1969, I do not xnow that he accompanied a ccjc clerk bacx to Moscow at thut time. "J was KOSCLAPCV's direct supervisor from January 1960 to January 1 2 anc would have to know and approve any operaticral «+ pL by KCSOLAPOY outsice the USSR. In the case of hi ip in March 1960 to Helsinki to accompany Paul JEURER, I talked with him about it, and then approved after he wrote it, the ceble to the Hel- » Sinki resicentura @ agal Residency) informing them of his miseion, ani of wrse recelved Ais report after” the trip. F€ ra s c g ' "Normaliy, ald knew abouk and spevova this trip ba re @way at the ci would hava heard about the trip uren 1) ever, I don't remember anything about oc: hetore or after RCSULADCV's trip to Hols were further developrents in “this CAS weuld have known about thom. “% in advance. tf ia (c) The Early 2960 TOY (JENNER Case) NOSENKO by the FEI. &~NOSENKO reminded his interviewer that he had travelled to Cuba in November 1960. He was toid that CIA travel records show that he trensitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba from Moscow on 15 November 1960, three days after KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki. NOSENKO was then asked if he would have learned of the trip in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow, and he stated. that he would have... ae, crap eee sas ar een fee Spank oe chide MES tds, wbadhies Bel unto Me sentido nds] eetemanet tet ade Mee tne cnet bee ogee vats bed beth ERD en al ante tee Ss
NOSEN“ZO was interrogated by CIA on the JENNER case on. 15 Pebruary 1965. On the basis of this incerrogation, a proto- col was drawn up in ques tion-and-answer forn, incorporating NOSEXKO's reepoenses, end cn 1¢ February 1965, NOSENKO signed =: the protecol, attesting to its accuracy. ‘The following is taken from this signed statement: , Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENEKO: Question: NOSENKO: Did you supervise the work against JENNER? Yos. Did you vead the file ona JENNER? 3 don"t renember. Did you read re,orts on JEWUNER? Yes, 1 read materials on JENNER, everything which cane into the section on JENNER and the other code clerks. Did you ever see JENNER personally? Yes. We had his anketa [visa application]. What was the operational plan on JENNER? Before his arrival we had only the anketa, nothing more. He was listed as secretary/arcaivist, * and there was a date on this anketa which was the date he was dve to cross the’ Finnish porder--the ‘middle of the month, the 15th. It was the beginning of 1960, not long after I had arrived in the First Department. We decided to create an active opera-~ tion. We knew the date, and we thought he was to 4 “Phe position of secretary/archivist at the U.S. Embassy in _ in Moscow was usually occupied by a code clerk, but as pre~ > yhously stated, this was not t rue in. JENNER'S case. te és pons ithe oblast ae eA MGad seat nttn drcadgytbilet ances Narn cage Facies eon
7400000 2 Te eee ae Tues ee . wT te 1 wat ee 7 Tg Dhak Batata ag 4 a, vi be a code clerk. We wanted to send KOSOLAPOV to Hel- oe Toe ae  ginki with ‘the mission of returning with JENNER on: -. ON . the game train, during which time KOSOLAPOV was to | bot be ee . gtudy his behavior. JENNER was young and 80 was "Question: How old was JENNER at the time? NOSENKO : I don’t know. We sent GRYAZNOV's agent, a ballerina, —— to Vyborg as part of this operaticn. I think her first name is Yeva, but I don't remember her last - name; her code name was “SOLISTXA®... She was placed on the train in Vyborg as if she nad been visiting someone there and was returning to Moscow. The main idea was to place an agent near JENNER before he even arrived in ‘tascow. .We- wrote a proposal to the Chairnan of the KGB-giving the reasons for doing this. We explained that we had usually only one year in which to work. The agent “SOLISTKA" met JENNER and spoke with him. KOSOLAPOV also became acquainted ‘ ; with JENNER and spoke with him, but I can't say that : they were all speaking together at one time. She gave JENNER a telephone number. | : t } i } veamd nied Abts Latah ae ee pada oe one Question: A KGB telephone number? t t NOSENKO: Of course not; it was her own telephone number, but } he didn't call her. We then noticed that he wasn't i working in the code room but in the mail room. O.K.» } that was interesting too. We waited one or two months for the call to come, but nothing happened. } } When JENNER once went to the railroad station or 4 airport alone to meet the couriers, we sent her with © A GRYAZNOV by car in an attempt to have them meet 4 again. JENNER saw her but did not approach {her]. j Instead, he turned in the other direction. Only Po. 4 later did we learn that he is a very quiet person. ; : There was nothing else on JENNER at all except a j suspicion that he may have been a homosexual, but j : there was no proof. He was like a child. 4 “Question: How much time did you have between the time of the 4 ; anketa's arrival and the time of JENNER's arrival? 4: NOSENKOs A month, plenty of time to prepare. ; Question: A month? i : NOSENKO: -Well, approximately a month. The usual approval oy ; from the Central Committee was necessary so that | KOSOLAPOV could go abroad. oe “ 4 Question: Who wrote this? nee ort Siemen a sen ~ ane eneatbee: » -NOSENKO: I prepared the kharakteristika [official form} on KOSOLAPOV for this TDY and gave it to the Personnel a, Office. a ee : Question: Whose idea was it for this Helsinki operation against — JENNER? ; a ot
fvuestion:s BOSENKOs ‘Gaestion: WOSENKO: Question: “a was the idea of ‘the group. opet “Did you advise KOSOLAPOV on what his role was to be ‘other units, What other correspondence was there? ‘to use girls... STE | With whom was KOSOLAPOV to speak in Helsinki? OE "190, before he left--what. he was to do? Iwas @iscussing this case with GRYAZNOV and KOSO- LAPOV, and maybe we discussed it with KOVSHUK on the day. before KOSOLAPOV left. ; ; Was "SOLISTKA" an experienced agent? She had been working before 1960, but I don't know for how long. Who handled her before GRYAZNOV? , 3 I don't know. ; 1 How did you coordinate this trip of KOSOLAPOV's with= for example, with the {KGB} First Chief Directorate (FCD)? - ate ae Eh Aly KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable saying that he was coming for two or three days. Did you approve this cable? I didn't sign it, but I read it, and then we took it i to KLYPIN for his signature. Once it was signed, KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second [European] Department, : FCD. cine tata pate ie What cover did KOSOLAPOV use for this trip? I don't remember. ue _ What name did KOSOLAPOV use? I don't remember if he used his own name or. another. Correspondence? What other cables or letters were sent 'to or re~ a | ceived from the Helsinki Regidentura {Legal Resi- f dency of the KGB] concerning is operation, KOSOLAPOV's : trip? cos, . “ wed cteaiaihe a Uae! Only this cable, nothing else. “KOSOLAPOV was to dis- cuss with the Rezidentura the possibility of obtaining their help in Helsinkr with the work against code clerks, to see*what agents they had, or. to study the situation, the possibilities. We wanted to nge, agents : against the code clerks in hotels and restaurants, oe
14-0800 ” NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Questions NCSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKOs Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: -NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: He spoke with the Resident. and the beputy Resident He discussed this question with them and they said. a Also on 15 February 1965 NOSENKO made the following addi- > ¢ional statement not included in the protocol: “The agent was " *SOLISTKA. ‘ - WOV briefed her for the. mission... ° they would. see about it, but we were told that the, Residency has more important question [Se What was more important than the work against code clerks? They didn't tell us. meses seemnaqunmsinie 18 Well, wasn't there some sign, some hint as to what 3 was so important? . a Coge clerks in Helsinki would be more important for . hee them; this.is the work of the FCC. ‘ se Wnd OAM a Beedieitiadieiay How did KOSOLAPOV know how to find JENNER, to. recog- nize him and make contact? KOSOLAPOV ‘had his photograph, knew his name, and with the help of the Residency, I think, they found : i out at the railroad station who was going on the : train. Then they bought a ticket on the same train : = for KOSOLAPOV. We knew JENNER must cross on the ca L5th. When did KOSOLAPOV leave for his trip to Helsinki? I don’t know. : i When did he return? I don't know, don't remember. How long was KOSOLAPOV gone in all? About one week, not more than one week counting travel time. How did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki? remap ethene amettwenm tn ’ 3 aw iss Sa BaslpeaD Lala. By train, both ways. Was he alone on the way down or did someone go with him? . ‘ He was alone. How did you arrange for "SOLISTKA® to board the howe ot right train? : enn ehy isa Bit Dict aoa sot de GRYAZNOV sent "SOLISTKA" alone. to, Vyborg and had the oo } local KGB:officers there meet her and place heron) | . i the correct train. They knew the date and would ; sd establish the fact that KOSOLAPOV was on that train before placing her aboard... She was GRYAZNOV's agent even before 1960. GRYAZ- KOSOLAPOV wrote a. report. on
eee eset cot Tia he eg ent 5. his: trip. gave a report: to GRYAZNCV, “but there’ was Rothing there, either.* . “NOSENKO was “questioned | on “20° ‘October "1966 “about: his. respon- . sibility for and knowledgeability of. KGB. operations against — ; American code clerks. He was required to give only brief answers, Nothing ‘unusual | ‘Or ‘interesting ‘ ‘in ite. *SOLTSTKA* aise’ without discussion, to specific questions. The CIA questions. and his answers were as: follows: Question: NOSENKO: ~ ‘Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO : “BQSENKO : Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: : Pirst part of. 1960. Did you supervise all ‘code ‘elerk operations in 1960 and 1961? Yes. Were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPSV your subordinates during this period? Yes. how many times did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki in order to travel to Moscow on the train with Ameri- can code clerks? know of one. When was that? Which one? Don’t remember. 15 March or April 1960. Which code clerk? It wasn't a code clerk. When he arrived it was found that he worked with the mail. He came as a secre=- tary/archivist and the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he is a code clerk. Found out later that he worked on the mail. JENNER? Yes. Bo you know of any others? No. What do you mean? only one? Only one--JENNER. Was the operation successful? No it wasn't successful. But it. was interesting. It was the first: “try | to send an officer ‘to Helsinkig® When aia it happen? | - think X approximately 15 narch ae OE nets Or April. “Other: than the trip to meet. . JENNER, dia KOSOLAPOV Make other trips abroad? - wee Mlb ae tye ae Pore, Aone
74-00000 ves tee “ah ah Fy ® 1 stig, oo € , iv. .' »  NOSENKO: He went to Copenhagen to meet this couple {the YOUNGERs]. pe — and was in the United States.at one of the General Be boo et Po any ASBemblies., That's all. That was in the '50's. No .. ve "7". ethers. De vo Soe a Question: Did KOSGLAPOV personally meet JENNER? NOSENKO: Yes. Question: Did you read his report of this meeting? 3 i ? NOSENKO: Yes. erecta reeiemen: eereny ee aie When on 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was shown the KOLOSOV photo- graph fo: the first time, the following discussion ensued: Question: Do you know the person in this phetograph, number 17 F [Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, empinoyee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927 in Perm, USSR]? . agains he oes NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV, Vadim KOSOLAPOV, the former case officer of First Chief Directorate, First Department. From : 3 '59, the end of '59, case officer of the First Depart- : ment, Second Chief Directorate. Question: We have information that a Viktor-- NOSENKO: (interrupts) Vadim Viktorovich. Question: Anything else you want to say about the name? NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV. of oo HE Question: Concerning his travel to Helsinki by train in March of 1960 under cover of Vneshtorg, does that mean anything to you? we Heat NOSENKO: I was telling you that there was trip when he was returning with Paul JENNER. Question: JENNER, the code clerk? NOSENKO: He was secretary/archivist, but he wasn't working as ; a code clerk. He was working with mail. _ : ; Question: Well, according to official records he arrived in Helsinki by train from.Moscow. So : NOSENKO: Yes. — wot 1B say atbad Bates Question: On the 3lst of March 1960. NOSENKO: Yes. nS * tye '. Question: And he went to meet JENNER, to come back on the 2 . train with him. Right? , -< ". MOSENKO: ¥ was thinking and I'm not sure. ‘60 or *61. I'm - eo "not sure. ‘60 or "61. I'm not sure. I'm not sure - - a ° 60 or ‘61, I was telling '60, but i'm net sure. : . Anyway, I cannot tell exactly. I know he was in “* "> Helsinki, that he was going to Helsinki.:.- oe
Finnish Travel. Manifests: for 31 Haren anc ‘Part V.E.3. c.iii) : mee a Pusalta morse te tate ketene ae ere ne - es2sat.o1bGs Foc 783) 0 8 ais § 036 © Mhz. / 31 fMarch 1960 Fee Kerican ter: cwteateet - Sslagton Bhi, © Moste _ . Eatazaiiea 6 Bertses:, Jozro Aarre ame v sy vehes 6.12.26 | Sseseum “siugutaees, Kizett Bolte Bross. jeonsl apak {24.07.23 | Jyecaryie Viteac.cteat, Tyyee Kylee Yi. lrowra | b3.09.22 F Vek} e@ = iesones 4 Vsklepestage 12.07.08 @sakste, Dive Exxxi  ¥_ Voelivernoat. [27.03.22 Sgertateen, Extcd Gavd Y WolUrarv.ates (09,09.29 - aicesgie, Cate alken & _ _ _ |toaetttaja)v9.12.17 ‘ iFexes sad, Fases Viisein ScEsurpibiedd, Gocie _ _ sate: ot.85 a Relesay, Vikwe | i 3.93.27 i mine noes ~ bane amt | te erection cn my ei eee mie: creesnsesttnitin ee We a nn ee on rd | 4 ] | H ( . | i | re dt i vcomee tne cas cembin cts antes at a ee amen settee en ene cnt gat fete o me ememne i : wo" Lento 1s betes 4” Rite sat hs.of.23 April 1960 (See sine — BEE Pe eT nnn Se eee es Po L £ i seer mer gee sremeagrrenenenctergsitten ita rene Soak ye 4 4 2 4 2 “t 3 4 te raat byes, Ea shia
14-00000 | ns (Ur Sebned ene |.) neta DA AR CP LEGALS BSE EE AGS Rar ro eg Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKOt Question: NOSENKO: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKOs Question: NOSENKO: Question: SOSENKO : 193. It*s 1960. He made a trip in 1960, in March, to Helsinki by train using this name, KOLOSOV, and us~ ing this cover, Vneshtorg, and we also have a report from official Finnisn sources that he left Helsinki by train on 2 April 1960 and went to Moscow. - “ey f f I don't remember the dates. Don't remerber. Must i be 15 March or 1 April, 15 March or 1 April. | t renin wal’ Ao went No, he didn't arrive until 31 March. We have the official record on his travel. We have his photo here, which you just Saw. shen me: On the visa certificate, anketa, wi-ch this picture ‘ ‘ of Paul JENNER, it was sald tat he must come; we . | knew that he must come 1 April or 15 March, or some~ : thing of this kind. ; But we have the official records showing KOLOSOV's, or KOSOLAPOV's, arrival on 31 March. I cannot give you any details. All I have said, everything what I knew. If you need something on KOSOLAPOV, I will try to remember. The interesting thing is KOLOSOV, or KOSOLAPOV, left Helsinki on 2 April. JENNER, Paul JENNER, according to the same cfficial sources, left Helsinki by train to go to Moscow on the 3lst. Two days before. They were going in one train. They weren't even on the same train. Here, please, they were going in one train. KOSOLAPOV remained in Helsinki. (interrupts) KOSOLAPOV in one even carriage, in one even carriage with Paul JENNER, Then... ce eye ee em a. (interrupts) How do you know this for sure? I was reading his report after his coming. I was i reading also the agent's report of the female agent j who was put in this carriage, in this carriage in : this train, and at the station Vyborg, the first Soviet station, Vyborg, where she was taken by GRYAZNOV, and was put in the same carriage, and she | Was acquainted with JENNER. And later, it was a i try, as I was telling, to show her to JENNER, but JENNER didn't want to have a contact with her. ' That's all. It was finished... And she was acquainted with him and was speaking with JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV himself was speaking with JENNER... I was reading ~ KOSOLAPOV!s otchet [official account] about his [trip]. That's quite possible. It's quite possible that they gave you a report to read concerning this. But it is a fact that official records show that the two men. - were not on the game train. They were two days apart. No (whispered).
og Nhe SoA SS af Question: JENNER left on the 31st. ns . * Git 2175+ t doen't know. Tf don't kricw. pacledeaetneia #* NOSENKO has mentioned s #k*CGOLITSYN identified the I dea't know. Maybe this is a mistake of Pannisn effiizciais. i dem’t know, but he was on the same train and he was return ing from Helsinsi with Patl JENNER. The same train, “3% tet TEL SLE Pte The remaining information on KOSOLAPOV's TDY in early 1969 comes from other sources: « After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960, JENNER reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a bey and a girl, probably uni- versity students."* The two Russians struck up a conver gation and were soon paiting him on the guestion of racial discriminetion in the United States. They said that they might see JENNER in Moscow. About three months later, on 29 June, JENKER was performing his normal duty of escort- ing Embassy couriers to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the nussian girl, Yuli, who acted surprised to see hin and asked him to go outside to talk. Yuli explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend wno was leaving on a flignt to Irkutsk (JENNER had seen the Irkutsk flignt dapart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with Yuli's questions concerning JENNER's impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy. When JENNER said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted that he call her.** Sne advised JENNER that “it would be better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone.” ion about his Soviet companions on NNER also told U.S. Department of bout sexual advances made by nd about provocative clothing (NOSENKO has not indicated that $s u KGB agent, but has said an code clerks ~ Besides informat the Moscow journey, JE State security officials a his first maid in Moscow 4 worn by his second maid. either of these two women wa in another context that all maids of Ameri were KGB agents or informants.) ~ CIA investigations showed that Y. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the police chief there on 31 March 1960 to ask his assist~ ance in locating an American named Paul Ff. JENNER who was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.*** SERGEYEV explained that he had some “business” with JENNER, but he -"KOSOLAPOV was 32 years of age at the time. everal times that GRYAZNOV's agent ®SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number. Helsinki police chief as a Soviet Intelligence agent from "about 1945 on." : - vals 1 . neh chee nat Lee tabi ehe i ; { a 4 4 Fab sae Site: Be bed sewed ae cee ae ba HR ented
vot ge ted ” dor wot 136. did not specify its nature. Reportecly this was the first time that SERGEYEV had made such a request cf tne police chief.? « CIA travel records sho: that JENNER arrived in Hel- sinki en route to Moscow on 30 March 1960 and ceparted ty + train the following day. KCSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki the same day that JENNER left, 31 March 1960, and remained there until 2 April 1969 when he too Gepartec for Mosccw py train. The Finnish train manifest for 31 March 1960 indicates that there was oniy cne passenger abcard the daily train leaving Helsinki for Mosccw on this cate, Paul JENNER, listed as a U.S. citizen and secretary/archi- vist. The manifest for 2 Avril 1960 carries the name Viktor KCLOSSOV (KOSCLAPOV) and shows that no American citizens were aboard. (d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case} Apart from denying that it ever tock place, NCSENKO has gaic nothing about a trip to Helsinki by KOSOLAPCOV in november 1360, but GCLITSYN said such a trip occurred anc related it to an in- cipient KGB operation against an American code clerk. GOLITSYN was not posted to the KGB Legal Residency in lel- ginki until July 1960, i.e., after KOSOLAPSV's first trip to Nelsinxi, under the KOLOSOV alias. He has reported that at Nabout the end of 1960, about November or possibly ty the begin- ning of 1961," the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegvam to the Helsinki Legal Residency. The teicgram advisec that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinsxi in tra.sit to Moscow: the responsible case officer would ke KOSCLAPOY, who was being sent to Helsinki under an alias anc under Vneshtorg cover; KOSOLAPOV was to strike up an acquaintance to be con- tinued with the American in Moscew. The following extracts are from the transcript of GOLITSYN's further remarks on this subject in early 1962: Question: You say that around November 1960 KOSOLAPOV came to Finland? GOLITSYN: Came to Finland. Question: He came under cover? GCLITSYN: Yes. Question: Under a new identity? With an alias? GOLITSYN: Yes, as an emplovee of Trade Union (Vneshtorg). But, of course, there may be scme different dates. faybe November. I suppose [believe] it was the end of 1960 or it can be the beginning cf i961. And he waiting for some days, a week or so. Question: Xn Helsinki? . OR Similar request to the police chief was made by SERGEYEV with regard to GARLAND (see below). Zeger peaserseet pretenses settee a Sane tee + dae SN CN apt rr tee TE ae Be OP GE AR ES Ye RR LE BE IR IS aE Oe EE ANTE SRR AIRPORT EES RR Me SRS ENT TL PAIS ; : FOE RAT Metres BAT TY at eo
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14-00000 AED GOLITSYN: Question: GOLITSYN: Question: GOLITSYN: Question: GOLITSYN: Qv2estion: GOLITSYN: Question: GOLITSYN: Question: ~ get} forthe train... . And KOSOLAPOV took a ticket. ‘in the same. compartment. Yes, Maybe. | four. days. Then we knew that the Ameri-. can Embassy tock a ticket for him [the American tar- | And before the departure we knew exactly from ‘the guide [conductor] of that train that it's the sane person--[I'm not certain -— whether he was a) code clerk or not a code clerk*-- but his name, his real name. It was listed. And I was at the railroad station at that time. I went - to see off the delegation, the Soviet delegation.** See them off? Yes, the delegation. And I asked him, KOSOLAPOV: “who is this perscn? I suppose [fhe is an) American?" I suppose [believe] he said: “He's a fat man, a young fat man. vip ag The American? ~ 5 Yes. And TI suppose [believe KOUSCLAPOV said] bespecta- cled.*** And KOSOLAPOV and these persons were smiling and looked through the window before depart- ure. In the compartment? The train compartment? Yes, and then this other person visited Helsinki from KOSOLAPOV's division [the U.S. Embassy Section, Ameri- can Department, Second Chief Directorate]. i alialiel When was this? It was in surmer or maybe September or so of 1961. And I asked him. I reminded him about his case... Who was this? Do you remember? I don't remember because he changed his name. I ‘know him but I... And I asked him how as that case that I helped KOSOLAPOV with? And he did not want to discuss it. That's why I came to%the conclusion that this case was a success, Otherwise he would have told {me}. And I am not sure but I can try to rece- » ognize this person in pictures. You think that you could? “ Be ¥ When he first gave this lead, GOLITSYN identified the American as a code clerk. ae GOLITSYN was not asked details of this delegation. There were eight Soviets, including KOSOLAPOV, on this train. ##t KOSOLAPOV's description does not fit John GARLAND; it is, however, a fairly accurate characterization of Paul JENNER. &&#% NOSENKO has not mentioned. this TDY, and the. KGB ‘officer remains unidentified. . Le nie Dea teaamet See ine 4 i + re seernd nein Eb any eect eel 2 5
- Gruitment." Although he could not recali whether he had read GCLITSYN: Yes, prokably, He reninds i Little of one of my, friends. . Question: Ee looks @ little like your friend? GOLITSYN: Yes, Question: Which one? KOSOLAF OV? GOUTTSYN: No, no, Tals American “he Finnish raisresd mnil from Helsinki to Moscow an i6 cf eight Soviets gheard tie ‘travelling a w3As One WvLEND was the arrived in Hele niy Anerican., OGAKLANG, by at eet ar Sirnki on 14 November faco0: -. Laing to Moscow to assume ; : the duties of supervisor of Ussrrtumus: code reom in i the U.S. Eniessy. 2 % .eohe had with aid ty JENNY. boy +, SERGEVEY of : the KGL Legal &uesidensy rn Helranda mie du. c.k police chief 1 (and XGH acent, accopding te wubitsy i Savemnner 1¢£9 for ; help in locating GARLAWD. an /nerivan whocwouid arrive there on ‘ 24 Lovemoer. . Z GARLAND wos first anterviewes by ohn AMIDLiAN, the Exbassy 4 Security Officer ain Moscow in connec: with the GOLITSY: lead of on li? Jane 1962. In this interviow iD denied having mec “3 any Soviet of KOSOLAP OV 2s physical drsiragtion during the Hel- 4 sinki-to-Mescow train trip ord wise denied having ever been “ approached SY Soviet wHrellic rence “2 TQ Fu 1963 Gani he? ‘was 4 . 4 4 i Be Ed SR UE PRR CS: : es 4 .NOSENKO on 28 Jenuary 1964 identified 20 Americans em- ee: ployed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow «ho were of interest to . “ ‘the KGB because they were suspect intelligence officers or eo eat at thede sents abled agents, or because they feli into some other category of in- | terest to the KGR. He gave a short statement concerning each of these 20 persons. One of them was CARLAND, about whom ROSENKO said: “code cleck,* but’. mothiog doing." | NCSENKO was asked on 2 September’ 1964 to review this List for the purpose. aa of supplying eny additional inforination re mighs have concern- ing the individuals named, NOSENEKC stated: As with all cece clerks, they were studying him (GARLAND! in.order to.gather “enough material to make a recruitment The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. I don't remember the names or descriptions of any agents, and I didn't heer of any derogatory information. As . far as I know, there was no. operataoral. approach and no re-.. 3 the KGB file on GARLAND or noc. NOSENKO on 15 February 1965 said. he. thought that he must. have read. current materials” concerning: GARLAND as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section.» NOSENKO _ ~a@lso said that. there was ro operatzrona! plan drawn up for GARLAND “because the KGB had no derogatory information whatsoever concern~ ‘ing him. NOSENKO has not provided additicnal ‘information con-~) cerning. GARLAND, . “whom he chad presumably never seen,. and was unable. -.
199, a to recall any background information concerning GARLAND or any - details on his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Hos- — os In the context of discussion of KOLOSOV/KOSOLAPOV' travels na zy to Helsinki, NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out on 26 October 1966 that CIA was aware of a second trip there which NOSENKO had ~ not reported. The following is a transcript ef this portion of the discussion on that date: Question: Well, we started to look for other trips by KOSO- LAPOV, or KOLOSOV, and we did run across another trip, again by KOLOSOV, using the same alias. NOSENKO: To Copenhagen? Question: No. This‘was a trip to Helsinki. NOSENKO: Oh, I don't know. Maybe after, after ‘61 maybe. I don't know--'62, '63, I don’t know. Question: No, this was in 1960. When you say you were in the First [{U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American] Department, Second Chief Directorate. He was on the train, according to cfficial records, on 16 Novem- ber 1960, going from Helsinxi to Moscow. wer ede lh idindin adits owhau diem mdt NOSENKO: I know about one, he has took trip, when he was re- turning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER. or ae ares say Question: We looked at everybody else, all the other records concerning this train trip to see who was on the train with KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV. KOLOSOV was the name he used. duit an a NOSENKO: Yes? ste Question: We found there was one American on that train with : KOLOSOV going from Helsinki to Moscow. . NOSENKO: Yes? And his name? If it is not secret, if you can gay, Of course? Question: One of your targets, an American code clerk. NOSENKO : He was, I know, going from Helsinki, only with Paul : coe JENNER. , Question: You don't know this man's name? NOSENKO: (silence) . Question: Well, we checked ‘further and we found;out that en ee GOLITSYN had told us about a trip. ot . When he was returning from Heisinki’ with Paul JENNER? GOLITSYN was then out. yes?® , ® rr
“Question: GOLITSYN told us that KOSOLAPOV was travelling to, -. . Helsinki to meet a code clerk in November..1960. ~ - You understand what I‘m telling, you? NOSENKO: Yes, I understand. And KOSOLAPOY must tell hin ‘about: the sode clerk, but we found out that Paul JENNER is a not a code clerk when he began to work at the Embassy. ote Question: This is not Paul JENNER. This is a different time . oe of year-- ; NOSENKO: (interrupts) When he began to work in Embassy. Question: This is not March 1960. This is November 1960. A different time. It's the same year, but a different time. Fi NOSENKO: I know only about his trip. when he was returning with Paul JENNER. sec tit etanlil Question: Well, how do you explain that this man, who's suppcsed oo to be under your supervision in the Embassy Section, . is aboard this train with this American code clerk, i one of your targets, in November 1960? NOSENKO: I know only about one trip {by] KOGOLAPCV to Hel- ' ‘ sires when he was returning with Paul JENNER, about : whow he was thinking also that he was a code clerk. Yes. ‘Question: KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV was not on the same train with SENNER. We have the names; we have the facts; we have the official records. We also have GOLITSYN's : information about November 1960. GOLITSYN went with r KOSOLAPOYV to the train station to see him off. fhe genta. « a) cy 4 i NOSENKO: He must. He was working as a case officer of counter intelligence, of the Fourteenth Department. Of course $ he must, of course he must. And KOSOLAPOV must speak with him. Question: KOSOLAPOV spoke with GOLITSYN, and KOSOLAPOV ‘rode with this American code clerk from Helsinki on the train back to Moscow. Sut GOLITSYN was not in Hel= sinki when JENNER was there. It wasn't JENNER. beds fdaeen NOSENKO: With Paul JENNER I know, but I don' t know of anybody ¢ else... You are giving me such a big bluff. I don't : know, I don't know, I don't know. wep dee! tome Question: It's no bluff. Do you have any idea who this other code clerk was? , aye ‘ NOSENKO: No. There wasn't such a one. / Question: Well, I'll tell you who it. was... Did you ever hear ' the name GARLAND? pe NOSENKO: Yes, I heard GARLAND. And there wasn't any approach . Made to GARLAND. There wasn't any attempt to recruit _ him. There was a study of him, yess but there wasn "te | recruitment or something else. i: Soothes :