157-10014-10122 JFK Assassination System . Date: WT/2015 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: = SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10014-10122 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-28 Document Information ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 03/09/1976 PAGES: 71 SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY COMMITTEE BUSINESS DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION: _Declassified RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 03/22/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 324 v9.1 1] HY 50955 DBoctd: 32423510 Page i , 0
Date Page 08/07/95 ed JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10122 , RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-28 \ DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO : _ TITLE : DATE : 03/09/76 PAGES : 71 SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY COMMITTEE BUSINESS DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99 OPENING CRITERIA :;: COMMENTS : CCBOX 324 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED. , HW 50955 Docld:324273510 Page 2
sie Senate \ ee -.. Senate: Select. Committee to: Study? Governmenta ‘Operations: With: Respect to Intelligence: Activities “ : (Stenotype Tape and Waste: turned? ao ‘tothe: Committee for destruction): 410: FIRST STREET, 8.. ES “WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008: Ss (202) 544-6000
WARD/smnl | pe ps . OP SECRET. ol | | | a a L | FOREIGN ANE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING 5 Tuesday , March 9, 1976 a 4 - - - 5 United States Senate, 6 Select Committee to Study Governmental } 7 . ft 7 i Operations with Respect to i Bf Intelligence Activities, : g a Washington, D. C. . =; 10 The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 7346 .o'cloc = 11 p.m., in Room S~407, the Capitol, Senator Walter D. Huddl SEO. 12 presiding. - 1 7 13 | Present: Senators Huddleston (presiding), Hart of 14 | Colorado and Mathias. © | 15 | Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Charla, 6 || Kirbow, Joseph diGenova,. Elizabeth Culbreath, David Aaron, i i7 | Blliot Maxwell, Ai Wuanbeck, Lynn Davis, Rick Inderfurth, Greg { 18 || Treverton, William Bader and Bob Kelley, Professional Staff 419 “Members. { nw 4 ah wn | | ° ! TOP SECRET \ ne 50955 DocId: 32423510 Page 4 WARD & PAUL
noted here, it does raise important questions about our own WARD/sm~nl wrey' SECRET | 2. 3/9 : | | 1 - EVENING SESSION 2 | | ! | : : oe (7:46 p.m.) Lo og | Senator Huddleston. iOkay, the Committee will come ta order. ar’ Did we develop any néw. language for No. 2 on page 49, 28 Mr. Aaron? | | 6, og ur. naron, we have jnot. TI think that the recommendation |} 7 a og “concerning the police and |internal security forces, the F oe 8: “real alternatives which engage in systematic violation of og human rights or the cruel jor unusual punishment is just a ve an 10 || very difficult concept to japply to what police do as oppo Ss ay to what courts and governments do, and as I think other: p | | Mr. Kirbow. May we have say tomorrow afternoon's meeting?! ~ 12 13 internal standards which are something ef sort of debated. | 14 ‘I think we would be delighted to try to tie it back to 45 the Constitution, but maybe it is -~ we are just tired, but is we cannot come up with a ¢reative phrase that: will do the job - 17 for us. | 18 19 “senator Huddleston. Al right, we'll pass that and what, 20 go-to-2 a 7 ; . oo, 21 Mr. Bader. Go to 3. Mr. Aaron. I take it; that the concept is fine. ‘We will work on the language, and we will .come back to that. We will also oA have to review all of the various changes we have made. We 25 have made a number of changes as we have: gone along. We will HW 50955 DocId: - Page 5 TOP SECRET
® 25 | Senator Hart of Colorado. Yes, media organization. : 2 fOr SECRET | 1 || want to review them Specifically at some point. But I take > it that.there is instructions from the Committee tea try to 3 || work out something that there is ayreement.on the sub- 4 | stance, we are trying to find a way to tie it in to uur own. 5 || Standards of justice, 6 | ‘Senator Hart of Colorado. your first proposal wasn't ty y || bad, the <= | | | | ; | j 8 . Senator Huddleston. Right. : 9 Senator Hart of Colokado. I would like to propose an 10 additional item on that No. 2, on publications here in thi 11 country, a prohibition against publication -~ | 42 | Mr. Bader. Covert publication? 13 | ‘hat is in the next section, Senator. 7 . Senator Hart of Calorado. It is in the next section? 15 Mr. Inderfurth. Where is that, Bill? . aC: Is that under the mahi recommendations? 1 Mr, Kirbow. It was originally in this position. it was 18 taken out and moved down. 19 Mr. Inderfurth. 1 must have overlooked it. 20 __Mreaaron. It vould be page 64, and there isn't a o1 number’on4t, but it's on the -- I'm sorry, it's not page 22) 64- | a | 23 | Mr. Maxwell. I think that got lost. It had been agreed 24 upon at the staff level. - fOR SECRET WAR & PALA. HW 350955 DocId: 34 23510 Page 6
. | me TOP SECRET | . ep . Mr..Aaron. I'm sorry. It must have Slipped out. ) | Mr. Inderfurth. so we would include the -~ . 3 “senator Hart of Colorado. Publication or subsidy of any ~ 4 books, magazines or other! publications inside the United 5 || States. | 6 Mr. Bader. That's right, Senator. that == the staff level the proposal had been that those publications that CIA put out and then. identified as CIA either funded or published by CIA employees, or the CIA as an in "¥ 7 7] . Mr. Maxwell. It was, clandestine or unattributed, We thou il tion, that it would ba possible and that it would add tq ie | overt information. — on 13 Senator Hart of Colotado. How many of those da they do? 14 Mr. Maxwell. They do,a substantial number. | 6 Mr, Aaron. Yes, we just got this publication by the -j¢ |} CIA on Soviet military spending, which is an unclassified i) attributed documen-t. | | 18 _... Senator Hart of colorado. oh, all right, I attributed a 19. a “Mr. Maxwell. The ocner part is that there was a question £ po || at -leasteat the staff Level as to whether you would forbid them 51 | printing nfaterial that would be distributed overseas, propa~ 29 || ganda that would be printed here but distributed overseas, 93 - . ‘Senator Hart of Colorado, ° Publication. — og | Mr. Maxwell. Publication and distribution, or publication os | May be clearer... That means publication and distribution, or toe SECRET ARR PALE HW 50955 Docld: 3} 473510 Fage *
HY 0955 10 Ll ie 13 14 15 L? 18 19 Docld!3 423510 Page 8 WARD & PAUL 4 - fOP SECRET. 5 of covert action, and it's just. a listing. printing and distribution, Mr Treverton. why don't we say printing and distribu-~ tion, because publication isn't clear. | “Senator Huddleston. ‘Well, shouldn't that best ne left to that next section, the media section? Mr. Kirbow.— Well, you wouldn't want to have an exact recommendation, I don't think, would ou, Bill? Mr. Miller. Well, here you are talking about other typeg {*_ Mr, diGenova. Your specific point, Senator, is you’ 1! want the CIA publishing in the united States books ehioh covertly written by them and people don't know about it, right? So it really, doasn't eit in here because this deals with. our actions against foreign countries. Mr. Inderfurth. B8ut|the point of it, if it is dropped in here as well as in the| media -- _ Senator Hart of Colorado. This doesn't. say anything about foreign countries. this is things to be absolutely banned, and itis a grab bay, | | Mr. diGenova. {acluding covert actions against ourselves. senator Hart of Colorado. ‘It's a covert action grab bag of things. . | MR. Aaron. The reason that it was included subsequently was that we wanted to have each of the recommendations rollow fOe SECRET
o 10 U1 12 13 14 15 16 19 18 19. 20 Re 29 vs oe ee bet HW 50955 Docld: | ‘Or sO P SECRET findings_in a particular area. The findings on the whele subject of media, its fallout, and the difficuicies of control- ling it are in the next section. | I don't think we feel strongly except for the order, Mr. Kirbow. The publication of any other publications inside the United States is the way it originally read. that!s |p , « on page 52. ‘ Mr. Inderfurth. Could we add Puerto Rico to that? — Senator Hart of Calorado. And the Virgin Islands. —_ f° an Mr. Kirbow. “And its territories." Mr. diGenova. What loout genocide? | Mr. Aaron. There was a feeling that genocide was not something we engaged in and we didn't want to give the impli~ cation that we did, and wa didn't examine cases of alleged genocide. . | | | Mr, diGenova. . Regicide we did look at. Mr. Kixbow. senator; you do agree that we adopt - "“commonwealths and possession," so we include Guam and the rege “Mr. Kelley. The varianae? | | | —temaaron. No. 3 begins the statements and requirements for the kind of review we' recommend take place, - and these proposals would involve a ‘statutory requirement for these kinds of reviews, and Bill, you might just ‘speak to it. Mr. Bader. The Senators will remember, we discussed the issue of whether the N8c committee, the appropriate NSC conmittde TOP SECRET ans RR Mm hm aes 4 423510 Page 9°
LO ill 12 13 La 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 25 "HW 50955 Docla: 34 23510 Page 10 || did agree that that was appropriate for a review of every should review every covert action proposal, and the Committee -recommended actions, a formal meeting to consider and recommend recommendations is the matter of accountability. . OP SECRET ti ra covert action proposal. I am sure that that is understood. The thrust of this section is that the Committee recommendy that the review would consist of a series of steps, careful and systematic analysis of the political premises underlying th@, to the President all covert action projects in which the views and positions of the participants would be. fully recqrdad ‘The intent here is ~= I mean, the consistence of: thew. . I might go on to four, since it is really part of it, Ms. Culbreath. “On my draft copy, I have 4 bracketed, but. I see it is not on the retyped. | Mr. Bader. I don't believe it was in dispute when wea. dicussed it at the state level, but we certainly can flag it because I'll go through it here. "By statute, proposals for covert operations submitted to the NSC Committee: should show formally the: concurrence or objections for :the Deputy Director of Intelligence, for the | Deputy. Dixector of the Clandestine Service, the Assistant Secretary of.State, and the Ambassadors." | Now -- Mr. Kirbow. I know now why it is bracketed. Mr. Bader. Well, eC me give you some background on TOP SECRET | WARD & PAUL , i
un 10 Ll 12 713 18. 19 20 21 - BR 24 BW S0955 DocId: 39423510 ‘Page 11 dey Oe tin as ee . this. It is that as far as the Deputy Director cf Intelligence that is in the DDI, tne situaticn that no obtains is that the express his opinion, his analytical view of proposed covert action, but that it is not formal, and from our observation of” the process, it seemed sensible that the top of the analytical 4 section of the Central. Intelligence Agency should be formally . recorded in the process of covert action projects, So when they did in fact go to the 40 Committee or its - successor Committee which we're now talking about, the Opera~ 7 ‘Deputy Director for Intelligence. does have an opportunity rq tions Advisory Group, that that recommendation for covert action should formally show the concurrence or indeed, the objections, if that be the case, of the Deputy Director for Intelligence... In the process, it has. been added that the formal concurrence of objections of a number of other individuals, including the Assistant Secretary of State and the Ambassador of the country or countries affected by the project, and then a ‘perhaps was the issue for bracketing. » This is an attempt here to really get everybody on board. ~ es . . . ; formally. _ _ Formal concurrence we see as the best way or.an important way for those who will be responsible for these to have formal concurrence and thereby formal responsibility. Mr. ‘Aaron. And to ensure ‘that they have the access necessary to. make the judgments and so forth. TC! SECRET. WARD & PAUL |
— 10 il | i 13 a a5 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 HY 4S0954 DocId:3)423510 Page 12 _ TOP SECRET) > I might say that in the cases that we looked at -- and correct -me if I am wrong, Bill -- that at least retrospectivel: we have some serious question about -- of the particular projects, and this obviously is hindsight, and hindsight is easier than foresight. | | | We find that in the case of Chile, in the case of Indonesia, in the case of ~~ I had one other one in my mind -- Angola, one or more of these individuals had serious reser~ vations about the wisdom of proceeding with these activities, - In some cases they were just cut out of the process. Tit the only case. that we have had come before us in which th were fully cut in but overruled was the case of Angola, Lut the judgment is here, ‘AS a routine process, the most sensitive things of this ; nature, including something like Angola,. does generally get this kind of concurre:.ce, and the purpose here is to formalize. what is at this point a general. but not. necessary procedure. Mr. Kirbow. Senator, the reason that we asked is not because of the Ambassadors, because’ clearly: now they operate and_repast directly to the President and “not to the Secretary ~ of State ¥s the point someone “raised ‘the-other day; but I would like to raise ‘the point that here, unless it has changed in the executive order ‘and I just- don't recall it, the DCI is currently responsible, aint hopefully the head of the Agency wil be if it is changed, tor vhose things which are submitted for TO SECRET | We DM RB BALE
a (OP SECRET | Lo 1 his agency. You confirm him in the Senate, you go ‘threugh 2° all these extensive processes to make him absolutely respon- 3 | sible, but then you dip down below him’ ‘and pick up all of. his. 4 contrary or firming positions of his deovuties to either bolster 5 or shoot down his position before the National Security 6 || council, and I think if you are going to have the head of -an 7 agency, just as you have a Secretary of State, it is ultimately his responsibility and there is‘no way to pass the buck, and that it be recorded someplace internally I. think has some merit, or that the Deputies. in the CIA have. a “4. | formal: opportunity to comment for the record within the :A : 12 But I don't see that it contributes anything whatever except 13 a second guessing process, which is what was going on, I think, a in part of those agencies, within the divisions of the State i5 Department: versus the secretary’ in Angola, regarding the is Deputy for Intelligence and Operations and everything to have i7 | a second shot if they are unable to convince their director, 18 whe has the responsibility for the decision. 5 ag a Mr. Aaron. I don't think that is the concept exactly. 20 Maybe thére is a misunderstanding here’and it is not properly | a1 expressed, The notion here to do is what --~ > what I think 22 Charles has suggested is nota bad idea; in other words, — 23 to have a system whereby they do have a shot and they do o4 || Check ofe, and this is not a proposal for this all to be 5 || handed over to the Conyress every time there is a covert TOP SECRET HW 50955 pecta: 34423510 Page 13 . WARO & PAUL
WW 50955 10 iL le | 13 14 15 16 1? 18 Lg 20 21 7 29 23 || R4 | 1.0 - fOP SECRET | nh action. This is not a proposal to have them do this after the DCI or the head cf the Agency or his deputy or whomever ends up with the responsibility for covert action, day to day of programs, but rather that in the process of preparing these. recommendations for covert actions, that these bases be touched | so that when he makes a recommendation, and when the Operations f r Group sits down with a recommendation, the paper shows the formal concurrence or disagreements generated by those particul, individuals:. | That is, I think, the point. 7 oo - Mr. Kirbow. — Well, who has the responsibility for eu the CIA? Clearly the Director gets blamed if it goes wrong. if don't understand, unless you just want a little checkoff ‘bracket on the right so that it shows in there from some. responsible person that yes, the Deputy Director for Operations Mr. Nelson, had. his input, but do you indicate by this where it should shor formally what his position was it it differs from’ the Director? Is that your intention? | Mr. Aaron. “the intention is to state his position, if it is concugrence. | | | Mr. Kirbow. Sa it goes to the NSC, whether it be concurr- ing or different. | Senator Huddleston. Well, here is what it does, Charlie, It gives the members of the NSC, who may not be able to 25 || contemplate all of the possible objections to a particular BDoclda: 37473510 Page 14 WARD & PAUL: TOP SECRET ©
18 . 19 20 el Ra Council. _ —  fOP SECRET operation, it gives the an immediate notice that some individual of some stature disagreed. They can ‘then pursue “— they are going to make the ultimate decision and ‘they can pursue this matter with the person involved and find out what his objection were, and then, it seems to me, they are ina better position of making the final decision as to whether or not they told hearings on the specific covert operation... Mr. Kirbow. The very point is there will never be one go to the National Security Council if the DCI.disagrees with it. It doesn't go. He finally has to approve all of they. covert operations which are submitted to the National Sec Senator Huddleston. I don't think so. Mr. Kirbow. Sura he does, sure he does. They are his recommendations. . Senator Hart of colorado. oh, no, nO, no; no. Chile, Angola, those weren't his recomendations. } He was throttled. “Mr, Kixbow. This won' t cure a Chile or an Angola. Senator Huddleston, “are | you Suggesting . the National Security. Council can only consider those matters that are. brought te it by the Director? Mr. Kirbow. No, Senator. What_I am saying is covert operations are not generated at the National Security Council. They are only generated within the intelligence community or by the President, apparently. What I am really trying to TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docla: 32423510 Page 15 ‘ WARD & PAUL
13 | 2 FOP SECRET al Prevent is having a Deputy or dipping on. down any level, you ca 2 ge down - to a dissenting Deputy Director. 3 . Senator Huddleston. - Wel, there was considerable talk 4 during our testimony about the President or whoever is making 5 that final decision, having access to all aspects of the 6 problem, whether or not he just got a consensus from that § ) group and they presented it-as a consensus, or whether they i 8. really pointed out to him that while the majority of us believe” 9: that this action we ought to take, certain, members think this : 10 or that, and to give the President or whoever makes that 11 | final decision, maybe more than -- | 12 | Mr. Kirbow. Senator, I don't disagree with that, All I 13 say is that all of the members of this Committee should have 14 their opinion stated individually to. the President, but I don't category aS a member cf& the National Security Council or the 40 Committee. He has a Director over him that is responsible 18 for. that écision. 19 Mr. Maxwell. I think, Charlie, that here that the people 2 20 “identiteed were hopefully. people who would have some, “substantia! knowledge “about the issue being. raised, and that it would be very unlikely that the NSC would not ‘provide substantially. - greater weight to the Director than ‘to any of these people, but that it might in. fact help to clarify the set of issues that the NSC would consid iax about a covert action project. TOP SECRET 5 think that a worker out at the Agency falls into the same HY 50955 BDocld: 37423510 Page 16.
10 ll le 13 14 15 “1s 1? 19 20 21 22 23 24 29 | fOP SECRET dd 13 ae wouldn't expect that each time they are going tu go looking for the one dissent and say we have got to hear fully from this person, but it might clarify issues, Mr. diGenova. Also, you might have the Secretary of of them agreeing that this is a project, and then having his ambassador or his assistant secretary disagreeing with him the same way that the deputy here, the Ci, would be. In Angola that was exactly the problem, that those views never got up to that level. | ’ } Of course, the Secretary would have done exactly wha wanted to do anyway, but-at least there would have been a formal recommendation. Mr. Treverton. I think the Angola case is the kind of. ‘Secretary Kissinyer, he let the people from the African ‘Bureau have their argument, passed it on to the President, ‘MET diGenova. That's what he told us. ;I don't happen to believe that. would make it more likely that that would happen. Mr. Kirbow. Then you' re saying that the NSC should pass those aiftering views on to the President: Senator Huddlesion. I would say if they felt: they were important enough. In wther words, there would be a formalized . ‘ HW 50955 pocra:34 23510 Page 17 fOr SECRET State agreeing with the Director of Central Intelligence, both } example that this recommendation is intended to formalize. Acco Mx Treverton, But this recommendation, it seems to me, —
13 14. 15 Le L? 18 19 20 HW 450955 Docld: 34 23510 Page 18 it have to be-a.unanimous vote, or can he say two chiefs are. r TOP SECRET 15 record that we have not had in the past. It seems to tie a lot of this -- that we're trying to farmalize a lot of it from the | standpoint of accountability, ‘and this is. consistence with. that, I believe. | Senator Hart of Colorado. How do the Chiefs of Statf work? Do they offer dissenting views on military operations? ‘Mr. Kirbow. By law they are authorized to take a dissent where they differ with the Secretary or the Secretary decides | against them. ‘The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs may individually make his appeal to the President, but that is because they got a cabinet man that faces directly to the President, | is the law. | | Senator Hart of Colorado. But I mean, do they have -- when-the Secretary reports their. views. to the President, does for it and two are against? Mr. Kirbow. I am sure that he can say that. I know of nothing in the. law concerning the Joint Chiefs. that restricts individual views from being presented, but they do not have a right to yo above him at all except through the Chairman, Senator Hart of Colorado. I think that is essentially the * analogy here. ‘Mr. Kirbow. t think the individual views of the Chiefs _ are taken at various levels into consideration, but before | formal -- well, that’s within their own department, and [ Tab SECRET WARO & PAUL ©
think that's where it should be within a major agenay, is if y 23 | SOP SECRET 16 i 2 || you are going to hold the! Director responsible, he has got 3 to have control of the ppople that work for him. | 4 Senator Hart of Colorado.’ I don't think: it's a question 5 | of control. | 6 ‘Senator Huddleston. I don't:think this breaches that, 4 9 Mr. Miller. It's to assure that all bases are. covered. | ! g | That is the issue. | i 9) Mr. Inderfurth. And that's -- 10 Mr. Kirbow. And you can assure that, Bill, without il dissenting or the details of dissent. | | 12 "Senator Huddleston, If we go your route, there is hdrdly | 13 || any reason to go to NSC, just the fact that the DCI has made 14 | his decision. | “15 Mr. Kirbow. No, sir. The NSC has“the input from the ~ fh Secretary of State. Ox the Secretary of Defense or anyone LG iq | else. I was simply not trying to quiet that kind of dissent among ‘the s differing duparteentey ‘but. from: auaking below the. 18 19 person ~~ do you think that the Assistant Secretary's of 20 State should be free to » go directly to the President through 21 the National Security Council? 92 Senator Hart of Colorado... They're not going directly OE eS 2% to the President. They initial.-- I mean, there are two o4 || little boxes on the edge cf the page, “agree," "“disagree," 25 initials in there. Nobeay is going directly to. the President. TOP SECRET | wARD & PAUL . | i HY 50955 DoclId:3 _ Page i9
10 lL 13 7 14 1s 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 put his dissenting views into detail on whatever he dissents. .the side, I agree with the Senator that I agree that everybody Bo fOP SECRET 17 Mr. Kirbow. But Mr. Miller said this is intended to Now, I agree with you, if he is just talking about -— didn't you just say that it was intended“to express their views? | Mr, Aaron. That is correct. Mr. Kirbow. Well, if you're talking about a checkoff on had his. shot and his chance, wherever his chance came, be it out at the Agency. it should be on the paper on the~ to the President. Mr. Inderfurth. this is in the Operations Advisory Grown - and there is no requirement here that they have to be passed on to the President. these are going to the OAG. | Mr. Aaron. That's correct, and just let me say one other real. -- I'd just like to speak out of my own experience ag | having work on the NSC statt and having been a principal staff member for some of these committees, and that is that the toughest problem is to find out: what’ is: really: the: problem, ~ and I think that whataver one may think about the current ermanimemeenenttl ‘Secretary-of State and his capacity as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, one of the things he _tried very hard to do was to dig into the bureaucracy and be sure that issues, problems and questions were not covered up but were in fact presented at a higher Level, so that people TOP SECRET AW 50955 pocta:34 23510 Page 20 ; | WARD & PAUL
10 ll Le 18 1.9 20 HW 50955 pocTd:3¢423510- Page 21 _ were not. compromised over in what are very large bureaucracies, ae — ek’. eer) toe 2 , could in fact get, particularly the President and the senior policy makers, sould have an opportunity to try to confront the issues as best they could.” | Now, that system didn't always work, and it breaks down and what have you. ‘this did not undermine the authority Qf the Director of the Arms, Control Agency, the Director or: the Secretary of the befense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of ee Staff, for that matter, but it did make sure that the issues any of these, so that decisions are not. just taken on the m ritter of the problem, . oo a oe oo, -and I think that this recommendation is aimed at two chings: one, the paper trail, which would show concurrence and perhaps nonconcurfence, and secondly, if there are non- concurrences, to indicate the nature of the problem so that that can be addressed ata higher level, much as at the Operations Group if there is a non-concurrence, those views are sent higher so that can be addressed to the higher level, And it's really kind of a two-tiered kind of addressal of tha problem. * | 7 ‘Senator. Hart.of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I. recommend we. move on this one and get going. My calculations are that we. will finish about three weeks from now. Senator Huddleston. That's pretty accurate, -Is- there a motion?. foe SECRET WAR OD & PAUL
19 Senator Hart of Colorado, Yes. Report it as written, 78 SOP SECRET. : | | , | - 2 | Senator Huddleston. x second the motion. 3 Mr. Kirbow. May 1 respectfully reserve, Senator? 4 Ms. Culbreath. May I touch on two points, please? One 5 ! is, we make reference to the director of the Clandestine Servicd, 6 and I'm Wondering if that was intentional since there is not 1 9 a Directorate of Clandestine Services as such. Do we want oo 8 il to use the terms that are currently being applied in the Ayency & 9 or was there some other purpose for using these words? 10 ur. Aaron. No, I think that is fair. We will put |i 11 Directorate of Operations. | | - . . | Ms. Culbreath. That was the one thing, and the other 13 | thing is something that has been touched on several times 14 | about the different kinds of ambassadors: that we have, and } - guess it is in terns of the ones that the Department really has 45 confidence in and takes it into account in terms of what is” 7 | really going on, and in some instances, as I understand it, 18 : Ambassadors that are wore of a head instead of a really j9 || functioning person. | 20 —#inwondering in view of that if there is any concern Pt about this requirement that they be informed. 22 Mr. Aaron. Well, tie requires that they be informed, 2% whether they are competent, incompetent, or wherever they DA came from, and this vourdn't add to their responsibility. 25 Mr. Miller. Tt migut lead to better ambassadors. HY 50955 DBocld: 32423510 Page 22 , FO} SECRET
AW 0955 10 LL ‘12 13 14 15 1s 18 -- 19 - 20 Al: 22 235 Docld: 34423510 Page 23 action should be specific and detailed as to the activity as fOP SECRET *0 Mr. Bader. Can we go to No. 5 now? Mr. Miller. Wo. 5. Mr. Bader. No. 5, this recommendatoin goes to the question of what level of specificity should one have in the ‘covert action budget submissions. : It argues here, and so recommends, simply that the annual budget submission for. covert. he gamed 4. Be recommended. This works against -the careful look on the part of the Committee and the staff ag the present level of specifici @® covert action in budget recommendations, which it is fair say are near devoid of detail. this is not to say that this most ~~ the most intricate details of the operation. What we are doing here is that it should be more specific and more detailed than it is now. This is really a signal to the Committee. | The second point that is in that recommendation is or goes_.to—the issue of where funds come from for unforeseen covert action projects. The recommendation here is that = those—femds should come. from and be limited to the contingency | reserve fund, which could be replenished only after the concurrence of the oversight and any other appropriate Congressional Committees. This goes to the point that the record is very clear on this, that the contingency reserve fund, that it can be, and that . TOP SECRET AA. BORE Me MAEDA
10 il 12 13 14 L7 18 19 20 el 22 235 HW 50955 Doclda:32 of containing, if you will, the funding process for covert te to “that, they really don't. They would rather have it done 2 - fOP SECRET =n it has been replenished through pre- payments and transfers from other sources, and this can be done internally in the Agency without reference to the appropriate Congressional | Committees. What we are saying here is that in those unusual circum: | stances when you have to come back for funds that are not called far. inayour annual buaget submission, that those funds should come from one source in the ‘contingency reserve fund, and any replenishment of that: fund should come only after the concurrence of the oversight and the other appropriate - Be Congressional Committees, and that ‘is.the thrust of it. | "Senator Huddleston. Is that gonig public with the a“ budget request? Mr. Bader. No, Senator. It is not a matter of public. It. would be in the normal process; it would be a classified budget. This is not calling for public detail for covert action. It is calling for more detail, more specific detail fox the oversight Committee, and it is calling for a means - action to. one source, an identifiable source, of which the appropriate ‘Congressional Committees know where’ it is and how it is being done, and have an approval Chop + if you will, on whether that fund should be replenished. | -Mr. diGenova. And the Agency doesn't have any objection a | TOP SECRET 23510 Page 24 WARO & PAUL
ke Lé wa 18 HW 50955 Docld:32423510 Page 25 (OP SECRET | 21 . Oo | 22 that way. Mr. Aaron. It, I might say, it ties in to the propasal or recommendation made earlier concerning defining the way in which reprogramming throughout the entire community can take place. | : Senator Huddleston. I have no problem with that one, Mr. Maxwell. Can I make one suggestion? “It's a sentence which I don't think changes the meaning at all, that I think may | express the view of the Committee as to the present notification arrangements of the contingency reserve be added SQ the 12 | sentence would read, "The funding of unforseen covert acti projects should be consolidated and limited to the contingency reserve fund, the use of which. would continue to require the present system of notifications, and which would be replinished only after the concurrence of the oversight and any other appro~ priate Congressional Committees." You make no finding -- we describe the notification at present to OMB and the Congressiona ..Senator Huddleston. Should there be any statement that it oe] s should be classified, anything of that nature, or is that implie | —te-Rixbow. Adopting this, the present procedure is that they notify the Appropriations Committee and the Office of OMB, and it is classified, and the Director signs off on it, and they expend the funds. | Mr. Bader. There is no call here, Mr. Chairman, for any exposure, any public exposure of the funds. It is simply “TOP SECRET seem mmm & mm . i
smn 22 Ke E LO ll le 13 714 15 1? (18 19 20 21 23 24 22 considerable evidence before the Committee of funding of news to me unless it is something: that occurred recently, an these replenishments and transfers and prepayments. “fOP SECRET = ® an internal process of revealing more details for the Congressional Committee, and insuring, from our point of view, that the funding mechanism is identifiable and controllable. Mr. Kirbow. You indicated earlier that there had been covert action projects other than from the contingency fund by some kind of transfer. ‘Would you give us an example of it, because this comes as example of them. getting money from some other source othe=.~ |= than that which had originally been planned for cavert ac or from the contingency fund? | - Mr. Bader. What I was referring to, Charles, was the contingency fund as it is now established,and the rules under which it operates can be replenished by the Agency by internal transfers in its budget system without notification of the appropriate Committees, and it also can be replenished through prepayments from other agencies. | I was not apeaking to the issue of how it is expended, the record shows, and we do have the statistics on this, that the Sontingency reserve fund has been pushed to very high levels at particular times in the Agency's history through Mr. Kirbow. But tnere is a requirement that the Committee on Appropriations be notiried of the outstanding balance of TOP SECRET N¥ 50955 DocId:32423510 Page 26 a: WARD & PAUL
pe fOP SECRET LO Li 12 13. “18 19 20 Al ne 250 HWY 350955 Docld:323423510 Page 27 24 the contingency fund at the time of any transfer. Mr. Bader. there is also a requirement that the appropria committees be notified when there is a drawdown to it. ‘This © doesn't change any of that. ‘This simply means that it requires the concurrence of these committees for these kinds: of transfers and replenishments. It is a double check , if you will. | Senator Huddleston. No. 6? Mr. Aaron. No. 6. I'm not terribly pleased with the first introductory phrase, and I'm sure we can do better. Bi Ms. Culbreath. We did better Sunday. 7 Senator Mathias. Where are you? Mr. aaron. Page 20, No. 6. Ms. Culbreath. ‘The way my introduction read, as I took my notes, so the first sentence under No. 6 would read, "To ensure that Congress Las an adequate opportunity to scrutinize covert paramilitary operations, the Committee recommends," and struck-aut that middie and put a "covert" in. front of pacar military. | | | | _—MerwAaron. All right, the two operating requirements relate to ‘the two functions, general functions of paramilitary. activity. Those activities are essentially covert or clandesti e military assistance programs which involve supplying training and weapons abroad, and in much rarer cases, but nonetheless, cases, the actual invoiveuent of U.S. personnel, often military TOP SECRET
10 ll 12 13 14 24 20 HW 50955 Docld: 39423510 Page 28 [24 FOP SECRET 25 assistance prdégram goes around the military assistance legis- at least bring that under some control by giving the covert would require a modification -- let me back up. It would go to the whole Congress but would go just to the oversight officers. in mufti, whc are actually involved in combat or combat support. | Now, we tried to distinguish between those two categories of activity in the following way: when it comes to what is in effect covert military assistance programs, the concept ig ta require that those programs require the prior approval of the oversight committee and the cognizant Congressional committees a OOee eteage : for military assistance. In effect; .the covert military lation, which does authorize X amount of money to go to;Y | . _ {. countries and no others, so that we feel it is important programs the ‘same scrutiny at. least on the committee level of the Congress. ‘That is what the second of these two recommenda~ tions would do. | The first deals with the less frequent but more explosive and politically more difficult question of the use of Americans in actual combat on a covert, paramilitary basis, and it apply—the principles o# the War Powers Act with’ appropriate ~ modification to this kind of paramilitary activity: specifically, the notification required under the War Powers Act would not committee. However, within 00 ways the entire Congress would have to TOP SECRET tata oP om BALE
1.0 il 13 L4 15 1c L? 18 19 20 HW 50955 DocId:3 | | : «FOP SECRET. act, and this would be an open act, and the operation therefore could not remain covert for more than 60 days. [In effect -- I'm sorry. Senator Hart of Colora do. . Have we gone on to that now? Is that what we are talking about? Mr. Aaron. Yes, this i about now is the very first Senator Hart of Colora What have we been talk Mr. Kelley. in the Wa Senator Hart of Colorado. Have we given up absolute the notion of prior notice? 3s No. 6, and the one that I am talkir subparagraph. do. What is immediate natification? ing about here for a long time? r Powers Act, it'is 48 hours, % Mr. Aaron. No. This would not affect that particularly. ‘This would -- the point of notification under the War entire Congress as it must currently required by the W this phrase here:would be that the Powers Act would not go to the in an open kind of way, as is ar Powers Act, but instead it would go to the Committee, and the point of that phrase is not to take away from the Committee's responsibility to be notified in r a timely.or prior Fashion fs) £ covert action projects. It just simply makes a point that the notification would still take place, but it would be to the Committee instead of to the entire Congress, but it would not change the requirement to. 60 days for the authority for the President to engage in this activities to lapse unless TOP 4273510 Page 29 the Congress’ took affirmative action. SECRET WARD & PAUL
wo 10 ma 12 13 14 15 a6 18 19 © 20 21 22 HW 50955. Docld:3 eo fOP SECRET 27 Mr. Miller. The prior notification is of anticipated acfign and it may be that the action may not take place in the | | case of prior notification. 7 | Senator Hart of Colorado. But immediate notification of an action that is being taken. That may be 48 hours old, Senator Mathias, It is like the old rules for making prctytoag - political speeches. Firat you tell them what you are going . aie =! ae to tell them, then you tell them, then you tell them what you told them. there. : i Mr. Aaron. Well, I see your point and I think we don't really account for the fact that the Committee is already. suppose to have received prior notice of this activity, and there should be either a sentence or footnote to that. Senator Hart of Colorado. I would take the “immediate" out, and I would say that “notification showld be made to the Committee." ene tcsang, ' «Senator Hart of Colorado, I think I missed something: _ 7 Mr. Kelley. Notification required by the War Powers Act. Senator Huddleston. Restricting all paramilitary to 60 days. «.. Mr. Aaron. And the import of this rule would be to restrict paramilitary activities to 60 days before they would become open. Not all paramilitary, let me say. We could -- let's take Angola as an example. Angola presumably could have TOP SECRET #73510 Page 30 WARD & PAUL
7 FOP SECRET J continued at the level at which it was going, covertly, if it 2 | wasn't so large and exposed. — It coulda have continued fa) indefinitely as long as, cf course, the oversight committee 4 || agreed and there wasn't a great deal of discussion about it. 5 | - _ On the other hand, in a situation such as the Congo, where | 6 ‘U.S. personnel began to actually fly certain combat missions i 9 against some of the dissident elements could not have persigted’| j 8 beyond 60 days. | } -Q Mr. Kirbow,. David, the term "CIA funded Americans," or | 10 || “CIA officer combatants," this would not have gone to the | 1 | Angola operation at all that you're talking about. They 12 || combatants. 7 * Mr. Aaron. That's correct. 14 ' Mr. Kirbow. And whether notified or not, or approved by 715 | it, it could have gone on forever. Lé- Mr. Aaron. That i8 correct. Mr. Kirbow. If you're talking about not running a covert “Mr. Aaron, That's right. 18 | action Like Angola, this will not do it. 19 , —_ . 20 __Mr_-Kixbow. if you're talking about using an American at citizen irf'a combatant role, that is all the exception this 29 makes. — . | | | 2% Mr, Aaron. In terms of our past paramilitary involvements, ‘v4 || it would have -- the two that--would have fallen under this in all likelihood, certainly Laos, and to a lesser extent, ve TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId: 39423510 Page 31 WARD & PAUL te an
“ - fOP SECRET 7 | | 1 depending upon the duration where you began ‘counting, possibly Indonesia, where you nad Americans flying sorties in B-25s and— 3 go on, and then it would also probably have included the ~ 4 Congo operation. - 5. Mr. Kirbow. | I agree with the Senator that if you want fs) prior notice! you should insist on prior notice in all major Ty a, covert operations. This is certainly the most major one 8 we are going to talk about, is where we are going to use 9 military coinbatants, paramilitary. 1LO- Senator Hart of Colorado. Is there a prior notice, 11 recommendation anywhere? | | 12 MY. Davis.: Yes. 13 Mr. Aaron. Yes. 14 Senator Hart of Colorado. ‘Have we already taken it up? 15 Mr. Aaron. It's in the oversight and it is in the NSC 1G section as well. | 7 Mr. Inderfurth. 1 think it might be useful to have a 18 footnote to outline briefly the principle of the War Powers 19 Act we are referring to, and I' ve got that. 20 -—sefator Huddleston. And where we ‘differ from it. Pal Mr. ‘Raron. Right. 22 Mr. Kirbow. This will be done in the little “supportive, 23 findings rather than in recommendations, don' Le you think? ” 24 | Mr. Inderfurth. How does that read now? || Mr. Aaron. It wou le say, "By statute, any covert use ot TOP SECRET BW 50955 Docld: 39423510 Page 32
Le | 13 L4 “ AO 18 _ Be 235 24 t HW 50955. Docld:39423510 Page 33 _ . WARD & PAUL | || come to this Committee. a TOP SECRET 30 CIA officers or other CIA funded Americans as comLatants shall bb governed by the principles in the War Powers Act. The require notification in the war, Powers Act will be made te the oversigh Committee, and the authority in the | Act would lapse unless reaffirmed by. the Congress 60 days after the initiation of such activity. Mr. Inderfurth. But aren't we going to get a line saying prior notice in that, or prior notification is the 48 hour: thing. See what I'm saying? ur. Aaron. I thought we would probably just put a fe on it saying ‘the committee’ -- the oversight committee would, at course, receive any prior notice of any covert action as well as notification, as well as this notification, | Mr. Kirbow. The problem is, the War Powers Act notifjeati doesn't go to this Committee, it goes to the Armed Services Committee. - Mr. Aaron. Well, under these recommendations it would "Senator Huddleston. well, there's another point, too, whe: we talk abdbut 60 days. That is the limit. Congress can move 7 within 48 hours. | Mr. Aaron. Congress can move as ‘soon as it is notified. Senator Huddlestan. If the Committee wants to act. Mr. Maxwell. Ace we recommending the War Powers Ast be TOR SECRET
LO 11 le 13 (14 18 ‘19 20 21 22 > ‘HW 50955 DoclId: 39423510 Page 34 to paramilitary? - fOP SECRET amended, are we simply recommending the principles according Senator Huddleston. t'm not sure if we're not confusing — the issue a little bit by referring to the principles of the War Powers Act rather than just writing in those provisions that we want to apply. | | Mr. Kirbow. Just as a-major covert action, Senator Huddleston. And say, "consistent with the War Powers Act." | | Mr. Aaron. Perhaps a better way to do it would be 1d those lines and then make the footnote that related to ah War Powers, simply, and that way we could fold in the prior notification and say they would have prior. notification of this, and then the footnote would say that would constitute the notification that would be analogous to the notification under the War Powers Act, something along that line. Senator Huddleston. — Consistent with or parallel to or something. | | ' Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, we should here, for the sake of clarity, to keep from a dual overlap with the other committee * if you want this oversight committee, you mean intelligence oversight, you should say intelligence oversight committee. Otherwise, the War Powers Act notification does go to Armed Services. | | | | Senator Mathias. we ought to make it clear that we are TOP SECRET WARO & PAUL -
HY ROO5S 10 1 le 13 14 el 22° 23 Doclda: 32493510 Page 35 | | | | 2 OP SECRET. concept that merits serious consideration as a result of Gur section which is relations with United States institutions and ' privatemwitizens, which ties into both espionage and covert | work on this, to -~ if you might: talk to the specific recommen~| 32 talking about a new statute or a new -- Mri Kixrbow. It really amends the Senate Rules and doesn't have ‘to amerid. the War. Powers Act on prior notification. Senator Huddleston. Well, that concludes that section, Mr. Aaron. Well, the next section is on the reorganizatior of the CIA, and essentially it talks about the pros and cons of the concept of dividing the CIA by taking in effect the Rae ee analytical part of it and attaching it directly to the DCI and making the rest of the Agency a separate agency, There | are reasons to do it, reasons not to do it. The recommend is not a firm one. The recommendation is that this is 4 own work, and that we would recommend that the oversight body — look at it. Now, a lot of the reasons for doing that have to do with the production of intelligence, and we don't have that section of the paper here yet. I guess I would recommend that we come back tg this section, and at this point proceed to the next ‘action, anid for which we have a number of recommendations. I would like to ask Bill, who has done. all of the hard dations contained in it. Mr. Kirbow. Where? TOR SECRET WARD & PAUL
5 Mr. Aaron. I would suggest we go on ta page 34, and then | 32 a fOP SECRET 33 1. 2 when we shave the other paper, we can come back when we haye a 3 fuller picture to deal with it. 4 _ Mr. Bader. We do not have any bracketed sections in the 5 introductory text, but we do have some bracketed sections | 6 meaning differences of approach and options in the recommendatichs | 9 ! section, | | | | 7 | on 8 So what I thought I might do is go to the recommendation | a 9 section, unless the Senators would like some time to read that. oS 10 section, ‘the introductory. section: ‘as it now stands. —- iW Senator Huddleston. We had this the other ‘day. | 12 | Mr. Bader. We discussed this at length the other day, 13 Senator. “This ig just a Summary of an outline of the problems 14 on both the media level and the educational institutions. 6 Now, what it veally comes down to, the decisions befare you os is in the ‘recommendations: section about what you: do in order “ 1 ea ensure ~- at least, that is the thrust of the reconmendations|, 18 that there: bea. prohibition on the use of members of the united ig States academic community for operational purposes, and opera~ a tional purposes is explained in the text, and rune from the use | 21 lof American. academics to assess and to assist in the operational 22 use and recruitment of foreign students for espionage purposes | . 23 to the use of academics for cover purposes, For: example, ‘in ‘na the 1960s, one of our major American research institutions was ng [used as a backstop ox cover for using two CIA agents to Latin | WW 50955 DocId: i Page 36 fOP SECRET an
13 14 15 ares) 17 18 19 20 -21 _ 23 24 25 HY 50955 DocId: 33 23510 Page 37 2 FOP SECRET esi America, to the use of American academics as what the Agency calls writers, that is to say, individuals who write propaganda or write at the Agency's direction. | | You'll note, for esample, in the text,. which you should be aware of because it is perhaps one of those parts af what we have done that will take on a certain amount of press. interest, there is at least one occasion in which a book written under CIA direction was reviewed in the New York Times by a CIA agent, which is rather closing the circuit. Senator. Huddleston, Pretty good review, too. Mr. Bader. Yes, it was a good review... Now, where the recommendations and the options are an the recommendations, when it comes to the question on the - prohibition of ~< on the use of members: of. the United Statea academic community, it simply turns onthe issue of whether the Committee recommends that the CIA amend its internal directives to include such prohibition on the use of the United, States | academig community, or whether this. should be done by statute. | “The first. option, the argument goes that. the CIA does in. fact have internal directives that go to this question. We have seen*them, we have reviewed them. We have been given « testimony by the Agency just a few. days ago that.they felt compelled if for any such directives, that any changes that would be made to those airectives would have to ke brought to: the notice of any oversiyht committee, so the Committee then TO SECRET. WARD & PAUL
13 14 15 “18 49 . BO HY 50955 DBocld: 33473510 Page 36 ; : WARGO & PAUL  { would assume it would, but whether it hard _to_say. be buttressed, as we see the argument, on this side is that the a ‘TOP SECRET — would have a continuing review mechanism to see that these - directives remain as the Committee would like them, in this case, to approve a prohibition on the use of members of the united States academic community. Mr. Kelley. Haw do they define a member of the academic community? | | Mr. Aaron. It means administrators, faculty members and igs HS graduate students. Senator Huddleston. Graduate students? “Mr.' Bader. Graduate students. | Mr. Kirbow. Administrators down to what level, offi managers, record keepers? | Mr. Bader. They really don't give any further definition, and there's obviously a question of how far that goes down, but whether it goes down ‘to, you know, a Deputy Assistant Dean, | | would take someone in the registrar's office. | Mr. Kirbow. An emplayee of the registrar's office. Mr. Aaron. The supervisor of the heating system, It is Mr. Bader. This option which would go to encouraging, if you will, the Agency to change its internal directives would academic community, through this report, would be alerted to the problems of the use of academics, and would be botn attentiy TOP SECRET w
40 LL 13 L4 15 1? 18 “19 ZO 7 end lb 23 h-gin ga prevented from the use of academics for operational purposes, ‘believe the argument against that to the Senatora themselves ; 36 to it and would, we hope, see to their own directives and rules within the university. So it would be a self-enforcing, re- inforcing system. The other argument for doing this by statute is very clear. It is very Simple that by law the» Agency would be . are een as to the difficulties of shielding legislation, to. shield a particular group of Americans from operational explaitatian on the part of the Agency. That is questions 9f definitiy to what an academic would be, and emblazing that in law. “My own recommendation goes to the first option, as you can perhaps detect, which is that the Committee should begin with the insistence on amending the internal directives, should alert the academic community to its problem, should maintain a continuing oversighi. of this issue, and that if need be, in time an oversight committee could move to the legislative remedy i if it did not see that this was working, and it woure not guarantee that this prohibition would in fact stick. __the statute is vary clear as to what you would do. You would put *it in law, and it would be-done. Now, I would call on -- David, would you like to argue the statute? Ms. Culbreath. Could we ever have some comments as to whether either of these is what we want to do? 1 wouid like TOP SECRET Hy 50955 Docld: 32, 23510 Page 39 © , WARO & PAUL
fOP SECRET - ew ‘to, speak to the point of view of either by directive ar by statute;prohibiting people, simply because they happen to belan to the academic community from doing something which they may © there is a tendency to assume that everybody in academia may have the same attitude about operational use of academics, but } I can think of institutions in the country where the adminis- tration and faculty and parents of students who go there, they -all feel that this is an appropriate role for a citizen qr a patriot to do, and I just question whether we want to.” 2 5 4 wish to do voluntarily anda knowingly and wittingly, I think prohibit it absolutely. LD I think in terms of having an informed administration or it being aware of this, so that if the president or the trustees think we don't want our school or our faculty people associate that's one point of view, but to say that others who may wish to be involved and. who may wish to provide a forum even ta | “encourage these kinds of chings, 1 just question whether we want to put that much of a prohibition in. | r think that is the other side of academic freedom. : ___ Senator Mathias. Could someone articulate exactly what the evil is that we are trying..to eradicate. Maybe if we can get.at it that way ~~ Mr. Aaron. Do you want to do that? Mr. diGenova. Weil, the evil, just from reading what Bill has written, or to get it from your view is that this is TOP SECRET _ HW 50955 DocId:32423510 Page 40 WARD & PAUL -
- fOP SECRET os 1 an institution which people look to to shelter and to aid 2 the education of "young minds," and that it: has a basically 3 sacred function, which is the education. of our young people, 4 and to involve it covertly in the clandestine collection or 5 operational purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency is to 6 basically prostitute its function when it is done unwittingly, 9 and that therefore it should be prohibited because this is an 8 “institution which requires the greatest insulation from any 9 sort of activity concerned with intelligence collection other - 10 _ than overt, contractual relationships, correct? - . ' at? Ll Mr. Kirbow. You missed the very point which she nade za 12 | You said unwittingly. She said wittingly should be aio. 13 Mr. diGenova. I know that, but the question was, what 14 |) was the evil that was attempted from what. is here. 45 | . Bill, is that‘a fair summary of what you were getting | Mr. Bader. I think that's a fair summary. I think very, very simply stated, as it see it, within the academic community + > one 18 | 19 in the relationship of-a professor, a teacher to student is 20 one of trust, is one, as I see it, where it is an ‘open PL relationship that is entered into under very “special circum- stances of trust, and that trust should be preserved. ps | Senator Mathias. well, let ‘me be: the Devil's advocate 24 here because I think we are going to have trouble with this x5 | one later on. We might as well understand it ourselves. | fOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 34423510 Page 41 WARD & PAUL”
; 49 20 21 Be 23 24 25 HY 50955 Docld:3 Se Renn OP See Ee ne fOP SECRET 4g What about a non-teaching acadenic, say a librarian, or a Soviet ‘American expert, ora Chinese research expert who really has very little contact with’ students but he is on the faculty of a university? | Mr. Bader. It becomes very much more difficult when you a get: ‘down the system to the grounds keeper ata. great American university, whether he would be part of the spotting and assess _ing system. That is difficult to deal with, and obviously the further you get from the professor~student relationship, the less intensity, it seems to me “=< | Mr, Aaron, I would be happy to make a point that ae Mr. Kirbow. The person that keeps the record has the control over the information they are seeking. Mr. Bader. But. they are all part of the university community to which. the student has introduced himself, and I ‘don't think the student would make this kind of distinction or differentiation between the nature of the relationships ‘he woulaBerceive between himselé and those in that. . | Mr. Maxwell. Couldn't he make a differentiation if he kne that the individual faculty member was providing, on a voluntary basis, information to the Domestic Contact Service? | , Mr, Davis. That wouldn't be done covertly. Mr. Maxwell. “But it is not broadcast. It is not something where -- Senator Mathias. Well, let's look at some of the hard . cea «=St(‘<“‘itéN OP SECRETE
10 LL . le 13: L? 18 19 HW 50955 Docld:3 23810 Page 43 fOP SECRET ssn cases. Now, what akcut an academic who is in good standing. Let's say his name is Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and he has _tenure at Harvard, and he takes a year's sabbatical and hitea out to CIA for a year. Mr. Aaron. He would be prohibited from doing that, and I. - would go beyond in arguing in this case, beyond what Bill has. |. said, that it isn't simply the question of students. It seems to me that we look to our academic institutions, which ze non- profit institutions, as sources of inquiry after the truth in : some basic way. . | : me ot: Now, if there are open associations with corporation i government and what have you, people are in a-wosition ta. assess the extent to which those open associations are reflecte in the views and academic work and ideas and analyses that may come out of academic institutions, but if these relationships are secret and covert, there is always the question whether the views and ideas ahd concepts that are being put out are in face~independent, are in fact objective, really aren't serving the policy and purposes of what is a clandestine organtzation. | | | Now, I personally don't think that most of these people, or even any of these people do that, although we find cases in terms of fallout, so to speak, in terms of writing that | Some of these people may have done, but I think that one really has to ask whether institutions, private institutions or even TOP SECRET
LO il bot te 13 14 15 HW 50955 Doacld: 3: fOP SECRET 8 public institutions devoted to trying in some sense to find the truth, to establish themseives as objective, above-board, wheth you really want them to have a clandestine relationship to an organization whose. part of its purpose is to manipulate , ' opinion at least abroad. Mr. Kirbow. bon't you think that that is a judgment for that directorate and the board of directors and all of those people to make, just like any other business? | Mr. Aaron. No, i don't. I think it is a. public policy question. Mr. Kirbow. Even if it is made witting? — Mr. Aaron. We are seized with the question , we can either say this government is going to pursue policies, it is going to use these people or it isn't. Mr. Kirbow. I'm sorry. Mr. Aaron. We are ina position, it seems to me, of bein seized with the questions. We can either make a decision which says these people may be used for this purpose, or we can maka. the decision to say these people should not be, and we can. argue_abeut the form that that ought to take, but we have the question Before us. But it is not a question of what these people ought to be allowed to do, but it. is a question of © what the government ought to be allowed to do. Mr. Kirbow. And there is only a potential for abuse. I don't. think the Committee has before it an abuse situation fOr SECRET 23510 Page 44 ‘ WARD & PAUL
‘TOP SECRET | 2 1 || here that's been discovered in the evidence. a 2.) | ; Mr: Kelley. But taking David's point one step further, | | 3 it is not only what we would restrain the government from ; 4 doing, but we would also want to prevent a larger taint on 5 | those academics’ who have chosen not to be used by the CIA or 6 work with the CIA, and they would be suspected of that if 3 ” there were others who were traveling abroad on behalf~ gt the’ | ; cra, Co | 9 Mr. Inderfurth. Can I ask a question here: in the light of | Lo that? | = | a 3 fee ll Is there anything here to prohibit, if the second dp | 12 | -is taken, the overt relationship between academics and the 13 | CIA? Can they continua to advise, can they continue to 14 consult, offer overt intelligence, that they have gone overseas 15 || come back and -- a “Mr. Aaron. ‘Theres nothing to prohibit that, and they L? | could even undertake classified and sécret work, but the 1g || fact -— | | | 19 Mr.. Kirbow. But not. for operational purposes. 20 —Mrv~Inderfurth. But the overt relationship would exist. 21 Academics ‘could say, when I was in the Soviet Union I found . 22 |) out this. | 2% | -Mr. Bader. tow, the text, in fact, does speak to the 24:\| majority of these contacts being opened. What has been iost a5 | in this text, I think, in the late night brutality that has from Tor SECRET 1se Mm RA HW 50955 DocId:3 4273510 Page 45
HW 50955 ° 19 me Le 13 14 15 46 19 20 al “22 23 BRO BDocld:3 . ; oe : 43 have this balance between -- if time to time been applied, is that we have lost a paragraph which I _ think should be reinstated, where we endorse this variety, of open contact, and I ‘would think it would be sensible to restate that paragraph just to be sure that we Senator Mathias, I would be very much in favor of reinstating that, but let me say that I think maybe you have gone too far if. you say that someone who is on a sabbatical, an extended sabbatical, really has to give up tenure, sever all connections if he is going to enter any operational =4... — Mr. Davis. Well, Senator, let me interrupt and say what tenure means to a person in the academic community, “that means a person has been teaching for six. years, and at that point is supposed to go off and do some research, and sort of come back and be all refreshed and be a teacher. So the whole idea of tenure, or of the sabbatical being used for ‘other purposes would in a sense violate -- | a Senator Mathias. Well, it is a leave of absence. Isn't that what Moynihan had from Harvard? Mr. Davis. well, I think that is different, but it would 7 still, you would go away in order to do those things in order to continue a career. You know, you can serve in the United Nations or you can come to the Senate Select Committee, but it's all part of the purpose of going back to be a better teacher and a better scnolar. Tor SECRET 23510 Page 46 WARD & PAUL
Senator Huddleston. Does it wock that way? Mr. Kirbow. would you not consider that an infrangement — {OP SECRET — 44 | : a | 7 | | | ; | | of your rights if you were prevented by regulation to have _ 4 | made this kind ‘of contribution to one of the intelligence 5 | agencies? 6 - Mr. Davis. This isa tough one, and: my colleagues split 9 | on this. X'might say that some.of them say they don't - want . 8 to be singled out and spoken to separately and told that they oo 9 cannot do things, whereas businessmen can, and other people | ; 10 say that academic Ereedom doesn’ ‘to extend to everything, .a%d WL that there are certain constraints -on.my academic freedar 12 already that I cannot engage in a classified contract at a oo, 13 | university without telling the university I.am doing that, and 14 | that I cannot come down here more than three or four days a sh without telling my university that I'm doing that, £3 | although Tr’ m.not. Suppused to anyways anyway, that my academic — av | freedom is already constrained by 1 my being a member. of thac 18 university. ‘And'l think that is a hard one to call, and I 19. myself at the end, E think, would come down to the hope that eo || my academic colleagues would sort of take care of themselves, Pt but I am hot too confident that in the public interest, that ze || My academic colleagues would not take this and ‘sort of do 23 | with it what I'd like. So t find it fairly difficult. 24 | Mr. Kelley. Mav i iaise that taint thing again in Ps response to Liz! S objection? TOR SECRET HY 50955 ‘Docld:3 473510 Page 47
Remember, there was an Operation Camelot a few years ago, a TOP SECRET. 45 5 I think, in Latin n America, where the Army was hicing profes-~ 3 sors te go to South America and write secret classified ; A papers on South American countries. When that was revealed, 5 I forget in what manner it was revealed, a lot of other academiqs 6 who were not invcelved had their freedom to travel in Latin Amer Tr , | ca, and their access to government people and their general | ! 8 academic business compromised. _ Then there was a whale of | 9 objections that came forth out of this. | 10 Mr. Maxwell. I think at least to be realistic about 5 hige | il regardless of what kind of promulgation this committee ma 12 as to the use of academics, there are relatively few societies 13 | in the world that will take at face value the notion that 14 visitors from another country who come to be studying there are 15 not in sone way tied to the government. And I think the hertet that we can convince any country in Latin America that 9 | visiting academics are not going to report to the Government 18 through this kind of promulgation, I think, is a bit naive, 19 and it may be dishonorable to do. ‘99 __MrueKelley. Well, you said the domestic contacts idea 21 | would not * be prohibited by it, that you could come back and 23 Mr. Miller. But it. minds “somewhat that.you counter -- 6 Mr. Maxwell. 1 think if you look at the record of 25 | American researchers in india, for example, over, che bast TOP SECRET HW 50955 DoctId:3 Loosso Page 46 . : ; ;
fOP SECRET. | 1 | give years, L think you will see a real. question about the - 2 acceptability of American researchers in a society. 3 Mr. Aaron. Well, there was a good reason for it. 4 | Mr. Treverton. It strengthens rather than weakens Bob's 5 j Poors: 6 i Senator Mathias. Well, let me tell you, even members of |, 97 the Senate are not exempt from this problem. I. went to teach i 8 ets Seminar of American Studies, and immediately 9 upon my arrival, all chese students, vugoslavia, Poland, 19 | Finland and where else, he's a CIA agent. ‘So I spent a ae a couple of weeks, whatever time I was there, playing pingp oa 12 | and drinking beer and singing songs and making all kinds of 13 | Sacrifices tio kill this impression that I was an evil agent V4 | of the CIA. 15 | I finally had just about eradicated that idea, and so the is | ast night I was there they asked me to say a few words after i, | dinner, and I said what a positive experience it had been, and ie I was going to tell everybody in Washington about it, and they. 19 said, see, we knew you were CIA. _-Mr.Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, would it make the academics fee] 20 el better if ‘this were restrained to only witting individuals at 22 witting institutions, so that, you know, you've got an agreemen ? 2% Throughout the south, Land grant colleges and whatnot, | o4 | are probably as conservacive -a-singte body “of -people in 95. teaching: institutions as there is-in the world, and a great TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL WY 50955 Doclad: 34429510 Page 49
TOP SECRET. 47 1 aggre lig ey ERS : ‘ 1 ‘deal of work along the lines of what other communities consider : a | to be distasteful type work ‘is’ done at those institutions. The 3 -] still have ROTC units at every one of them. | 4 Mr. Davis. But those are open, Charlie, and that's the 5 difference. It's the covert part of it that you are addressing | 6 here. | | . 7 Mr. Kirbow. If the individual and the institution is 8 || witting to do this -- oo 9 Senator Huddleston. | What ‘about if the student is witting? 10 Mr. Kirbow. The student himself is not affected unl | 11 || it taints the person who. is teaching the student his engi Xl 12 course or his mathematics: course. | | | 13 | | Senator Huddleston. — Maybe the student and his parents 14 should know when he enters the school that he is subject to 15: being proselyted by a secret agent. | 45 'Mr. Kirbow. I think that's what you do when you say that 17 there are 300. some institutions doing this ‘throughout the | 138. united states. 19 “Mrs Bader. “The problem with, the witting. ana unwitting is a very défticult one ‘to deal with just for the facts: of the.- | Pal matter. I mean, of the 134 American ‘universities and colleges 22° who have individuals aboard who do serve operational purposes . - 93 | of the. Agency, at 82 of those institutions: there is no one. 24 || but the individual involved who is aware of the CIA link. 2 Mr. Kirbow. ‘That's why I said it should be both. TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL HW 50955 Docld:34 23510 Page 50
HW 450955 165 i? 18 19 20 21 22 25 Kn4 25 fOP SECRET. 8 Mr. Bader. And at the other 42, there is someone aware. The Agency's definition of this is a very difficult one because it feels that the institution is aware as.an institution, if one responsible person in that institution is aware. This is the nature of the problem, How do you make an institutian. aware that its faculty Members are serving operational purposes# What is witting ina university? Senator Hart of Colorado. Let me add one fact for the lawyers to chew on. that is the possible First. Amendment freedom of association oroblem. I'm not sure you can pase ‘ a law that discriminates against a group, that says the: government cannot deal with you or prohibit you. from dealing with. it. Ms. Culbreath. Hay 1 raise one other point? Senator Huddleston. Does anybody ‘want to comment on that, you lawyers? Mr. Aaron. I am not a lawyer, but I would like to emphasize that while ! think there is some question about what the role and responsibility of the academic is, it seems to me_that the issue is what is the government going to do, and the government places restrictions « on itself all the time in its ‘dealings with citizens in all ‘kinds of prograns, domestic and foreign, military a and otherwise. Senator Hart of Cuivrado. But could you cite me a law ‘that says that a specific department of the United States TOP SECRET DoclTd: 33423510 Page 51 WARD & PAUL
49 Government cannot deal with a specific class of citizeis in our |- | a  fOP SECRET society? 3 The law would ke essentially gaying that the Department of | 4 | HEW cannot have anything whatsoever to do with farmers, 5 Mr. Miller. NSA laws have prohibitions against access to | 6 | citizens without clearance. | 9 . Mr. Aaron. I would be happy to research the question, but -8 || I would point out that your recommendation to prohibit the | 9 government from dealing with newsmen for operational purposes . 10 | is really ~- | | os iL Senator Hart of Colorado. Is that mine? 12 : Mr. Aaron. I thought it was. 13 | Oh, I'm sorry, publishing. I withdraw the allegation. 14. Senator Hart of Colorado, That says to the Agency you . 15 can't publish in a book. | | was Mr. Bader. Senator, we are starting with the issue of 1? the prohibition. As you know, my own vecomnendation is that 18 this~be~done as a combination of internal directives whereby 19 “the Agency would prohibit-itself from making operational use of 20: thesé Individuals, plus the generic exposure, if you will, so. 21 that the academic community is aware of the magnitude, if you 220 will, or the scope of the problem. 23 I tend to agree with you about shielding legislation in| 24 thisrcase. Well, there 1s one recommendation here which we_ 25 || will come to where to au something by statute is to say that HW 50955 Daclda:3 423510 Page 52 . a FOP SECRET , i
be 2 Gt 13 1.4 18 “46 i? 18 19 OG nO HW 50955 Docld:39493510 Page 53 | | | | i its prohibited list three categories: Peace Corps, Fulbr fOP SECRET = * in government. sponsored and government funded exchange programs, no funds will be expended in such programs, with a prohibition on the operational use aft government grantees. Now, that is not as difficult, I believe, is it? Mr. Maxwell. But you're then receiving the benefit from the governnent, and ‘as a condition of receiving that benefit from the government, one can make the restrictions suggested. | a : | Mr. Bader. It should be said there is a record here the Central Intelligence Agency has, for a number of years, .h aah Grantees, which I gather’ the definition of what they mean by that is those selected and approved by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, and employees and grantees of the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller and Carnegie. Oddly enough they have chosen these three. I gather the history of that is that John J. ‘McCloy insisted on that at one point, and it has ever prevailed. — So there is a record of internal prohibitions that che CIA-has+ | Senator Hart of Colorado. “But the Constitution says Congress shall pass no laws. That didn't say an Ageucy can't. | | | Mr. Bader. Well, we're just talking at different ‘levels. We are speaking first to the question of wha ner TOP SECRET Fo ree ere
mine) Ll Le 13 14 me) LO 18 19. 20 21 22 23 is B4 “x or WW 50955 DocId: 34423510 Page 54 testimony here of one of the key witnesses in this field is fOP SECRET —s_—, ‘there should be prohibitions, and second, as to how they should be implemented. ; - Senator Hart of Coloradc. I understand. I just wonder if there is a constitutional question here. Mr. Kirbow. I think’ there is a serious question that should be resolved, and I will only make one other point, as” <t have been reminded-by one of the other attorneys, that the Hence S engeeltey a Hay that if you eliminate their ability to recruit at the campuses, ~ you will eliminate 50 percent of their annual recruitment Mr, Davis. ‘There you have to be careful. Mr. Kirbow. Let me finish. And I do not indicate to you that all of the recruitments would necessarily stop if they ‘couldn't have spotting and whatnot, but they've indicated that eliminating use of academics even for spotting -- Senator Hart of Colorado. This doesn't do that, This doesn't prohibit recruitment of students. - Mr. Kirbow. It prohibits your using anyone in the -academic field there to introduce you even to the foreign student-over a cup of coffee. Senator Hart of Colorado, I thought you. meant recruiting. ‘for the Agency. Mr. Kirbow. Recruiting for an agent those students from a foreign country having nothing to do with American students. TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL
j : 32 fOP SECRET | L Senator Hart of Solorado. Well, if they want to recruit z a foreign student, they can just knock on their apartment door 5 || and introduce themselves. 4 Mr. Kirbow. I would just like to say that testimony 9 says if they lose the use of the favorable atmosphere that 6 they have of the academic, they will lose .50 percent of their. 7 recruitment. | | | 8 Mr. Bader. Well, Charles, let me say, in all respect, 9 || r think that is not their statement. their statement is in “10 two parts. First of all, it is that if they are. denied ~4 il || no, the first statement is that 50 percent of their annua Ey - 12 | recruitments come from campuses. | | 13 | Mr. Aaron. Domestic, That means 25 people. 14 Mr. Bader. Their second statement is that they would - 15 consider it a major loss in that recruitment process if they ce were denied the use of academics, but they don't make, or they 17 don't say that they would be denied the 25 or. 50. 18 Mr» Kirbow. Whac they said, Mr. Bader, it would prohibit 19 || them probably half the recruitments if they could not use 20 || that-facflity to do it. -I used 50 percent. ely Mr. Inderfurth. “Poreign students? 22 Mr. Kirbow. Yes. 23° Mr. Inderfurth. Well, this is another issue. I mean, 24 || what does the Commitiee think about foreign students caming ove vs | to this country and baing approached by the CIA. I maan, I. | ‘TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL. HW 50955 pocra:azoasie Page 55°
10 LL le 14° 15 Li 17 18 19 20 21 22 29 13 TOP SECRET | went overseas to study as a Fulbright, and I was under this regulation and so I couldn't have been used over there, but [I think there is something about Soviet, you know, coming here and: all of a sudden we start thinking, well, now, he might go back and turn on his country. Maybe it is a simplistic way to look at: it, but do we | want to continue that? Mr. Kirbow. If you intend to have human collection from the denied areas, it is 50 percent of your opportunity over the next foreseeable two or three decades. 5 | | . Senator Hart of Colorado. Now, no, Charlie, wait. a minute. Because they have found it convenient to do this in the past does not mean itis their only recourse. They will think of a way. | Mr. Davis. I can think of a variety of ways to recruit | foreign students at Colunbia and not use academics by that [detinteton at all. Senator Huddleston. How would. you do that? — Mr. Davis. Well, there are people in the foreign student center, there are people in the International House -~ | Me. Miller. in the restaurants. Mr. Davis. -In the restaurants. There are just a variety of places you could go to meet. people, in seminars. You don't have to be an academic... Mr. Kelley. Well; you're just being legalistic about TOP SECRET H¥ 50955 Docld:32423510 Page 56 . WARD & PAUL
| (OP SECRET. ss 1 who is going to contact ihem. You are still at the university, Rk which reaches Rick's point very quickly, that why draw this ° paper regulation so you can't use professors but you can use 3 4 the foreign student? 5 Mr. Davis. Well, that's a separate question. 6 | - Mr. Kirbow. Well, Mr, Chairman, if it were that easy 7 to recruit, I think we would be recruiting more than 50 people 8 in the United States a year. | Sa 9 I am not in a position, I think, not being a currently 10 experienced agent LOer uiter in the United States, ta make a 11 kind of -- the man that runs that business ‘Says ‘this wag & 12 | hazard that it created. ie even contacted one of the staff (15 '| today to say if you'r. going to do this, please consider this 14 ji aspect of it. About the only other 25 people they get, they 16 get out of the United Nations New. York involvement, through oad their principal office there. Li? Senator Huddleston, Well, of course, what we are confront 18 with-~is the question of the success “of the operation or the 19 propriety of it. ened 20 Are we going. to subvert propriety for success is one of ed the things we might have to do, I guess. ae Mr. Kirbow. Well, I don't-think-the question Senator 23 Mathias asked has been aaswered; that there has been any real “| harm shown by this” Peoloius over the years. “I don't know that FON ae has subverted the iia of any student. TOP CECRET re a ar 2 ey HW 50955 Docld: i Page 57
LO il le 19 20 21. Re fOP SECRET Mr.. Inderfurth. What about NSA? ‘Does that do? is that an abuse? Does that subvert the minds of the student leadars who were witting, or did it subvert the minds of the conference that they went to? Mr. Kirbow. I don't have the answer to that question, Perhaps you do. | Mr. Inderfurth. well, I have an opinion. I don't know if you can get an answer. | Mr. Aaron. Well, I think we have two separable issues here which I think we probably ought to -- I mean, if them © committee can address them seriatum. ‘One is, do we want & have the Government itself place some limit on its relationship with academics, its relationship, which is clandestine and covert, and if the answer to that question is yes, then the answer to that question is how would one do that? Would one doa law, shielding legislation which may raise certain kinds of questions, including constitutionality, or what have you, or do we want to recommend that the Agency itself put | the people off limits, would necessarily do anything except . institute policies which any Agency should have concerning _ journalists er any number of people. Mr. Miller. Well, let me raise a question, David, which really may go to the point. We heard from, is we discussed earlier, a number of Views of the President and so on, and as I recall that evening HW 50955 Docta:34a23510 Page 56 Lo. FCP SECRET
TOP SECRET _ se was that they don't want any laws, definitely. ' On the other hand, thay wanted to know whac the hell was 4 going on so that they could govern themselves, and that puis it 4 in a nutshell... govern itself in whatever way. In certain areas it won't 5 | - Won't the effect of this report, assuming that it is 6 | printed and it is public, provide the university community with - 7 || an awareness of what is going on? 8 I Mr. Kirbow. You mean without a recommendation, just the 9 finding that it has been done. 10 Mr. Miller, Well, I am just raising the question fox, - 11 discussion. Will the report itself provide notice that tlhoe 12 | things are going on and allow the university community to | ; | 14 | Make any difference, and in other areas it will. 15 Or is it necessary to take one of those alternatives which is either internal prcuhibitions on the agencies, ana the 19 further step is a statute. rang 18 And it seems to me that if you weigh those three possi- 19 bilities, you-may core to. an answer. 20 _Mr. Aaron, Well, 1 think there is-one problem with the 21 first step. It's just a problem, I'm not saying that it is ‘go || an insuperable problaa, but the problem is one I think that 23 Charlie put his finger on earlier, and that is the question of v4 witting. But we do have 41 individuals who are being used v5 || for operational purposes who are academics who do not khow Tor SECRET . AW 509545 Docld: 39423510 Page 59 WARO & PAUL
end 2a- : B 24 fe 4 = | HY 509455 DoclId: 32423510 Page 60 these unwitting relationship, but I. do feel very strongly | il | fOP SECRET ts 37 it, and we have -- I thinis there are 62 institutions is which _ no one outside of the operative himself, who may not know it = we just don't know how these numbers break out -- ar the institution doesn't know it. Now, it may well be that our report is so widely read that all institutions will have a chance to look at themselves and ask these questions, but there is a problem in the problem of | witting and unwitting, as Charlie points out: . xr. Kirbow, Weli, I, think none of the opposition to these. two recommendations at no’ time has said we shall mai the university management, whatever it is, and it can't. be very difficult to Find out who -is. running the shop, I would 1 ‘ think, and the individual himself are both witting, that we should -not prohibit. the Agency from this very, extremely i . : valuable. resource, performing this foreign. intelligence function. - Senator Huddleston. Well, you know, really, to get || back -- the major evil as Tt see it was. the’ recruiting Of students; a. “foreign. student. who. comes. to. the. States presumably to get an education, and whether he ais recruited by another > ' student, a member of ‘the “faculty ora CIA agent, a _ local businessman or a bar tender, . it seems to me that is the major evil, I think. tt is the subversion of the student who is sent over here, unwittingly sent over here for one purposa, TOP SECRET
ir fot | | 24 | 25. fOP SECRET 56 in our institutions of higher learning, and is subjecred to this effort. . | And I am not ready to say that we ought to eliminate that, but it seems to me that we really are after the problem that we are not totally addressing it by zeroing in on the academics. All we are doing is making it harder for them, to do it, I guess. | Mr, Aaron. Well, I think that is correct. If that igs wha you: see as the principle evil, you really have to go to the question of recruitiments. a Senator Mathias. But the response to my ques tion to afin the evil, I think we want wider, and we talked about the caint. Senator Huddleston. . We are not corrupting a faculty imem- ber. Mr. Aaron. I think my definition of the wider evil would encompass the question of the professor representing himself as being something other than what he represents himself to be, both to the Student and to the public at large, and I do think I would share Bill! s view, even though I am not an” academic, that they have a special responsibility in our society, and because of that responsibility I don't believe the government should bein a position of trying to detract from that. responsibility, which is a way I think you can argue that this kind of clandestine effort would do. = | If you want to get at the other problem, though, of TOP SECRET HW 450955 Docla:3#423510 Page 61. WARD & PAUL
Hiv 50955 18 19 20 Bocld: 33 {OP SECRET recruiting students, you know, we are talking here about positive foreign intelligence, and I don't even think we hava stepped around to find whether from the standpoint of counter=_ “intelligence there ave recruitments which take place of foreign students; ‘in other words, find out if another student may be | a witting KGB cooptee, Soviet. I mean, I just don't have any idea where that situation would take us. Mr. Maxwell. Now, there would -- one piece of information on that isthe. documents published in conjunction with. the: Huston Plan hearings this morning, I noticed that, whether rightly or wrongly, that close to 50 percent of those Boy iat iL exchange students who caine to the United States in 1972 were labeled as KGB cooptees | | | Now, if they are to ‘be seen quite as lambs being led to the slaughter --. | | ‘Mr. Aaron. The problem may be the other way around. Mr, Kirbow. Most of the graduate students, which is what most. ofthe students are here, I think, we would be concerned ‘about, or tne ones that are here under special programs~are hardly unshéltered youths, or rather, sheltered “youths. | | Mr. Quanbeck. I have a question, Would this apply to foreign students who attend like the. Inter-American Defense College or any of our wa litary institutions throughout the United States? he have naundreds of them coming in, , TOP SeCRET WARM & PAUL Leos ‘Page 62
TOP SECRET — 0 1 Mr. Kirbow, As it is weitten, it would -- the ones who 9 sit down here in Washingtoa where we have civiiian instructors 3 who are academic instructors. 4 Mr. Aaron. It goes from the Government's use of the 5 | academics, and unless we went to the question the Chairman 6 | suggests, as saying that We don't recruit students = 9 Senator Huddleston. ett, I think that's just an extension B | of the problem, I think it's reazly a difficult cecommenda- 9 tion, and I am inclined tio lean toward Bill Bader's suggestion 10 with the caveat of the wittingness of the institution, = -_ rT Mr. Kirbow. Institution and individual? 4 12 | Senator Huddleston. And individual. 13 | And specify, fox instance, that the president and, whether) 14 | it is the president or che board of trustees or the chairman 15 | of the board or whatever it is, be aware of it. 6 | Mr, Kelley. We ave talking about so many different things - | here, recruiting of students -— | ag | Mr. Aaron. Propayanda is another one. 19 : Mr. Kelley. Going only to the student and asking the 20 student will he be an agent. That's what Senator Huddleston . a1 is pointing out. | 29 Mr. Kirbow. whey don't use: them: for that. 23 Mr. Kelley. the CIA going to a foreign student who is wa here and trying to veeruit him. That has been pointed out 2s as one evil. Another evil or another practice is thaw se going| TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32423510 Page 63. GARD & PAUL
HW 30955 DocId: 34423510 ‘Page 64— fOP SECRET ss. r to American faculty members and saying, will you tell us about any students here, and that is using that faculty member for an operational purpose, and then ic is employing thase faculty members or other members of the academic comaunity during the leave of absence, when they go overseas or somewhere else. | There are so many different things here, and some have greater or lesser degrees of evil and desirability that I'm not sure that these two brief, you know, that we are taking into account all of the subtleties. ; . —s Mr. Bader. All of these fall under the Agency's termfgolog as the operational use of the individual, namely, to find each of these practices as béing more or less acceptable, but they are all operational. Mr. Kelley. Maybe I'm saying that a blanket ban is too blunt an: instrument, «nd maybe we don't have the time to analyze each. one of the things we are realy talking sbowt and apply the kind of precision to them to accomplish what we want, and therefore it inay be something for the oversight committee to study. | } Mr. Kirbow. I would suggest the third option, as the Chairman said, that it not be prohibition but it be in allowin practices where both witting individuals and witting institutions with carefully structured regulations which required) the type of notice to the governing individuals be as far as you “TOP SECRET waAROD & PAUL : |
{OP SECRET 62. 1 | go at thia time, with no further showing of wrongdoing. 2 Mr. Bader. Well, Mc. Chairman, the problem: with that is 3 as far as witting institutions are concerned in an economic 4 community, you cannot argue the case that -- well, youu can 5 | argue the case, but it cannot be a very sustained argument 6 that:-in an academic community, by ‘having one or more; a few 9 individuals somewhere in a university administration being 8 | aware that certain faculty members are being used for recruite: | . ‘Senator Huddleston. Well, I would assume it would be. 9 ment ‘purposes, that you make the institutions -- 10 a 11 | the president or the chairman of the board. y 12 | Mr. Aaron. Well, 1 think Bill's point is that they are 13 : not hierarchical organizations like making the cognizant 14 commander aware of whicn his troop is doing. 15 Senator Huddleston. ‘Well, the president can gay no, can't lt he? . | LB 7 | Mr. Kirbow. And he can put out a notice to his faculty 18 || that this institution does or doesn't. I don't think there‘s 19 any institution that. isn't managed by somebody, isn't: there? 20 Ms _Culbreath. Just this. one. . 21 Mr. Davis. A subset of that problem is how a university 92 would know that it's a covert problem, and. the ~- I mean, while 93 you were supposed to inform people of what you are doing, if.it 24 | is a covert contract, itss not entirely clear how the university | official would know. | TOP SECRET Hi 50955 Docld: 33423510 Page 65 WARD & PAUL
LO il le _ 413 14 15 1? 18 19 20 el. 22 23 24 25 HWW 50955 Docld: 32423510 Page 66 WARD & PAUL the individual. evil. It doesn’t solve that. It just gives the institution a chance to say na. may do far more than any prohibition. “that may be of limited duration. TOP SECRET) Mr. Kirbow. The CLA would have that responsibility, not ‘Mr. Davis. Well, then, if the president said no.- Senator Huddleston. Well, that really doesn't address the “ _ Senator Mathias. Why doesn't somebody look at Gary Hart's first amendment question over the night. L think we have kicked this one around about as far as we are going to . kick it. | | 7 Mr. Inderfurth. liis feeling, by the way, when he eid ae was because of the importance, that the various. options should be included into the report that goes to the full Committee, including the option of prohibition by law. Senator Huddleston. What are we doing when we raise this question publicly? In not sure the great body of the American public or the great body of the world a | Mr. Miller. The more I listen to this, just Our own recactic and we are ‘people that have been working with the problem for a year. It seems to me that the exposure of the question Senator Mathias. The only problem with that, Bill, is tha Mr. Aaron. Well, in addition to these options, then, it seems to me there ought to be an option which says that these TOP SECRET
10 11 12 13 14 18 19. 20 el fOP SECRET operational uses would be permitted as long as the individual .were witting and some, maybe as you say, the chairman of the board of trustees, or the presidents or their equivalents, were notified of the relationship. “Mr. Kirbow. Or regulations to that effect. Mr, Aaron... In other words, the internal regulations of the CIA would be to that effect, and is there a fourth . option, that there should be a prohibition on any recruitment of foreign students in the United States? Ts that a reasonable thing that the Committee ought to consider as well? " Mr. Kirbow. I think the Senator said he wasn't willing to go quite that far right now. Senator Huddleston. t may be by tomorrow morning. Mr. Maxwell. May I mention one more thing? Most of this has focused on recruitment of students, which I think is. an extraordinarily difficult issue because of the © value that is claimed by the Agency for that, and I think my own, at least, ignorance about alternative means of doing it. The- issue of another evil which is an issue that Bill has used about the possible use of academics to write propa~ ganda is I think a somewhat simpler issue, because I think that may get more directly, at least more directly than finding simply a list cf toreign students and providing it to the Agency, to the issue of how that affects the academic Top SECRET WW 50955 pocta:34423510 Page 67 ‘WARD & PAUL
HW 50955 10 ae 12 13 14 “15 1? 18° 19 20 21 22 eae) ee Docld:32 73510 Page 66 TOP SECRET re community, and a situation in which an academic may in fact be writing propaganda, putting out material that other people in the academic community don't know is essentially by. Senator Huddleston. Well, they have indicated to us that they have discontinued that, that they have put nothing out © that is not attributed in the first place. | Mr. Kirbow. Sic, many of these people used to write articles and whatmot for use overseas, so it has nothing to do with the use in the United States, and they rely a great deal on this type of contact for specialists in certain areas. to have an appeal to the people. an ; t “Now, whether or not that does them much good is a question that is debated in the Agency a great deal, but the third — option would include what you said there, anda fourtn, if you .want to put it down here, to go before the full Committee, is a total prohibition against recruiting foreign students. But I think if we could have until maybe tomorrow afternco this constitutional question on that one issue is going to get.a little more complex. Mr, “Inderfurth. Will the Supreme Court sit before tomorrow? Mr. Kirbow. No, sir, but Mr. Schwarz will be here earlier. Senator Huddleston. Well, we have beat that one all we can tonight, I believe. | . TOP SECRET
a) ay fOP SECRET Mr. Aaron. Weli, the second recommendation here, If | | | 7 | . | 2 don't know whether that is controversial with other staff | ’ members or with the Senators or not. | 4 Mr. Kirbow. That we are going to put the whole ucademic 5 || question under further consideration tomorrow? 6 Mr. Aaron. Including this one? ; Senator Huddleston, Academics for aperational purposes? 8 Mr, Kirbow. On top of page 59, say, they're talking about 9 the use of cultural gvantees of all U.S. government sponsored - 10 prograns. | . a Mr. Aaron. The point of that being the Congress and the 12 | executive branch, for that matter, makes grants for education 3 | ea soto cultural exchange programs that don't: involve 14 academics, the athletes, artists and whomever for certain kinds of specified purposes there, for Hands Across the Border purposds and what have you, and if these are used for clandestine . in 17 purposes, in effect they. would piggyback on overt programs 18 and there is some question as to whether the Congress wishes 19 these programs to be so used, and that is really the question 20° the committee has to tace up to. Do we want to permit those 01 ||. programs, some of those programs, clear to the ‘Fulbright 22 program -- I know there's a prohibition on it. The question is 93 whether that prohibition ought to apply to others. | 24 Senator Mathias. arid you're talking about during the life v5 || of the program. _ oo TOP SECRET HW 30955 Docld: 32423510 Page 69 WARO & PAUL ; |
fOP SECRET 8 | 7 | Mr. Aaron. Yeah, i get a grant: for six weeks ‘to go ; } to the Soviet Unitn co Boclov institute. It!s a Federal 3 Prograi. Should I have a little extra money to visit someplace 4 else. | | 5 Mr, Inderfurth. Yeah, but David, those are CIA prohibitions. 6 not by law, on the Fulbright. | 9 Mr. Bader, Those are CIA prohibitions presently. B “The recommendation here, which I think is separable from 5 the earlier recommendations, this is a question of whether hy F 10 statute the CIA should be prohibited from using programa, VL grantee programs that are federally funded to piggyback, as 3 12 David puts it, operational purposes and operational uses onto 13 it, in other words, if you are using Federal funds for another 14 purpose. | - 1 Senator Huddleston. I would agree with that. - - Mr. Aaron. So is it your suggestion we should adjourn rT until tomorrow? : 18 “génator Huddleston. & think so. 19 Mr. Inderfurth. Gary Hart wanted me to raise one question . 96 at the conclusion of this, and that is to get some feeling 31 for the timetable between now and Friday when this is supposed 29 to be all done. Going into speed, 1 think he has concluded it 23 will be two years or something like that? 24 Senator Huddleston. Well, we are open to suggestions: 25 for speeding it up. TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:39423510 Page 70 . WAROD & PAUL a
TOP SECRET oe 1 Me. Inderfurth. ‘Well, my comment to him was I thought the discussions of the National Security and the role Qf the oa ber in covert action, what we're discussing now, should be the 4 most Lengthy discussions, IG recommendations would go quicker, 5 || but will these all be done by Friday? | 6 - Senator Huddleston. “That is our hope, and t don't see 7 how we can do it unless we do meet twice a day. Hopefully we 8 | won't have to go any more nights. 9 |}  - 10:00 and 2:00 suits me, but tomorrow: we'll comnence, 10 some of us at least, at 9:00. | | . Ll Mr. Maxwell. I think that would do it, I think in texmg | | le of complexity and debate. With the staff, I think the material 13 | we have covered so far is the vast bulk of those, the hard 14] issue. | 15 - I hope tomorrow I will be meeting with the Domestic iS) Subcommittee drafters, and I think we can have an agreed versio at least on that side.on the questions of the role of the. ' Inspector General and the role of the General Counsel and © maybe we can go through that four or five pages. very quickly, if it is-agreeable to this side. | 7 Mr. Inderfurth. Isn't this supposed to be’ completed by Friday? | | | | Senator Huddleston. Well, this is what we are shooting | ‘for. Mr. Inderfurth. o go to the Full Committee over the TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423510 Page 71 WARD & PAUL
HW 450955 10 Ll le 13 180 19 20 | : TOP. SECRET 69 od weekend, and then Monday -- - Senator Huddleston. Wall, if we just finished Friday, we' ve got to have at least a day for typing. Mr. Aaron. Well, let me just say I think, Mr. Chairman, “may I raise a point? I think that one of the important questions here is the extent to which you want to look back at what you've done, In other words, we have been sent away to prepare and redraft | certain recommendations concerning the charter of the. CIA; for example concerning whether the DCI should wear both , . hats and so forth. At some point we must, I think, leave sone time in the schedule to look either at all of those. changes at once; or to spend a little time each day looking at the day. before's work, in assuring that in fact that is what we all want to do. | | | | Senator Huddleston. . I would rather get it all done and ee take a half a day y where wa might, where each one of us “= are you retyping as you go along?” Mr. Aaron. We are retyping as we go along. Senator Huddleston, LI think. if we get through the total, then we can git down, two or three members together, or the staff or the member of the Subcommittee, and read it. | | Mr. Kirbow. Could I suggest a convenience procedure for those of you who may have 30 minutes to. do that, is that on the top of every one of ciiese final, retyped versions, we list Toe SECRET Docld: 324273510 Page 72 : WARD & PAUL
fOP SECRET =” y the title and whatever short title we have got there, ¢2 that 2 | he can go right and look if he just has time to look at that 5 one change, he can go look at it instead of just -- you know, - 4 otherwise you have read lt ten times alveady. It doean't get 5 ‘much easier reading it the eleventh time if you haye to read 6 all 100 pages. — | | 7] Mr. Aaron. Just tab the amendment . 8 | _ (Whereupon, at 9:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed 9 subject! to the call of the Chair.) 7 12 | 13 1.4 15 18 19 20 21 ‘TOP SECRET BW 30955 Docld:34425510 Page 73