Groner ~6- _ Mexicans who are sacking contact with the Soviets. officers use this number. They are Military inteliisence officers uaing Comercial Office cover and in s2me instances actually performing commercial functions or trace vegotiations. The volume of trade between Mexico and the USSR does not justify a Comercial Office staff of ten (10) Soviets. The Mexico Station has had seme success in running dcutle agente against these GHU officers. LIENVOY provides a ke.pful check _ on these operationg. The take from LIENVOY also iientifios ‘the GRU officers aa escorts for trade, scientific, cocmercial and tourist delegations who continue to travel between the USSR Cpe and Mexico, either on visite to Mexico or to and frou other Latin American countries. Once these groups arrive in Mexico, : their itineraries usually become available. LIENVCY. 15 61 O7 Soviet Commercial Office. Five (5) known or suspect GRU 15 12 64 Soviet Pilms Office. This leads into the residence and office ‘.° of the distributor for Soviet Commercial Pilma in Mexico who ia @ suspect intelligence officer.. There have been a oumber of calla suggesting clandestine contact with Central Americans but the Station hag not yet been auccagsful in identifying the callers, 15 69 87 Soviet Military Attache. This contimies to be the least . _ productive of the coverage in terms of volume because the Soviet Military officers either wili not answer tie telephone or spend. very iittle time where it rings. It ia usvally tae number called by U.S. AWOL servicemen trying to aake contact with the Soviets, and by other Americans who for sce reason or another want to work for the Soviets or go to tres USSR. There are three (3) GRU colonels ami six (6) eiviltan GRU officera who use thia Line, Tha Soviet information is trangeriteal by the LIAAVOY transerlvery in tue game way as the Cuban traffic except that the reels also contain a considerable volume of Russian language conversations, This requires that the crels be picked up datly and delivered tc an outside (unilateral) translation (Staff Agent Douglas J. FIENGLASS) who translates the Russian conversations into Rnglish. From these transcripts it le apparent that the Soviets ace not avare that their conversations in Russian are being overheard and underssvod. These daily exchanges between the Soviets and their wives (who also werk in the Embassy) provide a good picture of personal habits, grievances, marriage relationehips, and weaknesses of targets of interest to KUBARK. '3, Czech Envassy. Two lines in the Chancery (45 20 91 and 35 30 12) ere covered by LIENVOY. Reels from these targets are delivered daily ty AREHANT to RIGGS woo delivers them to the EE Case Officer who arranges for transcription and translations to be done by David B. SCHLADHTER, field contract agent. This agent also prepares oa monthly summary of information on the astivities of Czech-offictals in Mexico, This Bmbassy las a staff of thirty-six (36) officials of whom eleven (11) are known or suspect intelligence cfTicers. LIENVOY has provided the great bulk of cperational intelligence om this ; REnbassy, ite personnel and activities in Mexico. Although no exploitable “7: pee vee aad at . ten at So
. — . ap re Thy” Ee Aey: rhe yt ry shave come to the Station's attention during the past year, this coverage has provided invaluable basic isvornation on the targets ot fa, _ &, Polish Eubassy, LISNVUY covers two lines in thia Eubasey. One of thea (11 25 49) fe in the main Chancery, Tho other (25 $2 38) 16 the private line of the Polish Gumerclal Counsolor. These reels are delivered daily by AREHART to RIGGS whe delivers then to the EE case officer who _arrangés for translations ani transcriptions to be done by Louise B. maAuaSIC (ps), a contract employee vio prepares a monthly summary of information obtained froa this coverage. This Snbassy has-a‘staff of tvelve (12) officials of whoa seven (7) are. known or sUsRRTS Intelligence officers, LISNVOY has provided considerable amount of operational intelligence on this Babassy and their Commercial Office in Nexics. Invaluable isiformation has been obtained re- garding the relationships betveen various Polish officiale. LIENVOY also provides a-very veluable check on various access agentes who are in contact with Polish offfeials. Practically all leads to access agents in this field have originated with the LIENYUY Projects ‘ , 5, Commmnist China Nevs Agency (NCNA), Three representatives of the Ccamunist China News Agency sre in Mexico, As a revult of a briefing of LIRAMA by Willfard C. TS on 16, December 1964, LIRAMA requested coverage ef the lina which gcea into a} ilding used by these Chinese a9 A conbination residence and office. This infcrmation haa been useful for travel data, idantification of contacts af the Chinesu Communists in Mexico and some wacksround on the three Chingsse news represontatives. Using leads from this source, several unsuccessful efforts have bren made to place a Chinese speaker in touch with one of the three Chinese newsmen to make @ cold approach {during international travel fre Mexico to Lomion). The Mexico Station Case Officers reaponaible for established FI and CI/CS programs feel that LYENVOY has mad. a very necessary intelligence support contribution. The fastlities of this project, duo to centralized tapping and transcribing, aretiouy to produce three tines the volume of . raw audio and finished inteliisence as LIFEAT at approximately one half the LIENVOY continues to be able eost. As a semi-official ifaison tap operation, to place a tap on any phone agsired whereas LIFEAT, aa a unilateral operation, does not always have immediate access to a deslred target. The continued success of Station Mexico's cperational program against the Cuban, Soviet and Soviet Satellite installaticas and personnel in Mexico {a largely attributable zo the continuous and thoreues coverage of these targata by this project. — Chaler of Station, Mexico, reccumends that the project be renewed for another year ag an essential collecticna aml support operation for the Mexico Station. 5. PROSLEMS There have been no sisniticant security, cover, control, or liaison problenas duving the project yeare . : ¥. LIAISON . This. Project encompasses an unofficial liaison relationship with high-level 1