DoclId: 32425003. Page 37 DTG: 150425Z November 1963 FROM: HARKINS, SAIGON TO: TAYLOR, CJCS INFO: . FELT, HAWAII SECRET MAC 2197 EYES ONLY FOR TAYLOR EXCLUSIVE FOR FELT In the military situation there has been little change from what you and Sécretary McNamara witnessed just over a month ago. I visited all Corps this week for a round-up before the Hawaii meeting. The VC reaction to the coup though late in starting was violent when it got going. There was no set pattern, It was something like - a blind dog in a meat shop - a bite here and a bite there. The incidents ran the gammet; attacks, harassments, propoganda, ambushes, road cutting, assassinations, kidnapping, etc. All tolled they exceeded the peak of any week since I have been here. The intensity lasted for just aboiit a week and have now dwindled to almost nothing. To me the VC seemed to be celebrating the change in Government in their diabolical manner. Taking advantage of the fact that government forces for obvious reasons reached a near low as far as offensive operations were concerned. The feason for the drop off in RVNAF operations was the fact that heads were falling right and left and everyone sat around waiting to see who was next. All new Province Chiefs in the LI Corps, three in the First, several in the III'd and they are still making changes in the iv corps. There are new Division Commanders in the lst, 22nd, 23rd, 7th, 9th, and 21st; flew Corps Commander in the IV Corps and a new CO of the VNAF.
Captain Quyen CNO murdered; same for Colonel Tung (SF's). Changes. are still being made across the board in staffs, regiments and | districts. While waiting to see where the axe would fall, the units, along with their Commanders, did a bit of celebrating, relaxed their guard, and the VC walked in. As a comparison with the tremendous upsurge of last week, only 27 incidents were reported for the 12th and 13th and only six of these were armed attacks; one in the I Corps, two in the II Corps, none in the III Corps, and three in IV Corps. This was while the ARVN showed over five hundred initiated actions for the same period, so things are getting back to nornial, however, it will be some time before the new Commanders, Province and District Chiefs can digest all their problems and come up with — answers. a “g I discussed my visit to the Corps with Gen Don yesterday. I told him many decisions must be madé at his Level so the people in the field could get on with the war. He informed me they were going to use the NCP as the basic plan and that he was going to atart visiting in the field ASAP... Incidentally, he is visiting the 7th Division and III Corps and intends to visit I and II Corps - next week, I sent Stillwell along with him today. .I also gave Gen Don a list of what I consider musts for getting on with the war. I'm going to have lunch with him Monday and should be able to report to you in Hawaii some of these actions he is taking. Regards. Docld:32425003 Page 38 ~~
ny ONLY at] ese DIG: 0417452 November 1963 FROM: HARKINS SAIGON TO: ‘TAYLOR, JCS, WASHINGTON TOP SECRET MAC 2097 EYES ONLY RE YOUR JCS 4285 Plane with Nhu children aboard departed Saigon at 042020 local a repeat 042020 local. Destination Bangkok. Children accompanied by — Mr. Flott from Embassy plus nurse. One of children apparently not - too well. Onward passage from Bangkok not known here. a oie? “eenanc Docld:32425003 Page 39 |
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF. STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR | THE JOINT STAFF COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES yo | DECLAS6IFIED BY JOINT STAFF yn a 23 March 1964 MEMORANDUM. FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF START é Subject: Lodge Proposal to the President Re= garding Vietnam - 1, In the Ambassador's message at Tab A he advances the thought that the US must determine how to apply its power in relatively limited doses as a warning to the North Vietnamese, He mentions in paragraph 9 that some overt reconnaissance flights might be useful as an initial step and recommends in paragraph 11 that an intensive study be made, 2, In the President's reply at Tab B it is stated that judgment is reserved for the present on overt military action and that planning for action against the north is on a contingency basis at the present. hen 3, In the Ambassador's response at Tab C he agrees that overt action should be held until Vietnam and US covert steps have been tried and offers that it is not premature to initiate this move as part of an essentially diplomatic pressure move. In his paragraph 3 he men- tions a report which is expected to propose additional actions on a "tit-forstat" basis which was referred to in the President's message at Tab D, and which are specifically in reference to renewal of attacks on Americans. ae ; 4 At . discussing the above with the Department of State,rabepresentatives consider Mr. Lodge's message is unclear to them, also, They believe his message con~ cerning the report on the "tit-for-tat" methods will pring clarification and intend to wait for Mr. Lodge's report before taking further action. Docld: 32425003 . Page 40
TOP SEGRET 5, We believe that Mr, Lodge's reference to covert actions refers to the operations included in 34-A, put until there have been some successful military ac- tions, it will be difficult to initiate the diplomatic pressures which he refers to in his paragraph 2.0f Tab C and which is what he is recommending to the President; i.e., initiate diplomatic pressure based upon successful covert actions. 6, I recommend that we await the report from Mr, Lodge concerning “tit-for-tat" methods prior to making judgment on what Mr, Lodge is recommending to. the President, yer x 2 ySk ( shore) Vij 4, ty aa pe gud Veeep WALTER M, HIGGINS, JR. prt wk Cen Colonel, USA Deputy Special Assistant Docld: 32425003... Page 41
OLS TELEGRAM =Debartment of State TOP SECRET _. ° Control: 110 7 __ Rec'd: MARCH 19, 1964 220M; SAIGON 3:04 AM ACTION: SECSTATE 1776 PRIQRITY aes 13-6 DATE : MARCH 19, 3 PM OM. AMBASSADOR LODGE TO THE. PRESIDENT 4ANK YOU FOR YOUR 1454. 1 WILL CARRY OUT THE PROGRAM WITH iy ENERGY « ae iT SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO COMMENT FURTHER ON TWO MATTERS s RST, THE PROPOSAL TO PUT PRESSURE ON NORTH VIETNAM, AS REFERRED TO IN YOUR PARA FOUR, SUBPARAGRAPH THREE, SO THAT PHEY WILL CEASE THEIR AGGRESSION AND, SECOND, THE IMAGINATIY AND INTERESTING SUGGESTION, WHICH DESERVES CAREFUL ANALYS ag YHAT. | SEE GENERAL DE GAULLE. 36 AS REGARDS PRESSURE ON NVN, | SUSMIT.T HEF OLLOWINGs yg US PROBLEM IN ANY UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY IS HOW TO APPLY Qua een THE COMMUNISTS, CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL NOT USE - OUR MISSILES, ARE TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE PEOPLE IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES RIGHT UNDER OUR NOSES. IT IS AS THOUGH WE HAD A TREMENDOUS WARSHIP CAPABLE OF DOMINATING THE SEAS, BUT WERE FACING A PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE OF THE DESERT. tN SUCH A SITUATION OUR POWER SEEMS USELESS. 5S. LAST AUTUMN THE US DID FACE THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO APPLY OUR POWER IN. SOUTH VIETNAM, PRESIDENT KENNEDY, VERY can | THOUGHT, WANTED TO BRING ABOUT SOME FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN eee THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GVN, BUT WE SEEMED TO BE UP AGAINST A BLANK WALL. THERE SEEMED TO BE NO WAY WE COULD USE OUR GREAT. POWER WHECH WOULD NOT EITHER DAMAGE THE WAR EFFORT OR BRING ON REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY 1S __ top secret UNLESS . “UNCLASSIFIED” CICS<2 DIS-1 STICS-1 Sacsa-4 NMCC DUGY GEN/ADM=] FILE=1 Docld: 32425003. Page 42
TOP SECRET -2- 1776, MARCH 19, 3 PM FROM SAIGON ae | AN ECONOMIC PANIC WITH WIDESPREAD UNEMPLOYMENT AND “STARVATION. | 6. YET, FINALLY,’ MUCH THOUGHT AND STUDY IN WASHINGTON AND IN THE ’ -MBASSY DESCOVERED WAYS TO APPLY US POWER. WE HAMM ERED “AY ATONE. PLACE AND THEN AT ANOTHER AND, AFTER AWHILE, | THERE WAS A CRACK IN THE BLANK WALL. THE BEGINNI ING OF A CHANGE IN DIEM!S ATTITUDE WAS BECOMING APPARENT WHEN THE NOV. 1 COUP CAME. A DESCRIPTION OF THESE METHODS IS IN MY 9g, NOV 6. © To NOW WE FACE THE ‘PROBLEM OF. HOW To APPLY ‘OUR POWER TO NVN, AND WE SEEM ALSO TO BE _UP_ AGAINST A BLANK WALL. YET. WE SEEM INGS: (A) ONE SINGLE. SATURATION RAID . O BE QUITE SURE OF JWO TH ON NVN COULD DESTROY. THE FRUITS OF EIGHT YEARS' FIGHTING AGAINST a YEARS OE ET ee ca LABOR SINCE 195%3 AND THE FRENCH AND OF TEN LLL To USE JUST WHAT WE . R FORCE UN Lee 8 THEY WOULD SEE TV SVNc THE PRICE WOULD BE TOO HIGH. PERSUAD _A_CORO ae ATIVELY LIMITED DOSES SO AS TO GIVE THEM A aan = re Say “DANGEROUS. we ane SOME. OVERT RECONNAL ISSANCE “FLIGHTS MIGHT BE Sere AS AN | AL ST ee | pie WHAT. WE CAN DO TO THEM SHOULD ALSO BE LINKED To WHAT We CAN. 0 FOR THEM -~°IN TERMS: OF RICE AND- REMOVING, WHATEVER US PERSONNEL... WE INTEND TO REMOVE ANYWAY 6 : & SAME kine OF. “INTENSIVE STUDY BE NOW: GIVEN TO THE ABOVE _| IN WASHINGTON. THAT WAS GIVEN. LAST FALL TO APPLY 2 © ING SANCTIONS TO DIEM. | AM CONF IDENT THAT GOOD RESULTS WOULD BE OBTAINED AND THAT. SOME. THINGS, WHICH, LOOK | PRETTY STRONG TODAY WOULD START FALLING | APART» ee Ae Hn oo g0P SECRET. eesti thaliana smepoareiniesarts ere 86 + da abana BS WE Docld: 324275003... Page 43
TOP SECRET ~3- 1776, MARCH 19, 3 PM FROM SAIGON 12, AS REGARDS DE GAULLE, | LOOK FORWARD TO CHANCE TO COMMENT, WrlCH YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR LAST PARAGRAPH, ON INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR BOHLEN, PARIS SEEMS HONESTLY TO BELIEVE. THAT 1964 15 1954, WHICH LEADS THEM INTO STILL OTHER DANGEROUS ERRORS, 13, AS REGARDS MY GOING TO PARIS TO EXPLAIN REALITIES TO THE GENERAL, THE FOLLOWING CAN BE SAID IN FAVOR; thy A-LIFE-TIME OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE FRENCH, THE WARTIME CONNECTION OF WHICH YOU SPOKE, AND MORE RECENT CONTACTS IN — 1960 AND IN 1961, AT WHICH TIME 1. LOCATED THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ATLANTIC INSTITUTE IN PARIS, ABOVE ALL, THE FACT THAT | WOULD BE VISITING HIM AS YOUR REPRESENTATIVE. SHOULD BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN ATTITUDE, IF ANYTHING CAN, 15. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE 1S THE REACTION IN THE GVN, PROLONGED | REFLECTION CONVINCES ME THAT GVN, FROM GENERAL KHANH ON DOWN, WOULD BE FILLED WITH APPREHENSION AND THAT, GIVEN THEIR MENTALITY, NOTHING COULD CONVINCE THEM THAT | WAS NOT GOING TO PARIS TO SELi. THEM DOWN THE RIVER, AS US REPRESENTATIVE, | AM EXTREMELY PROMINENT HERE, AND A TRIP BY ME TO PARIS TO SEE DE GAULLE, AT THIS TIME, WOULD BE A BODY BLOW TO MORALE AND WOULD, WITH ONE HAND, DESTROY WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, | ve GP_ le LODGE NOTE; ADVANCE COPY TO S/S~0 AT.6:0' AM MARCH 19 PASSED WHITE HULSE AT 7:35 &,m. MARCn 19 TOP SECRET DocId: 32425003 Page
ee ges coin TELEGRAM | Department of State _ 10449 ARGE TO TOP SECRET Ws ACTION: -Amembassy SAIGON 1484 * es N20 5 se EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM THE PRESIDENT 1. We have studied your 1776 and I am asking State to have Bilt Bundy make sure that you get our latest planning documents on ways of applying pressure and power against the North. I understand that some of this was discussed with you by. McNamara , mission in ‘Saigon, but as plans are refined it would be helpful to have your detailed comments « As we agreed in our previous messages ‘to each other, judgment is action in view of the consensus fron ‘Saigon overt military, conversations of McNamara mission with General Khanh and you on Sudgment that movement against the North at the present, would be premature. — We here share General Khanh judgment that fhe- immediate and essential task - gthen the southern pass: & me en ce ee ie a pa Drafted: by: Tolegraphic transmission and st rec'd from White | HOUSE? AMP satuson proved bn THE SECRETARY hy Gloaraneess : ne ~ oa . 2 SIs ~ ME. Read | | oe i "REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS SOP SECRET PROHIBITED UNLESS “OFFICIAL USE ONLY” OR “UNCLASSIFIED” a hci tai _siiismeninesinmiinaauulasnginnsstine ‘i t DS-322 pa | CICS-2 DJS-1 SJCS-1 SACSA-4 | As ey | NMCC DUTY GEN/ADM-1 FILE=-1 | a Jugs ert Se SS gy DocId:32425003 Page 45_ oo
\ Amembassy SAIGON of telegram to. TOP SECRET area is to develop the strongest possible military and political fo base for possible later action, There is additional international reason for avoiding immediate overt action in that we expect a showdown & between the chinese and Soviet Cormunis ¢ parties svon and action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown. ‘But & Lf et any. time you feel that more imsediate action is urgent, t count on you co let me know specifically the. reasons for such action; together with yo our recomendations for its size ‘and shape. 26 on dealing it may be_ with de Gaulle. XY continue to think (Stats is cending you draft inatruction to > Bohlen, which I have sot yet | rewle Bueds Cor. your. comment. » it ought to be possible to explain ee kal che idea of neutralize : ) point 1 think that nothing is more iaportant than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we Cate IT have made this point myself to ‘Mensfield and Lippmann and t : éepect to use every public opportunity to restate our position firmly. You may want to convey our concern on this point to General Khanh and get his ideas on the best # possible joint program to stop such talk in Saigon, in Hlashington, and TOP SECRET Docld:32425003 Page 46 !
INCOMIN Action =. a Contra 16669 UY eS Rec'd: MARCH 23, 1964 1:58 AM FROM: SAIGON ACTION: SECSTATE 1803 Info DATE ¢ MARCH 23,°.1. 7M EADIS “OR THE PRESIDENT FROM LODGE YOUR 1484, 1. | WILL. OF COURSE BE GLAD TO COMMENT ON WHATEVER YOU SEND ME REGARDING PRESSURE ON. THE. NORTH. I aa aa TO AGRE able asi Ue Se aie oe BE “ a TRIED -- ri Fieh S PART OF aN ESSENTIAL DIPLOMAT IC PR =SSu Re MOVE, |.DO NOT RPT NOT THINK THAT SUCH A MOVE INCLUB ING Tae WEET-NAM AND U, Se COVERT ACTIVITIES INVOLVED, 1S PREMATURE « le SUCH AN EFFORT COULD BE. SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT, IT WOULD OSVIOUSLY GREATLY DISCOURAGE THE VC AND HELP GENERAL KHANH STRENGTHEN HIS SOUTHERN BASE. IN FACT IT MIGHT VERY MUCK HASTEN THE END OF THE WAR HERE. | HAVE NOTED WITH INTEREST YOUR EXPECTATION OF A SHOWDOWN BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND SOVIET. COMMUNIST PARTIES. AND AGREE THAT THIS 1S A MAJOR ELEMENT TO BE CONSIDERED IN-ANY SUCH DIPLOMATIC EFFORT. U, Se MISSION (COUNTRY TEAM) WILL HEAR A REPORT, PURSUANT RUCTION IN YOUR 1454, PARAGRAPH 4, SUBPARAGRAPH 4-ON TAT® METHODS AT THE REGULAR MEETING THIS WEEK. lg AS REGARDS DE GAULLE, 1 WILL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO CARRY OUT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SEST OF MY AB Liy, 8 SHOULD YOU DECIDE YOU WANT ME YO GO. 1 AM CO MMENTING ON PROPOSED INSTRUCT TON TO AMBASSADOR , REPRODUCTION FROM - THIS. COPY. IS ° a SS TOP SECRET -—==——PROHIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED” GIOS-2 DIS-1 SJCS-1 SACSA-L NMCC(DUTY GEN/ADM)-1 FILE-1 (10)ceh Docld: 32425003::. Page 45
veh he Ba i iene init tee TOP. SECRET “2m 7 1803» MARCH 234 1 /PM-FROM SAIGON TO AMBASS 8 OR BOH! REASONING REGARD IN | WILL DISCUSS WIT ATE TELEGRAM, 1 LEKE YOUR DOWN THE IDEA-OF NEUTRAL ISM AND GP ot. UMT NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0. AT PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 4 AM MARCH 23 Fo TOP SE “CR oT DociId: 32425003 Page 49
Ly cen oeciaael Department of State y | uct We CHANG: 10" TOP SECRET ; OTF bog L ces —— “L454. Cy 8 \] 4 4-98 Pi ne : Orton ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY x HS 35 EXDIS beer FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM THE PRESIDENT JAR 1. I have now personally reviewed your cables 175" “hrough 1757 and have considered them with Secretaries of State and Defense. I am delighted to find that we have 4 very high measure of agreement. 2. Your comments on various sections of McNamara report mike good sense to all of us, and report has' been revised to meet most of your points. Revised version as approved today in National Security Council follows by air. 3, We have also shortened and amended the White House statement to reconcile it with your comments ; Different people seem to view the past differently, but there is no point in Letting such differences worry US 85 we go forward. as Specifically with reapect to the comments in your. 1757 your whole-hearted support of first eleven recommendations  gevers our most. important efforts watch are still in South The Secretary Serene WSS a a Tse Fon WHIKS B Ous Eretepraphic transmission end S / S & res ne. 4 Baldwin : 3 / 1? 64 S Taye || classification eporoved byy Cheete acess REPRODUCTION. Solu COPY [S PROH:. ; TOP SECRET 82 | Eyqgu2 DIS-I SICS=2 SACSA-} a NNCC(DUTY GEN/ADM)=1 FILE-2_ (20) cen i ee sir epesrinonipeenetnneeiisa i i Docld: 32425003... Page 50
“Page 2 _of telegram to. Amembas Vietnam. On your additonal coune nts, L have reached the fo5llowine conclusions: (1) I think addition should be intensively examined. ground penetrations should be ini AEB hy along any lines which can be wo by Bh hanh and Phownl with Souvanna’s endorsement, and I will aurhs orige Low-Level there wherever the present high-level flights indicate TeconmaLe sance may be needed, the questions of further U.S, parti wel sted) & against Laos rai 8S L asked “usk and McNamara My first thought is tha poe Ws ae pa pale re pee @ S 2 er | ad las o © © oe wh S a "> 2 B Souvanna a Wel, ch mi. have only Limited millrary wider Comounist action in Leow, On Ca dla we find ourselves put to keep abreast of the Sihanouk introduces . imte the sceme. is that biisteral GVNeREG talks may some thoughts on those proa * ceterloration, I wou Docld: 32425003 - Page 51 now be in progress and State ha;
amemba sey a: TOP On ore ot Rhighe or low-lev oe Wo are nok ceady to ma Le. preparations be x ance LE it seems merc ry or jJpolitical rea: ad your «¢ those dise Flic is a tr on this Scion . urther thoughts on (3) I have ordered oun inclination is to favor tion. Like you, I rese th Vletmam, Question on Americens is more complex. As I : not an | | contingency fox “ye bt attacks on 4a t . ‘ ; z } é . \ f Poison vemiomerisaieei Docld: 32425003. Page 52
a be Bage_f- ee YE teleseam ¢ tof Ament: \ _ EXDIS i Your cable does not mention it, b your concern about the effectiveness of owe representat ee age Frenne, oT e dis scussed this warter with Bohlen and we ma he will x ers with Comeral dea Calle perse latter rety from Caribbean, will circulete them fer ve we shey are final. y wish to consider whether a@t ity you to go fe » Paris yourse elf to 1. Ta the light of connection with Pe © to the Gene soseiblitey. seemn to me to GP=1, . END ayer \ Docld: 32425003 <Page 53.