Ur BeunLi 1-91 | suggestion was that we recess until 1:30. : z | Mr. Helms. I am at the Committee's disposal. I will he | 3 | back anytime you tell me. . r 7 4 Mrs. Burke. Is that convenient for everybody else? 5 Is there any particular reason why 1:30 would be inconvenient 6 | gor you? ’ Mr. Helms. Not for me. 3 He Mrs. Burke. If there is no objection, then the Committee 9 | ant stand in recess until 1:30. i (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Subcommittee recessed, to ey reconvene at 1:30 p.m. this same day.) 4 a Sree . on | a | to | 13 i at 22 13 24 Docld: 32263410 bage 92 TAP SECRET
Rd de WH Be BW 1-92 AFTERNOON SESSION (1:30 p.m.) Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session. Mr. Goldsmith is recognized. _ ee - ces Serer renner pene Er TET . ON oO ond te iw] xt u ~ ~N o ld wy oO fs. om oO Qo — “ a. a “ acd as x — —N re N e* fo] cet TOP SECRET Docld: 322763410 Page 933
aa. oe) at 22 33 24 Docld: 32263410 bage o4 | THe SERRET he could assume some kind of a life on the American scene. aor eiuadci | 1-93 | TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MC GARRAH HELMS -- Resumed | Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, the Committee will proceed at this point and I take it, based upon our discussion a few moments ago, you are willing to proceed this afternoon without a quorum? Mr. Helms. Certainly. Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you. When we broke for lunch, you were into the area of Nosenko and specifically I want to ask you whether or not in January of '68 when the SR Division Report concerning Nosenko was issued, I asked you what the Agency's position regarding Nosenko's bona fides was. | I. believe that your answer was that the Agency, in fact, had no position. Is that correct? Mr. Helms. That is correct, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not “recall there having been any necessity at that time for having to establish an agency position. As the Director, my pre-occupation, as I mentioned earlier | : | | fo | | | | | | | ‘i was to attempt to regularize Nosenko in such a fashion that And I. was most anxious, particularly, to change his method of living which, for a protracted period, as I said this morning, he was being held without the blessing of a court and I was entrusted to get him regularized in. such a fashion that we could, in effect, over time, get rid of our responsibility for
un DoclId: 322763410 oc te eens we ee ws ee 3. AR 2 ae aa a ae ns Se a ne Isr wLUnei housing him, feeding him and handling him. In other words, what was known in the intelligence community as getting him ready to be resettled. Mr. Goldsmith. The SR Division Report, which initially was issued, was approximately 900 pages in length. That report did make a statement regarding Nosenko's bona fides, did it not? | | Mr. Helms. I do not know if that were the 900 page report. I do recall that I did not read all of that. I was just told what the general thrust of it was. I believe that there was a disagreement between the SR Division and the CI. Staff over Nosenko's bona fides. It aid not seem to me at the time that it was essential that that had to be 100 percent composed. My problem was, as I say, was to get him resettled. I believe there was a disagreement. I would not be surprised -- I do not know for a fact, but I would not be surprised -- if that disagreement exists to this day. any type of a formal report? Mr. Helms. No, but they had mouths, and they could tell the Director what they thought about the case. | Mr. Goldsmith. In January of '68 --. | Mr. Helms. I am not. even sure -- excuse me for just a second -- as to exactly at that time, in 1968, because I do not age 95 TAP SECRET i kW Mr. Goldsmith. At that time, the CI staff had not issued
| iui WLUNLI ~— | | . 1-95 | | want to mislead the Committee or you, I.do not know whether certain conclusion about Oswald and his relationship to the Soviet authorities... If it was incorrect, if he was feeding this to the United 2 | SR and CI saw this eye to eye and the Security Division felt 3 | differently, or just. who took excactly what position: | I aM 2 © ‘ | not that clear in my mind anymore. | | { . ; | tt just know that there were disagreements inside the | 6 Agency itself. | | | ? 7 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Agency's position in January | 8 | 1968 with regard to the veracity of the information Nosenko had | 9 | provided:concerning Oswald? ! 1G Mr. Helms. I believe that really this was a matter that ! oY — at fundamental issue because if the information that | | _ te Nosenko had- provided about Oswald was true, then it led to a | | | | | | | ( | I 16 States government under instructions from the Soviet service, | | | | | | then it would have led one to an entirely different conclusion about Oswald's role and the Soviet identification with it. It rather strikes me that, as far as I know, to this day ! . 20 | it has never been satisfattorily resolved. What did Lee Harvey | Oswald represent as far as the Russians were concerned? I ) : promise you that I do not know. “Mr. Goldsmith... In your view of :the analysis; then, is the veracity of what Nosenko told the Agency about Oswald a ar 4 i ‘ critical factor in evaluating his overall credibility, his- ! 1 i i
Ww in oo a Docld: 32263410 Wi WLUdis i 1-96 | overall hona fides? _ ~~ Mr. Helms. It is not only. that, Mr. Goldsmith, but the fact remains that the. issue of why Oswald assassinated '. a - President Kennedy has not been resolved for the satisfaction of a lot of citizens of this country. .I assume that that is one of the reasons that. you are having these hearings. | If one could accept at face value what exactly Nosenko has said, it would lead you to one interpretation. If you cannot accept it, it may lead you to another interpretation. I do : | i | not know how you are going!:to compose the difference. | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. My question, though, | is, from the Agency's perspective, was the information that Nosenko provided concerning Oswald a major factor in determinin the larger issue imdetermining the larger issue of whether | Nosenko was a bona fide defector? Mr. Helms. It obviously played a role in it. Mx. Goldsmith. A major role? | | I \ oe Mr. Helms. I do not know whether you could say it was a | major role or not, but it was certainly. an important role, let's put it that way. Mr. Goldsmith. I.might state at this point in the record. earlier you had asked me whether I knew how Nosenko was se a a a ES a Re RR Security and the SR Division.. I wanted to clarify that. 4. | bandled in terms of the distribution between the Office of : \ 1 a, a | In fact, according to the Committee's sources, Mr. Nosenko | | Page 97 TOP SECRET 7
everyday. level. a aw “i Mr. Helms. 16 | Mr. Helms. Mr. Helms. a 25 4 Mr. Helms. DoclId: 322763410 bage 95 you have any opinion about the bona fides of Nosenko. i show a lack of forthrightness. to the question. | | — Mr. Goldsmith. “ UP SLUR! was handled by the SR Division at the time they had the responsibility of questioning him and dealing with him on an The Security Office personnel were in charge ‘sure he did not go where he was supposed to go.. Congressman. Sawyer asked you this morning about whether “you able to give ‘any more specific response to the Committee at this time concerning that issue? ‘No, I am sorry, ur Goldsmith, T am not. os realize that ‘this is a verribly important question and, recognizing its importance, Iam not attempting to duck or to Mr. Goldsmith. You have no opinion on it? No, I do not have an opinion. After the SR Division issued its report _ Mr. Goldsmith. . SNR -in 1968, was the Nesenko case reinvestigated by Bruce Sotey? CX oO came up with his. opinions about ‘Nosenko. I do not remember the date unfortunately. TAP CEPRET Are I just do not know the answer Is it not also true that late in 1967 of overseeing -him essentially watching for Security and making My recollection was that™ Bruce soley whether he did an investigation or whether. he engaged in long dialogues cave with Nosenko or just what, but I believe, at some point, Sdley SOley was actually given. responsibility for handling Nosenko? You
1-98 will have to tell me what those dates were. All I know is nw) . . . wl held in one situation. sGrey entered the picture. He was put da a, | : vee : | that there was a transition between the time that he.was being | | ; into different housing arrangements and so forth. I do not 3 | know the exact date of that change. 6 | Mr. Goldsmith. Fine, We will put aside for the moment a | ee | 7 | the question of the date, but at one point SStey took over | . | ee L . 3 | the everyday handling of Nosenko -- ‘Sotey was in and the SR i 9 : people were out. Is that correct? | 10 | Mx. Helms. I think by that time the SR people had had their opportunities to talk to Nosenko. This had been going Ww I believe at that time that Sotey -- the'job was given 12 | on for months. | . | | to Soley to handle this man, and to try to find some means of resettling him. Mr. Goldsmith. The SR people did not have any further responsibility? - | ; Mr. Helms. I think they had access if they wanted to, but I do not. think there was any responsibility they had. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether -s6auy had any particu- lar expertise in regards to the Oswald case? Mr. Helms. No, I do not think so. | . Mr. Goldsmith. was SAY considered to be an expert in | - 13 44 | interrogations? meh Mr. Helms. No, I do not think he was. I think that he was Docld: 32263410 bage 99 | THD eerorcry
ND da in Qo oO iy i ae. DoclId: 322763410 | | i 1 Tie ae ee ee SS Se > a ae oe es y= iUPr yfulil a good security officer. He was interested in the case. He had become acquainted with it when the Office of Security was responsible for it, and I think that he was chosen because. he... was game to try to work with this man. Mr. Goldsmith. To whom, if anyone, was seioy directly responsible’ during this period? Mr. Helms. I think he was responsible to the Director . Te of Security and, been responsible to me, Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, again, the 1968 investigation conducted by edie, whether Nosenko was questioned about Oswald? Mr. Helms. I do not specifically, no. Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable in 1968 ‘bona fides? aon if Sefey had been unable to resolve the question of*Nosenko's Let. me rephrase that.. If he had been unable to come ‘forward: with a viewpoint concerning Nosenko's bona fides. position one way or the other: concerning } Nosenko'! Ss Bona fides? Mr. Helms. T do: not think by that ‘time there was any feeling that come through bage 100 Mr. Helms. What was your question? Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable to the var Agency if séfey had been unable to come forward with a there was going to be suddenly a ray. of truth and we were going to be able to resolve the case TAR SECRET in turn, the Director of Security would have_._
nN in Docld: 322763410 | ( 1 { if SS a a ce ee a nn = 3 bage 101 TAP SECRET 7 | | of Nosenko. The problem in those days was to deal with this | . GALL man. The effort was to accomplish that, and Soley was given:.. | that job. oe ere . ee Whatever Soley had come up with, if he were reasonably successful in keeping the fellow contented, getting him squared away, getting his English straightned out and all the rest of these things, I would have thought he was doing a good job. Mr. Goldsmith. In light of what appeared to be the enormous consequences of the situation-where Nosenko, in fact, were not a bona fide defector, the consequences of that as far as the American intelligence community was concerned, it would appear, were quite great. had no consequence, for the intelligence community. It would have had consequences for the country. Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will take it step by step. certainly the American intelligence community would have been. | concerned. The entire issue of Nosenko's being a planted _defector, possibly; planted for the purpose of protecting other | | | { Mr. Helms. For the intelligence community, it would have | | | | | { Soviet agen¢ies working within the American intelligence : community. Mr. Helms. That is what I was trying to warn the Warren | Commission against; that possibility, that contingency, and | the implications of it. : Mr .cGoldsmith. In: light of the consequence of such a
ivi wlvali | 1-101, 1 contingency, it would appear that the Agency would very much want to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona fides and would ND 3 not be satisfied with the situation where you are in limbo. | ms ) 4 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, may I ask you a question? , : 5 | How would you suggest that that be done? 6 Mr. Goldsmith. My question is, is it not true that the Mr. Helms. We did the best we could. I | } | | | | H | J | 7 | Agency would feel compelled to try to resolve that issue? | I | | 8 9 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. By 1968, you are saying the Agency 10 did not have a position one way or the other. | “Mr. Helms. That is right. | iy | Mr. Goldsmith. What about at the conclusion of Soley's eee —r work when he issued his report? At that time, did the Agency i O have a-position with regard to Nosenko's bona fides? Mr. Helms. I do not believe so. At least during my time there, I do not recall us ever taking a position as an Agency. 16 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Has. the Agency ever taken a formal posi- 13 tion regarding the truthfulness of Nosenko's story on Oswald's 49 contacts or lack of contacts with the KGB? | — 0 Mr. Helms. That is the heart of the issue. That is why I believe on that particular question, the question has never been resolved, never been satisfactorily answered. Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you this. If it were clearly proven that Nosenko's statements concerning Oswald were untrue what significance could you attach to such a finding in so far > n =3=3 ’ DocId: 32263410 hage 102 TOP GECety } | '
| 1-102 | as the broader question of his overall bona fides is concerned? . . 2 | Mr. Helms. I think that, if it were established beyond 3 | any doubt that ne had been lying and, by implication therefore, o © 4 | Oswald was an agent of the KGB, I would have thought that the | 3 i implications of that -- not for the CIA or for the FBI, but 6 | for ‘the President of the United States and the Congress of the 7 | United States would have been cataclysmic. a | Mr. Goldsmith. Could you be more specific? 3 Mr. Helms. Yes, I can be specific. In other words, 10 | the Soviet government ordered President Kennedy assassinated. i Mr. Goldsmith. Does it necessarily follow that~Nosenko _was lying about Oswald, and that Oswald was, in fact, an agent of the KGB? Mr. Helms. It does not necessarily follow. We can do 1§ } all kinds of syllogisms here. . ~~ 16 The issue before the House is, was he or was he not an | 17 || employee of the KGB? It is on that that this whole thing tends |-° ; 13 | to turn. 19 | Mr. Goldsmith. The initial issue here is the truthfulness | 20 | of Nosenko's statements about Oswald and essentially those phat the . 21 |} statements are GB had no contact with Oswald. | : . @: 22 1 If it were clearly proven that Nosenko's statement on 5 | "3 | Oswald were untrue -- proven in the sense that it could not be. 14 | believed that Oswald did not have contacts with the KGB, but no a as aw not. proven. in the sense that Oswald was, in fact,-a KGB agent, t DocId:32263410 Page 103 TAP CEC OTT