(404-10162-10222 aad * DATE [?f{ F142 LOST/MISSING MATERIAL THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE. - DOCUMENT NO. - patep:_1% &# 1) R PAGE(S) of Cin © pce MEO FROM: CIA JOB NO. Mideefum: ARIAT BOX NO. | FOLDER no. “ZLLT RETURN TO ClA Background Use Do Not Reproduce
14-00000 a a eed ‘ike he Be ke ee ‘oreo ote hs, . -, CTT yp ; that is, they would be close enough for him to “reach ‘ for thes." _ co ( C. To furnish the advice, Chief SAS stated that he \ f -would make available an experienced, mature, able case ; : officer and-a small team to support our representation im contact with AMBIDDY/1's group. Specifically, Chief S48 mentioned a younger é¢ase officer to help our representative, a man~Of-allwork, a translator, and two radio operators. AMBIDDY/1 assured that he had a man for the job of translator, I ee _... D. No Contract Yet: Chief SAS emphasized at this time, as he did on several other occasions during the conversation, that he was not empowered to “sign a contract". with AMBIDDY/1 and he emphasized in equally strong terzs that this assistance does not include any commitments of 0.3. troops under any circumstances; except that, as _Secretary of Defense McNamara had previously stated, th> U.S. would not stand idly by if the Soviet Union shoula commit its troops to surpress a popular uprising of the Cuban people. Any victory won would be a Cuban wict cry. a Chief SAS stipulated the above four points to be the : , ground rules for the exploratory and actual work relation— ; a ship between AMBIDDY/1 and the Agency. E. At this point, Chief SAS turned to the questions which must be answered before the next step can be taken in this plan. It would be necessary for AMBIDDY/1 to ‘furnish the following: | . ode. A base fron which to operate, . «2, Individuals dedicated and stout~hearted enough to return to the fight of freeing Cuba. OS ert oe Sa emer tiesto at hee ms os oo 35 A general plan as to what can be done and a ’ how to go about it. ._ : ‘At this point, Chief SAS emphasized again that this is to be a “Cuban show" and an attempt to prove that Fidel can be destroyed by the efforts of the Cuban people. ¥. Chief SAS reminded AMBIDDY/1.that the first order . of business was to be the procurement of a base and that ae AMBIDDY/1 should proceed after a waiting period of approximately . : three days to survey the Caribbean area, Specifically  . oe mentioned -by Chief SAS were Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, . _ ae and Colombia. At this time AMBIDDY/1 mentioned that he had - RETURN TO CIAl. been told by WAVE representatives to scratch Nicaragua as a. ‘ ' Possible base for the reason that this is a “dictatorship ." Background Use [ ane awe 4 = - 8. - Ste whe ewe
. Lo 4 . ° ‘ . « . an) . - . * . . . em om sibs lye Hat Etetwtthan gree be - | AMBIDDY/1 was told, and he pointed out himself, that the use of a piece of property in Nicaragua should not be . - interpreted as the acceptance of the Nicaraguan government's Philosophy. The possibility of a Nicaraguan base was accepted. Chief SAS made it perfectly clear that if AMBIDDY/1's negotiations with these governments should be setae hate Ss neath ge led 8 ge it has a part to play, the U.S. Government would deny . . @ny part in the activity. On the other hand it was ; of _~ ‘Suggested that AMBIDDY/1 might possibly find it easier to i procure a base if he were to say that the U.S. Government - i might assist him if he had a base from which to operate. , i Again Chief SAS indicated that whereas the U.S. Government a would not be willing to formally admit any participation. oe ; 4t enuta eon cel ably dane KuoWwn its Sympathy with AMBIDDY/1's Plans and activity and give its “unofficial” nod, In general, AMBIDDY/1 was made 1: understand that the hand of the U.8. Government cannot and will not be revealed, . , : but at the same tine we would be willing to unofficially and informally assist, however possible. . G. Chief SAS told AMBIDDY/1 that once he had pr .2ured & base and prepared a plan, it would be“sossible. for Chief SAS to take the operation one step further and seek - . approval in Washington. -Chief SAS observed tL*t word | . will get around that AMBIDDY/1 has the support of the U.S. os - Government, which, of course, we will deny. AMBIDDY/1 .. . informed Chief SAS that he had already begun building — } the story of Support by certain Central American countries and even European aid, specifically from.General DeGaulle Chief SAS stated that he raised this particular point ; regarding probably leaks of U.S. support to AMBIDDY/1 with . i the thought that this would result in a great number of SO 4 Cubans, who really want to fight Castro: and Communism, ; + rallying to AMBIDDY/1. This would mean that AMBIDDY/1 : would find it necessary to be selective in his choice of collaborators, AMBIDDY/1 agreed that-"quality" should be the criteria. ' on ce et en Bh eee et tains eee ; H. Chief SAS observed that the number of collaborators : would determine how many people would be needed to support . coe - the operation, as would the size of the base. The conversa ‘ tion dwelt for some tine on the equipment that would be -meeded and AMBIDDY/1 informed Chief SAS that he had a Pc Boat with two General Motor's engines. Chief SAS stated ' that he would like to have a representative of his in the WAVE area see AMBIDDY/1's boat, in order to assess its .@eneral seaworthiness. This was fine with AMBIDDY/1. In this connection AMBIDDY/1 stated that he can provide a '« €rew for this boat, the mechanics necessary to keep it in operation, as well as men familiar with weapons and logistics. aw piettr oe | .
14-00000 ee bavsy ~ AMBIDDY/1 obviously. was not too sure of his strength in the logistical field. Chief SAS noted that he might be uble to lend a log officer to help in this regard. So far as radio operators are concerned, AMBIDDY/1 informed Chief SAS that he has these but that he does not have the necessary equipment. To close his part of the conversation, Chief SAS referred again to the fact that his representative would be present to advise the group, that it would not be ‘necessary to completely agree with the advice, and that if in fact the adviser sent to AMBIDDY/1 proved unacceptable, another could be substituted for him. Typically, AMBIDDY/1 hastened to assure Chief SAS that they would certainly be — able to get along with his representative, and that he . foresaw mo diiflcudity of getting on watn the prubica Of finding a base and presenting a plan, Chief SAS emphasized ‘that he did not want a minutely detailed plan, but the concrete outline of AMBIDDY/1‘'s ideas. At this point Chief SAS asked AMBIDDY/1 to take up whatever points he had in mind. ‘These follow: 1. AMBIDDY/1's Statement: AMP"DDY/1 has had some problems along the following liues: a. An inability to work out satisfactorily .@ radio program to be beamed te Cuba. According “to AMBIDDY/1, a plan has been worked out for a ten-.~.nute program, three times weekly on a station which beams largely to the exile community and is - . able to reach only a very limited part of Cuba, This is not a satisfactory solution to their CHER ) problem. b. Problems eurrounding publication of issue mumber two of his newspaper. Apparently the _ station wants another memo from AMBIDDY/1 regarding - desue number two. (Shier | SAS took up with WAVE - ~ ‘on 2 May.) ‘AMBIDDY/1 states. that approximately one month: ‘ago he had raised the question of the - - architect “convention to be held in Cuba, and that he had provided WAVE a contact with an exile architect but that nothing concrete had come of this to date. (Note: At this point Chief SAS reminded AMBIDDY/1: that it has been difficult to arrive at a solution of certain problems during ' this period when so much attention has been diverted -to the problems of the hit-and-run raids and. the “erdsis. within - the crc. ) ; i ae rn co eed | ne Warnes pear om. - =: ~~ aerate “eed gpa emma 8 t. + mee, ° 4 ee ee ar + earace bad AQ tet Fao
14-00000 “AO . ey : ol. : * . . " rand ® . . « : oo i : : : & . Lo SS nen ' _ i. wavy - | oo , ,? -d. AMBIDDY/1 stated that with a dissolution ‘ of the CRC, his organization would be cut off from its support of some $4,000 monthly. Apparent'y the MRR was paid $4,000 for April but has not , ( ' received anything for May. This was resolved. yz Yo ‘ a telephone call by Chief SAS to WAVE on 2 May; a MER to continue receiving this fund. - @. AMBIDDY/1 also indicated a need for funds _ i to pay the rent of the office used by the MRR. ; 1 ' (Idem phone cali on 2 May.) ; ; f£. AMMYIPDY/1 stated that ke hed heen asked ' by WAVE to furnish personnel for infiltration into Cuba. He stated that he is ready and able to do. a So and all he needs to know is how many and when. pe, He did ask, however, that these men not be asked ae to give up their membership in the MRR and become "solely agents." When asked if he had experiences - @f this type of handling in the past, AMBIDDY/1 ee. stated that there had been cases when members of ae his organization had been told to gorget their . . '. MRR membership, that now “they were working for KUBARK." Chief SAS said that this problem could i be resolved and added that he foresaw that under ‘ certain circumstances our Miami office could heip ; | i i i auMBiIppy/1 to put his seople inte Cuba for the "independent" operations, especially in case of Rorth Coast ops. ry i Loe g. AMBIDDY/1 advised he was presently training j sob we . gome of his persennel in intelligence and counter~ 7 j al intelligence work. He wondered if it would be | Tee Le possible to have KUBARK assist the BRAC officer ne he is using to do this, Chief SAS told him that ¥ Spoil EE EUBARE would be willing to assist, but that our - training. requirements were exceedingly heavy and 4t would be difficult to say when this could be a ‘done. At this point Chief SAS stated that he woo ALD oo: so would from time to time send experts to assist y : gM@BpIDDY/1 but that. these men would not be part of . the permanent. group supporting and advising AMBIDDY/1. - is 2. The meeting ended: with assurances on the part of AMBIDDY/1 that he was willing to go all. out. to work with KUBARK; that. the . . MRR had the longest list of martyrs in the Cuban cause; that it ; -- Rad been his organization that had put in the greatest number
14-00000 ° coe & an eo. ‘. & be teow *s ON oo ee 4 oeanenen teem ae ° FRE AE 0 atte seo. a oa TN” Se game . tee 1 nme Neto 8 bem, 36 omit Lafitte ela! ‘ecbl ites x + epg of arms into Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion and finally that the MRR and AMBIDDY/1 could be counted upon. Chief, SAS assured AMBIDDY/1 of his high esteem of AMBIDDY/1 and his . organization, of which he had heard and read much. Chief, SAS ? i met with AMBIDDY/1 as Don Archer, ; ( _ | — O43 oy aE ME! = mente ert SO «—rnepen etree a cate! ahpeciere ment ae, rn a Dr NG _, Distribution: an - . cet oe ee neo a | i 1 - AC/SAS os St ee ee 1 - SAS/SO/AR ~ Chrono ‘ i 1 ~ Subject File (with extra copies) ‘ ' 1 CERCA ERED At TR a AN 00) EBL MAL ARO ASNMON Ot Stn me be A Sn * oa . Mvitiaiwlicdenedinin ue binge M9 7 Ss ’ - - Ohare : 7 . rt fod int 83 6 de PY : a petite 8 play elen eel sete ne eetade retagie res TREAD AS ee eland ante ee neitera eA Rew) sad A onntonerton tcterutarctesocen ten eeepc ttintreonsrtsnascens e es een ote . - re . . now “ae sages Sic itn a