ca, 3 * mene . FA perm ear APE TEA DTI LIES OEY LEE STE NR a! OES ISTE Lhe ne seems et mamewen = REY Dia era paeecr ‘(ro4-t0210-10034 4 % sf CLA HESUQUARTERS DY HATE TAL REVIEWED aA see peepee se HOUSR SELECT COMICPPTER ON ASSASSINATIONS STAPF MEMBERS sie tituessumpersvonuse: — (7 INCLUSIVE DATES: (Ftv ?~ JE) nr: ; ns — — CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION : SE _ __ ein tspinnee eee eepentiacoee sve rea ance in Be ROOM: DELETIONS, IF ANY: @VERIAG (2 PENT ONCE — LUE TEX LAL een i i pee eee Fete ere te pe cep NE RC per A A I I t + ene © ¥ RECEIVED | RETURNED Li KAT 1978 ; sarge ming ae ms Re ie RE OF REVIEWiING OFF =; en NN ee eee hola ps é = A tee wee Ne pee pie NO DOCUMENTS HAY BE COPLED CR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE | see tapire eet em PRE ot
VI. Production | ao . i A. Pesitive interligence Information . a ‘ NOSENKO's positive intelligence production, has been meager, and nothing-he reported serited dissemination aS an J? intelligence report. According to bis biography, NOSENKO's ; entire adult life until defecting ad been spent either as ; ot & student or as an intelligence o!ficer, and in explanation -— of his lack of positive intelligence information, he has H ; stressed that since the early 1950's he had few outside Se : interests and “no real contacts" outside the KGB itsel?f.* , ; NOSENKO's assignments to the Soviet delegations to the ‘ Disarmament Conference in 1962 and 1964 were, he hes said, for cover purposes only. and he aeither had any connections : 4 with officials or organizations in the USSR concerned with a i x arms control or disarmament policies nor did he take any : part in the substantive work of the delegations. ceBlne gpatitin ged ae obbltslidie woth Use laa adds 0% beak 46k During the period 18 to 23 February 1964, a wide range of questions covering various aspects of nuclear weapons, missiles, electrunics, communications, unconventional weae~ pons, military industry, military units and equipment, and research and development were put to NOSENKO in order to evaluate his knowledgeability. He had no direct knowledge of any of these topics, although he was able to identify in reneral a few of the KGB organizations which protect sensi- tive installations such as nuclear weapons production and storage sites. NOSENKO was given a set of requirements from the Defense Intelligence Agency on 24 February 1964. These questions were premiscd on his two TDY tours to the Disarmament Conferences in Geneva; they dealt with such matters ag Soviet underground testing, Soviet efforts and progress in the fields of chemical and biclogical warfare, Soviet aims and purposes at ‘the disarmament talks, and Soviet views of the corresponding attitudes and intentions of the United States. NOSENKO stated he had no. information on any of these questions but expressed his personal opinion . i on a few of them, in general terms. NOSENKO's answers to ; ; other questions of a positive intelligence nature--those ; i concerning the viability of the current Soviet leadership. plans for a new Soviet constitution, anti-Senitism as mame! ‘governmental policy, personality data on Soviet leaders, and other political and social matters--—were couched in vague. and general terms and were not based on concrete knowledge. a. webb tee Ee Wee oe . . *At the start of his first meeting: with CIA on 9 June 1962, , : .. , however, when explaining how he knew of the real state of : affeirs ineide the USSR (as opposed to that presented by . Soviet propaganda), NOSENKO said: "I circulate among , ‘ ‘ministers, with the friends of my father, and I hear - ! what they say.” ; a heir wo Lake nate Catt ‘PLD Sancho alin toe Rnt oe cee TOP SECRET
cage rm maee wae wang Oe etme Tie ge ten ee - B. . Soviet Intelligence Personalities — _organizations. Ag indicated in the accompanying tabulation, NOSENKO has provided information on a total of approximately 1,000 Seviet citizens who are staff employees of, or have other- wise been affiliated with; Soviet intelligence and security he Shi ante in OO GRE ae ERE EY et GI Ale ae oe ern pmrenntngt ener aot + ei serestestn {ay Bam ete sania aa | KGB Staff Personnel 1 § Leadership and administrative components First Chief Directorate Second Chief Directorate* Third Directorate ' Seventh Directorate Eighth Chief Directorate Ninth Directorate Operational Technical Directorate Border Guards Directorate Republics cnd Oblasts Retired or deceased Possible KGB officers Total KGB Agents First Chief Directorate Second Chief Directorate KGB Trusted Persons, Cooptees (or primary use to First and Second Chief Directorates) Total KGB-connected 25 165 _ 435 25 il 12 74 55 12 830 116 19 980 g & er este Rete e veettt ase ME ae pore ote fetid tapas htt neigh
GRU Staff Personnel Current (1964) . 14 Former 7 Suspect i Cooptee _l Total 23 Total Soviet Intelligence Staffers and Coopted Agents '.1003 The following is a tabular summary of NOSENKO's infor- mation on First Chief Directorate personnel (who are the ones now abroad or likely to be stationed abroad), Total Identifiable First Chief Directorate Personnel: 146 (and 3 possibile) Previously identified:#* 103 Previously suspect: . 9 New Identifications: 37 Of whom: No record of any travel abroad: 6 Not abnnad since 1963; 7 After NOSFENKO defected, returned prematurely to USSR: bs) Were out when NOSENKO defected or came out thereafter and re. turned routinely vf Deceased since NOSENKO'’s defection 1 Stationed abroad in December 1966 11 In sum, of the 37 First Chief Directorate personnel '. newly compromised by NOSENKO's defection, 24 were abroad at the time of his defection or have come abroad since. ae Se axitaaceed ah a wth, tee ® . men gdh instabenthatet cabinet cose 3 4 t . Se
Cc. KGB Headquarters 1. Structure and Functions _ Prior to NOSENKO's contact with CIA in June 1962, the most recent information on KGB structure and functiong had:- been provided by GOLITSYN, whose information was current as of December 1961 when he defected. GOLITSYN's data and that from the Polish defector GOLENIEWSKI wero the first detailed: — new information on this subject available to the U.S. intel- ligence community since 1954, when DERYABIN, RASTVOROV, PETROV, and KHOKHLOV defected, just prior to the change-over from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) to the Committee for State Security (KGB). GOLENIEWSEI and GOLITSYN nad re- ported on the 1959 reorganization of the KGB, the first major realignment of the KGB's functions since the abolition of the Committee for Infornation in 1951, 1t encompassed the absorption into the Second Chief Directorate of the duties of the former Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Directorates. which had been responsible for political, econonic-industrial, and transportation security, respectively, It also included the upgrading of the Illegals Department to the status of a Special Directorate within the First Chief Directorate, the consolidation of counterintelligence operations abroad into one new department, the Fourteenth, and creation of a ney department--Department "D" (Disinformation) —--ta .coordinate and intensify the KGB's activities in the area of deception and misinformation. The lattcr, although placed in the First. Chief Directorate, was established to serve the needs of the entire EGB. NOSENKO's 1964 information on the organization and func- tions of the KGB indicated refinements of responsibilities in the Second Chief Directorate in accordance with the 1959 absorption of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Directorates. The formation of the so-called "Service" (Sluzhba) as a component of the Second Chief Directorate Centralized those political security functions (formerly handled by the Fourth Directorate) which were unrelated to foreigners in the USSR: the creation of an element entitled "the Directorate" (Uprev- leniye) accumplished the same thing for industrial-aconoémic functions formerly managed by the Fifth and Sixth Directorates. As for the First Chief Directorate, NOSENKO reported the up- grading of the Scientific and Technical Départment to direc~ torate status, and the expansion of the Information and Counterintelligence Departments to UService: Number’.1"' and “Ser- vice Number 2," respectively; according to NOSENKO, the latter organizational designation permits an increase in personnel without a corresponding rise in the bureaucratic level of the component. . - The accompanying charts offer a comparison of the or- @anization of the KGB in 1961, as known from GOLITSYN (and supported by GOLENIEWSKI), and in 1964, as given by NOSENKO, Comments on particular weaknesses in NOSENKO'’s information - on the KGB organization since its formation in 1954 will be found in Part VII.B.1., Statements of DERYABIN. a TOP Sctiet on epee sown Re. np re eine atcha aes te AG bab : 4 Cate hover WME 8 4 4 é 4 3 2
353. SYN Information: December 1961 — SSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS| ommittee for State Security hairman: V.Ye. SEMICHASTNYY eputies; P.i. IVASHUTIN A.1. PEREPELITSYN 1. __ atlegt Secretar tat}————— party Committee ener menue mernes menemeerbedenebnebnenee ixd Girectorate (Counterintelligence ‘in Armed Forces) ' “OUrth Directorate echnical Operations Directorate Department for Collation hief: (fnu) LALIN (sic: LYALIN) of Operational Experience : nvestigation Directorate] Department of Governmen ma Chief Dlrectorat (incorporated into cere amt communications nterintelligence} ‘Second Chief Direc 663 O.M. GRIBANSYV torate ca 1959) pupply Directoratel ommandant Departmen rete? | ifth Directorate a ence ame _ Parectorate of _|(incorporated into ersonnel Directorate 4 g@rder Troops Secend Chief Direc- Operational Registry and torate ca. 1959} chives Department ca : Hepartment oo pixth Directorate 4 _ one Chief Directorate . Seventh Directorate | (Surveillance and Th . ollegium or the vestigation) - ~ hekist Journal Eighth Directorate — Cipher and decipher) ‘ inth Directorate _o¢ (Protection of the Government) ; (Transport; incorpor- finance Departmen ated into Second —_ mien ate at ne nee cates neat eaente sent att eetaeten eran ante ne Sas Seta Te aemeReRER Ra tt
; 354. a oO formation: January 1964 ; NKO TN ¥ USS Vounctl OF MiiTErera] Committee for ate Security KGB Chairman: V.Ye. SEMICHASTNYY Deputies: N.S. ZAKHAROV ? ol. PEREPELITSYN -G. BANNIKOV -Il. PANKRATOV Secretariat Chairman's Group "y Thief: KISELEV hief: V.S. BELOKONE 5 TEPECTO & prrario =TeT aie ora KGB Higher Schoo (Surveillance) hie£: PATRUKHIN Chief: Ye.P. PITROVRANO Vv N A s L fC CHict Wir cctoratea areign Intelligence) ef: A.M. SAKHAROVSKIY t Chief: V.~. ALIDIN hie? Directorate. of Border Guarda a: bo abine 154938 dO ‘gm “Chief Directorate Eignth Chief Bbirectorate ternal Countecrintel- (Cipher-Communications) hief: P.I. ZYRYANOV hief: A.M.- IVANOV Ligence) Chief: S.N. LYALIN af: O.M. GRIBANOV { Investigative Department fParsonne Trectorate thief: N.F. CHISTYAKOV Chief: P.I. VASILYEV : fd birectorate Ninth Olyectérate “Bh mad Forces Counter- (Guards - "OKHRANA" me intelligence) hief: V.¥a. CHEKALO Registry-Archives Department dministrative Directora lef: I.A. FADCYKIN hief: A.V. PROKOPENKO (KhOZU) hief: A.D. CHETVERNYA ees ’ : “a ay 9?
355. ITSYN Information: Decomber 1961 First Chief Directorate Chief: A.M. SAKHAROVSKIY Deputios: (fnu) MORTIN Lo nu) KOTOV Niath Dep: Department Emigre E j Tenth Department rr Department Imited States} ef: B.S. IVANOV. ond Department Mgland, Scandinavia ——| eamaancensnetnet (Scientific and Technical Chief: L.R. KVASNIKOV ru Department eleventh Department ustria, Germany Advisors) at acre se tenet emp ‘rt épartment Twelfth Department Pance, Italy, Holland Outlving Districts uxemburg, Belgium, witzerland, Greece? T nirteenth Department (Executive Action) th Department Chief: RODIN @ N.B. KOROVIN atin America? ; _ Fourteenth Department th Department (Counterintelligencs) frica?) Chief: V.M. KLIMKIN énih Departinent Fifteenth Department gar East? (Intelligence through other agencies ; epar tien ‘ar East?) xtesnth Departmen Information Part Lommittee Special Directorate (Illegals) Chief: (£nu) KLIMOV, @ V.G. PAVLOV Disinformation Department (Department "D") Chief: 1.1, AGAYANTS age ete cn communications Department itorial-Publishing De artment Finance ection Personnel De artment ] Registry and Archives gher Ynteliligence Schoo anyuage ourses Stoeger ames 4 130038 dOL re 4 . . a. we ee ee B,C ce lens rea, Se a etgenaap is ow peng
tombe ty 4 Wer eemarencege § AGB First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) Chief: A.M. SAKHAROVSKIY Deputies: F.K. MORTIN V.V. MOZSNCHECHKOV F, KOTOV V.G. PAVLOV First Department (United States and Canada) — Chief: KULEBYAKIN Second Jepartment i (United Kingdom, Scandinavia) Chief: LITVINOV NOSENKO Information: January 1964 Chief's Group Specia iFectorate (Illegals) Chief: M.S. TSYMBAL % | Directorate Lor ocientitic- scteepeaeeie store Ninth Department Emigre sLevent. epartment _ Satellite Advisors | Twelfth Department (may no longer exist Technical Intelligence Chief: NOVIKOV ery Tos” Ne no. 1 | (Information) 4 Chi Chief: may be L.R. KVASNIKOV ervice No. eeaeteraatelligence) Chief: [Tair Department _ (Austria, Germany) ourth Department (Western Europe, including GF, GRIGORENKO . Greece irteent epartment (Terror, Assassination and Sabotage) Chief: L.A. STUDNIKOV? i {xth Department (possibly Latin America) iChief: S.N. ANTONOV eventh Department (includes India and Pakistan) fignth Department (unknown) ie oes epartment Tfth Department | | (Disinformation) | Eastern) (Cover Organizations- Moscow Chief: Ye.T, YELISEYEV | Special Group " (Chinese Chief: N.A. VLADYKIN Operational Registry Department Chief: P. ZAYTSEV TERMEND doh
MEETS TT Ign oy cee ete ge ee as a RR a a | ; . 357. TSYN Information: December 1961 O.M. GRIBANOV i Fecretariat i _ ‘torate for the Security he Foreign Diplomatic 1” ‘ics: Department (United States) b thief: S.M, FENOSEYE Seventh Departmen (Visiting Tourist and Businessmen) i | &ecoid Department EYGREN- Mapa rcMene ignited States Dept. (England; possibly l(ravestignt ions) - Canada and the Pra Commonwealth) Lenape nn Nini epar tien (Soviet Delegations ing Land Dept./- a ccc and Tourists) Fa ird Départme (Austria, Germany, Be Sy n thers = Scandinavia) enth Deépartnent  — * ~~ as (Counterintelligence NN ~~ ourth Depir then among the Intelligensia ~ ~ (Other European coun- and visiting Delegations; NON ™ wl tries--France, Italy created ca. 1959) ‘ ~. Switzerland, Greece, :. . \ ~ others; Scandinavia un Rreventh Departnent ; \ “ til ca, 1960) (Nationalists; created q VY Sy —— ca. 1959) t af ne ‘Lfth Department k N (The East; probably é Departmen i treaty organization (Economic Enterprises; & ‘ countries, Iran, Tur- created ca. 1959} \ key, Thailand) __. an (The East; probably non~ treaty organization countries) Party Committee Tfhirteent (created ca. Fourteen (Transport; created 1959) Ca. Wirfteent (Collation of Second Chief Directorate Counterintelligence Experience) Sixteenth Department (Struggle against Contraband; createa 1960) Personnel] Pepartment 1959) Sépar tmen Department
ec memeereg saengme pte tre eee mane Pov 358. SENKO information: January 1964 Second Chief Directorate (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief: O.M. GRIBANOV Asst. to Chief: MOLITOSLOVOV Secy. to Chief: Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV Deputies: F.A. SHCHERBAK F.D. BOBKOV T.A. MARKELOV KARDASHEV Secretariat Chief: V.V. PETROCHENKOV €cial sec (rechnical Support) Chief: N.A. GAVRILENKO irst wapaneasat eventh Departinent Directorate o Chie ) (U.S. and Latin America) (Foreign Tourists) Directorate Industrial Security hief: S.M. FEDOSEYEV Chief: A.G. KOVALENKO -Chief: K.1. MAKAROV econd Department SIgnth Department Service uf Secon (U.K. and Commonwealth, (Analysis and Machine Records) torate = including Canada) “Chief: V.M. KOPYTOV (Political Security Contrel) =ey hiet: G.V. BONDAREV Chief: KARDASHEV er ~ _- P Ninth Department rr ard Department ; (Students and Satellite Personne roup oF (Germany, Austria, Scan- Liaison) Chief: V.1I. KUDREV . ade dinavia) Chief: P.V. TOPTYGIN " - hief: N.P. NOVIK Finance Group enth Department Chief: I. KOLOSOV ourth Department {Intelligentsia, Foreign Cor- (Western Europys) respondents, and Ministry of hief: V.G. POVAROV Forcign Affairs) oo Chiet: : Ye. N. ALESHIN 1fth Department (East: Turkey, Iran, Tsracl, Japon) hief: A.P. DAVIDYAN bg) “Eleventh Department (Seviet Travellers Abroad) Chief:  T. ZHARIKOV axth Department Twelfth Denartment (Afghanistan, Africa, (Speculants, Embezzlers, india, all others) ne Foreign Air Lines) hief: K.N. DBUBAS a ; Chief: K.2. DRAGUN
14-00000 tr apt 4 a 2. Modus Operandi Less measureble or precise in comparison with KGB structure and functions are the operational methods and Headquarters procedures of the KGS. . NOSENKO himself has not. been as productive in revealing Tourist Department methods , as was the document which he provided on this subject in - | 1964. He has not been able to provide a systematic, detailed, or documented review of the methods of the other Second Chief Directoraie compensent to which he was assigned, the U.S. | Embassy Sectior, nor of the methods of the Surve1rllance : Directorate with which ne worked closely. NOSENKO neverthe- less has furnished insignis into the U.S. Embassy Section ‘ ‘and Surveillance Directorate methods in the course of dis- ‘ ~ cussing specific operations. ‘ : Sn nentente entanat: tered fo wbstends Teberede. bate NOSENKO brought to the Geneva meetings in 1964 a draft ; . of a report to she Collcgium of the KGB dated Mar@h 1963 on i i the work of the Tourist Departmert of the Second Chief BDirece . : torate. He claimed to nave written it hinself, and it bore , corrections in his handwriting. Tnis draft described KCB investigations of and op=rations against Western tourists suspected of being agrnts of forcizn intelligence services, primarily in the perivd of 196)-1¥52. It described tae functions of each component of the Tourist Department and the number ard qualifications of the operational staff, giving figures on lenuth of service, educational background, . forcign travel and languages, and training. It went on to , , Gite statistics on the number of foreign tourists visiting the USSR, and the number of foreign agent suspects uncovered among them througn the work of the KCB. A wide variety of techniques used by the Tourist Department were mentioned, with examples of certain successes interspersed in the discussion. | dinece im in fe etade ene” <= NOSENKO has made numerous references to the techniques described in this report, as discussed in she many cases reviewed in detail in tne foregoing treatment of his KGB .. career. When interviewed lor further information on the statistics which appear throughout the 1963 draft, however, NOSENKO was unable to identify the operations referred to in the numerical citations, nor those included as illustrative cerns alate atten pte ener end | etre lle ali Pan tie
OE Retest ne wees nee arene, ct leipe ee | Go tere setesiaaigere pre eicertenet cise genthanseaicieiet oben sud sins Sy ERE i seu j The document refers also to the role of the leadership i of the Tourist Department in briefing other organs of the - | KGB on work against foreign tourists. NOSENKO was questioned on this activity but owld not recall any information contained in such lectures or discussions, Although the document also emphasized the daily.need for cuordination of the Tourist Department activities with numerous other components of KGB Headquarters and with local organs of the KGB throughout the Soviet Union, NOSENKO was unable to explain how such coordinas& tion was effected in practice, nor could he describe require- ments for the preparation and approval of. correspondence — pertaining to such coordination; in many instances he asserted that telephone calls sufficed, but he said he could-.not indi. cate who was authorized to coordinate informally in this way. : Apart from this information on Tourist Department modus operandi, NOSENKO has described the operational metnods of — the UTS. Enbassy Section of the American Department and of the Surveillance Directorate in connection with their coordinated activities against Embassy targets. Of particular note is Part V.E.3.c., in discussions of operations against Embassy code clerks. ; 3. Staff Procedures In recounting vrrious operations in which he participated or which se supervised, NOSENKO described operations and events which encompassed various KGB procedures. Some of these were: authorization for recruitment; file checks; — correspondence and coordination with other KGB departments, \ directorates, or regional units; technical support of opera- tions; administration of safe houses; KGB files and reports; . and travel authorizations and accountings. He was from time ' to time asked to describe such procedures systematically and in detail. From such questioning it was not possible to derive any detailed picture of current KGB procedures. The little NOSENKO was able to provide did not differ from infor- mation dated 1954, and was only a small fraction of the. infor. mation available from earlier sources. He had no information on changes or developments in the interim. Examples of the level of NOSENKO's knowledge of certain procedures may be | found in Part VII.B.1, DERYALIN’s Comments, as may instances of inaccurate reporting of procedures. TOP SECTS? oo hae Sit eelbeatbe atte oot « HL eocteas ned adetinst  k aul ep ected Mi ete nets
14 90000 ke D. KGB Activities j - a ; 3 1, Onerations Against Americans DO 7 . t oa In the context cf KGH recruitment operations and investigations, NOSENKOG has mentioned 111 Americans: Forty-nine of them were said to have been recruited, 33 were under development, and seven re- | : fused to collaborate with the KGB; investigations of nearly-all © the remaining 22 Americans were reportedly predicated on KGB sus->" : picion or knowledge of their affiliation with U.S. Intelligence. eerie asedittiadndt Lite wbieat eae. Of the 49 Americans recruited, NOSENKO attributed his knowl- edge of nine of them to his own direct, personal involvement in - 4 the approaches, usually as recruiting officer; these cases are discussed at greater length in connection with NOSENKO's KGB career (Part VY}. His knowledge of 11 other recruitments was said : : to have derived from either indirect involvement or contact with 3 the targets of these operations; NOSENKO indicated that he be- 4 came aware cf these 11 persons through his duties at varicus times : in the America: and Tourist Departments of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. fecause of interest in American correspondents during 1954 ani 1955 while in the American Department, for exam- ; ; i pie, he was able to report that five of them were KGB agents, al- Es though he had taken no part in their recruitments, which had been. ‘ achieved earlier; likewise, he learned of two recruitments when : an American Department officer twice visited the Tourist Depart- . Ment with a request for operational assistance during 1962 and a) 1963, when NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of this department. } Ina four cases--all First Chief Directorate operations--NOSENKO said he learned of the recruitments unoffi cially from discussions with ; friends and froma remarks by other case officers which he over- 4 heard. Two ot tnese four cases were considered by NOSENKO to be i among his most significant information, the penetration of the : Orly Courier Transfiér Station by U.S. Army Sgt. Robert Lee JOHN- Z SON and the recruitment in Moscow and later handling of coce- : machine mechanic Dayle W. SMITH; detailed information on the : JOHNSON and SMITH cases is presented after the tabulation (below) of NOSENKO'’s American leads. ' NOSENKO has provided no sources for his information on 25 of the 45 successful KGB recruitment operations against Aneri- cans, although he has sometimes identified the case officers in- volved in them; most of this information was contained in handwritten notes, which NOSENKO carried to Geneva in 1964, According to NOSENKO, ‘he learned of these cases casually while Deputy Chief of the Tour- ist Department during 1962 and 1963; many of the recruitments were Said to have been accomplished in 1960 and 1961 at a time when NOSENKO was serving in the American Department. He has explained ‘these notes as follows: “If I did not participate in a case, I don't know much about it. Please understand me. Since 1962 when ' I first began to get ready for this act ({defection], any time I got a whiff of something which smelled Like an agent, I would put ; it down. I have a regular safe in my office and then I have a a hidden wall safe. There I may put my personal papers, notes. -I 4 am the only one who has a key and any little notes, like those 1 mentioned, I would put in there." etecltim + yhoo aoe we etasadwsat Vebvaime en + TOP Secret i | F ‘ '
H 00 be 4 me oe The tabulation below presents NOSENKO's American case leads under the categories of successful recruitment approaches ,* de- velopment operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and KGB investigations, in that order. Within each of these cate- gories, the tabulation summarizes NOSENKO's information, his sourcing and the year he reported the lead to CIA, and the re- sults of investigations of the NOSENKO leads by U.S. and other Western security services. As indicated in the tabulation, cer- | tain cases are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this paper. reteitnmeney strmreentrneny peasant ato A> eneoe $ me a é “§ 5 stieaboata hon. § tb aaa b
& Tahulattion of American Leads oe Sttecess erty rte nee tee fal Recruitment Approaches 9 | ; Lead t 4 STORSPROCTOR: | (NOSELNKO has given SER THe TRETER amd PROCTOR names on iPWieus o¢casions.* A valuable First tefl Diresterute agent who travelied ‘ertly to Western Europe, where he fainn: a visa from Soviet contacts i@o went on to the USSK clandestinely. CBRECEY. Nelson Charles: Born 1938 Plena bat WUT ST eTtiszen re- rbites hy the Seviets im 1960 on ve basis of coupromising material; 7Bin visited the USSR in 1861 and yk follow tourists he was de- igued by the Soviets in 1960 for ba@chmerketeering. ARRETT, Kobert: A guide at the 1S. FAnipitica in Moscow in 1959 ARRETT was trapped in homosexual MApronise by agents VOLKOV and EPREMOV, whom NOSUNKO handled. hough resulting photographs were figeood enality, a moratorium had een imposed on approaches at the xhibition because of KHRUSHCHEV's lanned trip to the United States. ame photocraphs were used suc- essfully to recruit BARRETT: when sireturned with another exhibit ne), 3 nities Se eee wet aan oo ee ee ee tase 363. Sourcing and Date of Report Tourist Ponartment officer VN. NOS- SOV Learned of the case from an un- identified First Chief Directorate officer, ant he reported it ta NOSENKO. (i964 notes) Source not numed. Secruited by Tour- ist Department during period NOSENKO in American Department. (1964 notes) Learned of compromise in 1959 through personal involvement as responsible case officer and haadler of homo- sexual agents. Seurce for informa- tion concerning subsequent recruitment not given, (1964 notes) Paste nn tte agony pet + cates é ciueee eine tennnemteennintnnltts, — anemia One AeRUCOER wt: sp gamers a me 32 nt Tia: PEt Vas ad a a BOP. he 5 oe 23 aad Bs Investigation Results... One Vernon W. PROCTOR traveiled to the Soviet Union during the sumer of 1963. Investigation cuntdsulng.- BARRETT reported his compromise sad: recruitment to the FBI in January | 1962, immediately after his rceturn remy inrerrprycpege yrs to the United States; claimed he was drugged at time of compromise Part V.D.4.m. for details ~. ve See 398 OL * 5 i b rameee eae ery i
Me cree beat, Pe cee eer eee a a “ 364, FNSTOCK, Natalie: Recruited hy erKOB during @ T902 visit to the SR, with Cull knowledge of the Bi that she was an American Intel- gence agent; case turned over to apartment DBD," and if she returns the USSR an effort will be made break her; KGB knows of her l@ in the AIS attempt to contact ef Sovact ballerina Natalia SLAYA- HYSKAYA. ‘ Source not named. <A Tourist Depart- ment case, Case officers were K.G. KRUPNOV and A.G. KOVALENKO. (1964 notes) XCHES, Adam: Born in 1894; h fatives in the USSR and was r aited cn ideological grounds ile there with a tourist group eptember 1960, Ss Source not named. Tourist Department - case while NOSENKO in American Depart- ment. (1964 notes) GB V.M. ZARUBIN, then an Illegal; BB eoawel guide for MAUPIN Tours visited USSR bod two or more times in 1959 er' 3960 | via Finland; KGB knew of his\history” He as Sovict agent, but suspectad his.” on ‘visits to USSR might be cover for , a American Intelligence operatios aimed vomd eee ere Te Cte ee cane Ateecten mt anit eee saat — AeA AN RARER ENERER LT Cn” ig Cee a OMNI Rn Hat pA 8 nero) NOSENKO's information on BIENSTOCK's part in the AIS approach to SLAVA- CHEVSKAYA is correct. RIENSTOCK con- fessed in July 1964 to recruitment 1 during tourist trip to Moscow in 1962 and to clandestine contacts with xGB upon réturn to USA; she claimed all contact was broken in late 196? or early 1963, at Soviet initiative. Born in 1890; has a brother Alesaader born in 1896. GOLITSYN reported that Tourist Department officer told him in 1960 that Adam BROCHES had been Soviet agent in 1920's and 30's in Paria under at effecting contact with ZARUAIN; KGB placed BROCHES whder intensive | surveillance, and the Chief of Tuvere- ist Department was planning CoiGas- cuss with ZARUBIN what shoulects | done about’ bin.. DROCKPS “iniervigewed ee rere eager See Sa as @. aS Ae » Ge
ta Seale Pe Fite SS Lat Hees ote. , Ban mnaie the ake ain ee at seetinhdle Geman tee cee © INDARTN, fina: Born in LOL? and @ son ef DW Russian emigre 3, was ‘Gruited an 1662 on ideological dunds; was an employee of the Gur Winds Travel Agency” in New rk City but left it; case is in- five, but the KGB is waiting for Pte open his own travel agency. Pa IRGI, Richard: Recruited in Kiev » 6 on Dasis homosexual comoromise INCSENKO and Deputy Chief of rhe wrist Pepartrent, ALS. KOZLOV. Gl is a professor at Yale Uni- -@gyity. Keeruitmont historic- ly significant as it was first igcessful approach by Tourist De- wtment, established in 1955. & EW, George: Visiting the USSR ofa TOUTISE in 1959, DREW was g@tted as a homosexual by NOQ- INKO's agents VOLKOV and YEFRE- W. NOSENKO recruited DREW in mingrad on basis of homosexual mpromise staged with assistance Fia homosexual agent of the local 1B in Leningrad. g . PISON, Henry: U.S. citizen of rmenian Ovigain,; recruited in : pril 1963 by the KGB of the Ar- eMian SSR; recruitment based on d@ological grounds but not firm; sischeduled to return to the SBR in 1904, at which time the Source not named. ease handled by Vitaly Grigorevich lepartment invelvement as responsi- and handier of homosexual agents. Fersonal involvement: reported to NOSENKO who made the approacn. Personal Source not named. Tourist Depart- ment case. (1964 notes) and admitted contacts with Soviets.,.-- ye She Cae secemmgmegmpe taenegte Spree geenie ne ee, Fort * ere Fe . pee ee eg ee OO eC CORRE Wale ue vee eee ee CSL Ce I Se De aca Eugene Peter BUNDARIN: bern ag aeedh 1917, is the son of ah eudevas Ayeda t travelled to the Sovier Unies for 18 days in 1962; employed by “Heys winds Travel Agency” from June-246h ant dh April 1962, when he left-ta travail: abroad; now working for Herses teavel, Tne. of California: aay Sa pe é Ar) Sgr iat Ss 5: BE Saude Pitervieweu DY lefed b eee e Henry APISSON, a naturalized U.S. °" Citizen visited the USSR in 1963.. °. and planned to return in 1964; owns a hotel and restaurant near West ;*. Point, N.Y.; interviewed in 1964 in Armenia; said he may have. g4v68,.:., uo,
KOD will attempt to consolidate tthe relationship; has access to a Military installation in the New em suburbs. MERIPPEL, Arsene: American Express Company representative in Moscow precruitec be NOSENEKO and V.0D. \CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the fTourtst Department, in 1959 on fbhasis heterosexual compromise... INOSENKO handled PRIPPEL until he Pyeft Moscew in i901 and met him Ewher he tater returned with tour Pgroups. npreductive agent. aGROVER, Preston: Currently Asso- §eTated Press Correspondent in Mos- Ecow; is a recruited KGB agent. frances, Giselia: An employee of ; the Ancrican Txpress Company in | Salt Lake City, HARRIS visites tthe USSR as a tourist in 1958S and was recruited by NOSENKO on basis (of her remantic involvement with i Soviet mute. Case turned over f to First Chief Directorate. and NOSENKG unaware of subsequent developments. 366. Personal involvement: Took part in recruitment and was later handling officer. (1962) Source not named. A Tenth Depart- ment case. (1964) Personal involvement as recruiting officer. (1964) geen nnn ome ge ee trae grammes neta impression of willingness to seat: retired in 1965 and new fivce he HERE ee) sone somes wee necetteraat ate atten etetnemenalnee une eendhae SeMeapeeentn eos < Soviets in USA if they shoi git: West Point; said he dia Not Sesie ize the approach was for gntelli- gence purposes. Vote ett a American Express Company representas tive in Moscow from Apri 1939 to January 1961. Interviewed by FBI =p No derogatory information; GROVER France with his wife, . Latter was born in St. Petersburg, Ravel, aad apparently emigrated at eoout the time of the Revolution an QFi*. - GROVER met her in Moscow, #icve she was a correspondent for iret
DY, Herbert: Recruited by the uring his fourtmonth ThY to the mbassy in Moscow in the spring 1O62; was on temporary USIA ser- ef, on a publications procurement Sgon, FE. Sam: This ARC correspondent JAGscOw TS an active KCB agent tivated and recruited by V.A. INSCN, Robert Lee? In 1962 and ‘5; The KON Tid? an arent, name nown, who was assigacd to an artant military installation if Paris and had access to highly iG@itive materials. On six or ‘gn occasions technicians from ‘$Special Technical Section or ‘JSecond Chief Directorate Welled to Paris to assist in Ting envelones taken from the sit at this installation. BNKO described this First ,ectorate case as the most Chief im- @ant information he learned ile in Moscow Juring 1962-1064. | Nene pe ae 8 oR re a ae to ome 367. Source was Gib. GRYAGNOV, U.S. Nahassy Section, asked NOSENKO'S help in obtaining a hotel room near HOWARL's for a woman fron Leningrad. (1964) Source was G.f. GRYALNOV, U.S. Embassy Section. In 1963, MOSENKO asked GhYAZNOV For an agent who coutd be used against @ visiting American delegation, and JAFFI was suggested. At the time, NOSENKO was in Tourist Department. (1964) Sources were various technicians of the Special Technical Section who were directly involved in the case and with whom NOSENKO was on good terms by virtue their collaboration in ‘Moscow Tourist Department opera- tions. (19564) Ces rite tary © Before NOSENKO's information was re- ceived, JAFFE reported recrudimeat by "Slava" KISLOV in October 1962; in a CIA interview in December 3966, JAFFE did not recognize A.K. KISLOV'S photograph but identified a photograph of KUSKOV as being the KGh officer who recruited him in 1962. JAMFE was expelled from the USSR in October 1965; he is now serving svisevhere abroad and apparently hss not yet tn: been interviewed by the FRI on the. ot basis of NOSENKO's information, eid : Identified as Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON who, in January 1965, confossed hov- | ing been KGB agent since 1633 and confirmed NOSENKO's description of vault entrics at Orly Courier Trans- fer Station, Paris, JONNSON is now in prison as result of NGSENRG lead. ‘For full description see Part ¥2,D- 3.6, 00077 wen wg
st eh ene ea waste gueey psaetey ta gyeatper corer lio Visited lo ogeG64 and wee hoch tame: WPT Gaia ne WOULD bers MGn if contacted; Jas- DMARD, Farst Chios has not followscl un a) = tye yk ofa oe ee eazg noc an active © Ges LUNT, an AMGricC ia Slavic philology, was ecrubrted on i96) by the Puloa @ervics an Sefaa on the Rom. woNuaL comoromise. ye wes in Sof2a on temporary geic : “ as an audviseor to tne fese’ service, helped the Bulqurians O mount thea operation but dad moe partistpate directly. LUNT pre- picunlv visited Moscow several imes and his homosexual tenden- fes had been noted by the KGu. setemney, whe cay oe eye ete eae oe se ageegrat nomena a ree were + now mam a rrorant case. (lued) bh ounvelvement sor to Palygarians; LUNT' xuodliry ENKO by one or both of si agents, VOLEOV ane "HY as KGB a. A Tourist ad- s homo=- ea.rlier reported to his homo- YEPRENOV, £ ye ke a eR NE Pome er ere MCR A t * wus, a? rays To wrote a fame phict about the 195a incicant which was available te lecture audglenves at least as early as 4906. Paro sw 4 Immediately following hie reccuit- ment by the Bulgarian MVD on 6 May 1961, LUN? travelled to Yugosbavia where he recounted th. inezaent in tatadl te Ambasvades Georga NESUAN, an academic culleague. uit La cure rently a professor end Mead of the » Department of Slivic Larquageé and Literature at Harvard. ; ; He Son phe MS Te Mm ot? TEI Ano
A Baptist minister JOUNSON visited ‘GON, W.E.: meativornia, Soviet Union in 1962 and was ‘éted mailing letters which were deritical of Soviet Life. Tt decided to approach him and ‘@ him to stop this activity. it has been determined that NSON was 3 homosexual, a compro- elwas arranged involving one of ERKO's two homosexual agerts, KOV and YEFREMOV. Compromnising tographs were made in the Metro- Hotel in Moscow and JOHNSON was roached by NOSENKO, who obtained igned statement in which JOHNSON ‘iged to stop criticizing the R. No attempt was made to Tre- it him for intelligence acti- y. JOHNSON was later seen enter- “ithe U.S. Embassy, and it was umed that he had reported the fwoach. In 1962 NOSENKO said ig- happencd in January of that ag; in 1964, he said the approach s{made in the spring of 1962. A student at Har- zt who was Tecruited on ideolo- cal grounds in 1961; case turned ~ to the First Chief Directorate. NTOR, Melvin: 368. Personal involvement as handler of hemosexual agents, and Tourist Department officer who approached JOHNSON. NOSENKO alluded to the approach in 1962, without naming JOHNSON, In 1964 he brought a note to Geneva with JOHNSON's name and the date "5 January 1962." He in- sisted in 1964, however, that this date had no connection with JOHNSON ar-l had no significance to him. (1962) A Tourist Depart- while NOSENKO was (1964 notes) Source not named. ment case in 1961 in American Department. a pregpeds eeperen ecepgegeesiereeny : : rer Np eieretnar Raper syeernti cree + 3 eeeanrt prime . JOUNSON reported the approach to the American Embassy on 5 January 1962, describing his compromise. and the approach by Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV [sic; NIKOLAYEV was one of Marvin KANTOR, 4 Slavic-language Instructor at the University of Michigan, and 1959; gence contact in 1959 when inter- viewed by CIA in TOOT; rein vie visited USSR in 1958 admitted Soviet Intelli- Hone re ene aeRO 8 CIMT EO KOMEN CAO BR TREN TS ORSAY ME NEAT PRCA EE ee pe eee
Pag erp Lee gerber oe Ret Ear bea ttye rome ine ScaeCNeeeT “ ws - . yee wee ee grees oe . Si a ee co ee ta Se meee pe epee OCT TyP REE neuntTongacgteme, Boor een nt pene mene retorts t et Poet haan baa | fs a 4 i i a OE ‘ a a Visited source not named. A Tourist ‘ : : i , and wes Department case. (1964) gp ee : tees Tes said he wouls : i =—cp he or! V USA Af contacted; ede : a eee . to @ pame= eA rusttal of RERAPT, Farste Chios phda the 1958 ineduent which gre arectorate bias not rellowed up . was avadlalle to lecture audlences <3 no Cie Approach; not an avtive al least ag early aa 1969. rot JASCO. emt pnw Beat, borace Ger  LUNT, an American Persenal involvement as KGB ad- immediately following his recruit- pecr Of slavic philoloyy, was : visor te Bulgarians; LUNT's homo- ment by the Bulgarian MVD on 6 May BecruLrted in 196] by the Bulgarian sexuality carlier reported to 1961, LUNT travelled to Yugoslavia . gervice an Sofia on the basis of a SEUKO by one Gr both of his homo- where he recounted the inciuent in . homosexual compromise. NOSENKS, sxual agents, VULKOV and YEFREMOV. detail to Ambassador George KENNAN, ey’ who was 2a Sofa on tenporary 22 an academic colleague. LUNT is cure assianment as an advisor to the rently a professor and Head of the focal service, helped the Buldarians . Department of Slavic Languages and to mount the operation but did not participate directly. LUNT pre- viously visited Moscow several times and his homosexual tenden- Gies had been noted by the kGB. ‘ - | os | . Literature at Harvard. en ete ete atte ne erate eat RTE art nen WTR Set arene ah TT
; ‘ at ~ a8 a . : 1 spe ot Ps ws peer owe tee ree penne gy : FROM ARETE ODES IAT ERIE SERRE EET ee om aaa tee oe ‘ , $ By I z mere res atte ranged Dae sh Rasniene eae ea ae * ane - . : - a a ora acter sete ain + naemapt anes reensthantatortnitts +" . Aeemtee 18 aatee nie at rattewm ment shade sen fete 370. MEPTENS, Rolort: Professor from Personal involvement as responsible Tennessee who was recruited by the case officer who approached MERTENS. KOR in Minsk in 1959 on homosexual Reported without name in 1962. founds: case of no value and was opped by the KGD. ' 3 di XON, Martriuy: Amorican touris’ Source not named. NOSMNKO said: CTorte? th Moncow an dune Pond, "Thais as all To hnow. ‘Phe Seventh tourist} Lepartment recruLted him bot Lo denth knew the case offienr. twas on ‘Fb¥Y at the time so I doen't know any cocaiis." (1964) - BECUTER, Rernairds PECHTPER was Sources mob named. (1964 notes) SPITOT by (Ne KG ani Mowe uw peu. not named, (i964 notes) Ydentified as Aron PRESSMAN, 4 bong= time Communist’ and a clons@ frend of Bernard KOTEN (see Bert Vee.6.)3 and was vecruited by the kKGP; cas ; ; in about 1945 sister married a Bove | - then handed over to the Pirst chie€’ " get citizen identified as 4 courier for Soviet Intelligence.:' She has. a i. been living in Soviet Union wi pla”. ; Wad berg) Mel s os : * - for many years sinc@e... ©. MAD, Poly seks Cane to whe SUurce : fs SB UeboOue: LOST wath a dela- is . ‘ . . gation of Amsrican metailurgistes
=e a _ soe “ roe ca > wot ee soreremmes renner Sepegrsic tant wy : ee bP esi AE “ : . toe ¥ 371. , ° A walter: President of World Source not named, Recruited by ide irs; Was recruited in the USSR PTourish Pepartiment officer Ye.N. n£2960 and has made several trips nesrov while NOSENKC was in Amerie i@ce; used for spotting tourists can Department. Mat by American ith incelligence affiliations; KG Tourist Section officers on trips ve ete T nB received cniy one oven cove subsequent to 1960. (1964 notes) i L Brose from RASK since recruit Source not nemed. Case run by Ameri- because KOBERTS for- qrounds i ERTS, Spencer: Recrurred aan nt 1962; case turn Embassy employee in tee: RGR Case officers were V.M. ceatiied RUSKOV, and V.M. FSI: SMibe aeiagnod of events KGH. B.A. SOLOMATIN, First Livectocate Officer assigned American Tiepartment. (1964) ra | . ev : . whe formor cavers Shon An American De- in 1962 ROSS reported t¢ tha Aineri- ms 255 ru Ambassacor's fase. UOSLXSo said he did can Embassy her arrest in Kiev in = | amily oni mow Treacher in Amevicest wv rocrultest her hecause 1958 on charges of immoral Dehevior on : ‘ ot oan u.o. Mmbassy Section, s in Beer 196% ba partment, at time of rid notes) ry asic of sexual involvements wo 4 5 ut ook in Moscow was recruited cn ‘ 3 > ho now ath USA, a (BRE, John: During a 1959 visit Sourea net named. A Tourist Depart- In 1964 RUFE, a New York attorney, — STINT TS his homosexuality was ment caso at time NOSENKO serving ' confessed that he had been compromised iBeovered but ne action taken une there. (1564 notes) in the USSR in 1962 and wat: in can- ij {962, when RUPE was recruited tact with Soviets in USA during 1962 nia homosexual compromise; case was and 1963; contact broken in: Novem ¢ ekminated in 1963 and, while active ber 1963. Be ag only of marginal value. _
Recruited in Moscow ‘BRN, Gerald: Tourses Department in 1988 or 1959 gdeological grounds. He is valu- @ all-purpose agent, His KGB jtonym is "EDVIN." < TRO, tienry: Correspondent who reeriitcd some time prior to when NOSEXKO entered Ameri- Basis of recruit- SHAPIRO produced 3 ni Department. nt uninovn, £ : . : - : ly peliticsl information. His Becryttonvis eas “VALERTY" for ny years, but has now been changed PPETR Tn 1953 SHAPIRO was be- randied by Venyamin Alekseye-- ch KOSLOV and in 1964 his case ficer was Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Fef the deputy chiefs of the ‘cond Chief Directorate, At one me he was handled by Vladislav IWSHUK 0. 7. IATTAUER, Sofia Greta: Recruited Poland by Soviets in 1946-47 @ never contacted because KGB ‘lieved she was known to American itelligence; again recruited in atember 1962 when she returned kSoviet Union. . mea see * 372. Sources were the Deputy Chief of the Yourist Department, V.D. CHELNOKOV, and the case officer, VOM. IVANOV. NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the section working against American, British, Cana- dian, and Commonwealth tourists at the time. (1964 notes) SOSENKO read SHAPIRO's development file in 1953 when responsible for operations against Anerican journal-~ ists. Case then being handled by vy NOSENKO's friend, V.A. KOCLOV. (19623 Source was D.A. DITYATEV, Tourist Department case officer who re- cruited SHATTAURR. (1964 notes) Cae er nee a Russian-born parents; name origin- ally was. Gennadiy SEVASTYANOV. En- joys special residence arrangements in Moscow; strongly;suspect as KGB agent prior to receipt of NOSENKO lead. fo [ SEVERN has not re- turned to the United States since July 1961 and has not been interviewed by the FBI. GOLITSYN said that in early 1959, the American Section of the Fourteenth (Counterintelligence) Department, First Chief Directorate, had an agent whose KGB cryptonym was "EDVIN'; possibly an American with Russian background or relatives. . SHAPIRO has lived almost exclusively in USSR since 1933 and is married to a Soviet citizen. GOLITSYN re- ported in 1961 that KGB officor kOV- SHUK had been handling an Amexican correspondent, whose Cryptonym was “VALERIY"; GOLITSYN believed this was SHAPIRO. } eee FST Bae eee e i a9 Es ERY ATE epee Re ree RET At
1s Cheaienaak Rakteais weaaeaial epee props arrears nue ar yc nme . r ‘ Theme porte eet oni Terre emmerermgeyreinnpt oF ee cmrean carted i 4 “ ee ee ane ne dh tee te eediene eae ~~ eres te tect aoe a ae ccpen nmap teenie teammate hla ataminenneanatmemematenes TE anna wettsnlen erent AL Node a ne a | 373. | [. ~ i HUBTN, cehn:  SHURTN a professor " ONOSESKO was in the Tourist Depart-— John Andrew SHUBIN, born 26 February — q New "YORE Univers ity, born L91$S ment at time of SHUBIN's first visit, 1915, a professor of cconce ce at NYU, my Califtornic, wus spotted by KGB and because of his Russian background, In the mids 1940. « rvel Lance riding in a GNU car in special surveillance was assigned to with as scow sometime curing PSS. or 1954, SHUBIN, When SHUSIN arrived in 1963, identi’ ee Raniries were citeie with the GRU, NOSENKO, who was Deputy Chief of the hich requested that tre EGR make no Tourist Department, was informed by ss axel temp? to contact SHUBIN, (Sn this the Chief of the American Tourist ROR Gf ok Be Pere DERG 4 sis NQSENKO suprosea SHUBIN to be Section, V¥.G. DERA. (1964) agers iti ted” a cenit RU agent. ILBIN was in Moscow 4 ee me ain in 1963, 3 ey 6 ‘ MIVH, Davie: Nang unknown, KGB Varicus sources named at uifferent Identified as Dayle W. SMITH, who Fa BY PLOL vin WRNEREY ," a code-machine times, KOVSHUK appears to be main in 1963 confessed his recruitsent? g @chanic at the American Embassy in source, but others mentioned were by the KGB while in Moscow but has ~ l@scow, was recruited by Norman N.G. BAGRICHEV, V.A. CHURANOV, and denied furnishing anything of value Zt lgkhayiavich PonmOnTS somesinme during G.L. ZHUKOV. (1962) to the Sovicts. SMITH is currently 48-1253 (various dates given at being questioned by the FBS. do za- ‘@riouc tines}.  VANDREY’ provided tired imom the Army in December 1561 . weh valuable information in Moscow and lost access to U.S. Goverraent d affer his return to the U.S., information at that time. , ae: Part GB officer V.M. KOVSHUK travelled . VI.D.3. b. io 6 Washington to reactivate him. As € 1962, "“ANDRLY" was working at ome military district command in lashington area and was furnishing | information of value. This case me of two items NOSENKO first €fered to sell CIA in 1992.
rem Mpemnetny semper es cere en, : mee Dee tan vere ns vee ry . oo Fem met te ee at tpmmre an ner pamper gr seme « Dre nme eraptiee age beter eee | “8 Bid. FOCHURDE , Howard: The Time /Life Source nok named, Tourist Nepart- SOCHUREK, who was in Moscow fron 1956 an ia an No Tscow r for one or two years S57 WAS ment involved in case in 1962. until 1960, reported to the U.S. Emb=- mrobably an agent of Vadim ATKYUKOV. (1964) assy a number of instances when the Soviets attempted to pressure him and described contact. with KG3. officers; han named BIRVYUKOV ag the guide and t isterpreter wha invariably aceompan- i ied him while stationed in the USSR. STEIGUR, Amirew J.: U.S. corres- Source was perhaps VLA. FOaLOV, who Numerous reports of Communist affilia- ponsent” 4 tn Soncew and an agent of was handling STETORE in i953. NO- tions and of suspicion that he was an Bhe KG there, veporting on pOlin SENKO said he may have learned of anformant for the Soviets; married to cal matters; refured to cocs ne "accagentally" when ROSLOV a Soviet national. to translate an AP dis- aca) G ate with the KGB in the Un tates or in Genuva later T Se pri Meyer ne nated. U.5. Embassy Sece Formerly a member of the CPUSA, STEVENS ‘ging Naren “may ananed went whon HOIEGEO joined in claims to have broken'with the Party in && Used pi Lo provide a ng handed Ly KUVSHCK dure the early 1930's; soon thereafter he homn é: wicwor at Ho's 1960-196) assignmant first visited Moscow and has lived 8 t , Aeclarat.ons: rican Sepa tment. NOSENKO there intermittently since: married Ais warviage naa “Soviek woman and 2en STEVENS in company to a Soviet; many reports on file : Bea uivolyencat with othr Savaet te of his extensive blackmarket and dille- C fore mots bive Deon factors in tiie gal currency activities and of his fen KGB beliewes ba may close rer ationsn es with Soviets ; Ee ibe encdenes1~es a nel . & oe Lot plans te use this to incroase Brol over hin, As of Lo6a, 2 Was furnishing only superficial nformation. Brawn, Franchs: Former Stat: Departe Seurea not named. U.S. Embassy Left a detailed writt ten repork “t the fient cmployee asbigned to Moscow; vis- Seetion e1se hundled by V.M. KOV=- Embassy for Ambassador THOMPSON ime dead USSR in 1951 as a tovrist: then SHUR and V.aA. KLYPIN when NOSENKO mediately after the incident. ars vad working as a correspondent; was com- assigned to section in 1960-1961. interviewed by Minister Conn oF the promised in a blackmail operation in (1964 notes) which ho was accused of rape: agreed to Gooperate, STEVENS described approach in @® letter to his mother which he left at the Embassy. Letter was opened and read by Minister Counsellor, who at once dictated @ cable to the State Department describing ‘he events. This was heard by the KGB via
AIOKERIP PA cme te Raa oe UA PRT Teta pear: Node dts van erweatlesath bysemibtne nt 6 ate 375. Counsellor's Chiecft Diree- he microphone in the Minister ffice., vase wis given to First rate. ECN planned te contact STEVENS in New ork, but NOSENKO was unsure whether this was oe VENCHANSRTY , Alexander: Owner of “Afton is,” a New gare travel agency, and of Russian-language bookrtor td in Chicaqo; Personal participation as senior Nourist Department officer after transfer from American Department aS recruited by the Tourast Department in in 1962, SVENCHANSKLY's case offi- dscow in 1961; was used to spot interest- cer after mid-1963. (1964 notes) MG ceurasts coming to USIP. B63, HOOUNKG, then in Parse Deputy avtumn Chief of the furast fepartmant, tock case over from Yev~ Vy Nekobayevich NOSEOV and suotequently t Ener ree cul finer’ : res seal Me Gh : snong lie bee Ue are BRREY, Carman:  Roeruited by tae Soucco met nank Reerulited by n eut on the basis of ne love for a Tourist Cepartment while NOSENKO Q@viet: turneeé over to Fi © waS in @&inerican Department. rectorate (L964) Hoyt ae : which net Source mot named. Recruited by Tourist Department in 1962, when NOSENKO there. (1964 notes) 'QLEOV, Vasiliv Andrevevich: A construc- (ere caniesie See tn eames ame ne Nena teen cerntlann ee eee " aon company employer; was recruited dy he KGB in the surucr of 1962 in the USSK @x use in emigre operations. : 4. MERE ene Leta a HOARE AES = me ah aah eae Reel | miter ane ae Born in Russia, SVENCHANSKIY emi- grated to USA in 1923. Has travelled frequently to Moscow; during and fol~ lowing World War 1! had extensive contacts with Soviets; close con= nections with numbers of known CPUSA members. Several accusations of Sov- ict espionage on record. Linkea to Soviet espionage in USA by Harry GOLD in 1950. Another simllar otatee- ment by GOLD reported in New York Gq Times in 1953 (see Part a a a . mo, . . an In 1960 it was reported that TORRPLY ae) planned to defect to the USSR because em | sne was in love with a Soviet named aa Yuriy Petrovich NIKOLAYEV; in 1961 ot she married an American. In 1962 the KGB defector GOLITSYN reported KGB attempts to recruit an American iden= | tifiable with TORREY during an Octo-~ ber or Novenber 1959 visit to Moscow. There ig no indication she has been — employed by the UN or NATO, although. she worked for the Pan American Union during 1954-1959. — A carpenter and religious fanetic living in California; has a record ‘ ‘of many arrests; may be mentally dise t o USSR in 1962.
Nae ae an ae PRET NEM gE ere LSKTY, ny TFaVE? “ABFoad," VOLSKIY was re- udted in 1962 on ideological Ofinds; his mission is to spot spiciaus tourists. and to notify BERGR hy open code. Roris: am: Student at Vienna ruited in 1G) in orpical grounds; now First Chief Direc- iPREY, Thomas: American cor- sponlen: Thomas WHITNEY was re- batec by the KGB in Moscow some- 1 betore 1953, when NOSENKY ied the KGB. In 1983 he was iag hangled by Venyamin KOZLOV the American Embassy Section. was furnishing information the American Unbassy, political Oruation, and personal infor- fon on Americans in Moscow, ‘@sed to cooperate further with qKOB after leaving Moscaw. Parmenter tah ot >: President of "“Ameri- o ~ Sepertenn oe - . * + aa tan oe ohne rn) sores rere Seay mre, ¢ viva ob wren a ® a 376. Scurce not named. Tourist Depart- ment case in 1962. (1964 notes) t Source not named. Tourist Depart- WALLACE visited the Soviet Ualea in —— : ment case in 1961, when NOSENKO in 1961; interviewed on 22 Fehruery 1965 id American Department. (1964 notes) in Vienna, he admitted spproach by A unidentified Soviet but claivad he rom) refused to “help them"; ssid there ma have been no further attempts ts con- oma tact him. ; NOSENKO said he poihaps learned of WHITNEY was interviewed by the PDI the case “accidentally” from V.A. Site SoS trite ae Ser ae ad KOZLOV who was handling WIITNEY in sf. a 1953. (1962) } dero V.C.2.
————————ee—e << eee OUR oo orerpeners men Deew ney peinentt srry cee aoe ety : a 377. ‘ UNGER, _ Ralph cand Fyelyn: Ara Seurce not named. 1962 American On mission for the U.S. Army at the Stead as AIS aqeats And “aabied Department case. NOSENKO's friend time of their arrest, the YOUNGERS MP RGR in the Of oR an P82: they and former American Embassy Section reported thoir recruitment immedi-~ en failed Co appour at a meot- subordinate, V.V. KOSOLAPOV, was ately on leaving the Soviet Union. , g Sate an Denmark. . directly involved in the case, which KGB officer KOSOLAPOV travelled ; ; took place when NOSENKO was back in to Copenhagen under alias in 1962, the Tourist Department. (1962) at the time the YOUNGERs were sup~ posed to meet with KGB in Denmark. tha Source not named. Tourist Depart- Interviewed in London in 1964, ZIRING 960 meant case while NOSENKO was in admitted blackmarketeering but denied ASiS American Department. (1964 notes) ere ke 7 hetceer- comm fm] a] roe wis M.A. SHALVYAPEIN, who re- Unidentified. Investigations by CIA,. <4 ce Offi-~ Lee "SASHA"; also possibly heard _ ACSI and the FBI continue. See co sdli- . from Yu.I. GUK, Yu.A. LOPUK}~ Part VI.D.3.a. fri V.M. KOVSHUK. oil i@rmany as 4@ <enartment chie Wtelligence in late 1962 or iriy 1963. Ce ame: Unknow a U.S. citinen “ive No indication of source. (1964) Unidentified, possibly Daniel Echicl Ag in “Enea d inds a furrier inerried * SHERICH, who married a Soviet na- a Soviet national who is horself tional in 1955; marriage was suffi- long-time KGP agent He was re- ciently unusual at that time too be wited when he visited Leaningrad : i ; @rx fur exhibits between 1956 id 1961. ee a
{ ame Unknown, KGB cryptonym oer bon agent in Geneva wre he is employed by the nternational Labor Organiza- ign. ame Unknown: KN. SMIRNOV ravel led from New York City to eneva in 1962 (while NOSENKO ag there) to meet an agent, writer who was a former U.S, tate Department employee, possi- ly with prior service in Mos- ‘Ww; in 1962 this target had tremely good connections in i€lueatial U.S. circles. | t create eae gdp a tre | oo Be wee mee ee aan t 378. Source was Yu.I. in 1962, Source not named. SMIRNOV in Geneva GUK, in Geneva Handled by in 1962. (1962) Unidentified, possibly Joseph Wilson HAYDON, long-time counsellor- librarian of the ILO; as early as 1950 was reported to be “well known for his Communist sympathies" and ‘for being associated with Soviet In- telligence networks in the United States and Canada. Other possible candidates also under examination. Unidentified, possibly Francis STEVENS (see vabove) 7y03S doh t a ie! sae tet mace omc gn bene anam smeeprteteteettnenl Me RnANaNb cer on see Ob Tere fhe
@ Development Operations Lead MSTRONG, Rohert: The Ambassador's de Tn Moscow is a homosexual and Glose friend of Stephan HOFEMAN ec below) s he is known to be hav- g homosexual relations with hannes BUHLE, a code clerk at the Rish Embassy; no other informa- an available. - Frank: NOSENKO identified NAY a State Department code clerk in scow in the 1960-1961 period. tle ¢ a target of either KOSOLAPOV or YAZNOV (NOSENKO could not recall ich), but ne active operational a@sures were taken against him for ck of opportunity. NOSENKO said did not remember anything inter- ting or unusual about DAY from con- aled microphones, telephone tapes, gurveillance and that he did not member DAY's KGB file, although he ad “skimmed it.'' NOSENKO also said at he did not know who DAY's osest American or foreign friends re, or the names or descriptions any agents working against him, aiso did not know of any trips Y¥- may have taken outside the USSR d doubted that DAY took any inside a. USSR. The KGB had no deroga- ry information on DAY and was aware of any vulnerabilities he ght have had. . er Nai “AE peme ores maps yt Ce aye ewe t 379. Sourcing and Date of Report Source not named. A U.S. Embassy Section case at time NOSENKO said he was Deputy Chief of this section. (1964) Involvement as supervisor of opera- tions ugainst American code clerks, (1964) at aye wees aot? Investigation Results Recalled from Moscow on the basis of this information, ARMSTRONG ad- mitted the truth of the allegations and resigned from the State Depart- ment in August 1964; he denied having been approached by the KGB. DAY arrived in Moscow by train from : Nelsinki in May 1960 and. served there until October 1961. After living alone for several. months in America Heuse, he moved.into the Embassy compound where he roomed successively with State Department code clerks BRIDGEWATER, SALSAVAGE, and GARLAND In July 1961 DAY travelled to the Caucasus with his. friend G. Stanley BROWN, who was the Agricultural At 3 : on pee gettepsetng sere aeons aut see Part V.E.3.£.). atéY Féported to the State De- partment Office of Security that the _two were foliowed by five surveil- lants at all times, that on. one occasion when they returned to their hotel room they found four "repair-. men’ there, and that while traveling by train on this trip they shared a compartment with “an available and attractive Soviet female." DAY de- nied any approach by Soviet Intelli-. gence, any homosexual activities, and any heterosexual activities with Soviet females in Moscow, or that he had participated in blackmarket activi- ties while there. (He was aware of
14-00000 FOLD tr Prete on ne anes: oe . “ my . _ owe ctor : . -- ee nee se eraenarns Sten cena mat Hi the fact that a number of his : acquaintances were involved in cur~ 7G rency transactions with“ < KOSOLAPOV's ageat, “according i sold a hi-fi set at a larec profit to an Egyptian when leaving Moscow (probably GOSRRNe eae GRYAZNOV'S agent, accoruing no MUSEMAGH « ey : hoviewinsg & U.S. Personal involvement a5 supervi-~ DWELLY was assigned to Mosca a8 4 Last in September sor of cade clerk operations ang a code clerk from April 1959 to July MOS TUNG gard he bol.eved that handler of homosexual agents YEFRI- 1960. He was interviewed by tha Cf- was a edo clerk during the MOV and VOLKOV. (194) fice of Security of the teas tment Pag topesrod.  NUShARO sand of State in March 1964 wee kame tak Lovever wis no of NOS SENKO! informatt Ly oand that : _ ee o ails of tha Cwe.Ly or the ho migni nave at wore Oris POSOLABIY and Got. pataorrogebion an MEO sgund wnat, Of “behavior when vis.tirg go roan,” the €GB was "109 tre" that ne was a homosexual. oC said, “a big hunt a. onumber of evenings hen (SELLY was known to be free fron fark, NOSENKO, GRYASNOV, ROSOLAPOV, | | | See { | nd Lise two homogearual aqunts YEPREMOV nd VOLKOV waited in vain in a KGB sure Webllonce car in the hope that DWELLY ould visit dovntown Muscow and contact could be astablishad with him. No photo-: yoraphs of PWELLY were obtained; there was no approach and no recrultment. INOSENKO could reeall no other informa- ion on DWELLY at this time, but Later @ said that perhaps GRYAZNOV's homosexual
RTT ren ep et rac a Crepe PPM TN oe eS co Bre terse yy ee Ayo rememnegnenee ses ae © 381, nt “VOLODYA" had spoken with DWELLY ab publ ic foilet in a museum or a kfand believed on this basis that LLY was a2 hemoseaual, also provided MmTrorwari concerning a KGB operation against a homosexual American code clerk at about. this time. GOLITSYN reported that he : had learned from discussions in the sq American Department in the spring of 1960 that the KGB had photographs of a code clerk engaged in homosexual acts but that KGB Chairman SHELEPIN had forbidden their use at that time a because of possible political reper- cussions. (See Part VI.E.3.d. for details on this lead.) Apart from the coincidence of dates and the na- ture of the compromise, there is no information available to permit an : equation of the NOSENKO and GOLITSYR = information. i hor so: A consul in Moscow, Reported to NGSENKO by his homosexual agent VOLKOV. (1964) Nf, wis spotted by NOSENKO's hoo- ual agent VOLAQV, whe exchanged nces with FAIN and was “almost per cent sure that PAIN is a home- wai; this was in 1959, when FAIN kted the USSR from his post in ‘@slavia, am there was insuffi- ‘At time to mount an operation inst him durirg this vis ar, when FAIN arrived in Moscow, AKG was planning to place a “ ; @sexual agent in his life; no “ , . Pt, : ther details available. : , : FAIN was interviewed by sccurit oftiss Department of State 4
14-00000 K, David: ja Phila. Navid: Prefessor phia ahd frequent visitar to “MSSR, the Leningrad KGR hoped recruit him on ideological hasis through use of a female agent, aise ot sister’s lowe affair with aviet he was refused a visa in B, but the KOB has arranged it that he will be admitted if he ‘Ales again. An Norman: Visited the USSR as gQurist in 1939, when he was ssec as a homosexual; if he re- is he will Pea recruintment tar- : ‘EEY, Josenh: Griginally identi- PWV NYSTNKC as a malitary en- ged man in Moscow curtuy 1960- it period who sas an operational rgetiof Viacimir DEMKIN. in ofuary 1965 he correctly identi- @ hin-as a’State Department d@ clerk, saying that V.¥. KOSO- POV was the responsible case ficer and. that. he, NOSENKO, super: sed KCB operational activity sur- amding GAFPFEY. The KGB attempted dure GAFFEY inte downtown Moscow ing Svetlana IVANOVA, & maid in erica House and one of DEMKIN's ents. Despite her repeated invi- tions, GAFEEY would not meet her. her than. IVANOVA, NOSENKO knew ‘no foreign friends of GAFFEY or ‘any trips he made have made in- de the Soviet Union or abroad. 382. Case brought to NOSENKO's atten- tion when FINK was denied a visa do the Leningrad KGB objected. MOSENKG was Deputy Chief of Tourist Department at the time. (196043 NOSENKO copied name when retiring file of one of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV or YEFREMOV. NOSENKO said that when such a file is retired, KGB requires case officer to draw up au list of persons on whem the agent yenorted.  NaSUNKO made a copy of List and gave it to CTA. (10645 Lavolvement as supervisor of KGB operations against American coce clerks in Moscow. (2964) sv eronqemetas © ° “oe ere FINK's sister was trying to marry a Soviet citizen, but the Seviets refused her a visa to do so;% FBY f ‘ FISK travelled to Europe and USER with his wife and parents In 1989) interviewed by pi GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in Sep- cember 1961. Fred KADERA, 8 fellow resident at America House, reperted during a State Department Security interview Wy ie a ote oe ee ee paresis Se A oes Cee dos d0l Ls
‘GB, NOSENKO said, had no acropa- nformation cn GAFFRY and was jare of any vices he may have WRF, Iddvr American correspor- metipeme Coane tn | . Was a nGY recruitment target 963-1954, but NOSHENKO did not whether he was subsequentiy re- ted. BERG, Professor (fnul: Came to ISSR TV eT ay 195s, when ational centuct was established een him and the 4408; details of ag@t unknown, MAN, Srerhen: Currently assigned i@ American Embassy in Moscow; indulyed in homosexual acts an Armenian in Yerevan and is ndly with Robert ARMSTRONG, her suspected homosexual (see oe}; KGR is now mounting a com- ige operation against HOFFMAN. 383. Persona joss ments File to read sible on GiLMOIdi., C1904) Source not named, l involvemenc: the U.S. Embass: Section in he wos given GILMORE's develop- 6 Khen and was (1964) NOSENEO respon- for hundling agents reporting Source was G.1. GRYAZNOV, who came to NOSENKO, then in the Tourist De- purtment, to arrange for comp ing photography of HOFFMAN, 4 romis- (1964) dyer ey 2, ies ee RTS aati Se eran , tine. GAFFEY was recalled from Mos- wv cow in the summer of 1962, before expiration of his regular tour, because of drunkenness. During ques- tioning by the State Department a . . Office of Security i‘ ee 2 Ee = a : iddy Lanicr King GILMORE first went te Moscow in 1941 and was chief of the AP Bureau there from 1945 to ¢ the summer of 1953. Married a Soviet 35 citi Lees cee 3 , tv"a 4 ad Professor Michael GINSBERG reported to U.S. officials in Helsinki in August 1956 about a recruitmont approach.
HUSTON (fnu): -Travelled TDY to Mos- 384. Source not named. An American cow from Belgrade and was photographed Department case in 1960, when NO- making a blackmarket deal in a taxi; & not returned to the USSR. i when tne KGW Téarned through normal ¢hannels that JENNER was to be assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Mos- tow, 2t was supposed that he was a @ode clerk because he was listed as ‘@ Secretary-Archivist, a frequent gover for code clerks. As first @tep in development of JENNER, U.S. Embassy Section officer V.V. KOSO- LAPOV travelled to Helsinki, where he boarded the train on which JEN- NER was travelling to Moscow, and then struck up an acquaintance with him. Additionally, a Fomale KGB agent boarded the train after it crossed the Soviet border and she too became acquainted with JENNER. SENKO was serving there. Gase not completed because HUSTON has SENNER, Paul Francis: In early 1969, (1964) NOSENKO originated the adea for this operation, was involved in its planning and in arranging KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki; Later KOSOLAPOV reported to NO- SENKO on his trip and contact with JENNER. G.I. GRYAZNOV, case offi- cer for the female agent, also sub- mitted a report. (1964) The plan was to continue these relationships din Moscow. Because JENNER refused to ‘do so and because he turned out to tbe a pouch clerk and not a code clerk, j he operation was put aside, No re- Jeruitment approach was made. -it in late 1960. JENNER reported USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON. was arrested in Yugoslavia in 1954 for sexual activities; this, the only adverse information abovt him. was reported to USIA on 30 October 1963; he claimed no recruitment was made in his 1963 interview and saic he made two trips to USSR during Belgrade tour. Other than his ar- rest in 1954, he stated there were no other incidents in ‘Yugoslavia © or elsewhere in the Sovict Bloc which could be used to embarrass him. Currently serving in Taiwan with USTA and has not been inter- viewed on basis of .NOSENKO's alle- gation. Sh GOLITSYN described a similar opéra- tion involving KOSOLAPOV, dating meeting girl and her brother to Embassy officials on arriving in Moscow, but reports no encounter with person matching KOSOLAPOV's description. Official Finnish travel records show KOSOLAPOV was not on same train as JENNER, but returned to Moscow two days after JENNER travelled from Helsinki to Moscow. See Part V.E.3.¢. , sane tertaretanean see ( euemianmeege sueammmuingnnnmretimmenney nova ean gt 8p wor AES
5 . Be CERO TM tour yn ATR peyee TEE ate oe OER PE TRE gt stp een Sreravars we te . None eee ae 385. |) fnu: A wealthy Baptist layman Source not. named. Case handled sited the USSR six or seven by NOSENNO’s Tourist Department -@ and has met with Russian PRapt- suberdinate, Vitaliy DERA. ion each occasdon; personally (1962) binted with President JOUNSON Knew President KENNEDY; under lg by the decond Chief Director=- to cbtain blackmail materials; 62, JOMN"S became involved with act female, and although she is 3 ne, the KGB has taken hip under centrol and rally attemeted to ob- ing photonraphs on 5 tie ee JONES. , His earlicreac stivicaes & on in-a 1961 Top Secret Cn docune. ¢ furnished to CIA by GOLITSYN in Ly | citing JONES' Bible-snuggling act. ed ; vities an@ giving his name. IZA é Goteck of much Source not mained. NOSENKO explained Charles P. HAMZAUI, son-in-law of 2 ao Ree:cot during his 26 Octcher- that the First Chief Directorate Alexander SAFFIAN who was reported 4 wWember 1%63 visit te the USSR; requestod Tourist Department assiste in contact with Govietsa in, the 1921 ae | i@ otgicer under cover made con- ance in arranging centact with HAMZAUL himself was noted in trope’ f with aim on@, planmnéd to continue KHAMCAL ia Moscow and that "we ex- contact. with Sovacts since ar rivers $contact.in the United States. erted all efforts to help them make this contact.” NOSENKO at time was Deputy chief of Tourist Nepartment. flood) OV (fnu): Visited the USSR in Name included in list NOSENKO said Only pos ssible candigata s no fax ie ig WHEN vie Was assessed as a he made when retiring file on one eR TE eae = ‘ r@exual; rf he returns he will of his homosexual agents, see above érecruitmant target. entry for FISK. (1964 notes)
14-00000 soy arte ages ey cree ee pee eb SER oop ROT I 386. MNEDY, Rebert: In 1962 NOSENKO BOLSHLKOV, whom NOSENKO described agned from Gh Colonel G.4. BCL]= 2s a friend whom jhe had known for AKOV, who had been selecicd by Presi-' pabout two years" (since 1962). n& KENNEDY as a confidential channel (1964) ch correspondence with KHERUSHCREV, ag R Robert KONNEDY had long wishec to sit the Sovict Union. BOLSTAO YW also ld@ NOSENKO that, when the molshoy Mle: had been on tour in tne uni tes ates, FPobert KENNEDY ghowt ine et an one of its leading porrtornc Sh Maye PLISETSEFAYA. NOSENKO an pa: basis propesed to OM. GRIGA NOV, def or Second Chief birccturane, *% EENNODY be invited to the VSGR, set ‘be peavate quarters, ana waver the carpe.” treatment, including MESKAYA 2f£ he wanted. MOEN Ppropose that KENNEOY | compromises hat oan attempt be made to reeruit ee the ourpose of this pt Ondy Pe promote 2 rapproche: oe haa and to Lane over the n President AENNEDY and FuReoncdny, ch was then being handica by the CRIBANOV thought the plan a good and said he would dissuls a6 + Lie ‘MICHAS@? BYY, Chaizrgan of nhe EOn: @ further was done, however, ne 'presideant MENNEDY's assassin : an thereafter. “a seroele cue nites pm | ores nant nes Se Tereeey conte ED aa Re ete ae BOLSHAKOV' 3 role as a Soviet *dis- information" channel was. publicized in the press in 1962, after he : assured the White House that the \ Soviets had. no offensive missiles in Cuba. G33 Bees te identified BOLSHAKOV as7a Untr NOSENKO'S officer. developmental plan for Robert KEN- NEDY cannot be checked. -Robert KENNEDY had already visited the USSR ; once, when he accompanied Supreme cS Court Justice William BOUGLAS in See Part V.F.9. 1955 or 1956.
AL Martin: <A graduate ctudent, A; visited Moscow for about four hg in 195% and homosexual tenden- were detested. KG suspected APor antelligence ties. Compro- Operation staged in Moscow lf room, but MALIA insisted on img off lights and no photo- hy possible. Consequently no gach icde. Again visited USSR 961, hut was more careful and her opportunities did net sre- themselves. NOSENKO also @ates of MALIA's visits as 195 1962, : sexusi tendencies during his wisit to the USSR: will be a e& for cocruitment if Le re- * NE, Joseph: State Department flernx Joseph MORONE was an ational target of the U.S. ssy Section in 1960-196], he travelled to Warsew on @ in late 1960, a Polish girl’ WAS @ US agent was placed on train to seduce hin. om iping phetoqraphs were mada arsaw. At KGR request, the gent. was later brought again sBCOw where more photegraphs rede. Operation was termi~ @ before approach could be because Americans ordered NE out of Moscow before the of his tour, possibly because ig intimate. relations with et females at America House. 387. Personal involvement as case offi- cer; for this operation, NOSENKO borrowed Viktor’ BELYANOVSKIY, crypto- nym "STROYEV," a homosexual agent of the British Department, KGH Sec- ond Chief Directorate, and arranged the compromise cperation in the Mos- cow notel,. (1964) NOSENKO noted name when retiring file of YEFREMOV or VOLFOV, his homo: alo ayeats; see above un- cries for PISK an@ ZARLOV. (1964) Personal involvement; NOSENKO in charge of code clerk operations at the time and helped plan the compro- mise en the train. At the time MOROND went to Warsaw, NOSENKO was on TOY in Cuba, but details were reperted to him on his return. {194} teen me pee ease A U.S. Navy Intelligence officer during the Second World War< | HATLIA visited the USSR in and again in 1962, In the spring of 1963, he tola| Ihe had had no involvement with black= marketeers, homosex : Identity confirmed as Ralph. MATLAW; case ‘still under investigation. was interviewed and polygraphead in Se yin May 1961 and admitted inti- lutea with the Polish female; he denied ever being approached by either the UB or & alligence. He was transferréd |. n August 1961, a year after ha first arrived in Moscow. Sse Part. V.£.3.
Seater cot Pony TeneAT kom SEN, v, Philip: NIELSE N's first ito the USSR was in 1957 or 1958 ittourist. Because he made the- laintance of some “teddy boys" igscow and tried to acquire a ies the Moscow Phone Directory them, the KGB suspected he was acted with CIA. NIELSEN was lunder surveillance during this all subsequent trips, but was ad observed in other intelli- tasks. On one of his visits iscow, NIELSFN- fell in love with agent Tamara KUNGAROVA, and the decided. to use her in the de- ‘pment of NIELSEN. For the pur- ‘*g of assessment, LEONOV, a ist Department officer, was @quently introduced to NIELSEN he role of KUNGAROVA' 8 father, there were. Ad’ ‘positive results. @, perhaps in 1960 or 1961 INOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy ion, he heard that the “active ‘§ section (penetration of Ameri-~ Intelligence opnmrations) of the ‘dean Department was planning to \further on NIELSEN, but NOSENKO ced ho more in this connection. lid hear, however, that NIELSEN RUNGAKOVA had married and as of 2iwere living in London. NOSENKO wlated that one of the reasons for failure of the recruitment opera~- 1 Seta Deepa a te fy pete re 388. NOSENKO was involved in the de- termination of NIELSEN's possible intelligence status on first trip. No seurce given for subsequent in- foimation. Tourist Department officer LEONOV and American De- partment officer Viktor KOPEYKIN were involved at various stages of the operation. (1964) against NIELSEN is the possibility ihe learned that KUNGAROVA didn't fa father or that she told him the operation surrounding him. “NIELSEN met KUNGAROVA on @ NIELSEN travelled to the § nien by private car in‘Ap trip, in January 1959, and to sec her in Moscow in Ja despite indications and wi rhings that he was involved in what appeared to be a KGB operation. Because KUNGA- a ROVA's "father" allegedly. objected f to the plans of the couple to, marry, NIELSEN agreed to taik eos hilt: In- troduction was made at the: Hotel Praga in Moscow. NIELSEN’: ‘later noted that the "father*® bore no resemblance to KUNGAROVA, ‘although = her broghor “could have been ‘her a twin? | \ He" Ps “EO Moséow in 1962 and.mar- c3 ried KUNGAROVA. They subsequently ea lived in Paris. KUNGAROVA: died in Franc ° in 1965 (see entry: for[ tte Mupren tameyptE, weap eee
389. Cu, Pauhs Gontacted by the Source was K.G. KRUPNOV, case uring fhe Squaw Valley Olym- officer in American Section, Toure gg but not yet recruited; to be ist Department, who arranged con- MBtacted in Switererland. tack between OMELICH and First . Chief Directorate officer, (fnu) SAVYTSEV, when OMPLICH visited Mos= cow in August 1963. (1964) SBRENNIKOV, Seracy;: In 1955, Personal involvement. (1964) yg Ge 1957, SEREBRENNIKOV, an tdyen of the Library of Congress, agta Moscow with a Congressional agatio:. Hey had a brother, a i@ai doctor, living in Sverdlovek, $he KGH arranged to bring the her to Moscow to meet SRREBRENNI~ | ROSENEKO told the FEI tnat it was to use the “reunion of the two tBergs of a pousible wedge toward rgioment of SFREBRENNIKUV"; he told that the KGB had informaticn indi- ima SERESRENNIKOV to be connectud hfAmerican Intelligence and that the pO@se of the meeting was “to feel ut." NOSENKO himself arranged for EBRENNIKOV's brather to be brought M@ncow and then briefed him to meat FBRENNINOV. "first as brother meeting ther.” tle told the brother that the Woule have further instructions for After the first meeting. A meat- fon take place, but it was “very t ° 2 onal®* and the brother later told CB that he had no ‘opportunity d&’scusa with SEREBRENNIKOV the pos~ iQity of hia helping the Soviet om. As SEREBDRENNIXOV was only in cow for a few days, no further meet- si took place and no further action taken by the KGB. NOSENKO said t the KGB felt that SEREBRENNIKOV wuspicious of his contact with his ther. No further details. Me eincapetenaprmen wes m wungoatern, Peer fuae gone gee yen es ve ee sone noe cf tere cgertenegieet cn we at Ee ‘ Apel any concerning tis 1956 tour of C det Union accompanying Senater Henry li. JACKSON and Lieutenant ‘Colonel Edward HATHAWAY from the Pentagon. On his last night in Moscow he re- ceived a telephone call in‘his hotel: room from a person who said he was SEREBRENNIKOV's brother from Sverd- levsk, whom he had not, seen since 1918. The brother requested a mecte ing. SEREBRENNIKOV was convinced from the caller's uneducated speech and other signs that he was not in fact his brother. Therefore, he re- fused to see him. Immediately after the 10-minute conversation, SEREBREN- NIKOV called Senator JACKSON's hotel room to report what had happened. Senator JACKSON sent Colonel HATHA~ WAY to SEREBRENNIKOV'’s hotel room, and they discussed the entire inci- dent. At JACKSON'’s suggestion, SEREBRENNIKOV then moved into the Senator's room for the night. SERE<- BRENNIKOV also advised tha U.S. Emb-= assy of the incident. After his return to the United States, the atory of the phone call was written up in Newsweek magazine. ‘The article wrongly stated that SEREBRENNIKOV _ knew his brother was dead. 200? s938 dO U7 ach ESE tah Seem meng rimeenierpeargmagi  nereaptcan toenrememcazee sore ? ole &
|: sas) = . . Ante eonT eee Fo yprene erage nate eo aeeren ate per te emt oe wget niga eee etter site Sop tee tes et ere aimee: eee tes we Naeitiie oberon deme tiehAe nis na eet Hosein n vmamem seed ee ae : f eeeemenecte + eames teen a He aenune nna tal et ne cee dee ae et ennn nineteen mtitrernetentine | athknesetimteeetenlinnaesiae tee bit , — rieb inet oterabaaa ni eA ¢ 390. largisca: A correspond= Personal involvement. Read develop- SALISBURY was first in Moscow in 1984 ALGGWURY was an opecalional mental file on SALISHURY and also and again lived there from 1949 to 1 of the U.S. Embassy Section, handled two KGPR ayents, a chauffeur 1954. He was closely associated iGan Department, curing 1953 and a maid, who were reporting on with Thomas WHITNEY and WHITWEY’ ¢ 1954, NOSENEO) was assigned him, (1os4) wife during later riod | (se > Fwitt sponsibility for such ~<SE, Sree * weber Bions NOSENEO read the doe- ae thie on SALISBUPY bat is impossibls toe tell oe ny oo Se : er tha tarqel wos MOT en we roams ast ene PRVEY canta setangstctgenterensecrctree erent th sen IR st cnt ata nuance STON, who Personal involvement as SOBO- £:rin in the POVA's casa officer. (1964) red the USSR sae became mo Larissa . inter- wag NOSEMRO' s - morried and retired. uspected that she had elationshipo with SiUPrToN intimate with . donot ropart thia, and tnere fore NOQUVENKG be oanre., SULTON used SOBGNOVA Letiers and which he sigqnud "aloha.®
ASE, William: New York City lin; was worked on by the inian EGR in June 1663 with aera! results; had been pre- wWiety worked en dr Moscow dur- fRan earlier tvap in 1959, but fronsidered a “stupid and un- isina Carget™ at that time. R, John: NOSENKO identified EWS A “State Department code ‘Sk who was a target of V.V. SOLAPUV. NCSENKO did not recall de TAYLOR surved earlier and @ ha was not aware of any back- Wind information the KGB might ‘@ had concerning him. The Sov- .faaid whe cleaned TAYLOR's room gia KGB agent, and at KGB direc- Rf mbar reereemerene rm ~ SS incren stony momipet ee eee Tonge sate ee NOSENZO said he had no sersonal involvement, the 195d and 1963 trips made during Tourist Bee the 1960 trip, woich NOSENKO did nob mention, was when American net named. partmoiut NOSENKO partment. Supervisor of operations against American code clerks, succeeded in getting TAYLOR to ‘ seers ne pee epee Spergnteeny ea ate op oiacaees A ae step co mtg inet gie . ! ; A *S atieoe 9 t wees a - - we pes eneceninenecatiaentmstie! ae tenn EDT mentee Cahir enim ih ed 4 Travelled to the USSe ia b9%8,° 296¢9 eo ms 7 and 1963, x) | luper getuin from ~ rm 1960 trip, reported detalles of BGS approaches Ln 1956 anc 1960, danying Par AT UG GM Bee: Mic wsal es a dee! acceptance of Saviat. TAYLOR served in Tel Aviv aa a code clerk from Nicth 1333 ita -sep- tember 1959 and later canfease) that, during this tour he porformed chendes~ tina" He arrived inf Mostow in February 1960 and, aftar living a month in a Seviet hotel, soved inte quarters in the Embassy. ° Hie maid... a was Sophia ALEKSEYEVA; according to Rea 7 BE ae ;
sengrreneemeremaateaneeycmen eps cart apepaeh meen ty Me ater eo see pay agen orem cee tee 392. apartment where she lived with wlfriend. TAYLOR and the maid me intimate; however, no com- ising photographs were taken @r apartment as the KGB pre- ad to lure him to a different tment which was better suited this purpose, By studying his acter, tha naid learned that ough not a Communist, TAYLOR sympathetic toward the people way o° life in the USSR. At Point it was decided to insert MAPOV into the operation etly. ‘To accomplish this, LAPOV contacted the agent's girl- nd and recruited her as an op- donal contact. An evening y was then arranged at the maid's tment, and NOSOLAPOV was intro- @ to TAYLOR as a friend of the friend. It was KOSOLAPOV's in- don to develop TAYLOR further tfaake a thorough assessment with deological approuch being the Lh objective. This was toward end. of TAYLOR's tour. KOSO- Vonever mat him again, and @ was no recruitment approach. ae NOSENKO's opinion that no mpt was made to recruit TAYLOR kis time partly because the did not want to jeopardize more important STORSBERG case )}Part V.E.3.c.) by risking a p." The case was turned over _ he First Chief Directorate when QR was reassigned from Moscow. One te St mee Seer ot ence mn ET were mye paren rerpenes ot men en <2 sane neha a nate meetin mace sale tiie RoR Mr aren teeter oe Se TAYLOR, he began to have intimate relations with her in about Septem ber 1960, On the first four occa- sions, their relations took place in TAYLOR's quarters, but there- after, because TAYLOR roomed with the code clerk Paul JENNER, Sophia invited TAYLOR to her apartment. TAY..OR recalled having been, intimate with her four or five times! there. Shortly after he began having rela- tions with her. Sophia announced that she was pregnant; TAYLOR cf- fered her money for an abortion but, he said, she refused to take the money.° In about December 1960, Sophia invited TAYLOR to. visit her girlfriend's apartment (she had no roommate). TAYLOR recalled that this was a well-furnished apartment with, he believed, a full length mirror on the closet door; TAYLOR thought the KGB could not have acquired photographs because the lights were out during their rela- tions. Around Christmas or New | Years 1960, TAYLOR also recalled, - there was a party in Sophia's aparte- ment; two Soviets who did not speak English were also present. TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961. He has denied ever being approached for any purpose by Soviet Intelligence. oS 1393S dOL cee - 777 trremiamea womenenaamermamineranecnmin cmecieree maven cess mpeg eens a d=
. e ' * ~ S 4 oo. : Aenean . : ; § _ 393. as In 3987 or 1959, an NOSENKO reviewed THOMPSON's file. rican progessor named To O Chulist in Russian literat ¥> became invelved with Pamarca KUNGA- Ag a RGD agent within Inturier Al- ugh Professor ThHOsTSGN ned Talimate ions with KUNGARGVA and photoyraphs a@CQulrad, Ne wan not appro wched c by the KOS. It was plonned n gr THOMPSON and for coer Si. tle did not ep and NOSENENO, after dies (date not give), % the Case be retired returned to ie seg SWE #: Amoi tha B Archives ae as” RARE
«gE sos CAS in Ae aep sep rE te ree ate son: An American profes~ NO ROG “Gane to the Soviet Union Y9G2 or 1963 and was the target In operation run by K.G. KRUPNOV. Gis a speeialist in Russian rature ond speaks Pluent Rus- » ff: was lured into. a compromising Wation by a feanle KGB agent ind tegraphs were taken. At one point ypffticer Yevguniy NOSKOV was placed Girect contact with TWARNG, but it idecidee not to approach him as fcompranising photography was net @idered wugficient basas for ro- Stment and he was expected to kn to the USSR in 1964 or 1965. source 394, given. (1564) s Whale in Moscow, en i THOMPSON reported at thous... that a Sovler acqualnrosos .. that NGSENYAD wag had told hie fligate with debts and ig someone they Corer gots at. a ar AER ME NER MERRIE Nw on weapon epee me ork. aay 33 Patek } “e pros tus wives and eany CONG LOT a Fete BAN Bey sre wes Ls 2 oe mee me arey tyes weeteatine Sty +
RRAROV, > Lawrence ALLY migeanenes SENOS Can. dtecd the tacted @rican bigenese bacng round, in Novembar i983: he F n > we Dome taype ft ead F Lae American coph 2 psanbay Hugo VAN AAANOYV. in, LARTHEM,; Gearder  Asudbaiann Aas ache al Geo. Popassy, she ciw. Russsan actrees, . placed on a train going fron a¥lin to Moscow some time in 1953 Alla DARIONOVA, cel954, in orluer te tring us. Laintance with VAN TA aM did becore: acquainted with aand gave him her address and y@ne number in Moscow. Although n@ was sure she would hear from me, he never did call ber in cow. | Po ae x8 hue Ww wa Source not. named. NOSENKO said “ho was a tourist and that's why our man made the. first contect hs Rim." This wan one of the hich NOSFRKO "“sirpiy » becevse at crossed S vision.” (1964) NOSTHEC icard this story pyom POE. PANKRATOV, whose os ae “F WAICPOMOVA Wase HOGS LN KO vdiud i thac the case officer workl DASUIEM himsed¢ : NOW, who Was Teapon Sible for work against all meme bere of the Air Attache of fice bes t time. (2904) ‘by NOSENKO. | coe noe Lage gre OM ROE Teg SM ONT ne oR J3u03S dO George VAN LALTNEM was jAsealatant Army Attache at the U.8. @rbasry ii Hogcow from March 1941 to March 1953, and again from March to May 1955. He was the eryptographic security officer, In charge of the Exbassy coda rocn, and supervised the activities of thu milotary code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and wan alue doy RHODES’ supervisor. VAM LARTHEM's © 1955 ansignmant wae related to the use of new and sensitive @lactronic equipment carried by military attaches on trips. Thie equipsynt was captured - by the KGa in Stalingrad {nm Hay 1955. He has been interviewed ona number of occasions and has reported no) incident: similar to that describea. .... Sae VpC.aelk}-- for dew." | e
menage pee staee nee ote 356. Personal involvement as case officer for agents VOLKOV and ERPORD, Prederick Rayne: the American exhiovition in Moscow A guide 959 and roommate there of Robert YEFREYOV: was behind two-way ETT (sce above). WTLLERFORD became mirror and viewed compromising lved wich NOSENKO's homes saxual agents acts. (1964) YERREMOV and photographs were to approach hin was because of a general pros tment attonpts ct the ction with RHRUSHCHEV'S the Unites GSthates Voand i Peraioshon éd, however, €ion on vecrui Bitdion da conne Reomina trim to & case Personal involvement as officer. (1904) : NOSENKO sunervised Oy eration against ZUSUS, who replaced © STORSBERG at the American Fmbassy 961. <As part of this cgveloomant WWKO directad Nis aqent G7 ae teres aes VA a ot fe stulying: ear a ZUIUb! ae nau intane em at. Amerhon 1@.  hyeatually etwas to help dive SUVS with a Soviet female, Bees ame friends with ZU7US during mber of wi to America Hous, was able to accomplish and report a an ZUIUS was reserved by nature Wing derogatory was dnmveloped anid wing came of tha operation, tary code clork = a gies om ament as supervisor of ainst American (1964) Invoiv cpyurations ag code clerks. 1@, Maurice: SOSENKO identified iG in Tec es an American code “R who was"actively worked on" in ‘pw durinag the 1960-1961 period; WHO supervised activity against “4 An agent, name unknown, an Arab 6 ma the Fyyptian Embassy, introduced NG to Inga VARLAMOVA, an agant of N.S. Embassy Section, and ZWANG Ps ited her apartment several times. “MOVA cid not like 2WANG, however, 4gid not want to have intercourse reed rere gm some ee oe cvicowe: moper 1965, he said he had mat -but @id not know hig name and sd to him for only about 15 minutes on one occasion; edaictad sexual relationships with a number of third nationals in Moscow. | | % ee bet eet spree et ZWANG , a state Department enée clerk, served in Moscow from Febru- ary 1961 to January 19F2. His maid from February to October 1961 was | # ‘ Seaton | Ss fe) | i)
See aera TCR Se Ot a ee as soe ae a or . : . f ‘ : : eee ge ee pen Se mamegsaritim erm ne rpetaieees T+ vee a hepa meergmenens ¢ ~ 4 4 forrra y see 2 tet omen ' a . ene ee each ame an oe Ga leet GeO ORRSAR I reemnONte Se. enrtmtemienahibtretiat es. oe. te ne es oy * ith him. ‘this reason the case was roppec and no recruitment approach wasn ade te ZWANG. Tn 1965 NOSENKO said that WV. KOSOLAPOV was the case officer respon- ible for 2WANG and wrote the operational aln concerning him. It was G.I. GRYATNAY, everthe) ess, who arranged for the Egyptia gent to visit America House, whera he ta deve Lone CWANG. GRYALNOV was also ase eti.aur for VARLAMOVA and arran : mx to be antroduced to SHANG throuch Gyprics. AL the tame Left WB.ooamlassy Section ra Ja ry dee, hor actavabty rooouber aeonis were Mo vabnerabbets and mo approacu Rad bein rae ZWANG has been Jescribed by bellow inericans in Moscow a6 a hanvy gam- ; bler; he has also beun seportad by Ce arious sourced to have been active in currency speculation and black unease teh en ies centerin around witém NOSENKO identi fiad, as. KOSOLAPOV' s agents He resigned from: rhe Stace ¢ Department. .
tetas AEP URE RENT eme tte oT we tae sented mee e wee JInsuccess ful Approaches ; Lead i “R, Peter: The KGB attempted to re- E“BINDPR, an Army sergeant assigned 1@ U.S. Embassy in Moscow on the of his involvement with a Russian At America House. ‘The attempt . NS, Horst Henry: A former Soviet etteeniretitrenc cemerrmeniins sti 6 -ansranaangaassasner titer zen who left the USSR with re- ting German troops in 1942, BRAUNS target of unsuccessful approach he returned to the Soviet Union tourist to visit relatives in -? BRAUNS was told he would he zed with war crimes unless he pted recruitment; he initially a, but later refused ta co~ ate. The KGS has dropped the aie hv. Investigation Results BINDER reported the attempted re- cruitment at once and was recalled from Moscow: Sourcing and Date of Report Source not named. ‘NOSENKO said he never read BINDER's file, al- though he saw some “materials” concerning him in 1961 while in the U.S. Embassy Section. Saw no more information after return to the Tourist Department in early January 1662, Viadimir DEMKIN and S.M. FEDOSEYEV named by NOSENKO as participating in case. (1964) served in Moscow from Le March 1961 until 22 January 1963. V.0.4.C. See Part Personal involvement as supervisory | Tourist Department official and later as recruiting officer. NO- SENKO reported that when BRAUNS re~- fused to cooperate, he (NOSENKO) travelled to Leningrad to speak with him. Parts of lead learned from K.G. KRUPNOV, who originally approached BRAUNS in Moscow. (1964) : iWOIS dOL in 1962; in 1964 learned of the No source given NOSENKO said he case from Chief of the U.S. Emb- assy Section, V.M. KOVSHUK. Did not know who made the approach. (1962) © + TIREpr pee cae ae te vert naa Soy
seme EST gE et gt te KM mes: The KGB discoverad that SEES] QZ Code clerk, was a homosexual mone of the KGB ajoents at America ge spotted him Kissing a member of isiting Tce Copades tour. Appar- hy the Anercieans determined KEYSEsS' KAMess at the same time, as prepira~ AB were immediately made to remove SESS Crain Morvcew. Becausa .of lack ame, «ll the “GBR could do was to PRKEYVSERS a letter pointing out he fin decp trouble and urging him to ect. sBYSERS reperted this lohier AMerican officials. at the airport, nm KEYSERS was ieaving Moscow, he @pproached by NOSENKO, who made 2 al bid for KEYSERS to remain in the R. When originally reporting this G@, NOSENKO named the American as US anu then, 4 few days later, called eilal meeting with CIA to correct mistake Pes elarke: SERS at without 399. Porsonal involvement as American Penartment officer responsible for operations against U.S. code personally accosted KEY= Moscow airport. (1962, name) , awe em tg enue gt we eae te met RR fate em ON tmew ene er fee! “ rt serkoews 4 oe 4, ae) ‘ . Lhe athena eaten mitts sae encmentheh eeetttnetdrinin nearer signee te rf a8 KEYSERS, who performed code clerk duties for a short time in addition to his regular administrative funce | tons in the office of the Military Attache, was recognized as a homo- sexual in the spring of 1961 and was removed from Moscow shortly there- after. He had earlier been relieved of code clerk duties due to lack of interest and aptitude. Events in-~ cluding delivery of the letter and the approach at the airport were much as NOSENKO described. KEYSERS unable to identify NOSENKO photo- graph. See Part V.E.3.c. (vi).
TH, Edward: KGB cryptonym "RYZHYY." Writy Otffieer at the U.S. Embassy twas the target of an unsuccessful froeruitment operation in 1954 or ‘¥. On the basis of falsified os of SMITH and his Russian maid gexual relations, the KGB tried to italize on the fact that he was i@ed having an affair with this maid. oyranhs were sent to him in a Lat- hieh get up a meeting with KGB. Jame to the meeting, but did not qe to recruitment: agreed to come nothec meeting. He did net appear, latter receiving several more @atuning letters from the Hub, onfessed to the Ambassador and was hone. DRSBERG, James Harry: Military code agk who was NOSENKO"s principal re- udtment target during 1560-1961, ow-moving development operation nedeated of involving STORSBERG rét with a series of Soviet females th the aid of NOSENKO's agent, Johan SISFREUND, a Finnish businessman; cond in blackmarket activities; @.€inally, with the aid of N.S. VORTSOV (who posed as a French sinessman) with more female KGB ents. Compromising photographs i TREE g eprom yet peer Pe 400. NOSENKU claimed case officer ine volvement in the operation in 1962, but in 1964 retracted this and gaid he learned of the case from V.M. KOVSHUK who was the case officer. His only role was in a surveillance phone-watch. (1962) Personal involvement. NOSENKO said he devoted almost full time to this case for about a year. In 1964 NOSENKO said he was pres~- ent in the hall outside the hotel room in which STORSBERG was approached. In 1962 NOSENKO had said that he personally approached STORSBERG. (1962, without name) noe eeteens onencrrommmnapen ep Bs 4 cyanide deitey oor Bote tpn ce tee ements! IL NRE Ae NREL Stn He tat a entnenanned trite gt A | | GOLITSYN told of reading, some time .in 1957, of a case against a U.S. - " Embassy Security Officer, not namea, based on his love affair with his Russian maid or cleaning woman. By KGB instruction she told him she was being forced to work for the KGB and would be arrested if she did not. He helped her by pass~ ing her false information, until my the KGB objected, after which he j° passed a mixture of false and true material. This took place between 1953.and 1957. Edward Ellis SMITH acknowleuged to CIA his having ro- ceived letters (as described by NOSENKO) --in June 1956==-but denied having personal meetings with the = KGB . He did confess to the Ambassa-. “G dor, but only to having been intimate ef? with the maid. Not until 1962, when SS confronted with the details from ee] GOLITSYN, did he confirm the truth ai} ef the rest of the story as GOLITSYN told it. At all times he aeniea accepting recruitment. See Part a, VI.D.4.c. for details. q’ GOLITSYN reported two leads which may relate to this operation. First was to a military code clerk in Moscow who had been developed to the point where recruitment ‘ was virtually assured by: spring of 1960. (STORSBERG was one of two American "military code clerks" in Moscow at the time.) Second lead was to American at U.S. Emb- assy who was successfully recruited with the aid of PREISFREUND in . late 1960, (NOSENKO and PREISFREUND . emer nem ames seemungreermaimnntas suns eantt Fe RTE TR Tete oe ace seme iy
CEP TITe ame eter erate = fobtained and STORSBERG was gdached on basis his activitics and ifieial aeed shortly before he was igigned in late 1961 SRERG STORE do to cooperate, but cid not ren the approach to the Americans and ge approached again by the KGB if rs abroad, SCUWARZENSACH : an “urisuccessf: ul KGB approach in 1958 or 1959. Jing in Moscow at the time love with a male KCB agent. compromicing photograohs this Soviet, but it was : that these were now ho approach, which was bese her afrection for the Sav- did not nnow who made ar under what cireum- was Certain the attempt Sete peg aba “eth amy at feat eect et nme tet 4ol. was not sure from this information, NOSENKO said he whom he learned bur it may have come from V.il. MURHAYLOV Of U.S. Embassy Sec~ tion who cirected the operation. NOGENKO did not ceac the file on SCHAARZE NBACH, but saw it and the compromising pchoetographs. (1964) be sede Sep ees AR reported that PREISFREUND took part in eration SCHWARZENBACH Nuring 195 5 and 1956, was secretary to Mrs. BOHLEN, the Ambassador's wife, and Director of the Anglo-American School in Mos= cow. In 1956 and 1957 shoe worked for Henry SHAPIRO, UP representative there (see Part VI.D.2.a.)i While employed by SHAPIRO she became acquainted with one Viktor‘I. SER- GEYEV, 4 functionary in, the pube- lishing business. In January 1959 she was approached by a KGB officer in Riga on the basis of compromising photography and was asked. to provide specific information on the U.5. Embassy. She reported this at once to Henry SHAPIRO, who told Ambassador THCHPSON, SCHWARZENBACH left the USSR in carly 1959, shortly after the incident. She was, inter- viewed by the State Department Re= glonee Security offic against S° STORSRERG. ) 38038 dOL L . foe cca tence one te He mete 8 pea aT TH NET SHeenme ty te Se em
State: Terese pe mee ‘Investigations REDIAN, fohn Veg ROSENKO was the KGL age Olticer responsible for ANIDIAN uging 1960-1961, ABIDIAN, the U.S. Security Officer, was ot important target of (he Setend niet Directorate aon this period, oWRVer, rb was deciaed merely to a@ch nim and not attemon recrunt- ant in hupes of “catehiiod onother opov" (the GRU Lieutenant colonel no had been handled by former ogurity Officer Russeli LANGHiLE n@ who, according to NOSENEO, was pprehescee un 1959 through surverl- ance).  SOSENFO received the reporc- ng fron those agents who were in toucn ith ARIDEAN and Supervised surveil-~$ ahce coverage on him. At the eng £1960, ABIDIAN was noted visiting nf adéress on Pushnin Street in ow which appeared suitable for a agd crop anc special surveillance fi-this location was bedun, but there are no results. Only later, when OBENKO was no longer in the U.S. Mos~ assy Suction, was it leagned that ni 8 drop site was related to the PEN- OVSKLY operation (GRU colonel who was gent source for CIA and British in- @lligence). unt: IGER, Bonald: Barn in 1937, a U.S. Tere, “traveled to the USSR in 1963 md wan the target of a KGB javesti- ‘tion in Sechi; he was thought to be- @ng to American Intelligence >ecause @ his contacts with a KGB agent, kyptonym “TRAPEZUND," 402, wee er paaene weep of Personal involvement as ABTDIAN' 5 case: officer. Atter RAIDI AN visited Pushkin Street addvess, NOSENKO inspected area and later received reports of stationary surveillance established across the street. (1962) Personal involvement; supervised activities of local KGB organiva- tion; discussed case with the American Department and with O.M GRLBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. (1964) ess It took place on 30 December 1961, a year after the date given by NOSENKO and several days before NOSENKO allegedly transferred to the. Tourist Department. See Part VI.D.7.b. Donald ALBINGER * eyed teats woos semnmnniee eheante tsp: seanenamem mene heet Ha Std ES REG ce «ett [IIS 201 } ‘ i
ee ORN, Feoederick: BARCHOORN, a fOr at Yale University, was the of a KGB provocation operation 33 the KGB planted disinforma~ ni BARGHOORN and then arrested he purpose of the provocation counteract the FBI arrest of NOV in New York in connection he BUTENEO case with a view fe Wy tracing BARSHOORN for IVANOV Misecacraging future such arrests FRI. BAPGHOORN was in the USSP ourist at the time of IVANOV's fand was considered the most ; availabir hostage for 4 way, “Whomas Franklin: Twice totter ences te istry + eran thes SER CT et a . groups to the USSR in Wd was assessed as an Ameri- elligence agent; BARTHELEMY nhact with Re. a Finn a pet rye Arsen ete 403. Personal involvement in prelimi- nary discussions and sélection of BARGHOORN as vietim; NOSENKO was present during initial stages of BARGHOCOPN's interrogation follow-~ ing his arrest. (1964) Learned of BARTHELEMY’ s contact with LAINE from the Leningrad KGR while ghere on TRY in i963. Lik= THE LEY had Leen under observa- tien by the Tourist Department in 1959 because KGR had information he had graduated from an intel- tigence school, This information was in his file in Tourist Depart- ment.  €LRed) Professor BARGHOORN was arrested in Mescow on 31 October 1963 after an unknown Soviet approached him on the street and placed what purported to be classified documents in his pockets. BARGHOORN's account of the provocation-arrest and its aftermath generally coincides with that given by NOSENKO. BARGHOORN recognized . NOSENKO's photograph as that of one £ the Soviets present at hia intere- rogation. See Part V.F.7. name appears in a KGB document on Western tourist operations, supplied by GGLITSYN in 1962. acts with
XR VEA eny Aan eae ot aes vey Monee pase et ate , John S.: BENSON, an Army major, Ge Assistant Army Attache in Mas- 1955; because of his status he sumed to be an intelligence : and was therefore studied. Tiong time the KCB had wanted cet of electronic intelligence fent being used by the Ameri-~ As early as the beginning of fauthorization was given the Embassy Section to steal this ment. This was accomplished in when BENSON was on a trip to ngrad with fellow attaches x MULE and William STROUD. Hav- @arned that the American attaches he equipment an their hotel room, ifficers broke in at an appro-~ moment and took it. All three @ans were then declared persona ata. Other than normal sur- Ince, no other action taken r BENSON during Moscow tour. iN, Harold: While visiting the v% Union RERMAN, an American we und prominent jurist, was vOnded by KGB agents, but the KGB {ido nething with him. i ‘Ns Lewis: In 1960 the KGB dered” that Lewis BOWDEN was ecurity Officer at the American s8y and that he was “perhaps 1Gted with CLA or the FBI." He ig@aling with counterintelligence egs such as “SK" (i.e., was con- a@ with security of Americans goow]). The U.S. Embassy Section 4o4, Personal involvement as U.S. Embassy Section officer working against military attaches in 1953- 1955. Took part in initial attempts to secure electronic equipment, but had transtarced to Tourist bepartment in June 1955, before the theft took place and was not involved. (1964) Source not named, and NOSENKO did not provide date he obtained this information. He said he did not know anything about BERMAN other than that he is a professor of law, came to the USSR quite often, and was being studied. (1964) KOVSHUK, who told NOSENKO about BOWDEN in 1959 when NOSENKO was in Tourist Department, NOSENKO used Arsene FRIPPEL, KGB agent recruited in 1959, as a source on BOWDEN. (1964) -ary 1960, which sets the goal of © _antageer awe ghia aman me + uA ale wed In May 1955 the KGB officers forced their way into the Stalingrad hotel room occupied by Assistant Army Attaches BENSON, MULE and STROUD, pinioned the officers, and left with sensitive electronic equip-- mont. The three were immediately declared persona non grata by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Part V.C.3.b. GOLITSYN also reported on the Stalingrad equip- ment seizure; he added that a KGB general organized the operation. When the Soviet General Stafr gave the equipment a very high evalua- tion, it was then recommended for use by the Soviets abroad. — vw Lad938 dOL BERMAN is a professor at Harvard University specializing in the Soviet legal system; he has visited the USSR on several occasions for o} study and research and has described several incidents in Moscow which appear to have heen provocations. BOWDEN was Second Secretary in the | Internal Affairs Section of the : U.S. Embassy in 1958-1960. He was not connected with CIA or the PstI at this time. He is the subject of the CHEREPANOV paper giving an operational plan, dated Febru- “exposing his possible agent
officer working against him “A. KUSKOV, and V.M. KOVSHUK was acquainted with him. TNER, Robert Charles: CHRISTNER prested while touring the Sov- mion by automobile. (NOSENKO ‘this case in passing while re- Wg a list of Americans who had da the USSR; he was not ques- ‘& further on it.) itIN, Howard L. A lieutenant al and edistant Army Attache 1953 until 1954 or 1955, when 1g declared persona non grata Waltation for a similar act @ United States.  FELCHLIN Watonatically ass sumed to be itelligence officer and was i@d accordingly. ; IOUSER, Richard: The U.S. Emb- “Beclicn suspected that FUNK- Rowas a CIA officer because he Specialist on Russia, parti- ‘Ly economics. NOSENKO did eall the nanes of agents re- Ag on FUNKHOUSER but reported he case officer responsible ’ was V.A. KUSKOV. IOFF, Ray: At Geneva disarma- balks in spring of 1962 and olled to the USSR in 1963 and was 2¢ted by the KGB of being an igan Intelligence officer; NKO assigned to watch him in in 1962 and close watch was 405. None indicated. (1964) Personal involvement as Ameri- can Department case officer re- sponsible for FELCHLIN. NOSENKO held FELCHLIN's file and directed agents surrounding ham. (1964) Source not named. NOSENKO thought he may have read some of the "matorials” concerning FUNKHOUSER, but could not recall their con- tent. (1964) Source not named. Tourist De- partment case while GARTHOFF was in USSR, (1964) contacts, See Part VI.D.7.¢c. As announced in the press and as stated in a KGB document on Amerie can tourists which GOLITSYN pro- vided, CHRISTNER was arrested on charges of of 1961, as well as his countering telligence activity in the Embassy. * FELCHLIN, who arrived in Moscow in July 1953, was declared persona non grata with Major Walter McKINNEY on 25 March 1954; they were charged with spying while on a trip to Vladi= vostok, Sea@ Part V. Cc. 3.b FUNKHAUSER was Counsellor for Econo- mic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in 1961-1962; | u IGART- HOFF is[ lan advisor to the State Department and inatructor at the Sino~-Soviet Institute at George Washington University; he is a specialist in Soviet political and military policy. Hg ennta aniston eect, eee Fay oa & Tg re ca oe cae e = 3 ce erate AD
~eresteprnetenime eerie t fevgmare rece one nt we tae ON RE ae tte emt ae ef tampeee oe beg ote Liste pn one ae cainfem pentane age are ata p ENTE tees E ne ee enti arene eygeeg ane ee 406. so, ; mo A ohim in 1963, whan KGB cgents wer . @Gainst him; a >; A member of the CPUSA ‘ i $ : KOTEN, i c Supervised the case as Deput an instructor at NYU and mem- t puty Ecsiaent of New York City, KOTEN Chief of the Tourist Department ber of a mumber of Communist front 4d A number of contacts with an and sanctioned KOTEN's compromise organizations, wasinterviewed by Int KGR Ga agent Leer eae and detention in the absence of representatives of the State Depart=- EN travelled to the suvact OM, GRIBANOV and NOSENKO's other Ment in January 1964. Ue described : pn 1963, he carried with him the superiors. (444) his arrest, interrogation, and month- Lo ig ef relatives of this agent and ‘long imprisonment in August-September ig@d to visit them KOTESN thera- 1563, saying that he denied being as considered to he a probable an FBI agent and that the Soviets rant. and because of this and later told him the arrest was ail. Signs of FRI susricion of the a mistake. He was released on 28 @® agent, che ePayRE pegs September 1963 after intervention a mev began preparations to Gee by the CEUSA. In unprecedented = agent out of the United States move, fact of arrest on homosexual ROTEN was in the CsSk, he was charges leaked to Western press by 4 @fully compromised by a Kos Inturist, and case received wide or) ual agent, was arrested, inter- publicity in U.S. newspapers in ma i@, and imprisoned, Uis dotane . 3. «4 | id bean requested by the First Directorate, which wanted to ritime for the ABP acent to es- aa we KOTEN returned to the : illmore K.: Repiaced Mt 7 Personal involvement as case Army Attache in Moscow in 1954- i Sea AE Attache (see below) ’ officer responsible for military 1955, replacing MICKELSON. A nume- pe wag automatically assumed to attaches during 1353-1955. No- ber of incidents, including one — litary intelligence officer. SENKO was present when baggage was recruitment approach, on record-= feurrounded with agants, and- searched with assistance of the none of which has NOSENKO reported. , @ entered the country for the Special Tuchnical Section of the See Part V.C.3.b. time his baggage was searched Second Chief Birectorate. (1964) Sopy "of his service record found. was no approach to him, and no s8ses or Vulnerabilitics were ‘@uring his tour-in Moscow. pice te ern me wee ee rend rere arn Te Re orenen ant ne on
Coe Tera nninene sp compen ian” LSON, Fart L. Army Attache and ad military “tatelligence officer; fore, main task of U.S. Embassy on was not recruitment, but to nt him from carrying out his in- gence mission in the USSR by aAt heavy surveiliance, MICKEL- £2 le in the U.S. Embassy Section ited nothing unusual or interest- ron any source and no derogatory ation. PF. PANKRATOV was the aa case officer working against and the case was turned over to KO in 1954. t may have been LSON rather than MEARNS whose j@ was searched (see above). Walter: Captain MULE was an tant Army Attache in Moscow in 1955. In either 1953 or “i954, KO accompanied N.M. BORODIN and KOVSHUM te Leningrad, where BORO- repositioned MULE to work for oB. MULE refused. In 1955, #@3 with DENSON and STROUD in ngrad when the KGB broke into - hotel room and stole classified ro@nics equipment. He was declared n@ non grata shortly afterwards. 3ENSON, above.) 2} Lee Harvey; When OSWALD in his vesire to defect to the ied cgUnion and particularly after he Weed suicide by slashing his wrists, 1B felt that there was “something * (with him and decided to leave him tly alone, OSWALD was never ached by the KGB at any time during tay in the USSR or subsequently and 6 he nor his wife Marina were, at ime, KGB agents. Se oe Sere ee ee 1959 ede eeecices a 407. Personal involvement as responsible case officer in 1954, (1964) Served as Army Attache from 1952 until December 1954. See Part V.C.3.b. : Leningrad incident took place on 29 September 1954 and was reported at once by MULE. Along with BENSON and STROUD, he was declared persona non grata on 7 May 1955. See Part V.C.3.b. Perscnal involvement as respon- sible case officer in 1954-1955, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK blocked MULE's exit from Leningrad hotel room so that BORODIN could talk to him in 1953 or 1954. (1964) Documents provided by the Soviet was first involved with OSWALD in Government after the assassination 1959, when as a Tourist Department are consistent with NOSENKO's officer, he had a part in considera=- account and give no indication of tion of OSWALD’s application for KGB interest in OSWALD. See Part Sovict citizenship and the KGB's de- V.D.6. : . 1 cision to “wash its hands of him," ' | In 1963, after President KENNEDY's | assassination, NOSENKO, then Deputy . OO chief of the Tourist Department, took ~~ \ part in investigations of OSWALD. , : (1964) Personal parlicpation; NOSENKO ane eaten Laeceanmeemmngen geese vee ene mp eeye ot nn ae ea
TRS STEERER NBS LE I aa RU a Se caer ig Sa aa ind SRR emerge ues panei gree care es i INER, Gabriel: Head of the Cosnes ave. agency; has visited the Soviet Union ana is of interest to the KGB whach has place@ officers in contact wath hai; however, ho da bebrcverd te be in contact with the FRI, and no atteme: hos been made to recruit him fér this reasen: REINE® is talkative, shrewd, and foxy, bat he would not be JOod agenc material, and any athempse t® comercemise hin would be.a waste of tame. Fra S.: “Lieutenant Colonel vas an Assistant Army Attache if Moscow during 1994 and LOSS and as shcon was a subpyjec: of study. >OSENKS WAS resp ongible case officer and nanu~ ABA agents venorting on RICHARDS. WHO was nating onterestimg ay une . waboan RESEARDS' Ron file. 4, fi fred: An American who QO EO yp aphie Shop in bew York poy, SLESINGSE has visited the USER veral times, pessibly in i960 and spot ni is suspected of being an he agen’. lio New York he has had d@éatings with a aumber of Sovict visitors who cams to his store and sgemed to display more than normal imtercsc an them. When it was thought h@® miqht make some contacts cr do something interesting in the USSR, the TOurist Deparcment put an agmnt, the Owner Gf a Moscow phstoqraphic shop, in contact with him. They became friends and may have exchanged cor- r@spondence there was no plan to DER Sena eee este 408. Source not named. REINER was in contact with Tourist Depart- mont officer V.D. CHELNOKOV and was considered for KGB recruit- ment in connection with NOSENKO's plan to recruit tourist firm em- ployeces for use as spotters. (L904) Personal involvement; case offi cer. (1964) Sources nob named. Tourist be pastmont case officer was Yu. OYIRAIN; SLESINGER visited UssA at tine NOSEN:O was in the Tour- ist Mepartment. (1964) con emanpenpn reef - ered ae tg Born in Lithuania or Poland, REINER came to the United States in 1922; he is a member of the New York City Bar Asseciation and has managed Cosmos since 1935; he, had travelled extensively to the USSR and Satel- lite countries and is:a registered foreign agent on Inturist: he hag not been interviewea by the FBI. RICHARDS was Assistant Army Attache from July 1954 to July 1956. He was interviewed by CIA. in November 1964 and mentioned a-:number of Sov- iets with whom he had contact and whom NOSCNKO! had identified as KGB agents One of these was Lyudmilla GROMAKOVA, his language teacher, whom NOSENKO identified but did not sociate with RICHARDS. See Part v. C.3.6. ‘ é oat eS sectromgs tts Ny
eNom ren ee + PIP Ree rotmec re yerpe weet oe ere Aeron SLESINGER, but only fo gtudy him. NOSENKO had no other decails. ‘ STROUD, William R.: Captain STROUD @as an Assistant Army Attache in asa and POSS From concealed micro- phones the KGB learned before his arr ivakh aun Mescow that STROUD was an @xpert in electronic intelligence techniques. STROUD, together with BENSON and MULE (q.v.), was caudnt By the KGB an Stalingrad in posses~ @ron of electronic intelligence de- yaces and was declared persona | non rate Qther than this, NOSENK anew “nothing anteresting or unusual about sTRoup from any source. dasnanKo, Steve: The KGB considered @asENRG, the Agricultural Attache, to. @ either a CTA officer or contact. On: rips outside Moscow he gathered intor- ation in manner of an intelligence Officer and was heard discussing rce- ports on his return via concealed microphones. He once mailed a letter, probably in 1959, to a KGB- ~controlled agent inside the. USSR. Also, he con- tinually checked for surveillance. American Department therefore in- @tituted special surveillance, surrounded him with agents, and metka to his clothes to detect @ailings. = i rrr rs 409. Personal involvenent as respon- sible case officer in 1954-1955, but hod left First Department in June 1955, before the Stalingrad theft took place. (1964) Source not named. NOSENKO said he joined U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960; WASHENKO was in Mos- cow until March 1960. (1964) tiem + te Romie epee Assistant Military Attache from 1954 until he was declared sona non grata on 7 May 1955 following the seizure of clec~ tronic equipment in Stalingrad. ' wie Quesd 4 sete teat,
pe ee meee ae S$. George; WINTERS was the a tie compromise of CIA agent KGB surveillance detected WINTERS fa letter to POPOV in January an this way got its first indi- "Pchat POPOV was working for CIA. i$, because of his conduct, had ansadered a CIA of facer and pare gattention was given hin prior -Wetter mailing. One of his KGB ts was V.M. KOVSHUK, who used the VQMAROV and the cover of the Sov- fistry of Foreign Affairs. ‘8 was not cicclared persona non With LANGELLE after the arrest QV because the KGB did not want ‘@al how POPOV was discovered, in we that WINTERS might attempt — .Q@nal letter matlings. He was iaily declared persona non grata Sw maser zro nematic ee. emt ete te 410. First heard of WINTERS from KOVSHUK probably in 1959, when KOVSHUM said that he had an appointment to meet WINTERS and therefore could not go out drink- ing with NOSENKO; KOVSHUK probably did not indicate that WINTERS was a guspected CIA officer at this time. After the POPOV compromise, NOSENEKO learned from KOVSHUK that WINTERS, not LANGELLE, was the true cause of the compromise. (1962) WINTERS served in Moscow from June 1958 until October 1960, when he was declared persona non grata for his part in the POPOV opera- tion, (LANGELLE, POPOV's case officer in Moscow, was declared persona non grata a year earlier.) A CTA staff officer, WINTERS mailed one letter to POPOV in January 1959 and performed other support funce- tions in connection with the case. In debriefings he has described his relationship with KOVSHUK, whom he saw frequently. POPOV compromise is also given in the CHEREPANOV Papers, many of which concern WINTERS. See Part VI.D.7.a. The story of the crmmiene, peepee =e 48,* Lobe “potting 4 oun co] eS eo owe os as é Peer: ae
PUD Cuban missile crisis in late 1962.** SHALYAPIN had 3. Selected Causes of Recruited Amer:cans ‘Note: Of NOSENKO's leads to Americans recruited by the KG8, ; there were three who, he indicated, had access tc Classified U.S. Government information at the tine he first reported on them to CIA. These three cases-- "SASHA", “ANLKEY' (Dayle W. SMITH), and the penetra- tion source in France {Sergeant Robert Lee JCHNSON)-- therefore have been selected ror detailed discussicn. (i) NOSENKO's Information on the Agent At the first meeting with CIA in 1964 NOSENKO announced that he could not continue to work in place for CIA; he was going to defect outright, he said, rather than ,o back to the Soviet Unicn. He was told that in order to make the arransements isr his secure removal from Switzerland it would be necessary to expand the limited number of people in CIA who were avare of his case; in this connection it was extremely important that he think hard about «.ether he knew of any indication ci. nenetraticn of CIA. His first reaction was to shruz his shoulders indicating that he had no idea, but upon his case ofiicer's insistence he thought : ’ t & further about the question and finally said: "Il do not know of any in CIA, but there 1s one in vour military intelligence. This one worked in Germany, and then returned to America in 1955, and then after 1955 he worked in Geruany." He explained that he had first learned of this case from M.A. SHALYAPIN, who had been the case officer for this operation in Germany . This agent, whose mame SOSENKO did not know, was still in Cermany as cof the time SHALYAPIN left Berlin in about 1957.*® SH!ALYAPIN told him that this agent's KGB cryptonym was “SASHA, and that he had recruited “SASHA” himself in Germany, on a purely financial vasis. Asked if “SASHA wore a uniform while meeting his KGB handler, NOSENKO said he appeared in civilian clothes. He knew "SASHA" was of offi- cer status, but whether he was in civilian or military intelligence he could not say; he thought, however, the agent was working against military targets NOSENKO added that "SASHA" returned to the United States in the 1960's, then specified 1962, and returned to Germany again after that. In February 1964, talking about another matter, NOSENKO said he had remembered something that might help to identify "SASHA." He had heard that the KGB had not -had luck’ in getting ° intelligence from high places in the U.S. Government during the *On the basis of the collateral evidence on KGB officers in Germany named by NOSENKO in connection with SHALYAPIN (see below), it has been established that--despite NOSENKO's dates of 1955 to 1957--"SASHA" would have been in Germany and recruited some time between early 1957.and late 1959, when . re (according to NOSENKO).SHALYAPIN left Germany for an assign- ment to Cuba. *®See also Part V.F.10. for. NOSENKO's statements about the fole of GRU Colonel G.N. BOLSHAKOV in the Cuban missile crisis Of October 1962. aoe acted ce wole es dave Cola, $ 4 4 { : i
14-00000 PERSO ep Bln VSTT SES , antioned in this context that “SASHA’ had Leen tioned in Re United States during this pertcd but had ne eer able to rivide any infe:maticn of value. NOSENKO concluded from this that "SASHA's" second assignment to Gernany, +iere he served as a department chief in antciligence, did not tase nlace until sometime after the Cuban crisis--November leo? at the earliest, ee a Ou ea ee CD GF Hots ciate H thee AAS Rime MRE, RTS ard perhaps not u.tii the first part or 1363 (He later stated 4 firmly that SHALYAPIN had not told him this part of the case, 4 but he was unable to say whe had.) : 4 - 3 NOSERKO was not certain «hich depa i e of the First Chief Directorate was criginally resjonsibie 3 A"; at first he because the agent ‘4 thought it was the Third (Eurcpean) Separtm had been recruited in Cermany, but then he reiéerred to Cermany as : r a special situation aud said he thought if might have been the First (Ancrican} Separtment, since the agent was an American. In . 3 2s on o 2 ao fl ee je any event, NOSENEO stated, the Service No. 2 the last First Chief Directorate elesent responsitle for th a cated that it was uot a valuable operatiucn produciny intel ligence-- otherwise the Ancrican Department would not nave given it up to the Service Ne. 2. NOSENKO knew no other kOe case officers who had been persenally involved in the case with or after SHALYAPIN, se, which indi- (ii) NOSENKO's Scurcing NOSENKO was interviewed intensively about SHALYAPIN and the "SASHA" case on a number of occasions. Concerming SHALYAPIN, he said tnuat this KGB officer had been stationed in the United { States in 1944 or 1945, at which time he worked as an interpreter in the United.Nations fer the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, D.c. MANUILSKTY SHALYAPIN was in tae United States for five or six »years, but NOSENKO did nut know an what year he ; returned to the USSR. Upon returning, he was assigned by the 4 First Chief Directorate to work in the Anerican Department as ; Chicf of cone of the four directions *«hich then existed in the department--New York, Washington, Canada, and Latin America. At some later date SHALYAPIN was Deputs Resident and then Resi- dent for the KGB in Uruguay, succeeding I.P. MISHIN in this capacity.* His next foreign ass gnment was berlin, NOSENKO did not know definitely the period of this tour but believed it was from 1955 to 2887; he did know thar V.¥. ERIVOQSHEY was in Germany for a short time after SHALYAPIN arrived. ** N.S. SKVORT- _ SOV was also there fer a short while, because SHALYAPIN took over SKVORTSGV's cases befcre the latter left to return to Moscow. Although NOSENKO invariably has given 1955-1957 as . SHALYAPIN's dates for his Germany assignment, he has also said i that SHALYAPIN left Germany because he had to go to Cuba, and ; ‘that he went to Cuba some time in 1959. He was recalled from Cuba around January i962 because he had been rude to the Cubans, oo quarrelled with the Chief of Cuban Intelligence, and was drink- , er ing heavily. NOSENKO said that he met SHALYAPIN for the first : *0n the basis of this item from NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN was iden- ‘ tified from photographs as being identical with M.G. KOTUKHOV, ‘ i assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Montevideo from July 1950 j 7 to June 1955, with five or six months' home leave in 1953. a f i ° | ; 4
PaO le be eer  &t:) enero tise in about September or October 196Z, throucn Yu.1 GUR, who had wotked in the Anerican Department of the Firse Cnief Direc- torate in Moscow Headquarters with SHALYAPIN at some tine, pro~- bably before GUK was asSigned to the United States.*’ When SHALYAPIN came back from Cuba, he was to be a case officer in the Latin American Departaecnt of the First Chief -: Directorate, under 5.N. ANTONGY, SHALYAPIN, a full colorel at . this time, resented this assignment, and there vas also consider- able animosity between himself and ANIONOVY. whose work in America hed been criticized by SHALYAPIN, the desk officer for ANTONOV at that time. Thus SHALYAPIN decided to retire, and he applied to tre Medical Commission of the KCB for UGisabllity retirement on the basis of ailments he had contracted because of his work. (On one occasion NOSENKO clained that a friend of a friend of his was or this commission, and NOSENKO used his influence with him to help SHALYAPIN get his medical retirement.) He retired on full pension, and NOSENKO then helpsd ham to get a jon with Isturist. Wher SKYORTSOVY and ANTONGV heard or this. they tried to inter- cede with V.D. CHELNOKC, Chic f of the lourist Department, Second Chief Directorate, to prevent him fron getting the job, because tney both wanted to revenge themselves on SEALVAPIN for his having exposed both of them in the past @ poor work. NOSENKO, however, personally told CHELNOKOV of ihe true background of their efforts and pointed out to him how good a case officer SHALYAPIN was. SOSENKO got SHALYAPIN s file from the Tourist Department officer who ordercd it in connection »ith the Inturist job and brought it to CHELNOKOV. As a result of this interven-~ tion by SOSENKG, SHALYAPIS got the Inturist job. These actions on NOSENKO's part made him a close friend of SHALYAPIN. Because of this SHALYAPIN felt free to talk to NOSENKO, and over drinks he expressed his particular bitterness at the way the First Chief Directorate had treated fim. Since without him 1 it wouid not have had an agent Like "SASHA" an Germany at that time (1963). On a couple of other such occasions, SHALYAPIN told NOSENKO some of the details about "SASHA." The above story is what NOSENKO most often cited as the back-~ ground for his having happened to learn about ‘SASHA, Under in- tensive questioning, however. on exactly when and how he first learned of the "SASHA" case, NOSENKO backed off of his original attribution to SHALYAPIN; he said he did not remember when or from whom he had first picked this up, but that it could have been from GUK, or LOPUKHOV, maybe SHALYAPIN or others. He added, hov- ever, that .he was sure that SHALYAPIN had talked to him about the case at some time.** come *CUK was in the United States from. August 1954 to September 1956. He had transferred fron the Second Chief Directorate to the American Department of the First Chief Directorate in January 1952, according to GOLIESYN. Trus if he and SHALYAPIN served there together, it was either during the latter's home leave in May-October 1953, or in late 1956, before SHALYAPIN went to Germany. #*At this time NOSENKO nad already met CIA representatives in Geneva and had agreed to collect information for them. a tee tbat nil een wait TEES an ial ecae ashen ish phil teint ne + tae helt aration ethic mee kt tek ribet te « wb pee ecb can
14-0000 Deed on Com ge Ta NOSENKO has indicated that others to vnom the “SASHA case vas known were GUK, because he worked in the American Department when he returned from Switzerland in 1962; KRIVOSHEY, because he was a good friend of SHALYAPIN; LOPUKHOV, who was with NOS ENKO when SHALYAPIN talked atout “SASHA"; and SKVORTSOV, because he “ig sly" and had many acquaintances. Also aware of the case was Ye.A. ZAQVSTROVTSEV. because ne too “is sly” and “knows every- thing that is going on wherever he is"; ZAOVSTROVISEY was in Ger- many for many years. ANGSENKO said he thought KOYSHUK also: knew about “SASHA.” Aithough he had first attributed rhe story of "SASHA" in re- lation to the Cuba sissile crisis to SHALYAPIN, in subsequent discussions of the “SASHA" case, NOSENKO has denicd that he learned of it froa SHALYAPIN. He could not reeall from whom he did hear this, "perhaps from (¥Yu.1.}) GUK, from [¥u.A.} LOPLKHOV, or from (V.M.) KOVSHUK." . (iii) GOLIISYN's Lead to “SASHA GOLITSYN provided a lead to a KGB recruitment of an agent in Germany who had tne KCK cryptonym "SASHA, ihis agent was eonnected with American [v.telligence. and «ithougn originally this was an operation of the Emigre Department, KOB- First Chief Directorate, it was taken over by the Fourtcenth (Counterintelli- - gence) Department, predecessor of Service ho. 2. COLITSYN first learned some details of this case in about 1955. H ? i 3 : F . i s § $ Ml & Bicone ae She “as a yt . wok stishin BOR a haeaae ible swe ott heme bn! gnats
feet ore viet [Ir contacting CHA in June 1992, HOSFNKO offered to cell : ‘two itens of antormation aicat KGS operat.arns in return for money 4 to replace cperaticnal funds he hed squandered on a Geneva bar~ Giri. He fisse made tris offer to David MARK on tne afternoon of . 2 a ‘6 June 1952, deecribing one iteh 19 MARK & (the case of an Amer.- 7 can who had ceen re. ruited by the KGB in Mos ow while assigned to ‘4 the U.S, Epnbas-y, and whe vas then (Jung 1962! working in Washing- = ton "near ciphers. On the €vening of the game day he geve this lead in greater detai: to a CIA case often and said “ANDREY" was the KGA cl yprony NOMSPENKO dic net kruy bis true name but gave sore, data which iid puesvat Identification. Sariy in the 1964 : meénings with ROSDENKO thc SRNDVEY’ og: wis BUHLN Giscussed, and . “a Gerpive ditieré: eS sn ett ain portienlacs as compared + with Cs EXKO's 19670 es aprarent afrce further anvestiga- rien that thore was eniy cues pole candidare for “ANDREY’: Sergeant Davie WW. GMITH, a codge-nachine repa.iman im rhe Moscow Embassy from Apriid (992 tu fori: i954, «bo nad cetired from the U.S. Acmy on db hovtrner loeb. was then pas FRE oon the oasis of toe NCGENKO Aacrhough G oreptinent PEED, RR Lede Soe sticned PY the Tarst cnied ; i The fotlowing review of the "ANDREY" case is divided into several parts: NOSENKO's intormation 19 Vooe, nis information in 1966, his sour. ing for thas antormatier, and the results of : the invest:gatior of the NOSENKO lead. 3 (24) NOSENKO!'s Into, i2 rMarye a In 1962, at the First meeting in Geneva, NOSENKO intro- 4 duced the ‘ANDREY' vase: NOSENKO- Now Twili teil you (about the se.ond of we cases). 4 T did not work on this vase perso onaliy. A code : machine mechanic was recruited in Mascow., He was : fe.0e cited with women und mouey. In 13950 or 1949, : Question: Wher was this? NOSENKO:: 1949, 1950, With this case it is more difficult. : ' Recause IT will rot be able.to Give you his name. But I will give you such facts which will allcw you to find himees They recruited him. He worked in Moscow satistactocriy. He gave information on : “ ciphers. He gave materials... He promised he would cooperate with us abroad, but he said he ould net work with us in America. He said: "In : ne case do I want to sit in the electric chair." 7 They paid nim well enough. He did not want to i WOrK In AMEN LC Geee : i 4 Question: He was recruited when? j . ee a ae Doe a NOSENKO: Tn 1949-1950, in Moscow. ; i ° F 4% 3 aA : “3 ; ’ eene : 5 C : } TOP SECRET -
_Guestion:: Yes, yes, I am saying, was he already at that time... NOSENKO: I tell you T was not working on this case. He was SR recruited in 1949~1950. ‘ Question: When did he leave Moscow? NOSENKO: He left in 1950. It seems sc, yes. He said that he ; = would not work in the USA. : NOSENKO went on to say that "“ANDREY" was the cryptonym assigned to the agent by the Second Chief Directorate at the time of nis recruitment. Although NOSENKO was not sure of the dates, he was certain that this man, a U.S. Army Sergeant, had been spotted for the KGA by Roy RHODES, whose KGB cryptonym was "QUEBEC", RHODES was still im Moscow when “ANDREY" was ce- cruited; he had told the KGB about many other U.S. Embassy employees, including military personnel, and the name * ANDREY" would mean nothing to REODES because he did not know that the KGB had recruited thie man.* The mechanic worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB, providing materiais and infermation on ciphers. "“ANDREY" pro- mised he would cooperate with the Soviets in future assignments abroad, but would not work with them in the United States as he did not want to "sit in the electric chair.” He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow, and the Soviets wanted to pay him more but he refused to accept it because he said he couid not plausibly explain the possession of too much money. When the KGB offered him diamondsand other gems for later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers that possession of a largé diamcnd of more than a carat in the United States could arouse the attention of the police. In 1950 the agent left Moscow for the United States, and the KGB waited for him to reappear in some other country, but he did not. Finally in 1955 the KGB sent an officer, who had participated in the re- eruitment of the agent in Moscow, to the United States for the purpose of finding “ANDREY" and the officer had no other nt anata mane stented nae - After NOSENKO's first mention of Roy RHODES' role in this es case; records were checked for the dates of RHODES’ assign- ment in Moscow, which were April 1951 to July 1953. . Accord- - ing to RHODES, the date of his own recruitment by the KGB was January 1952. When these dates were cited to NOSENKO on two separate occasions during the 1962 meetings he , changed the original date for the recruitment from 1949 or 1950 to 195z or 1953. In 1962, as well as in 1964, he said he was certain that the recruitment had already | taken place prior to his (NOSENKO's) entrance on duty with the KGB. In 962 he gave this date as « Marck. 1953. In 1964 and since he has given a variety of dates for this, ranging from the beginning of 1952 to April 1953. (See Part V.A.) natebedbe testa’ a at Techn d att rake be alien oan tae gee eh aimed ne amends wt Began at eeelhata er oe ee
arsignzment. The ma mt urder the name of KOMAROV® as a secord or third FECEE® ary to 1 Soviet Erbassy in Washington, After a long search, “AIDREY' was found, UOSENKO's impressicn was that. the acer.t worked at the Pentagon chen and that. in 1952 he was still working at the Pentagon. ° We < poe KOVSHUK (KOMAROV), with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in Washington, learned where the agent was living, identified his automobile, and contacted him finally at the end cf 1955 or the beginning of 1955, Speaking of the difficulties the KGB had in locating "ANDREY”, NOSENKO said: "... He (KOVSHUK) said they were locking for him a long time, the places where they looked for him. Then they found where he parked nis car, wnere he lived - in a place «here there were many other people and it was difficult to get close to him. Then (he told) about his surveillance, the nours of ‘ANDREY's' rerurn from work: sometimes he was sitting in the movies. But we knew that he had made a contact..." At first “RNDREY" was frightened and refused to work, but when at the third contact he was offered a package of $1,900, “it went dift- ferentiy." The agent finally accepted the money from KOVSHUK because, Gue to his gambling, he was again in financial straits. From that peinct on he worked well with the KGS. He again pro- vided good information and was 8111 doing so as of 1962, NOSEINKO WaS Hot sure what kind of materials he was giving ther, out he knew that he was close to codes at that time and this informa- tion was considered important by the KGB. NCSENKO pelieved that when KOVSHUK found him, "“ANDREY” was working in the Pentagon and that Le was still there in 1962, In reference to the modus operandi for meetings between KOVSEUK and “ANDREY,'' NCSENKO reported that KOVSHUK knew he was under surveillance cy the FBI, for the Sevicts were intercepting the FBI surveillance- radio traffic which included references to "The Three Musxeteers Tre Soviet monitors knew this to be aterm applied to KOVSHUK and his colleagues.** NOSENKO was not * NOSENKO identified KOMAROV as the alias used abroad and in his Ministry of Foreign Affairs cever job in Moscow by V.M. KOVSHUK, who had bkerome Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American De- partment, KGB Second Chief Directorate, by the time he was sent to Washington to locate this agent. GOLITSYN had previously identified KCVSHUK as an cfficer of the American Department who had come to Washington in 1957 for nine or ten months. He did not know the specific reason for the trip but said that in view of KOVSHUK's job it would be to solidify a developmenral operatior begun in Moscow or to recentact an agent already _fecruited in Moscow, He identified a photo cf KOMAROV as KOVSEUK. ; , TOP SECRET ab ibd abll ae gatttine wosip de bibtbitlninciadiictie * 2 ohn dat Mth ired® Br edostos
7400000, ea enna erin nnteemey Ooh te ge ne ee ae 416. aware of the identities of tne octner two Soviets comprising the tric Tn adéition, NOSENKO descripedd the meetings as having taken place always in cars: KOVSHUK would lese his surveillance the day before the meeting ané go to enother state where he would wait by the highway; the Anerican would drive by and stop hig car; KOVSHUK would sit down with him in the car, receive the materials, and give him the money; ther KOVSHUK would get out, and the American.would drive on. According to NOSENKO, the person who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL (Reino HAYHANEN, who defected to CIA’in Paris in May 1957) also gave away information on Roy RHODES, who had been un Moscow as a garage superintendent, When RHODES was under znvestigation, *‘ANDREY" was called as a witness because he had worked with RHODES in Moscow. “AIDREY" was the only person called aS a witness, ard ne was called upon several times to tell how RHODES had behaved in Moscow. The acent, NOSENKO stated, could be identified by the fact that he was the only person who testi- fied at the trial. He suffered during this investigation period and stopped meeting the Scviets. Ne was afraid he would be ex- posed and errested too, as a result of RHODES' arrest, NOSENKO suggested that “ANDREY" may have had some suspicion of RHODES' involvement in his own recruitment; or he may merely have been panicky because he knew he could be accused of the same thing as RUCDES. Little by little, however, “ANDREY" resumed his meetings with the Soviets, having little other cnoice. KOVSHUK turned "“ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington Lecai Residency and returned to Moscow, NOSENKO d:d not know who succeeded KOMAROV as the handler but said that this seccnd officer eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV, wno corn iuded his tour in Washington in 1961.*% NOSENKO did not know PAGRICHEY's successor, but said in 1962 that the case was stiil alive. (i121) NOSENKO's Information When the "ANOREY” case was discussed with NOSENKO in Geneva in 1964 and in additional discussions after his defec- tion, he altered several details of the 1962 story and supplied some new details about the recruitment, various officers know- ledgeable of the case, and information provided by “ANDREY.” Only where the 1964 information differs from that of 1962 or adds to it is it included below. The recruitment of "ANDREY" took place in 1948 or 1949. according to one interview, in 1952 or earlier by another, and in 1953 according to a third discussion of the case with NOS- EKKO, The association in NOSENKO's mind between "ANDREY' and Roy RHODES remained firm, but he could not be certain whether "ANDREY" was still in Moscow in 1953 or that he heard nothing about the agent in 1954. “ANDREY" used to play cards, NOSENKO reported, and may have played poxer for high stakes. He also said that "ANDREY" had worked at the Pentagon - in codes - but by the time that KOVSHUK got in touch with him Ae was nearing” the end (of his * BAGR BAGRIGHEV was ~yeassignea from Washington in June 1960 but returned on TDY from 3 July to 1 November 1961. TOP SECRET esac ant tea vilib diac! R + Ab thee tr editor bint hae TAL bese eet olign arr “datetam ratewordeence bye 2 vhs idraniading aneatibinlnitinad etn thtbimem bes ’ : |
enlistment and #was working in an Army recruiting office, where he stili was assigned wher BAGRICHEV took over the case from KOVSHUK. . NOSENKO'was told by CIA that “ANDREY" nad not yet been iden- tified. He réplied: “i'd like to say that you have selected a a sligntly wrong #eay of trying to find him. You should not be looking for him during the trial. It was the investigation, during the investigation was when he made an appearance. Only once he appeared during the investigation. He was called just | once, and he was scared to death..." Asked if he thought this information to be correct, NOSENKO answered: "Oh, absolutely. I'm absolutely sure it is. It's absolutely correct. The fact that they called him - they summoned him to be interrogated during the investigation - this 1s absolutely correct...“ later he said: “As I told you, take all those who were called up for the. pre-trial investigation of RHODES, not who were at the trial but” at the pre-trial and among those people must be ‘ANDREY'..." Questioned further on whether “ANDREY" had testified at the trial of Roy RHODES, NOSENKO repeated: "No, he did not testify at the trial, and at the pre-trial investigaticn he was only called up once for questioning because he had worked with RHODES at one time." Describing "ANDREY'‘s" production in Moscow, NOSENKO stated that he explained to the KGB how the code machines in the U.S. Embassy worked ard on one occasion NOSENKO expressed the opinion that ‘ANDREY" may have given the KGB parts of code machines sucn as “discs” (sic, meaning rotors). In this connection, NOSENKO recalled that one Aleksandr SELEZNEV, a deputy department chief in the Communications Directorate of the KG, had peen involved in the “ANDREY' case: NOSENKO said he first saw him in 1953 during the period that “ANDREY" was working for the KGB 1n Mos. cow. SELEZNEV came to meetings in the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, held to discuss and plan the "ANDREY” opera- tional meetings. The reason for SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with the questions to be asked of "ANDREY." Since SELEZNEV ceme to these meetings in civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO normally saw him in uniform in his visits to the First Department in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO speculated that SELEANEV may have gone in person to some of the meetings with "ANDREY! NOSENKO was asked if SELEZNEV had instructed the case officers working with “ANLREY" to ask him for discs from inside the code machines, but NOSENKO replied that he did not know. Although he did not know how the KGB exploited him, NOSENKO repeatedly emphasized “ANDREY's" great importance to the KGB during the time he worked for them in Moscow. "Thanks to his help they were able to read your State Department codes. To date we have never been abie to read your military codes..."* NOSENKO was asked if “ANDREY" had broucht military code material to the KGB, and he replied: "No. I believe 1t was only State Department material, What he did mainly was to describe the operation of code machines and what daily or other periodic settings were made..." , According to NOSENKO, “ANDREY" supplied valuable material from the time that the first recontact was made until he ceased ® See Parts V.3.c. and VI.D.9. on KGB operations against U.S. eode clerks as KGB. cryptologic successes. | TOP SEGRE? abetted aanitie tin 88 a nea Nettles UALR ong foein Cte Athens wea Derbi, Hae at ees a te Ph teh Nae ay te cae serih sab it ban. wp tdee ae mh Aieertatielba oe bt aren ad te
eo hire 418. meetings because of the RHODES trial; again after the trial he was able to furnish good materizl, not only orally but also in the form of documents, papers, and written material. This was true for the period KOVSHUK was handling him and also for the BAGRICHEV phase of the operation, SOSENKO was queried as to whether during the period between June 1962 and January 1964 he hed heard abour “ANDREY" continuing to supply geod information. He answered: "No, something is going wrong there with thia operation." , ASerneincnt sd tate lentes. tot wee eeFs abc eka (oot oR Be at ons bd ob de ete estinmba tes « Sambi Caninater fh wn Lew aot np ont einer oan
AF eke ete wee nn a ee NOSENMPO was asxe “2 CREY" case. He cep Ll was wornang in tie F ceite a bit tater.” But it w. the United States) is my frien. ence: here you hear sovechirg, irst (Crier) Divectoraie. SATRICHSV the GSGecend Lirertorate. | @o in 1962 tow he had learnsd absut the che furet occasic::: “Well, cecause Alchoucn T worked there . ROMANOV, who wene (to i frienis in intelli- , - r fa be the Lf was once working ‘Kol HGRICIEN) , + t 3 i ¥ be & i 3 t+ ow Were You working Wit 2 he giving? Hew? Seed for the mane@ooe ; this tase c 4 2 nd BAGRICHAV. in the 4 tae wpa ott be cp a tt Pirecrorare at ae! S @utae Since he returned t : : eels weet & hnowiecs crew @]li aunout recruitrent we gexed carn MegNOREY'? Tt wan im og conve: : CHURBNGY knew aoout [AUR EY.* &: j ‘ONDSEY'... Iocnagnt Rave heerd orem 2 } BORODIN, who said that when he was leaving he returned the -tonese.e.’ NOSEMKO said tnat it was from KOVINVE that he learned : -“AbouL What hed happened in Washinglon and about EPRGRICHEV working y with "MIDREY." HOVSHUK told him how “ANDREY" had been frightened at the time of the RHODES triai, and late: GUE G him the came story. Or yet another occasion NCSEIKS was ax whether GUK knew cf the case, and he asseited that he had neeer discussed "SNDREY" with GOK. tv) Results of Investigations eee renee ene cen amenrese ; ; ; . * As notes in the preceding discussion, in 19€2,NOSENKC gave his date of entry into the KGB as March 1953. y ae Lee irmateat abe, Bisbee id et nectann — atlabite a tonchalinteiedn Raa are dm dram’ = Fenny SRE NES Se SOR OEE
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Ce The KGB Acent_ in Paris (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON) (1) Inrroduction ; Tne lead to the penetration of a sensitive U.S. military | amstallation in the Paris area during 1962 and 1963 was the first _ prece of information NOSENKO gave CiA after reestaclishing con- tact in Geneva in January 1964. NOSENKO characterized this lead then and iater as the most important single ccunterintelligence item that he hac acguired during the year and a hal? he had been a CIA colleborator at KGB Headquarters in Noscow; the subject of the lead had previded the KGB with significant documents, some of which had Leen shown to Premier KHRUSHCHEV personally. Still active at the time NOSENKO left Moscow for Gereva, the agent nevertheless had lost access to the sensitive infermation some months uvarlier. NOSENKO explained that the agent was scheduled to remain with tne American Armed Forces in Paris until May 1964, when he would be rotated to the United States. In the interim. one of the Second Chief Directorate's special techni- clans, an expert at opening and resealing envelopes, had been essigned cn extended TDY to the KGS Leqal Residency in Paris against the possibility that access would be regained before this transfer, NOSENKO was unaware of any other services this agent may have earlier performed for the KGS and estimated that he had been recruited in 1962. NOSENKO's lead eventually led to the idencification of “UrSss-Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, JOHNSON ‘s wire Hedwig, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH, a friend, as KGB agents. All three had been recruited 1m Berlin in 1953 and had worked closely together since. Although Mrs. JOHNSON's direct par- ticipation (she serve@ as a courier) ended with JOHNSON's transfer from Berlin in 1954 and despite KGB efforts to com- Ppactment the activities of JCHNSON and MINTKENEBAUGH after 1959, all three were aware of the others' clandestine work. NOSENKO's lead to JOHNSON therefore compromised the other two, While investigations ef the NOSENKO lead were proceeding in the early autumn of 1964, JOHNSON deserted his duty assign- ment at the Washington. Area Courier Station in the Pentagon and disappeared until the end of November, when he voiuntarily ‘turned himself in to Air Force Police officials in Las Vegas, “Nevada. JCHNSON had arrived at his Pentagon assignment in May | 1964: -.for the previous nine months he had been serving as non- commissioned officer in charge of the classified documents control section of the Seine Area Command Headquarters in Camp Des Loges, France: for two years before this, until Aug- ust 1963, he had been assigned to the U.S. Armed Forces Cour- jer Transfer Station at Orly Field in Paris. During the _ latter assignment JOHNSON had regularly stood weekend security watches in the Station's vault area, and it was to this period of time that NOSENKO's lead pertained. In confessing to American authorities in January 1965,. JOHNSON admitted having penetrated the Orly vault for the Soviets about seven times during December 1962 and the first . five months of 1963. Although there were certain differences in timing and detail, JOHNSON's confession closely matched | the complete description of this operation earlier given by NOSENKO. Except to implicate himself and other participants, JOHNSON added few essential details that were not already TOP SECRET enn AS dare ow! Bedtans cee hatin a8 Ae wg wn aceNoth Lam denendeehe et ome # Lee welag stern aitietaaiinnnne
known. JOHNSON's lcss cf access to the Orly vailt in August 1963 coinciéed closely with the date when MINTKENBAUGH Jost ~ corntazt with the KGB, probably in September of that year. NOSENKO has described the Paris operation as being entirely a@ First Chief Directorate case. He first learred of it in 1952, shortly after returning from his meetings with CIA in Geneva, in casual conversations with one ur more Second Chief Directorate 4d technicians who had been sent TDY to Paris to assist the local 4 Legal Residency. NOSENKO was not sure which technician told him 3 about the case, or under what circumstences. Additional infor- | oe mation was similariy obtained “in bits and pieces" from one or ‘ : the other of the technicians: over the next year and 4 half, and ‘4 NOSENKC had most recently discussed the case with the TOY “flaps . : and seals" expert in Paris while he (NOSEZNKO) wes enroute to Geneva in mid-January 1964. NOSENKO explained that, although as F a Second Chief Directorate officer re had no rightiul access to information on this cperation, he hed worned with the special technicians in operations against tourists and other foreigners i in Moscow and was on good terms with them. In such circumstences, ; NOSENKG said, it frequently nappens tnat KGB officers will tell other KGE officers “some details of operations on which they are working." . The following discussion of the details of tne operation commences with a review of NOSENKO's statements on the case &n the way in which he learned about it. The remainder of the dis- -cussion covers events leading up to the confessions by the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH; the substance of their admis- sions, including the security problems posed by Mrs. JOHNSON's mental condition and the Soviet concern for her illness; and the as5sessmenc of the damage to U.S. interests caused by the \ activities of J\.HNSON, - ; (ii) The Lead from NOSENKO The agent was described by NOSENKO as being a U.S. mili- tary mén, probably not an officer, who served nightime guard duty with others at an American military installation in France where an airfield was located ard where top secret documents were held in a vault which he had helped the KGB . i to penetrate. He was scheduled to leave France in May 1964. : Through him the KGB acquired documents on U.S. strategic bomb- ot ing targets in the USSR and France; “almost all" of these materials were of interest to the Soviet Ministry of Defense, NOSENKO said. From early 1962 until the agent was promoted, the KGB Legal Residency in Paris effected 81x entries into i the room with the assistance of technicians from the Special : Section, KGB Second Chief Directorate’ whom NOSENKO named. . After the agent lost his access,. Fedor FOFANOV** was sent to ‘ * The Special Section, according to NOSENKO, handled surrep- titious entries into Western embassies in Moscow. **POFANOV was assigned from June or July 1963 to Februery 1964 to the Soviet Embassy in Paris as an employee, and he is believed to have replaced a suspect KGB officer in this overt position; he abruptly left Paris immediately after NOSENKO's defection. NOSENKO indicated that FOFANOV was one . of several technicians transferred from the KGB Operational- - Technical Directorate to form the Special Group cf the KGB Second Cnief Directorate. NOSENKO proposed that he himselé part ec pate in| approach. to FOFANOV in aris. 7 Alike Moat Bs eta oe enantio 3 Sea see a Vaatelaedeat EN eB aie sumed
14-00000 ge Paris “in case he will get access acain tome time, even just a quick possibility.” NOSENKO's statements concerning | this lead | are given in chronological order below.. NOSENKO said at the 22 January 1964 meeting* thst: he first learned of the successful agent penetration of the classified documents vault at an “important American military organization” in the Paris area ehortly after returning from Geneva in: June 1962. NOSENKG did not knew the designation or precise nature of the installation invelved in this operation, but because the - documents included information on strategic targets in France aa. well as in the Soviec Union, he assumed that it was a “strategic planning installation." He also knew that the installation had its own airfieid and that there were “procedures for bringing top secret documents in and for taking them cut.” There had reen six successful entries of the vault, four in 1962 and two in 1963. On each occasion Special Section tech- niéians had travelled TDY to Paris under courier cover to assist the local KGS case officer in the technical details of the opera- tion, Their function was to advise the case officer, concerning ‘the entry and later to process the documents. The case officer, on this basis, would give appropriate instructions to his agent, and it seemed probable to NOSENKO that the technicians had never met the American. Entry into the vault erea was first achieved after the agent had used some radioactive substance to derermine the com- bination. (NOSENKO thought that the agent had also photographed the Lock for KGB study.) Subsequent entries were always made between two and five o'clock in the morning. The agent removed documents from the vault and delivered them to his case officer, who in turn passed them to the Special Section technicians. The envelopes were then opened, photographs were made, the documents. were repackaged, and the envelopes were given back to the agent ~ by the case officer for return co the vault. Thereafter, the Paris Legal Residency pouched the films to Moscow, and the technicians themselves left Paris until the next opportunity for entry. The last time the vault lad been entered was in the fell of 1963. At about that time the agent, a military man, received @ promotion énd was relieved of his night watch duties. (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the United States but, with his promotion, had obtained an extension until May 1964.) Al- though the agent was still active in January 1964 and was still assigned to his military post, he therefore had lost access to the Gocumentary information. NOSENKO characterized this in- formation as highly sensitive and valuable te the KGB, adding that the Chief of the Paris Legal Residency as well as several case officers there had been rewarded for their part in the operation. * Because of technical difficulties in recording the first part of this meeting with NOSENKO. it is not possible to give a verbatim account of his initial statement on this ease. What NOSENKO said at this time has been pieced to- gether from remarks he made later in the meeting, from recorded recapitulations of his statements by his case officer later during the meeting and from notes taken at the meeting. 4 PCPs y a at “4 Rae Screnee aa ssetke 0) Bintentlinns cbdindiigen Ridin sheen ch eemtb et teen’ eae nate dates oe
DN EMRE EA RR IOM, Merman rete tena eins meee yo Finally, at the 23 January 1964 meeting NOSZUKC reported that three of the Special Section technicians whe had travelled to Paris to participate in the operation were 5.A. IONOV, L.A. LEBEDEV, and S.D. ILYIN: he said he could probably identify more if shown pictures of diplomatic couriers who had travelled to Paris. NOSENKO d:d not know the identity of the Paris-based case officer. With the exception of those concerning strategic bembing targets, NOSENKO hed no information on the nature of the ‘@ocumencts which had ceen obtained. He explained that he had never seen ary of these documents, that the technicians who had seen them did not reed English, and that they had learned about the targetting data only casually, from asking the case officer ‘\hat's this stuff?" at che time they were taking photographs. — Asked on 1 Yebruary 1964 whether CIA could do anything with its information concerning the travels of LESEDEV which might help to identify the EGR agent of the Paria Legal Residency, NOSENKO replied: "Of course you can, Fer instance, find out when unose ccuriers were in Paris, what were the aates of their stay there, keeping in mind that this will be cne and the same LEBEDEV, (V.V.) SINIYSYN, that Venyamin KARETNIKCV*... Not FOPANOV - he came in the fall and did not get invoived.** Then *SINTTSYN ard KAZETAinOV, whose first name and@ patronymic have aiso been given by NOSENKO as Venedikt Vasilyevich were also in the Special Section, according to NOSENKO. **NOSENKO gave CIA a similar clue concerning travel by the spe- Clal technicians on 12 June 1962: "The Chief of the Special Section ts Sergey IUCNOV. an excellent man. He is on a mission to Paris. (Note: CIA has been unable to equate any Soviet in Paris at this time with IONOV. There is no record that ICNOV has been asroad under that name since December 1955. He made several trips to Paris and Brussels during the 1953-1955 pe- riod.) ...In the Second Chief Directorate there are good spe- Cialists, wath experience. These lads sometimes go to Aus- tralia, to. France, immediately when something is needed. At once. This means that there 1s something (going on) where they are sent... In this Section there are two or three spe- -cialists who can open any package and then seal it back up as it was. But there are only two or three of these altogetrer. Therefore, wher there is something somewhere abroad, there is an immediate request to send these guys. One went to Australia one or two years ago. This means that there was something there. One went to France. Then this IONOV received the Boyevoye Krasnoye 2namya for this. Every time (they travel) “they use a different last name. every time a different one... Tnere are three men there that can open anything and then make it look as if nothing had been cone... I know them. But. they never come out in their own lest names. Each time they have a different one. There were (M.I.}) PREOBRAZHENSKIY, (V.Z.) KARETHIKOV, and LEBEDEV." In epeaking of IONOV's assignment to Paris and the travel of KGB “flaps and seals" specialists to France, NOSENKO apparently was not referring to the JOHN- SON case; NOSENKO said he first heard about the case after returning from Geneva in 1962; and JOHNSON stated firmly that the first entries of the Orly Courier Transfer Station did not begin until late 1962, about six months after. NOSENKO made this statement. In 1964 NOSENKO named both LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV as having a part in the Orly penetration. Contrary to his statement, however, both travelled under true name on their temporary assignments. CIA had no traces on Week. ors a4 a aes At inteb enna? ES, ity wstgeetc ot a ioe tice a ah cies. Sunes wn * tas fee we betel eo
Rea NET 43%. we must look at- what “ind of an organization (the U.S. installa-_ tion is}: Sane leading American personality who has his own airport, who cets his :sail delivered by plene, who has posses- ‘$10n of strategic plans. And then cuke a look at the people. Guarding tnis ¢staclishsent. Start from there, Then, see if you can get from the French a cundown on the activities of cer- tain members of the (Soviet) Embiesasy during the period when these specialists were there. This in addition te a careful Study of those wno work tnere, of the guards, and who takes the night duty, specifically during those years and during those times. Also who among the quards got a promcezion - jumped ahead. Try to pinpoint the American installation. This one has an airstrip. This installation would be the one which would hold the war plans, even Lombing target data on France. Where would such materials be found? It seems to me that there would be only one such installation. & would not be in 10 different places... It is a private airdrome,not 4 public one. I don't Know whose base it is, I only know that they have the airstrip and that people come from there carrying in mail, They bring mail from the airdrome, from their aicdrome, taeir airplanes," NOSENKO gaid on 6 April 1964 that before leaving Moscow. for Geneva in January 1964, he had been toid that the Paris Legal Residency agent hed lost his access and that POFANOV was sent to Paris in the nope that che agent would again be able to get into the vaule cetore his transfer to the United States.* When NOSENKO arrived at the Soviet Embassy in Peris on 19 Janu- ary 1964 while cn roire to Geneva, FCFANOV “was on duty at the entrance to the Embassy. He was the duty man, and of course when he saw me. he said ‘George, veorgel' So we chatted and he said he was not doing good, but he would probably be sitting there until May... So I asked him how this case was (going), was he doing any goed. and he said that, for the present, he waS not doing anything good but he had hopes that something might happen. ‘That's all." . Also on 6 April 1964 NOSENKO stated that the penetration Operation was “strictly a First Chief Directorate case," He then went on to describe the role of the Second Cnief Direc- torate'’s technical specialists in gaining entry to the vault | and in photographing the documents: “The specialists were not the ones that carried out the Operation, It was carried out by the case officers of the Residency. The specialists worked on the packages which they would open and then reseal again later, When this happened and’ -how they.got the keys made, I ' (footnote continued from preceding page) LEBEDEV until he was placed on the official Soviet courier list in 1962; NOSENKO provided the first indication that he had intelligence connections and in July 1962, a month later, LEBEDEV tock his “i weiling tones, |e | : * FOFANOV,-a-member of the Special Technical Section accord- ing to NOSENKO, applied for a French visa on 22 June 1963 and arrived in Paris on 27 July 1963. JOHNSON received notice of his transfer out of Orly on 4 August and left Orly on 5 August 1963. (see below). TOP SECRET a oat Manette a woe bin oy srt ptbinath aletiaedEaran, vie fb snettentee Dh “oe 4 a i] ? 4 2
14-0000 ective part ' the door at ticles we The sare 2962,.1 4 Raving ‘this don't xrow, > by the way, said that they vlaced redio- ith the help of this agent, inte the lock of .- inning. Then (LESEDEV said) that the par- = _and that they were picking the lock this way. the ‘room: finally read come there bb “had to open tne safe. Before everything was | (the Special Section technicians) nad to several times. How many times they came in I know it was the beginning of 1962. _quéstio im, detail about his krowledge of the Paris case, HOSENKO. Prova ed’ tne following information on 29 July 1964: “I “agent) was not an officer, considering that ne was wnight duty. but ncething was ever said about this either .0 we nagine che operation was successful in 1962 be- cause the. boys. from the Special Section were going several times ‘in 1962; 1 Hink- the kesidency didn't have the chance to do “his before .1962, because they couldn't do it without the help .ot these boys from the’ Special Section and they weren't going ‘(i.e., di@ not:go abroad! in 1960 and 296i.) I know he was work- ing on the basis of money - they were giving hin money. I think ‘maybe he was recruited on the basis of money... 7 cnly heard that if was a big sum of money. I don't know if he was recruited in Paris and don't know if it was even a formal recruitment. I ‘don't know wnat plans the KGR had for him after re leaves Paris, ‘They were thinking that he must co soon. He was to leave in 1963. And then in mic- 1963 he gct this step up, went a step higher, and “so he was then to stay until mid-'64. He no longer had regular’ access and this is why FOFANOV was sent: In case he will cet: €ctvess again sometime, even just a quick possibility, then he can ‘tell them and POFANOY will be there co handle it immediately. ~_ “Taking.-into consideration that I heard that almost all (of the material they got was of interest to the Ministry of Defense,.""NOSENKO continued, "I think it was a military instal- lation. It was a military installation. It was definitely an installation:and not just a single person with access to these ‘gecret documents. I know the operations were carried out only at night. The whole operation was completed while the agent -was on duty. The agent couldn't bring out a great deal cf mater2al, only:what he could hide on his person. From what _the boys were saying, I would think that he was not alone on duty. I was even asking the boys: "How can he take these things out?! And they said: ‘Oh, he just says that he is going out for coffee or a sandwich: he is gone on! y 5 or 10 minutes... I think he was still in the same installation even though he lost immediate access to the room after his promotion. This is why FOFANOV was sent in mid~'63. FOFANOV said when I saw him on 18 January 1964 (NOSENKO means 19 January) that the agent 1S supposed to stay in Paris until May 1964. He said that the agent.is supposed to leave in May and then he (FOFANOV) .will be finished there. this roughly matches JOHNSON's statement as to when the first penetration was made. : ; TOP S26°2~ With the sefe. . After they had the keys to ou. ° eB tle Ren a teem ete eee wt tadibeeee 5, "hele, sb atenlt Bee ebie 2 he ih Me AIL striatal Met tall Se tA vad $e rE bdacated: seb Pray ere eee 4 i i i i. f 3
14-00000 en 433. “I know chat they went by car and that they were able to complete the whole operation during the tour of suty of the agent. Trhey nad to pick up the materiais, drive some place - maybe the Soviet Embassy - oper the documents, photograph them, close them again just es they were, and cet back to return them to the ecent all in this time. They dad not specify : which documents the agent was to bring ovr. Sut they were ; 4 travelling as Soviet diplomatic couriers and = think their ‘ a various stcps were planned to coincide with the errival of new materials at this instaliation. Also the fact that they had to open al! =he documents shows that they were sealed when they received tren from the agent. ; "I don't know if it was a key or a combination lock on - 4 the door." NCSENKO concluded. "I know they had to apply radio- active meterial to learn how to open either the decor or the safe. The ecent had co open the door and inside he had to open a safe." . . (ii.) UOSENKG's Sourcing has beer asked cn a number cf occasions to explain rv what circumstances he learned of the Paris Legal peration against the U.S, military installation. He hes alwevs replied that he heard of tre case “in littie pieces“ at separate times from verious wembers cf the Special (Technical) 3ection wno parcicipated in it, NOSENKO, however, has beer vague ard at times inconsistent in describing what he learned from «hom and how and when he isérned this information. Generally he gave either LESEDEV or KAKETNIXOV as his principal . source; under repeated questioning, NOSENKS has sometimes re- . mained consistent in describing the cime. place, and other con- @itions under which he learned a particuiar item of information, 3 but he has said in one telling that it came from LEBEDEV while : in the next that he learned at from KARETNIKOV. NOSENKO has also contradicted himself regarding which of these two origin- ally told him of the operation and has said that he cannot re- eall which 1¢ was. The series of NOSEXKO-s statements abouc the sources of his information is presented in chronological erder below. ‘ : . NOSENK! when and und Residency's dH OW O "In connection with the thing in Paris...just exactly what did you hear about this military group?" NOSENKO was asked on 23 January 1964. ‘who told you. in exactly what. con- text, when, and so forth? Try to do it word for word... When and who?" KOSENKO answered: “Well, you know this Special . ot Section, this is IONOV and LEBEDEV ard well now, let's see, : ; (pause). In Moscow that's PREOSRAZHENSKIY, and ILYIN was in ; Lo i . Paris. They are subordinate to the Technical Section. They eg were counting the agents and what was needed - the target, the a rooms. safe. and everything else. He took molds and samplings of radio-active substances which could reflect characteristics in this American military installation." The subject changed my without NOSENKO answering the next question, about what the , Special Section officers had Gone in this operation. NOSENKO volunteered no additional information concerning his sources for the lead. and he was not questioned further on the matter during this. the first of the 1964 meetings. The transcript. ' o£ this meeting suggests. however. that NOSENKO got his infor- mation from one of the technicians who not only travelled to i e cine hatte cada sae bse ee at) te ate
34-00000 neh aso micpeceenceietane nina srennnaste oomneagcninge aneinien cindy BM Paris to instruct the Legal Residency case officer on the technical aspects of the entry but also was involved in photographing the documents provided cy the agent. ‘ ; - NOSENKO told CIA on 2& January 1954 that he had learned . . of this operation, shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962.. from a friend in the KG, one of several technicians who participated in the cperaticn. NOSENZO thought the source of this information was either LEEEDEV or FOFANOV. During intensive debriefing on 6 April 1964 NOSENKO stated: "] first heard about this from KARETUIKOIV." After describing the functions of the Special Section in Moscow, he went on to say that KARETNIKOY came frequently to the Tourist Department to see him. The reason for their association was that NOSENKO then supervised work with the Moscow hotels designateé for use by foreign tourists, while the Special Section set up equipment in various rooms cf these hoteis. The debriefing concinued: NOSENKO: Why do they come to see me? First of all, they krow me quite well ard, seconcly, simply because I super- vise this (American Tourists) section. IOXOV would come...to chat among other things. KAREINIKOV told me about this, 1n Paris. Question: What G@id KARETNIKOV say when you first heard about ese this? NOSENKO: That they had carried out operations several times in Paris, that two had already been there for this pur- pose, that they went there as diplomatic couriers to Paris... (NOSENKO at this point repeated KARETNIXOV's description of the role of the Special Section tech- nicians in advising the Paris-based KGB case officer and the methods which were used to gain initial access to the vault.) NOSENKO: KARETNiKOV was the first and then LEBEDEV. LEBEDEV was later. Question: These were the cnly two people, you say? ‘ NOSENKO: Only two, only two. Question: But you told me before that FOFANOV told you sbout : it too. NOSENKO: FOFANOV, FOFANOV. I knew that FOFANOV is here in Paris. He was on duty at the entrance to the Em- bassy... (Here NOSENKO told cf his conversation with FOFANOV about the case. NOSENKO then explained that he had already heard from LEBEDEV that the agent had lost his access and that FOFANOV had been assigned to Paris against the possibility that ne would re- gain it.) . a According to NOSENKO on 29 July 1964, he "first heard about: this case from .fficers of the Special Section in 1962 ~ from . a ‘ LEBEDEV or KARETNIXOV, but I can't remember which was first. se LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV visited my office and maybe I. might say: toot ec naa te ah abe aI Drink dena te rDbcde y abides ine ate é 3 oat bye he ike abhi Bad ane Moa Dati Mabie te "] 7
Sesaeeantid cease & 1 Peemminmmmeai ais umnaia mains cam madonlimen aasanainace suc c ‘I haven't seen you in a long time, what have you been dsing?' And he would say: ‘Oh, I have just been to Paris on @ trip.' Or maybe I asked KARETNIKOV where LEBEDEV was because I hadn't seen him in a long time, and he told me that LEBEDEV was away on 8 trip." When asked on 29 July 1964 which officers had ever. “mentioned - this case to him, in any way at any time, NOSENKO replieds "KARET~— NIKOV, LEBEDEV, and IONCV in Moscow and FOFANOV in Paris in Janu- ary 1964." He affirmed that he had never discussed the case with, | or mentioned it to, anyone else. “Yes," he continued, “I think LEBEDEV was the first one to apeak to me about this case, because in 1962 I was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Bepartment and was super~ yvising the work of the Third Section on hotels and restaurcants.* LEBEDEV was a member of a commissicn which had been set up in the KGB to plan for the operational exploitation of new hotels which were being built or planned. He was coming to see-me about these metters. So «hile I mighc hear just a little bit about this: from IONOV, I would hear more from LEBEDEV, because he was a goed friend and was coming to my office on business." The following is from the protocol which NOSENKO aigned on 18 February 1965: wy first learned of the penetration of an American installation in Paris after my return to Moscow in June 1962 and at @ time that I was a conscious and willing collaborator of the CIA and was attempting to gather information of inter- est to Americar. Intelligence. I immediately recogr.ized the importance of this information to American Intelligence when I ‘first heard it. "I learned of this case in small pieces, in several conversations (some in my KGB office and possibly others elsewhere) with several different officers of the KGB over @ period of several months. These officers were KARETNIKOV, IONOV, and LEBEDEV, all members of the Special Technical Section of the Second Chief Directorate. "I do not remember from which of these three officers I first heard of the case, which of these officers told me what porticns of the story, or when-I learned the individ- . ual details of this case which I have reported to CIA, or the season of the year in which I learned them. "I do not know why these officers told me of the Paris case, except that we were in good relations. In . such circumstances it frequently happens that KGB officers will tell other KGB officers some details of operations on which they are working.** I don't know whether they told other KGB officers this information. As my relations were equally good with each of those three. officers, (any of them could have told me any: part of it. *"This would place NOSENKO's earliest knowledge of the case some- time after July 1962, when he said he became Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. “etThis sentence was added at NOSENKO's request prior to signing - the protecol. — * . Top SECRET a 4 we ‘a 4 + Rete a Beda hoe pene tabisiditalia Zs
14-00000 . oR are Ne na aa HeneMmeIET EL Gugh Y Had not spoken with FOFANOV about this” case” : befors he left Mozcow for Paris and althouch fOFANOV had no idea chat I was eware of any derails of thic case at the time, he answered my two or three questions about this case during a short stop in Paris while i was enroute to Ceneva an January 1964. I may have told nim that I knew about it.” eoaed yoo tnan MALE Bt 1, (iv) JOHNSON and MINTKEIBAUGH After preliminary investigation of the NOSENKO lead by the FBI, CIA, the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Department of the Army (ACSI}, it was decided in early Septem- Sn ber 1964 to concentrate on Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON as the ; ‘ likeliest candidate fer reing the KGB agent in this cperation. On 2 October 1964, however, CCHNSON disappeared from has home in Alexandria, Virginia. after telling his wife that he was on his way to work. JOHNSON, 4 courier with eccess to “secret” materials, | : at the Pentagon, failed to appear for dury on Monday, 5 October. bY 4 Army counterintelligence officers then called at the JOHNSON home ‘ to interview his wife. Mrs. JOHNSON said that she had detected 4 nothing unusual in her husband's behavior during the previous sev- - eral weeks, that he had simply left for the office at about 2:45 pPem. on Friday. the 2nd. ead had not returned. Sne did not know why he had left or where JOHNSON might have gone. Mrs, JCHNSON repeated tnis statement in two later interviews, one toward the i end of Octoler and the second in the micdle of November 1964. seta tad genial aS Bae Soon after JCHNSC''’s disappearance, representatives of ACSI : interviewed an Arlington, Virginia, real-estate salesman, James a i Allien MINTKEIBAUGH. He had been identified by Mrs. JOHNSON as : her husband's closest civilian acquaintance, having known JOHNSON from the time 12 years earlier when they served together in the ‘ Army. MINTKENRAUGH had first learned of JOHNSON's disappearance on Sunday. 4 October, when he telephoneé the JOHNSON home and had talked to Mrs. JOHNSON. Twice the same day and once the next ; i MINTKENBAUGH had telephoned the Pentagon in hopes of locating 4 JOHNSON. During the interview, he told the ACSI representatives : that he had no idea where JOHNSON was. ‘The last time he had seen JOHNSON, MINTKENEAUGH said. was several weeks earlier, at which time everything seemed normal, although JOHNSON had complained of difficulties raised by his wife's mental condition. * JOHNSON failed to reappear by 9 October 1964, the Army thereupon decleared him a deserter, and the FBI was prought into the case. The FBI reinterviewed both Mrs. JOHNSON and MINTKEN- '": BAUGH on several occasions in search of information which might ‘lead to JOHNSON's whereabouts. On 10 November, immediately. follow- -__MINTKENBAUGH asked his roonmate, | | to take him to CIA Headquarter SS "a Mattér Of importance." During an interview that same evening MINTKENBAUGH confessed to a CIA representative that he had been a Soviet agent since 1952 or 1953, following his recruit- ment by JOHNSON, He described im general terms his own espionage activities during this 11 or 12 year period as well as those of Sgt. and Mrs. JOHNSON. No mention was made of the Orly penetration, however. The next day, while his roommate was, out of the apart- ment, MINTKENBAUGH packed his things and disappeared, leaving a mote saying that he would be "back in the sprimg.." * JOHNSON had told a Pentagon co-worker shortly before he went AWOL that, “My wife is driving me crazy!” Others there hed noticed that JCHNSON appeared nervous and seemed to be drinking heavily in the days immediately preceding his disappearance. 2D etneyendng Hats oh mt aisalianelictashle abate eat a s: 7 £
(a La Rain MRRCROR CTE wcotetieme sAmtln Seibert gmake tema arene wt EE Ba “ 437. SCANEON remained at large, his wherezbours unknown, until 25 November 1964. At that time he turned himself in to a U.S. Air Force policeman in Reno, Nevada. He had, he said, run out of _money. JOHNSON was immediately incarcerated on the charge of being absent without leave. On 1 December representatives of the FSI and ACSI visited Mrs, SOHNSON to inform her that her husband had been found. Then, for the first time, she launched into a long, detailed account in which she implicated JOHNEON, MINTKENBAUGH, and herself in espion-- age activities for the Soviets, (She rad not confessed earlier, she said. because of fear of what JOHNSON might de to her.) Mrs. JCHNSON a@escribed what JOHNSON had done on behalf of the Soviets while stationed -in Berlin during 1953 and 1954, while serving in the United States from 1957 to 1959, and during his recent tour in France from 1959 to August 1964. JOHNSON, she said, had told her in 1962, when he was assigned to the Orly Field Armed Forces Courier Station, that he had removed documents from the vault there on three occasions and hed passed them to the Soviets. A joint FBI-ACSI team two days later began ta interrogate JOHNSON on the basis of the information which had been received from NOSENKO, Mrs. JOHNSON, and MINTKENBAUGH. JOHNSON stead- fastly maintained his innocence: He had gone AWOL, be said, only in order to force the Army to hospitalize his mentally ill wife and te require the Army or some other agency to find a means of taking care of his children. (He later insisted thet he had had no idea of the suspicions concerning him at the time he deserted.) During these interrogations, which lasted until 22 December, JOHNSON was confronted with: the allegations made by his wife and MINRTKENSAUGH. He made a point-by-point denial. Meanwhile, MINT- KENBAUGH himself had beer located by the FBI on 5 December at his brother's mountain cabin in California and was under inter- rogation. JOHNSON was courtmartialed for desertion in December 1964 and was sentenced to reduction in grade, forfeiture of pay, and . was ordered to reimburse the government for the cost cf return- ing him to Washington. The sentence included no confinement and, as he continued to profess his innocence, he was home for Christmas. FBI-ACSI plans called for a resumption of question- ing on the espicnage charges after the New Year. On 1 January 1965, however, before the new interrogations began, JCHNSON walked in and made a voluntary confession, His reason for doing so, he said, was solely to help his children and his wife, whose mental condition was worsening. The substance of this confession is given in the section which follows. “ (v) Information from Other Sources The confessions by the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH constitute the bulk of evidence on the case. They indicate that the operation which began in 1953 reac’.ed its peak in late 1962 and early 1963 when JOHNSON penetrated the vault at Orly, that Mrs. JOHNSON’s mental condition posed a serious threat to the security of the operation and that the KGB recognized this fact no later than late 1960. After August 1963 KGB interest 'in JOHNSON's access to classified information declined markedly, and MINTKENBAUGH'’s contact with the KGB was severed at approxi- mately the game time. The JOHNSONs and MINTKENBAUGH were TOP SEGRET +See z a eRe Bees Pana a a 4 a 2 4 ‘ ? preter cries. iyo oe menmeeet peemete
14-80000 + SRR A ERE AERIS NUDE he Hehehe, Lat ath eet ym tle be meme ine ime aA mente Thiet RI mn bat ORR mutually supporting in all major respects, for they paid 1fetle” heed to XGB efforts at compartmentation and continued to discuss their clandestine activities with each other. Their statements are summarized below, followed by a detailed presentation of their accounts of the operation. Mrs. JOHNSON’s revelations to others about the agent status of her husband. ana the Soviet re- actions to Mrs. JOHNSON's meatal illness which caused her.to make these revelations. An effective and reliable agent from 1953 cn, JOHNSON a 4 arrived at Orly in May 1961, out it was not until the fall of . i 1962 that he obtained the combination of the vauit. Probably in December JOHNSON made the first of hig seven entries into the vault. Five more penetrations appear to have beer made during the period January to March 1963, and the final one cccurred in May oo, : 1963. As summer approached and the days became longer,’ JOHNSON's — KGB case officer told him he was suspending the operation, on the ¢ grounds that the shorter hours of dackness had increased the risk peyond acceptable limits. buc the vault entries would recommence and intensify in the fall. In August, however, JOHNSON was trans- 3 ferred to the Seine Area Ccnmand headquarters at Camp Des Loges, i France, and lost access to the vault, As noncommissioned officer : in charge of the Classified Control Center at Camp Des Loges, JOHNSON had access to all classified @ucuments originating with the Headquarters conmand and with certain other commands as well; yet the KGB never pressed him to produce these documents and, JOHNSON said, seemed uninterested in the documents he offered : to provide. when he was transferred to the United States in 1964 | tad date deg? ok following NOSENKO:s defection, JOHNSON received the impression ' from his KGB handler that he was being "dropped." JOHNSON claims : to have had no contact with the Soviets during the six months between his reassignment to the Pentacon and his epprehension an December 1964. MINTKENBAUGH first served the KGB as a spotter of American personnel in Berlin during 1953 and 1954 and later. from 1956 to i 1959. as a courier between JOHNSON and officers of the KGB Legal ! Residency in Washington, D.C. At the time JOHNSON was assigned to Orleans, France, in late 1959, MINTKEBAUYGH was taken to Moscow to prepare for his “most important assignment.“ At KGB instruction, MINTKENBAUGH moved from California to Arlington., Virginia, in 1960. The plan was for him to establish a self- owned business so that he could be joined by a female (a KGB Illegal) who was to become h:s wife and operational assistant. -tOnce this was accomplished MINTKENBAUGH was to act as @ courier, secvicing a network of KGB agents throughout the United States. Despite repeated KGB pleadings and admonitions. he took no fur- ther steps to establish the desired cover, and for this reason the Soviet plan never materialized. Moreover, MINTKENBAUGH: has” said. by early 1962 he was depressed and disillusioned and was ‘looking for @ way to breek contact with the KGB; from this point : or somewhat earlier he claims to have performed his various KGB OO assignments in a perfunctory way or sot at all. Contact was finally broken sometime in the late summer or early fall of 1963 when MINTKENRBAUGH was unable to read directions for fur- ther meetings which the KGB passed him on photographic film via @eeddrop. The KGB took no steps to reinstitute contacts, and _ MINTKENBAUGH's own efforts - after apparently experiencing a change of heart - proved unavailing. Woes meebetten ale Ean eke oe ‘Hedwig JOHNSON's espionage career was limited to the 1953- 1954 period, when she acted as a courier between JOHNSON in west ge Ban acted edie tn thet Et ie i » 4 id é
14-00000 Par 439. Berlin and the KGB at Karlshorst. Although she was subsequently aware of the details of JOHNSCN'’s work and even on cccasion accom- panied him to operational meetings in France, she apparently never again played an active role. , nabt ch ALL ebb Tibia vat at Be etanaat + ’ + i i t ' i . — 5 7 i i i i : ‘ toa ; é 4 . i. . A : 3 i : : : i : ; 4 ; i Fa : TOP SECRE® os ! i, : 3 i H p % 5 as ~ 6 i * ~ .
PA eS RRR EE PC NNER NH RIT LR AION OT OY BATTLE INIA TOE NEP ORE A BELT AON RET ON IE AED PIT rc eineteaNRS be ate oS e seers detache a JCHNSCN's Statements at Having edmitted hia espionace activities to ACSI and the FRI, JOHNSCN gave what he said was the complete history of his relationships with Soviet Intelligence since the early 1950's. The following eccount is pased largely on ACSI réports to the U.S. Security Board on 12 and 26 Jaruary 1965; thev provide the details of his original confession and elaborate on his activities gGuring nis most recent tour in France.* cre at heartened In 1952, COHNSON wes stationed in West Berlin where he was the acting first sergeant of a Transportation Corps company. Desponcent because he wes passed over for promotion and not given the first sergeant position, and believing that his application ; i to marry would te disapproved, JOHNSON decided to defect to the ; Soviets. His first attempt to defect was aborted in February oo ; 1952 when Hedwig admitted to JOENSCN at the last minute that she had lied to him when she had informed him earlier that she had contacted th: Soviet authorities in East Berlin and arranyed for their defection as he had requested. After the initial attempt to defect, JOHNSON percueded Hedwig to return to East Germany to contact the Soviets, wnich she did. About a week after the abort- ed effo1t to defect. Hedwig and JOHNSON met with the Soviets in East Germany. JOHNSON informed the Soviets he was "fed up with the American way of lize" and wanted to defect to the USSR. JOCHN- . SON was toid there was no hurry about his proposal to defect, a ‘ statement with which he agreed. Another meeting was arranged fer the fclilewing week. During the period between the first meeting end his marriage to Hedwig on 25 April 1953, JOHNSON met ' almost weekly with the Soviets. JOHNSON was finally told that ‘ he would be of more use to the Soviets if he were to remain in . : the American Sector. He agreed to do so and at the same time to | perform tasks for Soviet Intelligence. JOHNSON has stated that ! he refused the money the Soviets offered for his services at that time, but he continued to work for Soviet Intelligence until his transfer to Rochefort, France, in April 1954. ‘DBuring his Berlin assignment JOHNSON conducted the follow-. ing activities on behaif of Soviet Intelligence: ~ He was given a Minox camera by the Soviets and trained in its use. ‘= JOHNSON's first important assignment was to call on aman named "Willie" (presuned by Hedwig JOHNSON to __ be Willie BRANDT, present Mayor of Berlin) nye wear his uniform at the time he called on “Willie, "Jeo get “Willie” in his jeep by telling “Willie” the Americans wanted to speak with him. He was to drive “Willie” to the Check- point between East and West Berlin where "lillie" would be taken into custody by the Soviets. JOHNSON was instructed to use any force necessary, and he agreed ; to bring "Willie" to the Checkpoint dead or alivé. JOHN SON. went to the address in Schoenenberg, West Berlin, - provided by the Soviets, entered the residence, but made . . no further attempt to carry out his orders. oe cS oe ae ers * Although the FBI subsequently debriefed JOHNSON in depth on et ; ~ his entire espionage career, these two ACSI reports contain os i - i> the main substance of his story. 4 fale at a Bee nek Bete . coher
- After his marriage on 25 April 1953, JOHNSON spent a week in Grandenberc, East Germany, a5 @ guest of the Soviets, : 2. during which time various meetings were held, usually in a JOHNSON'’s room. Durirg the weex there JOHNSCH was questioned extensively about his personal life and was asked routine questions about his organization. He was given a book on the history of Communism which he read several times, and on one occasicn he was questioned to such a degree on general subjects that JOHNSON felt he was possibly being psycho- analyzed. when JOHNSON returned to sest Berlin, Hedwig re- - mained in East Germany to act as courier petween JOHNSON nd the Soviets. JOHNSON supsequently met with Hedwig on. a weekly basis, . mn . 1 it sroeks bes ar att nibh Mes da bestia oo - JOHNSON was directed by the Soviets to try to. optain an assignment with CIC or the Military Intelligence Detach- ment (ID). He believes he mey have tried to get into CIC, and he definitely applied for an assignment in MID but was turned down. , - JOHNSON was given the assignment of furnishing the names of CIC personrel in Berlin. He accomplished this by . utilizing the Berlin Post Telephone Directory, which he og ‘also subsequently supplied to the Soviets. The Soviets were : extremely pleased with this accomplishment. , - In about May 1953, JOHNSCN was reassigned to the G-2 i Section of the Berlin Command, with a secret security clear- ance. ard assigned duties as a Message Center clerk. Be- ae } cause MINTKENBAUGH, then assigned to the G-z Section as — chief clerk, would re able to detect JOHNSON taking photo-. an 3 graphs in the office. and because JOHNSON believed that _ j MINTKENBAUGH could act as a lookout for JOHNSON during the ae period he was photographing documents, JOHNSON decided to , recruit MINTKENBAUGH. He subsequently “tested” MINIKEN~ BAUGH and recruited him to commit espionage for the Soviets. The recruitment was accomplished without the prior know- ledge or approval of the Soviets, JOHNSON believes MINT- KENBAUGH was agreeable because of the excitement of the idea, JOHSSCN and MINTKENBAUGH subsequently lived to- gether and were closely associated in espionage activities. Hedwig later escorted MINTKENEAUGCH to East Berlin, after which MINTKENBAUGH came under the direct supervision of the Soviets and no loncer workec for JOHNSON, 2 tote Sede bas ~ During his assignment with G-2, JOHNSON photographed ‘almost everything in his office, including cables, rosters, “intelligence summaries, alert plans, evacuation plans, and : : possibly clearance documents. Usually he photographed the . ee documents on his.lunch hour. JOHNSON also wrote reports eee tees containing his personal observations and activities, which he photographed for transmittal to the Soviets. Hedwig acted as their courier, carrying the film to East Germany in the hollowed out portion of: the heel of ner shoe. - When JOHNSON informed the Soviets that he expected to be transferred out of Berlin some time in 1953 due to an Overage in his MOS, he was instructed to try to obtain . oe - aM assignment in. Heidelberg, Germany. At. that time JOHN- . - . . 4 SON was disillusioned with the Soviets since they had _ - , . oe BE RSET att eas oe et re Fant a NE ae cane oe Py #