JFK Assassination System Date: 6/29/201 Identification Form eee , Agency Information _ AGENCY: — SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10014-10096 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE * AGENCY FILE NUMBER : —-—07-M-02 j ‘ Document Information ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA FROM: JOHNSON, LOCH ; TO: TITLE: LBJ LIBRARY NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS TOUCHING ON ASSASS. AND COVERT ACTION IN CUBA DATE: 07/21/1975 PAGES: 217 SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSEL r CUBA CIA DOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARY CLASSIFICATION : — Declassified RESTRICTIONS: = 1B; IC CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 03/08/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 438 v9.1 1 Docld: 3242734584 Page 1
Date Page 08/06/95 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION -FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA ~ “RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10096 RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE “AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-02 - DOCUMENT INFORMATION \ ORIGINATOR : SSCIA ; - FROM : JOHNSON, LOCH TO : TITLE : LBJ LIBRARY NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS TOUCHING ON ASSASS. AND COVERT ACTION IN CUBA DATE : 07/21/75 PAGES : 217 SUBJECTS : CIA CUBA NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSEL ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 438 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Docld: 324273454 Page 2?
R5EAX LBJ LIBRARY NATIONAL SECURITY PAPERS _ TOUCHING ON ASSASSINATION AND COVERT ACTION IN CUBA A SUMMARY WITH KEY DOCUMENTS 21 July 1975
Dock :33d23404 Page 4 °° °° °° Mee TOP SECRET — SENSITIVE 2l July 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF SUBJECT: Summary of Significant Documents Retriged from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas FROM: Loch Johnson I have just.returned from a trip to the LBJ Library where I in- spected the National Security Files. I was allowed to examine the files dealing with U.S. policy toward Cuba, the Johnson Vice Presidential Security files, and NSC minutes. The Library staff sifted through the Bundy papers for me, extracting anyttiing relevent to Cuba for my inspection. I was not permitted to examine either the Bundy papers or the Rostow papers myself, since the Library has not yet cleard them. Similarly, I> was unable to examine the Vietnam country files or the Laos country files because we have not been given authority to do so yet. Though these roadblocks were frustrating, I found I had my hands filled for the moment simply working my way through the papers which were available. I selected 44 documents to bring home, totaling 208 pages. These documents range from a verification of information we already know to some useful new information (see Items 21 and 22, e.g.) to some startling new leads in the area of covert action (see Item 28). What. follows is a capsule summary of each document presented in chronological order. High priority items have tabs marked in red. t ee eo he t
July 21, 1975 SUMMARY OF JOHNSON LIBRARY DOCUMENTS @) NSC Minutes, 5 May 1961 and NSC Record of Actions, 16 May 1961. ‘ ra er bony — J At the 5 May NSC meeting, Rusk suggested that the U. S. must take all measures to precipitate Castro's downfall or face the possibility that all South America will come under Communist influence. On the subject of Trujillo, the President said (25 days before the dictator was murdered) that the U. S. should draw the line on becoming involved in the affairs of another country, such as active participation ' in the overthrow of Trujillo. Instead, the United States should determine appropriate courses of action in case Trujillo falls. The 16 May Record of Actions emphasizes it was the President's view that. the U. S. should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him. This same document outlines U. S. policy toward Cuba; it was agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, though specific mention of assas- sination is not to be found among the many options outlined. ‘ 2. . Letter from Lodge to Rusk, 13 September (19637). In an obviously anti-Diem letter, Lodge asks Rusk to send General Lansdale to South Vietnam Nam to take charge of all U. S. relationships with a-change of government. Why Lodge so confidentally expected a change of government is an interesting question. _ 3. A note from Bromley Smith to George Christian (undated, but presumably early in the Johnson Administration, perhaps December, 1963). A good example of the establishment of plausible deniability for the ‘ President, at the suggestion of the CIA. re oe “ 4. Memo from Chase dated 2 December 1963 and probably for Bundy. ‘Among other things, Chase recommends "a vigorous, tough, and nasty policy" against Cuba, including strengthening the covert action program and continuing to explore "every avenue in order to make life as diffi- cult for Castro and as expensive and unpleasant for the USSR as possible." Moreover, "We should be prepared to meet any event which might offer the opportunity of a sudden overthrow of Castro (e.g., the shooting down of a U-2)." sepeaen mee ee ce 1 “TE > & & aoa: Docld: 32423484 Page 5
-~2- 5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 December 1963. Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will present several options for discussion, including unleashing of Cuban exiles and the intensification of the covert program. 6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1963. This memo is mainly important because it reveals who in the Admin- istration was dealing with Cuban policy. The list of people to attend the meeting on Cuba held this.day included: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk, Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms or Des Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy, and Chase. 7. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 December 1963. For a press conference, Bundy recommends the following language re- garding Cuba: "...say...that you expect to take every available means to stop and turn ‘back the spread of Communism in this hemisphere." -8. CIA Summary of Costs for Cuban Operations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15 ee December 1963. ; . ; — This table reveals that the CIA spent $106,155,774 on Cuban Opera- tions, almost 50 percent of which was spent on paramilitary action ($47,815,122). The total covert action budget (psychological and para- military warfare) was approximately $81,000,000 in this four-year period. 9. Chase minutes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963. The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new Presi- i dent on Cuba.. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which in- cluded a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans, oy and attempts by the-CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would lew: dislodge Castro. The CIA was aiding two exile groups in particular: : .one led by Manuel Artime, the other by Manolo Ray. _Bundy recommends that Lyndon B. Johnson take "a more vigorous line ftoward Cuba/ than we have in the past." 10. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 9 January 1964. Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of | - covert sabotage against Cuba. He notes that Rusk and McNamara do not support the program of sabotage, while "McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealings with the Castro problem." Bundy concludes: '...in your position, I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging ' to our broader policy." er Soccer : . . poset hte! - ited ee we Ee sat ne ree! Du ee cma ETT a Docld:32423484 Page 6 . - °° get J. ee eg eee
DocTd: 3242R484- Page 7 ~3- 11. A second copy of the above memo. 12. “Memo and attachment on Cuban policy From John W. Ford, FSO, to Bundy, dated 18 February 1964. The lengthy attachment appears to be a working paper on Cuba prepared for Bundy by Rostow's staff in State. The authors (Ford and Bob Johnson) write: "If we.are to be realistic about our intent to get rid of the cancerous potential of Castroism, is an attack on the symptoms enough? Is it not essential to get at the disease itself?" (10). And, later, "eee if we were publicly to acknowledge /the extinction of the Castro regime/ as. our aim, would not a sudden -blow seem a more logical way of proceeding then the application of measured pressures?" (14). The paper discusses the need for a plausible causus for action against Castro, asking the question: ''would not a better bet be to provoke one?''.(16). They suggest that "something like the assassination of a prominent Latin American leader" (17a) would be sufficient provocation, if blamed on Castro, to permit U.S. action. 13. Memo, Chase to Bundy, with various attachments, no date, ‘but probably early March, 1964. Subject: Cuba, Covert Program. Of special interest here is the attached letter from Desmond Fitz- Gerald to Bundy, dated 6 March 1964. 'Des'' implies that CIA efforts to get rid of Castro were carried out "only in response to what we understand to be policy requirements....'' (1). He makes the point that CIA-sponsored sabotage raids were to serve as ''a sort of firing pin for intemal unrest and to create the conditions for a coup.'' However, only five low-key raids were carried out (from August to December, 1963), followed by a three-month hiatus. Des concludes that ''a covert.program at this time designed to overthrow Castro is not realistic'' (2). He does ‘recommend, however, con- tinuation of certain covert actions, each as ''carefully concealed con- _ tamination of lubricants" shipped into Cuba and "similar actions" (4). A second attachment is a ''Status Report on Autonomous Cuban Exile Groups'', dated 30 March 1964, which underscores how truly autonomous — these groups really were; the CIA had lost control over them by this time. The third attachment is a CIA ''Review of Current Program of Covert Action Against Cuba," dated "about 1/25/64."' The ultimate goal of the CIA program was ''to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly -in the armed forces, to carry out a coup'’ (7). The time frame for the program was ''about eighteen months from June 1963" (7). The report notes that the CIA has ''continued to improve our own infiltration techniques and are still able to penetrate Cuba's defenses with good regularity" (13-14). The five sabotage raids on Cuba run by CIA are listed at Annex I. en r. tii dai einen nite GE: te Sa
-4- ‘The final attachment is an . unsigned report on "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect to Cuba," dated 21 February 1964, and probably a _CIA document. It begins by citing the AG to the effect that "there is no ae point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the. . pee fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the a — United States to live with Cuba.'' Without answering this question, the report sets out a series of options or courses of action under two headings: (1)''Can and Can't Live with Castro.'' Under the latter, the options range from covert sabotage to invasion, but do not mention assassination of Castro. 14. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 23 March 1964, with attachments. Subject: U.S. Policy Towards Cuba, April to November, 1964. Chase still recommends "the tough, nasty, but no military intervention/ blockade policy...." (7). The policy will include ''a modest covert program" (141). CIA sabotage efforts will be terminated, though the Agency will continue trying to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potential dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the Castro regime. The possi- ' bilities of talking with Castro are viewed positively (12). Chase suggests ee a that the realities of domestic political considerations.''reinforce our ca national security decision to keep a reasonable amount of pressure on Cuba.. Pee 15. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 7 April 1964. Crimmins warns Chase that infiltration/exfiltration problems may create noise regarding U.S. covert programs against Cuba. arm yom Ge Ce? tt. bi 16. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 10 April 1964, with attachment. | — , L More discussions on the possibility of opening talks with Castro. The attachment emphasizes the true autonomy from the CIA of the autonomous exile groups. @® Memo , Bundy to LBJ, 17 April 1964, with attachment (Memo, Taylor to LBJ, , | 1 March 1964). . poo The Taylor memo notes that LBJ asked the JCS on 4 March 1964. to think of new ways to (1)gain OAS support for the overthrow of Castro and (2) ; bring additional pressure upon Castro. Taylor concludes that the JCS "have ' difficulty identifying promising actions against Castro which: have not been a previously considered, and in some cases tried. It is a hard fact,"' Taylor ~ L continues, ''that little remains which offers premise of real effectiveness - in removing Castro short of. a blockade or an ascending scale of military fe Docld: 32493484: Page 8 |
action up to or including invasion." 18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964. Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charge of contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. . 5 \ 19. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964. This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was "to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections. Thus, the continued exile raids were viewed negatively since they increased the noise level. The memo makes it clear that the exile raids were becoming completely beyond U.S. control despite CIA financial support to the groups. 20. Memo, Chase to Bundy , 2 June 1964. Chase notes that Castro has executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed two others as CIA agents. CIA admits having a connection with the executed ‘Cubans ''but that it is completely deniable." @D Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1964. Subject: "Plans of Cuban Xiles to sassinate selecte ubdan Governmen eaders The CIA was made aware of certain plans to kill Castro. The Agency told the sources, according to Helms, that ''the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions.''- Apparently on 2 March 1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate Castro for $150,000. The wealthy exile turned down the offer. Similar offers were. make to other Cuban exiles in early March. A leading figure in the negotiations was Byron Cameron, a shipping-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale. An agreement was finally made to pay the Cameron group $100,000 for killing .Castro, plus $2,500 for expenses. Julio Lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban exile in New York was to pay much of the money, and did pay the $2,500 on 25 April. Though Cameron's group remained anonymous, it was clear the Mafia was involved. Cameron revealed that his contact was a 4 police officer in the St. Louis (Mo.) Vice Squad. (23 Memo , Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. Subject: "Assassination of Castro." Referring to the above memo from DDP to DCI, Chase notes that John Crimmins feels the matter should be discussed at a Special Group meeting. psiia: ‘30499484 - Page. 3 ° OT eaten
"John's own inclination is that the U.S. Government cannot knowingly permit any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing, '" notes Chase, "and should go all out to stop the plot."' In marginal notations, Bundy agrees with John and with the need to forward the matter to the Special Group. 23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, with attachment (Des. FitzGerald's "A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations"). FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and Chase disapprove of the operations, though for different reasons. 24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964. _ Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Caribbean crisis than the overthrow of the Castro regime. Chase continues to be worried about noice levels . and the November election. This memo is very much like his 14 May memo (see Item 19). @5) Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964. ~ In a reference to Helm'’s memo on assassination (see Item 21), it was | pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice that failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. '' The AG said Justice | would look into the matter. yo "26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964. McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 June (See Item 21). The Bureau interviewed many people allegedly involved, most of whom denied the existence of such a plan (The Bureau did not interview Cameron, since he was out of the country). The most interesting finding was that Lobo had in fact discussed the matter with CIA. 27. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 10 November 1964. The election past, Chase et al. agreed that "we can usefully do some — wet DocId:324234684 Page 10 g. r > a wr : ones
basic review work on Cuba." FitzGerald pushes for re-institution of CIA- directed covert program. Gs) Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 November 1964, with JCS attachment a __ da ted 30 October 1964. dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE DANCE. SQUARE DANCE. A contemptable proposal intiated by the Army to use germ 1 warfare against Cuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Bundy agree that the White House should "remain aloof from formal consideration of 'Square Dance’ at this stage." I believe this plan for covert action is even more shocking and unacceptable . than plans for assassination. i> Docld:32423484 .Page’11 De er,
Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 Apri . RE The: Bundy memo suggests that LBJ approved various options "short of war to get rid of the Castro regime," including the possible contamination eS. of sensitive Cuban imports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that a a Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating elements into Cuba. 30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964. The Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA (as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interfere with him at this stage. 31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965. Chase reports a plan told to Crimmins and the CIA about an Artime plot to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be "neutralized." D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed at an upcoming Special Group meeting on whether or not "to cut off Artime'’s water." Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation of the Artime/Cubela plot." 32. Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA document. Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against ships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should ~ be authorized to reduce its commitment in the paramilitary field. 33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1965. we This memo indicates that not even Artime had his group in control. The re ' memo also discusses CIA covert activities in British Guiana, such as pene- bei ‘trating the PPP and proping up the democratic trade unionism. ; | | | | i 34. Memo, Murat. Williams cae) to Peter Jessup, White House staff, 7 23 February 1965. Fo Recommends immediate termination of Artime support. be. a . oo hee or 35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965 bs: Discussion of who is for maintaining a covert capability against Cuba _ (presently on the shelf) and who is opposed. Chase guessed that CIA would be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not. Rusk's general attitude toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out the Vietnam problem. . DocTa!32423484 Page 12°
-~g- Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965. $A lS Chase recommends phasing out support to Artime. The CIA is consider- ing diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; this is similar to the kinds of tactics - mentioned in Items 28 and 29 above and are a manifestation of the moral ; ey bankruptcy of U.S. policy. Also some talk here of backing a new exile pea group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently. . Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilitary capability, while DoD and State want the capability maintained. 37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Bundy, 18 June 1965. This isa summary of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The ultimate objective | is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary program involving clA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really started." 38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965. Adm. Raborn recommends reactivation of a paramilitary effort against: . me Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNamara, and Cy Vance are against this ik oa chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level. "Most of us," Bundy each writes, "do not recommend visible violent. actions against Cuba." Raborn's ‘recommendations said nothing about assassination. 39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966. Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into ambush and the agents were captured, The President could expect "the noise level of Castro's charges of "threatened Yankee aggression’ may go up." 40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP,. to Rostow, 7 August 1967. This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile talking to them about their activities. ° 41. ‘Memo, W.G. Bowdler to Rostow, 18 December 1967. The new CIA emphasis is on developing contacts within Castro's inner circle. Dave Phillips was to be in charge of the new CIA Cuba program. Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for i accommodation or his disillusioned, lieutenants want .to know where. we stand if they move to dump him.' Docld:32423484 Page 13
G2) Memo, Helms to LBJ,-12 June 1968. Carlos Prio, former President of Cuba, is sponsoring a plan to asSassinate Castro. Two Cubans have infiltrated Cuba from Miami to implement the assassination. "CIA has nothing whatever to do with these attempts," writes Helms, "and learns of them only through penetration” of Cuban exile groups." G3) Memo, Rostow to LBJ,. 20 June 1968. "CIA, Defense, and State agreed that, should an assassination or an assassination attempt take place, the U.S. skirts should be clean," writes Rostow. Therefore, State warned Cuban authorities via the Swiss that reports had been received on a:Castro assassination attempt. So by 1968 we were warning Castro of attempts on his life! 44. CIA Intelligence Report, 18 November 1968. ra tt -..there is little chance...that a plot against the (Castro) regime could succeed in the foreseeable future." (14).
NSC ACTIONS NOS, 2420-2425 TOP ‘SECRET TN, COPY No, 2. RECORD OF ACTIONS by the NATIONAL SECURLTY COUNCIL at its FOUR | HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING held on "May 5, 1961 (Approved by the President on May 16, 136) ' The President presided at this ‘meeting. The Acting Secretary of the ‘Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Educa- ticn and Welfare; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Di- rector of Central Intelligence; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Dep- uty Under Secretary of State; Theodore C, Achilles, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Stephen E. Smith, Assistant to Mr. Achilles; the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Arthur Schiesinger, Jr., | Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President; the Assistant to the Vice President; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Adviser to the President for Para-Military Affairs; the Military Aide to the President; the Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended - the meeting. .- ACTION ; 2420. - Uz S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19. . 2421. . Us S. wottey TOWARD KOREA Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Seeretary of ~ _ State for Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19, NSC ACTIONS NOS. 9620-2428 eee ue - ne suas _ a / 7 Copy Lyndon B. Joh nson Li brary DoclId: 32423484 Page ‘45 ;
- ACTION NUMBER TOP SECRET “SUBJECT 2422, u. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (NSC Action No, 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961) — Be jo Ld s ge HSC ACTIONS NOS, 2420-2425 9 = 2= + TOP SECRET es Docld: 32423484 Page 16. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility | of military intervention in the future. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an aix war against Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Noted the importance the President attaches to ob- taining timely and adequate intelligence aa to Cuban: military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assis- tance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible inter- vention may be maintained at an adequate level. Noted the importance the President attaches to publi- cation in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime, and to possible polit- ical action to end the current terror. Noted the President? s direction that. the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today. Agreed that relacions with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a geyernment-in-exile, sup- port should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment. : “Copy Lyndon B. Johnson Library aed
TOP SECRET ACTION NUMBER , SUBJECT 2422. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA CUBA (Continued) be Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S, armed forces under plans” to be developed by the Sece retary of Defense. [> e Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visite ors' visas will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in carry= ing on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas, Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status, All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and it was understood _ that they would also be eligible for citizenship. j. Agreed not to impose. an immediate trade embargo on | Cuba. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of a U. S. em= bargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle Act, It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed, it should be as ccmplete as possible, with certain exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of druggs,. ‘Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other Amer- ican states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling sub- versive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic rela- tions with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of interna- tional communism by all nations of this hemisphere. We NSC ACTIONS NOS, 2420-2425 -3-. POP SECRET Copy - Lyndon B. Johnson Library Docld: 32423484 Page 17
TCP SECRET ACTION . NUMBER . ‘SUBJECT 2422. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) i. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implemen- tation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social de- velopment, including conside¢ation of a supplemental appropriation for development loans of the order of $200-$400 million. m. Agreed that the U. S, Information Agency would ex- pand its existing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro re- gime; means of propaganda should be made available to non-U, S. groups. n. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Departmenc of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers, Q. Agreed that the Secretary of State should. prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effec- tive ant i-coamunist action, p. Agreed that pending appoint of an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should be continued under. the chairmanship of Richard N, Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President. 2423... U, S, POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI . Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly . both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist in- tervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United | States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo be- fore we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral. NSC ACTIONS NOS, 2420-2425 -4- . TOP SECRET Copy a _ Lyndon B Johnson Library ‘Docld:32423484 Page 18
as ACTION NUMBER TOP SECRET SUBJECT 2424. U, S, POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would considar what can ba done in cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take-over in that country. 2425, UL 8, POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit and Diem that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia. Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told that we are considering. inclusion of U. S. troops ‘in SEATO forces to be stationed in Thailand, the timing to be dependent on developments during or after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference. Noted that che. Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending recommendations to the Presicent promptly on u. S. training troops. in Viet Nam. NSC ACTIONS NOS, 242002425 .-5- °° ©. °° + TOP SECRET DociId: 324293484 “Page 19 “Copy” “Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library
Doclda: 32423484 Page 20° TGP SECRET NOTES ' Meeting of National Security Council, 5 May 1961 The President directed the establishment of a task force to study the Iranian problem and suggested that Mr. Talbot head the group. Mr. Rusk pointed out that General Bakhtiar visited the United States comparatively recently and that a coup involving him would possibly . embarrass the United States. The President discounted the possibility. , The President directed that a group study the Korean problem and: report its findings within two weeks. Mr. McConaughy will head the group of Defense, CIA, State and Treasury representatives. Mr. McNamara appointed Mr. William Bundy to represent Defense. The President.asked Mr. Nitze for a report on the Cuban situation. Nitze replied that the Navy could blockade the island but results would not be immediate but rather long-range, and in the course thereof unfavorable world reaction would probably accrue. Admiral Burke pointed out that . -only complete interception of all ships approaching Cuba would achieve eventual success, and the job could be done with 24 ships. Mr. Rusk ‘interrupted Admiral Burke to point out that such action would be an act of war.and was wholly impracticable. , The President asked about a reported letter from Senator Goldwater in which the statement is made that the Air Force could resolve the Cuban situation. Admiral Burke replied that there had in fact been an Air Force proposal with which other services had disagreed, especially the Marines. _ In any case, the Air Force had made the suggestion that the Cuban problem _be resolved through rather heavy and perhaps indiscriminate bombardment. The President immediately rejected such an idea, and added further that there would be no Navy blockade. He emphasized the importance of more effective watch committee action on Cuba. He also asked Mr. Dulles what new information was available on foreign equipment going into Cuba. “Mr. Dulles replied that we know practically everything about the equipment, but offered no specifics.. The President directed that close surveillance be continued including overflight with an American pilot. The President approved flights of a frequency of every two or three days, but t suggested’ extreme caution. _ The President suggested that all Americans be urged to leave Cuba and asked Secretary | Johnson to study ways and means of exit and. transit visas. ‘Top SECRET | “Copy” | Lyndon B. Johnson Library wat
TOP SECRET Mr. Murrow assessed world-wide reactions to the U.S. position with regard to Cuba. He felt that the departure of the clergy, the reign of terror, and such incidents as the imprisonment in the theater will result in favorable reactions toward the U.S. and tend to considerably offset the unfavorable ones. He felt that world-wide impressions of the United States were improving generally. The President suggested that the Iranian issue might be interpreted abroad as a possible result of ' the failure of the U.S. to act in Laos. He suggested action by USIA to discount this possible impression. Secretary Rusk suggested the over- . riding theme of U.S. rejection of Castro and went on to say that the U.S. must take all measures to precipitate his downfall or face the possibility that all South America will come under Communist. influence. , The President asked what specific courses of action we should take to prevent the crippling influence of the Cuban fiasco, assuming that no military action by the U.S. will be taken. At the same time the President asked what circumstances would have to exist before the United States could move unilaterally against Cuba. Rusk stated that action could be taken under Article 51 of the Rio Treaty. Inthis connection the President asked if the U.S. could recognize the Cuban Government in Exile and what might be expected of this group. Rusk replied that such recognition was mot possible because of the absence of certain essential elements of a governmental organization, identity and territory. The question then ‘arose as to the status of the Cubans in the United States and Robert Kennedy replied that they should be designated refugees and stated that legislation exists to handle them under this designation. The Department of HEW will begin registering the refugees with the assistance of CIA. . “The President stated that the United States will invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act across the board as far as Cuba is concerned at such time as some overt act or incident occurs in Cuba. The President gave as an | example the shooting of a United States citizen. The President would exempt fromthe restrictions of the Act some $30 million for food and drugs... At the suggestion of Mr. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury, the drugs should be donated to the Cuban people through the Red Cross. The President suggested the acceptance of the policy to encourage all Latin American states to sever relations with Cuba and to establish a complete economic boycott. The United States however should draw the line on becoming involved in the affairs of another country, such as active participation in the overthrow of Trujillo. Instead, the United States should determine appropriate courses of action in case Trujillo falls. The common danger in Haiti should be included in these considerations. 2 Docld: 32423464 Page 21
Saigon,September 135 ‘Dear Dean: I ask that youshow this letter to the President personally, - as it is vital that it not get into the governmental paper mill.For — -- maximum security I am typing itsenyself and am sending it to you by messengers What I ‘ask is that General. Lansdale be sent over here at once | to take charge,umder my supervision,of all U.S. relationships with a change | of government here.To function efficiently he must have a staff and I therefore ask that he be put in charge of the CAS station in the: Embassy, relieving the present incumbent,lMxr.John Richardson. This is said without casting any reflection on Mr.Richardson. Indeed I think of him as a devoted,intelligent and patriotic American.If his loyal support in the past of the U.S. policy of winning the war with Diem hes made it difficult for him to carry out a different policy now, -he has never said. so or showed it.If,as I am inclined to think, Vietnamese | have naturally suspected him of being pro-Dien,it has not been his faulte Ly request to put General Lansdale in his place is not because | Tohave- anything but praise of Mr.Richardson,but because of my belief thhat | we need a new face and that Geherallansdale has outstanding qualifications. But I hope John MicCone will be told my my high vegard 1 for kx. Richardson. | CAS telegram FVS-9617, September ll,is the most encouraging report I have seen since arriving in Vietnam.And it is confirmed by a wholly | independant source in whom I have great confidence. No written answer to this letter is necessary. General Lansdalejs arrival will be a more than adequate response. | I hope you will tell the President how much ‘I valve his message contained in Deptel 396. : With warm regards , 4s ever yours | | - Hon.Dean Rusk - Secretary of State “Lyndon B. - Johnson Library 4 oo Be Ve Copy. Docld: 32423484 Page 22
20 om - Sa Save i _ The most pertinent reference to a Presidential reply at a news _conference with respect to alleged agent activities of the CIA in _ Cuba ig one dated October 31, 1963 at President Kennedy's news conference at which the following question was put to him: Question: Mr. President, Fidel Castro claims to have - captured some Americans whom he says are CIA agents, and he says he is going to execute them. . Is there anything at all that you can tell us about this? The President: No, no. It would seem that this is the proper reply for the President to make to such a question, and we would suggest that, if the question arises at a White House news conference a similar reply be made. If the ‘President or the press secretary wish to make a fuller statement, it might be along the following lines: . - "JT gee no useful purpose to be served by any comment » I might make on such allegations." ae : oe oe | ENT Copy DocId: 32423484 Page 23
* Cc LRN ‘ ba cis THe WHITE House a . WASHINGTON Dadveedt Ve en ee a “Copy | Docld: 32423484 Page 24 , . “Lyndon BL Johnson Library
THE WHITE HOUSE . WASHINGTON’ TOP SECRET | - . December 2, 1963 U.S. Policy. Towards Cuba 1, The objective of our policy is a free Cuba which poses no threat to its neighbors; we do not intend to coexist with a Soviet satellite in this hemis- phere. In moving towards this objective, we have rejected the option of unprovoked U.S. armed intervention in Cuba. Instead, we are engaged in a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures, both defensive and offensive in nature, which stop short of invasion. 2. ‘Our defensive measures primarily aim at three targets. First, we are intent on ensuring that Cuba does not become again a military threat to the U.S. or Latin America. To this end, we conduct intensive air and sea sur- veillance over and around Cuba. So far as we know, we have been entirely, successful in this effort. Second, we are intent, for domestic political, as well as national security reasons, on effecting the removal of all Soviet mil- itary personnel from Cuba. To this end, we have made it eminently clear to the Soviets on numerous occasions that we cannot tolerate the permanent assignment of Soviet troops to Cuba. Asa result of Soviet self-interest and our pressures, there are now 4-7, 000 Soviet military personnel remaining in Cuba, representing a drop of about 65-75% from the peak reached in the autumn of 1962. Needless to say, the issue remains # highly delicate one, especially in view of the fact that at any moment the Russians could arbitrarily decide’ to send more troops back into Cuba. Third, we are intent on impeding and, if possible, stopping Cuban-based and supported subversion of the Hemisphere. To this end, we have made a special effort, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, to direct the Latin American attention to and to assist (materially, where appropriate) Latin American efforts in the problem of controlling the subversive movement of people, funds, arms, and propaganda between Latin America and Cuba. We have had some success; one small measure is that, primarily through the use of travel con- trols by Latin American governments, there has been a 50% drop, over the past year, in the number of Latin Americans traveling to Cuba. On the other hand, with Castro still exceedingly intent on producing "another Cuba'' in the Hemisphere and with many Latin American governments still unwilling or unable to cope effectively with subversive efforts, much remains to be done. In this regard, proper exploitation of the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela might take us a long way towards getting whole-hearted Latin American cooperation in the fight against subversion; such cooperation is a vital key to success in this field. , ~ ' - TOP SECRET Copy. pecta:32423484 Page 25 ce “Lyndon B. Johnson Library
DocId: 32425484 Page 26 TOP SECRET -2- 3. Offensively, our ultimate target is to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. We hope we can achieve this by concentrating on three intermediate targets -- intensifying Cuba's already~serious economic dif- ficulties; increasing the cost and unpleasantness to the Soviets of maintain- ing Cuba; and stimulating direct and indirect internal resistance to the regime. Our chief weapons for achieving these offensive targets are two -- isolation measures and covert measures (which, of course, also have an impact on our defensive targets). . (a) The most outstanding characteristic of our isolation measures is that they are exceedingly difficult to implement -- primarily because imple- mentation depends on the cooperation of others and not merely on U.S. will. Nevertheless, we have been surprisingly successful in implementation; while one could have reasonably expected our isolation policy to break up as the world moved away from the heat of October, 1962, in fact, this has not hap- ' pened. Instead, over the past year, our isolation policy generally held the ground already made in some fields, ‘while making further progress in others. About a year ago, only five OAS countries maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba; the number not only remains the same now but the anticipated OAS reaction to the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela gives some reason to hope for further ruptures. Free World shipping to Cuba in 1963 has fallen off by roughly 60% from the 1962 level; prospects for further re- duction are good. The low level of Free World trade with Cuba, reached in 1962, has generally been ‘maintained in 1963. Air isolation of Cuba has been fairly successful; a dramatic demonstration of this.is the fact that many Latin Americans have had to travel to ‘and from Cuba via Prague. The effectiveness of our isolation measures in hitting the target is impos- sible to gauge accurately. ‘While Hurricane Flora, in a few days, probably hit the target more squarely than our isolation measures did in a whole year, it is generally agreed that the economic chaos which now exists in Cuba and the. enormity of the Soviet aid bill is, in part at least, due to our efforts. Castro's repeated and loud public protestations about our isolation policy and his serious and strenuous efforts to break out of Free World isolation substantiate the view that the isolation measures probably hurt him, economically and politically. (b) The most outstanding characteristic of our other chief offensive weapon, covert measures, is that its potential for bringing about a basic change in Cuba is still largely unknown. The program, which makes use of Cuban exiles and which is not yet fully underway, has already achieved a degree of success -- e.g. in demonstrating to Cubans that Castro is not invulnerable, in forcing Castro to divert valuable resources for defense against covert activities and, _perhaps, in stimulating the insurgency which is evident within Cuba. As yet, TOP SECRET Copy Lyndon 8B. Johnson Library
TOP SECRET ~3- our covert program has not been directed in sucha way as to inflict serious ' economic damage on Cuba. There are those who believe that much can be done in this regard. a 4, In theory at least, our present offensive measures, vigorously pursued, will lead finally to one of the following three results, each of which constitutes a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. (a) An overthrow of the Castro regime. (Dissident elements, most prob- ably from the military and the bureaucracy, seize power with a direct or in- . direct assist from the U.S.; the people of Cuba, tired of economic hardship, lack of freedom, and isolation from their Latin American brethren, embrace the new group.) Most Cuban experts in the U.S. Government regard this as _the most likely of the three eventualities. * (b) Accommodation with Castro on U.S. terms (Cuba breaks its tie-line with the USSR, ends its subversion efforts, and perhaps, renounces its Com- munist ideology). While highly unlikely, it is not inconceivable that, . such factors as (1) U.S. isolation and covert measures, (2) further economic deterioration in spite of Soviet aid, and (3) distrust of Soviet intentions, will lead Castro to believe that he has no choice but accommodation. Indeed, there - is evidence that Castro may already be thinking along these lines. In the past. several months, he has made a number of accommodation noises, and since he undoubtedly has a pretty good reading of our minimum terms, these noises could conceivably indicate that he is willing to go a long way towards meeting them. Che Guevera's reported nervousness at Castro's accommodation tend- encies substantiate the view that Castro's desire to negotiate is genuine and not merely a Ploy to ‘reduce U.S. heat on Cuba. - But there are obvious major problems with this alternative. Not the least of ‘these is whether the American people would tolerate accommodation with even a reformed Castro, especially in view of Lee Oswald's pro-Castro connection. Also, it is not now possible to gauge accurately the impact of President Kennedy's death on Castro's apparent accommodation tendencies. Nevertheless, accommodation remains a distinct possibility, if not for now, then for later. (c) A Soviet decision to quit Cuba. This may be the most unlikely of the three eventualities.. Yet such a Soviet decision cannot be dismissed categorically in view of such factors as (L) the lack of real Soviet progress in making Cuba a "show piece", (2) the obvious U.S. determination to make Cuba a Soviet ''dead end" in the Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will be permitted), (3) the magnitude of Peace | Copy | “Lyndon B. Johnson Library | TOP SECRET DocId: 32493484 Page 27
TOP SECRET 4. Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of the USSR's own present economic. problems. At the least, these factors would appear to have a bearing on how the Russians would view their eviction from Cuba either by an overthrow of the Castro regime or by a Castro decision toaccommodate with the U.S. on U.S. terms. Relief would probably mix generously with Russian grief, espec- ially if the Russians could finda vaguely credible fig- leaf. 5. The $64 question -- Will our present offensive measures, even if imple- mented rigorously and flawlessly, ever lead, by one way or another, to the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere? -- is impossible to answer. Most people probably tend to be skeptical but there are also a number of optim- ists, many of whom are among the closest observers of the Cuban situation. Probably the most we can say for certain is that we appear to be moving in the right direction; and this, of course, is important.. A vigorous, tough, and nasty policy probably lays the best groundwork for bringing about any of the three eventualities which are noted above and which would each constitute a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. From a domestic political viewpoint this is probably fortuitous; a tough, but no-invasion policy is one. policy - which the American people appear prepared to support at this time. . 6. In closing, here are a few gratuitous and unorganized observations which ' bear on the problem of U.S. action inthe future, First, while always alert to the danger of escalation in US/ USSR relations, we should continue to explore every avenue in order to make life as difficult for Castro and as expensive and unpleasant for the USSR as possible. Special attention should always be directed toward finding new ways to (1) tighten existing isolation measures, (2) conduct other forms of economic warfare against Castro, (3) strengthen our covert action program, (4) deepen the now-visible rift between Castro and the USSR, and (5) gain solid Latin American interest and support for further actions against Cuba.. Second, we should continue to press hard in our anti-subversion campaign, not only for its salutary effect in Latin America but also for the effect it could have on Castro. Recognition by Castro that there is no chance for a winin Latin - America could go a long way in convincing him that he must meet U.S. minimum terms. Third, we should stay flexible. We should be prepared to meet any event which might offer the opportunity of a sudden overthrow of Castro (e.g.. the shooting down of a U-2). Also, we should never close the door completely to _ possible accommodation with Castro on U.S. terms; in this regard, Administration officials should avoid making the point publicly that we are after Castro's head per se. Fourth, we should ever be cautious about our public posture on any issue relating to Cuba. Generally speaking, we should try to keep Cuba in per- spective andina low-key. The Administration should try to convey the sense TOP SECRET Copy. Docld:32423484 Page 28 - - Lyndon 8B. Joh nson Li brary
TOP SECRET -5- {1} that it fully recognizes and understands the substance and extent of the threat which Cuba presents to the U.S. and the Hemisphere, and (2) that it is working hard, steadily, efficiently, confidently, successfully, and with- . out fanfare, in controlling the threat. Conveyance of a sense of high danger, normally, should be studiously avoided. CO Gordon Chase > | me “Copy ; . Lyndon B. Johnson Library Docld: 32423484 Page 29 ,
TOP SECRET | MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Cuba Meeting (Without President) Next Tuesday, December 10, 1963 1, I spoke to John Crimmins at some length about preparations for the meeting _ next week regarding new courses of action we can take, short of invasion, to -make life difficult for Castro. He plans to produce the following type of docu- 'ment for the meeting. . . (a) . The paper will include State's recommendation on how we plan to proceed in the OAS as a result of the Cuban arms’ cache issue. For ' example, should we pugh for a break in diplomatic relations among _ the ''soft 5'', a break in economic relations between Latin America and Cuba, a break in communications between the OAS countries and Cuba? (b) The paper will then describe a number of possible bilateral and of unilateral actions which we can take (e.g. unleashing of the exiles, low level flights, military feints (at a level which will make the Cubans, but not the Soviets, jumpy), intensification of covert program). There will be a brief discussion giving the advantages and disadvantages of each of these courses of action, along with State! s recommendation _in favor or against. (c) John will get the paper distributed by Saturday afternoon so that the agencies will have time to consider State's recommendations before the Tuesday meeting. 2. John plans to meet with Alexis Johnson and the Secretary this evening. ‘Among other things he hopes to clear the above menu. 3. Bromley feels that we should try to maintain this meeting as a Standing Group meeting (among other things, this will allow us to invite the AG). Attendence at' the meeting would be roughly as follows: Ed Martin, somebody from the 7th floor of State, John McCone, Dez Fitzgerald or Dick Helms, Roswell Gilpatric, another person from Defense, Don Wilson, and the AG. C ( an THE WHITE HOUSE . a | WASHINGTON December 4, 1963 { | | | Do you have any problems with such alist? How about Douglas Dillon, Maxwell | Taylor, Ted Sorensen? © — Gordon Chase ya e teen ee wots aaa Puen eet eae ‘ce: Bromley Smith . _ c _ TOP-SECRET | “Copy” _ Lyndon B, Johnson Library Docld: 32423484 Page 30
! { | THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOP SECRET re 7 December 2, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY | SUBJECT: Cuba - 6:00 P.M. Meeting 1. Attached are 2 copies of the talking points which State prepared forthe Secretary. I assume that the meeting is on again. Is this right? Lae gap 2. Assuming the meeting is on, the attendence list now ¥ | stands as follows: (1) The President, (2) Secretary Rusk, J (3) Ed Martin, (4) Secretary McNamara, (5) another DOD ‘type, (6) Director McCone, (7) Dick Helms or Des Fitzgerald, (8) Don Wilson, (9) you, and (10) me, as notetaker. 3. In good Sonseions I should point out that I heard through 7 the grape-vine that Ben Read cut State's invitation list from -3 to 2 in deference to the President's inclination to abhor a _ exowd. Much as I would like to attend the meeting (I have never attended a Presidential meeting) I will understand perfectly if you feel I should stay home and mind the store. | oe If I do not hear from you, I will plan to attend. Gordon Chase _ ee a TOP SECRET | | L { i i i L i | t 4 | a Copy. Ba “Lyndon, B. Johnson Library” Docld:32423484 Page 31°
December 12, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Re: Checklist of Topies the Foreign Press may raise, and shorthand . answers 1. Meetis # with Foreign Statesmen and r travel * I suggest that you explain exactly what you have done and why. Toughest problem is de Gaulle, where what is needed is good humored and easy acceptance that there appears to have been a misunderstanding and that we certainly have no objection if General DeGaulle feela he | gould not come to the United States in 1964. You yourself do nct see how you can get to Europe in that same time. Nevertheless this is not . a cause for alarm or dispair. 2. Relations with the Soviet Union Your first diplomatic purpose was to assure Mikoyan and <hrushchey of your desire to sustain lines of communication opened under - President Kennedy and your determination that the US will meet Swryone half way for peace. You do not expect a summit meeting but you do expect to continue discussion in search of possible agreementa. You will not _ ‘wish to comment on specific issues, and in particular you will want to be ' gareful about questions suggesting that the British are more optimistic than we are. The fact is that they @ are, but that we do not want to make an issue of it publicly. 3. South Vietnam . Your determination to carry on the effort there has been made — clear to all concerned. You and Lodge are in the closest touch. You assume that while he is on the job he will not engage in politics(!} You believe that progress is being made both here and in the field toward | _ balty and an end of backbiting ~~ waleb you detest. oo 4. Cuba a You have indeed asked for a review of Cuba policy (Max Frankel story a couple of days ago} and you regard this as one of the major con- tinuing problems of our foreign policy. While that review ig under way and until you have a chance to consider its results, you have nothing more ' to say than that you expect to take every available means to atop and turn bacis the ‘Spread of Communism in this hemisphere. — - a Copy | a Docla:32423484. Page 32 . Lyndon B. Johnson Library
5. Alliance for Progress There is no higher priority. on your agenda and you are working closely with Secretary Rusk to find ways and means of increasing the . eiiectivencas of the Government's work on this whole subject. 6. Cn the Kennedy Round You had a goad talk with Governor Herter this afternoon; you have confidence in him; the foeus of discussion is now in Europe among “ the members of the Six, on the agricultural issue, and this is not the time for you to do more than to say that you have strongly supported the objec- . ' thyes of the Trade Expansion Act right from the beginning and that you mean to carry on toward the basic objectives set by President Kennedy two years ago. . 7. Majaysia oo There ia a real prespect of new adventures by Sukarno here, and you will probably not want to say more than that the situation ia one whichyae are _ watching very closely and on which we are in very close consaltation, not only with the countries immediately concerned but with the United Kingdom and Australia. 8. Cambodia . T think yoa will want to be very reserved. Sthanouk has been . gmaking outrageous statements, but the fact is the problem ia pathological . _ and not diplomatic, and it would be dangerous to comment even off-the- record today. 7 9. Wheat Deal ye You are in favor of it, but the question Is still one of price - bargaining between the Russians and the traders, and your position is what President Kennedy's was: iet the negotiators negotiate. 10, Yemen and the Middle East _ ‘| think you may wish to dodge the questions by saying this is another of the matters you are having studied and will be reviewing in the next two days, and yes \ would prefer not to comment tonight. li, MLE You are well priefed on this, and made your own: position clear in | Brussels earlier this fall. | McG. B. Copy _Docld:32423484 Page 33 tundam BR inhneaw Lilrarw
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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE December 27, 1963 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT - December 19, 1963 - 10:55 A.M. rc SUBJECT: Cuba Others Present: Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompson; Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; Assistant Secretary Martin; John Crimmins; Acting Secretary Gilpatric; Secretary Vance; General Wheeler; Secretary Dillon; Acting -. Director General Carter; Richard Helms; Desmond Fitzgerald; Deputy Director Wilson; McGeorge Bundy; William Moyers; George Reedy; Gordon Chase. - The primary purpose of the me eting was to brief the President in depth about some of the basic Cuban issues. Essentially, the discussion described where -we have been since January, 1963, where we are now, and where we can go. ‘(An outline which was prepared for the discussion is attached.) | 1. A large part of the meeting was devoted to a briefing by Mr. Fitzgerald and a general discussion on CIA's present covert program and on the U.S. Government's economic denial program, Essentially, this part of the dis- cussion covered 6 areas. (a) Mr. Fitzgerald described covert intelligence activities directed against Castro's regime, including the numbers, characteristics, and geo- graphic spread of CLA assets within Cuba. (b) Mr. Fitzgerald described ClA- controlled radio programs and other . propaganda media directed at Cuba which have been used to encourage low ' risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. He noted the recent-increase of spontaneous anti-regime propaganda inside Cuba. {c) Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba commodities from the Free World which are critical to the economy. The results have been mixed. For example, while we have been able “to penetrate certain European firms which deal with Cuba, we also know that equipment vitally needed in Cuba, some of U.S. origin, reaches the island via Canada and Great Britain. . ‘TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE at 0 py. pocta:32493484 page’35 cer Lyndon. BL Joh nson_ Li brary
om TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE -2- The group agreed that this is not an easy problem; Mr. Ball said that our allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have always had a different view of Free World/Bloc trade than we have had. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our efforts and that there are still things we can do. First, Mr. Crimmins noted that we could consider ways in which the new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Author- ization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program. Second, Mr. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive items would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on December 20; later, Mr. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World gov- ernments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities in- volved in Free World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Home and Pearson. : (d) Mr. Fitzgerald spoke about CIA's program to identify, seek out, and ‘establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the - power centers of the regime with a view to stimulating an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. Our effort is based on the premise that a popular up- rising in Cuba is unlikely, primarily because Castro is capable of controlling such an uprising. Instead, we are trying to penetrate the Cuban regime's power structure. In this regard, we have had only limited success. On the one hand, we have been able to make an important penetration in the Cuban army. On the other hand, the dissident elements, while willing to act, are not yet willing to act together. They simply don't trust each other, mainly because . Castro has been successful, in the past, in penetrating dissident groups. | The President President asked whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba. Mr. Mr. Fitzgerald said there is some but that there is no national movement on * _ which we can build. Mr. Bundy noted that the insurgents generally seem to suf- fer heavy losses at Castro's hands. oo (e) Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has directed four small scale, externally mounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating resistance and hurting Cuba economically. The discussion then focussed on a proposed attack on a major target.-- the Matanzas power plant. Mr. Fitzgerald noted that this “would have a significant.favorable impact, psychologically as well as econom- . deally;.the dissidents would view the attack as evidence that the Johnson Admin- -istration is not giving up the fight for Cuba. TOP SECRET -SENSITIVE | - mony - a Copy en oe ~ Lyndon Br Johnson Library - Docld: 32493484 ‘Page ‘36
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE -3- But there are a number of disadvantages to the power plant attack. First, the chances of total success (e.g. target destroyed, no one caught) are less than ‘50-50 while the chances of partial success (target destroyed, people caught) are only somewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caught, they will undoubtedly admit their CIA connection. (General Carter believed this point was weak -- we get blamed for everything that happens in Cuba anyway.) Third, such an attack will be highly visible and will have a high noise-level. In this regard, Mr. Bundy said that we might want to lie low for now so that Castro, presently under a strain because of the arms cache discovery, will not be able | to shift the accusing finger in our direction. Fourth, Mr. Ball said that it might - slow-up the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Fifth, Ambassador Thompson said that the timing seemed bad -- the Soviets now appeared to be in a situation where they may be thinking of cutting back aid to Cuba. They will draw a lot of conclusions from the first acts of President Johnson. An attack ona big ‘Cuban target could give Castro important leverage in his negotiations for more Soviet aid. General Wheeler thought that, to improve the chance of success, we might want to try to hit the Matanzas power plant from the air; it should be noted that there . have already been some free-lance raids over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out that an air strike might cause retaliation against one of our U-2 flights. In response to a question, Secretary Vance indicated that he was in favor of an attack on Matanzas. It was decided that there will be no air or ground attack on the Matanzas power plant at this time, primarily because of its high probability of failure and be- _ cause of the Soviet dimension. However, it was agreed, in principle, that low- risk sabotage efforts could go forward along with the planning necessary to develop an air strike capability. (f) Mr. Fitzgerald described CIA's program in aiding two autonomous. Cuban exile groups, which will be operating from outside the U.S. One group, ‘which is headed by Manuel Artime, will start operating out of Costa Rica and | Nicaragua in February; the other group is headed by Manolo Ray who is some- what to the left of Artime, but probably has the best following within Cuba. Both of these groups will conduct externally mounted raids on Cuba, and will send © teams inside Cuba to conduct internal sabotage and to establish contact with dis- sidents. Mr. Fitzgerald added that there are some disadvantages in these oper- _ ations -- the groups aren't trained by CIA and they operate outside of CIA control. ‘But there are advantages too -- they operate from outside United States territory and we will have relatively little trouble denying U.S. association with these groups. _ TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE : a Copy re DocId: 32423434 Page 37
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE -4- Mr. Bundy noted, and Mr. Fitzgerald agreed, that these groups operate a iong distance away from the target; we cannot expect too much effect from their raids. "2. Mr. Bundy gave avery quick briefing o on some other aspects of the current Cuban situation. (The group paused to read the attached CIA situation brief.) © (a) With respect to Soviet / Cuban. military strength on the island, Mr. Bundy noted that one of our primary objectives.is to ensure that there is is no _ reintroduction of offensive missiles.. The camera is our best inspector and, so ' far as we know, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy-added that we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about '- . ynid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully. As for the Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly. (b) Mr. Bundy noted, in passing, our anti-subversion efforts. The key to | "the problem is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American DocIa: 32425484 ‘Page 38 countries to counter the threat. Our efforts in the field of controlling travel between Latin America and Cuba are also important. (c) Mr. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal contacts we have established with Castro himself. The initiative is on Castro's part and we are essentially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are prepared to listen to what Castro has to say. Mr. Ball noted that such U.S. / Cuban contacts could have an unsettling effect on Soviet/Cuban relations, 3. Mr. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses ‘of action we oat can take in the future to make life difficult for Castro. (a). Air attacks, unleashing of exiles (allowing them to use U.S. territory as a base for attacks on Cuba), and low level flights are aggressive-type acts which have distinct advantages but which are similar in that they all.tend to raise the noise-level. Low level flights, for example, would provide us with more intelligence and would irritate and harass Castro. At.the same time, they could precipitate the shooting down of a U- 2. (b) Mr. Bundy said that we can take further unilateral shipping measures -- e.g. close ports and deny U.S. -financed commodities to lines engaged in ‘Free World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through past experience that bilateral measures are more effective in reducing Free World shipping to Cuba. At the same time, we should not deceive ourselves. “TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE to , ne ; Copy” ; oo er se  eepyndon-Belalnswe bib brary .
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE -5- We should recognize that the Soviets are capable of handling all Cuba's shipping needs even if we are able to eliminate Free World shipping to Cuba. -(c) Mr. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in the near future, taking a more vigorous line than we have in 'the past. He noted that in his November 18 speech, President Kennedy made two points about Cuba -- the first was designed to encourage anti-Castro elements within Cuba to revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in the Hemisphere. (d) Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures against Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be a high priority target. NOTE: At this point the President left the room and there was a brief discussion | about the exiles in Florida. Mr. Crimmins said that. resettlement remains our basic policy. It is true that the exiles feel that the pressure for their resettle- — ment is intense. In fact, it is no more intense now than it has been for some time. 5. On the President! s return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduced the subject of © ‘the discovery in Venezuela of the Cuban arms cache. (a) Mr. Helms gave a graphic presentation of the link between the arms cache and a plot to upset the elections in Caracas. “(b) Mr. Martin: explained the. status of the OAS investigation of the arms cache. The evidence is convincing in showing that the arms were from Cuba. The OAS investigating team is still working on its report. Hopefully, it will be able to tie the arms cache into a general plot to subvert Venezuela. The report should be ready by about January 10. (c) Mr. Bundy described the types of action we can hope to get in the OAS as a result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the ‘surveillance action where we have essentially two basic choices -- we may want to push for a system which. involves search and seizure of Cuban vessels on the high seas; this implies the possible use of force. Or we can push for a system involving the search and seizure of Cuban vessels in territorial waters; this evades the issue of force. Mr. Bundy added that it is still too early to know how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force against Castro. We. have put out feelers. 6. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of lifting travel restrictions on Americans : who wish to.goto Cuba. Mr. Ball noted that a great number of students want to ee ee crs Cc pre Spree ae Temes deme ea es _TOP SECR ET - SENSITIVE Ce 0 py” pocta:avangae4’ 7 Page 39 moe ~-tyndon—B-Johnson- ki brary———
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE . ; -6- 'go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department — recommends that we lift our travel restrictions. If we don't, we will probably be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be embarrassing. Mr. Ball added that the State Department is tentatively opposed to lifting the travel restrictions because of the effect it will have on Latin _ American countries. We have been trying to get the Latin Americans to impose restrictions on travel to Cuba; if we lift our own re strictions, our position will. ‘be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting with the Attorney General later in the day | to talk about the subject. Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel restrictions and a policy of selective prosecution. -. Gordon Chase 3 ‘TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE ook rowers coe : ae “Copy ap aS a a —tyndon—Be-Johnson~tit brary———— ~ DocTd: 32423484 ‘Page 40
ay THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON SECRET - EYES ONLY | January 9, 1964 ' MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro. ' Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine con- tinuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involyed are: (1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier; (2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor: and (3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters, All of these operations would have been approved three months ago, ~ and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted ‘because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the | small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled, thereafter because it. ‘seemed to fall within the guidance you expressedi in your first review ‘of the Cuban problem). The policy question now is this: If we continue these‘even small _ sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we _ call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians.\ We thus have an opportunity to choose. “A I doubt if this choice should be’ made on momentum alone. I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never liked it and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced, © eee mers ne er ee teen er eee a nenieet I MIRINYEEE Rt  Anne aoe Af ne rersene en Rim tebe finteee peeyey Nine aru" Remnant hn mt SECRET. - EYES ONLY. oe a aps oo “Lyndon ‘B. Johnson. Library” pe Docld:32423484 Page 41
| | SECRET - EYES ONLY ee Jan. 9, 1964 | , but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position | I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union. McG. B. SECRET - EYES ONLY — . ae Copy’ peas’ “Lyndon B. Johnson ‘Library DocId: 32423484 Page 42.-
Docld: 32423484. Page 43 SECRET - EYES ONLY | January 9, 1964 MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT | SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Greup, but this recommendation is based on a routine con- tauation af broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are: (1) @ commando aabotage operation against a , coastal -warehouse and pler; (2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harber; and 3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters. | Ail of these operations would have been approved three months ago, ' and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While itis always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the | small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December | which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation " appreved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it ‘zeemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review of the Cuban problem). ‘The policy question now is thie: If we » continue these even amall sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we call them off, he will know it, aad so will the. Russians. We thus have an opportunity t te choose. t doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone. t therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whele principle. of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never Liked it and thas McNamara thinks it dees very little good. McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Caatro provlem. I myself consider the matter extrémely eveniy balanced, SECRET - EYES ONLY Copy | 7 Lyndon B. Johnson Library
2 . Docld:3274293464 Page 44 © : - . Lundan R Inhncan Rihrary mo SECRET - EYES ONLY © -2- - Jans 9, 1964 Sut before hearing full argument, my quees is thatin your position I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish — to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union... “Mec. B.. SECRET - EYES CNLY.
‘ Counselor and Chairman ‘ i | LL DEPARTMENT OF STATE Per... “oe Policy Planning Council ~ 4 . Washington, x ee eee | SECRET ATTSCHMENT = - Fabruary 18, 1964 | Mr, MacGeorze Bundy: Re: Cuba Paper Herewith the paper wh’ch Tom Mann's. office vesked “22. I send to you. . By way of background, this is a rough draf exposition of issues whick need to be examined. Ths terms of reference briefly were these: | 1 | "One conceivable way to ded with the Hanot and Havana protlems is by imcosing overt, measured sanctions against the source of aggression or convincing the authorities in those capitals — that they were likely to suffer such reprisal to the point where they would cease their illegal | } | { ~ actions..." Under Bob Johnson for tne Far East and under myself for Latin America, we attempted to get down . on paper. the results of an examinstion of an array of - 4ssue3 in both sreas responsive to the terms of reference “alt propesed. The results fof the examination of Cuba are reflected primarily in peges 5 through l7r. I suggest you may wish to glance at the incex. I reemphasize this paper is 2 rough draft pro duced syne a four-day time frame by several officers in Sinc erely,,——~ fe oe Docld:32423484 Page 45 | . | tac
_ SECRET gs Tit. Primary and Secondary Objectives © | A. Primary ~  Qur aim in this opetation would be to end the potential 7 of the Castro regime, and of the USSR or Communist China through _ the Castro regime, to extend Communist influence and power in °°. this hemisphere. _ Inmediately, however, a very basic problem °°: a arises: How can we hope. to attain this object short of getting. | ‘rid of the Castro regime itself? It is entirely. possible that | | Castro. might decide at any given moment to foreswear in solemn | Jeofeety Me dantey SeRrenely ant Suse A980 8 BE PARES oo | Conceivably, if us pressures s proved « effective he night go. SECRET: | - | - | “Copy” ~ DocId: 32493484 Page 46 . . “Lyndon” B.. Johnson Library affairs of other Latin American countries. As amatter of ° “further a mine ee ee ee
a ‘further and abandon identifiable activities such as the - . - training of nationals of other countries, the dissemination , of insurrection propaganda, and insurrection inciting broad- - casts. But could we have any assurance that once he had formally complied with our wishes and we had eased the . @uban manipulations?) | | ree protien Te er te A Eo — Uke this. Uteralty | and as a matter of ‘principle on their part, os _. peculiar. character of Centre end eerste Oe ee cop associates. Evidently revolution 3 is their raison a! etre as. | political . a “Copy” : “Lyndon B. Johnson, Library Docld: 324293484. Page 47
—_ political beings. We have every reason to believe that they Ro more could give up their cevolutionary agitations and “activities than they could stop breathing. we might hope that oo “the Soviet leaders, vith their greater sense of responsibility oe in a nuclear age, could be made to see the dangers and seek to | “~ “yegtrain Castro. But could we expect the Soviet leaders'to | “be effective? . Such evidence as we have suggests that Castro | © “gg quite capable of defying the wishes of Moscow. (Witness the against he. Albanians, the’ North. Koreans, sy and the North "Vietnamese. ) If the. Soviets applied strong ‘sanctions, it might. “pe another matter. But’ ever this. As s uncertain. ‘and, ebviousty, ee cokocce dau ts6s fanttic’ cSbputegtable! Ox oe [ee ee ee seizure upon any Soviet : > edtionary 1 move to score: > points in its cold war with Woscow au would I have’ ane 7: or “SECRET Copy | Lyndon B. Johnson Library | Docld: 32742734584 Page 46
+ - SECRET ° 1B inhibiting. effect on the Soviets. On the other, should the Russians choose to ignore Chinese scorn and threaten to wipe their hands clean of their dangerous tool, Conmunist. China would: offer Castro an alternative, at least ideologically, and one. | to which he might well turn. ey, g arms, disseminating propaganda, training subversives,. and” - @igpatehing agents, but in the impact the very existence of his’ ' regime has upon the leftist movement in many Latin American “(of the situation in Venezuela? The simple fact.is that Castro. represents pocra:srazsaea rage a9 =—SCt=“‘<‘ét”*S”*#«CLY MOM BL Johnson Library —
SECRET. 9 = | represents a successful defiance of the US, a negation of our, | whole hemispheric policy of almost a century and. a hal. untt} - - castro aid it; no Latin American could be sure of getting away ‘with a communist-type revolution and 2 tie-in with ‘the Soviet “Union. As. long as Castro endures, Communists in other Latin. ‘american countries’ can, to use Stalin's. words, "struggle with: ~~ ca "good heart. " “Also, might not a massive US effort to achieve. : wo Sete the Hmited objective of ending Castro's interference in Mould. it, not “2 "yas tolerable tous? Suppose again that Castro bowed to our demands © “. dn this matter. Would we not then be at a point wheré continued — ee Copy | ‘Docld:32423484 Page 50 | . 7 “Lyndon B. Johnson Library other: countries. actually: increase rather than diminish his power) - together with the military and political ties with the Soviets, ein seen AR ee Sere 2 Sr eet a ARP
SECRET - 15 - Probably the most judicious course would be to justify i ET an’ oe tet oe our action on grounds of defense, of the security of other Bo 3 eel ener American” states without any clarification of woen and ‘under eee a ee ae eee ee ene a ee a te eee ‘amen oe ne, SEE Se ericson REINS ciao ‘what circumstances we would consider the security threat at.an_ end, Once the mounting of pressures was underway, ve could — _ aia ni hadlte CO a ae ewe aed nee be “or: ‘its _polictes would, meet. the needs of. the. situation, Phe Cecacion: . hes aks second ey. question. is how do we justify inauguration of the measures. — oid 1d wac-bo eesesttcd to baie : ; wre ee ae aa a dramatic ineident | or. action on. which: to” peg our moves. Given mk PU ieee me 0 Saeeliaeteel war Pa Seger Yr Re UREN a aintiper  e Vt "the security of other Latin-American countries, would we not’) 0 70-0) the threat was real and immediate? With the possible exception “SECRET | | mo Copy Docld:32423484 Page 56 - - Lyndon - B. Johnson Li bra ry “© sag gongs in snich oo outd ponte tae 1s the uideat Ee” ae