202-10002-10104 ‘, a 1. Date : 10/15/97 ‘Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICA'CION FORM ‘ AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : JCS RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104 RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962 AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62) mmm ce em ee meme etm yy kt oe ye meme we oe eee eo ame ee ee ee a DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : JCS FROM TO : TITLE :. NORTHWOODS DATE : 00/00/62 PAGES : 197 SUBJECTS : U. S. MILITARY INTISRVENTION IN CUBA. CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA OPERATION MONGOOSE UPRISINGS. IN CUBA COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA SOVIET BASE IN CUBA CARIBBEAN SECURITY PATROL POSTS INVASION OF CUBA ; | , JUSTIFICATION FOR 1). S$. ..MILITARY INTERVENTION DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 1C¢ CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELE' °IONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97 OPENING CRITERIA : . ; : . ‘COMMENTS : JCS Central Files .962, Box 29. 3cs Record Case, Code Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to Jcs recommendation to .nvade Cuba and pretexts to justify US military intervention. NW 47874 DocId:32276301 Page 3
Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY : JCS So: RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104 RECORD ‘SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1°62 AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360. (7 FEB 62) October 20, 1997 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 0 - .- Number of Postponements: 5 Postponement # 1 (Page DJSM-909-62,25 July 1962, pg 2): " Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because if touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly " may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act. | Substitute Language: Operational Details Release Date: 10/2017 — _ Postponement #2 (Page JCS 1969/347, 2 May 1962,pp oh: Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted: because it touches on a matter currently relating to the - military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act. . Substitute Language: Operational Details Release Date: 10/2017 : Postponement #3 (Page JCS. 1969/347,Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose, 8 May 1962,pg 1): Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the ’ military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act. on  cagetaeiy OBESE 1 — 7 , MAR - 2016 HW 478674 Docld:32276301 Page i
Substitute Language: Operational Details Release Date: 10/2017 Postponement # 4 (Page JCS 1969/389, 23 July 1962,pp 14-15): Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches ona matter currently relating to the . military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act. Substitute Language: Operational Details Release Date: 10/2017 Postponement #5 (Page OP605F/br, Ser 000374P60, 24 April 1962,pp 2-4): Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act. Substitute Language: Operational Details . ‘ Release Date: 10/2017 Board Review Completed: 10/14/97 HW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 2
er Paper cli P | %02 -/0002- ojo Declassification Review/ Postponement Form Originator: _- \ Date: M yl ] | | Subject: M OW g Gt & Cy b of _ Original Level of Classification: ‘Third Agency Equities: é SUES 8 iJCrs SAF 4 Remarks: ev Rwy only ougeece ANd Mon euse related Beaty “Decumeane not 10s p01917R | ] Page # of Postponement Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act OSD NO OAWCGANS eh | cyugnoe DONO E se D FROM DE ECLASSIFICATION oo B'/ JOINT STAFF at TAGS exemprion:__ 6 (/)(() DATE: QQ __.. . nee a8 . | = N peat io NO OBJECTIO ass er a 4q y or" ef pot pie Ge * an ave ee | DECLASSIE ES BY ys G Sey H went ae e : No th aye © eASL RW 47874 DoclId:32276301 Page 4
UN ITED STATES INF¢ )RMATION AGENCY OFFICE OF THE GE NERAL COUNSEL DECLASSIFIC ATION UN IT THIS AGENCY HAS DECLASSIFIED ALL OF USIA’S HOLDING IN THIS DOCUMENT IN COMPLIANCE WITH _ THE JFK ACT _ | | DELASSIBIED ONC BY usta: cee | | NON eK Oe Be eee & en NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 5
AE! 1 9649/329 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, 0.c. - DaSH-S09-62 25 July 1062 . REMORANDUM POR THE JOTN) CHIEFS OF STAFF / Subject: US Contiwency Plan No. 2, Cuba (8) 4. £ have reviqved: mibject paper (JCS 1969/3989) and recommend that the folliving changes be made in orders _ to take full cornizence of the possible requirement ton : eames tes * svaant: on time to leas than eighteen. | | oe @. Yoga 18, paragraph 33(3), change to read as follows: oe *(3) US Military Teaction _ | po + {ga} With no prior warning . . . reeult in minimum delete remaindar of paragraph through (4}-weather-{te-a : _ . tdmesed-extent}e . . . / | , mo {b) Kk reqgine ment to reduce significantly the fo. | preenevault pesicd would necessitate incremental commitment id te asserdled and employed. Tha Cou 7 f 7 «of US forces as thoy ¢ if oo Sime required to cain essential US Bilitary control may bo _ | | . appreciably extended, F ovever, reduation of US military re~, cetion tima may ba of overriding importance. In such ease, hitiated in five (5) days “an airborna assault could be & tS @8 Boon On airfields are nded uni EERE RSET OE followed by airede UDED FROM GDS ee EXCLUDED F | BXCLUDEL = 2:4 > we see . RECRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 TOP S$ RET NOFORN | DOES NOT APPLY SPECIAL | NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 6
8 r . re) : Sd the ee . eo a : | Po Se Tye A nae 1964/3 29 TOP SECRET-NOFOAN | SPECIAL HANDLING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASH NGTON 25, D.c. Y SA tee et ay TES. DISH-609-62 ~ ci COMTI Bg duly 1562 > ae € 4 | MEXORANDUM POR THZ JOIN’ CHIEPS OF STAFF / —-* BuJeets US Contargency Plan No. 2, Cuba (Ss) ‘1. Ihave reviewed mbject paper (JCS 1969/389) and | watomnend that tho. follewing changes be made in ordey _ | to take full cognizance of the possible requirement far seGueing military seastion tima to leas than eighteen. 4 (iG) days. - ae | |. @. Pega 12) pardigrapt 3a(3), change to read as folloves -. (3) Us minttary Fesetion | | oe oa . (a) With no prior warcing « . . result in minisun _ ATS end. Cuban CUIUALELES, | ié-Shewe-ie-a-pequivamené . e 6 | delete remaindar of paragraph through (d)-Veather-lte-a timited-exzsSent}- j- a {b) A reqeiremsnt to reduce significantly the wand foo. ‘preeaessuls pericd would necessitate incremental commitment vet of 7 of US forcag as they could te assembled and employed. Tha i | _vime required to c1in essential US military control may be. spprecsably extended. fovever, reduction of US military re- eetion time may ba of overriding importanee. In such case, | “an airborne assault could be initiated in five (5) days followed by air~landed units as sson as airfields sre EXCLUDED FROM GDS EXCLUDED 3:38 AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DI& 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY FOP SECREI-NOFORN |. ISPeciaL HANDLING | - : _ NW 47874 DocId:32276301 Page 68
oh J ce t Prana’ : _» TOP SECRET-ROFORIT ; | | ‘  * > ISPECIAL HANDLING re ° e es gecured... Navy/Varing auphitious Sorces could be committed within eignt (3) days; follew on forces would be committed ag they become available. Incremental commitment of forces increased the risk of heavier casualties on both sides. (cs) the Cuban situation could demand more imacdiate reaction than employnent of airborne/amhibious forcen can provide, possibly to forestell drastic reprisal actions by the Commnist Cuhan Government. US military plans will provide for a rapid cormitment of air power, naval sunfire and initiation of a blecinde prior to the sirhorne/enphibtous aesauit.* 3. To be consistent with changes recommended above, page 14, paragraph 3b(3) should te changed in the first tyo sentences .a8-follows: with a sea=dmd-aie blockade, « _On-D-day-a-paried-ef concen- trated air strikes and coo inated Naval gunfire to wial: effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize ; feusvaiiantion and destroy destruction as much as possible of the eneny tank, armor, artillery, and anti~air capability,  QG-MUGh-Ra~-peseibles The initial air strikes . . Di Lo eared dD. are — , dco Aduiral, USH TOP SECRET-NOr0RN | Director IsPeciAL HANDLING SseccrAL ee HW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 9
within harborg to put these prs out cf action are risky in that there is a probability captured with subsequent expos the PT's commence to operate, shat agents/swimmers would be uve and US complicity, After their pattern of Operations will be studied so as to. establish methods to dispose of them out- side of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with less risk should become Practical after their pattern of operations is established, 4, Possible covert /clandestin : ways and means of putting VCLASSFIE iw ann FAD. ABN PM a m= -- - Cuban PT craft. out of action: inc.\ude the following: Af pendix to Enclosure
ioe 5. Although the Navy has ways ind means available te destroy or neutralize the. Cuban Pr boats, none can be covertly executed in Cuba Without undue: rise of exposure until more . i#formation: is obtained | on the degree of their security. protection. © Under conditions of cvert warfare. the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's, The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PTts and will. recommend appropriate means to disoose of them when an opportunity is presented. /s.’ George x, Anderson GEORGE W, ANDERSON Ee [ ppendix to Enclosure CDEQUAL BARINEDAIN ~-aarann Paye 13
APPENDIX 10 ENCLOSURE DEPARTMEN] OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS / WASHINGTCN 25, D.C. In reply refer to OP605F/br Ser 000374P60 April 1962 “MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Subject: Maritime support, Operation MONGOOSE * (78) References: a. CM 610-62 of 16 Mar 1962. b. CNO meno for the JCS Ser P O0031IPEO of 20 Har 1962 l. Reference a requested —che Chiet of Naval Operations ¢ to provide specified information on PT type craft, maritime support needs, and ways of putting the Soviet furnished cuban high speed boats out of action. Reference b provided certain data on PT craft and specificd maritime support, 2. The Cuban Pf's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuver- able, and possess a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mn (twin) guns, 2~ 21" torpedo tubes (two torpedces) and from 12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval’ war operations these boats would ve put out of action quickly, although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PT'g were eliminated. The primary means; of Gestroying Pr eraft would be aircraft delivered rocket/runfire and surface ship gunfire. 3. There have been no repo.-ts on the operations of the Cuban PT's, They have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana, . offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel, Eight boats are presently tocated as Mariel. Four Pfis, delivered in early April, were still in Havana at last report, but are ‘expected to move to Mariel in the near future.. The only way . to put these beats out of action while they are in port is by means of agents or swimmer (ULT type) sabotage. Operations Appendix to Enclosure we anara veered dl Pot SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
HWP SEGRE! SPECIAL HANDLIKD  NOFG within harbors to put these PI's out cf action are risky in that there is 4 probability that agents/swimmers would be 4 captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After the PT's commence to operate, the .r pattern of operations wilt be studied go ag to establish methods to dispose of them out- side of their harbors. A wider s)ectrum of ‘actions with ‘legs risk should become Practical after their pattern of operations is established. “4. Possible covert /clandestine ways and means of putting Cuban Fa craft out of action include the following: &. Fuel contamination, Fuel contamination could be ( ne mena tion accomplished either by insertin: foreign material (chemicals) directly into the craft's fuel system or the fuel supply ashore (POL). Delivery of the contaminant would be. by agent or swimmer, Resultant dariage would be temporary mechanical, Risk of detection vould be high, results would be minimal in comparison. b. Limpet mines/demolition charges. Underwater swimmers, -launched from submarines under cover of darkness could penetrate the PT base. and attach limpet mines to the under- water body of the craft. Agents could install demolition charges in the boats at their piocrs. Damage resulting from iimpets/demolition charges would be ma jor resulting in destruction and/or. Sinking of th: boat, Risk of detection in operations. of this type again: t Havana or Mariel would be high. Pt berths in both harbers are in secure areas making agent delivery very difficult. Both harbors are land- locked with narrow entrances fror the sea.- The PT's are moored at piers well inside the harbor and not on a direct line from the entrance, The entrances are guarded by con- tinuously manned machine gun posts on both sides of the entrance. Boats are known to pat:-ol during the day, ro information is” available on night boat patrol activity, The Ga Apr endix to Enclosure . > JOP SEGRET, SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN NW 47874 Docld: 32276301
ur rune - SPECIAL, ARDLIK: “NOFORS . . currents in the entrances ar: swift, This: would possibly Yequire a swimmer to penetra:e on a flood tide. ana reniain inside the harbor until the bb tide before he would be able to effect his escape. Under these conditions, the risk of swimmer detection through accident (equipment malfunetion op similar difficulty) woula be Figher than the benefits to be realized by such operations Ge Logistic Sabotage. . Sabotage of any Portion of the Spare parts supply system would minimize operational availa- bllity of the boats. Agents vould be° required to Perform the sabotage, Insufficient information is available on the logistic ; supply system to ‘eva: uate the risks involved. d. Floating debris, Placirg floating debris (logs, fishing nets, ete.) in PT operating areas. would ereate an Operational hazard, if a PT struck a solid object, the. resultant damage would range from minor hull damage to ; | destruction depending on the sveed and angle at which the abt object was struck, Fishing ness, Pope and similar material would foul the screws and temporarily disable the boat. Operations of this type would have to be carefully executed to insure that’ the hazard was -.Ocalized in the PT area to avoid danger to innocent Shipp: ng. While not feasible at present Since the pts have not commenced operations, it may be practicable at a later time: e. Lures, Floating devices with explosive charges could be made into attractive lures by ‘bright Paint, emission of - spurious signals (radio/noise) 2° given other distinguishing characteristics which would engender curiosity or demana investigation, These devices could be fuzed to explode in "a number of ways (remote contro: » contact or by handling). The devices would be planted in the pp operating areas after they become know, Extreme care would be required in the conduct of such operations to insure that *nnocent shipping ‘7 Appendix to Enclosure TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING WOFORR HW 47874 Dacld:32276301 -Page 16
1UP SEUHEL . OPEGEAL HARULIK AUFUNR | was: not endangered. Damage resulting from detonation of the rare could extend up to permanent destruction of the boat. f. Deception. When the o2erational pattern is developed for the PT's, it might be possible to conduct deception operations that would result in their destruction. Drone targets, electronic/visual slgnals, changing positions of navigational aids or similar acts might be used to cause the PT's to run into shoal witers or onto a reef, This form of operation could also be used to divert the attention of patrolling PT's from othe: operations being conducted a 5. Although the Navy has way: and means available to destroy or neutralize the Cuban PT poati:, none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue iisk of exposure until more ifformation is obtained on the cegree of their security protection. Under conditions oO] overt warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban PTs. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PI's and will " recommend appropriate means to cispose of them when an opportunity is presented, /s/ George W, Anderson GEORGE W. ANDERSON Appendix to Enclosure QP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING  NOFORN HW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 17
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHI GTON 25, D.C. fe 8 May 1952 MEMORANDUM “FOR THE CHAIRMA:!, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ; Subject: JCS 1969/317 - Maritime Support, : Operation ‘iongoose (TS) lL. ‘On 14 March 1962, th: Secretary of Defense inquired. whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnisned Cuban PT boats out of action, po 2. The attached memoran ium for the Secretary of Defense i forwards a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations, , which sets forth some poss ble ways and means of putting the Cuban PI boats out of iction, but states in substance that it is not practicable to carry out the operations at this time and that appropr ate recommendations will be submitted at a later date. se AieetDeer cerca tte attr at ta ec ES te et te Ne ce, teeter la re ft ¥ . tee rt - ’ D4 ’, . : } 4, The Operations Deput..es approved the attached memo for the Secretary of Defenie, together with its enclosure, on 7 May 1962 fcr transmit:al to the Secretary of Defense. .It is recommended that you approve and sign the. attached memorandum for the Secretacvy of Defense, which forwards, the CNO report. WILLIAM H. CRAIG - Brig. General, USA DOD/JCS Representative Caribbean Survey Group "EXCLUDED 1ROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC ie ‘ REGRADING; BOD GiR 5200.10 i Be Gan, 7. DOES Nor APPLY Sy emo ere ei mp ot vo ry seer HW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 18
. a 10? “SECRF®. SPECIAL au NOFORN _t - 8 May 1962 MEMORANDUM “FOR THE CHAIRMAN, .OINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ; Subject: JCS 1969/347 -- Maritime Support, : Operation Mongoose (TS) 1. On 14 March 1962, the S-eretary of Defense inquire whether there is some way of jutting the Soviet furnished Cuban PT boats out of action. 2 reenter AEN PE ee ‘ . 2. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense forwards a memorandum from th: Chief of Naval Operations, which sets forth some possibli: ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of act:.on, but states in substance that it is not practicable to carry out the operations at this time and that appropriat:: recommendations will be submitted at a later date. , ‘out of action enumerated ar uel contamination, sabotage, and one or more of the follow. ng: limpet /demoffFiion charges, 5 floating debris, lures and de: eption operations. we Some on enumerated ange de © fhe Cuban PT boats 4. The Operations Deputies approved the attached memo for the Secretary of Defense, together with its enclosure, on 7 May 1962 fer transmittal to the Secretary of Defense. .It is recommended that you apvrove and sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which forwards the CNO report. | { pie Fy | WILLIAM H. CRAIG - L oes Brig. General, USA DOD/ICS Representative Caribbean Survey Group * exctupeD FRON GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; BOD Dik 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY ’ cy a wre NW 47874 Docld:32276301 yhage 19
(5) At such: time as essential US military con trol | is gained in Cuba, mat cers of civil affairs and mili- tary government will b2 given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includ:s provision for a provisional military government pr spared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until. such functions can be, turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and oréerly manner. Remaining resistance | elements of the Commur ist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will te isolated, contained and destroyed ’ or captured as rapidly as possible. ‘US military combat "units will be scheduled for early return to the. United States consistent with. security considerations. . Department of Stati: Operations. a) Phase I. The Jepartment of State will seek to place the United Stat:s in as broad a’ multilateral context as possible. : . (a) Immediatel; sound out Latin American i . ; Governments to det2rmine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of a WAS (amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 wy La the Rio Treaty. NW 47874 Doold: 32276 14 ap
6 URUORE &: Ul LUEPE HAN LENS5 NUrUAR “b. Department of Defe ise Operation ° (1) When directed oy higher authority, | or as the ~ situation demands , the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory uetions for US military inter- vention in Cuba. The: e actions may include pre- positioning forces anc equipment by. execution of current cover and deception plans. (2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba. _ | (3) In concept, inisial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordi-~- nated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutr:. lize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy lank, armor, artillery, and . anti-air conse tity. ; \ (al In_western Cuba airborne and amphibious assaults will be conducted by a Joint Task Force with the initial objective of seizing the city of Havana and obtaining control‘over the seat of - government. Army ai-borne units will secure the Major airfields in the area as well as major port areas required for follow-on forces and logistic “resupply. Navy/Marine amphibious forces will secure a beachhead ir. the vicinity of Havana and designated Army untts will follow the Marines over the beach. The Marire amphibious forces will be prepared to re-embark for further operations as directed, . “(b) In eastern Cuba, Guantanamo will be re- a inforced by air- and 3ea- ~lifted Marines for aerensel i 14 (Amended as directed by the Joint Cliefs of staff - 27 guly 1962) § TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING  NOFORN NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 23
fo bur OLUNLE -: wi Ruome. Pe the pase. Additional Navy/Marine amphibious fokces will be employed in operations against Cuban forces in ‘the Santiago de Cuba complex or in other operations in eastern Cuba as directed. (4). Subsequent to “he seizure of Havana and San- tiago and the success: ‘ul defense of Guantanamo, operations will be coiducted to defeat remaining pockets of resistance. Additional amphibious and airborne operations may be required. The most likely areas for such operations are: Matanzas , Nuevitas, ia Trinidad, Bakia de Cochinos, and the Isle of rinses) . (SY at such time «s essential US military: control is gained in Cuba, m.tters of civil affairs and mili- ‘tary government will be given priority and undertaken ~ in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This ineclides provision for a provisional military government 9repared to assume full legislative, - executive, and judicial control until such functions ean be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and crderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Comrunist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups wil. be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be sched ied for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations. ce. Department of St ate Op erations. (1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the. United States in as proad a miltilateral . context as possible. , a , (a) Immediately sound out Latin American . Governments to cetermine whether the United. States can count upon | a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of mili:cary forces under Article 6 of . the Rio Treaty. | 15 . (amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 Jul “TOP SECRET rel HANDLING AT HY 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 24 1962)
DEPARTMEN f ‘OF HE NAVY OFFICE OF ‘SE CHTSF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGT IN 24 D.C, ; oe a.) reply refer to ' OP605F/br Ser Q00374PA) 24. April: 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Subject: “Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (TS) “References: a. CM 610-62 of 16 Mar 1962 b. CNO memo for the JCS Ser 00031 4P60 -of -20- Mar 1962 . l. Reference a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to provide specified information on PT- type creft, mar ritime | support needs, and ways of rutting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed. ‘boats ous of action, Reference b provided certain ‘data on PT craft and specified maritime support. vo By The. Cutan PT's:are., fast- (up to 45 knots), - highly Mite V ear able, and possess a eredible armament consisting of he -25 rat (twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo ¢abes (wo torpedoes} and from 12-16 depth charges, In ovest conventional naval war operations these boats would be put out of action quickly, . although an anti-PT defense vould have to be established to HW 47874 Docld: protect our troop/eargo carrying ships until the PT's were eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would be aircraft delivered rocket ‘gunfire and surface ship gunfire, 3. There have been no reports on the operations of the Cuban PT's. They have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana, offloaded and sailed under tl-eir own power to Mariel. Eight boats are presently located :¢ Mariel. ‘Pour PT's, delivered in early april, were stili 4: Havana at last report, but. are expected to move to Mariel ir the near future. The only way to put these boats. out. cf action while they are in port is by means of agents or swimmer (tbr type) sabotage, . Operations Kea mo, a .— EXCLUDYD FROM GDs
RW 47974 Ho€Ld30076%oT “pays 6 ° within harhorg ta yut in that there is a probability that agents/owimmers would be captured with subsequent exposu-e and US complicity. After the PT's commence to operate, taeir pattern of operations will be studied 50° as to establish mothods to dispose of them out- side of their harbors, A wider spectrum of actions with . less risk should become practic: 1 after their pattern of Operations is established. 4, Possible covert /elandestare ways and means of putting. Cuban. P enaft out of include the following:
nw 47674 DELFA: 32 BSA" PR 27 ~- - - . as a,
Ne 47874 5, Although the Navy has ways and means available to , ey or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, hone can be .covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more _ information is obtained on the degree of their security protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban pp 8. The Navy will continue to .wateh closely. @ activities of the. Cu usa a PP's and will recommend appropriate means to. spose of them When an a opportunity is presented, /s/ George We Anderson GEORGE W, ANDERSON AP Ae ae f8 @ Bum o aeom . ” —
~ IU? SEUNEL SPEBIAL HANDLIN? NOFORE pe. within harhors ta) put these Ofte shot ne = 7 on be Fm tom - om wee Tae bite brake Che bh 3 uy in that there ‘is a probability toat agents/ewimmers would be _ captured with subsequent exposur > and US complicity, - After _the PT's commence to operate, thiir pattern of operations will be studied SO as to establish mechods to ‘dispose of them out- side of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with _! less risk should become practica.. after their pattern of operations is established. . | 4, Possible covert /elandestine ways and means of putting Cuban. PT craft out of action inciude the following: fa...Fuel contamination. Fuel contamination could be accomplished either by inserting foreign material (chemicals) directly into the craft's fuel system or the. fuel supply ashore (POL). Delivery of the contaminant would be by. agent. or swimmer. Resultant camage would be temporary . mechanical, Risk of detection would be high, results | would ‘be minimal in comparison. - | b. Limpet mines ‘demolition charges. Underwater swimmers, launched from submarines under cover of darkness could penetrate the PT base and attach limpet mines to the under- water body of the craft. Agen;s could install demolition charges in the boats at their ders. Damage resulting from limpets/demolition charges wou..d be major resulting in’ destruction and/or sinking of che boat. Risk of detection in operations of this type aga:.ost Havana or Mariel would be high. PT berths in both harbors are in secure areas “malting agent delivery very difyioult. Both harbors are land- locked with’ narrow entrances fiom the sea. The PT'g are moored at pliers well inside the harbor and not on a direct line from the entrance, The ertrances are guarded by con- tinuously manned machine gun pests on both sides of thé entrance. Boats are known to ratrol during the day, ro ‘information is available on night boat patrol activity. The | ws cis soo ABR ELDET CPEPIAL MANAIING ~ MEAD
oe NW 47874 TAD SEROET QDERTAL BARA ine . AIA oP AR VGY SECHEL SPEUIAL HANULIN’ — NUFURE [currents in the entrances are swift This would possibly ~vequire a swimmer to penctrats on a flood tide and remain inside the harbor ‘until: the ebb tide before he would be able to effect his escape. Under ‘hece conditions, the Tisk of swimmer detection through ace ident (equipment malfunction or similar difficulty) would be h: gher than the benefits to be realized oy such operations, Cc. Logistié-sabotage. Sabc-tage of any - portion of the spare parts supply system would minimize operational availa- bility of the voats. Agents vould be. required to. perform the sabotage. Insufficient infornation is available on the logistic supply system -to evaluate the risks involved. - d. Floating debris, Placing floating debris (logs, fishing nets, etc.) in PT operiting areas would ereate an operational hazard, If a PT s:ruck a solid object, the resultant damage would range f:-om minor hull: damage to “destruction - depending on: ‘the s}eed. and ‘angle at which the. object was struck, Fishing nets, rope and similar material . would foul the screws and temp rarily disable the boat. Operations of this type would fave to be carefully executed ' to insure that the hazard was localized in the PT area: to avold danger to innocent shipping. While not feasible at present since the PT's have not commenced operations, it may be practi, cable at a later. time, e. fures, Floating devices ‘vith explosive charges could be made into attractive lures by bright paint, emission of . 8purious signals (radio/noise) or given other distinguishing characteristics which would engender curLosity or demand investigation. These devices could be fuzed to explode in a number of ways (remote contre:., contact or: by -handling).. The devices would be planted ta the PT operating areas after they become know, “Extreme care would be required in nS
WUE DEbNEE OF EGIAL HAHULIN'S RUFUKR not cudangerca, temace Pasdbtics Spam Antenets on of the “Ture could extend up to permanent destruction of the boat. f. Deception. ‘When the op2rational pattern is developed | for the PP's, it might be possible to conduct deception operations that would result tn their destruction. Drone targets, electronic/visual siznals, changing: positions of navigational aids or similar icts might be used to cause the PT's tovrun into shoal waczerg or onto a reef, This form of operation could. also 1.e used to divert the attention of patrolling PT's from other operations: being conducted, | 5 Although the Navy has ways and means available to Nestroy or neutralize the ‘Cuban PT boats. none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue r..sk of exposure until more information is obtained on the dugree of their security: protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can - quickly dispose of the Cuban PT", The Navy will continue to. watch closely the activities Of the. Cub van PI's and will recommend appropriate means to da ‘Spose ° of then when an & opportunity is presented, ,8/ George W. anderson GEORGE W, ANDERSON wwe wADB,SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING — HOFORN
12/15/2014 ; ; JFF Full Results National Archives and Records Administration os Kennedy Assassination Collec tion Full Results Viewing/Orderin 3 Information Back to Brief Restilts'|| Back to Search Hits 1-1 of 1 Hit 1 of i AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : JCS RECORD NUMBER : 202-10@02-10104 RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962 AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 336@ (7 FEB 62) | DOCUMENT INFORMATION . ORIGINATOR : JCS FROM : [No From] ; To : [No To] ‘TITLE :; NORTHWOODS DATE : 86/00/1962 PAGES : 197 | DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT SUBJECTS : U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION Iti CUBA; CONTINGENCY . PLANNING, CUBA; OPERATION MONGOOSE; UPRISINGS IN CUBA; ’ COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA; SOVIIT BASE IN CUBA; CARIBBEAN SECURITY; PATROL PO! TS; INVASION.OF CUBA; JUSTIFICATION FOR U. s. MILITARY INTERVENTION: CLASSIFICATION > UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/67/1997 . \ COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1962, Box 2°. JCS Record Case, Code Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to 1cs recommendation to invade Cuba .and pretexts to justify a US military intervention. Audit history for this Record Identification Form Hits 1-1 of 1 ExitJgEK mie Fi " .| Back:to:Btief Results. |zBack to:Searchis ne EP aR erY as ARNE PB ABEreNE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF -. WASHINGTON, De c. 20301 HSEE SEC, NO. lin access No, | PREPARED BY sy | Jcs [REMARKS AND/OR SUBJECT | xx] iSECTION NO, | 3360 (7 Feb 62) - : zz {‘SuBsECT NORTHWOODS 18 Feb 62 | | JcSM 103-62 i [28 Fed 62} | scsm 158-62 | 28 Feb 62] DepSecDef 1 Mar 62 | | sM-240-6: fl Mar 62 | | sM-241-62- fl Mar 62 | | sm-242-6> | sm-243-6> ;l Mar 62 5 | JCSM-166 -62, 18 Mar 62 | | 3csm 272 62 | JCSM 365 -62 | JCSM~366 -62. 18 May 62 | DOD rep .csG [8 May 62 | DOD Rep csc | 8 May 62 | DOD Rp CSG. | 8 May 62 | | JCSM 367 -62 ; | 13, Jun 62) cacs }25 Jul 62 | bysm 909-62 | | scsm:564 .62 i eer 07) os IDIS Unnum vered | Icrcs Unnui ibered ICJCS Unnuibere : How ow. | SPECIAL. ACCESS. oF = oz L JCS RECORD CASE CONTENTS ‘Ine FORM NO, 2 : Jee yan 69 : NW 47674 DocId:32276301 -Page 33
RERA-BR., JOINT SECRETARIAT PILE HO, ‘ "| cross INDEX NO's . Code .- NORTHWOODS 3360 (7 Feb er "| Name."- CRAIG; B/Gen. 5740 REQUEST INITIATED BY suaszer- NORTHWOODS (s) Report by Gen. craig™s; Referred to JCs Decision on Jos 1960/303.. A. Report; neferrea to Jes Decision’on JOS 1969/30 : A Report - Referred to the Chiefs | A Report - Refered to the Chiefs Decision on JCS 1969/311 | Decision on JCS 1969/310- A Report’ - Referred to JCS A Report - Referred to JCS A Report-Referred to JCS _ _ Decision on JOS. 1969/30 & 1969/316 ‘A Report - referred to JCS . Decision’ oa Jes 1969/32 Decision on Jes 1969/313 A Report Referred to JCS Decision on ses 1969/324 A Report — Referred to ses - Decision on JCS. 1969/325 A Report Referred to JCS” “A Report referred to JCS Decdsion on JCS 1969/327 Decision on JCS 1969/328 Controlled Distribution THIS 19 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF BTAFF MASTER ‘ASE FILA COPY, IT MUST BK RETURNED TO THE JOS CASE FILE COVER SHEET 41GB PAPER HO, 19PP/BPB/ TEED FFL T Feb 62 1969/303 Ye- 8 Feb 62 13 Feb 62 1969/306 15 Feb 62 "20 Feb 61 | is69/n0 20 Feb 61 1969/31 x 20=Feb-62 | 20 Feb 62 2 Feb 62 1969/313 fe 27-Feb-62 1969/314 5 Mar 62 7 Mar 62. 12 Mar 62 . 1969/321 13 Mar 62° 1969/324 iC 196/325 ¢ | 1960/327 % 1969/328  #- RESEARCH AND RECORGS ANALYSIS BR,, DOCUM ENTS DIVISION, JGINT SEGRE TARIAT, ROOM 2n349, PENTAGON, WITHIN $8 DAVS OF THE DATE BORRC VEO UNLESS OTHERWISE. SPECIFIED, GDS Review 16 SE? 1974 HW 47074  Dackd:32276301 Page 3 IEEE Sle ABAD AA BEAD sb a on narouuenornen teeta es neriesemn pitches musing eer ecepe teense
QGRA BR, JOINT SECRETARIAT | ____JeS CASE FILE COVER SHEET. 35BS (Perop-c2) | rene mows nee a | 7 : page 2 : nuaumeT INITIATED B ——S — | [AGENCY PAPER NO, | 369 PAPER NO. : pusagen= ORTHVOODS (s) oe — A Tapeig Referred to ges” oO | Ombprao2 | 1969/334 Ye. A Report, Referred to ‘Jes oo | : Q~Apr~62 . : | 1969/335 Decision on scs 1969/334 te -: . 10-Apr-62 Decision on JOS 1968/9350 | 10-Apr62, | Report Referred to JS a CO ; 27-Apr-62 a ' -1969/343 te Report Referred to Jes . 1969/344 xb A Report ‘Referred to aes . 1969/347 ia Decision on JCS 1969/343 | a a Decision’ on JCS 1969/344 Becision on JCS 1969/347 A Report referred toJ0S 12—June-62 | 1969/36 A Report;Referred to JCS a “q2ejune62:| °° «| 1969/367 ’ Decision on JCS 1969/366 mo 13 Jun 62 “Decision on JOS 1969/3607 i 15 Jun 62 A Report Referred to JCS rf Bul 62 | 1969/389 Decision on JCS 1969/389 a . : Q7mJul-62 . . “A Report Referred toJ0S > 2fugé2 | | 1969/3092, Decision on 1 ICS 1969/392 : a 8 Aug 62 . A Report = “eferred to JCS ~ .  |-32 Aug 62 . é9/ia A Report -.Referred to JCS oo 31 Aug 62 . . 1969/ui2 #E Decision on JCS 1969/W11 - in - - | 31 Aug 62 Decision on JCS 1969/U12 " a oS _ [31 Ang 62- A:Report Referred to JCS a 1 Sep 62 [396973 ' THIS [8 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF BTAFF MASTER 2ASE FILE COPY, IT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RESEARCH AND RECORDS ANALYSIS oR, e¢ DOCUMENTS DIVISION, JoinT SECRETARIAT, Room 2neao, PENTAGON » WITHIN 8 DAYS OF THE GATE BORROWED UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIPIZO. : FOR ‘ REFERENGE !-AR, 46(4 JAI 5760.1 JCS UNE Ng 2 Co, MW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 35
SECRE SPECLiL HALIDLIMG AOFORN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF a / GL #/292- WASHIB STON 25, D.C. 8 August 1962 ‘Subject: Consequence:. of US Military Intervention in Cuba US MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETAR\’ OF DEFENSE reo : > Lote 1. On. 2 August 1962, the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, requested the DOD,“JCS Representative, Operation Mongoose, to” prepare a pape: for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented ) on 8 Augu:.t 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth 'Consequenc s of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (;ersonnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide abilit:' to react, possibility of a ; “-pequirement for sustained ‘occupation, the level of national ‘ : ; mobilization required, and ‘uban counteraction. 2. It is recommended tha: you approve the attached memorandum for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented). If more- specific and detailid information is required by the Group, I will be prepared to provide it orally. ae CP ED Lhe : Gneirman Joint Chiefs of St ff EXCLUDED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY o_ T0P SEC SPECLIL HANDLING NOFORN co Sein atten ee entender os emt ta i San ‘ ee & _ Vee NW 47874 DooEd: 32276301. ‘Page 36
‘TOP SECRET “SPECIAL HANDLIP® NOFORN. | | fe [64 3? ae. ol oo CO ae 7 August 1962 -MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF ” Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention - An. Cuba’ (75) (ses 1969/392) ie 1. Pursuant to the discussion of the subject item at today’ 3° meeting of the operations Deputies, the following material “4s submitted for addition to inclosure A. (page 4) of the subject paper; "3. The Commandant of the farine Corps, while agreeing that positive and successful ailitary intervention in Cuba “ks: fully within - ‘current US ea ablitty, ts of the opinion that the attached memorandum is unduly optimistic in its ‘ appraisal of’ the force requir ments; duration, ‘and con- ‘sequences of such an action. He has expressed the following ". Peservations with respect. to she several elements of ‘the analysis: ae _ Ae Cost (personnel, “ainits, and equipment) OE notice that this element 1s treated in . terns of the magnitude of forse: commitment and no specific estimate is made of cost in ‘torms of personnel casualties, material consumed, and equipment to be replaced or rehabil- | _itated. Even if this treatment is considered. acceptable, . I do not consider that the ground forces’ now shown are adequate for: the intended Purpose with: 4 the indicated time frame. rf the Castro regime is to be confronted with the prospect of overpowering force, and ca: walties reduced by early capitulation, I consider that a minimum of three (3) _ infantry divisions. should be: ntroduced: immediately after” an entry point has been seized b;' amphibious/airborne assault, “" 'D, Level of National Mobilization Required. (1) Adequate growid combat forces are available ' in our current force levels even if the scale of intervention .” EXCLUDED. FROM .GDS- voow wwJDRSEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING —NOFORN
. > TOP SECRET © SPEC ‘Al. HA HDL HOFORN is increased as indicated above, ‘The. same situation does not appear to apply with respect to tactical airlift and military government /civil affeirs units. Tf all elements of the intervention force are to have the same degree of “peadiness: and: preparation, it would appear necessary to resort . to partial prior. mobilization in these areas. : (2) ‘The foregoing consideration is addressed only to direct commitment in Cuba. Restoration of out capability to respond quickly to heightened tensions in -_ other areas might well require additional mobilization “approaching -the--seaike of -that undertaken during the Berlin crisis, . oo . " te, Effect on World-wW: Ge Ability to React, A critical point here is the duration of ; involvenient of ma jor elements of our strategic reserve in Cuba. From examination of tine and distance factors, and » assessment of the probable level of opposition, I cannot: agree that the indicated time frame is adequate to" introduce and deploy forces of this magnitude, establish effective - , control, install an effective new government, turn over control to that government, withdraw ind rehabilitate our forces, and place those forces in a renewed readiness posture in CONUS. In my opinion a much ~.onger time would be involved and during this period. our ab: lity to respond to other crisis would be seriously reduced. | "ld. Castro-Cuban Coun: seraction. The statement is made ' that Cuban. defensive plans ar: believed .to contemplate a strong. : initial resistance, followed oy a determined defense of - ; _ preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare. This statement is: fiom the current: National Intelligence Estimate which aso° states that ‘the present military establishment as a widle is politically reliable. NW 47874 rectal Wesso8 ‘-
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANBLIP™ AUR PORN rf Castro's Cuba is only partially successful in the execution ‘of its. defensive plans Sy combe t- operations could be of considerably longer duration than’ anticipated with personnel and materiel casualties - increasing proportionally. v " Je, Possibility of a Requirenent for a Sustained Occupation. The. present wore ing makes no mention of the very ‘real probability that a US provisional military government. would be required for an extended period of time. considering the size (44, 206 Sq. mi. ) ané population (6, 743,000) of Cuba, - its long history: of political unrest, and its tradition of sustained and extensive guerrilla and terrorist resistance to constituted authority, the estimate that only a division- -size | - force: will ‘be required subsequent to the assault phase appears modest. I consider it more probable that a clean-up and . occupation force of three inf antry. divisions and associated support. units ‘would be requir:d for a considerable ‘period. This is in addition to. the ne2d for’ a military government / civil affairs establishment capable ‘of directing the clvil - and economic affairs of cuba intil we can organize and install a successor regime capable of responsible self-government. This period of transition, re- “organization, and economic : rehabilitation might well: con zinue for several years,! wo C. H. HAYES Major General, U.S. Marine Corps. Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)
TOP SECRET / 7 3 august 1962 Decision on: _ ICS 1969/392 (NORTHWOODS) (S) - At their meeting on 8 August 1962 the Joint. Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose as set forth in paragraph 7 of the subject paper, as amended ‘in the Appendix to Enclosure A by: a. Substitution, in the heading of paragraph 2 ‘on page.5, of the word "Requirements" for the word "Cost". | b. Insertion, in subparagraph 2 aon page 5, of the words "key strategic. areas int after the words "seize control of". | | . . c. Substitution, in the first sentence of subparagraph 3c on page 6, of the words "were originally" for the word "are" as well as the addition of the words "prior to D-day." at the end of that sentence. Additionally, deletion of the last sentence of that subparagraph. da. Changing the end of the first sentence of paragraph 4 on page 6 80 as to read:- " ,. achieving | eontrol of key strategic. areas of Cuba within 10-15 days. Further, in the second sentence of the same. paragraph, the word "such" is substituted for the word “essential” | ; ; SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED; ei Leg f NOT REL:ASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS was oe 1 - EXCLUDED FROM GD3 ae che copies each "TDP SECRET = Harris~ wt a3 pages series_A—-——_—— = PS aia re HW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 40
SPECIAL HANI Ine REOU RED, NOT RELEASABLE BE a0 LGAREIGN NATIONALS (Dec on JCS 1969/392 - Contd) e. Changing subperagraph 4 b on page 7 by: (1) Deletion, in the first sentence, of the word "only". | - | | (2). Insertion of a new second sentence to — read as follows :- "There may be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapid redeployment . and counter- guerrilla activities until order has been restored." | (3) Substitution, in the ‘present’ second sentence, of the words "30 to 45" for the words - "approximately 20". | f. Insertion, at the beginning of the first sentence of subparagraph 4e on page 7 of the words "It is estimated that the". | a oe _g&- ‘Deletion, in subparagraph 4 don page 7, of all after the words "would ve fully committed". . h. Deletion, in tae second sentence of subparagraph 5 c on page 8, of all after the words "targets in Florida". i. Deletion, in tae last sentence of subparagraph 5¢ _ on page 8, of all after the words “constantly increasing capabilities". Ne REQURED 0 FOREIGN NAT jONALS ee | ioP SECRET | HW 47874 DoclId: 32276301 Bage 41
“yop secret |_ SPECIAL HAN.ING REQUIRE NOT FELEASABLE ay FOREIGN NATIONALS 7 (Dee on JCS 1069/392 - Contd) J. Changing the end of the first sentence of — ' subparagraph 6 ¢ on page 9 so as to read:~ "....will consist of substantial Army follow-on forces with ‘such other sea and air support as may be required.” - Ms ne ' Golonel, USAF Secretary Sopy to: General Harris 3 er HANDUNG REQURED, NG ASABLE TQ FOREIGN NATIONAL NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 42
8 IOP SECRET-NOF oR | te : SPECIAL HANDLING > : 7 due i 3 ’ THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF . - ‘ WASHINGTON 28, D.C, SYSTEMATICALLY TP , BY 3 ee ¢ th cu sli Woh ATi [Tl hf a MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF "Subjects ea ICS. 1969/3¢2 - The Consequences of US Military . Intervention in Cuba (TS) . Bo 2. I have reviewed the subject paper and recommend the . following changes be made in order to amplify selected - paragraphs therein as requested by Mr. Giipatric | on eB, 6 August 1962; BO, a. Page 7, paragraph ud - add new last sentence as follows: meer "To yveplace the airbcrne troop drop capability vepresented by 14 Air Reserve squadrons, it-will- be. hecessary to degrade theater airlift capabilities _ to the following extent for approximately 15 days: "@) Less of 95% of PACAF total airlift and 15% of USAFE airlift; “or ‘ (9) Loss of 1C0% of USAFE airlift and 50% of ' PACAF airlift; or - "§(3) Loss of 7C% of PACAF airlift and 50% of USAFE airlife." oo Saeed ets al i beclendaeiesd omcaitamenienn wo awcletd a Seat pene toi to + . Page 15, paragraph 4 - change to read as follows: ” Lie "hh, Effect on World-wide Ability to React ~ The strength of the Cuban opposition and the resultant .. length of the operation will determine the total effect upon the US capability to react elsewhere. when the assault forces have teen committed to the Cuban Operation, the strategic Army fcrces fn CONUS would be shor e . Bupportin forces such as engineer, medical, mi ary police, signal and helicopter units for the remaining five divisions. Presuming acnievement of - it is recognized, however, that certain combat and support oe “elements will have to be retained in Cuba’ for counter~ . -guerrilla and military government operations+. and - _ that-engeiseer,-mediea Ly-Miis bavy-peiieey-aignas-and . ehviiw~affaivs-uniss-wiil-be-requiped-te-suppers-these . ey iabtead i gevernamest- “operations These’ s support units. . re SECRET-NOFORN | WDE Fon cps . ante | EXCLUDED FROM AUTO SPECIAL HANDLING |. RBGRADING: - DIR 5200.10 '" -DOES NOT APPLY. oe ALAR? athe 2 atk COREA Henne nnecesinn Dad meat Lan ein AY mb ACR taebenenbRta wt Aha AN mete lain iantsta ini esi «alma ~ 7 # : oan NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 43
a | So ae ogy | TOhis . / . ; Aad: ; : OFS. \ oe | ae HANDLING 7 ao C. ‘Page 15, paragraph b, iast line - add: new sentence as fol ows: "committed to a Cuban operation. To replace the airborne troop drop cupability represented by 14 Air. Reserve squadrons. it will be necessary to degrade | theater airlift capab:.lities to the Following extent for approximately. 15 cays:- "a. Loss” of 93% of PACAP total airlift and 15% of USAFE airlii't; or "b, Loss of 100%; of USAFE. airlift and 50% of PACAF airlift; or } "ce, Loss of 706 of PACAF airlift and 50% USAFE airlift." The readiness posture of SAC, coe HERBERT D, RILEY ~ . : -Vice Admiral, USN ~ . 7 . ; Director HANDLING — . { RW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 44
mo, 7 August 1962 Reng Tentative Decision on: (NorTHWoops) NB RELEASAR! © T9 FREE On 7 August 1962 the ‘Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively approved the recommendation: of the DOD/JCs Representative, Operation Mongoose, as set j'orth in paragraph 7 of the subject paper itself amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by: a. Substitution, in the first sentence of subparagraph 3 a, of the words “in lieu of" for the words "to obviate the necessity for". TS db. .The addition, to the end of the first sentence ' of subparagraph 3 ¢, of the words, ‘, however, CINCLANT and Headquarters USAF have been requested to prepare alternative plans hot involving any mobilization.": Purther, in the seconc sentence of subparagraph 3 c, the word "other" is sibstituted for the word "additional". ¢. The insertion, as a new first sentence to subparagraph 4 a, of the following: - "When the assault forces have been comm! tted to the Cuban operation the strategic Army forces in the CONUS would be short the supporting forces for the remaining five divisions." -@. The insertion, - in subparagraph 4d, of. the word "CONUS" before tle words "MATS airlift" and the words ", 1f£ mobilized, would be" before the words “about 30 per ore es SEOREL EXCLUDED FROM GOS t G : nt" Of pages series. a co Of ener i Hart ae y << ot NOT iH a1 Hare NW 47674 DeclId: 32276301 . Page 45
TOR si SPECIAL HANDLIYE B FASABIE TOF JREIng 7 e. The. substitut:.on, in subparagraph 6 b of _the word "may" for the word "will" in the first sentence and the deletiion of all of the last two sentences. | ‘The Marine Corps requested i "hola" on implementation and indicated that 1t would phone-vote either (a) its final approval, or (b) its desire to add to the Enclosure a paragraph delineating the Coumandant, Marine Corps! reservations concerning the draft. memorandum. contained in the Appendix to Enclosure A (in this event, these reservations will be submitted in writing by the Marine Corps). It was &lso agreed that the Joint Starr ‘should dispatch an appropri:.te message implementing the action called for by the revision to the first sentence of subparagraph 3 c of the Appendix to Enclosur¢: A. - (NOTE: Subject message was subsequently dispatched as .‘CS. 5602) . | Should the Marine Gorrs confirm that it desires to include the Commandant 's ‘res.ervations as cited above, please reschedule this item as Agerda Item 1 for the Wednesday, 8 August meeting. SPECIAL HANDLING BE NAT Ori rscepe nr TA CARED. Secretary Copy to: General Harrise~ THe SepHET , a S00 SONA, & NW 47874 Doocld:32276301 Page 46
UP SEGRE -SPEUIEL HAWULI“S HUrUAR “THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF . fe 49/8 WASHIN 3TON 25, D.C. i a SiSTENATICALLY APH ai! erst. = ae " gesm-séi- 62 _ CLASSIFICATION con 27 July 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE) | oY Sub ject: ‘United Stites Contingency Plan No. 25. _ Cuba (8) - 1. As requested in.menorandum for representatives of State, Defense, CIA and JSIA from Chief of Operations, Cperation Mongoose, subj: ct; "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planniig", dated 14 June 1962, the attached plan is forward:d for your approval, prior to: delivery to the Chief -of Operations, Operation Mongoose. * -@, It will be noted tiat the alternative methods of. military intervention deilt with in this plan take three principal forms. These ire, in descending order of magnitude: ; a. A deliberate, osderly, ‘large -seale operation ‘eapable of confronting the Castro regime with the — prospect of over-powecing force. — b. An accelerated initial reaction by lesser airborne and amphibious forces building up as feasible to the scale of the primary plan. This method entails greater risk, longer time to establish - fully effective control and the probability of. ‘greater casualties on both sijes. — e,. An immediate ani continuing air attack on Castro _ military forces and facilities to support and assist ‘the revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent operations. ‘3. The above described alternative methods conform essentially to current CINCLANT plans. for contingency operations in. Cuba. . .. EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC. - REGRADING; DGD DIR 5200.10 . TOP SECRET SPECIAL HAW tr wan ene, ee wee ee ee eee een Nn Frm Aen eee Aare ge tne cern eesti ee samen ce Rag ne ear ce silane een ag neem Paneer ee perme mmm gitar ee sean Recent e rane EXCLUDED. FROM GDS. BLING NOFORN NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 47
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HAND NW 47874 Docid:32276301 Page 48 z » ‘4. This plan was coorlinated with the Department of State during preparation in order to be consistent with and complementary to the alternate plan prepared by State which addresses the contingency of an internal Cuban revolt. but is limited to: US actions less than military intervention. 5. Operations outlined within this plan for the Department of State, Censral Intelligence Agency and ‘US Information Agency we-e prepared by each agency concerned. sor the Joint Chiefs of Staff: L, L, LEMNITZER Chairman ° Joint Chiefs of Starf Enclosure: Plan —
Decision ons SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED 30s 1969/780 ¥ JCS ON iy he | 969/389 — . GussicaTon onTINUED 7 (NORTHWOODS) (S) At their meeting on 27 July 1962 the Joint chuets of staff approved the’ recommen jations of the DOD/JCS Represent- ative to the Caribbean Surv 2y Group as set ‘forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper as ameided by: . a. The deletion, from the beginning of the last. sentence of subparagraph 3 b (3) (4) of the Appendix to Enclosure A, of the words “when relieved - by Army units". an - b. Substitution, in subparagraphs 4band4dad of the Appendix to En:losure A, of the word -"CINCLANT" for the words “the designated unified commander". c. CSAFM 229-62. itself amended: by the withdrawal — of paragraph ib. ad. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated . 27 July 1962 itself anended by revision of the proposed paragraph 2 ¢, contained in paragraph 2,s0 as to read:- "ce, An immediate and continuing air attack on . Castro military force:; and facilities to. support and assist the revolting “orces and to pave the way for _ Subsequent operations." | i Copy to: | M. \%. INGE General Harris — Colonel, USAF EXCLUDED FRO:4 GDS - of 1 pages Soria: S. A NW 47674 DocId: 32276301 Page 49
- 27 July 1962 Decision on: JCS 1969/389 . (NORTHWOODS) (S) At their meeting on 27 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recormendations of BGEN Harris as set forth an perneranh 9, of the subject paper as amended by: | | - a. A change to: pubparagraph 3b (3) (a) of the Appendix to Enclosure A. ; b. Changes to subparagraphs 4 b and 4 4 of the Appendix to Enclosure: A. : ¢. CSAFM 229-62 itself amended by the withdrawal of paragraph ib. . . . a. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated — 27 July 1962 itself umended in paragraph 2 by changes to the proposed parayraph 2 cc. sone a vie (fn _ ly aueee ASS apo INGEEIDO | Golonel, USAF ‘Secretary | “Gopy to: . by EXCLUDED FROM GDS General Harris 7 NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 50 .
3! 7 Swe JOINT Shters oF STARE | a — rT an So SPECIAL HANDLING WASHIT IGTON 25, 0.C. . eign LY REVEV joys. . BY JCS © GN =“ aed paSH.905-62 3 GLASSIFICN iGh CG GNTINUED 25 July 162 ‘a THE JOINT STAFF | . “ REKORANDIM POR THE JOINT CHIEPS OF STARF : [ oe Subject: US Contin genoy Flan Wo. 2, Cube (3) 1. T have reviewdd sw 2jest paper ‘(a0s 1969/389) and. recomend that tne follesing changes be made in orde» $0 take full commigance of the possible requirement ter mp fre) dos militery raactson time to ieas than eighteen ay D6 he Bs Paza 12, paragraph » 303), change to read as followss. : *3) US Military Reaction . (a) With no prior warning . . . result in mindinum 1 cnn, . WS end. Cuban cuinaliies, 6-there-du-serequisemens . . » _ i _. delete romainder of para zraph through {4}-Weathor-{tore | f/ | jdmeted- extend} | ne : j a. ee {>) A. require rant to reduce significantly the : ‘precasssult exiod would necessitate incremental count trisnt : “/ - of US forces ag thoy cou id be asvenbled and employed. The — He - Sime required fo sain essential US military control may »  -gporeeiably extend: ad. (Fo ever, reduction of US military re=- So petion tins my ha of ovsreiding impo tance. In such caso, an eirborne astault eouli be initiated in five (5) days *sLlowes be air-laried units as soon aa airfields are EXCLUDE «8% AUTOMATIC OP fOP SECREI- TNOFORN- - REGRADING:; DOD DIR 8200.10 i DOES NOT APP ‘Seca HANDLING. ot : een: | | t i | | oe E." EXCLUDED FROM GDS wee ene oe a { HW 47874 Doecld:32276301 Page 451
a nn a For SECRET] est . nd $6.7 hibious “orces could be committed secured ;.. Navy Marine an within eight (3) Gayst foliew on forces would te committed | #8 they become available .- Incremental commitment of forces increased the risk of heavier casualties on both sides. (ce) the Cubar_ situation could donand nore imncdtate - ¥eaction than employment of airborne/amhibious forces can. provide, possibly to forestall drastic reprisal getions by the Commnist Cuban Government. US military plans will 7 provide for rapid com 4 itment of ain power, naval gunfire | and Anit Siaticn of a bloc lade prior to the. girbomne amphihtons wen Gaim es assault." | 3. fa be consistent with: , changes recommended above, page - 14, paragraph 30(3) shevld be changed in the first tyo sentences as follows: . "(3) In concept, initial military eperations commence with a ee8-and-aie blockade, ~ | On-D~day-a-peried-of eoncen- trated air strikes and coordinated Naval guifire to waa | effect destruction af eremy air power and to neutralize | poubredization and destrc Sestroy destruction as much as possible | ‘of the eneay tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability, | Qg-mieh-aa-peseitles Tre initial air strikes .. ." | HERBERT D, RILEY . \- ne _ a 7 | _ Whee Aditral, USN. ot aoe CET eT-NHOFOR aN] | =. _ Director oe : Ex HANDLING | nen | sect KAN | , NW 47674 DeclId:32276301 Page 52
TOP SECRET copy no, 4 ges 1969/389 | SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 30 July 1962 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - DECISION ON JCi: 1969/389 ~~ A Note by the Lecretaries on ‘NORTHWOODS (8) Note by the &cretaries - oo - i. At their meeting on 27 Jul: 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendatior 8 in paragraph 9 of JCS /1969/389, subject to the followir 2 amendments: a. A change to subparagrapl 3 b (3). (a) of the Appendix to. Enclosure A, b, Changes to subparagrapht i’b and 4 d of the Appendix to Enclosure A. e. CSAFM 229-62 itself amerded by the withdrawal of paragraph 1 b. d. A. Marine corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 27 July 1962, itself amended in parag raph 2 by changes to the proposed paragraph 2 c. 2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of | the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed. 3. This decision now becomes 5 part of and shall be attached as .the top sheet of gos 1909/389. . Exe) M. J. INGELIDO- NOt FROM cs R. C. FORBES: | M¥ 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 54
TOP SECRET COPY NO. 4 JCS_1969/389 7 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 23 July 1962 - Page 2324 NOTE BY THE. SECRETARIES to tre . JOINT CHIEFS OP STAFF ‘on NORTHWC DS (Ss) A report*® on the above subject is submitted for consider- ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. M. J. INGELIDO - R. C. FORBES Joint Secretariat EXCLUDED FROM Gps. * Not reproduced; on file in Jcint Secretariat ! EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE . 5200.10 DOES NOT ‘APPLY TOP SECRET JCS 1969/7389 2: ah é2 fe Ok SERS, RW 47674 Doold:32276301 Page 55
‘TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN” NOFORK COPY OF COPIES SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION REPORT BY THE DEPARTY INT OF DEFENSE AND ; ; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAPF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE - ! -CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP - to tae 7 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S) -_ EXCLUDEL FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: TOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY — x TOP, SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING —NOFORN ’ NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Pag
‘ OP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN"  NOFORK US. CONTINGENCY PLAD NO. 2, CUBA (S) “tHE PF OBLEM 1. As requested* py the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, to develop an interagency contingency plan for US military intervention An. Cuba. ASSUMP! IONS 2, Tt is possible that a spc ntaneous. uprising . could occur in Cuba. A resistance movement against the Communist Cuban government, eould develop a sitvation that the United States . may ‘desire to: exploit. , , “ ; 3. The United States will prrsue the overthrow of the Communist Cuban government... FACTS BEARING CN THE PROBLEM 4. The Department of Defense /Joint Chief's of Staff representative ‘to the Caribbear Survey Group - is responsible* for the, preparation of a contir gency plan for US actions - | which include military interver tion,. in a situation of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba. 5. Normal readiness of forces will permit execution of CINCLANT Operations Plan No: 3:4-61"* at- any time subsequent to eighteen (18) days after the decision to 4mplement the plan. . ; ‘6, For additional facts bea: ing on the problem see Enclosure B. . . | . DISCU: SION 7. For. discussion see ‘Enclo; ure Cc. CONCLUSIONS 8. The pian attached: ate Ene: osure A provides suitable response to the requirement for a contingency plan. * Memo . for representatives of State, Defense, CIA,. USIA, from ' B/G Lansdale, subject, "Spor taneous Revolts.in Cuba, Contingency Planning, " date:. 14. June 1962; on ‘file in. Gen. . Harris! office. — ** CINCLANT Contingency Operat: ons Plan No. 314-61 (cuba). (S), dated 22 July 1961, as ameniied; on file in Joint Secretariat. we a t TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN 47674. Docld:32276301 Page 57
To SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN - WOFORN RECOMME! IDATIONS 9.: It is recommended that | ae The contingency plan at Enclosure A hereto be. approved and forwarded to Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, . through the Secretary of Jefense. . b. A copy of this pape.’ be forwarded to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE. | c. This “paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. . d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nation: Military Staff Committee. NW 47074 Docld:32276301 Page milan SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
47874 Docld: 32276301 Page TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN” NOFORN - DRAFT oo _ « BNCLOSURE' A MEMORANDUM FOR THE £ECRETARY OF DEFENSE . Subject: United States | Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba 8) l. As requested in memorandum for representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning," dated 14 June 1962, the attached plan is forwarded for your approval, prior ‘to délivery to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, — . 2. It will be noted that the alternative nethods of. military intervention: dealt with in this plan take three principal forms. These are, in descending order of magnitude: - ae A deliberate, orderly, large-scale operation capable of ‘confronting the Castro Tegime with the prospect of . overpowering force. - be An accelerated initial reaction by lesser airborne and amphibious forces building up as feasible to the seale. of the primary plan. This method entails greater risk, a longer time to establish fully effective. control, and the ' probability of greater casualties on both sides. | '¢. An immediate and ecaitinuing air attack on Castro ‘military. forces and facilities to support and assist the revolting | forces and to pave the way for subsequent opera- tions. | . . 3 The above deseribed alternative methods conform essen- ‘tially to current CINCLANT plans. for contingency operations | in Cuba. he, This plan was coordinated with the Department of state during preparation in order to be consistent with and - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 9200. 10 DOES NOT APPLY — 1 a ‘ Enclosure A (nmendea as directed by the. Joint chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962) HANDLING - - NOFORN
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN _naron - complementary to ‘the altern: te plan prepared by State which addresses the contingency ot an internal Cuban. revolt but is "Limited to US actions’ less ihan military intervention. 5, Operations outlined within this plan for the Department _ of State, Central Intelliger ce Agency and US Information Agency \ were prepared by eact agency concerned. _ . For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: L. Le LEMNITZER Chairman . Joint Chiefs of Staff Enclosure A (amended 2 as directed by the so} 38 Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962) TOP SECRET. SPecia HANDLING NOFORN 47874 DocId: 32276301 Pa
TOP SECRET ‘SPECIAL HANDLIN™ NOFORK ; APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A _ UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S) ‘Appendix to Enclosure A To SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING. ~ NOFORN NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 6
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN _ $412 SPECIAL GRO JP (AUGMENTED) WASHINGTON 25, D.C. MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State © | The Secretar of Defense . The Director, Central Intelligence The Director, US Information ‘Agency Subject: United State: Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S) 1. The attached plan delinvates, the course of action to be. pursued by the United States -n the event that US military - intervention is undertaken, in support of open, wide- -spread revolt in Cuba. 2. Subject plan is effecti: ‘e for planning « on: receipt and for. the conduct of operations when directed. 3 This document requires : ‘pecial handling and is not . releasable to foreign nationa!.s. ‘FOR THE 5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) . EDWARD G. LANSDALE Brigadier General, USAF Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE . EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY IW SECRET ‘SPECIAL ‘HARDLING | NOFORK NW 47074: Docld: 32276301 Page 62
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN’ NOFORN 1. The title of this docume nt 1s: UNITED STATES CONTI} GENCY . PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (s) 2. The title of this document is classified SECRET. The plan may be- referred to as the caribbean Survey Group (or, CSG) Plan No. 2, which name is unclassified ‘unless related ‘to cuba. . . | 3. This document contains information affecting the national’ defense of the ‘United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Section 793 and 795, title 18; UiS8.0;). Its transmission . or revelation of the contents thereof in any manner to an " unauthorized person is prehibited by law. 4. Reproduction of this document in whole or-in part without’ permission of the Director of erations, Operation MONGOOSE is prohibited except as necessary for the preparation of supporting plans. Distribution will be restricted to ‘those | Us government agencies specifi vally requiring knowledge of . the plan on a “Special Handling - Not Releasable to Foreign . Nationals" basis. EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: HOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP SECRET SPECIA. HANDLING  NOFORN RW 47674 Docld: 32276301 Page 63.
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN US CONTINGENCY PLAY NO, é, CUBA, (S) “TABLE OF JONTENTS Letter of Promulgation Page 1 Title Page’ . — oO _ Page 2 “Table of Contents . | Page 3 Distribution List oe “page 4 ’ Basic Plan. - a a Page 5 a) EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: 10P DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN NW a7e74 Docld: 32276301 Page 6 j
“TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN US_CONTINGENCY FL/N KO. 2, CUBA, (8) DISTRIBU) (ON LIST AGENCY . . GORY NUMBERS. - Department of State Department of De.ense_ _*Department of the Treasury “Department of Justice *Department of Health, Education and Welfare *Department of Agriculture Centra Intelligence Agency US Information Agency. _ 7 | *Federal Aviation Agency - *Bureau of. the Budget *Distribution to asterisked ¢gencies will not be made until such time as their particiu:tion is required in planning or " implementation of the plan. When distribution is made to ~ ‘these agencies, only-those portions of the plan which pertain to their participation will he disseminated. EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DoD DIR 3200 2lQ DOES NOT APPLY — TOP SECRET. SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN NW 47874 Deold: 32276361
TOP SECRET SPECIAI. HANDLING NOFORN UNITED ‘STATES CONTINGENCZ PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S) Reference: Memorandum for wepresentatives of State, Defense, ’ OIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation al Contingency Plaining", dated 14 June 1962. - MONGOOSE, subje:t: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba,. Task Agencies: Department of State Department of E2fense Central Intellizence Agency US. Information Agency 1. Situation, — a. The purpose.of this plan is to define the courses of * action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US "Government in the event that a decision 1s made that the United States undertake nilitary intervention in Cuba. b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-. spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being - activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit ' the situation include the use of US military force. ec, It is assumed that this plan would be implemented under the following conditicns, and would be considered - for implementation under situations less severe. . An internal revolt has ereated a chaotic situation in” cuba where: . © °(1) The revolution is open ana threatens ‘the. Communist regime} 1XCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: 10D TTR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY Lo Tor SECRET “SPEGIA HANDLING - NOFORH “NW 47874 Docld: 32276301 Page 66 .
(2) Areas are teaken-and ‘held by the revolutionaries, ands; . (3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to. overthrow ai the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely, requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS), © ¥ a. The United States” “may, cr may not, be able to determine that a rebellion is imminent tefore actual outbreak. However, it is unlikely that tne assumed situation will oceur all at onee and without rotice, More. probably it will evolve from a localized revolt which will provide ‘some . advance notice and-the opportunity to initiate necessary atplonatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations. e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of unfriendly forces will be assuned to.be as described in current estimates of the Unite i States Intelligence Board “(USIB). . | - ' 2, Mission. The United States wlll support ‘and sustain the rebellion in Cuba thro ugh all its resour 2¢5 including the. use of us military force to assure repla rement of the Communist ‘regime with a new cuban government ac 7eptable to the United States. 3. Execution. . a. Concept of Operations. . (1) When the likelihood or emergence of a Cuban revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence commund ty it will be immediately brousht to the attention of the 5412 39) ecial, Group (augment » 2d) through the office or the Chief of Operations, Op 2ration MONGOOSE. Evaluation of the situation by the Spe:isl Group will determine whether JOP. SECRET SPECIAL HAND nw 47874 Doold: 32276301 Page 67
NOFORN or not the President's ‘ecision should be sought to implenent this plan. _ (2) The initial stages of a spontaneous Tevolt, will be supported by the United States ‘through propaganda, po ee teerte oe tape cwnintn am wm magne covert operations and other actions as necessary, but’ Lame Ae Ry maintaining the. appearar ce of non-US involvement should the revolt fail.. In the event that the revolt spreads asa popular movement against the Communist regime, the | United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concertec md drastic reprisal program in ' the interest of humanit; and the mission of this plan. (3) US Military Reaction. (a) With no prio: warning and with eighteen (18) days of preparation < coordinated airborne-amphibious’ - assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, _ would gain control of key military installations and ' the principal center: of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in, minimum ‘US and Cuban ; casualties. . (b) A requirement to reduce significantly. the pre- assault period would necessitate incremental commit~ ment of US forces as they could be assembled and em- | ployed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended, However, reduction. of US mili- tary reaction time mey be of overriding importance. In such case, air ant naval forces could attack in. support of the rebel Cubans with little delay from the time 3 decision. is. made. an air assault - could be initisted within eight (8) hours,: an airborne assault coujd be initiated within five (5) days anda Navry/larine amphibious force could be committed three (3) days later with 12 (Amended as directed by the Joint chiefs of Start - 27 July 1962) . TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFO RN Doctld: 32276361 Page
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN7. NOFORN ‘a build. up to the full-scale effort to follow. Om Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases: (a) Phase I. After Presidential decision, this phase. will be underte ken by the Department of Defense — supported by other agencies of the government. It will be initiated by overt US military assault on ‘Cuba under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be terminated-at such time as essential , military control is gained over the island. The operation is to be ccnducted as rapidly as possible, quickly to confront Cuban forces with sufficient - strength to be clearly beyond enemy capability to. resist and to reduce risk to US units initially “deployed, with a vier toward early capitulation of © Cuban militery, units and avoidance of needless loss of life. | - . (b) Phase II. Fcllowing the establishment of essential US military control of the island, this phase will be ‘primarily concerned with the restora-_ tion of law and order and the establishment of a new Cuban governinent friendly to the US. US military ‘efforts will be directed primarily to matters of civil affairs and military government in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. Mili- . tary operations esser tial for the elimination of — ' small pockets of resistance and restoration of law and order throughout the island will. continue. Major US combat forces wil] be withdrawn as early as_ ’ security may permit. Operational responsibility of the Department of Deiense will cease at the time the “Department of State essumes responsibility for civil administration of Cula. “13 TOP, SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING  NOFORN AW 47074 Docld:32276301 Page 69
6. Department of. Defense Operations.’ (1) When directed by nigher authority, ‘or as the ‘Situation demands, the Tepartment of Defense will initiate preparatory actions ‘for US military inter~- vention in Cuba. These ictions may include pre- . positioning forces and e juipment by execution of current cover and decept ‘on plans, (2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will dir.ct execution of military intervention plans for Ciba. (3) In. concept, initi:l military operations commence’ with a blockade, concent) ated air strikes and coordi- nated Naval gunfire to ei'fect destruction of enemy | - air power and to neutralize and: destroy as much as possible of the enemy tark, | armor, artillery, and anti-air capability. (a) In western Cuta airborne and amphibious assaults will be conducted by-a Joint Task Force with the initial objective of seizing the city | of Havana and obtainin: control over the seat of ; oo, government. Army airborne units will: secure ‘the | major airfields in the area as well as major port . areas required for fol tow-on forces and ‘logistic resupply. Navy/Marine aitphibious forces will secure a beachhead in che. vicinity of Havana and - ‘designated Army units ‘ill follow the Marines over the beach. The Marine amphibious forces will be prepared to re-embark vor further operations as- directed. | —_ (b) In eastern Cube , Guantanamo will be re- inforced by air- and S€a~ “lifted Marines for defense 4 a '’ (Amended as directed by the Joint. chisfs of starr - 27 July 1962) TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING  NOFORA NW 47874 Docld: 32276301 - Page 70
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIR’ NOFORN of the base, Additional Navy/Marine amphibious forces will be emplo:‘ed in operations against Cuban forces in’ the Santia;:o de Cuba complex-or in other | ; operations in easter. Cuba as directed. (4) Subsequent to th: seizure of Havana and San- tiago and the successfu defense of Guantanamo, - operations will be conducted to defeat remaining pockets of resistance. Additional amphibious and airborne operations may be required, The most likely areas for such operations are: Matanzas, Nuevitas, - 7 Nicaro, Trinidad, Bahia de Cochinos, and the Isle of Pines. . | | (5) At such time as (ssential us military control is gained in Cuba, matt«rs of civil affairs and. mili- tary government will be given priority and under taken in ‘accordance with policy established by: the Department . of State. This inelude: provision for a provisional military government prey ared to assume full legislative, | executive, and judicial control until such fune tions can: be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Comminist Cuban government, armed forces” or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed . or captured as rapidly és possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the tinited States consistent with fecurity considerations. Ce Department of State ( perations. ; —_ (1) Phase I. The Dey artment of State will seek to place the. United States in as broad a. multilateral context as possible. - . (a) Immediately sound out Latin seottcan. Governments to deterr ine whether the United States. can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces, under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. 1¢ (amended a as directed by the Joint Catefs of Staff - 27 Jul 1962) TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING iti NW 47874 Docld: 32276301 Page 71
NOFORN (b) If 2/3 majority fs available, request the Council of the Organization of American States to. convoke immediately a neeting of foreign ministers under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. and obtain Organi- zation of American States (OAS) decision authorizing use of force.” ; (c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin “american nations (pref srebly not Nicaragua or Guate- mala) to’ provide token forces to join United States | forces. ; (a) If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize “or "the anti-Castro forces as. the Government of Cuba and, - in response to its app al for help, come to its | “assistance with United States military forces and ° whatever foreign token forces have ‘been’ made available. (e) Keep key membe:'s of Congress informed of "significant developmen :s, (f) Inform all friondly governments of our actions and the reasons thetefur; obtain public expressions of their support and o:’ their sympathy for the anti- Castro forces. | Warn them to expect communist directed | violence and offer’ theri assistance. (g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as ‘appropriate) of our ac’ ions and ‘be. prepared to defend _ them in these internat’ onal bodies. . , (h) Engage in all-cut ‘psychological warfare and ‘propaganda stressing the morality of United States action designed to assist the. Cuban people throw, off ‘the. bonds of comminist onslevenent. ; (2) Phase TI - (Fast Uyestas 2. (a) Provide imese: = oy “-e70nomie and other assistance to treo are.) isspulace. TOP SECRET SPECIAL HARDLING  NOFORN NW 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 72°
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN” - NOFORN | . (b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban | Government for admin stration of the territory taken | by United States tro ps and assist that government to the. extent feasib. eas it requests.’ % (ce) Make prepara tons to provide the’ Cuban Govern- “ment with “long range economic assistance. (d) Take méasure.: to assist the Cuban Government to control entry ints and exit from Cuba. . (a) Re-establish the United States country team _in Havana. . / ~ a. Central Intelligence Agency Operations. (2) cra operations a;;ainst Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquirters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, ‘Florida, with sub ‘elements at other Florida locations. ; i (2) In the event of © ocalized revolt, CIA will give | covert support to the revolt through introduction of: | communications, arms,equipment and trained personnel; as | a appropriate and feasibl.. GQ) when US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are Liplemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA . " Command Relationship Ag -eement, whether it is Implemented or not. | _ | | (4) Liaison’ and comm inications will be established " -prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate pins. (5) CIa will support military operations by clandes- . tine’ intelligence, coun :er - intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitury opefations. (6) After the initia. assault and during the subse- quent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected personnel from CTA Headquarters and/ or CTA operations vase, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and_ conduct clandestine ope-ations in support of US forces and objectives. tia :ely,. the bulk of CIA Florida based personnel. will be transferred to Cuba to establish a permanent ae and bases. — TOP SECRET. SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN NW 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 73
TOP SECRET. “SPECIAL HAND NW 47874 Docld:32276301 . Page 74 . . appearance of US involvemeit during this phase so as to nullity possible later chirges of US intervention (by e. United States Information Agency Operations. (1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spon- taneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such, coverage will be to seep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. Extreme caution vill be. taken to avoid the. Cuba or other Latin Ameri tan governments) ‘should the revolt fail. In this con :ext, the Agency during this -phase’ must carefully refr iin from a type or tone of | coverage that might be coistrued as incitement to riot. (2) In the event of di-ect us involvement, the Agency will: (a) Assign informa :ional specialists to work with Defense Psywar units diring combat operations. _(b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Depart: ient of State contingent at the time and place to .e decided on by the Department. (¢) Prepare for imiediate shipment all physical equipment and resource; necessary to support .a USIS ‘operation in Cuba. - (3) Basie considerations in’ Agency informational _ support of direct us milicary actions: (a) Medium wave ralio should receive priority attention for any over ; combat operation im Cuba. Immediately upon secur ng any beachhead or other . enclave on the isleud, and perhaps immedia tely-prior to or concurrent w..h iuch action, massive medium wave  broadéasting shoulc bein. A beefed-up Guantanamo
TOP SECRET Pac HAN DLR” — NOFORH transmitter, leased Us 3. Florida facilities, floating "transmitters and, as s90n as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increesed to provide necessary backup. (>) The messages of this initial phase should be ‘simple and. direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and th: protection of their individual. rights, instructions o1 the nlaintenance of public order, the cistributio1 of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in 1 Cuban context and with only. the minimum of referen:e to US military forces and | power necessary to maiitain order and to assure credibility of the ine itability of Castro's rapid and, complete defeat. (ce) Care ‘must be e cercised, particularly with the vanti- Castro Cubans, to woid alienating possible sup- port. by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications . of possible loss of. ans gains (housing, land, social . benefits) which might : nave’ accrued to the peasant and worker ‘groups ‘during tie Castro regime. . (d) Given the rela-:ively high rate of literacy in. Cuba, wall posters ind leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcas :s should also be available and utilized as soon a; practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of mili-cary action where deemed. advisable. ; (e) Any provisiona . military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the eivilian population. (f) =n all psyc’oli sgical planning, special atten- tion. shold be givea to avoiding in so far as possible - NW 47874 Docta: 32276301 QP SECRET SPECIAL HAND 19 Page 75 .-
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK” NOFORN any indications of plans ‘to return to the status guo_ ante,. all informatior output should be designed to reassure the ‘populace that the US supported movement “is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic espirations. of the Cuban people. f. Department. of the Trea easury | Department of Justice : . Department of Health, Edueation and elfare Department of Agricul ture . Federal Aviation Ager cy ; Bureau of the Budget Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies: ‘a. AS requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and b. As requested by Chief. of Operations, — Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented. us Coordinating Instructiors. 7 a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by. "the President. | i b. Military operations, including clandestine and para- “military activities, will te conducted by CINCLANT as. directed by ‘the. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration : of military government. activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy esteblishea by the Secretary ‘of State, Ce Political, psychological and econorite operations will be accomplished in accordar ce with. policy established by the Secretary of State. a. Supporting plans" are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination betweer. agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One cory of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operatiors, Operation Mongoose, and ‘maintained in current status. 20 "(amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - - 27 July 1962) _ TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ~ NOFORN HW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 76
e, During implementatior ‘of the plan the Chief of ; Operations, Operation Monge se, Will act as the coordinator - for the p12 Special Group (Augmented) on inter- ~Agency activities. The coordinating office will be established. in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs. of Staff, . Room 2 B 913, telephone ext ansion $9710. , 21 (ainended as directed by the Joint Chi2fs of staff - 27 july 1962) TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORK NW 47674 DociId:32276301
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK” NOFORN ENCLOSUR]: B y FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM QL. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. on 20 May 1962 approved CINCLANT ‘Operational Plan . 318-62? which provides cover for US ‘preparations for military intervention in Cuba. 2. Planning for US military .ir tervention in Cuba with a reaction time reduced to five (4) days is courrently in’ process but has not been approvec by the Joint Chiefs oF . . Stafr.* 3: CIA operations against Cube are controlled by Commander ; Task Force "Ww" which is a compone it of CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. The primary ope cational, element is’ the CIA unit located in the vielnity of Miami. with sub elements at other Florida locations. CIA vill support the military operation in the event US' militar: action is taken against Cuba, . | . Ay Sub-parag graphs of the execu sion paragraph of the basic -- plan, outlining separate departme ital and agency participation, - were provided by the agency conce: ‘ned. * “CINCLANT: Operations Plan No. 3: 8-62: on file in Joint Secretariat . Oo -** CINCLANT Onerations Plan No 3°5-62: on file in Joint Secretariat . Enclosure B 22 TOP. SECRET. SPECIAL HAND NW 47874 DocId:32276301 Page 78
NW 47874 “Docla OP SECRET SPECIAL HAN DLP” NOFORK _ ENCLOSUR2 C DISCUSSION _ i. The approved military plan for US intervention’ in Cuba can be executed in eighteen (13) days from a condition. of no warning: It is not anticipited that funds will be expended nor units pre-positioied to reducé this reaction . time, unless, of course, such >reparatory measures can be Clearly related to imminent military action. Extensive troop. training at this time for a Cusan operation which may not be | _ executed within the next few y:ars is of questionable value. Similarly, prestockage of supp -ies, pre~positioning of forces and activation of ships from tie reserve fleet does not’ ; appear justified if such prepa ‘ations’ have no likelihood of being required in the foreseea tle future. 2. It is. unlikely that 435 » mtaneous uprising in Ciba .coula develop and sustain itself for an appreciable length of time without active and positive | US military sppport. It is expected that the. United State.; ‘would Maintain an appearance of non~ involvement prior. to amr decision to intervene. it is therefore: important that US fo:-ces be capable of more rapid response than eighteen (18) da,s, first, to sustain-a revolt | and, second, to react adequate: ¥y to irrational acts or reprisals by the Communist Cub: n government. 3. Although there are inerei.sed risks involved in commit- ting US forces in| incremental duployments: such risks may have to be faced. The most rapid reaction possible would be to . employ air power, which ts eur: ently being planned by CINCLANT as directed: by the Joint Chief: of Staff., This air plan could be the. difference between succrss or failure of any popular uprising in Cuba. The use of : ir power should be followed ‘as rapidly as possible by the : ir-dropped/air-landed assault. as planned in CINCLANT OPLAN 3: 6-62, with follow-on amphibious forces introduced es°s00n as frasible, and a build. up.to the full-scale effort of CINCLANT (PLAN 314-61, - 23. TOP, SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 232 2276303 - Page 79
Wes ssncu © SPECIAL HANDLING REQU 50S. 1969/365 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGA NATION (NORTHWOODS): (s ) a Fo, lONALS. - at their meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommen lations of the Don/scs Representative to the Caribbean Survey Grow as set forth in paregreph 9 of | ' the subject paper, as amend3d in the ‘Appendix to Enclosure A by: . . . a. Substitution, in the second sentence of paragraph 2, of the words "urgency for" for the words "complexity of" and deletion of the words "and increase the risk of Soviet retaliation elsewhere." from the end of the sentence. Addi tionally, paragraph 2 is a redesignated as paragraph 3. | be Deletion of pe ragraph 3. e.. Deletion of the word "However" from the beginning . of the first sentence of paragraph 4. and of the words: . "in the face of incressed risk of Soviet countermeasures elsewhere. " from the end: of the sentence, Additionally, all of ‘the last sentence of paragraph 4 is. deleted and SYSTEMATICAL FV} _ BY J08-on ie, GLASSiFIC A nA ATION AN CONTINUED . ™ the paragraph is redes ignated as paragraph 2. MLA. INGELIDO . a Colonel, USAF EXCLUDED FROM GDS Copy to: Deputy Secretary Genera) } Oral - rs | SEPRET der pL at de routes a aach NW 47674 Docld: 32276301 - Page 80
13 June 1962 Decision on: «ICS 1969/7366 (NORTHWOODS) (S) At their meeting on 13 June 1962. the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved. the recom nendations of BGEN Craig as: set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper, a8: amended in the. Appendix to Enclosur2 A bys - a. Changes to paragraph 2 and redesignation 8s paragraph 3. b. Deletion of p2ragraph 3.. . Cc. Changes to paragraph 4 and redesignation as paragraph 2. Coronel, USAF Deputy Secretary Copy-toz | EXCLUDED FROM.GDS General Craig rRmET NW 47874 DocId:32276301 Page 61 . ‘ i ‘
TOP SECRET re _ COPY. NO. JCS _1969/366 14 June 1962 4 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION - JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DECISION ON JGE 1969/36 ‘A Note by the Secretaries | on NORTHWOODS (S) - Note by the Secretaries 1. On 13 June 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the ‘recommendations in paragraph 9 as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by: . - a. Change to paragraph 2 anc redesignation as paragraph 3. b. Deletion of paragraph 3. oo c. Change to paragraph ‘4 ‘anc redesignation as paragraph 2. 2, In that the Commandant had expressed direct. concern of th. Marine Corps in this matter, the ; rovisions of Title 10, US Code 14 (c), applied and were followed, . 3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached “as the top sheet of JCS 1969/366. 1. J. BLOUIN 1. J. INGELIDO  oint. Secretarlat RW 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 82
TOP SECRET | - . "COPY NO. JOS 1969/3066 Oo SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 12 June ‘1962 s | . Page 2257 NOTE BY THE S:CRETARIES . | to the ‘JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF , on NORTHWOO) 3 (8) . oO . , Lo A report*® on the above Sub, "éct is submitted for consid- eration by the Joint Chiefs of S aff. y Y. z F, J, BLOUIN ‘M. J. INGELIDO Joint ‘Secretariat x * Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat ~ _ . EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY EXCLUDED FROM GDS TOP SECRET Jes 1969/366 BBN “NW 47674 Docid: 32276301 Page 83
/NOFORN 1p Tune 1962 COPY_NO OF 4 20 COPIES 12 Tune 1962 . “PECIAL BD: SERIBUTION REPORT BY THE DEPARTMEN': OF DEFENSE AND - JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPESENTATIVE ON THE ; CARIBBEAN SURV.: Y GROUP : _to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on SOVIET BASE IN ‘uBA -(S) | ‘ BICLUDED FROM GDS . EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING _ DOD DIRECTIVE 5200. 10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING HW 47874 Docld:32276201 Page 84
SOVIET BASE IN (CUBA (8S) PROBLEM 1. In response to a request* fiom Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, to determine in appropriate course of action for the United States to take in event. that the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba. ; PACTS BEARING ON HE PROBLEM | 2, The problem atated above was ‘initially posed by Mr. Robert Kennedy at the meeting of the Spe sal Group (Augmented) on 22 March 1962. 3, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1oting the increased "complexities attending the ae1ay of US intervention in Cuba, have previously recommended** tha; a national policy of early military intervention be adopted vy the. United States which should be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Gu wd, end Reserve forces on . active duty. . - Tr US military intervention will be required to assure the final and successful overthrow of the Communist Cuban government .*** DISCUSS] ON 5. For discussion see I Enclosure B,. | * GONCLUSICNS 6. The United States eannot tc lerate the permanent oxistence of a communist government in Cubi:.. 7. Military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the Communist Cuban regime. * Memorandum for the Special G -‘oup (augmented) from Brig. Gen. Lansdale » subject: "Status 0.’ Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June 1962. on file in Gen, Craig's office. #% JCS 1962/335 , ; ; #e# "Guidelines for Operation: Mo goose", dated 14 March 1962, on file in Gen. Craig's office. . oe 2 TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN. NW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 85
8. The establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba will increase the complexity of US military action in Cuba and increase the risk of Soviet, countermeasures elsewhere. _ RECOMMEND/ TIONS 9. It is recommended that: . a. The Metorandum at Enclostre A, with its Appendix. — ’ which reflects the’ above conclt sions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for appro\ al in order that the Memorandum for the Special Gro p (Augmented) may be tabled at the meeting schedule: for 14 June 1962. b. This paper NOT be forwarced to commanders of unified ox, specified commands. . ¢, This paper NOT be forwarc ed to US officers assigned: to NATO activities. . | a, This paper NOT be forwarced to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Mil: tary Staff Committee. 179 TOP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING  NOFORR NY 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 86 ;
ENCLOSUR:: A "DRAFT "MEMORANDUM FOR SECRET..RY: OF DEFENSE Subject: Soviet Base in Cua (S) 1, Reference is made to Memorandum for the Special Group _ (Augmented). from Brig. Gen, Lansdile, subject: "Status of Requested studies, Operation Mong: ose" - dated 8 June. This memorandum requested the opinion of all participating agencies | having membership tn: the Special iroup concerning the appropriate: course of action for the United S:ates to take in the event . _ the Soviets establish a military ase in Cuba. 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff r commend ‘approval of the attached memorandum as the position of the Department of Defense. Fo: the Joint Chiefs of Staff: +. L. LEMNITZER ‘Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff t EXCLUDED FROM Gps ‘EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY Enclosure A’ TOP SECRET. SPECIAL HANDLING — NOFORN ae 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 87
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A . a DRAFT ‘MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECI..L GROUP (AUGMENTED) ‘Subject: _ Soviet Base in Cub: (S) 1. In response to a Memorandum :'or the Special Group (Augmented ) from Director. of Operations, Opera::ion Mongoose , subject: - "Status. of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose," ‘dated 8 June 1962, the Department of Defense has consider d the problem of an appropriate course of action for the United St: tes ‘to take in event that the . Soviets should establish a militar; base in Cuba. ; 2. In the event that a Soviet bi se is established on the island, the choice of US counteraction is letween long term acceptance of _ a communist state in the Caribbean with an increasing military threat to the United States from the South, or US military inter- vention. It is considered that the latter course of action would be the only solution compatible with the security interests of the United States. oo oo 3, It-is believed that military intervention by United States forces will be required to success) ully overthrow the Communist | Cuban regime. Eotablishnent of a joviet Base an Cuba would inerease the urgency for US military action in Cuba. GOS exceed FROM EXC].UDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING | DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 ~~ DOE: NOT APPLY . Appendix to Enclosure A (Page revised as directed by the JUS, °13 June 1962) _ TOP SECRET ‘SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN “NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 68
ENCLOSUR i 6B DISCUSSION 1. The United States cannot to .erate permanent existence of a communist government in the ‘lestern Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides commun‘Lem with a base of operations for espionage, | sabotage. and subve: ‘sion against Latin America, , The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and cover: actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability ‘that on: or more other nations in Latin America will become communi::t or comiminist Gominated. “This | will greatly increase ‘the problem. currently facing the United States and the Organization of Am rican States. While considered “uniikely, it is possible for the ‘‘ino-Soviet Bloe to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. . Establishment of such bases would increase . US defense costs, as forces were ‘a veloped or shifted to meet the threat.* | . 3. Time favors: the Cuban regim and the communist.bloc. . They are provided with the opporti nity to continue with their subversion efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by pol: ce state methods decrease the possibility of internal upris: ngs within Cuba. The - steady improvement in military dei enses strengthens the - resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military Antervention and could lengthen tls time required to secure control of the government ‘and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the: elimination of the present government, . “This creates a problem for the future which is . steadily increasing in magnitude.” / ® gCS 1969/335 E.-CLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC 'REGRADING ‘DOD DIRECTIVE 5200. 10. DOES NOT APPLY TOP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING=-NOFORN NW 47874. Docld:32276301 Page 69
3. There is nothing to prevent the Soviets from eventually establishing their own. base in Cua. US acceptance of a Soviet base, or bases, in “Guba mi sht avoid the risk of Soviet ‘retaliation to US military action but such acceptance would - alss generate a greater eventual “isk to the United States from the improved Soviet general sar posture. 2 , "Enclosure B TOP SECRET SPECIAL HAND NW a7@74 Doclid: : 32276301 Page 90
QELKEE SOP EGIAL HANDLING , WUT UA _ ‘TE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF a » WASHINGTON 25,B.C.° 7 13 June 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: “Soviet Base in Cuba (8) 1h. “Reference is made to Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brigadier G:neral Lansdale, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June. This memorandum requested the opliion of all participating agencies having membership in the Spe:ial Group concerning the appropriate course of action: for the Uni:ed States to take in the event the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba. 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the -. attached memorandum as the position of the Department of Defense. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: L. L. LEMNITZER Chairman — Joint Chiefs of Sta} ". gvSTENATICALLY. Reviews, 7 / : | BY JCS ON ai oe 4 = EXCLUDED FROM GDS BLASSIFICATICN CONTINUED v | _ EXCLUDED FRCM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY omnes Crna ‘TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN NW 47874 DocId:32276301 Page 91
TOP SECKET SPECIAL. HANCLIP™ NUFURE : oo | oe att t MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GF OUP (AUGMENTED) Subject: Soviet Base ir Cuba (8) oo at 1, In response to a memorandum for -the Special Group | (Augmented) from the Director of Operations, Operation | Mongoose, subject: "Status ef Requested Studies, operation Mongoose", dated 8 Jane 1962, the Department of Defense has considered the problem of an appropriate course of action ‘for the United States to take in event that the Soviets should take steps to establish a military base in Cuba. .2. In the event of such a contingency, the choice of US counteraction is between long term acceptance of a communist -state in the Caribt2an with an increasing military threat to the United States from the South or US military intervention. Our present view is that the latter course -of saetion rust oy olsen soe with tne .. security interests of the United States. EXCLUDED FROM GDS ome woBAP. SECRET SPECIA. HANDLING  HOFORK age 92
VOR S TOP SECRET a COPY NO. “JOS 1969/3847 oe _ SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 9 May 1962 a ' (JOINT. CHIE*S OF STAPF DECISION ON ICS 1969/347 A Note by th: Secretaries 7 : mn yO NORTHW.0Ds_(S). Note by the Secretaries 1. On 9 May 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the © _ recommendations contained ‘in J38 1969/347. 2.-In' that the Commandant hid expressed direct concern of ‘the Marine Corps..in this matte, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c}), applied and wre followed. ' 3. This decision now become ; a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/3::7. F. J, BLOUIN M.. J. INGELIDO Joint Secretariat EXCLUDED FROM GDS RW 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 93...
HW A774 TOP SECRET .. COPY NO. ~ JCS_1969/347 oS _ SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 2 May 1962 . — Page 2213 ° NOTE BY THI. SECRETARIES to the . JOINT CHIIFS OF STAFF , on NORTHWOODS. (S) A veport* on the above sibject is submitted for consid- — eration by the Joint Chiefs o1 Staff. F, J, BLOUIN M. J. INGELIDO Joint Secretariat + ' .*® Not reproduced; on file in Jcint Secretariat SICLUDED FROM GES EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC . REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP SECRET oo JCS 1969/347 | 2213 a ig PED 1G OE BP ero we Ny 8 Docld:32276301 Page 94_
TOP SECRET SPECIAL fame NOFORK 2 May 1962 | COPY -NO. l ord ?COPIES — SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION REPORT BY THE DEPART} ENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEPS | he STAFF F SPRESENTATIVE ON THE ARIBBEAN CURVEY G to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF or MARITINE SUPPORT, OPERATION MONGOOSE (ts) [ SEE, [CONTROL #ee 7 | a EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 '. DOES NOT APPLY 1 EXCLUDED FROM GDS , f ww arena “ADE. SESRET SPECIAL HANDLING -—NOFORN
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK: NO MARITIME SUFPORT, OP. ‘AT ION. MONGOOSE (TS) THE PROJILEM | 1. To respond to a request oy the Secretary of Defense for a report on ways of putting th: Soviet furnished Cuban high Speed boats out of ‘action. . - FACTS BEARING ‘Oi. THE PROBLEM 2. On 14-March 1962, the Se-retary of Defense réquested* a report on ways of putting th: Soviet furnished Cuban high, speed boats out of action... . 3. On 16 Nareh 1962, the Ch ef of Naval Operations was | requested. to submit a report te the Joint Chiefs: of Staff** on ways of putting Cuban PT: bo: ts out of action. 4. On 3 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that the lavy was studying means to put ‘the Cuban PT boats out of acticn.and that report “would: be submitted when the stidy was’ completed, adalal 5. On 26 April 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations ‘submitted the ‘requested report to the Soi nt Chief's of Staff.**** Copy attached | (Appendix to Enclosure ). . * CONCLUS ION 6. The Memorandum, Enclosure, for the Secretary of Defense, together with its Appendix, is an appropriate response to the request from: the Secretary of Lefense for possible ways of "putting the Soviet furnished Cv ban high speed boats out of action, , RECOMMENI AT IONS 7. It is recommended that: ; a. The Enclosure, together with its Appendix, which reflects the above conclusica, be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. “*Nemorandum on file in General Craig's office. **CM 610-62 dtd 16 Mar 1962".  *## ICS 1969/325 . . ****O0n file in General Craig's office. a ADP. SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING HOFORK
b.. This paper NOT be for warded to commanders of unified: oe or specified commands | a ¢. This paper ‘NOT be fox warded to US officers assigned "to NATO activities, oo -d, This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, U US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. TOP. SECRET ‘SPECI HANDLING — MOFORA NW 47674 Doold: 33276301 Page 9
ENCLC 3URE “DRA aT MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - Subject: Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose (TS) ol In response to your question* of whether there is some ‘way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action, the enclosed me norandum from the Chief of Naval” Operations ‘has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is forwarded for your information. — 2, The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible covert/ clandestine ways and means of sutting the Cuban PT boats out of action but states in substaice that none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of ‘exposure until- more information is obtained on the degree of security protection afforded ‘the boats and a patte-n of operations has been established. 3. The Navy will continue t> watch - closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will rec ommend appropriate means to dispose of then when an opport inity is presented, a ; , EXCLUDED F : *Memorandum on file in Brig General Craig's office. HEDED FROM ops ‘EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 - DOES’ NOT APPLY TOP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDL HW 47874 Bocld:32276301 Page 9 Snelosure
APPENDIX TO ‘iNCLCSURE . ’ DEPARTMENT O° THE NAVY. OFFICE OF THE. CHTEF )F NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON 29s D.C. In reply refer to oPp605F/or Ser 000374P60 April 1962 _ MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOCNT CHIEFS OF STAFF Subject: Maritime Su2port, Operation MONGOOSE (TS) References: a, CM-610-62 of 16 Mar 1962 - -' " }®, GNO memo for the JCS Ser 000314P60 of 20 Ma> 1962 1. Reference a requested th Chief of Naval Operations to provide specified information .0n PT type craft, maritime support needs, and ways of put sing the Soviet furnished Cuban “high speed boats, out of action, Reference b provided certain data on. PT craft and specified maritime support, 2. The Cuban PT's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuver- able, and possess a credible a-mament consisting of -4-25 mm (twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tub 2s (two torpedoes) and from . 12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war . operations these boats would b? put out of action quickly, although an anti-PT defense woild have to be established to protect our troop/cargo carryi ig ships until the PT's were . eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would be aircraft delivered rocket /g infire and: surface ship gunfire. 3. There have been no reporss on the operations of the Cuban. PT's. They have been delivere j by Soviet ships to Havana, offloaded and sailed under their own power » ‘to Mariel. Eight boats are presently. located at Mariel. Four PT's, delivered in early April, were still in lavana at last report, but are expected to move to Marlel in che near future. “The only way . to put these’ boats out of action while they are in port is by means.of agents or swimner. (UL? type) sabotage. Operations Lo ‘ ; ; he, : Appendix to Enclosure F JOP. SECRET. SPECIAL HANDLING NO NW 47674 DecId: 32276301 Page 9 ORN
DLIK> NOFORE within harbors to put these PI's out cf action are risky dn that there ls a probability that agents/swimmers would be - captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will be studied so as to establish nethods to dispose of them out- Side of their harbors. -A wider spectrum of actions with . - less risk should become practical after their pattern of operations is established. | . 4, Possible covert/clandest ine ways and means of putting “Cuban PT craft out of action iiclude the following: a. Fuel contamination. ‘uel’ contamination could be accomplished either by inse *ting foreign material (chemicals) directly into the craft's fiel system or the fuel supply “ashore (POL). Délivery of she contaminant would be by -agent or swimmer. Resultan: damage would be temporary mechanical. Risk of detect:.on would be > high, results would : be minimal. in comparison. a ; oe ie : oe 2. Limpet mines/demolition charges. Underwater swimmers, ; launched from submarines unvier cover of darkness could . penetrate the PT base and a::tach limpet mines to-the under- water body. of the craft. Aj.ents could install demolition charges ‘in the boats at the:r piers. Damage resulting from . Limpets/demolition charges vould be major resulting in destruction and/or sinking «f the boat. Risk of detection in operations of this type tgainst Havana or Mariel would ‘ be high. PT berths -in both harbors are in secure areas making agent delivery very cifficult. Both harbors are land- locked with narrow entrances from the sea, The Pf's ares » moored at piers well inside the harbor and not on a direct — line from the entrance, The entrances are guarded by con- tinuously manned machine gur posts on both sides of the .. entrance. Boats are known t> patrol during the day, ro ‘information is available on aight boat patrol. activity. The . sO Appendix to Enclosure wi arena “voulfl.5 EORET SPECIAL HANDLING AOFORN
‘TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIE': NOFORN currents in the entrances ire ewift. This- would possibly ; “pequire a swimmer to penetrate on a flood tide and remain “inside the harbor until the ebb tide before he would be able. to effect his escape. Under these conditions, the risk of swimmer detection through ¢ccident (equipment malfunction or similar difficulty) would be higher than the benefits to ‘be realized by such operations. . / - . ce. Logistic sabotage. abotage of any portion of the spare parts: supply system vould minimize operational availa- ‘pility of the boats. Agents’ would be required to perform the sabotage. Insufficient information is available on the logistic supply system to evaluate the risks involved, d. Floating debris. Placing floating debris (logs, fishing nets, etc.) in PT coerating areas would create an operational. hazard, it a Fe struck a- solid object, the resultant damage would rang 2 from minor ‘hull damage to ‘destruction depending on the speed and angle at which the an? “object was struck. Fishing nets, rope arid similar material would foul -the screws and t mporarily disable the boat. Operations of this type would have to be carefully executed ' to insure that: the hazard wis. localized in the PT area to avoid danger to innocent shipping. while not feasible at present since the PI's have riot commenced operations, it may be practicable: at a later time, - @. Lures, Floating devi :es with explosive charges could be made into attractive lur:s by bright’ paint, emission of spurious signals (radio/noi se) .or given other distinguishing characteristics which would engender curiosity or demand investigation. — “These devic:s could be fuged. to explode in a number of ways - (remote, coitrol, contact or by handling). The devices would be plante | in the PT operating areas after they become know, Extreme :are would be required in the conduct of such operations ‘O insure that innocent shipping. Appendix to Enclosure woe snlQP,.SEGRET SPECIL HANDLING —NOFORK
TOP SECRET SPECIIL HANI we oon weuwB, SEORET — SPECLAL HANDLING ‘ was not endangered, Damage resulting from detonation .of the -lure could extend up: to permanent destruction of the boat. f. Deception. when the operational pattern is developed for the PT's, it might be rossible. to conduct - ‘deception operations that would result in their Gestruction. © Drone targets, electronic/visual signals, changing positions of .. navigational aids or similer acts might be used to cause the PT's to run into shoal waters or onto a reef. This form of operation could also, be used to divert the attention of patrolling PT's from other operations being conducted. 3. Although the Navy has we ys and means available to destroy ‘or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly - executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more igtformation 1s obtained on the degree of their security protection. Under. conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban F's. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban: PT's and will recommend appropriate means tec dispose of them when an. opportunity is presented. /s/ George ®. Anderson GEORGE W. ANDERSON Appendix to Enclosure. OFORN
+ eoegg sf raped =9 Ce . TOP SEGRE SPECIAL HANDLING THE. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASH) IGTON 25, B.C, nOFO JCSM-367 -62 § May 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETA iY OF DEFENSE _ fc Subject: Maritime Sapport, Operation, Mongoose (Ts) 1, In response to. your question of whether there is some way of putting the Soviet “urnished Cuban high speed boats out of action, the enclose memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations has been ipproved by the Joins Chiefs of Staff and is forwarded for your information. 2. The enclosed memoranium sets forth some possible covert/clandestine ways ani means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action, but szates in. substance that none can. be covertly executed in Cuva without undue risk of exposure until more informition is obtained on the degree . of security protection afforded the boats and a pattern of operations has been est iblished. 3. The Navy will continie “to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opoortunity is presented. for A the Joint Chiefs of Staff: | . . G. H..DECKER i ; Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Enel: Memo from CNO EXCLUDED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  'REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY xR wd BW 47874 Docld:32276301 bage 103
DEPARTMENT ¢f CHE NAVY OFFICE OF ‘f8e CHTEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON 25, D.C. ‘In veply refer to . OPGO5F/br Ser -000374RF) ah April: 1962. . MEMORANDUM FOR THE JCINT CHIEFS OF STAPF Subject:. * Maritime Suoport, Operation MONGOOSE (TS) . References: a. CM 610-€2 of 15 Mar 1962 , -b. CNO memc for the JCS Ser 00032!4P60 of 20 Mac 1962 , 1. Refercnce a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to provide specified information on PT type creft, naritime . >: support needs, and ways of putcing the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats ous of action. Reference b provided certain Gata on PT craft and specified maritime support, 2, The “Cuca PE'S:are fast. (up to AS knots), highly nieavest= ‘able, and possess a credible avmanent- consisting of 4 “25 mm (twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tub:s (ewo torpedoes) and from 12-16 depth charges. In. overt conventional naval war. operations these boats would b2 put. out of action quickly, although an enti- PT defense wold have to be estab Slashed to. protect our troop/cargo carrytig: ships until the P2"s were / . eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would be aircraft delivered rocket/g infire and surface ship gunfire. a 3. There have been no repor:s on the operations of the Cuban PT's. They have been delivere i by Soviet ships to Havana, offloaded and sailed under. the:r own power to Mariel. Eight boats are presently located at Mariel. Four. PT's,; delivered in early. April, were still in lavana at last report, but are expecteG fo move to Mariel in che near future. ‘ithe only way ‘to put these boats out of actin while they are in port is by means of agents or swinner (UD: type) sabotage - Operations EXCLUOFD FROM Gis HW 47674 noord EiSdeoo pee el , eo i Re A
CBECiA: UAB nA NACADE SPECIAL HARDLI NOFGhi within hawhons: ta put these Pitre out a. action art sisky in that there is a probebilit: that agents/owimmers would be- captured with subsequent exporure and US ccmplicity. after the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will F be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them out- side of their harbors.” A wider spectrum of actions with less risk should become practical after their pattern of operations is established. | ~~ Say, hh, Possible covert/clandest ine ways and means of putting ' Cuban PT craft out of action include the following: a. Fuel contamination. Fuel contamination could be . accomplished either by inserting foreign material (chemicals) directly into the craft's fuel system or the fuel supply _ ashore (POL). Delivery of the contaminant would be by. agent. or swimmer. _ Resultar t damage would be temporary mechanical, Risk of detection would be high, results would ‘be minimal in comparison. b. Limpet mines/demolition charges charges. Underwater swimmers, launched from submarines urder cover of darkness could penetrate the PT base and <¢ttach limpet mines to the under- water body of. the craft. fEgents could install demolition charges in. the boats at their piers. Damege resulting from limpets >/demolition charges would be major resulting in . destruction and/or sinking of the boat. Risk of detection in operations of this type against Havana or Mariel would ve high. pr berths in botr harbors are in secure areas mat cing: agent” delivery very difficult. Both ‘harbors are lania- $ locked with narrow entrances from the sea. The PT's are moored at piers well inside the harbor and not ona direct line from the entrance, The entrances are guarded by con- tinuously manned ‘machine Bea posts on both ‘sides of the entrance. Boats are known to patrol during the day, no inforiaation is available or night boat patrol activity. The G3 Cy NW 47874 Docla2342%6301
currents in the entrances “sre swift. This would possibly © require a swimmer to penetiate on a flood tide and remain ‘inside the harbor until the ebb tide before he would be able | to effect, his escape. Unde ¢ thece conditions, the risk of "swimmer detection through eceldent (equipment malfunction or similor difficulty) would ‘be higher than the benefits to be realized py such operations. . Cc. Lopistié: sabotage. Sabotage of. any portion of the . . ( spare parts supply system ».ould minimize operational availa- bility of the voats. Agents would be required to perform the sabotage, - Insufficient inf ormation is available on the logistic supply system to evaluate the risks involved. a. Floating debris. Placing floating debris (logs, fishing nets, etc.) in PT coerating areas would create an operational hazard, Ira FE struck a solid object, the resultant damage would rang2 from minor hull damage to destruction depending on th: speed and angle at which the object was struck. Fishing nets, rope and similar material - - would foul the screws and camporarily. disable the boat. Operations of this type would have to be- carefully executed to insure that the hazard wis localized .in the PT area to ‘avoid danger to-innocent shipping. - hile not feasible at ‘present since ‘the Pts have not commenced operations, 4ta may be practicable at a later time. ; e. Lures. Floating devizes with explosive charges could be made into attractive lur?s by bright paint, emission of spurious signals (radio/nox se) or given other distinguishing characteristics which would. engender curiosity or demand investigation. These devic:s could be fuged to. explode in a number of ways (remote coitrel, contact or by handling). ‘the devices would be plante 1 in the Pr operating areas after they become know. Extreme vare- would be required in the conduct of such operations 32 insure that innocent shipping
feast prey € "e cs peas a cs a eS ems tc = Rene , Gee Ba Anbanntdan af the ee eda meen meet be wos mot ondarngarcct, Tanne Biase LEA ~Lure. could extend up to permanent destruction ef the boat. f. Deception. when the operational pattern is developed . for the PP's, 4t might be } ossible to conduct deception operations that would’ resu..t io their destruction. Drone targets, electronic/visual signals, changing. positions of “navigational aids or simil: ww acts might be used to ‘cause - the PT's to-run into shoal waters or onto a reer. This form of operation could al..:o be used to divert the attention of patrolling PT's from otier operations being conducted. 5; Although the Navy has wiys and means available to destroy. . or neutralize the cuban PT boits, none can be covertly . executed in cuba without undu: risk of exposure until. more information. is obtained on th: degree of their security . protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can . quickly dispose of the Cuban °T's. The Navy will continue am mS ban Casha DM 28 of the Cuban PT bk» “to! wateh closely the aetivit recommend appropriate means t> dispose’ of them when an nN opportunity is presented. -fs/ George ¥. anderson GEORGE W; ANDERSON NY 47674 Docial boon ee CIAL HELIN HOFORN
SPECIAL HAN... f REGUL HED; NOT RELEASABLE TO FUREIGN NATIONALS . si May 1962 Decision on: «JCS 1969/344 On 8 May 1962 the Jo:.nt Chiefs of staff approved ” the recommendations of the DOD/JES Representative to the . ‘Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph li of the | sub ject paper. - fet. Colonel” Sa oys wrERS ANT PCAL! 15 aay v7 03 ysis As Deputy Secretary. — wi ae ' Copy tos: General craig / EXCLUDED FROM Gps NOT tr a FOREIGN ue 7 ONA eg —vece ia | RW 47874 Docld: 32276301 Page 106
8 May 1962 ‘Decision ‘on: . JCS 1969/344 ( (NORTHWOODS) (S) On 8 May 1962 the Jo:.nt Chiefs of Staff approved BGEN Craig's recommendations as set forth in paragraph 11. of the subject: paper. | Golonel, USAF - Deputy Secretary HW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 109
PPECIAL HANDLE i ba THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF oe VCE WASH NGTON 25, D.C. : ck ‘ * ICSU. 265-62 8 May 1962 MEMCRANDUM FOR THE SECRE CARY. OF DEFENSE Suiject: DOD Task No. 38, Operation MONGOOSE 1. Pursuant to the re juirements set forth in DOD Task No. 38 the Department of Derense was requested to review the present arrangements for granting asylum to Cuban refugees at “Guantanamo Naval Base, with the view of. granting asylum to all Cibans so desiring it, at the Naval Base. 7 2. The Joint Chiefs o:' Staff recommend that the recommendations outlined in the attached memorandum be , 7 oo approved. po FOR THE JOINT CHIEI'S OF STAFF: . ” Gb 7 G. H. DECKER : - Acting Chairman | . 7 ' Joint Chiefs of Starr aoa I \ | ; | . , ‘ EXCLUDED FROM GDS . EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY SEE cee Ws epee th rere eyelets TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORI . «4 ait NW 47674 DoclId: 32276301 tage 110
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHIt GTON 25, D.C, JCaM ann noe wowiy Lf ANDUM POR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: DOD Task Ho. 46, Operation MONGOOSE 1. Pursuant <~o the DOi Task 46, the Department o Defense was requested to 2xamine the possibility of establishing patrol posts in tne Caribbean area, wi particule? emphasis on a United States manned petro post in Haiti, ‘to guard ¢gainst any ‘invasion attemo at that country from Cube. 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the results of this examination, outlined in the attach memorandum, be approved. FOR THE JOINT CHIZ]S OF STAFF: » H. DECKaAR Acting Chairman ‘Joint Chiefs of Staff 4 oot EXCLUDED FROM Gps EXCLUDED FRG Au £ th 1 t 2 2a PCHATAC i . REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 ee “wd NW 47874 Docld: 32276301 Page 111. DOES WOT APPLY
<tc sae btn mtn nin nnn a it sent oa a sas inet i eo a eee mrt ai mane eo im TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLICIG. NOFORE le SECRF® SPECHIL HANDLING NOPORR "THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF | WASHIT GTON 25, D.C. : - 8 May 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHATRMAS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Subject: ” ges 1969/247 =- Maritime Support, - Operation Yongoose (TS) 1. On 14 March 1962, : the Secretary of Defense inguived whether there is some way of: putting the Soviet furnisned Cuban PT boats out of action. 2. The attached memorar ium for the Secretary of Defense forwards a memorandum fron the Chief of Naval Operations, which sets forth some possible ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance that it is not practicable to carry out the’ operations at this time: and that appropriate recommendations will be submitted at a. later date. 3. Some pogssivie Ways «f putting the Cuban PT boats out of action enumerated zre fuel contamination, sabotage, and.one or more of the following: limpet/demolition charges, floating debris, lures anc deception operations. . 4, The Operations Depuiies approved the attached memo for the Secretary of Defeise, together with its enclosure, on 7 May 1962 fcr transmiital to the Secretary of Defense. It.is recommended that yo. approve and sign the attached memorandum for the Secret:ry of Defense, which forwards the CNO report. , ' WILLIAM H. CRAIG ; . Brig. General, USA. . DOD/ICS Representative Caribbean Survey Group ro  excLUDED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM -AUTOMATIC | ‘REGRADING; BOD bin 5200.16 | DOES NOT APPLY : ttt rar Pentti edt = ome mo ed “NW 47674 Docld: 32276301 Bage 112
BLE AOF OR EGSEL SPECIAL HAR 8 May. 1962 MEMGAOUM FOR THE CHAIFMAN, JOINT CHISFS OF STAFF Susiect: DOD Task Ho. 38, Operation MONGOOSE 1. In accords :se with Task Ho. 29 the Department of Defense was requested t< ertake « review of the oresent arrangements for the use wantansne Naval 3ase for asylum. The review included 211 legal, political -and security -aspects in edditicn to development of recommenda- tions on the feasibility and desirability of gv ; asylum to all Cubans so iesiring at Guantanamo i: Jeval Base. 2. The Operations Deputies approved such a document responsive to this task om & May 1952. It is recommenced that you approve ang sigi the attached menorandun forwarding the results cf this review to the ‘Secretary of Defense. Ute “h Cpate wa ‘ Brie General, USA | ; , ~. pOD/ICS Representative | , Caribbean Survey Group EXCLUDED FROM GDS ' i | |] EXCLUDED FRO AUTOMATIC | | . REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 | [ y DOES NOT APPLY TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING HOFORR wee ; oe wad NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 113 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF oe GEL ESR aes , a ee Z “
THE JOINT SHIEFS OF STAFF at WASHIIGTON 25, B.C. ; Pig J tle og Fat “sf Ny 8 May 1942 MEMORANDOM ¥OR THE CHAIR IAN, JOINT CHIEFS oF STAFF Subject: DOD Tas: Ho. 6, 0 Operation MONGOOSE 1. In accordance with Task Wo. “46, the, Department of | Defense was requested to examine the possibility of ‘establishing patrol post; in the Caribbean, to be manned by personnel from one or several countries. Farticular attention-was to ve givei to the possibility of suth an establishment, to be pur:ly United States, in Haiti so as to guard against any invision attempt at that country from Cuba. . 2. The. Operations Dep ities approved the results of this examination and recommendations responsive to inis “task on & Mey 1962. It .s recommended that you approve and sign the attached mel!orandum forwarding the results . to the Secretary of Defeise. foo lp age “i. WILLIAM H. CRAIG Po Brig General, USA -S ; . DOD/JCS Representative . Caribbean Survey Group EXCLULEO FROM GDS EXCLUDED. PROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN . . & bcs: aad HW 47674 Doold:32276301 Paye 114 -
TOP SECRET ; COPY NO. JCS 1969/343 7 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 9 May 1962 JOINT CHIEF 5 OF STAFF DECISION ON JS 1969/343 A Note by the Secretaries O11 NORTHWOODS (S) Note by the jecretaries ‘1, On 8 May 1962, the Joint chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation set forth in par.graph 11 of the paper. 2. In that the Commandant: har. expressed direct concern of the. Marine Corps in this matter, th:: provisions of Title 10, US Code ° 141 (ce), applied and were follo'ed. . , 3. This decision now-becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/34... _ F. J. BLOUIN M. J. INGELTDO Joint Secretariat ide bbe 22 . yitd ibe HW 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 115 :
W427, IP, TOP SECRET So COPY NO. 4 Jes_1969/343 So SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 27 April 1962 ' Page 2209. nO NOTE. BY TiE SECRETARIES “> the | 7 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on NORTE woops (S ) A report* on’ “the a above subject is submitted for consid- - eration by the Joifit Chiefs of staff. F. J. BLOUIN oo Oo, _M. J. INGELIDO Joint Secretariat EXCLUDED FROM GDS Wor reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200. 10 DOES NOT APPLY . “‘QOP_ SECRET Ics 1969/ 343 + | 2209 NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page.116 : rOv SECRET
a COPY NO. / oF _» 4 COPIas 3 Ney 1962 ~  SPRCIAL “DYSTRIBUTION REPORT BY THE DEPARTM NT oF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF %SPRESENTATIVE ON THE CARIBSEAN S JRVEY GROUP to -he . JOINT CHIEF ; oF STAFF - 7 on ESTASLISHMENT OF np, TROL Posts" (UY) —_ . ' . #ACLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RUGRADINGs DOD DIR 3200. 1o DOES NOT APPLY 1 [at ee
_ ESTABLISHMENT OF ":ATROL POSTS" (U) THE PRC 3LEM 1. To respond to a request™ from the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, to examine the possibility of F establishing | "patrol posts" in the Caribbean. ‘ASSUMPTIONS 2. The term "patrol posts" dé assumed to include any agency or facility which could contribute to an anti-invasion and infiltration surveillance. systen. Such an agency could be overt or covert an nature and eculd be: purely US, bi-national,. or multi-national in nature. _ _"*" BAGTS BEARING 0} THE PROBLEM | 3. By memorandum to the DOD/ECS Representative, Caribbean Survey Group, dated 17 April 19€2, the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested ar examination of the possibility — of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean. Particular ‘attention was tobe given to the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely US, in Haiti,, so as to guard against . any invasion attempt at that country from Cuba. 4, For additional Facts Bearing on the Problem, see Enclosure B, DISCUSS ION’ 5, For discussion, see Enclosure C. _CONCLU: IONS ‘ 6. Cuban ‘military forces Lach the capability to launch a meaningful military invasion agi inst any Caribbean country with the possible exception of. laiti. In the case of Haiti, . the capability is limited to a _ightly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or small boats. Surveillance of cuban coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability of the US Atlantic Command, Foi-ces of this command, assisted by military forces of the country concerned, are capable of combatting successfully any invi.sion attempts by Cuba. *On file in General Craig's office TOP, SECRET SPECIAL HAND NW 47674 Docld: 32276301" Page LING
‘ 7. From a military point of view, the primary value of air- sea "patrol posts", would be in acquiring advance information of Cuban actions and indication: of intentions. ‘Due to the _ nature of the likely Cuban thre:t, i.e., infiltration and “subversion. supporting an indiger ous revolutionary movement, _ the value of surface -"patrol po: ts" is questionable. 8, Based upon the past exper’ ence of the Department of State in exploring the possibility of arranging for bilateral agree- . ments with Central American gov rnments to provide assistance , for defense against communist dr filtration and subversion, it. . is not feasible for the US to. stonsor at this time the establish- ment: of arrangements necessary for the "patrol. posts" through ‘bilateral agreements . . 9. At the 8th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS, member States collectively took recognition of the threat posed to the Western Hemisphere by cormunist infiltration, ‘One of | ‘the ‘actions taken to combat this threat was the establishment of . a Special Consultative Committee on Security to study the threat , and make recommendations on measures which ‘should be taken to preserve the peace and security of the hemisphere. It is - possible that this ‘committee maj develop a multi- lateral pro- ‘ posal for such action. . ‘10. An’ early availability of an amphibious training and staging facility’ required in Haiti for use of: Fleet Marine Force elements of the Atlantic Fleet as previously expressed* by the. . Joint Chiefs of Staff, could assist in the performance of the functions envisioned for a US manned “patrol post" in Haiti. RECOMMEN DAT TONS ll. It is recommended that: a. The attached memorandus, Enclosure A, together with its Appendix, which reflects the above conclusions, be : forwarded to the Secretary 0: Defense. * Decision on JCS 570/547 JQP, SEGRE SPECIAL HANI NW a7e7a Docla: 32276301 age 119
TOP SECRET SPECIAL WANDLIK NOFORE g ; ; . b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of. unified or specified commands. e. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. | . uO . d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, Us Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 4 won snal@P,.SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING
TOP SECRET” SPECIAL HANDLIE? NOFORN ENCLOS|RE A “DRAI . MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECI:-ETARY OF DEFENSE — ' Subject: Establ: shment of "Patrol Posts"(U) | It is recommended that : ‘he attached memorandum ySubject . as above, be approved and for arded to the Chief of Operations, ' Operation Mongoose. - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 9200. 10 DOES NOT APPLY ) . 5 Enclosure A wom wo lQPSEGRET DLING = NOFORN
7874 Docld:32276301 Page 122 APPENDIX TO EI CLOSURE A DRA} T MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPEI:ATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE Subject: Establishment o: "Patrol Posts" (U) ‘1. By memorandum to the DOD/. CS Representative, Caribbean Survey Group, @ated 17 April 192, the Chief of Operations, _ Operation MONGOOSE, requested ai examination of the possibility’ “of establishing "patrol.posts" ‘n the Caribbean manned by personnel from one or several countries. Particular attention was to be given to the possibil. ty of such an establishment, to be purely US, in Haiti, 80 a; To. guard against | any invasion attempt at that country from Cuba. For the purposes. of this examination, “patrol posts" wer assumed to .be any agency or facility which could contribute to an anti-invasion and | infiltration surveillance syste. Such an agency could be ‘overt or covert in nature and could be’ purely US, bienational or multi-national in nature. . 2. Cuban military forces lac: the capability to launch a meaningful military invasion aginst any Caribbean country, with the possible exception of laitt. In the case of Haiti, . : the capability is limited to a ‘tightly armed invasion using - a few aircraft and/or small hoa:s. Surveillance of Cuban coastal areas and the entire Ca *ibbean is within the capability or the US Atlantic Command. Those forces, assisted by military forces of the country concerned, are capable of combatting successfully any invasion attemots by Cuba. In this respect, the ‘US through the Ambassador in th: Central American Countries, Colombia and Venezuela, has inf ormed the Presidents of the respective countries orally thas the US was prepared to establish, “upon request of ‘the: local gover iment, a system of air-sea ‘surveillance to assist in seeki 1g out, and interdicting within 6. "Appendix to Enclosure A . TOP. SECRET SPECIAI, HANDLING  NOFORN
national jurisdiction of’ the roquesting state, attempted landings of armed forces, agents or sup lies by Castro-Communist elements and otherwise to assi;t local governments to identify and frustrate armed assistance to such subversive elements. This committment was not affor led Haiti. 3. From a military point of view, the primary value of air-_ sea "patrol posts", would be 11 acquiring advance information ; a. ; of Cuban actions and indicatiois of intentions. Due to the nature of the likely Cuban thr at, 1.é., infiltration. and subversion supporting an -indig nous revolutionary movement ‘the value of surface "patrol posts" 1s questionable. 4, Based upon the past expe: ‘lence of the Department of State in exploring the possibi. Aty. of arranging for bilateral agreements with Central Americ. ie] governments to provide assistance for defense against communist infiltration and subversion {aversion to entertig. into: bilateral defense agreements with the US), it is not feasible for the US to sponsor at this time the estab ishment of "patrol posts" through bllateral agreements. 5. At the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS; member States collectively tool: recognition of the threat * posed to the Western Hemispher by ‘communist infiltration. One of the actions taken to-corbat this threat was the establishment of a Special Con:ultative Committee on Security to study the threat and make r:-commendatiots on measures which should be taken to preserve th peace and security of the hemisphere, - It is possible thi t this committee may develop a , multileters] proposal for such ection. | 6. By JCSM~5-62,* dated 4 Jawaty 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated a requirement for ian amphibious training and staging facility in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force elements of the Atlantic Fleet. In reply to the letter from the Deputy *On file in Joint Secretariat NW 47674 DociId Appendix to Enclosure A DLING = HOFORN $32276301 Page 123
Secretary of Defense, dated 6 March 1962, which transmitted the request of the Joint Chiefs of jtaff, tne Deputy Under Secretary — of State stated ‘on 20 March 1962 that: . "The establishment of nilitary facilities “in Haiti raises a number of basic que stions with respect to our policy toward the present (Cuvalier) regime, and requires most careful consideration." The Departuent of State, is curr ently conducting an. analysis _ of our future policy. in regard to the present government of Haiti. An early availability cf a'US facility in Haiti, however, could assist in the performance of the functions envisioned for a US manned "patrol post" in Haiti. . . 7. During this critical period, maximum use will continue “to be made of US forces in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB, MAAGS, Missions, and Attaches) in cooperation, where possible, - with Latin American military fcrces to perform the functions envisioned for the "patrol posts." For example, training “operations at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal patrol activity, ‘and traffic between that base end US naval installations in Puerto Rico provide effective éir-sea surveillance of eastern Cuba and the island of Hispanic la including Haiti. a. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that no further action be taken in regerd. to the establishnent of ' ‘patrol posts," A7 this VOAE. Appendix to Enclosure A some wJOP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING — NOFORK f ay , my
ENCLOS URE B FACTS BEARING CN THE PROBLEM 1. The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the American states (OAS) at their eighth meeting® took cognizance ‘of the threats to the peace and security of the western Hemisphere as a result of communist infiltration, The Council of the OAS (COAS) was requested to “maintain all necessary vigilance, for the Furpose ‘of warning against any acts of aggression, subversior, or other dangers ‘to peace ‘and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and. to make recommendations to the governments of ' the member States with regard thereto." 2, As directed by the Foreign Ministers of the OAS at their . eighth meeting, the COAS has established a Special Consultative - Committee of experts on security and has charged this committee with studying the threat to the. hemisphere and recommending to “the COAS measures which shcvleé be taken to maintain the peace ‘and security. This Special Cc nmittee is to submit the anitial report by 1 May 1962 and subse quent reports as available. General Thomas BD. White, USAF,/ietired, is a member selected from the United States, = 3. On 10 May 1961, the Department of State by message** to - US Ambassadors of Central American countries explored the ‘possibility of consumna ting b11 steral anda later multilateral agreements with various countries’ to defend against communist infiltration and subversion. Yesponses from addressees indicated. most governments sere not responsive to such arrangements and opposition. co1ld be expected. This ‘* Final Act of the Eighth Meesing of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Doc. 68 (English) Rev., dated 21 Jan 62; - on file in Joint Secretaria: , ** Department of State message, Circular 1761, dated 1O May 61; ' on file in Joint Secretaria: Enclosure B. LAMP. SEGRET SPECIA. HANDLING NOFORK NW 478674 Doecid:32276301 Page 125
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN? NOFORN proposal was discarded and ins.ead, the US Ambassadors to. the Central american countries wer requested by message* on 2 November 1961, to ‘inform the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of host countries orally that “he US Government recognized the -Carisaseen countries as likely cargets of communist subver sion or attack and that it was prepare:. to establish, upon request of a local government, a system ora air-sea surveillance to assist ‘in seeking out, and interdictirg within the national juris- diction of the requesting: stati, attempted landings of armed. forces, agents. or supplies by astro-Communist elements and otherwise to assist local governments to identify and frustrate ‘armed assistance to such subvei'sive elements, In respect to Haiti, the Department of State stated, "Serious question has been raised as to whether mateiiel and other kinds of assistance “against indirect aggression in addition to that already being made available to the Haitian (overnment should be given in present cirounstances, particu arly because of the apparent. ‘aspiration of President Duvalicr. to perpetuate himself in office indefinitely." 4, On 15.May 1961, the Joini Chiefs of Staff, by. memorandum** to the Secretary of Defense st: ted, “While it is recognized that i there may be overriding political considerations which dictate ‘the negotiation of such. bilateral and multilateral assistance agreements, they - cannot be rect mmended from a military point of view," * Department of State message, Circular CA- 388, dated 2 Nov 61; ‘on file in’ Joint Secretariat *#* Decision on JCS 1976/365 te 10 . Enclosure B LING TOP. SECRET SPECIAL HARD NW 47674 DoclId: 32276301 Page 1
DISCUSSION l. ‘The communist threat to che Western Hemisphere ‘through . infiltration and subversion wa; " Tecognized by the Foreign Ministers of the OAS at their 3th Meeting at Punta del Este and “action was initiated to find means to, combat it, The results ‘of the COAS Special Committee should provide measures which could be taken on a collective basis to guard against and combat the threat. ; | _ 2. Cuban military forces la:k the capability to launch a ‘meaningful attack: against any .atin American country with. the - possible exception of Haiti, in the case of Haiti, the capability is limited toa lig. itly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or. small boats. . | 3. Any invasion of a Caribb:an country by. Cuban forces would serve only to further unite th. governments of Latin’ America and lead to collective -OAS act on under the terns, of the Treaty of Non-Intervention, Further, a Cuban landing on the territory of another country could provive a valid justification for US | military intervention in Cuba. Any attempt to export communism. from Cuba would be most. likely by infiltration and subversion ‘and would take the form of an -ndigenous revolutionary movee- ment, ‘supported by arms from Cuba and perhaps Cuban’ volunteers,’ and would be made to appear as an uprising against the incumbent government. | | 4, Surveillance of Cuban eo.stal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability of US aircraft and /or ships assigned: to’ the: Atlentic’ Commen'!. ‘Also, Us. forces and facilities in the Caribbean are adequate to prevent any; invasion of a. Caribbean country by Cuban for:es., From a military point of view, the primary value. of "pat rol posts" would be in acquiring . advanced information of Cuba's actions and indications of intentions. The value of grow d "patrol posts", even considering governmental - agreeme nts could le effected, is. questionable in view of the nature of the thre: t from Cuba. TOP SEGRE WY 47874 Doecld:32276301 Page 127
HW 47674 Doc¥al® 56 Although the Joint Chief's of Staff consider there is little military justification for esta lishing multilateral forces for use in the Caribbean area, the iolitical results of such an effort’ may have some value in gaining ‘urther recognition of the threat and in strengthening national t..es between participating countries. Based upon the past indications from Central Anerican governments in regard to the negotiation of bilateral assistance agreements, and the present: relations betwen the US and Cuba, it does not appear feasible for the US to sionsor a "patrol post" concept in the Caribbean area at this time Additionally any consideration of such a proposal must conside:: the possible effects on the treaty with Cuba for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base, if it is to be used as a. "patrol post." 6. In specific regard to.a g:-ound “patrol - post" in Haiti, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by memora:.dum* to the Secretary of Defense, dated 4 January 1962, stated th-re was a requirement for an amphibious training and staging facility in Haiti and requested that the Department of State, subject ‘to political assessment of the political considerations in ‘olved, make necessary governmental arrangements for the conduct of surveys and for subsequent arrangements on specific Fequir ments that are developed. The™ Department of State has indicat: d a reluctance to negotiate with ; the present Government of Haiti until a thorough analysis is made with respect to US policy ‘oward the: ‘present Duvalier regime, The early availability. of this cact lity, however, would meet’ any requirement for a US "atrol post" in Haiti. In the "meantime, training operations al Guantanamo Naval Base, normal . patrol activity, and traffic between that base and US naval installations in Puerto Rico prc vide effective air-sea surveillance of eastern Cuba anc the island of Hispaniola including Haiti. . 7+ The most feasible course «f action, likely to be acceptable to the countries concerned, to contend with Cuban infiltration and subversion of Caribbean. countrics lies in collective efforts of the . OAS. Past indications from gove rnuents of Caribbean countries have been to the effect that collective OAS efforts and actions are defensible and rational, ‘whereas unilateral and bileteral actions SECRET... SPECTR WANDTING”'” ROFORK™ VAiGar, Page Tks S77 /
TOP SECRET SPECIAI. HANDLING NOFORN case, appropriate consideratior of the recommendations for action, to be submitted by. the Special Committee on Security . “of the COAS, should provide a lasis to accomplish the objective. 8. During this interim pericd, maximun use should continue to be made of US forces ‘in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB, MAAG's, Missions, ‘and Attaches) and the Latin American military, forces to perform the functions envisioned for. thie "patrol oa posts." . . 9. Any actions to establish “patrol posts" as such in the , Caribbean. area would require ar propriate "cover" to hide or obscure the real purpose. . Whil:2 several means are available, (civilian commercial interests, activities associated with the Atlantic Missile Range, etc.), the ostensible purpose would | . Surely invoke strong reaction from the Cuban government and might jeopardize the over-all s2curity of "Operation Mongoose.". Enclosure C 19? SEORET NW 47874 Doold: 0. Page 129°
ICS 272-2 10 April ig9é2 a FOR Ite, SECH TARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Cuba ree b Chiefs cf Staff believe that the Cuban solved.:m the neay future, Further, they earls suceess in overthrowing the present either os a reault of internal upc 'nines: Leal, ceononmis or poycholerical po .nsures,. believe that military intervantion tne 2211 bea re cuired to overthrow the Pree at statce cannot tolerate perminent ex:.utence a it din the vos lissisnohere. ‘The POVIC OS na base of “slon against me soveriments in Latin overt & covert actions Obinucd existence of this con Soe the oy moa that one or in AuerPica will becone communist i catly increase the States end the Orraniza= gered unlikely, it is : VG GlUAbLisn: rilitary US instalistions around the blos € of such haces would increase US vere Geveloped or ahifted to met and BUDVe Time favors the Chan regime and the commmist biec. dwith ihe opportunity to continue with a effort: in Latin Aserica., Inereasing internal security meamues by police state methods decrease weet Wc tee NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 130
-can' be uc complished rap: uly e o the possibility of internal uprisines within steady improvement in military defenses atrens vasistance which must be overcome in the evens of US military intervention ard could lencthen the sine required to secure control of the government ivi the island. The continuing indoctrinaticn of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for @ c smunist unde: creund artazr the Glimination of the prescnt covernment. wdhis ercates @ problem for the future vhicn is steadily increasins in magnitude, . &, The Joint Chiefs cf Steff believe that the Ur.'ted States cnn undertake military. intervention in Cuba ::ithout risk of soneral war. ey @leo believe that the incorvention, snougn to minimizs comminist opportunities Lor nollie: bation or UN ection. Forces available would asoure 2apid essential military control of Cuba, Continued police action would be required. - _. §. In view of the in creasing military. and cubversive threat to the United St:.tes and the ritiong or the Western Hemisoherae posed by the communist rorinme in Cuba, the Jolnt. Chiefs of Starf recommend that a national policy of early. ndlitary intervention i Cuba be adantcd by the United ‘ States. ‘Shey also reco mend that such intervention be undertaken a8 Booh ag possible and preferably hevore the release or Koational Guacd ond Reserve Yorces presently en active duty. — ; : For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Le Te LEMNITZER . ; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff a . et ‘RY 47674 Docld:32276301 Plge 131
“ al TOP SECRET COPY NO. _ 2 JCS_1969/335 _ SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 10 April 1962 ‘ ' JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DECISION ON J(S 1969/335 A Note by the ‘ecretaries on NORTHWOOLS (S) Note by the Secretaries ‘1. at their meeting on 10 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 6 of the report sub- mitted by JCS 1969/335, after making amendments to the memorandum in Enclosure A thereto, 2, The memorandum, as amended, was forwarded as JCSM~-27 2-62, to the Secretary of Defense, | 3. In that the Commandant had *xpressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the vrovisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followe:l, Ay This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/335. F, J.. BLOUIN M. J. INGELIDO Joint Secretariat roe SECRET HW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 132.
¥ a 4 he " TOP SECRET | oo COPY WO. + JCS 1969/335 - SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 9 April 1962 | Page 2187 , ' NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES | 7 to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on NORTH: ODS_(8) A report* on the above eubject’ is submitted for consid- eration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff , F. J. BLOUIN, M. J. INGELIDO Joint Secretariat seer a rte PEE EC APSR * Not reproduced: on file in Joint Secretariat SACLUGED FROM Gms EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY. TOP SECRET JCS 1969/335 | 287 OS NW 47674 Docld: 32276301 Page 133
HW 47874 Decld CUBA (TS) THE PRC 8LEM 1. To develop the position cf the Joint Chiefs of Staff with reference to two questions posed by General Taylor at: “the meeting of the Special Grovp (5412), 5 April 1962, re- | lated to possible sentences foz the invasion prisoners as follows: ; - (a. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should intervene? - . | _ b. Does the United States have the capability to ‘intervene? . | . FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM ‘ - @. Past considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been reviewed for opinions or ¢ecisions related to General Taylor's first question. Two £tudies are. appropriate; however, both studies were directly concerned with the current Cuba Project (Mongoose). a, The first study,* dated 8 February 1962: A significant conclusion of this study states that | the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime can te accomplished without pre- cipitating general war and vithout serious effect on world public opinion if, among other things, the impression is... created ‘that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba. b. The second study,*#*dated 16 March 1962: , This ‘study repeated the above decision, but further, * JCS 1969/303 ‘**® JCS Tee Top. See RED SPECIAL HANDLING  NOFORN
DLIK:  HOFORK - appended a list of circumstar ces which could be considered sufficient provocation for U. military intervention in Cuba. ‘one of the situations listed, which depended upon degree. of seriousness, is stated: - : . | "Execution of prisoner:- taken in the abortive attempt _of April 1961." | . 3. For additional facts bear: .ng see Enclosure B. DISCUS! ‘ION “4, For discussion see Enclosure c. " CONCLUSIONS ~ 5. The Secretary of Defense should be advised during the meeting of 10 April that execut..on of 100.or more Cuban prison=- ers should be exploited ‘(with p‘etexts and. an expanded propa- ganda campaign if necessary) by the US as justification for intervention. , 6. The Secretary of Défense should be advised that there is no question of US capability to intervene, and that the deliberate course of implementi ig such action within 18 days after decision is more prudent chan the faster but riskier course of piecemeal force comm snents.. « ; “De Inasmuch as .the Joint Chi:2fs of staff have not addressed the question of US military int srvention in Cuba except within ‘the context of Operation Mongoo se it appears ‘desirable that military action be recommended to the Secretary of Defense and/ or ‘the President as the only course “which provides « assurance ‘that the Communist Cuban. regime can be removed inthe important time frame of the near future. RECOMMENE (TIONS 8. It is recommended. that: . Qe Conclusions 5 and 6 atove be reflected as the position ; of -the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the: ‘meeting: with the Secretary of Defense 10 April 1962.
OP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK’ =f OFORN "bp. The memorandum at Ene: osure A be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to “exp? ess the views. of the Joint Chiefs . of Staff concerning US mili: ary intervention in Cuba outside © the context of: Operation Mor goose. . . c. This paper NOT be forvarded to commanders of unified or specified commands. . . 7 . a. This paper NOT be forvarded to US officers assigned _ to NATO activities. . . | e. This paper NOT be for\arded to the Chairman, us : Delegation, United ‘Nations tilitary Staff Committee. y w oon wood OP.SEGRET SPECIAL HANDL
LIK. NOFORK ‘TOP SECRET SPECIL HANG MEMORANDUM FOR THE S!CRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Cuba (TS) -1. The Joint Chiefs of Staf: believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near futire. Further, they see no prospect of early success in ot erthrowing the present communist regime either as a ‘result of internal uprisings or external political,. economic or psychol: gical pressures. Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the United States will. be required to- overthrow ihe present comimurii st. regime. "2, The. United states’ cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in tre Western Hemisphere. The - present regime in Cuba provide: communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage ‘and silwersion against ‘Latin America. The stability cf some governments in Latin America is already threatened ty the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence’ of this con= munist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin Ane rica will become communist or communist dominated. This vill greatly increase the ‘problems currently facing the Laited, States and ‘the Organi za- tion of American States. While considered unlikely, it is . possible for the Sino- Soviet Bloc to establish. military. . bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of stch bases would increase US . ‘defense costs as forces were de veloped or shifted to meet the. threat. . 3. Time favors: the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the oppertunity to continue with. their subversive efforts in Latin ‘America. Increasing internal security measures by Folice| State methods decrease EACLUSER FROM EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR. 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY * soa , 5 : Enclosure A “(Page Tevised as directed by the ics, 10 April 1962) woo soAQP.SEGRET SPECIA. HANDLING — NOFORN
Tar see SPECIAL HANDLIK?  NOFORR the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The “steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the ‘resistance which must be overcome in the event of US: military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. _The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban. yeuth creates | a growing nucleus ' for a ‘communist underground aiter the elimination of the present government. This creates a prcblem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitide. . | 4, The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States. can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention can be accomplished rapidly enough te minimize communist opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure rapid essential military contiol of Cuba. Continued police action would be required. 5. In view of the increasirg military and subversive threat to the United States and the rations of the Western Hemi sphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of ‘early military intervention - in Cuba be adopted by the United States, They also recommend — that such intervention be unde rtaken as. soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently on active duty. 6° -° Enclosure A ° (Page revised as directed by the Joint Chiefs of. Staff, 10 Apr’ 6< . __ __ TE, SEGRE SPECIAL | AANDLING NOFORK
P SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK’ ENCLOSIRE B.. -FACTS BEARING Ol; THE PROBLEM LL With regard te the question concerning US capability to intervene in Cuba, implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 will assure forceful and ‘rapid overtl:row of the Cuban government . within 10 days after forces are committed. As recently as 3 April.1962 CINCLANT |(in responsi: to a Joint Chiefs of Staff query concerning the adequacy o: forces'in his OPLAN) has . advised . that contingencies whicl. could complicate the. campaign against Cuba have béen recognig:d and considered acceptable hazards. CINCLANT states, ", 2 6 it is my judgment that the forces in CINCLANT. OPLAN 314-61 are adequate to gain essential control of Cuba within the estinated 10 days." CINCLANT quali- | fies this judgment to depend on the following: ta, Intelligence availabl:: to this command concerning the current strength, capabilities, morale, and Locations of Cuban military férces is ess ntially correct. . , The amphibious assaul’; lift now available in LANTCOM and PACOM is, as ‘an absolute minimum, maintained at no less than present levels and improved and increased as feasible. “"e, Certain of the "on cal" army forces now listed in the. plan are reclassified as reserve forces and put in motion din time to arrive in the objuctive area on or before D plus 10." 2, While the fastest means 0° assuring completion of the total task in Cuba.is OPLAN 314-61,. the situation may require initial reaction by the US tn less than 18 days. A calculated risk could be considered, providing piecem:al commitment of US forces as rapidly as they and |their trans ortation become available. This is CINCLANT OPLAN’ 316-61,. and a:.though not approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was returned t CINCLANT for rewrite. Represen- tative reaction times, proposed in OPLAN 316-61 from a condition Enclosure B ws come oe TOR. SERED srectd, age
‘TOP SECRET SPECIFL HANDLIE NOE of no warning were: 2 ABN Divisions . - 5 days” 4 Marine BLIs ~~ 7-8 days ‘Artillery and Armor - 13-12 days. Follow-on-Forces _ _ = 15-18 days. - ij 3 ' Enclosure B TOP SECRET | SPECIAL NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 14
‘TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK> ROFORN ENCLOSE URE C DISCUS SION” 1. In addition to related ccnsiderations of the Joint Chief's of Staff, additional factors which support US intervention An ‘Cuba, if 100 or more ‘prisoners are executed, are: a. Guidelines establi shec for Phase II of Operation Mon- goose, already approved by tke Special Group, indicate that .mili- tary intervention must eventually be resorted to for overthrow of the Communist Cuban regime, a b. The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US. | _¢. Justification for US iatervention will probably be more convincing to the rest of tha world if it can be related to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on . manufactured pretexts which ontail some risk of compromise. The US could, however, bolstar the justification for inter- ; vention, at required, to. Provide a stronger case for US military action. ad. Execution of significait: numbers -of prisoners would adversely affect the faith aid resolution of refugee Cubans and the Cuban underground in future attempts to resist the Communist regime, if they fé21 that the US has ignored, in , apparent disinterest, the filial chapter of last year's invasion attempt. 7 .-2. US intervention in Cuba could trigger Bloc _Siversionary tactics in other parts of the world (most probably. in known trouble spots’ such as Laos, Sou:h Vietnam, Korea, the Offshore Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would likely engender propaganda campaigns t» include use of the UN forun for pressure against the US. However, the essential and most important element of the US play against Cuba is speed. CINCLANT's OPLAN states, "Some } days subsequent to gaining ; | control, conditions should perm.t withdrawal of assault forces, Enclosure C FORN _... TOP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING age
* QP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK”  NOFORK leaving small military units tc conduct civil affairs and counter- . guerrilla mop-up operations." Estimating from -D-5 therefore, it should be expected: that US forces committed to Cuba will be unavailable for other continger cies for: only about 20 days, although. the Marine Division Wing Team from the West Coast will . be in poor position for immedi: te redeployment for some time . longer. - . - 3. The fastest means of appiying force against Cuba would .be through the use of US air pe wer (Naval plus USAF), although this would be an interim measur e until surface forces could be ‘deployed. This capability, nov being prepared by CINCLANT as a new and separate plan, could be utilized for destruction of Cuban air power, reduction of ground forces (especially armor), and disruption of Cuban commun; cations and utility systems. This plan to be operable in 6 tours in the strength desired by CINCLANT will require prepositioning of 12 ‘Air Force Squadrons in ‘Florida. Enclosure C econ oaclQP,.SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING WOFORN-
TOP SECPST SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN a P] . ‘ EXPLANATORY NOTE One of the requirements which evolved from the JCS Meeting, ; 6 April, was to up-date JCS 2304/30. That: document has been ee reviewed and up-dating appe:rs infeasible for the following reasons: ; -ae JCS 2304/30 was wr:.tten in April 1961 to expand po forces involved in CINCLANT Plan 312-60, from two battle | groups to.a force level considered adequate to cope with the improved Cuban militsry capability. Force levels are increased from two battle groups to two divisions plus a third division in reseive. This plan was overtaken by CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61. which further increased the total forces required to the extent that the augmented plan 312-60 was superseded. The plan for Cuba in JCS 2304/30, therefore, is ne longer valid; the plan should in fact be withdrawn. b. Much of the relate: information included in JCS 2304/30 not strictly concerned with the military plan is reflected — in the more current papeis published in support of the Cuban Project (Operation Mongoose). NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 144
uw | fe | 10 .pril 1962 1969/334 . At their meeting on 10 Apri] 1962 the Joint Cheifs of staff considered the subject papers which were tabled at the meeting. JCS 1969/334 was roted and used as a background = >_—y paper by the Joint Chiefs ir their discussion with the Seeretary of Defense at their 1430 meeting this date. A This is aN: Extract from the JCS minutes of 10 april. (Original of the minutes is filed +a = ete. ae ' NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 145
TOP SECRET ts” COPY NOs Jcs_1969/334 ee SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 9 April 1962 oo — ‘Page 2186 NOTE BY THE. SECRETARIES _ . to the . JOINT CHIE'S OF STAFF on NORTHWO :2S_(S)° A talking paper* on the : bove subject is submitted for . approval by the Joint Chiefs o. Staff. _F, J. BLOUIN, M. J. INGELINO, Joint Secretariat * Not reproduced; on file.in Joint Secretariat einen ko ; a. = “DED FROM Gog EXCLUDED FROM. AUTOMATIC TOP SECRET -_ Dr . _ REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE JCS 1969/334 oO 218} 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY. SAID GS Pp 18 ar NY 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 147 ; an POP SRR et
w owe woul GP..SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING. 9 April 1962 Talking Paper for the Chairman. JCS for the SéeDef Meeting, 10 April 1962 m ‘Subject: US Intervention in Cuba eee - At the meeting of the Special Group (augmented) on 5° Apr 62, General Taylor questio.ed the US course of action in the event Castro decided to ex:cute about 100 of last April's invasion prisoners. Inconclus .ve discussion led General Taylor: to ask, "Suppose Castro decide! to shoot them all, what would we do then?" Mr. Johnson, for State, expressed the opinion that even this extreme would not provide sufficient. justification for US military action. Mr. G lpatric, for Defense, and Gen Parker for the JCS, indicated shey felt both the bob and the JCS would stand firm for military -ntervention. - During the JCS meting, 6 Apr 62, discussion ‘of this subject developed two basic questions: m a, Do the JCS believe th: US should intervene? b. Dees the US have the sapability? Discussion - Past consideratiois of the JCS have been reviewed for opinions or decisions relaced to General Taylor's first - question. Two studies are app-opriate; however, both studies were directly concerned with tie current Cuba. Project (Mongoose). a. JC3 1969/303, 8 Feb 62: . ‘A significant conclusion of this study states that the JC3 believe the overthroy of the Communist Cuban Regime can be accomplished without precipitating general war and without serious effect o1 world public opinion, if, among _ other things, the impres3ion is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian reqilrement to restore order in Cuba. b. JCS 1969/313, 16 Mar sat ’ This study repeated tae’ above decision, but further, appended a list of circunstances which could be considered sufficient provocation for US. military intervention in Cuba. One of the situations listed, which depended upon degree of seriousness, 1s stated: ' 'Evecution of prisoners taken in the abortive attempt of April 1961." . - In addition to these related considerations of. the JCS, additional factors which support US intervention in Cuba, if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are: a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mon- goose, already approved by the Special Group, indicate. that mit tary: intervention must evertually be resorted to for over- throw .of the Communist. Cuben Regime. b. The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US. ce. Justification for US intervention will probably be more convincing to the resi of the world if it.can be related to a real and valid provoc: tion rather than based entirely. on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise. . EXCLUDED FROM Gps
“The US could, however, bolster. the justification for inter- vention, if required to provide a stronger case for US military action. — _ @. Execution of significent numbers of prisoners would adversely affect the faith end resolution of. refugee Cubans and the Cuban underground ir future attempts to resist the Communist regime, if they feel that the US has ignored in apparent disinterest, the final chapter of last year's in- vasion attempt. , - With regard to the question concerning US capability . to intervene in Cuba, implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 31 ~61 will assure forceful and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government within 10 days after forces are committed; forces can be com- mitted 18 days after the order is given. As recently as 3 Apr 62 CINCLANT (in response to a .CS query concerning the adequacy of forces in his OPLAN) has ad\ised that contingencies which -.gould complicate the campaign i: gainst Cuba have been recognized secon woolQP.,SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING and considered acceptable hazaids. CINCLANT states, "... . it is my judgment that the forces in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 are ade- quate to gain essential contro. of Cuba within the estimated 10 days." CINCLANT qualifies his judgment to depend on the following: ; . oo . "a, Intelligence availab: e to this command concerning the | ‘current strength, capabilit:.es, morale, and locations of Cuban military. forces is es::entially correct. "Dp, The amphibious assau.t lift now available in LANTCOM and PACOM is, as an absolut: minimum, maintained at no less than present levels and imp.‘oved and increased as feasible.. "e, Certain of the''on c.ill' Army, forces now listed in the plan are reclassified a; reserve forces and put in motion in time to arrive in the objective area on or before D plus 10." . ; ; - While the fastest 1eans of assuring completion of _ the total task in. Cuba is OPLAI] 314-61, the situation may re-. . quire initial reaction by the JS in less than 18. days. _ A cal- -@ulated risk could. be consider 2d, providing ‘@kecemeal’ commit- ment of US forces as rapidly as they and their transportation become available. This was proposed in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61, and, although not approved by the JCS, was returned to CINCLANT ‘for rewrite. Representative r2action times, proposed in OPLAN 316-61 from a condition of no varning were: ‘ 2 ABN Divisions ~ 5 days . 4 Marine-BLTs | - 7-8 days Artillery and Armor - 10-12 days Follow-on Forces § - 15-18 days ~ The fastest méans of applying force against Cuba would be through the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF), although this would be an interim measure until surface forces could be deployed. This capatility, now being prepared by CINCLANT as a-new and separate plan, could be utilized for destruction of Cuban air power, reduction of ground forces (especially armor), and disrurtion of Cuban. communications and - utility systems. This plan tc be operable in 6 hours in the strength desired by CINCLANT vill require prepositioning of 12 Air Force Squadrons in Floridz. . ; ‘= US intervention jn Cuba could trigger Bloc diver- sionary tactics in other parts of the world (most probably in known trouble spots such as Leos, South Vietnam, Korea, the. ’ “
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIR” NOFORR Offshore Islands, Berlin or pcssibly the Mid-East) and would likely engender propaganda canpaigns to include use of the UN forum for pressure against the US. However, an essential and most important element of the US plan against Cuba is speed. CINCLANT's OPLAN states, "Som 5 days subsequent to gaining ; control, conditions should peimit withdrawal of assault forces, | leaving small military units 1.0 conduct civil affairs, and counter-guerrilla mop-up oper: tions." Estimating from D-5 therefore, it should be expec’.ed that US forces committed to Cuba will be unavailable for «ther contingencies for only about 20 days, although the Marine }\ivision Wing Team from the West Coast will be in poor positio:. for Immediate redeployment for . some time longer. Recommendations ~ _ as SECDEF should be adv.sed during the meeting of 10 Apr ‘that execution of 100 or m-re Cuban prisoners should be ex- ploited (with pretexts and an expanded propaganda ‘campaign if necessary) by the US as justification for intervention. b.. SECDEF should be adv: sed that there is no question of US capability to intervene and that the deliberate course of implementing such actio: within 18 days after decision ‘is more prudent than. the fi.ster but riskier course of plece- meal force commitments. — c. Inasmuch as the JCS jiave not addressed the question of US military interventio: in Cuba except within the context ‘of Operation Mongoose it a pears desirable that military- action be recommended to tiie SECDEF and/or the President as the only course which prov des assurance that the Communist Cuban regime can be remove! in the Important time frame of the near future. ; , Opinion as to Recommendations : DOD/JCS Representative Oo . Caribbean Survey Group a (Concur) (Nonconcur) Director, Joint Staff. ; __(Concur) (Nonconcur ) Talking Paper prepared bys Colonel C. S. Seamans, USAF - Contingency Plans Branch, J-5 Ectension 59057 . ET SPECIAL HAND SEC WW 47074 Docld: 32276301 Page 1 30
3 April 1962 Decision on. ‘XS 1969/3268 (WORTHWOODS) (S: At their meeting; on 38 March the Joint Chiefs of steff approved the forwarding of a memorandum (CH-628 ~62) with attachment to the Sueretary of Defense. Se: J. BLOUIN Rear Admiral, USN Secretary Copy for: General Craig BICLASSIFIeD py: HS DECLASAIFICATION BRANCH 6 Ah Mle PL oe afen Bom i EXCLUDED FROM GDS NW 47674 Docld: 32276301 ‘Page 152
a “POP SECRET a . COPY NO, as JCS _1969/328° SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 3 April 1962. JOINT CHINFS OF STAFF DECISION ON JOS 1969/'323 “A Note bythe Secretaries . en . ORTHWC ODS (3) ; Woté by the Secretaries 1. At their meeting on 30 Merch 1962, the Joint Chiefs of. “Staff app: soved the forwarding cf a memorandum (CM-628-62) , with attachment, to the Secretary of Defense. 2. In that the Commandant hel expressed direct concern. of - the Marine Corps in this matter , the provisions of Title 105 US Code 141 (ce), applied and were followed. 3. This decision now. becomes a part of and shall be attached» as the top sheet of JCS 1969/323. F. 3. BLOUIN a | M. J. INGELIDO ‘Joint Secretariat ‘EXCLUDED, FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY | HW 47074 Doold: 32276301 Page 152
NR ATOT4 Doold: 32276301 Page 153 BROR EY TOP SECRET —- -  . . GOPY NO. _ 4 JCS 1969/32 | SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 29 March 1962 : co - ‘Page 2179 NOTE EY THI: SECRETARIES to the y a “JOINT CHIJFS OF STAFF | : on - . “ - NORTH 100DS {s) 7 A report <c* on the above subject is submitted for consid- "eration by the Joint Chiefs o:' Staff. F. Jd. BLOUIN M, J. INGELIDO. Joint Secretariat ~ * Not reproduced; on file in Joint. Secretariat — EXCLUDED, FROM. GDS ‘EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC - REGRADING: DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP. SECRET oe | Bi, an BEER JES RRA Bo baile ui gai Te te EL wr CR eR aT. EE
' THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF . WASHING (ON 25, D.C. 3 April 1962 Decision on_ “ICS 1969/327 _ (NORTHWOODS) (¢) ‘At their meetirg on 27 March 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted tke assumptions which had been agreed 4 to by the Special Group for Operation MONGOOSE. , <A oa FJ. BLOUIN Rear Admiral, USN ‘Secretary. Copy for: weowaumGeneral Craig 7 ‘DE EOL arin, Lf ay Bera 7 g AP Pee ei SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRES: NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS NW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 154
3 April 1962 ICS 1969/327, (NORTHWOODS) (s) At their meetirg « on Z Cad 3 March 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Steff nected the subject paper. qh J. BLOUIN . Rear Admiral, USN Secretary . Copy for: General Craig NW 47874 Doecld:32276301 Page 155 |
i TOP SECRET | sO COPY No. JCS_1969/327 © _ SPECIAL, DISTRIBUTION - 3 April 1962 JOINT CHI:FS OF STAFF _ DECISION ON ICs 1$69/327 . A Note by the Secretaries . cn 7 NORTHWCODS (S) Note by the Secretaries -1. At their meeting on 27 M rch 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted Ics 1969/327. 2. In that the Commandant hid expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this: matter, tle provisions of Title 10, US Code ‘141 (c), applied and were follc wed. 3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet. of ‘JCS 1969/37. F. J. BLOUIW M. J. -INGELIDO Joint Secretariat EXCLUDED FROM, GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY | RW 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 156
QOP-SECRET | . copy wo, 4 JCS _1969/327 a oo SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 29 March 1962 - os Page 2178 NOTE BY THY SECRETARIES ; te the . "JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF mm WORTHVOODS (8) - A. report* on the above rubject is submitted for consider- ~ ation by the Joint “hiefs of <taff. F. J. BLOUIN M. J. INGELIDO Joint Secretariat * Not reproduced; on file in .foint Secretariat EXCLUDED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP SECRET JCS 1969/327 © ' 2178 NW 47874° Docld:32276301 Page 157 : — ‘ ae oe wis deans « vet
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLID' GUIDELINES, )PERATION MONGOOSE : ‘The Special. Group (Augmented) agreed that planning and preparations would proceed on the basis of the following . _ assumptions: (extracted from Gen Lansdale's copy.of the "Guidelines", dated _' 14 March 1962) ©. . . "a. In undertaking to. ca ise the overthrow of the target government, the United States will make maximum use of indigenous resources, inter ial and external, but recognize | that final success will regiire decisive US military inter- vention. . "py, Such indigenous resoirces as are developed will be ‘used to prepare for and jus :ify this intervention, and thereafter to facilitdte ani support it”. ; | . | -BNCLUDED ERGa4 GDS “144/327 Be Oe a ww vvois secre Dheo SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING HOFORR
4 reese, ° eGHEY SPECI il HANDLI WOFORN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHH IGTON 25, 0.C, “43 March 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETA 2Y OF DEFENSE ‘Subject: Justificat Lon for US Hilitary Intervention ’ | dn Cuba (17S) me ; 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached ‘Memorandum for the: Chief cf Operations, Cuba Project, which. . responds to a:request of.tnat office for brie? but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a vreliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is.assumed that there will be similar submissiors from other agencies and that these inputs will be used a5 a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Indivicual projects can then be considered on a case-by-czse basis. ; 3. Further, it is assured that a single agency will be : given the primary responsibility for developing military i and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is { ; recommended that this responsibility for both overt and : covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of ' Staff. . . For the. Joint Chiefs of Staff: | . L. ‘Le, LEMMITZER _ Chairman going Chiefs of S i 1 Enclosure . Memo for Chief of Opera sions, Cuba Project EXCLUDED FROM GDS | EXCLUDED FROM ANTOWATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.16 DOES NOT APPLY NW 47074 Docld: 32276301 Page 159 ine,
TOP SECRET COPY NO. 4 JCS _1969/321 - ce SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 12 Mareh 1962 Page 2165 NOTE BY THE i ECRETARIES , to he - - JOINT CHIEF:: OF STAFP - . , oO}: "NORTHWOODS (S) A report* on the above sul-ject is submitted for consider- ation by the Joint Chiefs of stiff. F. J. BLOUIN | M. J. INGELIDO Joint Secretariat * Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat . FACLUDES FO ope - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE. 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP SECRET JCS 1969/321 B16 c _ NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 160 ao
TOP SECRET SPECIFL HANDLIR: NOFORR 9 March 1962 , . COPY OF ‘COPIES SPECTAL DISTRIBUTION "REPORT BY THE DEPAYTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STA#F REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CARIBBEAY SURVEY GROUP to. the _ JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. on CUE \_ PROJECT (TS) The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested that he be furni shed the. views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ~ on this matter by 23 Merch 35 262. EXCLUDED FROM GDS - wom wQP.,SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HAND JUSTIFICATION FOR US-M(LITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS) THE OROBLEM 1. As requested” by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts whic 1 they consider would provide justification for US militar intervention in Cuba. 7 FACTS BEARI 1G ON THE PROBLEM 2. It is recognized that iuny action which becomes pretext . for US military, intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would-leid to military action. = 3. Cognizance has been ta<en of’ a suggested course of actiwn proposea** by the US Javy relating to generated . instances in the Guantanamo rea. | 4, For additional facts s:e Enclosure B. . ’ DIS USSION _ 5. The suggested coursego . action appended to Enclosure A are based on the Premise tha : US military intervention will result from a period of heig :tened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in tie position of ‘Suffering justif- . “4able grievances. World opiiion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably a*fected by developing the inter- national image ‘of the Cuban sovernment as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpre lictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere. ; 6. While the foregoing pr:mise can be utilized at the _ present time it will continu: to hold good only as long as there. can be reasonable eertiinty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly lwolve the Soviet Union. There is * Memorandum for General Criig from Chief of Operations, . Cuba Project, subject: " .peration MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in ieneral Craig's office. ; ** Memorandum for the Chairmin, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations. subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions. in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig'; office. ; won val AP. SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
QP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIR> NOFORN to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have ‘the Soviets established Soviet bases . in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be-an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the. next few months . , | CO} CLUSION 9. The suggested courses cf action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, - these suggestions-should be forwarded as a preliminary submission -— suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective. of justification fcr US military intervention in Cuba. ’ RECOMMENDATIONS. 8. It is recommended that: | a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretar, of Defense for approval and _ transmittal to the Chief cf Operations, Cuba Froject. b.. This paper NOT be fc rwarded to. commanders of unified or specified commands. | , c. This paper NOT be fc rwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. | | ad. This paper NOT be fcrwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. voor woul. SEORET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN ge
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HARDLIN> NOFORN "ENCLOSURE. A_ RAPT. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SEC) ETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Justification for us Military Intervention "in Cuba (TS) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Stiff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request* of tht office for brief but precise . description of pretexts whic! would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. | 2. ‘The Joint Chiefs, of Stiff recommend that the proposed * memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. “Tt 4s assumed that there will be Similar submissions from othor agencies: and that these inputs willl be used as a basis-for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be- considered on a case-by-case '. basis. © - . 3. Further, it is assumed that a single ageney will be given’ the primary responsibl. ity for developing military and | para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility. for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Jo..nt Chiefs of Staff. ? ' * Memorandum for Gen Craig fFeom Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in Gen Craig's office 4 .  Enelosure A ‘woos saucl(P,.SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING  KOFORN
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HAMDLIK> NOFORK ; "APPENDIX |) ENCLOSURE - ri . | MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF 0? OPERATIONS, copa PROJECT Subject: Justificatio1 for US Military Intervention in Cuba: (TS) 1. Reference is made to m:morandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Cr lg, subject: - "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which re ested brief but precise description of pretexts whici the Joint. Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justicication for US military inter- “vention in Cuba. 2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded / a8 a preliminary submission 3uitable for planning purposes. It 1s assumed that there will be similar submissions from’ - other agencies and that thes; inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan.. ‘The individual projects can then Pe considered on a rage ~by-case basis. 3. This “plan, incorporati xg projects selected from the | attached suggestions, or fron other sources, should ‘be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provid: "adequate justification for US military intervention. Sach a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflaze the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The “plan would also properly integrate and time ohase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired regultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position ‘of suffering defens ible grievances frem a rash and irresponsible governnent of Cuba and to develop an inter- national image of a Cuban trreat to peace in the Western Hemisphere. . | ot . Appendix to 5 Enclosure A w oon wouclMP..SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING — ROFORN
OP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIR: -NOFORN 4, Time is an: important yactor in resolution of ‘the. Cuban problen. Therefore, the ‘pli.n should be so time-phased that projects would be operable \ithin the next few ‘months. 5. Inasmuch as the ultim.te objective is overt military intervention, it is recomme) ded that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert m litary operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Appendix to 6 . ' Enelosure A