104-10065-10174 MEMORANDUM: a | , | (\ SUBJECT: Political Action Operations 3 in Cuba - Tie PROENZA ~- ( Ca se ; h ot 1.- Introduction This memorandum sets forth information concerning the conduct of a series of interlocking non-violent political action operations against the Cuban government, its internal coalition and its alliance with the Soviet Union mounted in 1963. | 2. Objectives — | | | | | Pursuant to instructions from the 303 Committee of the Kennedy Administration the CIA established among its. objectives against Fidel Castro! s Cuba pawn fragmenting Ats governing coalition and of Siacorbating its relations with the USSR. This decision was taken prior to the October 1962 Missile Crisis. u As a result’ of the decision a number of non-violent operations were carried out. Those pertaining to the Teresa Proenza Proenza case are set out below. 3. “The Co evatrous “BQ. On 3 April 1963 a set of spurious documents falsely: ascribed to a disaffected CIA agent in Mexico were passed to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The documents made it apparent that the Cuban Vice Minister of Defense, a highly placed and violent Moscow-line Communist who had been in Moscow when the missile build-up was planned in early 1962, was actually a CIA A agent who had betrayed the build-up. Porn mma Per , SAL taron 5 mcr ammat Suit |
14-00000 . It was believed that such a revelation would throw a great strain on the relations of the Cuban Communist Party (then known as the PSP} with the other partners in that coalition. It- was also felt that the operation would redound against the USSR because the Vice Minister of Defense was a senior member of the Moscow-line. PSP. It was calculated that the USSR would “move to defend the Vice Minister, who was probably their chief agent in.the Cuban. government, and that a ‘collision between. the Soviets and Cubans could result. The Cubans accepted 1 the Spurious “papers and paid for. them per’ our ‘demand. ¢.b-Through the summer of 1963 several. further deliveries Of spurious documents were made to the Cubans and several thousand dollars were received in payment, But results of the operation from inside Cuba were not yet observed. Therefore on 13. November 1963 when a delivery of documents was again being made several were included revealing the presence of another "CIA. agent" in the Cuban governnent; this” time inside the Cuban - Embassy in Mexico. “This target. was ‘Teresa Proenza Proenza, . long- time Cuban Communist and contact of. the Soviet intelli ence ane WI oe. es. Close coctech ay hy LAr aves chr t de teu fe ~ in. Mexico, who was acting as Cuban Cultural Attache. On 10 December 1963 Miss. Proenza was informed of her sudden transfer back to — Cuba; she actually departed on 23. January 1964, . It was apparent : that her recall was connected with the. spurious documents and’ her known long-time friendship with the Vice Minister of Defense. &.c, The first reaction to the. operation inside Cuba occurred in the week of 14 sere At that time.a junior member of re ras ot 7 a ter i rer 8 } FH oo
14-00000 the Communist Party (PSP) was tried and convicted of betraying non-Communist leaders of the.resistance to the former government of Cuba which had been overthrown by Fidel Castro. As the trial wore on it became apparent that since the yung Communist had been the protege of the Vice Minister of Defense the trial was really a trial. of the latter; another Tukachevskiy case. ao. During 1964 deliveries of documents to the Cubans were 1964 continued and ‘payments received. On 18 November“ the Vice. Minister . of Defense was arrested on charges of. treason and removed from his post. Sof was his wife ‘who also held cabinet rank. They _were jailed as was Teresa Proenza. #.€» After terms in prison all three defendants were released to house arrest: Proenza was later permitted to work as a librarian in Havana. The Vice Minister died peacefully in his. ‘bed several years later. His widow was allowed to leave Cuba _ to reside in Spain.. This phase of. the CIA operation wound down in March 1966 when the Cubans ceased taking an interest in a4 concluding Remarks | The foregoing is but the barest outline of a highly complex operational system that made use of a wide variety of ‘techniques and assets which. have not been revealed to the public, The sand tine story would make the juiciest. of headlines if it Became publicly known, especially in the present moralistic environment. The fact that several persons: were deprived of their freedom as a result of the operation should be noted. Furthermore, this eld bd
14-00000 ae operation laid the basis on which other operations of a similar nature were successfully mounted against Cuban and other hostile targets. In short, this file is a Pandora's box the opening of which would not only expose the cryptonyms of other operations of this type but would attract unfavorable publicity for the Agency in certain quarters and would expose Hitherto secret techniques and.assets. This would make theic employment in the future very difficult. The fact that this series of operations | did not begin. to register on the Cubans until after the- death : of President Kennedy should remove any suspicion that it in’ any way goaded Castro. into. assassinating our president.