404-10213-10079 cee ty eee * fe a i wall NO RY aac ere MATERIAL REVIENED BY HSCA STAFFERS Regie fv Wie Yay Folder Subject: HSCA Review at Headquarters - Comments on Book : V, SSC Fial Repa@at The Investigation of the Assassination of _ _— President Kenne CE SF OT TRAPS Eft eliisence Agencies o 77-0090 DATE NOTES TRANSMITTED DATE STAFFERS (Signature) Filled in by OLC Nef|_ <adwtp | pel99\  —<Cagwetf - praly tholre ee Be YP ASat RTA : ‘ a TOiee 088 o ee
14-00000 ‘ ‘ & i ‘ow ep ARE BAS i , Sennen ireennare aE ES LTT TES ee eit Pa con'Polkasnheat | ! I t AEE ee AEraRe AT . } | 2 eae, Lo & Bed Bebe eee = vioerree Yo A } I *MATERIAL REVIEWED BY: Mr. G, Robert Blakey on 8 December 1977 {reviewed unsanitized version) . Mr. G. Robert Blakey ard Mr, John-Ws-Hornbeck | : reviewed unsanitized version on Saturday, : . 10 December 1977. : MATERIAL FURNISHED BY: Inspector General « sanitized and unsantitee d ® copies i i H iy SUBJECT: Comments on Book V i . | | | FILED: HSCA 77-0090/1: Review at Headquarters: Comments on Book V *Members of House Select Committee on Assassinations MATERIAL REVIEWED BY: Mr. G. Robert Blakey on 13 and 14 December 1977 Mr. Gary Cornwall on 14 December 1977 Mr. Gary Cornwall on 15 December 1977 seagrass Mena Uw : f ? i : i a Pa 4 1 aro see Mam ys tg aby Ltt * dha do se ae : 2: ser 2 PPO sas tet 5! FER EE BS vee : MERRIE day ass dats ce y Wa ERTS : Poca! ge CEE ear ae ada ei aS Cua is ats . . . 2 Bare aie gta Pe * wae on Ree aad + eet
were ® APP OUER EG je REE aed oi axe Seve oe, Table of Contents i 4 a Suemary of Findings ; Tab A. Organization for and Conduct of the Review : Tab 6. CIA Performance on the Inquiries ' Tab C. CIA Operations Against Cuba " a Tab D. AMLASH Operation | Tab E. Materials Forwarded to Warren Cormission and FBI Tab F. Mexico City Coverage of Oswald Visit , | Tab G. Selected Newspaper Stories with Comments \ i ! | oil igs rat oe esas xs Ea aS a isa i
B4-c0000 cae pe carne ae renga Vuit fed ome oa UE See i penn a SUBJECT: Corments on Book V of the Final Report of the U.S. Senate . Select Cormittee to Study Governmental Operations with i Respect to Intelligence Activities 1 1. Book ¥ of the SSC Final Report, titled The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, presents a number of issues that address thenselves to the conscience of the Agency. The criticisms of CIA are based on a series of presentations of how various investigative leads were handled, and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that the $SC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry. 2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the onerations of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exercised a negative influence crtret mean we eens on the quality of their support for the Warren Comission investigation. The following statements appear in the Report: ? "It (the SSC Report) places particular ' 4 4 emphasis on the effect their Cuban opera- tions seemed to have on the investigation." ie ie ee Page 2. "They (senior CIA officials) should have j realized that CIA operations against Cuba, i particularly operations involving the cnewingro swe merece none ee assassination of Castro, needed to be con- i sidered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts.” Page 7. AANA IINPEA i : whet Dl ibe Sad leet ae J | #,$33 2 gee A Ma ta AUR oe Fe tej igspeets Tae ee rar atten oa 8 a Liha alta amet oh a eRe TT Te 1 eee AS TS aS
4-00000 wraps tenes eset eee CONFIDENTIAL ben ee es mere ee The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSC ‘ Report, is highlighted as follows: “Certainly, concern with public reputation, “4 problems of coordination between agencies, ‘possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment, i and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge : anys anes of sensitive operations may have contributed to aa these shortcomings. But the possibility exists that senior officials in both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information." Page 7. A central feature of the rationale is the concept that 1f Castro | had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and eanenangcee-nge ey 6 we eR accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro programs to see what it might reveal. eon re ne sateprpeeaiese sasha ot The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the api adtis Oa eats TR a fe Pe. SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was con- ducting its investigation. There was a general concern in 1964 that 3 rc; e 4 saemecemcotenet on eremtitintonen nee the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President ft at ‘4 2 : 7 CONFIDENTIAL rot an senna Cente ARI Sheed oe Sb OAT Lh ote AER rit RNA soe ore Bem Te nee nti nba saie Mabe Bem RTI art Ate tone, Cette NEDO, te i RAD oo qeoeTereemaRNSRNPINE
14-00000 er es CONFIDENT Kennedy. This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the Soviet and Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban ; Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to 4 Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs. The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile i Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how {it might have been perceived by a foreign power as a provocation. To note these events serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at the time. The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention. This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of provocation of Castro represents. the result of an evolution in percep- tions. In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the various operational activities against Cuba and Castro. Organization for the Review As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved Ae ome epee cere nenp enn de ne matia NRE WE mabe we om - at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963 Se BREE BER Se a 65 ea Te ELE PRL RRA MN ee Tee”, and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are ee GEERT TERI eo no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investi- gations. Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for 3 te ely yes stuns iat ; ~ * + fF Oli ide brags Sul salsa VGRG nee ORNS Ch agg te MEN TT RON genet EEE EL OSE me om fem lio MAL em Oy as Ao vee Peet Ss Somat nal
14-00000 RHEE OTF apical bet ho gw s-e “fy the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following 3 it. It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The : organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper. It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations, é: it necessitated careful analysis of the content and nature of the oper- : ations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to plotting against Castro. ae o The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are contained in this covering report and im the separate annexes to it, Tabs 8 through &. Lay eepat ach sige in PRES We seen meds! CIA has now conducted such a review -- looking at “the other end" of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have ae ata t started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination, although it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity say Py & bd an eee Se | ate Sdn be mee oy s 1 FM GONE a I te eo Re em int ote CRUE TT OR Rae, se?
'14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL (whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make ; the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC’s presentation seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.) OME Ker ue We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance 12 CSE * or in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is ; compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones. : Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Commission considered the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, but could not find evi- dence of it. Were it known at the time of the Warren Commission, it would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in the minds of Americans knowledceable on the subject. To hold dif- cn Angee NSEREEROT | SERLIND em cone ements ferently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often “prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of government employees could engage in such a well~disciplined con- spiracy to suppress evidence. 9 5 | CONFIDENTIAL ' hf? | ed Nae | er UBOUND AR 4.0.91. “Vn ser chet bates ame me RoaT Late ness aes 5 { : ~ 4 sg sae cee et ic TIER Es CE Rr gear eee aes man Bic eth tliat aaa GARR. TG ne mw Ra ae Ente :
14-00000 PP ats ta aS fo os eke th oe i k a : pence st .a oe € Viet tui: Ph Operations Against Castro The AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop a capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could oust the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban extles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum, with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. Ata later date, in 1965, it was believed to be corpromised and CIA withdrew from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity from its inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having been foreign agents. While the suspicions cannot be verified, the reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to assassination in retaliation. This is discussed at Tab C. Operation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1, who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime. The SSC Final Report undertakes to demonstrate that the operation planned Castro's assassination during the period preceding the murder of eee rs ci yee tea! Uti ted me ist fa See memeemenu remem! Smee
14-00000 AE PRES eee President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation \ shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA not agreed to give any support to AMLASH/1, but had rejected his proposals to assassinate Castro. When evidence supporting this view was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1 was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot. Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the basis for the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail at Tab D of this paper. The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as @ source for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There are new considerations that developed in the course of the present review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate, but they do not provide a basis.for taking issue with the judgment of the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C. 20808 gees © » 7 Gaerne band av iahS 3 me tee owe ot nie epee Ee et
14-00000 ees me emerge = Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment The SSC Final Report picked out a nuaber of selected subjects for treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the in- vestigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with the allegations in Mexico City by a man designated as "D". These al- legations were demonstrated conclusively by the Warren Comission to. rt ere have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City, awaiting arrival of a private aircraft with a mysterious +7" ~~ - ; 7 See file on Cilberto was the Cubana flicht on the ground for four h Policarpo LOPEZ alleged five hour delay in departure) it depar : - . CS alleged arrival of the private aircraft. After CIA reported ona Ye ie MS a Me 28 thas’ or, RRL EOE AN MA i t 3 Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investi- gated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially : being placed in doubt by cther evidence in the record. In another instance considerable emphasis was given by the SSC Final Report to a cable“from the Mexico City Station, replying to a 23 November 1953*in- quiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports on contacts with certain parent nee  naene new ete - named Soviets. The true name of AMLASH/I was given in the Mexico City reply, but not as having had contact with the Soviets -- which was the Purpose of the inquiry -- but as the subject of a meeting in December “DIR 84885, 23.11.63 MEXE 7045 (IN 67281) CONFIDENTIAL ~ 24 wovenser is6s. [| — \ Pee ve ey Rey Redan eee ny Sic DM Oa re greet: cette te aeRO ae : . a’ ve we Neale a aE REE RM Cae TS tee Lite tin dB ent”
14-00000 scene CONFIDENTIAL Oy 1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a Soviet, concern- ing a press conference to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/1] in February . and March 1961. AMLASH/1's name could have been omitted from the cable . altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the - meeting in December 1960 was prior to President Kennedy‘s inauguration, which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject Ba af s matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to AMLASH/1's name did not lead te detailed research about him. This is © dehyde, > discussed further at Tab D. Conclusions i meee dk Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two general conclusions. First, the SSC Final Report contains numerous factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera- tion (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents. Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti- Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for that concept Book ¥ of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to characterize it more generously. In a very real sense, the $SC Final Report has compounded the eens een enne ee cee ee problem of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to CONFIDES TIAL 4 Se EB ne aT SS Me, oe Voegeli e EOaee m ORE RENAE Bet etme RS At se , +=<TeeEE ener eer RE BPP PR ART AE) «1 OU Pe) eye RE AR CORAL bE ve
14-00000 CORE AL | future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry. while one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served seems fat abe ee ee em em ee to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had ‘ fo relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place ofa record of conscious review. The present research effort has t eynete wameer tee undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings - . , ! f t | | are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA b cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of President Kennedy. a 10 a ee RR Ree ee Beds ay kL SATS Sele apa Lath etetange Ema Re cnr OR MeL ge ae aay BF ou te a mttaer | ae ae 4 a $
“ ORGANIZATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF REVIEW Seager ~~ ern k n remem wee cee ere ane oe ene mene eat aguemametemntn wee dndmme Beno ap pen ge re Wer aie Las econ { } i {
14-00000 Mae boob Sew Nr BAe sore Pe 6 CONFIDENTIAL Organization for and Conduct_o* the Review 1. Hany years have passed since the inquiry by the Warren Com- mission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Commission, are no longer in place in the same work. Some of the employees have retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died. 2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the ssc Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A study group was established to consider the size of the problem and to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a repre- sentative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also ° consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in “early August 1976. Points emphasized for the review, because of the thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy » and (2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of CONFIDENTIAL
ot Bale arta ss ee orb, areata TT EEO CRRCLLLE ADSL SEES CE SE TRE EEE TIGNES SN EB CRB AR NUR SONTAG OR ttt be tar Preity tee BID Sica LENT CUag ERR chests ARCA Lt, ATA RAL OTE IR ALE Wt oe Toteat cent AE MS RE APA ed wo 2 oe President Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached. 3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question were in LA Division and CI Staff, of the Directorate of Operations, with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security and the Office of the Inspector General. The organization for the review of those files is described below. 4. LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known to be extensive. Under the Terms of Reference those files for the period ] January 1961 to 1 January 1965 were selected for review, covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy and the following year. A research group was formed composed of . five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor. An additional four researchers participated in different phases of the research, which continued to mid-May 1977. 5. Reference to material for this research was obtained from the LA Division registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information ‘Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900 operational folders, plus numerous related 201-files. It was later determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional operational and subject files which brought the total to well over two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it, ‘ “eae er reheated ate ign Soon Ee al a TION Rta BEE eee tag FAME HB AP LAE Ohad A, sate C6 ORE an Rabie a TOP OE Rae Pn RITHM SH TT Tg metetate errectre Se tawrmene Rn Pret “erenmnenerum oh ea ae eee Or ee nortan re ater ep aneNnenetannt 1 rnoraimecrmine ye eR EET ee mato + went lg Cosco MHeMITER Retro manin © eee t's 09 Cp tRErEERE AONRENNC net! —ccomertrteneningtmulmenere De
yy ate | een are Mee! Low .ecme shite tres fee oot RIPE Gian Ba ayia des ow es 2 PURE OT AA ES bas — CONFIDENTIAL wo 3 == - both operational and subject, had been retired to Archives at | Pirginia. The remainder is held at Headquarters in the files or archival material of Information Processing Group. This material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein). 6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and organization of the material: a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed (1) Operational 1,729 (601 with findings and 1,128 with no findings (2) Subject Files _ 547 (186 with findings and 361 with no findings) (3) Cuba Policy Files 101 (4) Chief, WH Division Chrono Files {Task Force W Chronos) 37 (5) Official 201 Dossiers __)00-plus Total 2,014 b. Criteria Used in the Research As a guide the research group followed the Terms of Reference referred to above. In addition to the Terms of Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest | 4 “Bat gh MR a en cnt EE he RETR PpRR AND E alban Do vet tae AP gent ite monn Oe ces eaneleg TY ila medner tt mma bih MONEE mig dnt wine ME AOE LEAR sanaptmmenerne we TAR ren ve core sleepin oe eee as eo aa renee meres ee ertaenantse {7 tn Feemeremmonrmennentiabenepineetae Sas popttdhnatentmerprnntOneiaronnerar eee
Bove Be pede gate i A ae ee MEA pits ih RA Ia ATOR Rite LBA ORY. oo Ct ee Re Eva Ne nt nk ASS eS ny! eiUh diecRER Fectns ard Onc CER AMER GA ROR ices ARR _— Ha a brought to its attention by the IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis, and to additional questions raised in the course of the study. A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-file was reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975, based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassi- nation attempts against Castro. c. Findings and Organization of the Findings Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the activity, and a copy of those document(s) or findings which contained information believed to be pertinent to the review. Also included were job numbers, official file numbers, inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of _volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or other government agencies knowledge of information, to the extent recorded in Agency files. Separate finished memoranda were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document number(s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing mg rare, ee eel TR NR ARSE ate ble, So ta P RGAE bach mi Sies toro wpe dan hg Fe EER RAT oe ae Rice A AER 0088 Hy Nas TE A eam me OS Ree Stee wanamemae 8 me om boo aa es Doo eee ee enim ore natant ans meee . ee eee an
a a aye 33 Peis SiR thie: CARTEL TCT SSR Sona Be Pee a “gyal 2 nee is nan rl abet ne og Lot gate temeents tel se yn een ee HS pt te tay ae TEER ag . mane Faas te a ote enn ; 4 FANS eS PGR MS te: cuts be Gti phe eek a Pe ema Atay rar ay TE mame eka Oso Sp 86 COTO, Ur COR sewers! “38 aga? ~~ 5 a= the gist of the document(s) for purpose of easy and quick reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document(s) attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official LA Division research group files under the official classi- fication number 019-664-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also included in the records are two folders {Volumes IX and X) containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings. These records are restricted in LA Division. 7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more complex than originally estimated. - Research continued to.lead to new files, and the requirements.for meticulous analysis and correlation of material further extended’ the time required to complete the under- taking. By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the death of President Kennedy. 8. Ci Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of Reference referred toe above, and also to generate papers on points not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject. 9. Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the LAr ee eeppeminsspeeen + Te see geet manent ecaemimeae 3
P-00000 CONFIDENTIAL a) «= 6 -- Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Com- mission. The so-called "Oswald File* now fills 57 volumes comprising some 142 file folders and portfolios. In addition, the Staff has accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy ; of those documents released under provisions of the FOIA to the public in March 1976 (first serfes) and those documents (second series) ' released in September 1976 and March 1977." 10. By necessity the documents in the file are held in chrono- logical order; however, the file has become much more than just a chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the Agency's central repository for information and documentation that it holds on: a. The life of Harvey Oswald; ee meres cee b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission, 1963--1964; c. The testimony by various Agency officers before the several commissions and comaittees set up to review be pointed out that this portion of this file is not complete); and d. The point of record for Agency action taken in , response to requests submitted to the Agency under pro- . i visions of the Freedom of Information Act. ; 1 CONFIDENTIAL cmemaaen! cele cag, niga geese anita finan en AAAS DIET ene AeA ara i { j i | the validity of previous investigations. (NB: It should Yapegagdtina Ane P Oe alia sik anna a te em OS
14-00000,° 5 CONFIDENTIAL -~ 7 -- 11. In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in the Oswald files, it soon became obvious that, in order to be in a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of = Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book V of the SSC . . Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to place these copies in folders set up according to general and specific subjects. In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there was "no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investi- gation or gather information,® the following files were set up: a. Correspondence from the Warren Commission; Na enmineta nities mie me nee b. Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren Coamissfon; c. Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community, particularly the FBI; d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting assistance and information; e. Chronological summary of information on and actions taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and swe ae f. Chronological summary of information on and actions ; pos taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the reece pO ERED ew SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do - in relation to the Warren Commission inquiry. CONFIDENTIAL SSO RS oP tat ena FOO ee et Sete ee Ae ae ets
14-00000 h ia NUS, ORM RARE ease! ERNE SR Ae IST RMSE a Oe Ne ules PR lle at PORN edt, “Sade ot? aaf CONFIDENTIAL w= § -- 12. The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for infor- mation, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b), its response to require- ments and requests Jevied upon it by the Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission. Certain parts of the record were summarized to record what actually happened in those instances in which it differs from representations in the SSC Report. 13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one officer to identify material in its records believed to have some possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. During the course of this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as containing material of some relevance. This matenial amounted to the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time of the “Garrison Investigation.” 14. Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against Castro, as well as related materials accumulated subsequently. It also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973 CONFIDENTIAL te weemeer teens Sete mt amen ermapae es we et om tate ws
14-00000 cicaitesentry me SPER ets ate Sek ON tet oot REY ‘ é ee ue e Fa B : 3 8 : Mas iad » request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector General emplcyed on contract a retired employee who had served as a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards. The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in Tabs B and F. 18. The file holdings i the Office of the Inpsector General are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed in Annexes D and C, respectively. 16. There were a limited number of interviews to clarify specific points. keke kk ee Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the respective components participating in this effort. Selected back- up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the Inspector General. acanp dtetneens ow cee enemies tee mete “9 9+ thee genaurrnensryetaitrertin treet. ‘ . sonnet rane Raa anal pratt ce T “ARE ARERR BRET en mp renee eT sentence : + scp ser peennacipererisenegtsn feet Ope
§4-90000 ‘~ REBEL AT Fae yt en a es . | | CONFIDENTIAL a request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to the project, responsible for overall] coordination of the research effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector General empleyed on contract a retired employee who had served as - a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards. The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in Tabs B and F. 18. The file holdings i: the Office of the Inpsector General are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed in Annexes D and C, respectively. 16. There were a limited number of interviews to clarify specific points. e#e#eeve tk & & Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the respective components participating in this effort. Selected back- up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the Inspector General. cr senty meet oeaerane area ae 2 a hee
, ty t a =, m TERMS OF REFERENCE pada aint Sets ee oe FOR REVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED IN PO oer BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT mehdery ie Po Mayle, wt 1. The Schweiker Subcommittee nas two basic theses=- : . . (1) the general idea that the intelligenée community--primarily : CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative and may have led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection program to ascertain all possible information on the subject. Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review. ne concrete misery eam te 2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general back- ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these general activities were provocative. More specific, however, is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity that the report suggests could have provoked Castro inte retaliatory action against President Kennedy. The failure of CLA te report _ this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information. . Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in . : support of the thesis. \ PATO AEB > PON, Ee ALO Y GPRE ES AE PIO SS AILS” i 2 notes | mainte PR Daatian. 9 Arter .- onme cep ont pw BES & “wean M78" T's WEY. Steam. -~« eat aa Pty cel eek SE teed: BOER TAR RR
k 4-00000 a ad [one + Ene gent ooo | _—— a) 3, The issue of operational activity that could have provoked a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot . be restricted to the AMLASH operation, In itself it may be one of the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro- vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against . President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un- i qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect. wet a. The following questions are intended to serve as i a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission. Dir. (1) What collection requirements were issued to the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination? e whe . (2) What follow-up of these requirements was there during 1964? (3) What form did the follow-up take? (4) Identify and describe the records with regard to this activity. MRE Er em Hate ne (5) What reporting was there from the field in ; response to Headquarters! requirements? ° H ° @ (6) What dissemination and review was this reporting given? (7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to the CI Staff? Renate RR AUR SORT tT. TAN at Cacao SR eS SRE AY aa (8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission? (9) What review of Headquarters’ material was ordered through 1964? : ements e Se 6 Le eee eg - eee genteel «Late na at SELAP YES Fe ds Sea Se terete Paden Lear a aA é pice he ee as
es . : ° ™ ero Grats [ew ~ bot want fre. rome on (10) What werethe parameters of these instructions? (1l} What responses were there and where are they? i (12) What evidence is there that the "provocation"! theory was considered during the Warren Commission i enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission? ‘ (13) What action was taken with reference to this : concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs? (14) What records are there on this and where are they? 1 Fe 2% BARBARO MA A BO ye ey (15) Were there any efforts made to develop an Oswald/Cuban connection? (16) What form did they take? ' (17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this subject? (18) What action developed from these exchanges? | (19) What records are there on these exchanges and where are they? (20) To what extent were elements of the Agency ether than the CI Staff and LA Division involved im in- vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission tenure? (21) What is the total CLA information on the two ; flights from Mexico City to Havana? (22) What was done at the time to develop further i information on this matter? . | (23) Can further information be acquired on this . matter now? ; | 4 ' nnn a eteemieteeniemeiatietetetieniaeeeat nes ‘e . . - 7 ~ me ie earn eee Smeptern TES oy woe wr ro ct mee Nerd _3- QTaT I” | | fer news sete § Site ad tees 2 ott fe gy AUER ENS eaesateonmamm eevee ms sve emer way . ce € wie « soul eesnsohe: “yaaa sions SENSU Sie ats fae
(24) What is the total CIA information on 'D''? (25) Is farther information on "D" needed in view of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it? (26) What information does CIA have on Oswald FPCC relations? VP bee tt (27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans training activity and was anything provided on this te the Warren Commission? Bha (28) What is the total CLA information on "A''? aera rah (29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City? e (30) What is the CIA information on the 4 December 1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba? (31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban assassination policies and programs up to November 22, : 1963? (32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's 1 f 7 September 1963 statemeats re retribution? i (33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA ; employees contain anything on the above questions? j If so, what? H j b. On the subject of possible provocation for the assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine any additional relevant information on this plot. (1) What is the total information on the plots involving the criminal syndicates? (2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate ; operation? , C ¢ i ry 4 SEENET ae.e Ss Fc RR ar ndeastheaaerearact OA MOD serneon, rh pt oe erage mena ale uicenatrns aura me ASS ar
Fae FER BE RN RN eT ee Stat ade cee aRAE RS ca SOREN TBE OGRE ad An? ae a SENN aN INNES OT LPO Reese at Aube: Te sarge * eC Iter) nee ad Sanry ( Seuncl | (3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office of Security officer may have knowledge that was not surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or Agency personnel, Additionally, a former LA Division career agent may have some insights that could throw light on one of the operations), (4) There are a couple of cases based on agent traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of Pigs period to shoot Castro, What is the total CLA information on these? ° (5) What is the significance on the subj ect of provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro? (6) While the AMLASH operation is subject te fairly detailed reconstruction from a very complete recerd, there are points that should be addressed particclarly, because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report, For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after suck a long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings? (7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1 when making plans for the 22 November meeting? * (8) What was the security of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy? : (9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the AMLASH/} operation was an assassination plot? | |
cae gee Wain. ¥ 5 d 4 FS c. What other action might CLA have taken in coanection with the investigation? An effort should be made to list these, including consultation with surviving officials to determine not only what they considered the requirement at the time, but what was omitted and why. 4. In conclusion, these Terms of Reference"! undertake to address the entire question of possible provocation of U, S, policy and CIA programs in the period Preceding the assassination of President Kennedy. An asoect of this ig the SSC Subcommittee's apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which, therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission. Just as importantly, the final paper sRould reflect findings in the area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This will include consideration of specific new and uenansw ered questions raised in the Schweiker repors —_— S. D. Breckinridge \ O/Inspector General Robert Wall CI Staff Ye fer. William Sturbitts 2 a LA Division OsaS t Raymond Reardon ‘alSecw) ity NT ee eee ae ot EN A Re AO a ge en or A mee egtieen 2 Sree mee | mets ah se See ee atty 5 ho TOPO ay
14-00000 i “ ; os CIA PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES i Aw) - ie eee
14-00000 SE SPRATT EU PAT HE) SRE ea PRR EAM 8 1S TN AN RON Ne RENE NRE ED Lak rn 5 Ot <A Wife “ttvemasonm 2 tee Peat pneu t- CONFIDENTIAL CIA's Performance on the Inquiries Book V of the SSC Final Report challenaes the performance of the intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, empha- sizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts were not. It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, every theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con- clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there js evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the intelligence agencies did -- in the present instance, what was the performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying a patter of neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record. The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in support of its case: a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as “D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was {nm New Orleans instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to have occurred. This subject is treated in a confusing and in- conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report. CONFIDENTIAL Te RBar om ong te gee FEMI IES SOR OTe tee og ann > sey eaten SOP oo NAB oe + ie PAL.
14-00000 ‘ CO ISENTIAU . oy b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the AMLASH operation. The operation is described inaccurately. The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D g of this report. See separate folder: - c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico "Unidentified Air Pas £ City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60- i Rew" 63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report, “7 a is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November be eb at oer flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story oa removes the basis for the inferences of the SS€ version. The Ferro second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him thoroughly, as fis apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC Final Report. ; t * he ef <9» ak Ra Be a ee ty Spee es These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional ' é ee ere ee “ ' ¢riticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions. . To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth and to report the findings, whatever they are. Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both CPOE RLS i dtely tly on the part of CIA and the Warren Commission--consideration was given | to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the te oR, : t i. ane tomers > copesianelirsioes mm 2 cet ge ee TOS RRR ree ea tm ioe Se nn aianrmensereer aaa “— tie Shis a a a Ae eRER Seat eg
14-0080 FA Rees \ ener ee see en wentas Bathing AAR? pret BS ne ‘ae questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those questions that have developed since then. What would be the areas of inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject of investigation. Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent to his return to private life from the Marine Corps in September 1959. These overseas adventures were appropriate for CIA attention. The first of these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union in October 1959 from which he returned in dune 1962. The second of these trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from which he returned in early October 1963. In addition to these two areas of obvious specific inquiry for CIA, there is the problem of general foreign intelligence collection that might in some way produce information on the subject. The SSC Final Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA as part of a general U.5. program against the Castro regime. These four general areas of inquiry are covered below. 1. Travel to and from the USSR 1959-1962 On 26 November 1963 a cable“ was sent to Paris, Rome, Madrid, | fre Hague, London, and Ottawa giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald. It noted his discharge from the Marine Corps in September 1959 and his travel to the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as to his employment and marriage while in the USSR. The cable requested: "any scrap information which bears on President's assassination...." eee { 3 a | - SIR 85133, 26.11.63 Saeennarepaing dee ane ety Ry arc cae cae a cat Sealine + _aperateptnernqetiggncritectmeetifeige * athena aim neeemeyrmetetntemnt fe = gee ae eate Nimrm perenne = Sp Ranta AE ARS RETO
b v {_] OTTA LOND OTTA i MADR z RRUS ROME PARI PARI PARI 2299 ROME 1235 1275 3469 6097 1277 9789 8739 1258 1770 1833 1845 J (IN (IN (IN (IN (IN (IN (IN (IN (IN (IN (IN (IN 68739), wR 077, 2 Necember 1963 BONN $579 (IN 73338), 4 December HAC 61170 (IN 73378), 4 Decenber NUNT 6316 (IN 75065), 6 Decenber STUT 6545 (IN 76758), 9 Pecenber EGNT 9400, 9 December 1963 1963 1963 1963 1563 27 Novenber 68802), 27 November 69005), 27 Novenber 69011), 27 Novenber 69100), 27 November 69233), 27 November 69296), 27 Novenber 69328), 28 November 69852), 29 November 70111), 29 November 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963 74234), S December 1963 77148), 10 December 1963 (IN 77397), 10 December 1963 Seach Sgfracpenneneir eee no am ne cenmerteremna mn sess 6° eset Rao — RON TIRE Kye AED Mt 2 are AEE fe creme Cerne eee onntRienntin — SERRRDR EHIME OS mtr any Rage trom t i t i } t } > 1 ' { ' i t ; t tmstyceboetar fftretiee rat + “ene le neroeeresnpmnns cebasmateptnae Hm eee gna entre scetrare eat AB rt
. 1p SR An Be Ra NSE ath Bh aR Sat ce a SORT RD : : . , On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with and Leadon providing additional details on the travel of Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British Journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American cangster named ‘'Ruby'." (See pages 24-25, Tab C.) Also on 27 November Cttawa reported the "delight" of the Cuban Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although the staff was instructed to “cease looking happy in public," in conformance with instructions from Cuba to “govern their actions by official attitude of Govt to which they accredited." [lon the same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the assassination on extreme right-wing elements. ‘ Otherwise, the initial responses produced no other information. On 29 November The Haque and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague?” various reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the United States in June 1962. The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without eS e ie : DIR 85973, 29 aovenber 1963 Peseta # rs on 5 wore oe ae Leto © LOND 6097 (TN 69109) 27 November 1963 { w OTTA 27 November 1963 ~ eR xe ee efprieateansan ont nee SK OI et CRA PAE ee 8 HOT oS Cat A PPO B A IR ttt AN, Daa ht ¢ at + fee as coe ere | 1277 (1 69233) OVember 2963° “i J ertnegearn
3 RA detailed results although there were some technical operations that produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible significance. No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's ; assassination of President Kennedy. Book V of the SSC Final Report, in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will not be detailed here. II. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963 The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F). The concern felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit, and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at SORA eA Ae EAA AIN ILE EEE IEE DAES EOD SOL itary teen An eennenteteine Benen wane the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City*on -28 November 1963: "We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have | been involved or even that other powers may have played a role. Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban instal lations | and your liaison with Mexicans." | le be. ‘ DIR 85655, ad November 1963 |: Hy plein men naa ME Sto Eat ES Eee hPa sat ba Ba Tan I Nah ole hye ROR ORE AE ate Sad AeNintnt Mottin WYRE DNUES NATE BSCE 0 PT altel LTD EATGG * \ NERS A Ne ayn NAM OR 2 TTA LAE PERO otromnt tn 8 aR eSATA PY DARD B FO ‘ «ere reremremimenmeers ea ferent repaliamn : Semele % ry Bene enn OA oA LEGER RRCEONED “AURA PERLITE iron reerni tn ee
aay unt woul? aT . rate Qty ‘ ™ gtatt Sate hs APP oteeye SU Lt FR ta ah at OB SORT ee ONS ee 7 LFS RASA ae 9. + Shramtes retin sean oberon cermin AS URN SSS Sia Se fe ~~ _eggpncnenmeinanset The allegations made by “D," about having seen Oswald taking money from Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive attention from CIA and the F8I, working together closely on the matter, and with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively to have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations was demonstrated by polygraph to have been lying. After the allegations by "D" had been demonstrated to be false, Heatiquarters made the following 2e de: tute. statement to the Mexico City Station on December 1963: a "Pls continue to follow al] leads and tips. “pip 86064, 3 The question of whether Oswald acted solely 0.21.63 | on his own has a not been finally resolved." Again, on 1 vecenber 1963" ‘the Mexico City Station was cabled as follows: DIP 88650, 12 December ss a¥ “ "Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction to investigation of assassination, evidence ' of their complicity, signs they putting out proPaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel in India had letters sent to [U.S. Government] leaders demanding full inyestigation of case." On 17 December 1963 Headquarters‘ ‘forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico City Station stated as follows: «. Mexico City has been the only major ; overseas reporter in the case. ‘ihile this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald’s 6 i ER are 3 4, i oo neem Nn ee AER ete TEE ie pila Tee , EBOY-12193, 17.12.63 | ea ental, oi tiaas 5 OR Aaa, areal ASS RSRSIES A Nm Rac re wake 9A nnn AGRE eet Pa AAS A eee ma a meentiaeestal pein Ear ta eaeeeTA  ewe te prota tte 6 00 Can Per Med ek oa Se ee ee esanperrene sss Nepne remerry permet oem creer seem enmanperabaeemei
ve gated Anudetivseetmrteeetintnintenen osee mE tavern ie teow ete On faard 1“ “On Aye oe LT life, we have not overlooked the really out- - standing performance of Mexico City's major assets and the speed, precision, and perception with which the data was forwarded. Here it was relayed within minutes to the White House, [Department of State] and [the FBI]. "Your LIENYOY data, the statements of Silvia Bee ELT Neat DES SPER, TERR TT OE SH DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in the quick clarification of the case, blanking out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing.” Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything, events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more simply that if it bears on the subject at all it fs inconsistent with speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation. It is noted that various allegations have been. made in the press fn connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations ceeneeene -ceeremantnssnneresenea asad RETF EtSTOSt MR MELE TENTED SER REESE NNE O REE AE A EU e N NG ASM EE BOUL MPLS i Hien nent RENN SERRE Wg nLURTE rmearo nee me { inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit; i | these are commented on at Tab G. 1 : DIR $4608, 22.11.65 i III. General Collection Requirements : On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable ~~ | from Headquarters with the following statement: Y SAP mee eee t ws Boe 6 ame 6 8 06 vam | - ? P| 4 ; i antsevearalcamst son ABARAT UN eb cts B ke tt TGS lig Eh sa 9 teens Ae eS SIS SERA SSS SSE ATTN — | pce meme cprredeee amen ange ct * 3 et meer epcmenapeente Set oe teint oe
ee, ALANA ANESTRUS NH AAS a AR Ae nomen MAES AgIe Nab 4 arttey te wy thee Aeon + Neaneechereihe seen renatorntiheey o: eee nee ~ mags thas 2 ARR 2s a = Su ° . oS MA ‘5 4 es Lt Ned AB WARE hs Gee LI GARRET REN TEESE Pee SON TEMES mee me ng ‘wh hb bee coms “Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. Although we have no reason to expect anything of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert at least for the next few days while the new President takes over the reins.° it is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi- cance of impertant information and will report it on their own initiative. It fs significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant or significant information on the subject it would have been reported either in responses to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources. If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously fond She eee ey as deve MAE'S Beene teste ant ah VASE Yee x “entenee = ne i : i i \ vob _f t rh regncnimnoemsetiigemenpenn— = “stn atniinmnsmeatafnee aterm ten
14-00000 Oe aedy Heat elkitle AF sb eH i. Syuuthe. cI ape ed AM WS 8 Gee E TT ee tte he apieine ee re semana ot ‘ enh area ae RESTS ASE SE RT IE SI LIND PP OLE ATER REVEL, cme yk wo he o Lt bbe would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to serve, regardless of which ig the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken. As has been noted above, there were initial CIA coliection re- quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued, but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who- what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in the veadquarters? saute to Mexico City on 17 December 1963” (note above) which contains the follswing comment about the limited reporting from other stations: , A ypepre3293, 17.12.43 « . , this partly dictated by the facts of tee Oswald's life... ." a rine ts faposetin! ae mer rr The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10 about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description of “an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor- mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently was missed -- or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report: “iow if you are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited." This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting ‘ _— woe |e petpamt gots aoe 7 9 a ae en rt ne et A LO LL OR CLR CARE ESS SE OS . ah gtigpe talent ay i nS a Re —
hagoono 7 nt wa — 1 es a “es, requirements Jevied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity . i in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case | : officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic i z activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Stzetion 5 i a as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be “ extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the | nt 2d. United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of * page 58. 4 The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very different | : terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI and the Narren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of | z activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every : 9 question that has been conceived since then. 3 IV “Unpursued Leads" 3 At pages 60-67, in 800k V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section u that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the | intelligence ayencies. This follows the section on CIA's Perfermance * | . £ _ onthe Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to | Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's , i murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported . | o = 2 to be aboard those flights- ; ¥ oe file on citberty 5a -. oe a . . 3 By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana Policarpo LOPEZ @ flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and Mexico ‘ . an on u hc Ea 3 City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this } i 4 time on 22 November, 25 November and 27 November. The flights on 5 | i 10 4 3 Gonna sgigignaaenee manera AE eS S TTT mn A NS ESD At eM AER Ste a8 ge cooks: ny et
14-00000 rp Rite ee gt See Peers  e ERT tes po RISE CET TA POT E rea ge EGS eta a AE ETF TTA SITS BATES TBE EE RR EEA STS SE 22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights to Havana apparently carried some freight. CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable reports to Headcucef.rs. chere was one| «(CIA surveil lance team (\TFIRE) that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights, reporting any unusral incidents and providing copies of flight manifests. The also had a surveillance team of its own at the airport, which provided photographs of passports and also provided copies” of passenger Vists|_Additionaity, a telephone tap operation (LIENVOY) against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with the Cubana office and the Mexican Airport Control orice. | The 22 November 1963 Flight At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, 22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from 6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at 10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring further into the matter. is bid mA AN SR eh TI aselt CRoait S Bash GD LBS OMELETTE np gate EM pete unen te tem et et re caentiee SEA IDR MER ete Ramen STE me Tht gee te wate aie HE gate ay ° ene 2 erento eeceneen remem treater e he dectine Mwwne hep eee mesereeined Bs te trONEEpUREDRaRSeenhNanetaeRee Sere rmnemeriyn i tha er it neem | nen temermusaytaon ase enmatibaeriaenaierye te ened ¢
14-00000 —™ . Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain, - . at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no -ecord of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori- ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject. In reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final i Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City times are used in the following discussion. The LIENVOY transcripts record a series of discussions about the Status of the 22 November flight--when it was to arrive and when it departed. These records show that the flight arrived at the platform at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed — . ' a few minutes earlier. At one point prior to arrival of the aircraft, ‘, one person speaking on the telephone stated that the aircraft was due a at 1630 hours and “it will go” at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround that would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as i i | | servicing, to a relatively short period. However, the key report on the departure of the aircraft was a statement at 2040 hours that the aircraft had taken off five minutes earlier, i.e., 2035 hours. a The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in 1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. It was not 12 © ney jie i | } ' ' i | | the SSC Final Report: | i i i i } & 4 ; wf 8 bat ne 2 ot, Semen aed ea 4 ot ee eo sete sear cernem geet capa man 64 nee sete eet Htaene mat tera aette teen metp en er eens oe ree tM eit! TiN en te sews domawtts snonetatonns (ome romeraniemeemttne meee? ee ne OF emanate ‘
14-00000 ELL PRR Dawe a re tae ot SE a eae ta WEP, IEE, wae TOES ¥ delayed five hours, as alleged. 2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight. which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it allegedly was delayed. . In view of the surveillance coverage of the Cubana flight, it is very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin- engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of these sources and probably knew the above facts, feeling no need to follow further. The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its sumary of the matter. - ’ The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con- siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the SSC Final Report state that: * . . . one source alleged that the Cuban-American was ‘involved’ in the assassination." tee eka AUR Tt 7 Mares Wee Dine a oth s Limmwernumuteninn os TE TET we ce oe Oe ates ti at mab th  gpakptean ere Ie thes st eh ane oat . a ° = ener t sas. + rene > emer ecstasy bait oe Byala es Se ene Ts Nabedeak i, Ce SACS WU eal PE grt RIOT EN ey a NE per meemns * (ins OAT NKalaeds 8 Senna alee: Tae 5 | | | vat meer manent we etenratees ctr cememmetecin  Nente seaman nieeampitires memes nine « wemetanamaatenen aa a —
14-00000 MaeUP OT te LAE Aon tte lee hk anne en ons meentienrettnten © aes Boe pee seams amar ag coe aaeeea ener eh BON RAEN ea Wg Rabe AMT fad re OORT clr ae EL AO Le acme arch ey EES HTS The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI “almost immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi- gation “as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission.” Further down the same page the SSC Report states that “(t)he FBI did investi- gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC) certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi- gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon~- sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the results of FBI inquiries. While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will be noted. Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement at page 104, in the chronology section: "December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who saw the Cuban-American beard the aircraft to Havana on November 27 reported that he ‘looked suspicfous’..." At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed= up on this report (that the man was “involved in the assassination"), 4 —— CONF Dei lAc Wie ce nee cee eae te eee ee garments a cnereenetin Metres eB ean ett wrenirmnecseumenee tig snes wepeete am rere deereeeuter emer te: eee vow — Danes meena a o> 1 oe senna enptoepesiifeirpgtediioee
be Sieg hale except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban- American's activities." terme cee opens nene nance Serer peeegrenepetinan antemncuenentmenyeren sear ia peel mena COE wake . The presentation of this matter in the ssc Report contains some inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington fos that the man “looked suspicious." There was a cable® dated 5 December SEP CRSOMOGRS Sam ANE RAH Hs YEE EON ga aR tt Birt 1963, but it reported that the man had “crossed at Laredo, Texas on 23 November,” that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at a certain time on 25 November, that he chetked out of the hotel at a fee OER FLO certain time and departed for Havana “as only passenger on Cubana flight on night 27 November," and that there was a good photograph of ke him taken at the airport. This was followed by a dispatch the same i i date, repeating the basic information in the cable, enclosing the Photo- ; - graph, and containing the following cryptic Statement: | © xr -7253 (IN 74227) ; a 7 H i “Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding ' § Decenber 1963 | Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana J ¥ IMPIA-22579, 5 Decenber Ad : This comment ts cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in are suspicious." ee aaron history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as soho a by PERE Ad ET OG A CL a REESE a tA Geter teh eR eee PEDALS RES ete Pie arenas tt larly an reno etree possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI; : . ; it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal . memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported ep . * See Nenorandum for the Do 15 Record, 3 December [1963 3 ; ae = ; To ems a
14-00000 1 eee RRC * q se neeeea ee pte enema me oan to have “jooked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way into the more careful statements that usually characterize official reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres- Stonistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic activity or final conclusions. There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the been eke # context of known facts. On 19 March 1964". Monterrey Base cabled * MNTY-0829 (IN 43193) that a source of a local (Monterrey) “agent of the federal judicial : 19 March 1964 police” had information on a man; the description seems to have the i . _ ag ee Baenrenn on TS same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the ° SARE a EOE, ama GaP Lots tnathy Bong SAND SY CRN edka tele y Hot ame nNfel tga Ww semeraineeneremeee on on report: it misspelled the man‘s name; it offered a bare statement that he "was involved in Kennedy assassination’; it states that he entered Mexico “on foot” from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and 7 Sy “hed SLE ettel fi Soh ROD A TAN ET DY oe | ! times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel -in-Mexico ; City, where he Stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect humber for his | passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa , | Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number : of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time, when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could FF BP $98 o ge Fores p Cay tee te Me | not recall it. : |. | wba nemaedecthad dress ene lkeSs Laid aMthieed ey oly, RRS LCR oR A teva : | | | | | Pe ay
14-00000 There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the pre- sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report . bine oe enim cage 4g! contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When | MEXT-8740 (IN 45040) Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of : 20 March 1964 ; Station replied“ that the information in the report "jibes fully with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63,* . It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained teday, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how it should be considered responsibly. Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became avaflable with such information he was queried and the results were provided the authorities. SELMA BSE NDL BE BEE PPT ANE Re BURNABY ERIN AEA, PECTIN, Colts A ALIN ELEN cet, ce rere eaten ppt uw nee nee nena wane aeons a ant amen ek epee A Alkaces sane TAME ON ert i bree a2 Vertarentt haste tte 7 | i * «Par 5 wre ae, ' : 1 4 i } : F nemsenacen mate 2 Pesrgower
14-00000 ----t 2 ay: CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA . ! | — | | 2 tree aterm aetlith mteetve eee ’ ? $8 aap De Ee apt OO oO SIS EB + cet strttnereehsteromnatitgrDatimeenen oe voce tema teeneten adeno ne ete e: neta oe AREER er reme , % Selagre oe et re eT Rie tee eee eT aS ae dee ole Da atone : cae
14-00000 earn Qperations Ayainst Cuba The SSC Final Report sp2aks of apzrations ancinst Cuba and the Castre regime, and contends that they should have teen reported in detat] to the Wsr-en Commission as cart of the subject matter that = conscicusly tevk into consicevation. A case can te made for specific considerations ¢ these varfous activities by the Warren Comission, at teast as pert of the uniquy backgresnd of the times; {t might have provided it additional invésticative leads. However, to advance the ceneral “housht is act te diseard the usual tscs of evidence that must st#11 contrei how the findings are treated. It should be noted thar at the time of the Werren Commission inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy : Administration ané the Castro regime. Euok ¥ of the SSC Final “Report refers briefly to some of the mory dramatic events, such as the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Misstle Crisis in October 1962 ~~ (see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American | | policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro / : regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro- \ vocative. Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations, se sethans eeeitae | A mm i i i oh wx popsetgoncanen. earn ot ant eta = eager eas €.ee ee ad eet cont ate bot tea codes leo tad fh Sas ewwists. y heggbigites , 02 ai eee ° “pds Gas £43 te sa 6% BONES, ase “Ek a fe ness ee em: wie a, a ye ety
74-90000 Learn ara wenpraktam tegerase ceneiecnmettpaaiet Senn economic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re- ceived recurring publicity in tne press), aS well as a variety of covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963 President Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what “White House sources” said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban people to overthrow the Castro regime. The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who conducted their independent operations against the Castro government. Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from private sources. With or without official U.S. support these exiles spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration, whether CIA was iavolved or not. We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took what might be characterized as "judicial notice” of the tensions between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of ; eat Ie '
74-90000 ‘tok rw wo ere Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request was not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intel- ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its ‘staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation. The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro- voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life. However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern- ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba." In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency files (the 7% a? + 5 eeatastasaitat tn ART AE ny TE . rn Sane. *, ~ Tn meal sa RRO scot, Seg SF “Sm Tegan yee Fe pepe &S NET a ead hagantet 7 tahoe Pons hated seers ee oF ms. radSf | :
14-00000 organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report). This was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President ; Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security. Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission in- quiries in 1964. Not all that happened is.a matter of record. For instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to ne ae Se eS various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded judgments about what seemed relevant or irrelevant to the considera- tions of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of President it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way. While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see Tab £) that more was not ‘reported is a meaningful indication of what was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary -- which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous con- ; | spiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom ‘ : } these activities that may have related te the assassination of the | knew aspects of even the most closely guarded activities. { | > , SECRET : | | - , wae ete me ee ste —~ SESRO Hie Sets La oat ceala Tinh HR an” meng ts eree atm mae mee ae ate oe ee oe sane ne ee ae | rey Stet havea tes ee hole tat Artes peg chet age PERSP | oS AEROBIE MN Soo
14-00000 SECRET Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's ' death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some i are dead. The SSC, for instance -~ in its attempt to capture ele- ments of the past -- seems to have led some employees into expressing opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in response to representations by SSC staff members as to the facts; this illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues, ; today, on a responsible basis. The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called i AMLASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative Wee nme ae tap ee | relationship with this man during President Kennedy's life, although : | the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted , to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so exten- Fe eet meme arate ane sively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an under- a crt ewe Aap San Nate taking. This will not be treated further in this section of this k . this paper, at Tab D. The key point is that prior to President : discussion. & i -OCREET Re Fe ota, SEIS ew eR EIN RE Sa teat tet ee te ee a ee ee aie i ee on
14-00000 eo% a oo cot In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report, it has been felt necessary to review in depth all records of Cuban operations conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1961-1964. The organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not possible to predict the form that information turned up by this inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort. In doing this the “provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in { mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review, it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational activity were found that either might meet some of the requirements of the provocation theory, or throw some further light on {ssues already considered. To report this concluston is not to dismiss the original questions that faced the Warren Commission as te whether there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That otay ome “perme Semen such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but _ , that the records of CIA, in such a review, do not add significantly ° to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry. The areas of operational activity noted above can be described briefly as follows: 1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (AMTRUNK). 2. Operations involving the criminal underworld. 3. Other reports of plans to assassinate Castro. San , “Esau ithe b OR ce Na Ee ny Oe ight PGA gD tn Bt AE UE I CREE REET Te ay augeah tine pene See as yd
14-00000 Sept cm Nha AN ite Lae NEA. San” TFS are BIRR neat ens = oe . . 7, © 8 bt wane Operation anTRINK® There is one other general activit: chat was considered in the course of the present research, which is discussed below, This activity, AMTRUNK, was to develop a capability for Splitting the leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered possible security vulnerabilities, it fs treated here evan though it never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity, because of its failure to vant to the question. It by virtue of its security ever develop substance, is net feally rele- is included simply because it might be viewed, vulnerabilities, as fitting in Part the hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to include it than try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thesis of the SSC Report. In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of them, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez and Enrique Cayardo Robera, developed an oper- ational concept to overthrow the Castro government, which came to be known as the Leonardo Plan. Cayardo had been a public fiqure in Cuba, who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception of the plan. Moreno was the son of a Cuban senator and Minister of Public Works; as a lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in the anti-Batista movement. Pa e 7 _ See Falder No. 7 - Opera- tions to Split CASTRO Re- fine; (ANTRUNK Operation) SRR DARED areas = eS Soe we. Sanger: Tae Semen ‘ . gy nmap one mec per enh amen 2 eng uae tee nant i net ee 0 ne eee es
g4-00000 aw ame mememeerneeie os 0 SOT one ECA Pe oe EH ote as ne | | t | - ei arr Le Sho id edt g Moreno defected tc the United States in April 1961, settling in Hiami where he associated with anti-Castro exiles. Among his associates was Jorge Ajbuszy Volsky, a Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Volsky had been in prison in the USSR in the 1940's, and enlisted in the Polish Air Force during UNIT under the British Air Command. ‘After WHL] he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own business in Havana. Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was imprisoned for a few weeks following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As he held a valid U.S. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961. Cayardo and Nereno discussed the Leonardo Plan with Volsky. He, in turn, discussed it with Tadeus (Tad) Witold Szulc, a reporter with the lew York Times. Szulc had reported on Cuban activities for the New York Times prior to the fall of Batista, during which time he haa developed a wide acquaintance among Cubans. He was transferred to the Times Washington Bureau in April 1961, where he claimed to have an entree to the White House through his uncle, Ambassador John Cc. Hijey. He also claimed to have a standing invitation for direct con- tact with President. Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and HcGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that the Leonardo Plan gained government-level support and approval. In early 1963 Szulc arranged an interview in Washington with Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor. Volsky and Szulc then met with Robert Hurwitch, a senior official in the Department of State, who presented the concept to the CIA with Department zpproval. CIA assigned it to its Miami Station, where it became known as AHTRUNK. wettig Bane de dt - 6 2 nem ano: soe mete MefeNONY Hes mt LAeA ae eeeeS Ok Ns
“eee | — Seat AMTRUNK was conceived as first identifying disaffected key per- sonnel in the Cuban armed forces with the Yong range objective of | uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be used in the activity. Ouring that period the CIA Chief of Station in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain security considerations, he felt it best to fund the operation gen- erously in order for it to proceed independently. On 17 April 1963 Szulc informed Hurwitch that the Miami Station had given Volsky responsibility for the decision of whether or not the operation was to proceed; this was not consistent with CIA intentions. In August 1963 things still had not progressed very far. A | Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable. It emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a high priority objective. In early September 1963 AMTRUNK had three : intelligence sources in Cuba: Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue, Ramon Guin Menten nt eeeahaprntbctaanentepaqeeat te Nee Peer ranEeREe ner comeuteepeuine ere na ecnttrman Hector Robello, and Modesto Orozco Basulto. One of these sources, Guin, was reportedly close to AMLASH/1, a man with whom CIA was dealing separately through a Headquarters case officer -- but at 0 : 9 7 - epee, ct eet, tye - pant eer 8 fae ee wee ee peceene ERA Namen ee ET A LIT RG ATRL DIS Cathal AMORA ETI DENI cme calasame sie tei ca btks nial pw ater ERO
GAD peewee memmaenee aammee antennae OND ne fiom Seg AGES Sein Doha AST, Ab Me 0. AEE — SECRET that time unsuccessfully -- in trying to develop an operational ap- proach similar in some respects to AMTRUNK. The AMLASH operation is discussed at Tab D. It was decided at the end of October 1963 that Moreno should be separated from the operational details of the AMTRUNK operation be- ’ cause of numerous indiscretions and poor security practice. Arrange- ments were made to involve him in a radio program to be used in con- nection with the Rebel Army that eventually it was hoped would arise against Castro. Moreno threatened to appeal this decision through Volsky and Szulc to the President. In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads into higher echelons of the military:and civilian leadership. The operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltratior routes. Although it had success- fully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made prac- tically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its secur- ity became less certain. In 1965 its security was believed to have been seriously compromised and the decision was taken to cut off re- lations with it. Various figures were arrested, including Guin, Diaz and AMLASH/1. Sener pada tate th eaten seen meaner deeded Manis RL ene she eertenre eae i i i ! } ; : i t ' i a wee Be ee epee ee cline ents note Cane cmameat ene emenani AO Cai 9 TE, as cn car cemtmnnnseet, ontgete Bog aan ca ttemeeeter-menecnereienen ont eee seas ae fone ree terete names ar meen emuntioe + . Bie
“agiocon SECRET The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses from the beginning. Szulc and Volsky are considered to be highly suspect and they are discussed below, with another person who became invalved in the activity. a. Tad Szulc. Szule has been suspect since 1948 when the FBI recorded reports that he was a communist. Re- portedly he was in frequent contact with communist party leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America. Sus-~ picions about his motives or possible connections with foreign intelligence services, have never been proven. Niccle Szulc, daughter of Tad Szulc, is reportedly an avid communist. Philip Agee’s Inside the Company: A CIA Diary credits Nicole Szule with having “obtained vital research | materials in New York and Washington, 0.C.* She is be- lieved to be an agent of the Cuban DGI. Doubts about Tad | Szule are unconfirmed but remain alive. Of Polish origin , Szule became a U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special bill of Congress. b. Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky. Like Szulc, he is of Polish origin. He and Szule became acquainted in 1959-1960 in S) . nN SECRET PUNE Se Se BT OS eins GWEC de OA a RN tae, a ect: oo ne rm enero” ~ sestonoret ? * cee rat om a be NB ni ee EMA Ror oS eet Aen ARE arte Me men se mee OF 2h seis 24 Coe Tlie cf 3 Pith co: ‘ ft VPS ie RES ATURE aia ea rg PEERS te, ofa
14-00000 SEoRET Cuba. ACI Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared by a JMWAVE analyst, makes the following statement: “Volsky’s knowledge of clandestine methods of operation, together with his Russian prison background and his ingenuity as a middleman in U.S. Government/CIA activities, made him an excellent | candidate for a communist penetration agent and that the pos- sibility existed that he might be a singleton, sleeper or stringer for the RIS." There has been no confirmation of these suspicions. Volsky became a naturalized U.S. citizen on 10 April 1969. ' c. dose Ricardo RABEL Nunez. Born in Cuba, he was the | son of a native born American citizen. He was educated both in Cuba and in the States and later (1940) enlisted in the U.S. Army. After discharge he returned to Cuba but kept moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a pattewof changing alle-~ giances. He joined the anti-Batista forces in March 1952 from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban Army under Batista and was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mis- i sion in Cuba from November 1954 until 1956. Suring his Ze) 2 SewAel ~-+ enc anriertihtAt tnkSe Scn sh mre s Nt at meee SS” areaBio omens MOREE i i | q ! first with the Cuban exiles in the United States and later { | i | i
k 4-00000 omy en OE . aha ° Gla wosio entire period in the Cuban Army, he was involved with dissident army elements. RABEL was arrested in April 1956 when he participated in an attempted coup. After a short imprison- ment he returned to the U.S. and worked with ore cf his brothers. In October 1957, he returned to Cuba and became involved with the 26th of July Movement and later with the Cienfuegos Group. Shortly after the Castro victory, Castro called upon RABEL to. set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendos Campesinas (Rural Housing). Approached by CIA, he refused to work in place but was willing to defect, which he did in December 1962, being recruited by JMWAVE Station where he was used “in AMTRUNK activities. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, reportedly to attempt the exfiltration of his family. Upon return to Cuba he was arrested and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967. There were accusations that RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven. In view of the later roll-up of the AMTRUNK operation the tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have been an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of cemented ee |
14-00000 a 1 : | | ~) om mae cceTTT, individuals in the Cuban hierarchy who were disloyal to the regime. Whatever the later penetrations by Cuban intelligence, the role of Szulc and Volsky, in the early phase of the operation, could have exposed both its members and eventual objectives to Cuban intelli- gence. Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress, although it did lay down caches and conducted some infiltrations and exfiltrations in 1964 and 1965. An attempt to build support that might eventually have the capability to attempt a coup against the Castro regime obviously . i would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really prog- ressed very far during the life of President Kennedy is a relevant { consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy. . New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul Meskil ia the New York Daily News attracted special attention because i ere cars ett pA MERAY fo " ercpnaah enceteteonnmnamepsnmoasaese ~ - . i eA Abas ahs PPh a BIG NEALE nk he e+ oA Aaa AOS Ie IOC AE ee = AE tn a ABNER OY RG, elUnn dL. ‘ i | { sditig veaphitarn yx 6 Bpchovra es ASE aes Eee eae
14-00000 meee on cet mtn se crate OA | of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories printed 20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis as follows: "The third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. ‘I had access to the Prime Minister's office,’ Sturgis said. ‘I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the embassy (American Embassy in Havana). ‘* ' Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the years, having served in different branches of the U.S. military and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's takeover. Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control - : . of the gambling interests. He came to the United States in 1959. Sturgis gained notoriety when arrested on 17 June 1972 in the Water- gate break-in. He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relation- i ship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency. The particular feature in the above excerpt from the newspaper ; story is that it constitutes the first public reference to Juan } Orta in the role of an assassin in plans against Castro. Orta was, ce 15 aeons Se emt we ot t 5 i £ TLaed i ST NISRA on 29 2p 809 PR a > qoeP STE ie io
14-00000 co spmartene cotati mntenenin t AOR TntNs nRONE en ttt  ,e  R BR ASSRI,  AS paeeemanh pence meee fe tet ear em nh ce la ne a AS eRe “ena Te the Cuban leadership. + ce nenmnnammemen ar 4 cman at Ta ste By Ri Beles tHE wl Ae AST ohh Peters saat AEH ERE te A in fact, the first man who reportedly was to have been used in the operation that CIA had, with the criminal syndicate, to kill Castro. Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961. Orta's role in this connection was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in February 1965. As for Sturgis’ assertion that he recruited Orta to work with the embassy, CIA files have no record that Orta was recruited for CIA by anyone during the period there was an embassy in Cuba. While Orta was reported in early 1961 as being used in the CiA-syndicate attenpt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationships with him until he 1968S left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of information on se The fact remains that Orta did at one time have the role of cng ta heegmonn Spence seeee cee ee intended assassin. Sturgis’ identificaticn of Orta in this capacity, prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised the question of just what Sturgis had known, and whether he could Viet doaa d fs ae nrte en qerttneeerss Cemanremmuiem Nae ETT
14-00000 + eee eer = ~ ee F have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life. Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of information. However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975 indicated a familiarity with Orta's availability to play the role of assassin in 1960, additional attention was given the statement in the press to see how it might fit in with other things that are known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach to the reliability of newspaper stories. The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another story by the same author on 13 June 1976, refer to possible relation- ‘ ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning a Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. The Office of Security wrote a memorandum in 1975, in conjunction with the first set of New York Daily News storfes, noting that there was a connection between Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports. It is pertinent to note here that in addition to the role Sturgis is reported to have had with the Castro government in relation to the gambling activities, Juan Orta's availability for the assassination assignment was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once received from the gambling interests. One can deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connections C7 ar} [ ees a ete at ea geeter SP Suet 2 erm a, metin neater AP! Malia oe wee aime me TR . | Pf ANG Skat hones a ea Bisiie® Tp PACHA On Tain a alr PE 3 bag Tae wpb Eb orcas, es Th ‘as s porte SRR Rd ee a, Site
14-00000 ema _~ wlsceeaad with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the garbling organizations. The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by a i Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also been mentioned in the ; 1975 stories. Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one : point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used as a means for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that “soon after ‘ her murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters ... to kill Castro..." In the news story she claimed that the plan involved the use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face cream; they dissolved and could not be used. On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 1960 memorandum from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA | Deputy Director for Plans: | "During recent conversations with several ) friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this state- : | ment, Giancana reportedly assured those fm November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-ta-be emma ets 6 tebe 5 5 1 i present that Castro's assassination would occur ; | Spine aivens snommnanienpastacl soni Cyst Ae wa in ewan nmanah warts anemia ee ees - coming se A Einaams cE eats a
14-00000 ~ SECRET on three occasions . . . Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the ‘assassin’ had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a ‘pill' in Some drink or food of Castro." . This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro with poison. However, the dating of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various > schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own. Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta, Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original inter- mediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader who might participate. This man, Tony Varona, headed the Democratic “ _ : Revolutionary Front, one of the exile groups that also received . | Support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation. Varona was dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station . ‘6 suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency. In . fact, it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination. rnamatbonanntapianenetennt arte stinpettet ences retain SE A AP eI EASE POEM? Meee mm ee se nen The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal ~~ SEGRE l 19 Stents AREER RAO IG Ae I ancl p88" "ghia De eee dH AARP oD caret Ae TES Ne mene oe Manca nie eee ee Pe ee te esl BL AR TCLs EG RES t
14-00000 O ot oe om FS ars Ie > hj ay wet wf bel underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 January 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre- sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an . explanation of why Varona was so readily available when approached by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the 1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri- butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction. eae oy OH .  « aww eendd | Beaty eater sense re ans ASR Derrek Ht aia anh IE RAINE BEA Ft Racer come mee SETS emer ee mare mene eae = a meme cee mae neree meneame oe ape ant = ranges on aerate tate
14-00000 ~ SECRET What do these various considerations suggest? It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be develeped, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities. Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be listed as follows: 1. The criminal syndicate may well have had some inde- pendent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involve- . ment in late 1960. These operations could well have con- tinued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs, being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan in April 1962. | die The syndicate operations could have activities such 2 meetin open oe mee as those that are reported in the New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976. | 3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he ; was not a member of it. He could well have been used by the syndicate in its activities. 4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his statements are treated with considerable reserve. He coats enema mannan + probably did know Juan Orta when both of them were in Cuba. He was outside of Cuba, however, when Orta was given the eeepc ancaperage GERRI ra Kee eee ee ee erect. r * wl ge pemientivateor? x. BM a ot ee aa ee ee Oe hee ee re ered
14-00000 SEGRET role of assassin. Whatever ne knew at that time--and his knowledge may be of a much later date--could have heen in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975 newspaper stories. If there was such an operation it was not CIA's; it could have been an earlier operation of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of or have been involved tn earlier activity by the syndicate, whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami community after Orta settled there in 1965. 5. If the syndicate was conducting its own operations, that would tend to reinforce the thought that the detafls of its operations would have been characterized by discre- netoetemmmene sd senses tion--or security--despite the FBI report in October 1960. e The authors of Book VY of the SSC Final Report felt that the operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate ee ee would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothe- sized for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated: { “... it ts unlikely that Castro could have . t Ciane SECRET ' 22 i ) : ' Bila a aes, tb yt einiioe 7 ” roms Sr Pegek al BOE saa Es ane am amas me ee a gee ee -- Treen ge i Adee ape Cok SNE, A ea Tact ,
14-00000 = em rere ae lonene ied . eo. wt a ‘ge! 2 6 BEB a ~ distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA.* ; In a sense the SSC made a conscious judgment, in the context of its provocation theory, that was made less copsctously and in a different context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations with the syndicate -- that they bore no relation to the assassination of President Kennedy. Possible Ruby--Trafficante Contact o@ There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect | of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as @ question. This can only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or another | ; are not within. the, Agency's’ capabilities. | “As noted earlier (see Tab 8. page 4), a 27 November 1963 | report records statements by a British journalist that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named "Santos* who was in jail where he was visited by another American gangster type named "Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that “Santos” was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in ; | 1959. An FBI report of 14 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante. 23 = io CEUs
. we t 14-00000 . SrSus Sidéen if the “Santos” in the British report was Trafficante, the British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow : point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material consideration, as there are reservations about both sources. It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but there fs no further known relevant information in the Agency on the matter. . The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in jail in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963 removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as evidence of conspiracy ageinst President Kennedy. However, if teen a oo a eae | | | Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide | an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible sigqni- | ficance of past assocations or contacts. Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby’s 1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned. 24 a ae ease ARNE AE NEI ot Sawa Oak ely TAG Sh OSB n Bh ave hE aap POEM Aiea 2 SOU, PRB ttn, HE ate “ES ener afte ete fons tno nega abies «mea
14-00000 However, Ruby fis dead and Trafficante has declined to testify at all. A later allegation of a visit by Ruby to Cuba in late . ! 1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true. | Otier Reported Assassination Proposals There werc other references to possible assassination plots against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign . Leaders. They are summarized briefly below: 7 In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee i stated that i. February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter. “AS a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the ; Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement. On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966) cman sortase nainntatteimniigiece” “eRe ine peas NERC UE pm oe He was rebuffed on each occasion. Again in 1970 there was a report of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas post. The details of his actual rote 4 unknown to the Agency, although the FBI may have more details on him. This is touched on in Tab G, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the ted course of this research effort. 25 tra name see eaen ree tet pores re f i i ! | i he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro. | Sere Sse lea pace: ty nas SE ieesvh = 5 RE Ly ic aia ermaem nana e ~— ream enn etre entree pet ee rs eS ey aay a semnsornnntenneanraniniewen™ a Saat
14-00000 westtoe 7 — Corrente ee EASILY STN eboegudaane’,” Agent Messages in 1961 Mentioning Plans to Kill Castro 1. During the investigations in 1975 five agent messages were identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro, or proposing such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation, the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The existeace of these mecsages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's tastimony before the Church Committee. In response to a request from the Deputy Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged with serving as an interface with the congressional committees. Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. The subject was not covered-in the Church’ Committee's interim report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is summarized again below. : I 2. Three of the messages involved the same group of agents, and seem to relate to the same plan. The first message, dated 27 March 1961 (prior to the Bay of Pigs) was sent by an Agency asset, AMBRONC/5. The message requested the Agency's opinion on &@ proposed sabotage of the electric company in Havana, stating that this could be coordinated "with attempt against Fidel in public appearance (at) Sports Palace." The cable expressed the view that 26 SEaRET Pater a® oh x ov serene aes ye an seen yearns ee oe cninweny ne LAS
14-00000 Acc AOL EEOC oats $e MN A ee SeeRel an “attempt against Fidel (is) in accordance with ceneral plan." There is no record that this message was answered. Two days Jater, on 29 March 1961, possibly because of the absence of a reply, the same agent sent another message. This stated that the plan was scheduled for 9 April. Castro was to speak at the Palace, and an “assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general shutting off of main electric plants in Havana.” General anti-regime developments to follow this were then outlined. This message was answered on 30 March agreeing that a "major effort should be launched Havana on date you selected.” It recommended contacting other named persons, looking to a more general uprising. The message addressed the general issue, making no comment on the proposal to kill Castro. A third message, on 5 April 1961, presumably from the same agent, reported that the persons he had been directed to contact had arns for only 50 men. While stating that the sabotage of the electric company and “possibly attempt on Fidel" would be carried out 9 April, he emphasized that to do so would make it impossible to maintain a clandestine organization in Cuba; “your military aid is decisive. If it does not come that date we are lost." There is no indication that this message was answered. No further reference to this plan has been found. 3. We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter. The four agents in question are conmented on briefly below: APRA MRE nee sean = we ates ape enenrtnmiegnaune oe &
14-00000 “Sela a. AMBROHC/5 is the agent who sent the messages out- vining the proposed sabotage effort and attempt against Castro. (1) 201 file opened 15 July 1960. A POA was ve not issued until 18 December 1961, and an OA on 31 January 1962. A debriefing of him in November 1960, prior to the Kennedy Administration, revealed that he had been in touch with people who had plotted the assassination of Fidel Castro, and claimed to have tried himself to make similar plans. He was infiltrated on 9 December 1960, exfiltrating 15 February . 1961. -(2) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again 3 March 1961 and exffitrated again 19 June 1961. This “ covered the period of his messages and the Bay of Pigs. His sole mission was to organize resistance groups. (3) AMBRONC/S was infiltrated again on 19 December 1961, exfiltrating 29 March 1962, again with the same nission. (4) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated finally 2 May 1962, was arrested 29 May 1962, and was executed 30 August 1962. He has been reported as never admitting that he was a CIA agent. His name ig not one of those oO 28 Seth aed Bh athe Se Roe att REF gtataG AURA RR UE 19 INSEE rth og iterate EER AES enna o 2 evapora Rats Heme senate menanpibne Telemnnee Ot brome an ae qe ren pant a tte
74-00000 ¥ "Gn the book given Senator McGovern by Castro, listing those claimed by Castro to have plotted attempts against his life. b. AMCOAX/1 was one of those -AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his genera? plan for April 1961. (1) POA on 5 January 1961. His mission was to organize paramilitary activities in Cuba. He in- filtrated in February 1961 and exfiltrated in July 1961 following the Bay of Pigs. This period covered the above messages. (2) Re-infiltrated 29 July 1961, with the same organizing mission, he was arrested on 17 August 196], and is serving a thirty year term. His name appears in the book given Senator McGovern. c. AMPUG/1 was another of those AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his general plan in April 1961. (1) Recruited in September 1960, he was in- filtrated that month, receiving airdrops in December 1960. He returned to the U.S. 15 May 1961, following the Bay of Pigs. (2) Infiltrated again on 29 June 1961, with the mission to organize resistance groups and conduct sabotage operations [he was arrested in July 1961, and fs serving a thirty year term’ His name is among those ) in the book given Senator McGovern by cee 29 SECRET BRaaate te RAT NRE GAS SL tly ROM SIG BE TEE Sa Panels Bins toe aa re Pat ae eet eek cane smmnireemnnerat ST oe teat AEE 4 nh ere niece weer tenctioney an ewrehapneipnmnee = Fe Nae ueenes 5  SEPEES cera ween: — pepemnes Seater reese personne aentaemetnen ee teste cst etn Ate ea ereenreraperomee otter recent pete seem tmgoneme-ont marmriteprmpey mmm ti = seat
Tr tame come amet witeaes gerd “SECRET d. AMPANIC/7 was another of those that AMBRONC/5 was - told to contact for his general plan in April 1961. (1) This man was a "walk-in" 15 April 1960, a POA being issued 30 January 1961 (although there was a MOC since 12 July 1960). He was to organize resistance groups in the Havana and Pinar del Rio areas. (2) Infiltrated 3 March 1961, he was arrested 23 April 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro. (3) Records relating to this man mention his in- * filtration into Cuba in August 1960 and exfiltration . in November 1960 (prior to his being issued a POA). His "mission" during that period is mentioned tersely as being "to organize resistance groups .. . for mounting sabotage operations . . . and assassination of prominent Cuban Communist members in the Castro entourage ..." The records refer to "his own personal objectives" during this period and criticizes how he functioned during his stay in Cuba from August to November 1960. The record then specifies how he is ‘to conduct himself and focus his efforts on his return, which was to develop sabotage operations. We were able te contact one of his two case officers, who has retired 30 dere! | STAN cadet rel U tk MM aS en SN a Rg ait Seats es teres me . ee le ep ne et eee eae ‘ ese
eo Antenne ete emi thks eR S 4 SAE AED doh Medea mint ne ee ete Par (the other had died), to ascertain his recollections. Stating that at the time the focus was on developing organizations for operations, he stated that an assassination mission, such as attributed to AMPANIC/7 on his earlfer time in Cuba, not only was not authorized, but would have compromised the effort to organize. Any such assassination mission, the case officer states, would have been at AMPANIC/7's Own initiative. 4. It is clear that AMNBRONC/S envisioned a general uprising in Cuba, to commence with sabotage of the electric plant in Havana and an attempt on Castro's life. The third of his messages reflected pessimism, and the fact is that the operation did not come off. While the man had no express mission from the Agency to mount an operation against Castro personally, it is clear that no specific objection was recorded ta his statement 6f intentions. The one ; recorded reply addresses the concept of general action and makes no reference to the proposal to make an attempt on Castro. 5. The fact is that the 9 April 1961 operation did not come off, and AMBRONC/5 has not been identified as an Agency asset. Nor was his name included in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro. The other men, none of whom had a mission of assassf- nation from the Agency, are]now serving thirty year terms, That their names were included in the list given Senator McGovern by Castro may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge on the facts 7) 31 “SEE WRG nalee Peten gti tran nae — — ee . . I Re elo i teSpenlon Son's taT at PARRY Tabet gans Mer fates eh anne cate Com eniee ee ete Ane on OEE Oe ee ae we atte eterwnnemetine thet te spies at re re ayn nay Sana ENE geet S Me
ae Meaage te enege rather than to report what he trely believes. They were not executed, a consideration that mzy support this view. 6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs. The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to the event described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent infiltrations into Cuba. There is no record that any of them had a mission from CIA to kill Castro. The person who proposed the act in 1961 -- AMBRONC/5 -- never acknowledged that he was a CIA ; agent, and is not listed among those Castro reportedly believes had the mission of his ssssinaion, ql 7. ‘Anotner agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a | man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy, who claimed to work for U.S. intelligence and to be in touch with ® one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who "have plans | for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel.” A reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and that Moratori was not known and should not be trusted. (Insofar as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name in Cuba at that time. H i i 1 { io) { ! Hy ; ; i H t i i iain Te SEA dit EAE wl Little is known about him.) The originator 4 of the agent message cannot be identified from present records. 32 rer a | Fah ot lA ERA BER TTD ae Anat STN 1 etemrenstramenenanes gore ame oe te Pmt tae et st nt # eee enaee REM EARETS meters . ema ee re eter eerie Eirh m e se nerd SRNR EERE a orca eee ypitenrenteeter we | creer yreemeen tcremattirne tigr at a
re f 33 SECRET III 8. Another agent message dated 3 May 1961 from a member of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement in Cuba said “will try to kill Fidel today." A reply to this message dated 4 May told the agent and his companions to “lay low" for the time being, and “will advise when operations can resume.” There were no follow-up messages on this subject in the records. The agent who sent the message possibly was AMPUG/1, but as noted earlier his mission did not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not been Identified. —_~ i | | — | i Re th Ne BAG ie, PEM RE AR ERT AINE Mate CAS oth 0 AE RE te A POE TRNETRIN AR Ort Seah om te co wer ren paetaly, mei tet Pro Rieree
yo0c00 ' t ; [ AMLASH OPERATION ; ~~ («| ® t | retary | | | | repent ae sane - SONNE woe i EN AB A SL IB ath tT a SP MO LIN om og abs en tee some ge ee Me situa
$4-90000 2F 3907 1. AMLASH OPEFATICN Comment on the AMNLASH operation, in the context of its presenta- tion in Book ¥Y of the Final Report of the $SC, is complicated by the treatment given it in the Report. Rather than being treated in a unified way, reference and discussion is found throughout the Report.” The actual nature and the significance of the AHLASH operation differs materially from that presented in the SSC Renort. The Report leaves the inference that ALASH/] was perhaps an agent of Castro, with the mission of provoking a plot against Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79), which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching Lee Harvey Nswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively, the Report suqgests that AMLASH/1 was so insecure in the conduct of his activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to Castro, thereby providing the same basic motivation (pages 74 and 75). Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the ANLASH operation should have been reported to the Warren Commission. Ye believe that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between CIA and ANLASH/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Xennedy, was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for *See pages 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 23 29, 31, 35, 36, 59, 68, 69, 79, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, and 86 of the 97-nage text, and pages 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 105 of the eight-page chronology following the text. é Be ope ee = er atte ' wewrege saw arene +
14-000 i omeserene wommmrnemaguiminmtrawanearatinnnsaiactnewatatnliTs Ba eth tyne ea + att ont sig tine caf ieta heart Bal oN f | i i j i i i i i i i 1 H i i tos Z | i i i : i axe ies aie asi 2 io wh 68 AMLASH/1 to fec? that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro. Whether one is inclined to see AMLASH/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simoly as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak. re a In preparing the current conment on the AMLASH operation, as treated in the SSC Report, it was judged best to aoproach it in two. ways. A sequential summary of the AMLASH bperation is intended to present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity. Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed. It is hoped that this presentation will heip establish a clearer per- spective for judging the actual substance of the operation. Po As early as March 1959, AMLASH/1 was reported as expressing directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba. At that time he also was renorted as expressing his disillusionment and that if he "...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill Castro himself." Two years later, in March 1961, AMLASH/] was met in Ilexico City by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was AMLASH/T's presence at the leftist-soonsored Latin America Conference on Mational Sovereiqnty, Emancioation, and Peace. The meeting was arranged by AMHHIP/1, a long-time friend of ANLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1967, ‘giving a general round-up on operational activity against Cubans in ae Omds cob papas renee Tt ncSNeRR RE Nag uate Tinmateomatmathirtiee Bag Beene, Yaseen ey en areemenmediammtnemmanartes i we ne onan atc eg Semmens MALATE S trent Mame Piety Hee ete eats aye tw BASS “Aaeeiierenre Aegerpe OTe ape nem tet aentt e Bisset tat serene sue snentgma barnepnearanens. *
74-00000 ech eit Md etnreREe Meee nee: Aareentetetntre ot smaaltate mes et Stee S) coo™ * Epona esses Grenier aves 2 0 ing ha bate dM ceat tad Ot cas ee SRT A Slae Ch toa bad hte tan wanted to meet with a "friend" of the Mexico City case officer's. The files do not reveal that such a contact actually eccurred. Bete hme SERRE gre uinsttemine bt Os gate et Pee a aA BM te nF p rary tai Hexico City, described the meeting (along with others) as follows: *,,.the Station made ‘an unsuccessful ‘apsroach’ to (AMLASH/1)...the ‘approach’ consisted of a ‘friendly’ talk between a case officer, a mutual friend of (AMLASH/1) and (ANLASH/1) when he last was visiting in Mexico. While (AMLASH/T) did not pick up the opportunity at that time. ne apparently did not report the incident to his superiors and the ground work may have been laid ‘for a similar action in the future." Later in March there was a report that AMLASH/1 and. another Cuban wanted to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfil- tration ended with a report that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/1's intention and plans. In August 1961 AMWHIP/1] reported plans by AMLASH/1 to attend th French National Student Union Cultural Festival, and that AMLASH/1 In June 1962 there was a report that AMLASH/I would be travelling via Prague to the World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMLASH/1 was reported as wanting to defect, and also that on ‘his return from Helsinki he would pass through Paris where he hoped to mest AMAHIP/1. The FBI, which was aware of CIA's association with AMWHIP/I, met with AMMHIP/1 in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to CIA if he should contact the Paris Legal Attache. Aan ERS EI Mi ROTI 06 FAC eed NG Me vcoainioanaey maemo woe PAs a a IROAMERON HAE RE snemeinsemiretreuntie wn ers ie te grees ae 4 ’ seoaetmnarer mirc penalise 7 Pe cen weenctegn ote enemas
in Sagtems 203 Ja sole we “In ‘July 1962 CIA contacted AMMHIF/1; -who'made known his dis- ° ; sat isfact on with the way “CIA handled AMLASH/1's “planned defection” in _ _— “paris | in August “i961. ‘ piang were made for a:CIAtcase officer and ~ ANMHIP/ to travel to “Helsinki and anmnereee necessary in an attempt sell as emorasizic ; to being about NLASH/Y g'defectiton. °f the cace of*'cers ~ “The first of a series of meetings with AMLASH/1 was held in Helsinki ‘on T hugust 1962.) The “or igitial ‘cbjective of his defection £ 4 became one sof “recruiting nimi ‘in ‘place: ‘AMPASH/1 was reported as feeling that if he could “do” something ‘really significant for the creation of a new "Cuba ‘he was interested in returnthg'to tarry.on the fight there.” AVLASH/T spoke of sabotage of aa'oilrefinery:and the. execution of a i CHA bes heacquerte “dinate, OF the? Soviet Ambassador and of Castro top | ranking Castes ‘Siubot fa nat himself. * Se se oft ¢ficer’s report: statedsve for { subject oneves acca as eal : . thie remaking Tid io ‘Comiftaien¢s ‘or plans, ‘ perforne i ig best a seeped ‘ : | Se bey Gata TALASH/LT Mena Ceehemes Tike : { { spirator aliswed to rec a avisioned certainty "had thetréptace, tut that - - whom we fh a A r a Sikbe teed 418 of "eoord inations planninas© taformatisn- distance ane ; line collection, Stel! were necessary prerequisites to H i “ensure the value and success’ of Slchy plans.” -& ern) asy action, Sased-en such aaa -adetie (caphast's GPoriginal) 2S AMLASH/T may pas C1 The security hazard of too frequent meetings in Helsinki led to i early, at trar reict Lac : ty further “meetings 48 Stockho im’ and “Edpérihagert? tAMEASH/1 was next i net on 16 ‘and 17° ‘igist Sg. paris ahere ANRHIP/T ‘arid the case officer ; reguiming-carefst rt vance i ; were joined by another: Saee officer 2? *AMEASH/?' #as-piven SH training 5 @atyon that cic- : 5 and supplies. “On 20 ‘August he was taken to the sowth of France for ; : | . ee “ro ie ; 4 Nabe “eeeng mimecrecerterecmrmer apn es Ore aT Be : “ 3 2 pert ° ORT EA use SENS ht ee! ahr aPedn so pci ow dinette nn Sg PED eM DESSAAEA DS seers OAS ener none nen ee Amie am meBp are ah Tam a tenons emer emg Meteo cameeg oe cate weet eee eeemnytere tat He “e- hee etatacet Mt eneaeeer wetre st Sait . ‘ ‘ . reopens oft «+ epasoontion te caeaiabameriaatth sexpemynenlcpomenaterey Mapua wnanie tan umanansamasen mated enamine ete it ne SB eRBS GRIP
14-00000 2g ata rar’ cS . - : - a | denol itfon demonstration. {ls refused to be pol yaraphed. The case Catice re ort ee . _. officer reported on W August . _ “Have no inten ion give [ANLASH/1} physical ' . beee 1 Cts bee tm Veale Lone OD py. ingig 7 elimination nigston as requirenent but recognize MSrye 2B 2 ae at. &e r . this “something he could or might try to carry $8. pler ar action. _— out on his own initiative." This suggests a plan of action targetted sricificaliv agai > . stro _ The Headquarters cabled repl y the next day stated: “strongly foncur that no physical elanination Reosrt, Lut the actigi taneuac frorcnel vty sey: 7 ; missions be ‘given TAMLASH/1)." " OR. 29 August 11962 ALAS ‘left Prague by air ‘for Havana. This was _the last tine ‘that. he | was. met until he next left Cubs in September 1963. . 1 3982 oML ASH still awaiting °.7 US reveal pias of COMMENT: > ggeesteemmremeesestesns It. is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a rictyvsin, action. COMMENT. ef " recrufted agent | at that time--nor was he ever for that ‘ one en, wth with 2 8 oeane ate matters, as ‘Operat tonal toproval was never granted for man with » 27 mac cee unmcerstard: vt ASH yithis purpose. ey. the end of ‘August 1962 the CIA rela- wm ‘ ro wary eenera as right "thonship. with AAASHI) had nade fo real progress. : alt hough. be was ‘viewed és an “operational “contact sith reference t2 in ngize Breres ; 20 $TéCivv w.8$tF5, potential. Qver & year passed | between August 18@ and as suggetica i7 tne SC repo: .. treeless toward. September 1963 when he »as next contacted by CIA. the moré tsrer. cuesticn o7 BltSt lrite. in terms of the relationship “that he “had with CIf the Tt wes “ssa alternativaiy. certext of ine “erftteal period, for ‘purposes of this Papers is there- Siderint 277° gaternai 27 azcvion, art fore between 5 Septenber and 22 November 1963. the sner‘tic conretatios + a 330 tresertativ 2) AMLASH/1 attended the collegiate Games in Porto Hegre, Brazil eee tere caress nah oe elas ertenan os A ase smote ene wae = sete SO MN eco, Mm oo _ froa § through 8 September 1963, as 2 representative af the Cuban ote ad ": a ae os ‘ RSS cence et Lay
14-00000 porn 7 a> ™ * Tho. } Government.’ He was met there by AMWHiP/1, and by the CIA case Lis) officer who was to take over the relationship with him. AMLASH/1 rethin Said that he had written two SW messages’ (oniy one had been received). were let He expressed his reluctance to use this form of communications because rs: of Cuban postal censorship. : “character izadt 4s ‘pertinent ‘to what followed to noté'shere the relationship is dispu between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time.’ At page 13 of Book V that the of ‘the SSC Final Report the followtng ‘statenent appears: . Hs - conclugs. tat wi“... the CIA took steps to renew its contact gperaticn. vhicn Eo with a high-level Cuban offictal namet AMLASH. The phase” of the matter. CIA's’ previous contact with him had been sporadic; Miesci Aesarsinr cic’ he had not been in contact’ with the CIR since the first contact witbefore the missile crisis of October 13%. The it was uncertain whetexaet! purpose thé:CIA had for renewing @mmtact is itself describes the atrthts’timé {6"ugd ANLASH {n"SA°Gssassination ! | (Page ). The svintmot khoun; bud” thare?ts nd°évidence the CK intended . | by AMLASH/1, and the operationz#2 U.S. response (supra). 6 | Any disethe reason-for-thereshaving béeri rd time aristapty that -AMLASH/T-did ‘not’ Téavé Cuba’ after ‘hat. unt{? September “Gontact since ‘August 1962 was SSC Ren1$63. “df it -ts ‘narrowly correct to ‘state that ‘the “exa:t purpose" _expressfor-retiewing contact’ was’ not ‘known to the’ authors of the SSC Report, SSC Fincft nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was mn important ‘ Thpotential asset whos® asefulness” remained’ to be @xplore’. At this in infec point, not. only was there "nd evidence (that) . . . an gssassination | with aroparation®: was” intended; it: ig’ quite clear’ that’ it'sas aot under At page 14 of the SSC Report it is staged that the first meeting be $ = | >) consideration. The problem at the time was tow to deal with the man. i 4 { em ee 6 e te if
14-00000 [d-ae ober | = rr iad { | | f in September 1963: ' * . « » may have been to gain intelligence and to : cultivate him as an asset for covert operations . . ." A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report, provides an insight as to how AMLASH/1] was assessed at the time, as well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers ~ j of how to deal with him in the future: gor. ROMER epee ae mere wr “AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always ; be a control problem . . (he) will not take time or 5 | i 4 Pl é 4 have patience prepare or receive constant stream S/W messages, let alone OWVL. AMLASH also needs strong confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain..." CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part: Poa « - « Based on what little feel we here have for subject however appears he 1s hopeless as intel] - ; ¥ ail sgh. performer and is best approached as a chief con- spirator allowed to recruit his ow cohorts among 1 ods Solves. whom we may then find persons susceptible to long veto) he ed distance and covert disciplines... * The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/? may put - together. 4 B Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially important, he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities, requiring ‘careful but long-range development for whatever course of, . .) action that might later ¢ ensue. ERAN a aD TNR Ee AIR FR Si Sameera 7 manent fc Ae a
$4-00000 nahn a RD me MERRY CORO“ OOREEIN reer ‘ sek emer em eniee wn oe nn ee i a ae Page 14 of the SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963 cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with ANLASH/1 as follows: “AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the United States to invade Cuba, or_in attempting an ‘inside job’ against Castro, and that he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action." (Empahsis added). This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro himself. That may have seemed implicit to*the authors of the SSC Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently: "AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish j } i q change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of 3 action.* . ; TT At this point, after a year out of touch with a man with whom there had been no working understanding, ANLASH/1's views were of interest, but were very general, Cela thee ss aa rca secre sone tytn +8 ee re en . wee as might be expected after such a long time. The actual ' yeference {6 an “inside job" did not specify castro, as suggested in the SSC Report, but was directed tovards WD oie om vamicae + ER BEE Ds. ao the more general question of how to bring about change. 3 it was offered alternatively, in the context of con- sidering both external and internal action, and not with | the specific connotation provided by the $SC presentation. aneke Pere ne tm RENN te cay Neath onker® em menagerie oo eee wea ee Ge
yo0000 SECRET The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left AMLASH/1 “awaiting a U.S. plan of action.” There was nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things were left very much up in the air. Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that "characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation 4s disputed." (Emphasis added). The footnote observes that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination operation, which begs the question of what it was for "this phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that “From the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba." (Page 86). The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book V, _ ¥tself describes the very general nature of the aporeach by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra). Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the SSC Report. Reference to the dispute may reflect views expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of “ne §SC Final Report. The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro tnvetghed | fa * eengpeppeaanass n+. i 3 or ena ge mente rem coe aptonm ome meme at on Ane mpRR LENT ey seme ym i H
: 7 gas against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.s. leaders. The intended inference, as is known from discussions with | SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or leaked) to Castro what the authors of the report elected to see then as assassination plotting. This characteri- zation is even more explicit at pages 3-4 of the Summary and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the inter- os nrnemeemectemarnenrar mene saree enemies pretation as categorically as though it were fact. The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and seorgrenmey someone - Tate x Pens wet * ‘ undertook nothing. fe ANLASH/' flew to Paris on 14 September, ostensibly to attend a - . meeting of the Alliance Francaise. The trip actually was for an ‘extended vacation, which AMLASH/1 intended to report to Castro bt 4 aot? tt cenepie sop meet after the fact. On 16 September he wrote AMWHIP/1 that he did not “intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to ales the CIA case officer. On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless chen * arrived in Paris to meet with AMLASH/1. Station officers were already Whaat . . On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that AMLASH/1 claimed to have the “necessary people and equipment inside . i Logos ) byt = rege f i ° in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed. { ' H | a) ek Be Se ai kt ~ SiR ata soe “ a ae amt 0s oth e 10 we are eee fT went tae tte AP ae SS ahd ot Beg et neal en lag RRS TW TOM ER EN A ER AI en sane VOT Sa LP ey
14-00000 Secaet [Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without [U.S.] assistance." AMLASH/1 was reported as wishing a meeting with a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of “moral support" for any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that the request for a meeting: “be given highest and profound consideration as feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that he deternined attempt op against’ [Castro] with or without [U.S.] support." A 21 October cable to Washington reported a 17 October meeting with AMLASH/1--"Basically he wants assurance that [U.S.] will support him if his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added). Desmond Fitzgerald, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff, was going to Paris on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/1. The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows: "Fitzgerald will reoresent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled to Paris for specific purpose of meeting [AMLASH/1] and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government if Cuba." (Emphasis added). On 29 October Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/1 in Paris. representing himself as a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person at the meeting wes the case officer, who served as an interpreter. ee, fade ss mene Mhe aed rs a ewmmrmeens Coy sale ; ee oo a aren en ceminma en aahruesien ~ «a aie ; nt Ne ees ete atte Sea i
14-00000 e He mens emp ees €a faa On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing high- - ‘ lights of the meeting. It reads in part as follows: "Fitzgerald informed FAMLASH/1] that the United States is prepared to render all necessary ‘ assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leader- ship and assumes sufficient contro] to invite the United States to render the assistance it is i, prepared to give. It was emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only efter a real _couo has been effected and the group involved is in a position to request U.S. (probably under OAS auspices) recognition and support. (Emphasis added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not va Pome hes prepared te commit itself to supporting an isolated uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished ina matter of hours if the present government is a Bee ee still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup period, the U.S. does not desire that the political clock be turned back but will support the necessary wo a& * economic and political reforms which will benefit " TA Ne ete ee EE ERE RE ee a ent the mass of the Cuban people." At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject in 1967, additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re- ge NOTE tte aE ant ae : . . - nen eee PAD SE a AO A ah Ss ee ig aeT Le OR eee ROR a rnge on ne ame pet RFT ee
{+0000 called that AMLASH/1 spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some other weapon that could be used te kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer, oy although not present at the mecting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and j had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer fs reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum noe : ’ stated that: ; ° “Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the Fitzgerald meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated ‘ that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now i | desired to know what technical support we could provide him.* | On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/1 was met in New York City. He reported on AMLASH/1's reaction to the 29 October meeting in Paris. The contact - _ report on what AMLASH/1 understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, is as follows: | . “The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the capacity of a representative of high levels of the Government concerned with the Cuban problem satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was con- cerned, but he was not at all hapoy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operational plan as he saw it. [AMWHIP/1] said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly on this point. SEGRE! vane re en eae - Fee ate ete certs I EOE OTT Ee we NO 3 : pes es
Boo wee Ha tae chee eS aot IR He could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, j the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to | (AMWHIP/1], [AMLASH/1] feels strongly on this point, | and if he does not get advice and materials froma | U.S. Government technician, he will probably become fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date.* COMMENT: At this point it is important to note that Agency documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told, and what he was told, which matches a later report of what he understood. In essence he was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then : rs URE T Cop ree only if he was successful. While that may not seem a a. very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a government, it is directly relevant to the question of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is wre So contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18) ee ee t to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 inter- preted the put-off by Fitzgerald. ave sieaemtnprenou n° s ’ . 14 ‘ ween ne. on Se tet a DREN NY estes aA th Celie 3 ey nee ey. Se ee pee: pe e oe
2 | | . be ci gn eminn pervs Gatotas gett Ce cape ot wee eet Kae teste TET ; rifles, w/scope..." Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/1's understanding is provided by a July 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously at pages 35, 72 and 74 of Book V of the SSC Report). This report was from an FBI informant who stated that AMLASH/1 was unhappy with the CIA response and that Attorney General Kennedy had refused to support the plan. Given the substance of this aspect of the report it is apparent that although the date of the report is June 1964, this particular information dates back to 29 October 1963 when AMLASH/1 was told by Fitzgerald, ‘representing himself as speaking for Robert F. Kennedy, that he would not be given support in this opera- ve. tion. while this is not the reason the FBI report was cited _ in Book Vv of ‘the ssc Final Report, it provides additional i clear confirmation that AMLASH/1 understood that he Lad - han: __, been turned down at the 29 October meeting. cop the sc. “Following the 4 November meeting with AMWHIP/1 CIA reviewed what & been r could be done to maintain the contact with AMLASH/1. On 19 November 1963 “9 muthis . Fitzgerald “approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside _ Cuba. The cache could, if he requested it, include .. high-power ~OStKO CL. “Tits with * on 19 November Af ANLASH/" told a CIA officer that he planned to . return to Cuba. On 20 Novenber Headquarters cabled Paris requesting _ that AMLASH/1 “delay departure. ..(to) permit one more meeting which _ -AALASH/T requested." . “on, the same day (20 November) in response to = wa the 18 Bon of bb in - TO re ae ke ae A ae cement mt et nate oe he omg a MAE STD ss nrmnaronasio t Bpaa aetna mre ee are pnp meng me atmpereemepttine Hein Sante AAA NBN Oe OINTES RR TT MARA Bs nT
14-00000 swe ee ence anges eed i res AN: Sega a telephonic request, AMLASH/1 agreed to delay his departure “tf it is something interesting.” The case officer told him that “he could not assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH 5 } had requested." The cable reporting this exchange noted that it was a “rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person in the room. The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief and cryptic telephone conversation into the "first indication that he might receive the specific support he requested.“ More factually, and quite significantly,. the Report acknowledges that no specific support had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of ro highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence. The case officer from Washington arrived in Paris the morning of 19 socom Nag oR 22 November and met with AMLASH/1 late that afternoon. As they left i i the meeting they learned of President Kennedy's assassination. They probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot. . Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of _ i ' President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President oo Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro. 16 a ® te seamed hal ede camcetamieattenrttn a rape Apis EON ay} 2G NERA Be cAENNeNT A Ae cy hte NS meee vs en = am Meme 5 oe ew sERaET ; brassy sc canston > auptettfptitt VigsE ANT tant = . tee anes LAA he: ene fee. Spokes foe a 2 oe rete ee Seria d Se _ 7 * Ty ate ES
14-00000 SESAEI Il. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC_ REPORT na tne ne RAN TATA et EEA Section 1, 8 This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that "it places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies) Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation." It states that the report “details these operations to illustrate why they were relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been | examined by the Warren Commission. The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the -MLASH operation warranted such review, {s summarized at page 5 of the Report as follows: . “The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the tarren ct orem a ot te ae me Commission's work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier er ' plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, see cee enmatees stir: eae enntte-qeeenem- nine sag ates sin ap netememn se tthe eo + the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat ‘of retaliation for such plotting.” without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly | | | t | As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was . | V7 | { 2 a Te at a a kod mabe ae sere wat ree | sane sound $ ee _ tage dag se : 6 NG +e . ii eee A Ma Seg ad . shina
(pave Conese westerns ne ma man + SEGRE! unsuited to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally accurate to note a coincidence in tine, of the contacts with AMLASH/1 prior to the death of President Kenncd;, but that is all. It is incorrect to say that "CIA had endorsed AMLASH's +roposal.” There was no agree- ment with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned of the contacts with him there was notitng to learn beyond the fact _of the contact. The relationship was most tenuous and without any support promised to him for whatever . planned. Castro's "threat" --a$ noted above--must be considered irrelevant to the substantive nature of the AMLASH relationship at i}. t time. This viewpoint was conveyed to tic Subcommittee prior to publica- tion of the report. At the same time it was observed that theoretically there was greater possibility of leaks trom the earlier operations Anvolving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence . of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have provided more reasonable support for the Subcomittee's view that there were CIA operations that should have been reported to the Warren Commission. pene eet The SSC “Subcommittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68 as follows: *...it is unlikely that Castro could have distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from ‘those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, cee cord _ the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from re attributing then to the CIA." . F | “
14-00000 4 ot eee geste] The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final Report may seem anomalous. It places CIA in the position of con- testing the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC Final Report, and to that extent the thesis that the presentation was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry-- that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks to: support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion of the report as written. On the other hand we tend to not contest a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.S. Government, including CIA activities. eeevkekke kkk tk tk & “At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, in a meeting with AMLASH/1, fs quoted as having: '  ®gtated the United States would support a coup." Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald: *also gave general assurances that the United States would help in bringing about the coup." “The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at ‘the meeting in 1963, in his testimony before the SSC fn 1975. This presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match __. SPORE! rat 3 . Loy Reet ce ke lean SR PT eR rae sae Oem cemrenn OSS Ae wage, ee ieee 2B creat mite sh te, GENER TES, vmet coe Spe 2 laa ree ans A wate meet eit ee Bi ae sme os ety te Ve NoReNOTITaR Fm tae + aetna 23 & on
14-00000 nee ret STE ESAS ee thereto rerar ay (woviil the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time. In considering the processes by which this version came into being, it is noted that the following statement appears at page 87 of the §SC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots: “Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and promised him that the United States would support a@ coup against Castro," citing testimony by the case officer who was present at the meeting. An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows: “3. The contact plan for the proposed meeting Stated: ‘Fitzgerald will represent self as personal ‘representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1 and giving him assurances of full Support with a change of the present government in Cuba.** . (Emphasis added). The underscored portion--the word "with"--in fact read in the actual document “if there is." This substitution of language in a purported quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what Fitzgerald planned to say, which takes on special significance when matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made (as discussed at pages 11 and 12 of this annex) and what AMLASH/1 understood (as discussed at pages 13-15), ; ; e®ee teeta et At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible lot aie were 8 e,. . [seoncd : TF Ae Smt ete Oke A ge ene Nan eT a i + seme Bmerege ie + ® ate 4 den, = meena wo pai, BAe Ce ee ee ee
h4-00000 aac 8 sect © - < "the 1G report, which was in its entirety as follows: ear Sedael for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1963 it It is only noted that it is to the SSC would have affected the investigation. likely that views elicited from CIA employees jn 1975 probably were responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was. tee eek eee ee ee At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the following statement: "According to the 1967 Inspector General Report, CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassi- nation and to return to Headquarters.” - This statement is at least a literary extension of the statement of '. “(The case officer] states that he received an OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off." The $SC was unable to the reference in the 1967 IG report. His testimony is cited, get the case officer to support its expansion on apparently despite suggestive prompting, that: he recalled receiving such a cable, but o * @ could not recall whether it made specific mention Pe ey od Lire |
Vpoocos © RET Ate rime Serre teams ving tas eit Fo Se) of the President's assassination as the reason for breaking contact . . ." It is noted that the cable was never found; it may never have been sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event, the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version. e*eeeke te 2 & & & & Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of tne security of the AMLASH operation. As noted in the above review of the AMLASH operation, AMLASH/1 was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1. Through sensitive sources we know that other Cubans were aware of his fulminations against the Castro regime. We do not know, beyond these generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what persons. We do know how little substance there was to his relationships with CIA during this period, and how little he had to tell others were he inclined to do so. @ 8 Assuming that AMLASH/1 was to attempt to organize a coup, he “obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind. ‘To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things that in fact had been denied him. It was not until much later that the question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than One person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA te break relations with him. bw te ifileaaten 8 nee toe ' ; roe anh wk iy
14-00000 | | \ 4 | | | i Mor ca  eAnte en eeeEN TS Sepa MOMR Rath fewest oA ~) SECAET Some have speculated that AMLASH/1] was, in some way, Castro's provocateur. Such a possibility is always a proper subject for consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the issue remains debatable. We do not offer an opinion here, although we do note that he was rewarded strangely if he was. When finally arrested he served ten years of a thirty-year term. His public trial did not mention his Agency associations for the period March 1961 to November 1964.- An interesting consideration i¢ that when Castro pro- vided Senator McGovern with a list of perscns the Cubans claimed had the mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/1 was among those included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this earlier period. 2geeekeekkkebkke e & & & . At page 26 of the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November . the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names _-Of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. The SSC Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to . determine the significance of. Oswald's contact with Soviets and to assess their activities. The SSC Report states that: “AMLASH's real name was included in the list of names on the Mexico Station cable." This is used as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification of the AMLASH operation. The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest on a misconception of the context in which the name of AMLASH/1 was mentioned. The reference had to do with a contact between a member of 23 eceart Tl at ann athe aoa, BP as oat on “ te Be lean tehe "Ute dati 1A i PM ES SAREE P+ 13 eee Seed t } i 3 ,
‘fgov09 SECRET the Soviet embassy and a Cuban cultural attache -- in December 1960 -- - about a press conference planned for AMLASH/1 in Hextfco City in . . February and March 1961. It was not a report of a contact between AMLASH/1 and the Soviet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable. In any event, the December 1960 date preceded the Inauguration of ; President Kennedy, which further removes the question from any relevance to the subject. There was no-reason to check the name. The presentation in the SSC Final Report is confusing and mislead- - ; ing on this point. pete heheh eat ; Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report cone . cerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states “that the purpose ef those meetings had been to plan the assassination of Castro." This fs the same FBI report that helped confirm the ‘earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages 14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that “there is now under “discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro" (July 1964) it badly mixes times and events. In any event, this aspect of the report substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is not directly relevant to the Warren Commission Inquiry. = * Sie . ¥ a rater, a 2 eget! oo Bite or SECRET a ors see ee OO mete Bo ~ Oe ot veal Poti toe Late OP a ec ee ee weet wee ot Sw amcnae amereapnennaateme = woe = ee 2 {oe ieieytae hn,
100000 eet Ato REREAD ATOR LACES. te ot eb te or weal gruas Ce ee 2 2 eS At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testimony of the Chief, SAS Counterintelligence. His recollections are very uncertain. He is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact tine fraze, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks of his “vague recollections" that the Fitzgerald meeting was related to an assassination plot against Castro. The $SC Report nevertheless gives this opinion full play despite the extensive qualification as to its reliability. Reka Reka KR ee EE At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration is given to what was known of the AMLASH operation by certain CIA employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept as a preaise that the relationship was an assassination plat. throughout, and overlooks the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period in question. e There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship with political action assets; that such was the case with AMLASH/1 is noted in the discussion above. In the present instance the uncertainties were recognized and clearly recorded, as well as the limits placed on positions that would be and were taken with AMLASH/1. It is important to keep this in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses, as presented in the SSC Final Report. 25 SECRET a Te re me ae a eg ee wy «Seas #0 Fn bh Vets, a lp vee conmetn t ®
io0v00 oe ~ SECRET Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding relating to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time. What did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circum- stances at a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps on the basis of representations by SSC staff members as to what it was--required quite a clear and precise treatment. The SSC Final Report did not accord the subject that treatment. keke ete ee & & At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made to a Cuban exile designated as “A,” who informed the FBI and CIA in mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made it clear that "A" was unaware of AMLASH/1's 1963 associations with CIA. This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an irrelevancy. It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his 26 SECRET Fame ae ee eres camp t y i { ; i Hi *
re gecatl oo assassination also conta‘ned no reference to that period, although AMLASH/1's later activities were cited. kekeeewekek & & ek kk ee ee It is useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows | that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented as a potential asset. There was early consideration of his defection, ' which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was . determined that it was best for him to go it ‘alone, developing his t own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were held concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically . conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period F preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his own program before he could expect support from the U.S. Eventually -- but not until after the death of President i 7: Kennedy -- firmer indications of support were offered. Even then “ the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a 7 man who claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside * omacgen ero . [Cuba] to accomplish (the) overthrow..." The nature of the ‘yelationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964 (page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/1 DET wate that it could not be associated with his concept of the first step of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro. hile one can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that these : ie - > directly involved structured their thinking differently. an 7 27 os de SEonE: oe = Om tema i “Ere sae ARE ie 3 Rr eans : ate i
74-0080 dewogenn amen SESRET o™ The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interia Report on Alleged Assassination Plots. At the time of the 1967 IG report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at i different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that ; question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship | Jone. developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC | Report is both imprecise and misleading, epee nena oe at senate ste tee oon an le = te 4 sighs. t 3 cy dhe “Pytemn yey - ne et : Pa ‘ o ‘€ ee “gin 0° PRecmapeamagmnsgsegeremicine tetiientTe <P AAPOR tr Tet EUAN x" tai Ti nae Nn Aan + arene nrg NENT eee( MAH Ge6st Mae mse cepmnners ne °=? “lunes = pene Gee SaaS, searongenaue
. votes wo — wemaapan 4 Fr aa <meta as eonmane He + i } _MATERTALS FORWARDED TO WARREN COMMISSION AND FBI rie, AT RR a ai ? bo | * Sect eeaacenaianmarertten = = 2 ce a oe Bt ee arama a ee ET wnat ae Seg erate 8 wees menue ene inate rt Re eT ne
1ipoooo Volume V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of ; limited effort by CIA in the course of the Warren Commission ' inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report, CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts 2 of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and ‘ Submitted special analyses and reports. ; The following pages I‘st reports and other papers submitted te the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation) end to the Warren Commission. It is felt that this compilation , F {$ appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that Be 7 ft effort. ae a fort Bs 4 The lists fail into the following sections: : E.1 Dissemination te the Intelligence Community a ss os E.2 Disseminaticn of Information to the Warren Commission 7: £.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations ' —.4 Memoranda to Warren Commission Mw 4ye ew Seterecene + Ae pee
a Information received from the Agency's field stations was dis- AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FRI AND THE WARREN COMMISSION seminated to appropriate agencies and departments as soon as possible after receipt. disseminations, CSCI's, Bureau of Investigation, et al. The following list of some 100 cabled and memoranda were forwarded to the Federal The listing covers the period from 10 October 1S63 through September 1964. AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISS I *10 October 1963 . “On 1 Gctober 1963, a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico City reported that an American male, wha fdentified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City ..." - Reciptents:. FBI, I&NS, Navy, State. mission] #24 October 1963 Request for two copies of most recent photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD. Navy. Recipients: 23 November 1963 Information relating to telephone call on 28 Sep- tember 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. I i & * . . alec aye ce Se Be an Dat 20 ant tres ee Be get eo Recipient: FBI - Pocument Date  focument Number IIl - Originating Office i DIR 74673 DIR 77978 DIR 34915 epat aah NATIONS Ht (WH/3/Mexico) (Warren Com- (H/3/Hexico) (Warren Commission] (WH/3) TS bbe Ce - An asterisk indicates that the document was also made available to the Narren Commission. whe Be SEGRET me epeptace Met en Ms om en eee tn eee tate abides sksuho ae ee EEO ate 1 °3 hadiada ia nS A + M wane co sae spe
14-00000 SBR le Geasenstesteapesteteteate eomatitesntetionceaee ssastemitiyeanann ony Sn xt tam 2 see thet she wl ee lente AR a ARM aT Ime OTT ne cena eee eet ee a a tS ens Sree eka s RE ag ay kent ) . 26 November 1963 SECRET 24 November 1963 TDCS-3/565 ,829 Subject: Cuban Precautions following Assassination of President Kennedy. Recipients: State/INR, State/DIR, DIA, Army/ACSI, Navy, Air, JCS, SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR, ORR, 00, EXO. 25 November 1963 . DIR 84950 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City; Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. ° Recipient: FBI. 25 November 1963 DIR 84951 (CI/SIG) Agency requests information relating to OSWALD's Activities in Mexico City. Recipient: FBI " 26 November 1963 cscl- (WE/BC) Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message. Recipient: FBI. : _ * CSCI-3/778,826 (WH/3) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of ' President Kennedy. Encloses transcripts of tele- phone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and 3 October 1963. Recipient: FBI. 26 Novenber 1963 CSC1-3/778 ,829 (WH/3) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. (Encloses transcripts of tele- phone calls made by OSWALD or concerning OSWALD between 27 September and 3 October 1963). NB: This dissemination may be identical with CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to be the correct one, according to a copy of, the - document in CI/SIG file No. 568 . ' Recipient: FBI. eo A seu. web geye oe erm wim ao smapagtgl ts cr et ‘ . a ee een nee ay a ee A tpt ee ee
14-00000 oe meammentete see es eaten item 26 November 1963 = = ~DIR 85177 (WH/3/Mexico) SECRET 26 November 1963 DIR 85069 (WH/3) Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress- man to Texas on 26 November 1963. Recipient: FBI *26 November 1963 DIR 85089 (C/WH/3) Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan, stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 that “on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy ,in Mexico City”. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 26 November 1963 DIR 85176 (WH/3) Subject: Marina Nikolaeva OSWALD (information volun- teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed REGGAB studying in West Germany). Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. Subject: Telephone communication between Cuban President DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassadro to Mexico. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. due ' 26 November 1963 = = ~—sUnnumbered (C1/SI1G) - Subject: HUNTER Report Ne. 10815. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 _ Unnumbered (cl/sté) ' Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816. Recipient: FBI. 3 ~ SECRET boas: i + Bm Nese pe Ee, Ato tian Tate - 7 ee on roe RS 9 ma ote He Sahn | a AUB Sg titicn 2 pe ae ™ 4
14-00000 SECRET 27 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 ,881 (WH/3/Mexico) i Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963. Recipient: FBI. *27 Hovember 1963 DIR 85182 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard - Thomas GIBSON, an Anerican living in Switzerland, who wn - 4 was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding , i latter to a close friend in Bern. . Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] i 27 Hovenber 1963 DIR 85195 (C/¥H/3) United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage : : of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. McCONE, : 3 i and Mr. HOOVER. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. - 27 November 1963 DIR 85196 (C/WH/3) . According to information from Nicaraguan Security i _ Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963. Recipients: FSI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. *27 November 1963 DIR 85199 (WH/3/Mex ico) Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. . Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 27 November 1963 DIR 85222 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Silvia T. OURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexice City, contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. + . Bpbibiteasion ‘en ’ eA ae oo wee Te eee re eee neers eee ae 1 see eta wnt 5 | BB teimcssaict eeeye
ong eat at whe << ohe -e ae . ee . cy . ' . - . ~ ‘ ‘ —seGhtt i 7 ' 27 Hovember 1963 CSCI-3/778,881 (WH/3/Mexico) : Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in { Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963. Recipient: FBI. *27 Hovember 1963 DIR 85182 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard Thomas GIBSON, an American living in Switzerland, who was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding latter to a close friend in Bern. , Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 27 Nov -‘nber 1963 DIR 85195 (C/WH/3) Ae apee pm ae + Cun nereeemtaReEMeN seen een aa United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage { - .of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. McCONE, mo . and Mr. HOOVER. ; Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service wad edt emery cos 7). eceived copy. | a 27 Novenber 1963. DIR 85196 (C/wH/3) . Yd ae 3 y kd :  .' ..., According to information from Nicaraguan Security a 4 [i -:_. | Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan Ey 4 | | ~ intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963. 1°. a-- + 7: Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service | received copy. ; | “*27 November 1963 DIR 85199. (WH/3/Mexico) : ~ Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. . Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] . 2 tow cet cee meee einen : 7 November 1963 DIR 85222 (WH/3/Mexico) r.. ,.,, Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the 7. Sar " Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, i * contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD. ‘ , Recipient: FBI. . . re: eer nite weil ~ abel oo te itch aud peut serensen Ste ean mins ac mnie pennants phameerepeenaementy FF Setar whi
# JSR 3) ’ 27 November 1963 DIR 85573 - 27-flovember 1963 —sechEt 27 November 1963 DIR 35246 (WH/3) Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service _ received copy. (Also relayed to S. PAPICH of the FBI by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.) 27 November 1963 . ° DIR 85471 (C/WH/3) Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. ° (WH/3/Mexico) information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALYARADO. _ Recipients: FBI, State, White House. > 27 November 1963. -. - Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Information on Ernesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by tele- phone to §. .PAPICH. : Recipient: FBI. — ; ".2'97- November 1963...“ Unnumbered’. -. . ”. (CI/SI6) Information regarding photographic coverage of Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed to S. PAPICH of the FBI. - Recipient: FBI. Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH with regard to OSWALD's presenc2 in New Orleans in September 1963. Recipient: FBI. - . 28 November 1963. -—>=DIR.-- 85657. (C/WH/3) On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Em- . bassy in London indicating that an “American gangster- type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1953. ‘ Recipients: FBI, State, White House. SECRET ‘minora ehettet 3180 quran meee RR. atm : ~ faut Cane nome c ee ea th Fer SADE ec esate eet Ses wean a ea rE iteted anemere mbete dS neem eneeden Sk RTI ” ~ + ae, ete enptas = ee | i |
140000 - j ~ i - j ; i. *28 November 1963 DIR 85662 (C/WH/3) Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte, Recipfents: FBI, State, White House. [Warren _ Commission] ’ ; *28 November 1963 DIR 85665 (C/WH/3) The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963, i a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to ; Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embaasy. ' SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. LEE [sic] who t murdered President Kennedy. ° Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service _ received copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 ,893 (WH/3/Mex to) Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirade de DURAN ‘ . and Horacio OURAN Navarro. ‘ Lo Recipient: FBI. : ; #29 November 1963 - DIR 85666 oo, [ je -.-..  Aeting upon FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARASG- ; 2 “ 2\:.-, .: be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional i of | oe Phe interrogation and investigation. en ee so; ->:, Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com. i ! . 29 November 1963... DIR 85668 ©; © (WH/3/Mextco) : . bg : _ Highlights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Havarro | re | i a and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN. re ;..~ _ Recipients: FBI, State, White House- : _*29 November 1963 DIR 85670 (C/wH/3) a | 3 | 7s" + Sensitive sources ... have reported that when the oh -., °°  @3 November arrest of Silvia DURAN became known to , 7 fi i ; the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a P| 2+" great deal of discussion. J 3 | is) “- -« Recipients: FBI, State, White House. (Warren - fi.. ++ Commission] , de 4 | are 3 . - 2) be 6 ; ew Boy | ae eel. ; | fe ed Boies Boo ; SRR ADA DB NESE STATA APR cepa aad BOA BS AEA 8 ot gg cht RENAE a Seem a eaecrneRe atin none mateitci sens + eal vor" sete 4
14-00000 SECRET. ~ 29 November 1963 DIR 85676 (WH/3/Mexico) | Subject: Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers. Recipient: FBI. *29 November 1963 DIR 85691 (C/WH/3) } Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man : claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to i assassinate Kennedy. i Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. . i 29 November 1963 DIR 85714 (C/WH/3) Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. ; *29 November 1963 DIR 85715 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 1959 at, ; - to May 1962). + of, : . Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service 7 oF i - veceived copy. . ‘ 29 November 1963 DIR 85744 = = (C/wH/3) Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate. : Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service 1. received copy. *29 November 1963 DIR 385758 (WH/3/Mexico) Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and ; Horacio DURAN Navarro. ' Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service } received copy. [Warren Commission] i a4 ij SECRET TO Dm maene «ARTES IHR Radin Gite Reps tat enternne TT ae te ne mee 6 A am mI tang éy | i { sauisaman SME Berea
14-00000 SECRET ®29 November 1963 DIR 85770 (C/WH/3) Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging advance information on assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with $. PAPICH concerning rumor that Oswald had made a bank deposit. 29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (C1/SIG) Telephone contact with §. PAPICH relaying the Director's suggestion that FBI check all bank accounts and safe deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas. 30 November 1963 CSCI-3/778/894 Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington Post suggesting two men involved in assassination. Recipient: FBI. . *30 November 1963 DIR 86063 (c/wH/3) Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte admits his story a fabrication. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 3 December 1963 DIR 86496 (C/WH/3) Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico. Recipient: FBI. a . *4 December 1963 DIR 86702 (C/WH/3) Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife, June 1962. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service | received copy. [Warren Commission]
14-00000 ne ae - . SECRET Segre mre ene en 5 December 1963 DIR 87189 (C/WH/3} i Known Soviet intelligence officer in New Delhi demanding full probe into assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. i *6 December 1963 BIR 87520 (C/WH/3) Correction of DIR 87502. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] *7 December 1963 DIR 37667 . (C/WH/3/) : Reinterrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded. i Recipient: FBI. (Warren Commission) § December 1963 DIR 87731 (WH/3/Mexico) Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with Cuban Embassy, Mexico City. Recipient: FBI. *9 December 1963 DIR 87796 (WH/3) Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging assassination arranged by Communist _ Chinese. ; Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 9 December 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) tt Telephone contact with $. PAPICH regarding identity ‘ of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy i prepared and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8658 IN 75902). Recipient: FBI. 11 December 1963 TOCSDB 3/658, 408 . Subject: Comments of Soviet official regarding | : (a) Moscow views on international situation following death of President Kennedy, and (b) | resumption of disarmament talks. Recipients: General distribution. SECRET nomen ORE can Mage Eitan I Ca yy AGS Sed pa fn MRE Eh ote eee = ern ane) t
14-00000 SECRET 12 December 1963 CSC1-3/779,048 (C/WH/3) Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: HILSON-HUDSON, ; John; WILSON, John Hudson.) Recipient: FBI. *]2 December 1963 DIR 88643 usr of “neds. Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Presi- ws. dent Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Mee BSS . 3 ‘ae cond weare, Rica. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com- mision] 12 December 1963 DIR 88682 (C/WH/3) Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not to comment upon the assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 12 December 1963 DIR 88747 (C/WH/3) Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. i [ Recipients: FBI, State, White House. zt . ; *13 December 1963 ~~ - CSCI-3/779,136 (€/WH/3) ’ . Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipfent: FBI. (Warren Cummission] 16 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,135 (C/wWH/3) Subject: Peter DERYABIN'’s Comments on Kennedy Assassination. : - Recipient: FBI. ; *18 December 1963 . DIR 89970 -  (C/wH/3) > Further information on Richard Thomas GIBSON. : Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service s { received copy. (Warren Commission] = a ; a SECRET ty % > ¥ i . — . neem oT oe Rina Ex-P- eBeoreataan. — aerteer ean Fe oe ee ee ee ot wee me cece
14-00000 SECRET *18 December 1963 DIR 89980 Subject: Actions of Siivia DURAN after her first interrogation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission] 19 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,225 Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned by Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 19 December 1963 C50B-3/658 ,870 (WH/Reports) Subject: a. Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and as Rauo ROA y Garcia. b. Probable Future Plan of Action for Carlos RAFAEL Rodriquez. Recipients: State (Miami) and others (not identified. 27 December 1963 S-—SsCSC1~3/779,297 , Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese). Recipient: FBI. . 3 January 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/S1G) ‘Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964 regarding newspaper article appearing in £1 Caribe on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November. Recipient: FBI. *10 January 1964 CSC1I-3/779,482 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. Recipient: FBI. [warren Commission] Vv oe ee oe . 1 athe age eee a a ae eet ee = cement Hanne
14-00000 SECRET | 14 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,510 (cI/SIG) - f Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling of t, information from CIA.) ‘ Recipient: FBI. 27 January 1964 CSC1-3/779,729 (C1/SIG) . i Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna ‘ OSWALD. | Recipient: FBI. ' 30 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 —~ (c1/S1G) Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 4 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,817 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names, addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the Soviet Union.) Recipient: FBI. 18 February 1964 DOP 4-0860 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of John F. i Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DOP 4-086) Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Comnission] 18 February 1964 DOP 4~0862 . «| Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service. Subject: Assassination of President Pe) 12 SeURET ene ee EES Se Ate nnn Ane FEE sft ae nae nates en wenn Aap 1 Ae: sOmen gir ? brcaatnet SS tll ognecagngene vorbis eer ete ent oe eee menameeeteae 2 At Me SAA eK RE RITEREN ee wo me MONET cs peo so ee areger Np Sis . see IR Ts oy Be
#400000 & SECRET | John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in “Historic so : f Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.) . i Recipient: Secret Service. {Copy to Warren Commission] ; 18 February 1964 DOP 4-0864 Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Subject: Assassination af President John F. Kennedy - Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary". Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission] 20 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,988 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding SETYAEVA and RAHM. ) Recipient: FBI. 22 February 1964 DIR 03101 (c/WH/3) Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan Student Mohamed REGGAB. Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service). 11 March 1964  CSC1-3/780,344 Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina QSWALD. _ Recipient: FBI. 20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,612 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. i Se (Photograph of an individual closely resembling OSWALD). Recipient: FBI. “16 April 1964 CSCI-3/780, 996 (SR/CI/R) ee etn melee chem eee ne a Rak Pacem mcrapeliseen rer ma Pr é De Meee St Ateeiges agra eo te th D bet . rai nor aa rs mee kar PR RIESE iS Ie 954 SORE OH 7 a’ = “s ~e : K ie : geste ate s 7 - oye tee! . ~ i x. a s sa ars Mi ~ my ci Bae Ey * . at, Gal ERE . Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. ~ Recipient: FBI. . ra 20 April 1964 CSDB-3/660,704 Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination. . Recipient: FBI (?) DOE Y ., . ce eee renee Re EEG ee SO A EIA LD RED EM te eed dee Se wlaetrd ftene Beameme 10" eons Seiad ay rege ed o ’ vig Pode ‘ bee Bia lt «Sari con 15 cadladioun, <n nant cee a ameter aee eee, ane Mtoe rcnmnanens oF Ses Pe ees
14-00000 Sn earn = = Foor anti gee nae ae 22 April 1964 CSCI-3/780,881 (SR/CI/R) _ ; Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.) Recipient: FBI. 30 April 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone Contact with S. PAPICH on 29 November advising PAPICH to contact SOLIE of the Office of Security for information. | i 8 May 1964 DDP 4-2351 L i Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook. f Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI. : ll May 1964 csc. CSCI-3/781,172 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book belonging to Marina OSWALD.) Recipient: FBI. 13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,282 (SR/CI/R) coe 1 armani wt Pas BES gh OE cae ee ake ? Poa Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (identification of photographs sent to CIA by FBI.) co, Recipient: FBI. : - @ 15 May 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service -to the Assassination of President Kennedy. ° oy