478-10004-10054 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : _ RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: _ TITLE: e DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : - - _ ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW: OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Ww 52879 Docld:32112782 Page 1 ‘ g. JFK Assassination system Date: Identification Furm Agency Informat on ROCKCOM 178-10004- 10054 - ASSASSINATION FILES MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3) Document Infomation PFIAB KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN RECORD MEETING OF THE DCI WITH PBLAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 A.M. 12/28/1962 {0 CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS PFIAB | MC CONE, JOHN OPERATION MONGOOSE CUBAN EXILES MEMORANDUM Top Secret 1B Redact 09/09/2016 4/17/20)
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‘ ae on eee ‘an DE Pie pelos Mas edges Fa LE Te gael y iM ap eilgs _Pou . a Dt Le ge . oat deed we ® aa . + . oo ‘ . faake sg ehewey oe) | ‘ t ‘ ereen 6 ya - : Aen. Seale sagt se Looe oe ade ome fee tees tow we kee ne tee fe THE WHITE HOUS i. ji.a.5 \. IDE@LIST, COROMA MEMORANDUM LOR ‘THE FILE [one scree sees snes DCRR TTT | an SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 26%, 1962 The Board convened at 9:(0 a.m. on December 27.* Those present were Dr, Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Cliiford and Messrs. Coyne and Ash. Dv. Killian suggested thet Board members read tre draft report which had been furnished to the Board on the vreceding day by Mr, MeCone, the Directcr of Central Intelligence, setting forth the vesults of the all-source review which the Board nad \ requested concerning U, S,. intelligence conmunity activities with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months preceding October 22, 1962, ‘Tne Cnalrman asked that 3oarc members : make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise . for discussion during this two-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that ny he was not sure the DCI's repert had the approval of the inteili- : genee community at this point, for he understood that Mr, McCone ‘ was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it - yas possible that some of the conclusions ana factual details i might not have yet received final approval by the agencies whicn contributed to the preparatior of the report (CIA, DIA, State and NSA). Accordingly, the Chaimran noted the importance or the @iscussions which the Board weuld have on the following day witn heads of the intelligence agercies, The Chairman also thought that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board report to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr, MeGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelli- gence agencies to the Soviet military bullduo in Cuba. Mr. Bundy assured that the President will understand that tne Board is going into the subject deeply and otjectively. About 10 days ago, the Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mr, Bundy who said that he had seen an ¢arly draft of the DCI's report (from a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not get to the basic issues, and Mr, Bundy expressed an intention to talk to Mr. Mevone about this. Dz. Killian stated that he had an appointment to see Mr, Bundy later in the morning at which time he fould ask Mr, Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of this meeting, 0.2 lobe ls. .unable to attend, 3 -
lager 44 oe fae “olheday stay in Cuba,"ar wours GOV ‘equally in wthe ‘dark: about Soviet and Cuban ‘plens ‘for ‘further activities ‘involving a other countries in this: Hemisphere. “Also wé-are! lacking -intel- ae ligence on Cuba/Communist China iisecussions, Hr, Murphy reiterated, “i; his concern that our lack of information on such matters as tnese’,; ’; indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to- an keep our Government informed abot developments in Cuba at the pre- ° sent time and in the future, © Se, . Dr, Killian at. this. point roported to.the Board on’ the con-~ Jy versation which he hadjust-had sith Mr, ‘Bundy. ° According CO” sat ‘Mr, Bundy, the Presidentfris fully “aware that the Board is’ con- ducting its review of ‘the Cuba situation. . The President wants an objective report ‘froma: group'of,scitizens ‘who have-no axe to + grind, and he is’ placing ‘great store on: this effort of ‘the Board, . fe Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about “:: the prospect that the Congress will make inquiries into the Cuba matter. However, Mr. Bundy feels there is a pare possibility that.” Congressional investigators will be more nesitvant to raise hypo- , thetical questions if they learn of the existence of a study having * been made by a group such as the Board, It is Mr. Bundy's hope that the Board will cevefully coisider the preparation of a sani- tized version of the report, but if ‘the. Board end the President feel that this cannot oe done’ then-the*Board should try to prepare 'a | report which’ could be.used in exscutlve session of a Committee of tne Congress, es toe Baw de oe sais Dr, Killian went on to report other matters which had been covered in nis discussion with Hr. Bundy, He said tnat Mr. Bundy: hed expressed concern aver the failure of the DCI to accept the suggestion that there ke supmitted a more adequate report than the one which the DCI forwarded to tie Board on December 26. Nr. Bundy noted in tnis connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy i. makers prime responsibility for any failures witn respect to intelligence handling. 7 bs i 0 0.0 - te ee . oe ee. bs BSS SES On- the question;of-availability of Special Group records for. purposes of the Board‘sistudy,: Mr. Bundy informed the, Chairman .<1-4" that certainly the Board ‘should sxamine such records and that 3°": _ they could be obtained, from. Mr, Parrott’ (Mr. Bundy commented: that whic. have. this !cind.ofsaccess).§ Handle, via BYEMAN es vey fee pte tA LEE OOS BORNE RR TTS Say UNRSREN
eet fice tng eas ws Fae ashe ne? Se a Tae at i food get ae] ey ee TA ne phe ce kee SAP Nang eae eae ¥5 fees Bo As to. the Board 'si's ‘cudy;, eity Sundyttold: ‘Dr. ‘Kal ‘ian - that, the Board snould include’ “in its ;“,eview discussions witn the Secretaries of State and Defense and‘ the Chairme an of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Mr. Bundy ‘ind: cating that the Secretary of Defense has particular reservations’ about’ ithe DCI's report, mother matter mentioned by. fir, Bundy was his belief ‘that the morale of the intelligence, community as a ‘ihole stands to Tet suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and report sat which is being ¢% pected | fron the Board, nce ste ore € ‘J *: hh a, esi a ¥s hes Seen weer eo Tes See With regard to the interim seport which the Board has under. way, Mr, Bundy informed the Chatman that the report could be Gelivered to hin or 1¢ could be pres ented to the Tresident directly,’ and fir. Bundy thought 10° anportant that the Board present 3t to. | tne President in person,:” Onefother matter di ssed was the Board's eoneern about any Intelligence Lot-dotin in the wale of the Cuba .-- « erisis, it being Hr, Bundy's bel ef that no such let-down is in 2 prospect if pre esent directives.aid disc sugsions on the subject. have + (aE any effect in Government. "ight... an . E Atis , So ude ee 5 = st (At the conclusion of the. Ciairman's account of his discussion with Me, Bundy, the Board recess 2d: for lunch, ) : ; At 2:30 p.m.,- ‘the Boai vd: Was briefed on the wor rld situation by hr, Thomas Lawlor, senior, intelligence ‘offices in CIA's Office of. Current intelligence (Mr, Ray ‘Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was. on vacation leave and not availavie to be present at this Board ~.. meeting). Mr, Lawlor explained. chat his own responsibilities in- | BSE eluded the handling of current iitelligence matters, the’ selection . eye and write-up of current ‘intelligonce items (e. g., in the CIB and in.. | Babyy memoranda for the White House),.and the preparation of internal in- 3. aay telligence nutes for use at the SIA Working level, Mr, Lawlor a pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis an? “Be production, not the coliection, of intelligence, His briefing of - ~~ Hate the Board: included. ‘the Following | Subject. matters: won a USSR/Chicom rélations:! Rec siminations wetween the USSR and! Communist’ China are the greatest in the history ‘of their dispute, _ and an . open break~ in, party relations. AS) most likely near, . oe rE a ae ek are “ussr/Cuba: . The: USSR is: Seosehsly | reapprais ing! its! foreign -poricy. post edons in: the (Lien tiof athe, Cuba. erisis aftermath. tee ty Ure sys SSR/Ber2in ie fame nSSR; ast atia: diplomatié thissisy traceablegtoy eLnes, ss 3/Chicom uit ERC ome Naat ie oR TOS REET AT taut et RANE eA POR ACT CEST EN DET SIONS
‘The Chairman asked! hes Del whether’ the MONGOOSE. achivaty? presented any particular"intelligence. problem in-the Cuba. situation. Mr. MeCone:said ‘‘ihat.it had not. He said- ‘that. - in the MONGOOSE: activity: the’ Special’ Group and the Attorney General had given a great del offconsideration to the need. for intelligence collection’ with: respect to Cuba, but ‘he’ intelligence needed. was primaurilysfor"covert ‘action rather is than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity’ i contributed to the. over-all :ntelligence collection effort on Cuba, iar, MeCone recallec| that there was a hiatus in the : collection of intelligence.on Cuba, after the Bay of Pigs in- +5 vasion,7and when he’cook: off:.ce in. ‘November 1961 ‘Mr, MeCone -wes surprised to learn” ‘that*no interrogation of Cuban refugee was aklng places” Thereafter, “following discussions with + '~ . the President and the: ay ae ee, they got the , 2Pelveces, ... interrogations under,..wa LY 9 ae ae r Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been | a * et-down in intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Myr. MeCone said that this took place before his time, but he assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and ~" -° other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's ||. question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in - store in the wake of the Cubs crisis, "Mr. McCone said that Lt there was in fact a great danger of such a development following ¥é,y what some officials consider was an “intelligence victory" ‘at! for the United States,” Mr."TieCone, noting that the Soviet SA-2's remain in Cuba,’ said he-had brought this up forcefully, a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and:the. +: President had agreed to get sord to the USSR tnat any Anters ::4 ference with our aerial recomnaissance of Cuba would be =.” considered as being most grave -- and Messrs. hicCloy. and Stevenson have pass ed this.word.to Kuznetsov. .Mr. MeCone.. added that while’ low-level: reconnaissance ‘flights. have pe suspended ,° should ‘any:ominous. Sevelopment ' occur it will be necessary. to obtain; President.1 approval: of the ‘resumptior , Of. eras Shot ities ue Seared ; oy. § Pace’ *inquiped ® vas to" ihether” ah on ‘the  Sonduet of.inteiligence operations with: ‘regard to: Cuba BRR Mr. McCone-said yes, it is ‘desired to, follow.a more Seeressiveg | battern of, agent™ infiltration into. Cuba. . He would: lake}: CO; Bees ~a°3.or°4'month effort: directed: ‘toward the obtaining; Sof. heaters _intelligence: yon SCubaii(in dew of ;political warfare , for; example’) to. oe toe sovseees “trendtof : So: Letiplans: -in,,Cube.. The:DCItinoted amare the :Sovie ae : Naas teens ets may duietly: ests out eg Lote iouba » gor ‘theyumay% inane ah a Os i rey Praia. ‘S Sr, x
fot aA “fact take. one step ‘ba ol’ "and: ac “stepstforvard, ‘and hold'on to- the Cuba real estate” "as. Be propé ganda | and: insurgency base, as a means of keeping? ‘Castro ‘urder ‘control, ar in order to. : \petain a capability for“quickt: “7 estoration of! a Soviet offensive. ;i , capability. The kindof: concerted’ intelligence’ action whieh “wih eo the DCI had in mind: would’ iricli.de: (1) penetration: ofrthe-: Castroueray sovernment regime (2) ‘the placement of additional agent’ teams “A in Cuba, (3) the continuation: cf efforts to obtain the assistance! Blof representatives in Cuba, {4).the.x “possible obtaining of uSéful i: telligence from - gs 3 Sonne Na at and (5} vbossi of useful.inform: tion from with Castro and who tye pyesterds ay. asked. 60, seayan Mr, Pace asked whether MES Mecone vould ‘favor the use of Guantanamo Naval Base as a base :for launching intelligence .and related operations against Cubi. Mr, McCone said that he would .. not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo for intelligence operations ‘Castro would obtain UN and other, support -: for Cuba's demands for Us. &\ acuation of the Naval Base. “ Answering General: ‘Doolittle 's question, the DCI stated that: -U-2 overflights of: Cuba were: gcing: at the rate of two a day, re-— sulting in coverage of all: tarpets once a week and in coverage of: some important targets’ (e. Bas jiarbors ) more often. Mr. MceCone said that COMOR and USIB. iist hg eer BE ES and that he tnen establishes... . flight schedules,  * ones Pes ; . ee . . ony . mt ‘ : Going back to the subject: of. Guantanano; “Me. Pace asked whether df the DCI had male a study of the expected intelligence return’ thatixé -would be obtained if-intelligence operations were’ conducted’ from. a ‘the Base -- Mr. Pace. adding thit. he thought such a study’ should .be made before:a final. -policy;dec: Sion was.reached,.,Mr.:McCone said. sthat he had. not: ‘made, “such; ‘als tudy "He, added- that ‘in -August the. ~ "operators" vin; EIAs nadfpropesed ; sto.,the MONGOOSE. Group, that Guan-., “tanamo Base be“ ‘so° ‘used, ),but: “th:. Wass ‘opposed at the policy. ahs Mr, MceCone said-that? ‘hes would: niotibez opposed ‘to..a restudy of. the = proposal’ at this:-timel gin, vansverg to; ‘DrveKillianis inguiry,;- Mr “ Me Cone ‘confirmed: that*we: ‘are@ conducting: | and Mr. tlonscthece Fee that Se bik AOE oat fe pene us ib an ee a
an ho aah re ne te to) RE CEA Ag poy ey Poet +... Mp. Murphy asked, the: DCI“ to ‘state’ the?meaning of: "MONGOOSE -B puus', Mr, MeCone explained”.-hat ‘in the MONGOOSE Group 16%" was originally conceived that Piase I would be one of gathering’ intelligence on the possibiliti:s for the organization and supply ats of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only fairly... -- ee ‘successful because: Castro has. 30me. 100,000 informers’ in place -in-f- Cuba and exercises internal-sec arity controls through a system: of ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many teams 1 te, Cuba as had been hoped. On Augast 10, -Phase Ti was reached with: - MONGOOSE planning. for, (a) violeat actions (b) a relatively high... .. level of actions, or: "B- PLUS", “and lesser actions, or "B MINUS”. ’ Mr, McCone said that he“had not been prepared to endorse proposed tp pLuS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing, = :\\°™ because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with «>. MRBMs in Cuba, In any case, .the MONGOOSE effort became diverted vy considerations of SovietJactivities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated. “Pos 8 a7 be In answer to a question fron Mr. Murphy “as to who chairs’ the oe MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not know 7 whether Mr, Bundy or the Attorrey General was now serving as. . Chairman. alee tare yi ce he . at ant : 4 . J 8 na . e 2 “ With reference to. ce of photographic evidence of Soviet | offensive missile deployment pi ior to October 14 photography, Mr. MeCone said that if one looks <¢t photography of Cuba obtained on September 5 it is possible ‘to. spot evidence of activity at the San Cristobal MRBM site, but this <cctivity could have been that of agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile activity. Dr. Killian noted tie Board's concern that Soviet cam- ouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. MeCone expressed his own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage methods, Acknowledging that ovr intelligence estimates leave a certain margin for error, Mr, licCone noted that it is nevertheless impossible for us to say that +e know all that is going on in the _USSR with respect to missile ac tivity. In response to Dr, Killian's.” comment that public discussion: ,seem.to indicate that U. S. missile ..: eo capabilities are superior.to,.those of. the USSR, the DCI considered «... ia that any such conclusion’ is‘erroneous and dangerous and could lead _ to a complacency which.might well result in curtailment ofthe U.S. :missile program by’ an economy -riinded Congress... Mr. MeCone added fii 4 that in his: presentations to. sclect Committees of the-Congress he 7" sses > concern 20 2.50mi periority.. 3 ‘Dr.! Killianjwondered’ whether:-the. President ;* the :Secretary. of ey 5 ae ze? A ‘ Defense ,,and «the sCongress\unde:‘stand .the danger: of” conclusions thate « Gijgnothing/isgthere wbeeaises Aen itibe, seen... Me. N fey Pecsundoubtedlys theres §) aktent Gavy,depe# quer gra ane ‘ abr ag t? hicgintel Ligenc? ie BP uses edie Bet