198-10007-10098) *. JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form nn ne Agency Information , AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10007-10098 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ; , ee Document Information ORIGINATOR: = JCS FROM: V.H. KRULAB TO: CYRUS VANCE TITLE: CUBA DATE: — 03/07/1963 PAGES: 28 SUBJECTS : MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: — Secret RESTRICTIONS: 1B CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 08/12/1998 v9.1 HY 4S0954 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 12. Memo from Krulak to Vance enclosingthe Second Working Draft of "Cuba: The Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees." NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION DATE: MAR 2016 TK Revie pariment of the Army EO 13626 Rocca [ Exclude & Exempt Authority. & Refer To oa ~ Review Date J //47/ Bb LS By ape Boclda: 327474091 Page i
an THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM Date __... an i . March . 1 963 a Mr. Cyrus Vance To? een cee ee ene Subject: Cuba 1. Attached is the current draft of the paper on movement of subversive “trainees. Additional copies have been made available to Mr. Califano. 2. I have notified the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this paper may be referred to the Chiefs for a short-notice review. All Services, OSD and the Joint Staff already filave copies. V. H. KRULAK Major General, USMC _ Attachment HY 50955 DBoctd: 3274274091 Page 2?
HY 0955 MAR 7 1968 LoMORAMINUM NO, ké POR CRANE RAL EARLE G. WHEELER (ICs) AUN 1 VMOALT, IB. , UINOED) oT, wow MAIOR GENERAL a CART: allan ear BRIGADIER GENERAL BM. dt. ELV OOD, UaMG sUaIEGT:  Llnterdepartmental Cosrdinatiog Comxition of Cuban Altair: Movement of Gubveraives, Attoched is the latect dvadt af the pager en the moveoent of subrergives and eubversive traleseas prepared by the Say Committee on Subversion of the subject comanlttes. tig requested thet your eomumeste on thie paper be ouleultted to me owt deter then 1760 howre this evening. This wil be the Leet appogrtunitiy te cama oa thie paper belere 1% _ is prevented te The President. sige® Soeeph A. Callians, Ter. Sgeckat Aaslatant to the Secretary of the dccay Atacheent ae otated ne Gr (a| Verchoo) a Wu Cel (im SEGHEL, oF ye van AkheGe ey BS fe é RA ue \ at | pe) - i , ASG Control fi No.7 ZoZ> CUOBOI es | aye Le BDocld: 327474091 Page 3
7 March 1963 TO SERVICE, OSD. AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS: . This is the second draft of the paper which you | examined on Tuesday. It embodies changes resulting from your suggestions as well as from a meeting of the Inter- - departmental Committee. Please make suggested final alterations and return them to my office by 1400 today, “Thursday, 7 March, since the Interdepartmental Commi ttee must put it in final form tonight. : a Service contact points are urged to ensure that their superiors are aware of the developments on this paper, since the Office of the Secretary of Defense will probably send it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their urgent consideration. “Vv. H. KRULAK Major General, USMC . GROUP-1l SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFIC ATION é HW 50955 DBocld: 3274274091 Page 4
HW 50955 SECRET 2 © Second Working Draft CUBA THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES TI, introduction The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the flow of subversives between Cuba and other. Latin American countries. Execution of any one or more of the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation; execution of them - all will not completely solve it. The practical problems involved are too numerous and complex. With respect to diminishing legitimate travel to Cuba, we face multiple problems in the policies and attitudes of | those Latin American countries through which the subversive traveller must pass. From the viewpoint of these nations _ the direct actions required have strong political and some~ times legal implications; implications which ‘cannot: be over- come easily, even where the leaders of these countries choose to do so. | | | In the matter of clandestine travel, we are confronted not only with the great depth of communist guile, porn .of two- generations of experience in the international movement of , SECRET Docld: 327474091 Page 5
HW 450955 SECRET  subversives, but with the inexperience, ineptitude and lack of awareness in these same matters on the part of the Latin American community. In spite of this, the advantages do not all reside . with the communists. Cuba is an island. Its insular. character.imposes certain sharp limitations upon personal | movement, Cuba has no frontiers with other states; every- one who enters the country must do so either by water, or air. There can be no slipping through the barbed wire, On the other hand, this same geographic situation. makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple, There: are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpatrolled Central | American coastline, between 175 and 850 miles of Cuba. | There are. at least 93 airfields, other than United states, within 700 miles of the island, and the ships and craft, indigenous to the Caribbean and capable of supporting the subversive | ebb and flow, number well into the thousands. | Even in the face of these unfavorable factors, a program of direct restraints, selected from among the actions enumerated herein, can have favorable effects. Under the _proposed steps some travel would be stopped completely. More - probably much more - would be rendered difficult. Some. hitherto legitimate movement would be driven underground. SECRET 2 Doclda: 327474091 Page 6
- SECRET Previous clandestine movement would be impeded, compli- cated and harassed to the point where it. becomes more costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus, hope- fully, less extensive, SECRET 3 BW 50955 Docld: 32424091 Page 7?
HY 50955 SEORET ee © | Tl, Nature and Scope of the Problem We do not know enough about the movement of subversive trainees into Cuba and - more important -~ out of Cuba. ‘We do not. know enough about the volume of travel, or the media employed. This is particularly true in the area of illicit traffic, where our knowledge is extemely limited. Regarding legitimate travel to Cuba, CIA presents the following estimate: Legitimate Travel into Cuba Country No. of Legal Travellers Country No. of Légal Travellers 1962 Jan-Feb 1963 | 1962 Jan-Feb 1963 Mexico 4912 | 969 Argentina 500 Unk Guatemala — 80 Unk Uruguay © 115 ° © Unk El Salvador 100 8 Paraguay 60 - Unk Nicaragua 50 Unk Brazil hoo. Unk | Costa Rica 216 © 10 Honduras 92 - 21 Venezuela 200 Unk British | om Unk Guiana Q, Colombia 400 Unk - Panama 56. 1 Ecuador — 208 | Unk Trinidad. Unk Unk Peru 181 Unk Jamaica 593 Unk Bolivia 500 Unk Dominican None Unk: Republic a - Chile 551 85 Haiti Unk Unk SECRET m BDocldad:327474091 Page 6
HY 0955 SECRET | iD @ While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico on their way. On the most conservative basis, then, it will be seen that there cannot have been fewer than 4912 travellers to Cuba during the year 1962, while the average monthly number passing through Mexico for the first two months of 1963 is even higher than the 1962 average, | | Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central Intelli- gence Agency estimates that at least 1500, and perhaps as many as 2000, have received ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many of these are still in’ Cuba. Others have returned to their homelands; some by legitimate means; some probably by illicit means. Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commercial airlines or, -on occasion, by specially chartered Cubana flights. Some travelled to Trinidad or Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled Cubana or KIM flights to Havana. ‘ Others travelled to Mexico, and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial flights to Havana. With the cessation of service to Cuba by. Pan American, KLM, Mexicana, and Iberia airlines in October, the regular Cubana service between Mexico City. and Havana remained the sole direct and regular airline connection betwen Cuba and the remainder of Latin America. SECRET .OR BDoctld: 3274274091 Page 3
HW 450955 SECRET | | a , oe The Cubana service between Havana and Mexico is scheduled to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only a single flight is completed per week. Aircraft now employed are British Bri- tannias -- an obsolescent model. Cubana has requested, but has not yet received, Mexican approval to substitute Soviet. IL-18 transports for the old Britannias. Delay by the Mexicans in granting this approval can have the favorable effect of. impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in poor condition. If, in addition, the British and Canadians can be induced to suspend delivery of spare parts, the planes will soon become Lnoperative:. | Iberia airlines resumed its regular twice-monthly flights from Madrid to Havana on 11 February. This flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching Havana. KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba from the Netherlands Antilles. However, it is now considering doing so. In this regard it is concluded that resumption of scheduled flights by a United States carrier could serve as an. ). encouragement to KIM and others to do the same. - Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not stop regularly at any other Latin American country, though the Soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally sought and received permission from Brazil to land at Recife, en route to Cuba.- - SECRET Doclda: 324274091 Page 10
secrer © | as Some Latin Americans may have travelled to Cuba on-these infrequent flights and, should Brazil permit this arrange- ment to become regularized, the movement of subversives could achieve a new order of magnitude. A Canadian non-scheduled line has operated a few flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying both | material and personnel. The Canadians have been unrespon- sive to our efforts to obtain identification of the passengers. There are no regularly scheduled gea carriers operating between Latin America and Cuba. However, a number of trainees from British Guiana have travelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled Cuban merchant vessels engaged in transporting rice from Guiana to Cuba. © i . Clandestine sources report that transit of Latin Americans through Mexico to Cuba often involves illict pro- cedures. The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides the travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their passports, and they are given pseudonyms for travel out. of and into Mexico, This procedure is obviously designed to impede any effort by the other Latin American governments subse- quently to identify the travellers and to exercise surveil- lance over their activities upon their return. SECRET HY 50955 DBocld:32474091 Page il
SECRET ® © Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow of travel by legal means. This must be countered directly. Beyond this, and perhaps.of greater importance, is the problem of illicit movement both into and out of Cuba, which will un- doubtedly assume growing proportions as legal travel is curtailed, and about which our intelligence is at present most limited. Elimination of this void must be accorded high priority. SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32474091 Page 12
’ BW 50955 SECRET III. The attitudes of the Latin American Nations Success of many of the overt actions proposed in’ the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes of the Latin American nations within whose borders the restraining actions must take place. Presented briefly below is an estimate of what can be expected from the various sectors af Latin America in terms of participation in a coordinated © program of travel control. As a general matter, the imposition of controls on travel is not popular with the public in any Latin American country. This, coupled with their current lack of full awareness of the danger represented by Cuba's training of subversives, will diminish the willingness of some govern- ments to impose controls unilaterally. This is especially true since they recognize that unilateral restraints will have little effect on curbing the travel of their nationals to Cuba, if supporting multilateral action is not also taken. It is likely, however, that most of the Latin American countries would respond favorably -- albeit in varying — degrees ~~ to US leadership in seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba for ideological or subversive training. The Central American countries are more acutely aware of the danger posed by Cubaninspired subversion than is Latin America at large, and can be expected to react SECRET 9 Doocld: 324274091 Page i135
HW 50955 SECRET favorably to proposals for reducing travel to Cuba which President Kennedy might present at the San Jose Presidential meeting. However, their ability to carry out commitments made under such circumstances will be limited by domestic. legal and political considerations, as well. as by their | countries! technical incompetence in such matters. Since Mexico is currently the only hemisphere transit point for legal travel of subversives to and from Cuba, the attitude of that country toward the problem is of great importance. Mexico, to date, has taken three significant steps with respect to travel between Mexican cities and Cuba. It has instituted close surveillance over travellers, to include stamping passports to evidence travel to Cuba. In addition, the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA). These actions all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even further cooperative © steps, particularly on an unpublicized, biclateral basis, wherein the political hazards of a public OAS position are not involved, In this regard, the Central American Presidents — would probably agree individually to seek the participation of President Lopez Mateos of Mexico in specific cooperative moves to restrict the flow of persons to Cuba through that country. SECRET | 10 Docld:327474091 Page 14
ad ro SECRET Peru now has regulations which actually prohibit travel to Cuba, but the regulations have engendered public resistance, and are not enforced. The Dominican Republic prohibits such travel. Haiti has no established policy, but passports and exit permits are reportedly issued. only on personal approval of President Duvalier,. Colombia could legally impose restrictions by executive decree, but has shown no inclination to do so. Other countries, such as Venezuela, Chile, and the Central American nations: plead the existence of legal or constitutional parriers which preclude the prohibition of travel to Cuba, but thus far, they have made little effort to remove these barriers. Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chie, Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. Brazil continues its drift to the left. and gives little evidence of modifying its tolerant attitude toward the Castro government. Chile, with a legal Communist Party, exercises no restraints on travel to Cuba, either direct. or via third country. It is to be expected that these five countries, with some possible exceptions in the case of a Mexico, will be the least cooperative in restricting travel to Cuba. | The elimination of all legitimate passenger service © to Cuba from Latin America could be achieved through SECRET .° 11 HW 50955 DBocld: 32424091 Page i45
HW 450955 SECRET cE . @ invocation of the Rio Treaty, but it is unlikely that the hemisphere countries would agree to do so in the absence of some major crisis similar to that involving the Seviet missiles or a case of direet Cuban intervention in another Latin American country. Nevertheless, a campaign on our part to develop a full awareness of the danger represented by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would probably create a growing willingness to take action oriented in this direction. In this connection, however, it is concluded that resumption of regular passenger service to Cuba by the United States . would render more difficult our efforts to persuade the Latin American countries to take a grave view of the situ- ation, and to participate in dynamic action. Virtually, all the Latin. American. countries would be willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives upon their return to home countries, particularly when the traineets conduct gave clear evidence of his subversive intent. An essential factor, however, is the realization that the efforts of these natiens will not be dramatically effeetive sinee, in the area of internal security, all of themvsuffer from de- ficiencies in technical skill, training, equipment and some- times from a lack of a sense of urgency. The United States can provide essential leadership in eliminating all of these deficiencies. | SECRET 12 Doclda: 3274274091 Page 16
Oo as SECRET IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel Listed below are specific actions contemplated to impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba. Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose, as travel on recognized public carriers, openly arranged and involving travel documents which are presumed to be in proper order. Certain of the actions, it will be noted, | are partially in effect. Others have been proposed to the OAS - wholly or in part - by the Special Consultative — Committee on Security. | a. Immediate Impact Actions The following actions offer promise of producing early, visible and effective results. i: (1) Intelligence Actions (a) Intensify U.S intelligence efforts in each country to identify persons who have traveled, or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected information promptiy to the host government, as may be consistent with our own intelligence pro- gram, and the requirement to protect our sources, (b) Intensify current efforts to introduce covert, U.Se - controlled agents from each country into the Cuban training program. (2) Administrative Actions (a) Induce each Western Hemisphere country to: SECRET 13 N HW 350955 DBocld: 32424091 Page if
HY 0955 SECRET i. Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to own nationals "not valid for travel to Cuba". 2. Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any national of a third country who cannot produce --a valid permit issued by his own country for travel to Cuba. 3. Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which | is not an integral, non-detachable part of the travel document issued by the country of which the traveller is a citizen. Ae Require accurate manifests of all carriers’ departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish : copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions of:.other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected, | | (b) Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition to photographing, all persons leaving for or arriving from Cuba, and to provide data to the parent country of the nationals involved. (c) Make covert arrangements with police and other security and administrative officials in countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba to impose administrative impediments and harassment on Cuba-bound travellers, in order to increase the SECRET Docld: 32424091 14 Page 18
o a SECRET difficulty of travel and thus discourage pro- spective travellers. (3) Actions in Regard to Common Carriers (a) Prohibit resumption of air service to Cuba by U.S, carriers, in order to provide a favorable example to other nations who may be contemplating similar steps. | (b) Expand current restrictions on foreign shipping engaging in commerce with Cuba by closing United States ports to all ships of any shipping line which continues to send any ships to Cuban ports. (c) Request Latin American countries to prohibit ships arriving from or departing for Cuba from embarking or disembarking passengers in thier ports. (d) Request Latin American countries to deny their ports to Cuban ships. (4) Propaganda Actions (a) Pursue a hemisphere-wide publicity campaign to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training of the nationals of other countries for sub- versive purposes, in order to discourage pro- spective trainees and impress the governments SECRET = 15 HW 50955 Docld:32494091 Page 19
HY 50955 SECRET and the peoples concerned with the urgent need to halt the travel of Latin American nationals to Cuba. b. Longer Range :Actions: The Following actions should also be undertaken - without delay. Their. ultimate results may be of far- reaching importance, but probably will be longer in realization. (1) Political Actions (a) Renew and intensify bilateral negotiations with the five Latin American governments which) have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba. (b) Through bilateral negotiations press countries with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibi- tion of such travel and providing severe. penalties for evasion. Recommend. that.rewards be offered Por identification of evaders. (c) In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, urge full and effective cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bilaterally among the. several states, in the interchange of information concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive activities. ; SECRET - 16 Bocld: 32474091 Page 20
HY 0955 - SECRET SECRET (d) Propose periodic regional meetings of ministers of the Central American nations to review the implementation of steps taken by two or more of them to combat subversive movement in the Caribbean. (e) Urge other Latin American nations to negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile in order to enlist cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent the movement through their countries of third | country personnel to and from Cuba. (2) Intelligence Actions Intensify our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature, and insidious implications, of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the requirement to protect our own intelligence program, (3) Administrative Actions (a) Encourage Latin American governments to institute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of aircraft, baggage inspection and inspect- ion of health and other documents, all designed deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult. 417 Docld: 327474091 Page 271
HW 50955 SECRET SECRET the carrying of passengers to Cuba. (b) Request governments of Latin American countries which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel documents by Cuban embassies or con- sulates, and take punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U.S, technical assistance as requested, -(c) Intensify technical assistance to Latin American countries in improving immigration and customs controls. | (4) Actions Related to Common Carriers (a) If unable to cause Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines service altogether, persuade Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet-made aircraft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical grounds, This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since the Brittania aircraft now used are in: disrepair. | -(b) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and any other potential supplier that they cut off the supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britania aircraft. (c) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Canada and Spain to persuade those countries 18 Doclda: 3274274091 Page 22
HW 50955 SECRET SECRET to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries normally providing terminal service for any of the airlines involved, auch as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying pressure. | (5) Propaganda Actions _ (a) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discredit- ing the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard ‘which it holds for Latin American tranquility,and discrediting persons who have undergone subversive training, in order to discourage possible volunteers and develop popular opposition to such activities. (b) Identify returned trainees who are dis- satisfied with thier Cuban training experience and exploit thier capabilities for provision of intelli- gence and propaganda material for exposing and discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities. (c) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout Latin America, not attributable to the United States, which focusses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit. facilities for movement af persons of other countries to and | from Cuba for subversive purposes. 19 Boclda:32474091 Page 23
SECRET c. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions In view of the important political, psychological, and, hopefully, material benefits to be derived from ‘any success achieved through the OAS in combatting Cuban subversive activity, the following measures should be pursued by the United States in that ‘body, at times and under circumstances which give regard ‘to the need to preserve hempsheric solidarity, and give recognition to the fact that progess will probably be Slow. | (1) Pursue adaption by the OAS of a resolution calling upon all member states to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba, thus impeding the travel of subversives to Cuba by legal means, and at the same time, creating serious obstacles to other related Cuban subversive activities. (2) Propose a recommendation by the OAS to. member governments of a program of steps, on both the national and international levels, to control travel. by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the proposals in the report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS).as.well as the specific recommen- dations set forth herein, SECRET 20 HY 50955 DBocld: 327424091 Page 24
SECRET G ©) (3) Once the initial comprehensive program in (2) above is recommended, utilize the appropriate. OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services of the Special Consultative Committee on Security. (4) Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution, binding upon all member states, to terminate air and maritime carrier traffic with Cuba. (5) Recommend action by the OAS to establish a public information program focussing on the threat to the hemisphere posed by Cuban subversive training activities. SECRET el HY 50955 DBocld: 324274091 Page 24
HY 0955 SECRET | ———— © V. . Actions Concerning Illegal Travel As the actions outlined in the preceding sections become effective, one of the results will be to force the hitherto legitimate travel into clandestine channels, It may, therefore, be expected that measures to impede. illegal movement will acquire steadily increasing importance. ‘The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the ‘preceding section, in terms of immediate impact projects — which promise early and visible results, and longer range projects which, while of great importance, cannot be ex- pected to mature as rapidly. a, immediate Impact Actions (1) Intelligence Actions ; (a) Increase greatly our penetration and other intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and determine routes | and methods employed, Report selected information, consistent with the requirement for protecting our ‘own intelligence program, to host government. | (b) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special SECRET | : 22 Docld: 327474091 Page 26
SECRET attention to Mexico,.Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republics Use evidence obtained. to persuade governments coneerned to institute sure veillance and other contrgl measures, (2) Surveillance and Reporting Actions (a) Continue current US sea and air surveil~ ‘lance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba, _(b) Continue the improvement, at high priority, of US communications in Latin America, in order to- improve alerting, reporting and control capabilities. (c) Establish intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemination to countries ~ concerned via the American Ambassadors, of intel- ligence on subversive movements. ‘b.. Longer Range Action 1 SECRET (1) Surveillance Actions (a) Establish a coordinated. Caribbean surveil~ lance system involving? | | i.. Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by US forces, 2. A US military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be papidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors 23 HY 50955 DBocld:3274274091 Page 27
HY 0955 SECRET @ 8 to countries concerned through intelligence “centers at Caribhbéan Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters. o3«6.A unilateral surveillance and inter~ ception effort by each country in its own territorial waters. 4, US assistance in final interception in territorial waters, upon request by the country concerned, (2) US Military Assistance Actions (a). Review Mild tary Assistance objectives and planning guidance to provide selected countries, especially in the Caribbean, and Central. American _ area, with small patrol craft, training and — logistical support, ineluding fuel for operations if required, to enable these countries to establish an effective: patrol of their own coasts, | (b) Provide US Navy, ‘Air Force, and Coast Guard training assistance, as required, to develop ‘or improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American military personnel. .This may take the form of a. Canal Zone training activity, employment of mobile training teams, or a combination of both. oy eu Docld: 327474091 Page 28
HY 0955 SECRET (c) Urge the accelerated improvement of inter- nal security forees and police forces in Latin American countries and the intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at pre+ venting clandestine departures and apprehending -returned trainees, Provide equipment, training SECRET DocId: 32424091 and advice as required,. 25 Page 29