AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION NSC 145-10001-10261 54 POSSIBLE FURTHER UNILATERAL AND INCREASE PRESSURE ON CUBA 00/00/00 . 10 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 1B RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 02/17/98 (I Date : 07/14/98 Page : 1 Peleased under the John Kennedy WSsassination Records ollection Act of 1992 (44 sc 2107 Note). ase#iNW 54214 Date: 1O-O4-2017 BILATERAL ACTIONS TO HW 542714 DBocld: 32977084 Page 1
- | The basic limiting factor in the intensification of our political and economic pressure on other countries bilaterally is, of course, the balance that must be struck between our interests with respect- . to Cuba and other broad interests at play in our bilateral relations, For example, Spain's in- creasing commercial and transportation relations _ with Cuba are a matter of concern in terms of our Cuban policy, yet the political and economic * pressure we can exert on Spain is circumscribed by the need to saféguard our other political and military interests in Spain. | B. Economic Denial — This program involves overt and covert, legal and extra-legal, diplomatic and private, efforts to » deny Cuba access to free-world markets and sources vs of supply for commodities critical or important to the Cuban economy, A major inhibiting element in this effort is the short world supply of sugar which increases Cuban leverage on free-world sugar con- sumers. In addition, there is a general (but varying) reluctance on the part of free-world countries to . C2 ; yoeentere with trade in items which are not strategic q a [ E_ : ot: 4 _-in. me, HW 542714 DBocld:32977084 Page 6
-8- in the internationally accepted sense (cocoM, Battle Act). This fact puts a premium on direct overt and covert pressures on the companies involved, as distinguished from governiuents, | Progress has Leen made in our economic denial ‘program, and effective operations have been carried out cooperatively by State, Treasury, Commerce and CIA, There is, however, considerable additional effort required, especially because Castro is now engaged in a major'attempt to broaden trade with the free-world, No new authority is required at oe this time, but rather an intensification of efforts through the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Com- mittee on Cuba. . | | “A more restrictive legal interpretation by the Executive Branch of the various legislative pro- visions on trade with Cuba could have considerable impact, if we were prepared to accept the costs to ‘our other interests in the offending countries and if we were prepared tacitly to indicate that existing legal interpretations had been in error, . Cc. COPY. SEoRersenserIyE 7 af HW 542714 DBocld: 32977084 Page 9
-S-. An additional immediately available step would be C. Free-World Shipping in Cuban Trade. . the conclusion of an agreement involving the amend- Ob ment of NSAM 220 with the British shipowner Navroteon| to guarantee the withdrawal by early 1965 of all his | ships in return for the progressive removal from | the blacklist of his vessels as they get out of the trade. This agreement should have beneficial effects on other important ship owners. A selective refusal to exercise the Presidential waiver of the Cuban: shipping provisions of the new Foreign Aid Authorization act could increase our diplomatic pressures on the maritime nations, if we were ready to incur the costs to our broad interests in the offending countries. D. Air Service to and from Cuba Our efforts to reduce, restrict and harass air services (free-world and Communist) to and from — Cuba should be strengthened by the provisions of the new Foreign Aid Authorization act, if, again, we are prepared to accept the costs to other interests ea _in the. offending countries, On the other hand, a ' POD ; ce US-USSR COP —— LaepppetesenstytvE an HW 54214 Docld:32977064 Page 10
HW 54714 DoclId: 32977084 US-USSR civil air agreement could have erosive effects on the always precarious barriers we have established against air services to Cuba. Anti-Subversive Program | Essentially, the problem here is to strengthen both the will and the capability in Latin America to take the politically and technically difficult - measures which have been recommended, The basic lines of the anti-subversive program have been laid out, and they are being followed with varying degrees of success in the different countries. Constant follow-up, technical advice and assistance, and training are essential to improvement in the execution of the program. Page i1