13-00000 CONTENTS (Information as of 1200 EST, 27 November 1963) . CUBA Page CUBANS APPREHENSIVE OVER POSSIBLE US POLICY CHANGE 1 Fear that President Kennedy's assassination will bring a wore "aggressive" US policy was reflected in speeches by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. THE COMMUNIST WORLD SO’ IET_STANDDOWN ON BERLIN _AUTOBAHN HARASSMENT... 2 r- The—USSR's.-failure-since--the_4=5 November-incident— > i} to stop Allied convoys of nondismountable size and || ie ‘its statements of 16 and 21 November suggest that “ % a Moscow has decided to settle for a standoff in the. 9 = Autobahn dispute | at. least fc for. the _present. SOXIET_ THOUGHT _ON "ARMORED ‘VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT __ . —[nformation compiled from classified Soviet: ‘docu--— / ments has provided a good picture of the thinking among Soviet military leaders on development of ' ‘tanks and other armored vehicles. They appear to be aiming toward two distinct tank types--a recon- maissance and a main battle tank--to replace the traditional light, medium, and heavy types. (Pub- . lished -Separately_as-Special Report. OCI_.No.. 9308/63A) (|) ere : RN. EUROPE _PREPARES. FOR HARD. WINTER poe 3 (~The™ regimes there “hope to prevent a° recurrence’ of- it: the widespread discontent and the economic disloca~ ? % : tions. “which | resulted d trom last year! s severe winter. ¥ PE samen 1 “their “gradually increasing trade in non-Communist.- a Asia provides foreign exchange the Chinese need to. 1, buy grain. Their aid activities in the area will ; probably remain at a moderate level as long as the | |. grain imports continue. Oe coy ene / P| i np Moe ee ee " ASTA-AFRICA JAPANESE. ELECTION OUTCOME ~~ mo — 5 ~The. ruling Libéral Démocratic Party": Ss “Victory did | | not significantly shift the balance between right ' and left, although the moderate socialist party | scored significant gains at the expense of its '. more extreme rival. SECRET 29 Nov 63 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i ed
13-00000 Tp SECRET ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page HIG Seba or widespread: in recent weeks, “thereby increasing. | pressure on South Vietnam's new rulers to produce kas ome dramatic achievement... i AREA NOTE oo ; On Laos — THE TURKISH. POLITICAL SITUATION. “~\Pur key" s military ‘leaders--who have retained ulti-— | mate authority since their takeover in 1960--must ‘| soon decide whether to turn over power to a civil- ‘| dan party they do not trust or try to maintain in ‘| power the present group which not only lacks popu- lar support but shows no signs of being able to generate it. Hitherto submerged currents of left- ist opinion may be coming to the surface. (Publishe _Separately. as Special Report. OCT. No. .0308/63B)._- (RIAN AND IRAQI REGIMES | TRYING. TO STABILIZE ‘<-R6latively todérate elements in both the Baghdad ‘ and the Damascus regimes seem anxious to reach an eu | |. accommodation with their various internal factions |: as well as between the two governments, but extremes ist pressures are still Strong. CONGOLESE EXPEL SOVIET_ DIPLOMATS oN 9 (}-Soviet representatives in Leopoldville had ‘been \ o assisting a radical exile group plotting against — ALAISE IN ‘MALI a 10 prt {Phe governnént of President - “Mod ibo - ‘Keita’ is- faced") || with mounting criticism from powerful local polit- 7 ,ical figures, dissidence among nomads, and a des-' | rate > foreign exchange shortage. et hy oe EUROPE T DE GAULLE — ERHARD TALKS “oy 11 (—The 21-22 November talks seem to. have ‘established’ -' @ good working relationship between the two lead- |, @rs and clarified certain aspects of French and Mest. German. Policies but. produced. few. decisions. hee conte ee co reenter WESTERN. EUROPE'S STEEL _PROBLEM.. are ae © Sst ted Be AS OA meeting next week of the Coal-Steel Community’ s = \. Council promises to have far-reaching implications |: }\\ for the CSC's future as well as for the outcome of | | \ international tariff negotiations. cine the Spring .. 0 | (SECRET 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
13-00000 SECRET EUROPE (cont inued) Page IT LY'S_ ALDO__MORO oe “In nearly five years as “party secretary, “Moro has. , won the confidence of Italy's perennially divided. _ Christian. Democrats but has only limited experience |, in cabinet posts. Personally retiring, he seems to be undertaking the premiership with reluctance. (Pubs) _ lished Separately : as | Special Report ‘OCI No. -0308/63C) . AREA NOTE ; Tn a oe On Italy — WESTERN HEMISPHERE AREA NOTES. | 13,14 On Brazil and Venezuela . SECRET 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
SECRET Cuba CUBANS APPREHENSIVE OVER POSSIBLE US POLICY CHANGE Cuban leaders are appre- hensive that President Kennedy's assassination will result in a. more "aggressive" US policy: to=- - ward Cuba. Fidel Castro's two-hour | speech on 23 November, which he _ termed an “objective analysis" of the implications of the. assassination, warned Cubans that the President's death was “serious and bad news." It could, he said, turn. "a bad situation" into a worse one. He also asserted that President Kennedy's alleged promise not to invade Cuba had been strongly. attacked by those. "ultrareac- tionaries" in the United States who: now are trying to create a climate of "anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban hysteria” designed to pressure the new US Presi- dent toward a Cuban policy "highly prejudicial to the in- _terests of peace and of man- kind." Castro stated that he had ‘never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald and insinuated that the Castro- Communist: affiliations of the | accused assassin were fabricated by. US “reactionaries” who, he claimed, were the only people 29 Nov 63 | SECRET .__—__ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY who could benefit from the Presi dent's death. In this connec- tion he warned that a "sinister ‘maneuver’ was under way, and declared "we must be cautious and vigilant and alert." Che Guevara echoed these warnings in a speech of 24 November, declaring that "the years. coming are going to be as tough as, if not tougher than; the years just past...we must be prepared to repel any attack." He expressed confi- dence in ultimate victory, not only for Cuba but also for "the peoples of Latin America." Guevara stressed that the revolutionary ferment in Latin America is reaching a climax and that the people there “are going to conquer power in what-~- ever manner necessary, destroy- ing whatever force that opposes | then. He pointed out that Cuba's continuing "anti-imperi- alist struggle" is closely linked with the coming revolu- tion in the rest of Latin Amer- ica. "The'fight of all peoples is also our responsibility," he maintained, “and it is part of our daily preoccupation. ae (CONFIDENTIAL) Page 1
clpy SECRET “Moscow apparently has de~ cided to refrain from harass- ing Allied convoys on the Berlin autobahn, at least for the time being. On 21 November the USSR replied to the Western notes of 6 November which protested tre ‘detention of the US convoy on 4-5 November, The main purpose of the reply was to restate for the public record the Soviet claim that the June 1945 agree- ment between the Soviet and Western commanders in Germany gave the USSR the right to ex- ercise “protection, maintenance supervision, and control" on highways used by the Western garrisons in Berlin, The Soviet note sought to strengthen this claim by stating that the "harmonized procedures" conveyed by the Western powers on 29 October "are in no degree valid for Soviet military au- thorities," Moscow denied that American authorities have any right to establish the ob- ligations and "manner of opera- tion" of Soviet checkpoint of- ficials, The note reflected Moscow's sensitivity to the point made in the Western notes contrast- ing the detention of the US convoy with the normal process~ ing accorded closely similar British and French convoys on 5 November which also refused to dismount. Moscow took ref- uge in the pretense that ‘these latter convoys were not challenged because they observed existing procedures and "presented tueir. personnel for ‘SOVIET STANDDOWN ON BERLIN AUTOBAHN HARASSMENT .Marked a clear retreat from personnel in convoys of more ' to dismount, The Communist World checking," whereas the US con- voy was detained until it agreed to “go through the same check," The passage since the 4-5 November incident of five con- voys of a size which are non- dismountable under Allied pro- cedures, the 16 November Soviet statement on access procedures, and Moscow's 21 November note all suggest that Moscow has decided to accept a standoff in the autobahn dispute for the present. The Soviet procedures earlier extreme demands that. all than five vehicles are obliged Although the Soviet procedures are not identical to the Western “harmonized proce- dures," the differences are not great enough in themselves to give rise to gurther incidents, The Soviet rules seem to pro- vide Moscow with a practical working arrangement not incon- |: sistent with normal Western Do ee ee ee ee the West into a new round of convoy practices. In light of the failure to divide the Allies on the access issue and the reper- cussions of the Barghoorn case, the Soviet leaders probably de- cided this was not an opportune time to propose formal negoti- ations, Their efforts to es- tablish an exclusive right to control autobahn traffic, how- ever, suggest that the Russians will revive this issue whenever theyfeel the situation is ripe for another attempt to bring (SECRET: Berlin negotiations. “NO FOREIGN” N DISSEM) _ _ SECRET 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13-00000 - re T | | | SECRET sie TNT nt meta Eastern Europe is making plans to prevent a recurrence of the widespread. discontent and the se- rious dislocations in some sectors of the economy which resulted from last year's severe winter. The | fuel, power, and construction in- dustries and the railroads were the hardest hit, and although a repetition of last year's weather conditions would be unusual, it is primarily in these sectors that preparations are being made. While there are signs that the other Communist regimes are making sim- ilar plans, the most detailed in- formation is available on East Germany’s preparations. The East German regime has already warned that electric pro- duction capacity again this winter will be inadequate to meet demands of all consumers. The shortfall results from growing industrial use of electricity, delays in com- pletion of new generating capacity, and the low water level available for power generation. The regime on 30 September published an ur- gent appeal to save electricity. _It was followed a month later by announcement of a “competition" for "power thrift." Throughout industry power consumption norms are being established. Production during night shifts is being in- creased to make more efficient use of the hours when power consumption is normally at a minimun. In the coal industry, the East Germans have made an exceptional effort to increase production and have succeeded in raising coal re- serves in industry by 5 percent since last autumn. Measures also have been taken to prevent freezing of coal loaded in open rail cars eee OY Ue EASTERN EUROPE _ PREPARES: FOR. _HARD | WINTER _ te NO FOREIGN DISSEM) "SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The Communist World and of rail switches at the mines, which posed major problems last winter. East Germany is easing the burdens on its railroads by con- tinued transferal of short-distance | hauling from the railroads to trucks. New schedules for contin- uous loading and unloading of trains and trucks were instituted on 1 October. Production in high-fuel-con- sumption industries such as steel and ceramics reportedly will be curtailed or halted as required. About 60,000 workers would be af- fected by such drastic measures. Czechoslovakia also has warned) | that electric power output will be insufficient to meet all needs this winter, largely for the same rea- : sons as in East Germany. The Czechs ' began instituting measures to save | power as early as mid-August, and — preparations at power plants were to be completed by the end of October. Both Poland and Hungary appar- ently are concerned with ensuring | ; adequate coal supplies for the do- mestic market. The chief of Po- land's coal exporting agency has said that the country this year will export to nonbloc countries one million tons less than last year. This move, along with greater — coal production, will increase sup-|/ plies for the domestic market. i Hungary has announced that coal production will exceed the planned level by one million tons as a result of overtime work, and that imports of coal will be 1.2 million tons above plan. (SECRET ne anh LMR ee Page 3
13-00000 Up SECRET The Communist World we OO. fee ee imei joe “Communist China! Ss economic activities in the countries of . non—Communist. Asia now are re-_ covering from the setback they suffered in 1960 following the failure of the "leap forward." Peiping’s 1963 trade with most of these countries appears to be above last year's, so the Chinese probably will earn more from their Asian trade this year than they have in the re- cent past. These earnings will imports of Western grain--which presumably will continue at about last year's level. China's net export earnings from trade with Hong Kong, its largest source of free world currency, are up about 25 per- cent over 1962 and are running at an annual rate of about $250 million. China's favorable trade balance with Malaysia may reach about $80 million this year, about 10 percent over the level achieved last year with the members of the new federa- |} tion. Sino-Japanese trade is ‘} currently at an annual rate of J: glightly over $100 million--up from $84 million last year. China's economic aid proj- ects in the non-Communist Far East have been implemented slowly in the last few years. Such activities are expected to remain at a moderate level as long as China‘’s attention is riveted on earning foreign ex- change to buy grain. oo ; PEIPING'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NON -COMMUNIST ASIA. ne again be used chiefly to finance _ ‘The Chinese may, however, be willing to provide additional economic assistance to Cambodia, which so far has utilized about 60 percent of a total of $50 million in Chinese grants. Peiping responded favorably al- though cautiously to overtures from Prince Sihanouk after his announcement of Cambodia's de- cision to end the US aid program. Earlier good-will gestures in- cluded Liu Shao-chi's visit to Cambodia last May, followed by a trip to China by a Cambodian bank delegation. Recently Chinese technicians arrived in Cambodia to survey prospects for construction of a glass factory to be financed under a 1960 grant. A Chinese delegation this month arrived in Djakarta to discuss implementation of a $30- million credit extended in 1961 for a textile plant. Peiping recently agreed to provide Cey- lon with textile plants and equipment under their $16-mil- lion aid pact signed in 1957. Senn Peiping's largest single economic aid pact--an $84-mil- lion credit extended to Burma in 1961--has been drawn down by only about $2 million. Burma, however, has recently accepted a Chinese offer to build two bridges in northern Burma, and there are indications that formal approval of other Chinese aid projects will be forthcoming in the near future. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) SECRET 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 4
13-00000 Asia~Africa JAPANESE ELECTION OUTCOME - fhe Japanese general elec- of assuring Ikeda a third term tion on 21 November was charac~- as party president or of strengthe | terized by a paucity of real ening his position within the issues and a low voter turnout. party. Intensification of ‘ It brought no significant shift internal rivalries for position in the balance between the ruling | within the party is certain Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ‘until precedences among the fac- and the leftist opposition. tion leaders can be hammered out. Actual damage to the party, and to Ikeda‘'s position The LDP won 283 seats and nevertheless will probably be is expected to pick up most of offset by the fact that the lost “i | the 12 conservative “independ- seats for the most part went 7 [| ents." Adherence by all of these to the DSP, while the JSP, the i; | nevertheless would leave the LDP real enemy, was defeated. |: | still seven seats short of the (} || | position it held after the 1960 |: | elections. : A period of critical self- it examination and possible changes 1! , of leadership clearly are in rh On the left, the important store for the JSP. Its net feature was the failure of the loss of one seat in the face .: | Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to of gains by its DSP and Jcp ', | gain, while the more moderate rivals may have seriously ': | Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) damaged its carefully self-con- i obtained six more seats than it trived image as the leftist : won in 1960. The Japan Conmu- “wave of the future," destined ar nist Party (JCP) now holds five to control the government by 1 | seats, a gain of two over its 1970. Loss of extreme left- \ 1960 performance. wing support to the JCP may be 4 i attributed to the confrontation | The voter's support of the of the JSP and JCP over the nu- | LDP suggests that the electorate clear test ban treaty and to is generally satisfied with con- the JCP's pro-Chinese stand. f ‘ ditions and progress under the The JSP's failure to reform : Ikeda government. The LDP's internally may have influenced of victory falls short, however, some voters to shift to the DSP, I (CONFIDENTIAL) ie iv, Pp 3 a cee aan ~~ re SECRET 28 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 5
13-00000 SECRE AREA NOTE pee we a te Laos: A widening breach -appears ae developing be- ‘tween the Souvanna government “in Laos and the Communist Pathet Lao. Further talks on ' the Plaine des Jarres between . Kong Le, chief of Souvanna's ‘military forces, and Pathet Lao ' commander singkapo have been . jeopardized by an exchange of allegations of bad faith. The ' particular attitudes and inten- , tions of Premier Souvanna and . of the Pathet Lao strategists i remain obscure. ae ws In the military | dmitiative rests for ‘with the government. A well- ‘coordinated clearing action launched north of Vientiane. on | | 21 November by. forces under Kong field, the the moment SYRIAN AND » PRAQT | REGIMES TRYING TO neni ween The stability of the re~- gimes in Iraq and Syria is still uncertain in the wake of the army coup in Iraq. . This in turn leaves unsettled the status of future relationships between these two countries as well as between them and Egypt. In Iraq, @ number of non= Baathist army officers are unhappy over the retention of several Baathists in the cabi- earlier push by a similar combi- NO FOREIGN DISSEM) net, and President Arif may _ tinued to be conciliatory to ‘| that the coup was not directed T Asia-Africa _— sen mena Le and rightist ¢ General Phoumi, along with Meo guerrilla elements has met with considerable success The government forces have se- cured Vang Vieng--long held by the Pathet Lao. . Although an nation of government forces in the Plaine des Jarres area did not attain comparable successes, the Pathet Lao position at Xieng Khouang town remains under heavy threat. Communist reaction to these developments thus far has been limited to propaganda warnings. However, there are unconfirmed reports of North Vietnamese troop reinforcements in the Plaine des Jarres. (SECRET STABILIZE ce ne have some difficulty in holding together the disparate army ele- ments who carried out the coup. Statements. by. Iraqi regime spokesmen, however, have con- the Baath. They have reiterated / f, fo toward any party, and Premier uf Tahir Yahya has said that the . . new government will continue the | previous regime's policies. LY 29 Nov 63 CURRENT nd. ne a) ~_ SECRET INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 7
13-00000 a . SECRET Asia~Africa CONGOLESE EXPEL SOVIET DIPLOMATS | “— en mn tenor Congolese Premier Adoula adherents of the imprisoned Antoine =~). last week declared all Soviet Em- | Gizenga and the late Premier Patrice bassy personnel in Leopoldville Lumumba. They fled to Brazzaville persona non grata. Adoula's move following Adoula's closing of parlia- followed the arrest on 19 Novem- ment in late September. . Led by for- ber of two Soviet diplomats found mer Lumumbist Vice Premier Chris- carrying documents showing the So | tophe Ghenye, they have been able to viets to be giving financial as- operate fairly freely in the Brazza- sistance and encouragement to a | ville Congo's present confused at- group of radical anti-Adoula mosphere under the shaky’ provisional exiles across the Congo River in regime of Massamba—Debat, They have , Brazzaville, All of the Soviet declared themselves a "committee of staff reportedly had departed by national liberation" for the Leopold- 23 November, ville Congo and are trying to convey the impression that they constitute The premier charged that the a "government-in-exile.,” captured documents proved "“unques~ | oo | tionably" the collusion of the So- The captured documents reveal ' viet Embassy with the leftist "com-| considerable infighting and confusio | mittee of national liberation" in on tactics within the group. The ' Brazzaville, He did not however, exiles nevertheless have been press- : break diplomatic relations with ing for foreign support, arms, and | , the Soviet Union and has stated funds, are trying to establish an or that he will consider the appoint- ganization inside the Leopoldville . ment of a new ambassador, Although Congo, and hope to subvert its army. , ‘Moscow has bitterly protested the ‘They reportedly plan also to try to iexpulsion of its officials, it has assassinate leaders of its govern- : indicated an intention to replace ment, Their successes and capabili- them rather than retaliate against | ties presently seem limited, but ithe Congo. their activities may well lead to ; further friction between the Leo- No action has been taken poldville and Brazzaville regimes. | against the Leopoldville missions of three other Soviet bloc coun- Katanga's ex-President Tshombé, . tries--Czechoslovakia, Poland, and | Still in exile in Barcelona, has , Bulgaria, Adoula earlier planned again appealed to Adoula to permit , to expel both the Soviet and Czech | him to return soon to the Congo. The i missions, and for at least a month | Leopoldville government apparently ' the Congolese have been debating still opposes Tshombé's return, and ‘some action to curb antigovernment | his bid for a high government post activities by all the Soviet bloc has been rejected. ‘missions, Soviet bloc representa- | tives have long been in contact -with dissident Congolese groups, and their activity appears to re- ' flect routine clandestine contacts and financial aid rather than So- {| viet backing of any imminent coup | attempt. Tshombé's recent promise to col-' laborate with the Leopoldville gov- ernment in the 1964 parliamentary elections appears to be having some appeal, however, Tshombé says. he has decided to return soon, but has indicated he will await assurances for his personal safety from the The Congolese. exiles in Braz- | central government. (SECRET NO zaville consist of perhaps 50 anti-| FOREIGN DISSEM) Adoula politicians and soldiers, ogee ne “SECRET yn 29 “Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ‘Page 9 ae upd
13-00000 “pd SECRET MALAISE IN MALI Mali’ s leftist government ‘Vis facing increasingly urgent economic and political problems ‘at a time when President Modibo Keita's efforts to mediate the Moroccan-Algerian dispute have raised his standing to a new high elsewhere in Africa. In the face of mounting criticism from politicians with strong local power bases and from young gov- ernment functionaries, Keita ‘; is devoting major attention to ‘|| defending his party's hegemony. ‘| He must also contend with dissi- dence among nomadic tribesmen | and with adesperate foreign ex- Change shortage. The key problem probably “is that of foreign exchange. The government brought most of -its troubles on itself a year and a half ago when, in a fit _of excessive Marxist-flavored . anticolonialism, it in effect “cut itself off from automatic ' aecess to the French foreign exchange reserves and set up a. Malian currency. Since then a steady adverse trade balance has cut into the country's own meager reserves, and by mid- November they had fallen to an = estimated $1 million. The gov- ' ernment’s budget deficit is running about $14 million an- ually. France reluctantly bailed the Malians out once be-_ fore with a stopgap dole, but it may, be unwilling to do so Asia-Africa ~Doctrinaire rigidity has helped to make ineffective the government's efforts to alleviate this situation. Whereas Guinea's Sekou Touré has recently retreated from "African socialism" when faced with an even worse situa- tion, Keita and his associates have been reluctant cto curtail the activities of such :consistent money-losers as the state trading company and the state airline. This evidence of ineffective- ness has brought to the surface dissatisfaction among local pol- iticians whom Keita has never succeeded in bringing under close control of his Soudanese Union Party. These local figures, who generally occupy the conserv- ative end of the spectrum, seem to control the National Assembly. They also have at least some in~ fluential spokesmen both in the party's political bureau and in the executive branch of the gov- ernment, especially among elements desiring a pragmatic approach to Mali's problems. At the same time, Keita is faced with active defiance of the regime's authority on the part of Tuareg nomads in. the country's northern deserts. Half of the army reportedly now is deployed in an effort, so far unsuccessful, to halt raids by these tribesmen. Keita himself has spent most of this again. The bloc has consistent- month in outlying areas, trying ly refused to extend budgetary to re-establish party control assistance, although it has pro- over potential and actual vid:d development credits centers of dissidence. (CON- amounting to $67.5 million. FIDENTIAL) . oy, SECRET | 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 10
13-00000 Europe THE DE (GAULLE ~ ERHARD TALES. tm The 21-22. November talks Common Market, some slight between Charles de Gaulle and — progress was made. Neither Ludwig Erha~d seem to have estab- leader appeared prepared as yet lished a good working relation- to accept the Mansholt plan ship and clarified aspects of whereby a single community _ France's and West Germany's grain price would be set between national policies, but produced the high German level and the few decisions. lower French level, but, accord- ' vs ing to a German observer, they De Gaulle reportedly en- agreed that the proposal offered couraged Erhard to take some a good working basis. Implicit initiative toward a politically in the relaxed atmosphere was united Europe, and Erhard re- | the suggestion that De Gaulle sponded that he would give the now is willing to discuss the matter sympathetic consideration. grain issue beyond the year-~- In his public statements, how- end deadline he had previously || ever, Erhard again made it plain | set for final agreement on that he favored a Europe rooted EEC agricultural policy. , '; dn an Atlantic community rather an & ‘| than the French-led third force It was agreed, moreover, ° q ‘| which De Gaulle envisages. that. EEC arrangements for beef, - ay ; ; dairy products, and rice be On defense questions, the completed by the end of December. i new German chancellor and the In addition, the communiqué |. veteran French chief of state issued at the close of the If “agreed to disagree." De Gaulle talks looked forward to the  veportedly lectured Erhard on the successful conclusion of the |; Gaullist view that France cannot negotiations envisaged by the i depend on the US but rather needs US Trade Expansion Act. " its own nuclear force, while | || Erhard publicly reaffirmed Erhard and De Gaulle {| Germany's trust in the protec- throughout. the talks apparently ' tive shield of US military power. maintained an air of cordiality, | | Neither leader disparaged the but Erhard demonstrated ‘that he | other's position, however, and was neither so innately | isympa~ ‘ De Gaulle is said to have assured thetic to De Gaulle's views as 7 ‘||. Erhard that France has no inten- was Konrad Adenauer nor so ‘|. tion of forcing Bonn to choose willing to play a secondary ' between Paris and Washington. role. Thus Erhard may have served notice that a somewhat ; ‘ On the divisive and po=- sterner era for Franco-German 7 litically treacherous issue of relationships has arrived. } _ | agriculturalintegration in the (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) SECRET . 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ll ol/
13-00000 .. Europe . , WESTERN BUROPE'S STEEL PROBLEM _ The Council ‘of the ‘Buropean versed its S position and now Coal—Steel Community (CSC) is will support a tariff rise meeting on 2 December to deal that was proposed by Bonn three with the problems that afflict months ago. If Paris and Bonn the continental steel industry. see eye to eye on this, it is The session promises to have probable that their tariffs-will , | far-reaching implications for go up to 9 percent--the pres-— ‘the CSC's future as well as for ent level in Italy. <A restric- i the eventual outcome of inter- tion on trade would primarily po national tariff negotiations | affect Japan, Austria, and the i that are set for next spring. UK, since the CSC already has lL: - . . strict quotas on imports from |; i The steel industry in the the bloc. mE Six now is running about 20 percent below capacity. More- The political importance | over, steel manufacturers have, of the steel tariff question '{ . in recent months, suffered from te the CSC has been generally mt reductions in price that have , recognized in the community. ai taken place both inside and out- President Del Bo has intimated ! side the community. During the to US officials that unless past year, CSC officials have the CSC can produce a Community- 7 i advanced several possible solu- wide solution to the challenge, : (6 ; tions to the problem—-~including the CSC's very existence will _ the promotion of both official be threatened. 7 or private agreements with for- eign producers to limit their The CSC's failure: to pro- exports--but none of these has duce a solution to date, how- proved effective, ever, is indicative of its de- 7 clining power and prestige. : More recently, the CSC has Its governing body, the High 1s been increasingly attracted to Authority, has, in theory, more ic the idea of raising tariffs, | power than its counterpart in ho but so far has not received the Common Market, But this - solid backing from the member authority has sharply deteri- states for such a move, The orated because of its failure Council has also been put on — to exercise its ‘powers and the > notice by the US that a tariff anpointment of mediocre per- hike on an item so important sonnel to its staff, This as steel would have grave polit- deterioration began in. 1958 ical and psychological conse- when, under very smiliar cir- quences on the forthcoming cumstances, the High Authority tarifi negotiations, was unable to produce a solution to the then serious glut in coal, Should the member states However, pressure for a resort to urilateral solution ; steel tariff hike or some oth- to the present problems in ; er restrictive action again steel, there would be little seems to be building up. The left of the CSC--~the first and latest word from Paris, for most supranational of the three / | ° example, indicates that the European communities. ' (CONFIDEN- French Government may have re- _ TIAL NO FOREIGN Y DISSEM) ,* SECRET ON 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCH WEEELY SUMMARY Page 12
13-00000 ed 3 om * AREA NOTES Europe Italy: : Leaders of ‘Ttaly* s “four. ‘CoaTition parties reached i agreement over the week end on .the proposed program for a cen~- | ter-left government and submitted /it to their parties' national executive committees for approval. || Ratification by Pietro Nenni's Italian Socialist Party is com- plicated by an intransigent group of 10 of the 32 left-wingers among the party's 87 parliamen- | tary deputies. A party spokesman told US Embassy officials that Nenni was willing to risk a split Brazil: “Recently ‘published (> statemen s ig Recently Goulart ‘\: have added to the widespread un-~ rest in Brazil and increased speculation that he is planning to establish an authoritarian ‘regime. In an interview with the Brazilian weekly Manchete, published on 20 November, Gou- ‘| lart declared that he had no '. doubt Brazil's’ rampant infla- {; tion will push ‘the country "in- |, evitably to bankruptcy” and a | "social disaster of catastrophic ' proportions." He emphasized his ' , lack of presidential powers to .SOlve the present crisis. Goulart's words have aroused ‘sharp criticism from responsible ‘Fanfani's participation has been : newspapers. ‘the next few weeks. in the party” to ‘go “along with - the accord. Negotiations over appoint- ments to the cabinet have pro- ceeded with some degree of ur- gency. There was general agree- ment that the Christian Democrats would retain the defense portfolio, as well as the Ministry of In- terior, which controls the police. | The question of ex-Premier Amintore | one stumbling block. (CONFIDEN- TIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Western _Hemisphere oS ‘The US Army attaché reports a growing concern among army Officers that Goulart may attempt some extreme action during | The additional unrest provoked by the President's comments has encouraged re~- newed plotting by rightist elements, such as the Marshal Odylio Denys group. It has also increased the chances of an illegal action by the op= position which Goulart could use aS a pretext to assume greater powers. In any event, it is likely that political tension will remain high for the foreseeable future. _ GE- political leaders and influential | CRET) . — SECRET 29 Nov 63 Page 13 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13-00000 14 # $ . ups ‘Forists, can -| “eftiue ’ eke tp to. election day .|, their campaign to sabotage the : vOting in ' moreover, . being arrested each day. * Venezuelan armed forces con- / tinue to investigate reports .of clandestine landings of weap~ ons for terrorist forces. “addition ,. SECRET AREA NOTE Wer es Venezuela: Communist ter— ewexpected to con- Venezuela on 1 Decem- ber for a new president and , congress. There is no reason, to believe they will turn from violence afterward. The proficiency of the gov- ernment security forces has been steadily improving, how- ever, and more terrorists are The With the security situation .reasonably well in hand, there ,is no question that the elections. ‘will be held on schedule. In the prospects are 29 Nov 63 | that the ‘voters will turn out ‘lem will be to pull together ‘problem could encourage plotting _SECRE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Western Hemisphere in large numbers despite Com- munist efforts to intimidate them. In any event, electioneer- ing has continued apace, and most observers still consider Raul Leoni, heading the Demo- cratic Action party's ticket, to be the likely winner . by a small plurality. cS The victor's biggest prob- an effective coalition govern- ment. Leoni lacks the personal magnetism and political acumen of incumbent President Betan- court. Failure on Leoni's part to convince the military of his ability to handle the terrorist for a coup d'etat. (SECRET) T Page 14
13-00000 < en _ SECRET OTHER INTELLIGENCE ISSUANCES Received during the week of 21-26 November 1963 RESEARCH REPORTS AND REFERENCE AIDS China (Communist) — vee Germany, West _ one — cee gE a ae wee . “Guatemala - ne vo ee ~“Directory of Chinese Communist officials: = vol... tab C.LA. O.C.R. BA 63-7. . 186p. 0’63. (QUO) Economic effects of the late summer foods in north China. bibliog il maps LA. O.R.R. CB 63-92. Sp. N 15°63. “8 No _ _ Foreign Dissem) oe East | German economic plans [for 64] show -increased caution and realism [as result of shift in policy] bibliog ta on | O.R.R. CB 63-94. Tp. N 22°63. 6 East Germany two years after the wall: eco- nomic problems, [plans], and policies. bib- liog tab C.LA. O.R.R. EM-36. 27%p. N’63. (C) National income and expenditures of East . ment, and foreign accounts] bibliog graph Erhard government in ‘West Germany: [foreign and domestic policy, and future Roo eae. 8p. N 22? 63. -& No Foreign . Dissem) — ‘Guatemalan Council of ‘State 5 appointed Oct 1 $3 Be G-88 Bp een ya LA.. O.C, R. Alp. N_14’63 and apprehensions over Socialist coalition] graphs C.I.A. O.C\I. Spec.Rpt.0307/63A. N. 22763. aCe No Foreign Dissem). ~ Chemical warfare capabilities of Turkey, 1963 14-63. 1p. | 04’63. (SNo > Foreign Dissem), Oppd. ‘Germany, 1951-60: (private, public, invest- / to © C.LA. O.R.R. ER 63- 4. 48p. 0°69... por tab C.LA. O.C.1.. Spec.Rpt.0307/63B. ||! “Italian “economic outlook [elouded by inflation | p we ee _ oN through 1968. map tab [U.S.1.B.] SIC-5-: | Indexes to classified documentary ; Soviet Min- istry of Defense reports in the Ironbark and Chickadee series. tab C.1A. CR-51. 1 vol. J1’63. (S No Foreign Dissem No Dissem Abroad) : Production of S-100 tractors atthe Chelyabinsk | Tractor Plant, Chelyabinsk, USSR, 1960-63. il tab C.LA. O.R.R. MCB 68-61. 3p. _ 0 31°63. (8) . NAT ONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES _ Algeria; , [political ‘stability, foreign ‘policy, the economy, and future prospects) U.S.I.B. ant NIE 62- 63. N 20°63. (S Controllec Dissem) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ‘SURVEYS _ Atlantic Basin. | Ld, Northern ‘sector - of North : UC -° Atlantic: Marine climate and oceanography. 4, Selected straits: Denmark Strait and | Strait of Belle Isle. bibliog charts graphs maps tab NIS 104, part II, section 4. 19p. Ja’ 63. Lc No Foreign Dissem) orth. Koreas “Tiitelligence and “ security~ “tab “NIS 41A;,-section 56, rev. 15p. J1’63. s No Foreign Dissem Controlled. Dissem) | ~Fortugal: Intelligence and Security. tab NIS 8,3 . - section 56, rev. 9p. JIP’63. 6 No Foreign | of [ -Dissem. Controlled Dissem) --- -- ny ' \ a Spain: | “Trade and finance. bibliog graphs ‘fab *-NIS 9, section 65, rev. SSP. Je’63. (c No Foreign Dissem)_- TL. oy ‘Turkey: Naval forces: ~il'tab ‘NS 27, section ‘ 19p. An's. (8 No Foreign : 48. Ciel ene Eo Requests for publications cited above should be made through normal requesting channels to the CIA Library/ Circulation Branch. SECRET re