- start the collection of Intelligence on. Cuba ‘in de - which to base firm estimates and operations. ~ . support will include de military force, 38 necessary: oo TSITIVEX - will ‘capitalize on this climactic momeént by initiating. an open revolt. ‘Areas will be taken and held. If necessary, the popular movement will appeal for help. to the free nations of the Western. | Hemisphere. —The—~ -United States, if possible in concert ‘with other Western Hemisphere _ nations,_ will then give open:support to the Cuban peoples" Fevolt. ‘Such © : I. _ESTIMATE, OF THE SITUATION . rs Our planning requires sound intelligence ¢ estimates of the situation. re. Cuba. The latest National Estimate (SNIE 85-61) of.28 November —_ 1961 contains operational conclusions not -based on hard fact,: in addition (to its intelligence conclusions; this is a repetition of an error inthe -- . a planning for the unsuccessful operation « ‘of last Aprils The planning indicated. herein will be. revised, as ‘necessary, | based” _on the: hard intelligence estimate of the situation by the U.S. Intelligence: ‘community. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-62 on Cuba), De “due on 23 January,. apparently. has been Postponed until. 7 February. It i is s recognized that” one result of the Project, so far, has been to: », to provide: facts. on ae (30 Nov 61 - 18 Jan 62) ° AL Establish a 1 U, S.. mechaniem. for the. Status: . The President's directive of 30 November 1961 was ‘imple- a mented’ by creating a U:S. operations team, with Brig. Gen. ‘Lansdale | : as Chief of Operations, ‘and with tasks promptly assigned. His immedi- 7 ‘ ate staff are Mr.-Hand and Major: Patchell. Representatives of Secre< _ i taries and Agency’ Directors are: 0. Coa oN State. os "Woodward (Goodwin, Hurwitch) yor : es : ys Defense -. Brig. Gen: Craig. (USA oe Wilson, — “Intellig ence. Support _ - ; . - ee \ , fo 4 . so f . ‘Status: “CIA made a special survey ‘of. U: s. capabilities to interrogate Cuban refugees in the’ USA (1, 700 - 2,000 arriving per month) and on. , - 16. January approved 2 a pr ogram increasing the staff at the Opa Locka oo “HW 54214 voce een a ee Interrogation Center in Florida from the present 2 peop le to 34. ‘CILA will . .. build up agent assets s (positive intelligence assets inside Cuba are very. - limited and it has no. counter- intelligence assets inside). .Special. intelli- gence asséts-will be’ exploited’ more fully. The Cuba project needs far - more hard intelligence. in depth than is. presently available, | ‘CIA will ‘require further assistance from. Defense and other U.S; organizations oe inthis intelligence effort, and‘is submitting. specific. qualifications . for’ - personnel on 19 January. - OO Ee eens , bocld:32977053 Page)3 = rr oy
C. | Political latiorm: for €o oples movement inside Cuba. - Statue: State has sketched i ‘ina broad outline. CIA is- to produce. a - "the firm platform statement of aims for ‘which the Cubans who will operate inside Cuba are willing to risk their | lives, and upon which _ Popular ‘support can be generated. . ‘ ne D. - Nucleus for popular movement A “ Status: To date, CIA has’ been unable to produce | the neces sary political action agents for this purpose. / Upon: re-évaluation of its. capabilities, CLA_now hopes. to complete’ spotting and assessing eight “to ten Cuban political action agents by 15 February, from among Cubans available in‘the United States. The minimum | need-for the _ oo Project to be effective is 30 30 such political action C Cubans” and CIA. is ye ‘tasked to make a priority search for them among g Cubans in the U. S.. and Caribbean area. re : oo  E | Deployment of sucleus nn , 7 re we - a, ‘Status: CLA. is ‘tasked to select 20 localities within Cuba. where a political action groups can | be established. “{nitial selection and plans _ for establishing these action groups are now due 1 February. Havana, _. and localities.in the provinces. of Camaguey and Las Villas will receive a priority consideration, according to present intelligence. . ; ‘Planning on = * _ this must. be: adjusted as firmer ‘intelligence is acquired. a ‘ ’ : row an : 1 . aa i t a ‘Di lomatic actions - oye “Status: State is ‘concentrating on. the QAS Meeting: of Foreign '.Ministers, which opens 22 January, hoping to get wide. Western Hemis-: ‘phere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it > from the rest of the Hemisphere. A companion resolution, to offer - OAS relief directly to’ the suffering Cuban. people (similar to U.S.° oS relief to Russia, 1919-20) is being. considered, as a means to. reach | the Cuban people sympathetically without going through their Com- munist: government, The OAS ‘meeting’ is to be supported by public ' demonstrations in Latin America, generated by CIA, and ; a ' Psycho- . logical campaign assisted by. USIA.” oe 7 - ° The major ‘task for our diplomatic capability it is to encourage Latin Latin , American leaders to develop independent operations ‘similar to this Pro- ject, seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist “Fegime.. This is. yet t to be initiated by § State. and must be vigorously, pressed. a G. Econornic warfare” 7 as : re yt 7 Status: This critical ‘key. to our political action Project is still in the 7 cS planning stage under State leadership. State is basing future’ economic. oe actions, including plans for an embargo on Cuban trade, on the outcome - oo . of the forthcoming OAS meeting. . Meanwhile, State has chaired an. Economic. -action group, which agreed on developing 13 actions... 15’ ‘February : is- set.for: _a report on. implementing plans; so that actions. can. ‘be initiated. CLA was ‘unable to undertake action to sabotage. the sugar harvest, which commences - (Sabotage ¢ of. transport, mills, sugar sacking. and’ ‘cane’ > fields was s explored. ue sc \ HW 54214 DocId:32977053° Page 4. 0° . about 15 January, and upon which’ Cuba's one- ‘Crop sugar economy depends. a : oO
H, TV intrusion Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts has been reactivated on a small vessel under ClA control. CIA plans to attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's ee speech and rade demonstrations. us: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility -emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship- ‘ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results pious n transport) is not expected until mid-1962/) x ee J. Military actions Status: Defense has been ta ringa conting enc for U.S. military action, in ca e request U.S. hel - ein t Starts makin : i permit obtaining a po < point of U.S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positiv ogical factorina people's revolt, even more itary action. Defense also has been tasked with fully CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and m K. Major elements of the Status: Both State and CIA a: _ (with results largely negative to J ' ealistneis of the youth and cbf psional groupings. Special consideration is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts. This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can pot it into place. L =a Soe As peported to the Special Group last week, there has bean a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required | clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up.” After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a r movement, to win external support _ for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in suport of a shift to overt action, — L, is fas "short < of the Cuba project's goals. potential capabilities, in the light ° HW 54214 DocId: 32977053 Page 5
V. TARGET SCHEDULE By A, imtelizence . Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA). Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation ( Center to be made an effective operation for collection and proces sing of intelligence (CIA with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI). Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban 4 iamai area. CIA to survey other refugee points] d on a priority basis to ensure maximum Cove points. 15 February target date. Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets, with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 Feb- ruary. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba. B. Political — | Task 5: CLA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban government officials, to fracture the regime from within. This effort must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to be worth at least a million U.S. dollars. This can be the key to our political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA project. : Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Decep- tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this. Task 7: By 1 February, ClA to submit operations schedule for initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Gubans, their infiltra- tion, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must deal with the "underground," assess its true status and plans to use it. Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S. Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed. Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February. Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February. NW 54214 Docld:32977053 Page 6 ‘Eee re rec rr
Cc, Beonomic Task 11: State to prepare recommendations to the President on U.S. trade with Cuba, as follow-up to OAS meeting. (If the minimum _result of the meeting is an agreement to condemn Cuba as an accom- plice of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and adoption of a general statement that — Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, — “State is prepared to recommend to the President that remaining trade DOS SO Seorns: between the U.S. and Cuba be barred.) Task 12: State to plan, with Commerce and other U.S. agencies, on how to halt the diversion of vital items in the Cubantrade. Due date 15 February. Cooperation of other OAS nations, particularly Canada and Mexico, is to be explored by State. Task 13: State, with Commerce and others involved, to plan on how to make "positive list” items to Latin America be subject to the game licensing procedures as applied to such shipments to other parts of the free world. Due 15 February. Task 14: State to obtain from Commerce proposal to amend present export controls of technical data (petrochemical, communi- cations equipment) so that Cuba is treated the same as the Sino- Soviet Bloc. Due 15 February. . Task 15: State by 15 February to submit recommendations on issuance of transportation order (T-3) under authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950 forbidding U.S. -owned vessels to engage in trade with Cuba. —  ”—”—C—”———C—COCC- ‘Task 16: State plan due by 15 February on feasible extension of U.S. port treatment now given to Bloc and Cuban vessels to charter vessels of Bloc and Cuba (Treasury to advise on this). Task 17: State to report by 15 February on feasibility of harass~ _ ing Bloc shipping by refusing entry into U.S. ports (statedly for security reasons), if vessels have called or will call at Cuban ports. Task 19: State to report by 15 February on possibilities for obtaining the discreet cooperation of the National Foreign Trade Council to urge U.S. shippers to refuse to ship on vessels which call at Cuban ports. (Commerce to assist on this.) Task 20: State to report by 15 February on possibilities to obtain ~ the discreet cooperation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U.S. firms having subsidaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic sanctions. (Commerce to assist on this.) HW 94214 Docld:32977053 Page 7?
Task 21: CIA to eubmaae n food crops ; oo Task 22: State to report by [5 February on status of plans to gain cooperation of NATO allies (bilaterally and in the NATO forum, as appropriate). Objective is to persuade these nations to take steps late Cuba from the West. a ruary on status of actions unde th Japan, which has compar y significant trade with Cuba es similar to those with NA ations. _on disruption of the Psychological ‘Task 25: USIA to submit plan by 15 February for the most effective psychological exploitation of actions undertaken in the Project, towards the end result of awakening world sympathy for the Cuban peopl , David) battling against the © unist regime uba to join "the Task 26: CIA to submit by 15 February its o ational schedule for a psychological campaign to provoke a relaxing of police state control within Cuba. This is to include effective means of publicly i g "people's criminals" for justice after liberation of Cuba nly individual top officials, but members of the Vigilancia, etc.). ‘ask 27: CIA and USIA will re on progress as of 15 Februar oping identification of the ¥ movement inside Cuba, as gs, symbols, propaganda 1 . k 28: By 15 February CIA -eport on plans and actions paganda support of the popu ement inside Cuba. Include exactly what is planned for y the movement inside Cuba, asibility of using smuggled f ickets (such as the "I Shall n'! cigarette packets to Phili guerrillas in World War I) rale boosters in generating the ular movement, - Military Action Task 29: Defense to submit contingency plan for use of U.S. _military force to support including a_ staterment of conditi whict h action would ix t's goal and believe: would not | 4u4 J - ar, Due 28 February. So Task 30: CIA to aubmit by 15 February its operational schedule | for sabotage actions inside Cuba, including timing proposed for the _ actions and how they effect the generation and support of a popular ment, to achieve the Project goals, vis le a
oo 9. Task 31: CIA to submit specific requests to Defense for required: , ; ., support by Defense as,early,as possible after its plans firm up. Requests, for all. major needs are expected by 23 February. oe woe ~ ! 1 - Defe rill: subr it lan ‘for 'ispecial operations" use of, © is a! . ; = enlisted inthe U.S. armed forces. Due 28 February. Meaty a 0) yy, FUTURE PLANS © 8) 0 0 pee - \ By 20 February, it is expected that sufficient realistic plans for ae -individual tasks will have been received, and initial actions started, to, © . permit a firm time-table to be constructed, Since the President directed - that the Chief of ‘Operations conduct the Project through the appropriate . - organizations and Departments of the Government, and since these U.S, | ’ " organizations are mainly in the-initial inventory and development of . a . ' . capabilities phase. concerning assigned tasks, a precise operations time- © 0. «© Oo ~. oO table as of today would be too: speculative to be useful. - oes, CLA has alerted Defense that it will require considerable military. 7 ..- gupport (including two: submarines, PT boats, Coast Guard type cutters, ),° - Special Forces trainers; C-54 aircraft, F-86 aircraft, amphibian air- raft, shelio- couriers, Army leaflet battalion, and Guantanamo as a base on, for submarine: operations). Also, CIA apparently: believes that its role © 6 ‘shouldbe to create and-expand a popular movement, illusory and‘actual, = _ which will create a political climate’ which can provide a framework of... Lo ‘plausible excuse for armed intervention. ‘This is not in conformity with a on -the Presidential directive now governing Project tasking. . Actually, ‘the te i “role of creating the political climate and plausible excuse for armed -, - | ” dmtervention would be more properly that of State and Defense, .if such “+ an objective becomes desirable... Ds a 1 . . 1 \ . ‘ \ \ \ : uN é : : . ‘ - : 4 i é o . : : Voss ¢ ’ . . a yo i We : . Lo ' . ~ a “ { ‘AW 54214 Dovld:32977053 Page 9 a7
’ » 7m G : Veo... . us N : ns a of Distribution: ~ Co . 7 y ‘ - 4 “Copy No. ; : My 7 The President. _ mt . 7 rs - Me | | Qe. = - The Attorney General. ; - oo . : ; a a : 3. : - The Military Assistant to the | President, ‘General Taylor a tes t The Secretary « of State (and Deputy. Under Secretary J ohnson) n e. ‘ The Secretary of Defense (and Deputy Secretary Gitpatric) ne 6 - "The Director, Central 1 Intelligence a oa 4 : ’ | 7. aor The Director, USIA y So ; A a ve oo: ‘The Department of State Project Olficer, Aseistant Secretary 7 ie _ Woodward and Mr. Hurwitch te : _ aaa , a 9. _- _ The Department of Defense : Project Officer, Brig. ‘Gen: Craig, cel . 10. a The CIA Project Officer, Mr. Helms oa | 7 lt - . ‘The: ‘USIA Project Officer, Deputy I Director Wilson ante: eae Brig, Gen, Lansdale ee . ay “ + 7 oc a - ‘ i x . . at : ~ “ ~ . n 4 q ‘ x “ys s a Yo a \ : s pé . 4 . ' 7 ¢ '. 4 . ? 4 os ' af ' ¥ Ve oo ¢ , ‘- \ ‘ , > ‘ . . 5 ~ 5 ‘ ‘ - HW 54214 Docld:32977053 Bage 10%: