Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) - 23 - for his temporary release to CIA though.the Mexicans were not to be informed of the motive behind his release. In addition, a CIA polygraph operator was being sent to Mexico City on December 4. Clarke Anderson was Gessanatene as the Cote ae (SALG* interpreter for the polygraph sessions. * “Pinally, CIA head- quarters stated that in anticipation of the polygraph examina- tion, Alvarado was to be well fed, rested, and not in fear of bodily harm. As for his return to Nicaragua, the issue was to remain open so that the polygraph operator would have "maximum maneuvering room." V(CIA Doc DIR 86563, 12/3/63) From review of the record it is unclear whether the "maxi- _ mum maneuvering room" to be given the polygraph operator im- plied that Alvarado's polygraph examination was designed to * This same cable noted that Anderson was to be used as the interpreter so that he would be able to testify regarding Alvarado at later hearings. Although not explicitly stated, the hearings referred to likely were Warren Commission hear- ings. The Warren Commission was established by Executive Order 11130 on November 29, 1963. This date may as well explain why greater efforts were not made to polygraph Alvarado while in Mexican custody. The original. Mexico City Station request for polygraphing Alvarado and subse- quent headquarters response that no Spanish-speaking poly- graph operator was available were both made on November 28, prior to the creation of the Commission. V(CIA Doc. MEXI | ‘2720, 11/28/63 and CIA Doc. DIR 85667, 11/28/63) On November 28, the question of testimony at hearings was not at issue. Thus, the necessity of a polygraph examination might not then have been deemed of critical importance. Classification: Classified by derivation:
SE LF LS LS . Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted : from ClA—controlled documents.) -~ 24 — prove his story a fabrication. However, the possibility cannot be dismissed due to CIA headquarters earlier stated conviction that Alvarado had fabricated his story. (See ae) , / { Alvarado was polygraphed at a CIA safehouse in Mexico = V | City (CIA Doc. MEXI 7280, 12/5/63) On December 5, the CIA polygraph operator and Clarke Anderson were ‘able to establish io Y 2 £60 a rapport with Alvarado. However, the subject of a poly- graph was not then discussed. (CIA Doc. MEXI 7267, 12/6/63) Alvarado was polygraphed on Decmeber 6. At that time, Al- varado stated that he trusted in the polygraph's accuracy. Alvarado's response§ as recorded during the polygraph session, evidenced deception. When informed of these responses, Alva- rado retorted that he must have made "an honest mistake" in identifying the individual he observed at the Cuban Consulate as Lee Harvey Oswald.* (CIA Doc. 7289, 12-73 see also BBE ae file 105-82555-657) on weris Buk laa * During the course of his interrogation only Anderson and the polygraph operator had access to Alvarado. At all other times Alvarado remained in the custody of Mexican Immigration Inspectors, pending his deportation to Nicaragua. In addition, during the course of his polygraph session, although not known to Alvarado, a CIA technician tape-recorded the questions and responses \/(FBI file 105-82555-1338).\ Consequent to Alvarado's polygraphing,; Anderson notified FBI headquarters and commented: Syed deep ae fpeks (continued on bottom of page 25) a Yo aT ee e . { 4 ON Classification: — : [mere . , Classified by derivation:
LE ke LE LE LE LT LP aa ‘ Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA——controlled documents.) - 25 - N The tape recordings were subsequently made available \ a ’ n a f by the CIA to the FBI. {776 G8 eRe - After being informed of the results of Alvarado's polygraph, CIA headquarters directed the. Mexico City Station to avoid any action which would induce Alvarado to reassert his original story. As a result, the CIA requested both the Mexican and Nicaraguan authorities to avoid any puni- tive treatment of Alvarado. \(CIA Doc. DIR 87666, 12/7/63) Alvarado was returned to Managua, Nicaragua on Decem- ber 8, 1963. (CIA Doc. MEXI 7289, 12/7/63)” oo Ah, xUWhile writer not qualified to interpret polygraph results, Alvarado's insistence that he saw person identified by him as Oswald at Cuban Consulate on or about September 18 last would seem to clearly indicate fabrication. }\AFBI file 105-82555-657, 12/6/63) (See also CIA Doc. MEXI 7289, 12/7/63)" SCOTT aal Classification: Classified by derivation: LT
Classification: | (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—conirolled documents.) ~ 26 - HSCA Conclusions The record reviewed by this Committee, as set forth above, supports the following conclusions: 1) Immediately following President Kennedy's assassina- tion the possibility of Cuban involvement was given serious consideration by United States government re- presentatives in Mexico City. Cuban complicity was of particular concern to the American Ambassador, Thomas Mann. His suspicions were based upon Oswald's past contacts with both the Cuban and Soviet Consulates in Mexico City, the allegations of Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte, and suspect conversations between the Cuban | President Dorticos and the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Armas. Because of Mann's immediate posture he inkeswesied-—-himsedt int#- the United States in- vestigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico City. Both CIA and FBI representatives in Mexico City had to contend with the Ambassador and probably felt \ that his efforts only further complicated an already complex situation. Therefore, CIA and FBI representa- tives in Washington, D.C. were able to impress upon. the State Department, particularly Alexis Johnson, S014 85 Classification: | Classified by derivation:
, ow: a LE LE SD LE ~ Classification: | (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA-——controlled documents.) , - 27 - that Mann was not in charge of the investigation a result, that Mann's statement to this Committee that his efforts to investigate the possibility of a Cuban assassination conspiracy were prematurely cut off reflect the instructions he received from pee his superiors that the FBI was in charge of Mexico phn § city investigation necessarily implying to Mann that and should be so informed. It is most likely, as : he was not. However, the Committee has found no- evidence to support Mann's contention that CIA and FBI representatives in Mexico City received instruc- tions to cut off investigations of possible Cuban in- volvement in the assassination. But it is the Com- mittee's comtensien that both the CIA and FBI were subject to political considerations created by the tion. In particular, Mann's request that Cuban di- plomatic personnel be arrested created an issue pregnant with serious consequences y atcthe-veryrbeast, | ltd thout. substantive evidence to support such action, creating-a-strain upenr the relationship between Oe 4 -& OS ge ® 2OATSa Classification: extraordinary circumstances surrounding the assassina- f | Classified by derivation: