157-10014-10004 AGENCY : JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency Information SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10014-10004 RECORD SERIES: HEARINGS AGENCY FILENUMBER: 01-H-06 Document Information ORIGINATOR: SSCSGO FROM: ANGLETON, JAMES TO: TITLE: DATE: 09/12/1975 PAGES: 151] SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES CIA HUSTON PLAN FBI , HOOVER, J. EDGAR DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION: — Top Secret RESTRICTIONS : — Consulted CURRENT STATUS: = Withhold ° DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 06/26/1997 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Attachments are partially unreadable.Box | v9.1 HW 50955 DoclTd: 32429392 Page 1 Date: W7/2015
Date Page 07/31/95 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY. INFORMATION AGENCY : ssesco ssc/A RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10004 RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-06 ean cen anh ens tus svnia eri, ssn evs exsup 50 END GHD SEND QED GHD: GEN HOD HED CUED END cE 800 teh ane) snes Gah GIO SW HUD SHED SE) UE EERD GED SEND GD GED Gr hs ED GET ETD ED “EE UY Sth ENS ten fees tn see SAD GE Se nS ey Nee GED SEED GED ENED GPS cuMTS END GEEED ENED ENP pw th nr tenn ny see SD SUEY SEHD GEE Ga DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO FROM : ANGLETON, JAMES TO : TITLE : DATE : 09/12/75 PAGES : 151 SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES HUSTON PLAN CIA | FBI DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE HOOVER, J. EDGAR OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/26/97 Attachments are partially unreadable. Box 1 {[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DBocld: 3274235392 Page 2?
2 ¢ Cc res on < -: ww "poctd BH ved 5 mY at Sales 4 PEN aR ENTS Hs i i ES By, Meets ‘ ceriaenerrty ene ? SC ORTGTNAL  @1 ys | MATLONAL/G SECURETY nae ey # * °G tke & INVENTOgIEOY ony S77 Report of Proceedings ry__2& Hearing held before “ Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities . Friday, September 12, 1975 Washington, D.C (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL .410 FIRST STREET, S, E, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (202) 544-6000
TESTIMONY OF James Angleton tmyene trea 202) 544-6000 EXHIBITS Number Angleton Exhibit No. A-l Angleton Exhibit No. A=-2 Angleton Exhibit No. A=3 Angleton Exhibit No. A-4 Angleton Exhibit No. A-5 2 4 cy € Q & « z TOP SECRET Leger URE RAL Bo 3242349 392
z “shelburne Top SECRET nash EXECUTIVE SESSION Friday, September 12, 1975 Brune (Area 202) $44-6000 United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D. C. The Committ-e met, pursuant to notice, at 1:10 p.m., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Notal, Senator Richard R. Schweiker presiding. (Present: Senator Schweiker { Presiding). Also present: Paul Wallach and Loch Johnson, Profession- WAHO ® PaUL al Staff Members. o, Cc. C Co ¢. Mm TOP SECRET
imesne tiyrea 202) 544-6000 4 pe) 4 a ¢ 3 € z TOP SECRET Senator Schweiker. Mr. Angleton, the first thing we wi do is swear you in. Will you stand and raise your right hand, please? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? Mr. Angleton. I do. Senator Schweiker. As you know, since you have been ' here before, a Senator is normally present at all times during! the testimony. However, with the press of Senate duties we have not been able to effectuate that fully. So if I have to leave -- and I will have to.leave for at least a substantial portion -- you have the right to hold up your testimony until a Senator is returned. So would you be willing to proceed without a Senator present? Mr. Angleton. Yes. And I understand that I am entitled to the draft of testimony? Senator Schweiker. Yes. We let every witness see it correct it. So there is no problem there whatever. Mr. Angleton. To me it is immaterial one way or the other. TOP SECRET
Prone (fees 207) 548-6000 WARD A PALE TOP SECRET TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, would you please state your name, address and organization for the record? Mr. Angleton. James Anvleton, Arlington, Virginia, and no organization. Mr. Johnson. May the record show that Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania is present, and staff members Loch: Johnson and Paul Wallach. Mr. Angleton, I want to make sure that before we start you understand that you have certain rights under the law anc under the Committee Rules of Procedure. Although this is not a criminal investigation, do ,you know you have the Fifth Amend- ment right to be silent in answer to questions if the answer might tend to incriminate you? Mr. Angleton. I do. “Mr. Johnson. Do you understand that you may be accompanied by counsel? Mr. Angleton. - Yes. Mr. Johnson, Are you appearing here todav freely and voluntarily without counsel? Mr. Angleton. Yes. Mr. Johnson. Are you aware that you may stop at any during the examination and request counsel? Mr. Angleton. Yes. 1 Mr. Johnson. I would like you during the proceeding to! TOP SECRET
trent (Area 270?) 944-6000 WARD ®& PAUL ar arr Woastianaian, TOP SECRET let me know if at any time you would like to stop and take a short recess. Let the. record also show that staff member Elliot Maxwell is present, but leaving. Mr. Angleton, do you wish to make a brief opening statement before we begin to talk about the Huston Plan? Mr Angleton. No, f really don't. I say that because as of the end of December, just’ shortly before Christmas, I have had not really had much access to my files, basically in the sense that a legman necessarily would pull things together. t imagine that with the number of personnel the Rockefeller Commission had, the number of personnel that you had, that you will get all the relevant documents. Senator Schweiker. I hope we do. We will sure try it. Mr. Angleton. The Huston Plan is literally about five- eighths of an inch thick, and I think half of it is a blue- covered Lepore. In other words, there is nothing much by way of files. Mr. Johnson. I like to forget by tracing chronologically the events surrounding the so-called Huston plan. And it is my understanding that the first import nt event in this episode has to do with a meeting held in the President's office on June 5, 1970. And at this meeting were the principals of the intelligence community, of course, including Mr. Helms ’ present?
Prone (Ares 202) 944-6000 a > « & € [9] & « 2  Wasminagtonm OC Soe? Sot rreet, PEER ROU ES ACCT REE 8) oe Re i 3, ytchae, TRESS Dine pm Ps When did you first hear about this meeting, if you did hear about it? Mr. Angleton. Well, I think the first news came when Helms called me, and I believe it was with Tom Kara- messiness, and simply stated that there would be a rather extra ordinary meeting in the White House. I think he did mention : the principals being the Executive of the USIB and Mr. Hoover. And that the President made some very strong: statements’ regarding the aack of domestic intelligence on the : incidents of the time. And therefore, that he had set up -~ wanted a working group set up by the principles. And in the course of this discussion, which was very short, he nominated me to be the agency representative, and Dick Ober to be my legman. Mr. Johnson. Did Mr. Helms give you any additional feeling for what that meeting was about? Mr. Angleton. He didn't really have to, because the question of what was going on in the country was burning in every investigative agency or agency in government. In other words, it was not -- the Huston Plan was jist simply the momentum of what was happening in the country. Mr. Johnson. Couldyou be more explicit when you say what was happening in the country? y Mr. Angleton. Well, the question of bombings, the questions of protest, the question of travel abroad -~- all TOP SECRET fs Ree Ree a
Prone {Ares 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL LOCO) 4 Wastineton, DF. SE DLO Feest St PNY Nts TOP SECRET the things which a contemporary newspaper would set forth, and the statistics which Director Kelley can give you ad nause on which there was not coverage. To put it bluntly, as it came through to me -= and this is the reason I think the thing was rather short -- it was a question everybody was asking themselves, basically, that the President of the U.S. did not feel-he had any answers, and, therefore, was more an anger in reaction to the inability of the country to give him answers. Mr. Johnson. So the summer of 1970 there was perceived ae to be a definite internal security threat? et ee Mr. Angleton. It had been growing for a long time. Mr. Johnson. As the leading counter intelligence 2 et EPO thee ese expert in the CIA, did you have any concrete evidence yourself: - cerwreentA AA ETATNTTTL A ANC A eA ES OTT tt heated eneeerarine te ern oer that there was. a foreign connection to this domestic uorest? A eects nae Da ee cee gest Sent Fm « i: JENS Mr. Angleton. The way I would comment on that is simply that the intelligence that we had gathered, fundamentally from December '61 on through, that the counter intelligence effort in the government was very important. Mr. Johnson. Does that include the effort of the Central Intelligence Agency? Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Johnson. Before the telephone rang we were talking about the inadequacies of the counter intelligence effort TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202} 544-6000 4 2 « a @ a z < z PONG Lo aatenatonn OF al wy in this country to include that of the CIA. why was the effort in this area inadequate in your Mr. Angleton. I think the reason it was inadequate was simply that we did not have the quality of sources to whom we could turn to resolve these problems. Fundamentally, the degree to which the Soviet bloc was taking advantage or stimulating the unrest in this country. In other words, we were dealing where everyone had a hypothesis based on holdings, which was quite a different thing from having a live source who could in fact tell you what was going on. Mr. Johnson. So in response to the President's concern about foreign connections over domestic unrest,the answer of the CIA, at any rate, was that we are not sure, because we don't have adequate sources to answer that question? Mr. Angleton. I don't. think, that necessarily follows, because I wasn't present when the President was present. Mr. Johnson. Let me rephrase the question, then. earlier question was, what was the degree of foreign influence over domestic unrest? Mr. Angleton. Well, that's a long -- I am prepared to give you a written paper on that, but to try to verbally reconstruct all of the scene of that period is very difficult: for me at this moment. We had bombings going on, and there TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET was travel abroad, and the dissident groups -- there was a whole series of literally hundreds of incidents. The whole question came up because of what we knew. from 1961 regard- Poaone (Ares 202) $44-6000 ing Soviet’ bloc political action. In other words, the most important development in the Soviet bloc was the re- orientacion of their services into their respective central committees to make a return to Leninist principles, that every intelligence operation must have a political objective. So, the verblage of the day, and the intelligence we had on Communist Parties, plus what we knew on secret sources, we could hypothicate in terms of the civil unrest and the travel of Americans abroad. Our weakness was anyone in the American department's concern who could give us the WARD A FRUL black and white answers as to what groups and what was going on. Mr. Johnson. I have looked at some reports presented to the White House in 1969 by the FBI and the CIA, and those reports conclude that there is little concrete evidence of foreign support, although there was a potential for such support to increase in the future. Iam just wondering -- mele Mr. Angleton. I don't know what reports you are re- Wasmingtan, ferring to. All I can say is that there was obviously a very cautious approach to this when it was dealing with oreet, the subject which might result in another Presidential re- action. TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 2 3 « cy é o is < z 2000 3 Wasnengton. [> ewet SF, A1G Fast st See ee TOP SECRET In other words, you had to be able to prove it, and I can well understand that any reports going in prior to this meeting would be hedged, because within the Agency itself therg were those who took a very staunch stand that there was no foreign involvement. Again, they had no more information than we had that i ' i i ! would justify their position. And these were fairly senior in- dividuals, mainly on the overt side of the business. Their attitude was very definitely that there was nothing to it. Mr. Johnson. But you have indicated to me, if I am reading you properly, that there were gaps in intelligence concerning the degree of foreign influence over domestic un- rest. Is that inaccurate? Mr. Angleton. No, that is an accurate statement, and it goes back again to what I described to be a source who would have access to information that comes into the re) pbs vedas first chief director of the GKB that deals with American t u problems. Mr. Jonson. Why is it that we didn't have such sources? Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that. Mr. Johnson. What I am driving at, is whether or not the intelligence agencies are constrained or fettered by barriers to collecting quality intelligence, and if so, what TOP SECRET Pee ne ee Ae f
Prene (Ares 207} 544-6000 4 3 4 a < fe} & € z Moos Wanmiungtan, 0 6 a oe ioceauey pean these barriers are. ) Mr. Angleton. There were no barriers as such. I mean, speaking from the foreign point of view, it is just simply that the target is one of the most difficult ones that one can conceive of, because you are dealing with a police state, unless they are on internal security, and with a degree of efficiency that simply doesn't fit in with Western terms. Mr. Johnson. What are the topics that apparently were discussed at this June 15 meeting at the White House? What was the degree of cooperation between the CIA and the FBI, in particulare the liaison between the two agencies? What was your feeling about the quality of liaison between FRI and the CIA in June of 1970? Mr. Angleton. This still doesn't have the official date on it? Mr. Johnson. I understand that: in May of 1970 Mr. Hoover terminated the official liaison. Mr. Angleton.’ Well, naturally this was a very big blow to every one concerned. Mr. Johnson. It was more than a symbolic gesture, Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. And it wasn't on a terminat- ing liaison with CIA, it was a termination, as I recall, of all liaison in government with the exception of the White House.
He Prone {Area 202) $44-6000 3 « a € 3 z < z TAGS? G ros Oo fo. Wasting « DEO Bess Street, * p ae Mr. Johnson. So in May of 1970 we had a very serious rupture in relationships between the CIA -- Mr. Angleton. If that is the accurate date of the Colorado Case, there was a very serious rupture. Mr. Johnson. In what sense was it serious? I wonder if you could elaborate. Mr. Angleton. Well, fundamentally liaison is misleading, a misleading word, because the fruits of liaison are obtained through daily contact. In other words, it is a creative process, it is not a static thing of a post office box. It means that cases are discussed, argued, meetings are held, and it is a type cf creative process that you cannot reduce to paper in correspondence. Mr. Johnson. Of course,there was the telephone. Couldn't the same kind of conversations take place over secure telephones? Mr. Angleton. Impossible. Mr. Johnson. So in face to face liaison is quite im- portant in your opinion? Mr. Angleton. It is essential, because it is a process of one side supplying the gaps to the other side, which could not prior to thatmeeting have been identified. It is only when all the case from one side.is laid out, and then you have a rebuttal, and so on, and you define future TOP SECRET
Prone {Aree 2027) 944-6000 J > « a @ fey & € 2 fo Weoatengtons, SF OS ATO baest St courses of investigation, and you reconsider actions that were going to take place. You simply do not have enough stenographers in Washingtm to keep up to date with that type of give and take. Mr. Johnson. It is my understanding that Sam Papich fulfilled this role of liaison with the FBI for a long period of time. Were you his contact in the CIA for liaison purposes? Mr. Angleton. Well, the history of the liaison is that it started back in the days of Admiral Hillencotter with Ben DeLoach, and he was eventually -- his successor became Papich, whose alternate was from San Francisco, and so Papich took it over, I believe, around 1952, and was Jana later up until the incident in Colorado in which it was terminated. I Mr. Johnson. And how often would you get together personally with these individuals to discuss interagency problems? Mr. Angleton. Well, I would say that Sam had two contacts~-— excuse me -~ he had the following contacts. He had contact with my liaison section, headed by Mrs. Jane Roman, and this dealt with the broad routine business of the agency, much of it not so routine when you deal with operational cases. His other contact would be with the Office of Security, which eventually became, to my. knowledge, so burdensome that
imine (Aree 207} 544-6000 a > a ES e a x a x ALO Barat stemer i P4 _interagency committees representing USIB and many others. He was TOP SECRET they put| | on as full time liaison with the Office of Security, plus Bill Creager was handling many of the a perennial person sent to the committees interagency-wise. And then Papich's contact was with myself and my various deputies. That was on a daily basis approximately. Mr. Johnson. In the summer of 1970 it seems to me, then, the country and the intelligence community faced these facts of life: pronounced domestic unrest: inability to completely understand the degree of foreign connections over domestic unrest; and a severing of relationships batween the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community. Mr. Angleton. With the exception of the White House. Mr. Johnson. With the exception of the White House. Were there any other factors that we can bring up as background in this situation of June 1970 that would be particularly relevant? Mr. Angleton. There would be also the allegations made by bloc defectors, which was maintained at a counter intelligence level, and was never injected into the body poli- tic. In other words, counter intelligence people were aware of. the allegations made, and yet there was a great difference of opinion as to the validity of those assertions. Mr. Johnson. What allegations are you thinking of? TOP SECRET
Rata atria aie (aan ites sina Et be Mr. Angleton. I am referring to the allegations of the activities of the KGB and the bloc services. In other words, let's take a simple one. ' That is whether Rumania was ' independent of the Soviet bloc or not, and this had, of course, Prete (Arca 202} $44-6000 far-reaching political impact, because President Nixon had a spe- “chal relationship with Rumania. The estimators were taking the position that Rumania was in a position comparable to Tito when he broke with Stalin. Now, on the counter intelligence level this couldn't be supported. First, it couldn't be supported by way of information derived from defectors. And second, there were too many cases which were in fact exposed which showed the most intimate relationship WARD ® PAUL between the Soviet and Rumanian intelligence services. And So, we have cases that we know about in 1961, without knowing the name of the agent, and one in France in parti- cular. If our identification is correct -- this is infor- mation, I might add, that we passed to the| in 1962 -- there was 4 French ex~Colonel who was being operated by the Soviets and the | | ane they gave other TOP SECRET pasa rerre eee ME ES
TOP SECRET descriptions of the person without a name. Subsequently, after some years, we acquired the man's real name, and we passed it to the| They picked him up and he acknowledged that he was an agent. He acknowledged brine (Ares 202) 544-6000 the broad outlines of the allegation. He was taken by two people to his apartment and while they were searching his quarters, he jumped out of the window and committed suicide. So there hus never been a thorough interrogation of him, ' a but by tracking on our information, and trying to reconstruct his activities, it showed very clearly that the Jena Soviet services were working hand in glove, and that the| | [rere not reluctant =~ that the quality of their EEI's essential elements of intelligence, ‘were for the Warsaw | 2 3 < a: € a z < z Pact. Now, we had several other cases in NATO of very deep penetrations into the most highly classified information by } and this also resulted in the ~ [| breaking up an entire network and expelling people Now, these were issues, that if you accept them as being ne Lwwastienaton, £ more accurate than the so-called overt manifestations of the where they are telling us a story, then you could not distinguish between| and the Soviet Union as a memher of the opposition. And, therefore, it is ironic TOP SECRET sn ng re G tsa
Prone (Area 2027 544-6000 a € & « a x «< z UMWantunatas, O60 that the President visited ] and danced in the streets v in the[ | at the time that the | were picking up the network in And than the Congress granting favored nations status and trade agreements to And, therefore, we had sources that stated this was a part of the reorientation of 1959, of presenting a type of wilderness of mirrors to the West, and to encourage the West to deal with these countries independently of one another. So, this again permeated the counter intelligence picture, not only in Washington, but in all allied capitols, and it was part and parcel of the kind of counter intelligence wpectrum, where you could never come to grips at resolving these matters. : One of the reasons simply was that counter intelligence did not have a voice at any policy level in the government and the Bureau could go along with their views, and we could go along with our views, but there wasn't any third party statue who banged heads together and imposed time factors as to when these issues should be resolved one way or the other. We lived with this from 1961, 1962 on, in all leverls of intelligence. Mr. Johnson. Do you think that Tom Charles Huston viewed himself as a potential arbitor for domestic intelligence
brane (fsrea 202) 544-6006 > < & € a x « x LWasnenaten, Sri. ' tO Eset ste te! rs ua LPs ahlr Se Mr. Angleton. I think he did. Because his short “letter of instructions to the heads of the intelligence commun? Pen tr en cect ity said that his role was to be what Dr. Kissinger's was penrrenetcin m nema oe smene aes ge nme in foreign policy. It was a very clear-cut edict, so to Pe ee epee ee a _ Penn nena speak, that he was the ultimate authority in the Executive for domestic security. cee ee Mr. Johnson. I believe Mr. Angleton is referring to a July 1970 memorandum. 74 Mr. Angleton. That is correct. Mr. Johnson. What directions did Mr. Helms give to you, if any, concerning how you ought to respond as the Chief CIA representative to the work group sessions held to @raft a report for the President on intelligence problems? Mr. Angleton. He didn't give me necessarily any instruction. He just simply stated that the Prasident had outlined his needs, that Huston would in due course call a meeting. He may have stated that the FBI would chain the meeting, and he attended the first meeting. Mr. Johnson. Who attended it, Mr. Helms? Prt gegen omni gn net at ent etme — Mr. Angleton. Mr. Helms. But he attended only for a few moments. uston made the opening remarks, as I recall, and since it was being held in our building, Helms made a brieé appearance, so to speak, the host. And he took off, and ra i don't think from that moment on he attended any other meetings. TOP SECRET
Prene (Area 707) 44-6000 WARD A PAUL HoRG 4 TOP S ECRET | Mr. Johngon.. .. Could you teli-me your impressions of relationship between Mr. Sullivan, who was chairman of this ‘ work group, and Mr. Huston, who was the White House reprezenta+ tive to this work group? | Mr. Angleton. Well, it was my understanding that they had known one another for gome time prior to this, and that Sullivan was seeing a great deal of Mr. Huston on domestic intelligence problems. And that would be -- I don't know how natural and normal it is. I know that since they main- tained the open link of liaison to the White House, there were. probably a great number of reports going to the White House from the Bureau directly. I would assume that within the White House staff that as the work was parceled out, that Huston was probably the recipient, and as a recipient would bring him in touch with the domestic intelligence, in those days the Internal Security Division of the FBI, which was headed by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Johnson. Would it be fair to say that Mr. Sullivan, who had a great deal of experience in counter intelligence, was cultivating the relatively inexperienced Mr. Huston, and perhaps tutoring him on the difficulties that the in- telligence community faced in obtaining the kind of infor- Js mation the President wanted regarding foreign connections over domestic unrest? Mr. Angleton. Well, I wouldn't characterize it that way. TOP SECRET
brane (Aree 202) $44-6000 WARD ® PAUL TOP SECRET I would say that Bill Sullivan -- that he was a person that would postulate a position, and then it would be in his nature to propagate it. I don't think that. Bill Sullivan ever propagated anything that he didn't believe in very deeply. I. know that he was extremely frustrated and I think part of his frustration was what the counter intelligence always encountered, and that is that there are no higher forums that take into account the finding of counter intelligence. In other words, it tends to feed on itself, because unlike espionage, which is conducted for the purpose of nN disseminating information to customers, counter intelligence N produces intelligence for its own consumption. And, therefore, it tends to be blocked off, and there is no question that Bill; who spent many ‘years, Bill Sullivan, who spent many y-rtars in the battle, underwent the frustrations that everybody did. I dare say that he found a kindred spirit with Huston, which is reflected in the correspondence that has been published between Huston, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and so on, Mr. Johnson. I wonder if you could be more explicit about the frustrations that Mr. Sullivan might have -been propa- gating to Mr. Huston. Are you referring to Mr. Hoover's raising of barriers to certain intelligence collection techniques? Mr. ‘Angleton. This all gets into the world of hearsay. But it deals with everything as to the Bureau's ability to TOP SECRET
gt tg reemenre rates Prone (Ares 207) 544-6000 a 2 « 4 € 3 & « z TOP SECRET operate, and to have a voice, That would cover all type of . domestic collection. 20 Mr. Johnson. Is it true that Mr. Hoover underwent a kind of transportation in his attitudes toward what intelli- gence collection methods were feasible and acceptable in this country, and that he refused to conduct certain activities tha he had conducted in the forties and fifties? ; ~ Mr. Angleton. Well, during the Johnson Administration and my facts by way of time may not be accurate -- he was gues. It is my understanding that he looked to the White House for some relief or approbation, and he received none. I think his attitude was that if he was not going to have the Support of the Executive, he was not going to subject the Bureau to a losing battle with politicians. Therefore he began Systematically to cut back on all activities. Mr. Johnson. As an expert in counter intelligence and intelligence collection methods, do you think Mr. Hoover was being unfairly Criticized in the Congress and in the tn de Press for certain techniques that the Bureau had used? Mr. Angleton, Well, I can't recall having read all of this. I knew it more from people who were knowledgeable and involved, and T think that there was a lack of both the support of the President and the Attorney General. I know that I have been told that when the President's foreign TOP SECRET | 2 tk Ho re di gis pai ate pre
TOP SECRET f . all type o } | intelligence board isolated these areas Of neglect, this a! eventually resulted in a meeting with the then Attorney aderwent HI . i General, the Purpose of all this being to restore different : “4 what intelli- i i kinds of coverage to the Bureau. ~ b in this h ‘ble in an Mr. Johnson. What time period are we talking about, the i He) itivities tha ye 4 Johnson Administration? i 6 " nf . Mr. Angleton. The Johnson Administration. And it is my ; tinistration 4- f La: , : a ~ understanding that the President's attitude was that he was foo ~- he was F . . . . a i not going to Give any instructions fo Mr. Hoover, because he od al techni- : . . . had never told Mr. Hoover to cut back on Operations affecting ome . e White ‘ . . : the national security, ved none. . And so the whole exercise went for naught. ie. x the “ ; : . : o have ood Mr. Johnson. But given Johnson's Statement, 1f indeed i ” ‘ct the . : . : ; that is accurate, wasn't that in essence a green light for mr, ‘ore he Hoover to continue? i : Mr. Angleton. - No, I don't think so. I think he would gence and . . . . . q regard that as a passive thing, it was not Charging him for oever ; . . . . . . . | ; directing him, it was given to third parties and not 2 the 7 , given to him directly. it was simply to Satisfy the third 2a? | parties without taking any aétion with Mr. Hoover, read l of ; ead al ° Mr. Johnson. So the upshot was for Mr. Hoover to elimin- ‘eable ea ate certain collection methods he had used before? oth ° L Mr. Angleton, Gradually eliminate them. - SN T know ; Mr. Johnson. Now, what impact did this climination of “gn : r previous. collection techniques have upon the CIA from your  Docld: 32423392
Prone (ares 4 2 « a € a E4 < 3 And I think by the same token we had a lot Co say on the Matter. AS your data base disappeared, then your whole Perceptions became cloudy, you didn't have the inforn ttion. And you could not levy on the Bureau as we had Prior to this requirement, targets, and Othermatters where we had coverage abroad. if the Bureau is Operating one ‘part of the psectrum and we are Operating the other, we would have total coverage. kind of relationship, and they can't follow UP, and they are thwarted from doing many things, 1 would say the Operational value diminishes, and eventually the final blow, banning, doing away with liaison, Mr. JOhnson, Let's turn directly to the meeting» held out at Langley to write the special -Teport for the President. and q want to get into the substance of that TOP SECRET
report a little bit later. But initially I wonder if you be could give me your recollection about the personalities in- 2 3 volved and who seemed to be setting the agenda for this Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 fe] meeting, and what the role of the NSA generally speaking was, : 5 || and the DIA, and the CIA, and the FBI? ~~ “ 6 _ Can we point to a motivating force here, a certain group 6 7 that was leading the operation? . " & Mr. Angleton. You haven't one of the tables of or- & a 9 : ganization of that group so that I can see the names? . 9 c 10 | Mr. Johnson. Yes, I do. vel _: 1 Let's take a short recess. a ~ 7 ra” : (Recess.) +. : pe Mr.Johnson. Back on the record. 1: Cc : La : Based on your recollection of the individuals involved 1. Cc tl “in the work group sections at Langley, I wonder if you could 1: ~ give us a feel for the role that the various spokesmen played 7 at that meeting? For example, John Downie as a representative of the % 1 Army. 6 . Mr. Angleton, Well, going down the list, naturally the| key individual was Bill Sullivan of the FBI. 2 F Mr. Johnson. Why was he the key individual? Mr. Angleton. He was the key individual because Mr. ‘ Hoover was the Chairman, and he was representing Mr. Hoover ; under Presidential instruction, or instructions from Hoover, TOP SECRET
nder if you sonalities in- a for this ly speaking was, , @ certain group tables of or- > names? duals involved vc if you could pokesmen played tive of the ., naturally the ‘dual? because Mr. Hoover : g Mr. from Hoover, 3) 1G bs TOP SECRET and in turn delegated to Sullivan. And the basic concerns dealt with domestic activities in the FBI. Mr. Johnson. Did Mr. Sullivan bring to the meeting a distinct point of view on the problem of intelligence gaps? t Mr. Yes, very deeply. He was probably one of | Angleton. the most cognizant. Mr. Johnson. What was his viewpoint, as you recall it? Mr. Angleton. Well, his viewpoint, I think, was the one echoed by Huston. And I think that to recast this, Huston was the authority present, because he came cloaked me ee } with White House authority. Mr. Johnson. “He was certainly not the authority when it came to inter-~intelligence, and the problems that CI specialists faced? Mr. Angleton. No, he was very knowledgeable. He had ; ; ve obviously gone into this matter at some length prior to the . _ J meeting. He knew precisely what none of us really knew, that ‘is, the depth of White House concern. In fact, the most dramatic moment, I think, was at the beginning of one meeting, or =t some stage in the meetings, after a preliminary draft had been put forward, he found it totally unacceptable, and his comments were to , the effect that the subcommittee was not being responsive to the President's needs. Mr. Johnson. I wonder if you could explain this to me.
Brone Ares 2027) 544-6000 2 2 «< a é o & € 3 TOP SECRET Mr. Sullivan was Mr. Hoover's representative, and Mr. Hoover wanted intelligence restraints maintained on various collec- tion procedures. And yet you tell me that Mr. Sullivan tended to agree with Mr. Huston's point of view, which was that restraints needed to be carefully scrutinized, and quite possibly lowered. So I am wondering why Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Hoover's re~ presentative, didn't reflect Mr. Hoover's point of view? Mr. Angleton. He obviously didn't agree with him. Mr. Johnson. Wasn't that a rather difficult situation \ for Mr.Sullivan to be in, then? Mr. Angleton. I don't know. You would hve to ask him. He didn't seem to manifest any difficulties with his role. Mr. Johnson. At no time during the meetings at Langley did he express his dilemma representing Mr. Hoover on the one hand, but wishing to lower restraints on the other hand. Mr. Angleton. He may have. But it doesn't stick out in my mind, I think he played this role very straight. Mr. Johnson. - Po you remember there being a military point of view at this meeting? Mr. Angleton. No. Downie -- the one remark that Downie made -- and he may have made it more than once, about which he expanded at some length, was that he couldn't even afford to keep the minutes of the meetings in his own office.
Emone (Arma 202) 544-6000 4 3 «< a € fe] & < z And then he went on to some length about the troubles the military had. I think it had to do with ROTC rioting, and a tremendous number of other civil acts against the military. And he believed that up through the non-commissioned officers that the thing would be leaked, to the detriment of the Army, or the Pentagon. He posed questions as to how he was going to be able to take it up to higher authority within the Pentagon, and really, this was the dilemma which he kept pounding on, that he didn't know how he was going to handle the paper, and he didn't know how he was going to play any role in it, because of the discontent wihin the Defense establishment, the draftees and what not, the cleri- cal, and non-commissioned officer. Mr. Johnson. How did you feel on a more conceptual level about the role of the military insisting domestic intelligence collection. Mr. Angleton.’ He thought that in recruiting centers and campuses of ROTC, and places where intelligence existed, that there was a real problem. Mr. Johnson. And did he see a role for the military in actively assisting in the gathering of domestic intelli- gence to find out here about domestic unrest. Mr. Angleton. Yes, a lot of it had to do with aetivi ties against the Pentagon, against soldiers. Mr. Johnson. But isn't it true that during this perioua
roe Caen eee parce tn tte ores arate Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 4 2 < % e a & < 2 1 Wasnenatan, f GAN the military was under severe criticism for earlier civilian surveillance programs? Mr. Angleton. From where? ' yy Mr. Johnson. I believe the military was preparing for hearings before Sam Ervin's Committee on the subject of milit- ary surveillance over civilians. To some degree the mili- tary was under public criticism for being in the domestic intelligence gathering field. Mr. Angleton. But I think the military took the posi- tion that they were responsible for their own security in conjunction with all other investigative agencies. In other words, there has always been a cardinal rule in government that the head of every agency is responsible for his own security, that when the FBI develops information on any subversion, within any branch of the government, they send copies of those reports to the heads of the agency ‘concerned for their action. And, therefore, as.far as I know no one had turned over the military prerogatives. Mr. Johnson. Do jthese prerogatives extend beyond the military base itself? Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think it has anything to do with what directly affects the security of the armed forces. Mr. Johnson. Was there an NSA point of view that emerucs TOP SECRET
Emaone (Ares 207) 944-6000 4 2 < a € ie) & « & 2 22800 ion 1 Wastinaios, st rreet, in these meetings on the subject of intelligence collection procedures? Mr. Angleton. The NSA position, I think, was simply that they needed an espionage assist to further their own activities, the results of their own activities, and that Mr. Hoover, in changing his operational posture, was depriving NSA of very highly sensitive collateral, which resulted in one, non-production, or if there was production, tremendous costs to arrive at the same intelligence break-through, and unfortunately getting away from real. time collection. Mr. Johnson. Are you talking about foreign intelligende? Mr. Angleton. Foreign intelligence, foreign and | domestic, but where it is interrelated. But the real time factor was that with the Bureau's help they were able to | have real time in terms of their collection. ‘ (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Johnson. We are talking about the point.of view of the NSA. I am wondering next if the CIA brought to these meetings any perspective on intelligence collection problems and how to resolve the difficulties with gaps in intelligence? Mr. Angleton. it don't think it brought it anything that wasn't well known in the community. Mr. Johnson. And that relates back again to Mr. Hoover throwing up barriers on:certain procedures? Mr. Angleton. That is right.
crete scent ve a on Prone {Bree 202} 344-6000 4 2 « EN € o & « € AYO Forster TOP SECRET - I mean, there wasn't any secret in the community re- garding the gradual cutting back of liaison, and cutting ~ back of operational support, and cutting back responsiveness to requests, in other words, ever sector of the domestic intelligence, which was a service of common concern which the Bureau bestowed on the community. : And everyone could see, they were too experienced not to see it all disintegrate, and more important, they knew about it as it happened, because there is a great deal of communi- cation within the intelligence community. And, therefore, if the head of NSA was asking Mr. Hoover, and he had been turned down on certain things, then that would be known to many others who were expecting NSA to produce as many as they had been producing a few months prior to that. So as those things dried up, it just hit more and more individuals in the community. It wasn’t any theoretical, it was all fairly hard core coverage. Mr. Johnson. Barlier you said that Mr. Hoover decided not to allow certain operations because of lack of support from the White House and the Attorney General? Mr. Angleton. I said that is my understanding. Mr. Johnson. Is it also true that Mr. Hoover, going one step further, was concerned about the image of the Bureau, and he was afraid that that image might be blackened by public criticism of techniques that had been used once before. TOP SECRET
Prone [Ares 202} 544-6600 4 2 « a 6 Q C3 « z + Wasrington, &.C. 20003 oe TIO Fost Stree Mr. Angleton. I think 80. I wohld go a step further and.state that the success and stature of the Burea depends in large measure on the public support. And once the public support starts @iminishing, it has a direct impact on the effectiveness of the Bureau, because they rely on much of the citizenry of thig-country.to come forward as informants and voluntary cooptees of the Bureau. . And once: conficence is lost in the Bureau, they lose this public support. And I think Mr. Hoover was very conscious, and probably more so than many people in the government, was very conscious and sensitive to the degree of public support, or the lack thereof. . And I don't think he was going to stand idly by and have | the Bureay made a scapegoat when the Executive wouldnot stand forward. Mr. Johnson. Before turning to the ‘actual special ° report itself, I wonder if you can tell me something about the drafting of the special report, and also the degree of consensus among participants as to the product that emerged from those meetings. , Mr. Angleton. To my Knowledge it was no real dispute in the product. Oh,my own party, used Ober as my research associate. In other words, when I needed information re- garding the strength of the operation and activities, ard so on, his job was tw» produce the study. TOP SECRET
_emertcres any apne ERD OE abr Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000 WAKO & PAUL S.£., Wasmington, 0.C. 20003 D1Q Ferst Street. Much of this was well known to the community, as I say, prior to the meeting, I mean with the gaps. So, I don't recall offhand -- this is nothing that stand forward as in any disagreement -- there may have been some, oh, verbiage, but I can't recall it. Mr. Johnson. Was the actual drafting or the report done by the Bureau? Mr. Angleton. I think they took all the proposals and came forward at each meeting with the drafting. Now, whether we cooperated with them in that I don’t know. But I know that, as I recall, they weuld submit drafts! that tried to reflect the consensus of the prior meeting. Mr. Johnson. Let me at this point introduce into the record Exhibit A-1, Mr. Angleton, a special report inter- agency Committee on Intelligence, ad hoc, June 1970. (The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-1l for identification.) TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 2 P] 4 & € a a < z 210 Feest Street, $-6., Wasmingtan, D.C, 20003 Mr. Johnson. Now, this is the 43-page special: report that eventually went to Mr. Nixon. And essentially it had thre major sections. The first section was a threat assessment. Do you recall what the CIA contribution was to the writing of the threat assessment, just in general terms? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Johnson. Back on the record. Mr. Angleton. From reading this, I would say that I don't think there was any dissident on the fact as laid forth here. We now know a great deal more about the Vinceremos Brigate because we have had defectors from the Cuban DGI, and their intelligence service. And we are quite accurate on the uses of that for espionage, and so on. And the projections there, I don't think we dispute today. Mr. JOhnson. The second section of the special report had to do with options for the President. There are parts that are somewhat indistinct, but what I wanted to focus your attention on was the actual options presented to the President under six different collection titles,the first one being communications intelligence. And you can see on gpage 25 there is a series of options provided for the President with a little space whereby he could check off which one he approved.
Prone (Aran 202) $44-6000 WARD & PAUL 20003 310 Fiest Street, SE. Wasningtoan, O.C. Now, what I would like to know is, from your perspective as a CIA representative, of what relevance were these options to your organization? ; Mr. Angleton. What is the intelligence directive No. G? I don't recall that. Mr. Johnson. That just outlines for the NSA its mandate | in monitoring the communicationg facilities, international communications facilities, used by American citizens. You might want to briefly glance over this section which explains it. r Communications intelligence is an activ-: ity of the NSA, as I understand it. And from reading the text it seems like NSA had primary interest here. Hut I wonder if the CIA was also interested in relaxing restraints in this area, Mr. Angleton. Every participant is a consumer of NSA product. And therefore they all have a an equal interest, they all had a departmental interest in enhancing the coverage by NSA. Mr. Johnson. And this would have included the DIA as well? | | Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because that is all they are, they are under -~ NSA is under the Secretary of Defense. o Mr. Johnson. Areyou aware of the NSA watch list? Angleton. I am aware -- you mean as of today, or TOP SECRET
Prone [Area 202) $44-60600 WARD & PAUL 003 S.£.. Wasnengtan, O10. A110 Furst Street, Sh ER ESN nha Now ce Johngon. Then -- Mr. Angleton. I know they had a watch list. Mr. Johnson. . Let me be more specific, then. Was not the CIA providing names of individuals of interest to the CIA who had been placed on: the’ ‘N5A watch Mr. Angleton. Are we talking now about domestic intelligence, or normally? Mr. Johnson. Let's begin with normally. i t ' Mr. Angleton. Normally all customers, to my knowledge; would levy requirements on NSA. Mr. Johnson. In the case of the CIA, what would be an example of a name that might be sent to the NSA to be placed on a watch list? You say a terrorist. Would that be an example? Mr. Angleton. A terrorist, an organization, intelligente 2 individuals, political individuals, travel control. Mr. Johnson. Would any of these names include the names of American citizens? Mr. Angleton. As of that time I don't know. I would assume that if they were American citizens coming within ‘our jurisdiction, traveling abroad, there was reasonable grounds for believing that they either belonged to an or- ganization, or have been in contact with foreign intelligence or foreign officials, that these names would appear on the TOP SECRET
a mone (Area 202) $44-6000 WARD & PAUL _, Washengton, 0.C. 20903 310 Fast Street, SE watch list. Mr. Johnson. So before the Huston plan the CIA was levying requirements on the NSA to include on the watch - list names of relevance to the CIA? Mr. Angleton. That is right. Mr. Johnson. Now, would one objective of the Huston Plan from the CIA point of view have been to perhaps expand the number of individuals being monitored that were of in- terest to the CIA? Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that, because at this mo- ment I do not recollect the procedures or the channels of command through which these watch lists were . é built up. I can't recall whether it went through Staff D or whether components in the Agency have independent liaisons “with NSA. In other words, the overt side of the House weould ob- viously have relations with NSA directly. ‘And the CIA people who were observers with the USIB covering other sectors > of the Agency would obviously, have liaison in substansive / . . rm matters, and then the clandestine side would hve relations. Now, it is that channel command, the channel of liaison, that would normally have. been through Staff D. Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, I am puzzled by these options presented on page 25. Let me read the second one to you: “present interpretation should be broadened to permit
Phone [Ares 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 70003 $.E., Wastington, 0.0. 31O Forst Sirees. a program for coverage by NSA of the “communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities". Mr. Angleton. Yes. | Mr. Johnson. Wasn't that already being done before the Huston Plan or before the special plan? Mr. Angleton. I would have to see what this directive No. 6 says, Since it related to that. Mr. Johnson. Do you have any knowledge that before of 1975 the NSA was in fact covering the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities? Mr. Angleton. I don't know. Mr. Johnson. You don't recall getting any product from NSA? Mr. Angleton. I didn't handle ~- I had a unit that worked on counter intelligence data that came from communications intelligence. And there were s0 many pro~ grams in the clandestine services on travel control -- in other words, all through the Cuban period there were literally thousands and thousands of pages of information derived from all other sources. During the Cuban phase there was all the travel contro: on all foreigners going to Cuba. And I assume that covered u.S. citizens. what I am trying to say is that there are so Many components in the clandestine side of the business that would be engaged in special operations which through “ TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 S10 Fost Street SL. Watninaton, D.c. 20002 Staff/D they would levy requirements. Mr. Johnson. But do you also see my point in I am wondering why these options would be written for the President's approval when in fact there is some indication that these activities were already going? Mr. Angleton. Because I think it relates to the question of interpretation of the President's Directive No. 6, in other words, that NSA was obviously complying with some portion of that intelligence directive which the group felt should be changed. In other words, they were relying on that verbiage to justify some fields of inguiry into which they weren't going, because they didn't have the personnel. But iff we had the directive it would be very clear.
Phone (Area 202) WARD & FAUL 410 First Street, S.E£., Wasnengton, D.C. 20003 Shee tesa es Mr. Johnson. Do you recall at the time any discussion about the need to make thia directive more explicit by having the President -- Mr. Angleton. No. All I know is, there was a directive that was inhibiting to NSA. What paragraph of it, what it said I cannot recall. But it was something that they held up as a restriction in their liberty of action. “ Mr. Johnson. From reading the text here one gleans the understanding that restriction had to do with coverage by NSA of communications o- US citizens using international facilities | And obviously they wanted the directive to be relaxed and broadened to allow that kind of coverage. And so the dilemma I am having is why they wished to have the President expand that ‘coverage when in fact the coverage was already there? Mr. Angleton. I don't know whether it was present in the sectors we are discussing. I mentioned to you the Cuban thing. There could be dozens of projects which would not be known to the Counterintelligence, which would be known to Staff D, in-~- which there was direct NSA involvement in supplying coverage. I mean, the ones I can think of were such things as Cuban, were matters where there was an enhanced interest on some matter, operational or otherwise. But’ NSa does have liaison officers covering the needs of NSA and so on. Mr. Johnson. The second collection method discussed in the | Special Report has to do with electronic surveillances and
penetrations. Of what relevance was this particular method to the CIA? The second opening talks about intensification of coverage of individuals and groups in the US who pose a major Phone (Area 202) 344-6000 threat. Now, based on your recollection of the Langley meetings to which organization did this operation refer? Who was going to intensify the coverage? Mr. Angleton. The coverage would have been FBI, I think. In other words, they are the only ones that were conducting an electronic surveillance. If you leave NSA out of the picture. Mr. Johnson. Within the US? Mr, Angleton, Yes. And I think our problem, or the problem that communities always had, is the lack of broad coverage to begin with on foreign diplomatic establishments, WARD &@ PAUL” and individuals within those establishments. And I will give examples, or at least I will give one example which I think characterizes the hard core counterintelligence interests. Soviet intelligence is probably most deadly when it recruit: a foreign diplomat from a friendly country, say, in Moscow, and follows his career. Eventually he ends up in the US. He has all the coloration of a friendly country, and thereafter all kinds of doors are open to him. And he is not under surveillande- Yet having diplomatic cover he can deal with legal KGb and the GRU at social functions. And the classic case is the case of 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
SRE - — ee ~ TOP SECRET Wannerstrom, The Swedish air Attache, who had been recruited sf by the Soviets in the middle forties. While he was in Moscow the Soviets built him up 4s the source of the American military ,| Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000 ana under Soviet guidance he produced a great amount of infoma-~ ._ tion for our attache's, which looked as though he was risking his own life on their behalf to acquire information, it being unknown that he was being manipulated all the time by the Soviets. So many yeare passed. And:eventually he was assigned to Washington. And the American military, because of his favors that he had done to American military in Moscow, opened up all the gates to him regarding US installations, and teated him almost like one of their own. WARD & PAUL Now, his control was in the Soviet Embassy... And he would take microfilm rolled up in the palm of his hand, and as he shook hands he would make his delivery. And he had dead drops, and go on. Now, taking that one case, and basing it on all of the modus operandi which has come out of the knowledge of the KGB, we would believe that there should be a listing of all diplomats who have served in Moscow, because the realcenter for compromise and recruitment is there, by the Secretary Chief Directorate. And they eventually turn it over to the First Chief Directorate, which is the CIA side of it, when a man leaves Russia. So the danger point in terms of economy of personnel allocated to Bloc 310 First Street, S.E., Wasningion, O.c. 20003
Prone {Ares 2027) $48-6000 WARD & PAUL 20003 §.£.. Wasnington, O.C. ALO Feest Street. as “TOP SECRET countries, and they have no activities really covering the so- called friendly countries. But you could build up a priority list for anyone who had served behind the iron curtain aa distinct from any of the other embassies, then if you didn't have constant electronic coverage at least you would have periodic coverage to take the pulse of that individual, what is he doing. . \ Now, one of the cases the Bureau had involved an individual from a friendly foreign country, and they found him in touch with one of the Bloc countries, and a lot of other activities. This was given to the intelligence ~- or the security service of his native country. Eventually they broke him as a Bloc intelligence agent. Now, that came from electronic coverage. So my point is simply that the status of status for counter~ intelligence purposes is totallly inadequate, based on the information which we had relating to modus operandi. Mr. Johnson. So this has been strictly an FBI activity? Mr. Angleton. Yes, but working together with the other ’ investigative agencies, because the Pentagon has all of the Liaison sections, and they have hundreds of officers who wander in the diplomatic milieu, it is a question of tightening up the controls where there is memorandum of record, and of meet- ings, and social events, and so, where they are dealing with Bloc people these should be deposited with the FHI in order that they have a data base against their electronic coverage. TOP SECRET aa a aH,
CRET in other words, it ig absolutely unbelievable that with all the conterintelligence data and defectors that we do not have the manpower and the lists to perform this relatively easy type ia of coverage. In fact, in my view it is almost irresponsible. Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 Mr. Johnson. When it comes to this kind of coveragé, does not the CIA also involve itself in planning and lending to the Bureau the use of sophisticated gadgetry? Mr. Angleton. We have loaned atuff, I don't Know how much, | to the Bureau. But again I have had something to do with the policy there. My attitude over many years ~~ and I was on the Technical Production Board was that anything the Agency developed by way of a sophisticated piece of equipment, that prior to its use by us, where it could be compromised abroad, that it be offered -- 4n offer and refusal business would be WARD & FAUL given to the Bureau to see-whether it could be used domestically - before its classification of secrecy became exposed, on the gournds hat the priority for the Agency is the espionage situation in the US. And therefore if we developed a piece of equipment, they should be brought in and they should be exposed to the equipment to see whether they can apply to a domestic case. And then if they refuse it we submit it at much lower gecurity abroad, where essentially, when it is compromised it i cmpromises the use of that equipment against all Bloc services. In other words, we had a piece of equipment compromised in Mexico. And the equipment was being used in other places $10 First Street, S.£.. Wasningtan, O.C. 20003
Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 a > 4 a @ oO « « z 410 First Street, S.E., Wasmngton, O.C. 20003 abroad. So you have to immediately know that that service would have immeidately take counter action in all‘ installations around the world, but it would also tell the other Bloc services. And ‘ therefore your dilemma is, you had given it to the Bureau with- Hl out telling them of its compromise. And therefore on the technical side you have to have the closest exchange. And by the same token, if they have a breakthrough, and equipment no longer has the same sensitivity to then, then we should get it for the purpose of either improving it or utilizing it. Mr. Johnson. Would the CIA also have a rule inviting personnel to administer this equipment in this country vis-a-vis dipolomatic establishments? Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge. I can see the Bureau, say, a very hard case going to any government agency, or even to the private sector, to bring in people who are superior to their own, who complement or supplement their own. In other words, I think when you have any operation, and you find a fault in it, ér a lack of expertise, you go where you can find it, without regard to charters or all that stuff. Mr. Johnson. If you will look at the two operations on electronic surveillances and penetrations, there is quite 4 difference between the second operation and the third operation. The third one has to do with diplomatic establishment, but the second one has to do with coverage of individual groups who pose a major threat. Did the CIA have an interest in using TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 344-6000 “ > < a é is] x « s 410 First Street, $.£., Wasnington, O.c. 20003 this particular collection method within the US against certain groups taht might pose a threat to internal security? Mr. Angleton. I don’t think that -- I don't remember explicitly, but I don't think that it was our desire that we would take on this activity if we could get the produce from the Bureau. Our interest would be to see what breaks out of that inorder that we could take the foreign element, if the individual traveled abroad, and there was 4 foreign angle to it, then we would take over that. aspect of it. ‘And furthermore, in our findings abroad we would have. those meetings with the Bureau that we didn't refine in the requirements and we could target more accurately individuals. When once you get latched on someone that is domestic, and you make the foreign connection, . you are in. And you have got the Bureau controlling some double on their side, and we are controlling some abroad, then you can expand that thing into the entire network all the way back. Mr. Johnson. Did you personally feel at the time that there needed to be some expansion of FBI activities in that area? Mr. Angleton. In the area of what? Mr. Johnson. In the area of electronic surveillances and penetration between individuals posing a threat to internal security? Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that wherever there is a threat to the internal security, I think the Bureau should be on top TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 944-6000 WARD & PAUL “0003 ALO Farst Street, SE. Wasnmaton, O.C, Mr. Johnson. What I am getting at is, I am wondering that if in June of 1970. you felt that Bureau coverage in this area, using this technique, was inadequate when it came to radicals within the US? . oe Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Bureau or anyone else had professional coverage to the degree that it was needed. And this means not to be opposed to these people, because I think curtail the legitimate part of this student unreast or whatnot, that. what has to be spelled out here, our motive was never to i our real problem was that since we weren't covering the foreigners and the diplomats, and we didn't know from morning to night what they were doing, that we didn't have a credible or professional data base on foreign activities. And the easieat.place to start on from is in our own country. The efficiency of the CIA's counterintelligence depends in large measure on the Bureau's, because anyone with a foreign connection is going to broaden our jurisdictior. Every diplomat or espionage operator in this country operates from the headquarters within our jurisdiction. And therefore we have a very highly vested interest that the coverage and the quality of the coverage in the US be brought up. And we didn't think much of the Bureau coverage, because we knew the limitations > that existed, as did most everyone in the community. Mr. Johnson. Looking at these first two collection methods TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 a 2 € a @ a « “4 z eooo0s S10. Fost Street, SC., Washington, De. that we have discussed so far; one on communications intelli-| gence, and the second one on electronic surveillance and penetrations, would it be fair to say that the CIA already had some names on the NSA watch list of interest to the CIA, and the CIA was already receiving some product from the Bureau gained through electronic surveillance and penetration, but in both areas there was a great deal of inadequacy, and so what the CIA was really interested in here was a4 better product in both areas, which really meant an expansion of the use of this . technique? Mr. Angleton. There is no art in this technique. The problem of the technique is -~ let me rephrase that. Mr. Hoover obviously conceived the Bureau as a group of mean primarily concerned with law enforcement. And in terms of his budget career, esprit de corps, he didn't want to water his organization with.a tremendous number of clerical officers who from the beginning to the end with only in electronic surveillance, because my understanding of the electronic surveillance is fundamentally that the message is in a strange language, and collected by the thousands, and had to be processed by linguists and I don't think he wanted to clutter his table of organization with this. He was prepared to. do it as it came up in the course of their normal operational activity if they came across a lead or an agent, then it might stimulate temporarily coverage r of that target. TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202} $44-6000 2 > « a a Q « < x 210 Farst Street. S.£., Wasnngton, 5.c. 20003 What we wanted was saturation on the foreign people, and on the Soviets. In other words, we had a case in which a young Soviet in the United Nations went outside of the restricted area and threatened or brought a threat to one of our agents who was hidden. We asked the Bureau, where was he that weekend. And they said they last saw him that Friday night in New York.in his house. . Something was inadequate in terms of manpower, of not knowing that on Saturday and Sunday he had gone to the Midwest on operational assignement. And that is what I am trying to say. I could take trht case and multiply it a hundred times. And my view is that since the opposition works in a way that — CRY both the KGB and GUR are principals, I mean they run the embassies, that there should be coverage on all of them. But the Bureau can only take a limited amount of personnel and then allocate it. And therefore if you are going to have any assurances of evaluating the situation, and $0 on, then you have got to have the coverage. And the coverage, the easiest, cheapest coverage there is electronic surveillance. Principally when it is secure. If everybody knows the phone is being tapped, then you learn nothing. And I dare say after all these hearings are over that there won't be much counter- intelligence derived if any. Mr. Johnson. Doesn't the embassy officials from Bloc TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 944-6000 a pe] < a e G « « 3 o Washington, OC, e004 S10 Forest Street, GE TOP SECRET countaies simply assume that their phones are being Mr. Angleton. There are emergencies that arise in which th phone is the only way you can handle the emergency. Or there can be pay telephones, and they are unaware that you have the ability to tap a pay telephone. In other words, there is a lot of art within this thing where the whole thrustvof. everything you do is to get the enemy to underestimate you, 80 there modus operandi is geared to really a false estimate of your. capability. And they don't use the phone, but they go to a pay telephone, and there are only five pay telephones within walking distance. - Ana this particular day the Sth is the one they are going to use. And surveillance can state which code that they are going into number one. And thereafter the calls is picked up. If he doesn't know that you have that capability he is going to start cunning his agents out of those five telephone booths. YI am only giving that example. Mr. Johnson. “I would imagine if we were monitoring pay telephone booths we would pick up a lot of other calls besides calls made by embassy personnel? Mr. Angleton. Those are all pinpointed types of things. It is known there has had to be communication between the agent and the principal. L£ you have a source that you can possible compromise, it tells you that there is going to be a meeting, and therefore 4 call and arrangement made, a code word said. And since they have gauged the fact that you don't
Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 J 2 < a « a a « 3 Yaoos Washengtan, DG, AYO Farst Street, SE, Lars Bp don't have that kind of thing, that means that for one call based on inside information, you pick up the business. Mr. Johnson. I would imagine that vigorous effort by the Bureau in this effort would have saved the CIA a tremendous number of man hours. Mr. Angleton. It would gave averybody in the community. Because you have to keep in mind also that the targets of the Soviet espionage and nen espionage relates also to the State Department, Atomic Energy, the entire military, and it goes all: the way down the line. Those agencies have standard security -officers. And they have to rely on the Bureau for the domestic coverage. And my point is this, that when you see cases of espionage which have occurred, and you go back track on them, you will find that had there been full time surveillance, and a lot of manpower devoted, that those would have been nipped in the bud, and you could have taken a straight agent and double him back into the opposition. But in a case such as the punlvp sf NY case, the Sergeant who allegedly committed suicide in SA, his activity with the Soviets was only after his suicide. Mc. Johnson. How was that? Mr. Angleton. It was known, it became known. In fact, if I am not mistaken, I think some of my communications to NSA, very sensitive, were found in a plastic bag in his attic, as 1 recall. Mr. Johnson. You say alleged suicide. Do you have reason to believe that it wasn't actually a suicide? TOP SECRET
Phone (free 202} $44-6000 a 3 « a 8 a & « z 20003 S5.E., Washington, O.C, 310 First Street, FeO SONA: 4 Rae f aie x Mr. Angleton. Well, one accepts he ia a suicide. But my point is that I do not know that we have such depth of knowlédge regarding his case that we know all the facts. And I would say | i the President's Foreign Intelligence Board made the most exhaustive inquiry into the case, probably more than anyone else in Government. And I have never seen their findings. Mc. Johnson. The thirs set of operations discussed in the Special Report had to do with the subject of mail coverage. Mr. Angleton. Yes. Mr. Johnson. Of what importance were those operations to the Central Intelligence Agency? Mr. Angleton. Now, would you tell me your question again? Mr. Johnson. What significance were those operations for our organization in June of 1970? Mr. Angleton. I think everybody there, with the exception of the Bureau, was unaware that we had mail coverage. Mr. Johnson. If you had mail coverage why was the President asked to remove restrictions on mail coverage? Mr. Angleton. I think the basic thing would have been ~~ I mean, he would know that this was a cover thing against the other members of the community. In other words, if this had not been brought out from Downie and all those observers, and so on. Mr. Johnson. I suppose I am still unclear about this. Did the President at this time know that the CIA had a covert mail coverage program? TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 a 3 « a a a « z .. Washington, O.C, 20003 410 First Street, SF sires at ails. fC, Ab rel Cass Mr. Angleton. My recollection is that we had certain information from mail coverage which must have come to his attention. Mc. Johnson. If you will look at this page you will see that it states "covert coverage has been discontinued." Was that in fact true? Mr. Angleton. I think thia is probably, -- that paragraph, | I think, was a Bureau comment. Mr. Johnson. Do you Find this rather misleading, to send a report to the President that tells him the covert .coverage has been discontinued, and then asks him -- Mr. Angleton. I am not 80 sure ~~ I don't know the origins. of that paragraph. In other words, it refers here to Congressional hearings. I don't recall -- I know'they were happening, but I don't recall which ones they were referring to here. We had a former Deputy Director, Scientific and De awrite Technology, Solville, who had belonged to the group of scientists who wrote some very pointed inquiries to the Post office ~- and I don't remember the date -- regarding the whole mail coverage business. To my recollection, Colville, while with the Agency, knew of the program. Now, what this is referring to I don't know. Mr. Johnson. Did the Bureau have a program at this time? Mr. Angleton. I don't know. They may have had one that was discontinued. The operative part of that as I see it is
Prog {Aras 202) 544-6600 a > « & @ a a «< rE oa00 3 420 Farst Street, SE. Wasnengton, O.C. shether those are Congressional hearings involving accusations of Government invasion of privacy. Mr. Johnson. So you think the sentence applies to the FBI program, not to the CIA program? Mr. Angleton. I don't think it has anything to do with the CIA. I don't “remember any of us ever making any representations to those representatives of USIB regarding the existence of the | program. Mr. Johnson. Including the White House Representative, Mr. Huston? Mr. Angleton. Well, I don’t think we bring him into it. That was the kind of thing that if anything was going to be said, it would be said to the Attorney General and the , . ! President, becuase the Bureau naturally knew about the program for a long time. And they knew that we had a common code name. And therefore they would be just as conscious of the fact that this was somehow known to the two of us, so there wouldn't be any purpose in a roomful of people of exposing the mail coverage to those people that had to go back and report to principals, particularly when you have the kind of statements that Downie and others made about the fact that they could not vouch for any security in their own organizations. Mr. Johnson. put isn't there a problem here that a report wag prepared for the President which had some misleading statements in it? TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 a 2 « a e cs) & < z “onod S.E., Washungtan, O.c. 410 Farst Street, Mr. Angleton. No, because I think they would have all been clarified fact to face with the President. And they may well ; have been. In other words, what I am trying to say is, it is guite conceivable ~~ and it really never eccurred to me -- that | it is quite conceivable that given the closeness between Huston and Bill Sullivan, that well before this meeting Bill could have gone into the whole status of the Huston project. Mr. Johnson. Huston claims now not to have known about the undercover program, and he feels somewhat duped by the intelli- gence community. And of course, the more important question is, was the President duped into believing that this was such a program, and being asked a few pages later to allow the Agency to institute it? Mr. Angleton. I don't think other than’ your thought that the President wasn't going to be notified. Mr. Johnson. Notfied about a new program? Mr. Angleton. No, notified about why we had to put this thing in there. My God, you couldn't be there asking for electronic surveillance and all those other forms of coverage with a group of counterintelligence people who raised the question of mail coverage. Mr. Johnson. But isn't it possible that President Nixon read this on its face value and did not know about the mail program, and thought that he was being asked Mr. Angleton. I don't think that he ever read the thing. TOP SECRET
See ATS SON ye teers Phone (Ares 202) $44-6000 “ > < a é a & « z ATO First Street, S.£.. Washington, 0.C. 20003 TI don't know myself. Because I was shocked when I heard later _ on that Mitchell alledgedly did not know about the Huston project. And I refused to believe it. Mr. Johnson, But to return to the question, isn't that a possibility that the President read this report to him at its face value and thought that he was being asked to institute a mail coverage program in which he was already doing -- ‘ 1 Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that. I know that any byplay | of what happened:'to that report until the blowup, in which Mr. Mitchell begged Mr. Hoover in terms of destroying this project ~ Mr. Johnson. This section of the report states that routine coverage is legal, while covert coverage is not. Mr. Angleton. Yes. Mr. Johnson. And you said that the CIA had a covert mail program underway? Mr. Angleton. Yes. Mr. Johnson. So the obviousl conclusion was that the CIA was conducting an illegal activity, is that the correct conclusion to draw? Mr. Angleton. I don't know. That was drawn up for the audience which was there. The audience which was there was fairly junior people within ‘the USIB community. Mr. Johnson. You mean the Special Report to the President was drafted with the unior officer in mind and not the President TOP SECRET
himself? Mr. Angleton. I mean, the people who were there were representatives who were pretty low on the totem pole. I mean, outside of Huston and Sullivan, all ot those were relatively Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 junior officials of the organization. Mr. Johnson. Well, you were not a general officer? Mr. Angleton. I mean junior in terms of the entire Agency, yes. Normally there have been Tom Karamessines, the Deputy Director, or somebody. Mr. Johnson. But on June Sth in a most serious fasion, the; President asked the intelligence community principals for a complete report on intelligence gaps and how these gaps could be fi closed? Mr. Angleton. Yes. J 2 « & 2 ie] Ba 4 z Mr. Johnson. A very serious meeting, and, as you mentioned at the beginning of this proceeding, a rather extraordinary meeting. Mr. Angleton. That is right. Mr. Johnson. And yet it seems to me that the produce that was prepared for the President was not compared in the same 70093 kind of serious vein in which all of the fact were laid out in a very valid fashion for the President's position. Mr. Angleton. I think that the paper responded that -- S.E., Wasmingion, O.C. I said that the first papers or first drafts, I don't remember how many were involved, were such that they were unacceptable 5 410 First Street. TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 a > « a 6 Q = « z 20003 3120 Fest Street, S.E.. Wastengton, O.C. to Huston, and that he turned the thing around by making a very articulate denunciation of the priorities, and of stating that the papers produced did not respond to the President's request. So he was very clear-cut on this. Mr. Johnson. Even after that upgrading by the 29-year old Huston, did the group drafting this rpport eventually respond to the President's request, that is, for a thorough complete report? Mr. Angleton. As far as Huston was concerned, yes. Mr. Johnson. But of course Huston -- Mr. Angleton. I was the judge of those things, beacause no one who was present had talked to whoever he was reporting to. He was the only one that would take the thing into the White House and emerge from the White House. He was speaking with the authority of the White House. Mr. Johnson. Yes, but he was a young man with not much experience in the intelligence community, and certainly no basis to judge whether this was actually a complete and factual report for the President. In fact it wasn't a very complete and factual report in some part, because the President wasn't even told about a mail coverage program. Mr. Angleton. I didn't say he wasn't told. Mr. Johnson. In the Special Report, I mean. Mr. Angleton. I didn't say they were going to get close to a lot of people over there. When Downie made the ‘statement, TOP SECRET
Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000 a > < a cs a « « z 5.£., Wasnington, 0.C. 200034 A120 Forst Street, I can't even take these papers back -- we weren't talking about anything as high level by way of secret as. mail coverage, and that he could not take any responsibility of building the papers. Mr. Johnson. Because'of the concern about leaks? Mr. Angleton. Yes, penetration. Mr. Johnson. Within the Defense Department? Mr. Angleton. That is right, within DIA. Mr. Johnson. Was this viewpoint shared by you and the CIA?) Mr. Angleton. We have no point ot make on his organization, we have no way of judging it. Mr. Johnson. I mean for your own organization? ‘Mr. Angleton. We took him at face value for what he had to say. Mr. Johnson. But were you interested in diluting the report for fear that it might fall into the wrong hands within your own Agency? You were manipulating and diluting it because of Downie's, concern about DOD? Mr. Angleton. Because this was a roster that people were present. Is that it there? Mr. Johnson. No, it is back here. Mr. Angleton. You don't have to go over that roster to see that you couldn't do a lot of things. There were a lot of other things you couldn't open up. Their report was not in otherwise supervised lateral arrangements. What business we were conduct-~ ing with the Bureau, we didn't table with those people. The TOP SECRET
3 ) « & & fe) £ < 2 as tolen) Wasningion, O.C. S10 Forst Srreet. SE. Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 | because for the years pri things that we.are doing with NSA we didn't table with these people, because they were already on-going operations or on-going liaisons. So there was no reason to table it to them. — \ Mr. Johnson. Was this a charage in essence, then? Mr. Angleton. No, it wasn't a charade. It was the fact that this was one area where, the same as you would enhance an electronic, you would enhance all forms of communication, all channels of communication. Mr. Johnson. But you harken back to the June 5th meeting in which the President was deeply concerned about the domestic | intelligence, because he says it to the intelligence community leaders, please bring me a complete report on intelligence gaps, and we want to close those gaps. Please do that report back and have it back on my desk in three weeks on June 26th. And yet when the report comes back one could argue that it is not the kind of complete report that the President requested. Mr. Angleton. All TI am saying is that it met Huston's need, and from what I read in the papers, his correspondence with Halderman and Exlichman, he expresses surprise at the cooperation received. And he was totally satisfied. And on the basis of that he submitted his famous letter of 8 July that he was assuming that role as the agent for or the White House representative on domestic intelligence. So he was obviously totally satisfied. And he wasn't as naive as you indicate, or to that, or for a year or so prior TOP SECRET
EXPRESS to that, he was working with Sullivan‘en all the Bureau tte ek, be ee — ee neeeei 2 tanec ents oA Rae et ees Saami problems, as again is reflected in his White House interoffice eee gee ewee one eee epeeceeee wate a memorandums with Halderman and company. ot ee scan ereet nennnn TTS 1e ae ea em ee twee (Off the record discussion.) Prone (Ares 202) 344-4000 Mr. Angleton. As I recollect, the letters when they were printed in the newspapers referred to the fight with Hoover, Billy Sullivan's own situation. Ahd:that was all in the papers. ‘SO my point there was that he was much more sophisticated than one would think. And second, he was speaking to a group who respected the 1 : H i i i ‘ i 1 ' fact that he was the White House representative. And you have to keep in mind, this was a unique situation, ‘because to my knowledge it is. the first time in history of American counter-: intelligence that a person at that high level ever attended a WARD & PAUL substantive meeting. Never in history has there ever been that type of thing, even though many times in the last 20 0 30 years the Bureau and the CI people, counterintelligence, in the Agency, had always wished to have a meeting between the Director of CIA and the Director of FBI with the President to resolve the question of cooperation between the two agencies. Mr. Johnson. So were you pleased to see this kind of high level policy access with the counterintelligence people? Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't know whether I was pleased or not. That never crossed my mind. Mr. Johnson. You had never had that kind of access to the 210 Fiest Steeet, S.E.. Wasmington, OC. 20003 White House before as counterintelligence people. Weren't TOP SECRET ee ze
Pnone (Ares 202) 844-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 Farst Street, S. 6... Wasnington, 1.0. 20004 POT TINANY? ae MELA Na you hopeful? Mr. Angleton. I am not pleased by those kinds of things. It was a development that didn't astonish me, because I was quite aware, in and beyond all the Sullivan and Huston business,: of what the real state of affairs were. And I know the problems that Admiral Gayler was having, and knew the issues in counterintelligence organizations regarding the threat. Mr. Johnson. With this new White House interest in the problem, weren't you hopeful that the thing would change, that the CIA individuals would have their day in court in the White House and be able to point out their position? Mr. Angleton. I certainly hope that the liaison with the FBI would be reestablished, because all that was something in which myself and my deputies had been involved in since 1954, and even before, and to have that cut off was -- just simply, it was like losing your moorings, you just simply drifted. Mr. Johnson. Let's return to this discussion we were having before about the meaning of the options... here on mail coverage. Is what you are telling me that this document was not really meant to represent the entire truth about collection procedure, because that would have revealed too mamy sensitive matters to a rather large audience? Mr. Angleton. We were not going to reveal outside the Bureau the mail coverage operation. Mr. Johnson. When you say outside the Bureau -- TOP SECRET
Prone (Arae 2027) $448-4000 a 2 a & e a & « = Washingtc ALO Farst Street, Mr. Angleton. To the’ people who were present. Mr. Johnson. But what about the White House representative,| he was not to know either? ‘ | Mr. Angleton. Inever had any private talks with the White House representative. Mr. :dohnson...:I ‘know, but he was in attendance: at‘ these meetings. as — Mr. Angleton. ° As I said earlier, I don't know what in the year prior to that Huston learned from Sullivan. But I was led | to believe that they saw Sullivan frequently, and Sullivan's . point of contact, and so forth, was Huston. — So it would not | suprise me at all if he had not aired it frequently with Huston, because I always knew the fact that Sullivan had a contact in the White House. I didn't know anything about him, and I didn't know his age or anything else. But I thought | highly of him, and so on. ur. Johnson. I suppose we have belabored this point enough. Mr. Angleton. Personally it is a very simple one to me, that in a thing of this sort, with the personnel who were present there, that ona compartmented basis you could not disclose to them in an interagency meeting this type of thing when they had to go back and report to unknown principals. And when I say junior, I mean junior in the sense that a colonel in the Army is a very -~ and he was then even a full colonel, a lieutenant colonel -- and going back and getting a TOP SECRET
gorges manera wy hone (Ares 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 2ooo} v Washington, O.C. 310 Ferst Street, SE Pentagon position, which with the DIA and Secretary of State, means a tremendous channel of staffing, which he himself outlined to us. Mr. Johnson. Of course one interpretation: that is made by some people in examining this document, is that:it was. an effort by the CIA to conceal from the President one of their on-going collection procedures? | Mr. Angleton. That is not so. Because I can't recall whether it was before or after that we saw the Attorney General, who we regarded to be the President's Chief Executive Officer. And where he was shown the actual messages of intercept. He saw the mail coverage on things which were of deep concern. And so there wasn't any -- the last thing in the world was to withhold from the President anything. Mr. Johnson. Now, if you are talking about the meeting that is discussed in the Rockefeller Report, that occurred a year after this? Mr. Angleton. I can't recall those things, because we were working on many levels here, we were working on a level like this, which occurred -- how many meetings, I don't remember? Mr. Johnson. Four meetings. Mr. Angleton. Was it the entire month? Mr. Johnson. Anyway, that was a very short period. And at the same time all the activity was going on. This was TOP SECRET
ger Prone (Area 202) WARD & FAUL ALO First Street, $.£., Wastiungton, O.€. 29003 purely a side line affair. And I would have thought that the meeting with the Attorney General was at a different time. I always thought this was a meeting coincident with this, because | I remember -- the reason. I feel that there was some communica- tion with the Attorney General was the shock I felt when I was told that the Attorney General stated he was aware of the Huston business, and it didn't make sense --~ Mr. Johnson. You know, on this same page, in a footnote that was apparently added at the request of Mr. Hoover, the Director of the FBI felt compelled to point out to the President in no uncertain terms that he was not going to support a covert mail coverage program. Mr. Angleton. Weli, I can't speak for what was on Mr. Hoover's mind. But the Bureau, and I think the Secret Service even, were levying requests and getting all the take, all of the production out of it. Now, I refuse to believe that given the quality of the information, that it wasn't -- that Mr. Hoover did not know what was going on. Mr. Johnson. My point was, though, that the Director of the FBI felt compelled to speak very frankly to this issue, apparently, ina footnote. But Mr. Helms did not speak with total frankness about his own program in this report. Mr. Angleton. But I don't know -- the thing aborted. No one expected this thing to die as it died. Mr. Johnson. But that is another issue ~~ TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 a > « a a a « « z 20003 Wastungton, O.C. 310 First Street. $.€.. Mr. Angleton. No, it is not another issue. Because my view ia that Hoover -- I mean that the Bureau and ourselves would have disclosed the mail program to the White House, because we would have no customers. Mr. Johnson. Would have disclosed the mail coverage? Mr. Angleton. Of course, Because if you had a man in Huston's position, domestically having the same authority, as he put it, ad Dr. Kissinger had for Foreign Affairs, then he would be entitled to all sources of information. That is what I am trying to say. And therefore he would be a: point..of the closest tie~in with the Administration, with the Executive, to work out priorities. Mr. Johnson. So the CIA and the FBI were going to hold off on informing the President on this program? Mr. Angleton. No, I didn't say that. I said that if the program had gone ahead, if there hadn't been this unexpected reaction, then -- because you see, no one -- I would never have dreamed that the White House staff could have launched such a thing without the Attorney General being fully apprised, because everyone was rightly or wrongly conscious of the fact that the most powerful individual, in terms of the White House, was the Attorney General. And therefore it was inconceivable that in his role you could have the FBI chairing from Justice a meeting of this sort without his being sully appraised at the White House level of what was going on. To me it still is something TOP SECRET
NASA RAL Prone (Area 202) $44-4000 a 3 < a 4 a « < 2 270004 410 Fost Street, $.6., Wastengton, OC. I refuse to believe. Because I only heard by hearsay of how his reaction was to the Huston thing, and how he had killed it, and how he went to the President. It was all hearsay. But it is inconceivable -- Mr. Johnson. I want to return to that point in a moment. To finish up this section on mail coverage, I wonder if we could finally reach some conclusion on why it was that mail coverage, covert mail coverage, was called illegal in this report, and yet the CIA had a program going at the time, and the Bureau had one going before. Why is it that the Agancies were involved in illegal prograns? Mr. Angleton. That is the whole history of the mail program. Mr. Johnson. I don't ask you to do that, because I think Mr. Wallach is going into that. Mr. Angleton. I say, I would have to go into the whole history of the mail program. What I am really trying to raise is a philosophical question here. When does an agency feel compelled to conduct an intelligence collection procedure which is widely considered to be illegal? What kind of decisions are made to go ahead on a program like that, despite its illegality? Mr. Angleton. Well, it went on since -~- what was it, 1952? And I think it was going on three years before we became involved in it. So it was an on-going operation, And I don't TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202) $44-46609 a 2 < & 4 a « < z 70003 310 Fest Street, $.£.. Wasnengton, O.C, res au reer aan ted aoa ing think that the files properly reflect that there was a much stronger counter intelligence interest than the record shows. “TIAA pa And Eric Trimm, who was prominent in the origination of it with the Office of Security, by background an FBI man in counter~— intelligence. ‘And in OSS he was X~-2, counterintelligence. And I know him intimately. And his whole thrust of any kind of | espionage or other operational usage would have a very strong counterintelligence base to it. Mr. Johnson. But you see the thrust of my question. Here was set before the President some optians which presumably he could improve by making a change in the little blank to the options . and if he had approved those options he would have been approving in essence the kind of lawlessness in the intelligence proyram, he would have been approving a program that right in the report itself was referred to as illegal Mr. Angleton, I understand that. Mr. Johnson. $0 could one make the argument that the intelligence community was asking the President to approve something of his own? Mr. Angleton. Not the intelligence community. The intelligence community was not told of the program. The who appeared were not told. Mr. Johnson. Okay, let me refine that by saying the leading representative of the Bureau and the CIA? TOP SECRET CRE Ae fa OT A a Loe ae
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 Forst Street, SF. Washington, 9.C. 20003 Mr. Angleton. I don't understand you at all. “TOP SECRET : fact it was the intelligence community,-wasn't it, because this Mr. Johnson. Let me start over on this point, because in | I ' document-is signed by Gayler and Helms. Mr. Angleton. But they didn't know to my knowledge anything about the mail program. . Mr. Johnson. But my point is that they were setting down on paper some options 75 for the President to check off which, i f had he done so, in case of two and three, would have meant that: he would have approved an illegal program. So can't we say ‘that the four principals of the intelligence community si ined a | document that laid before the President a set of 6ptiens™: that were illegal? Mr. Angleton. Let me see that again. This isn't it. This is electronic. It says here: “High level postal authorities have in the past provided complete cooperation and maintained full security of this program." “that is, covert coverage. It explains that | there is covert coverage in existence. Mr. Johnson. Where does it explain that? Mr. Angleton. “High level covert coverage. High level postal authorities have, in the past, provided complete cooperation and have maintained full security of this program.” Mr. Johnson. But isn't this the key phrase, "in the past"? Mr. Angleton. We will come back. TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 J 2 < rN é o 2 < z Fa003 2YO Reese Street, SLL, Wasnington, OC. "This technique involved negligible risk of compromise. Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence” ‘which is the present tense -- “and personnel involved ‘are highly 1 trained, trustworthy and under complete control of the intelli- : gence agency. “This coverage has been extremely successful in producing hard core and authentic intelligence which is not obtainable from any other source. An example, is a case involving an interception of a letter to a Soviet establishment .in'1964. ° The writer offered to sell information to the Soviets." et cetera. "Other examples include” -- and here we are missing a very operative part in this xeroxing. - You had better read this, because I haven't read it. Mr. Johnson. I think it is really the key phrase where it talks about covert coverage not being legal. Mr. Angleton. In your research on this have you come across any draft papers on these different things? Mr. Johnson. No. “ Mr. Angleton. Because I mean, I can't reconstruct who wrote this, who supplied the verbage. In other words, I don't know whether we are the ones or it was the Bureau that devised this phrasing. Mr. Johnson. Let's go off the record for just a moment. (Of£ the record discussion.) TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 “ > < a 4 o & < z q ALG Ferst Street, S.£.. Wasningtan, 0.6 3 s Mr. Johnson. Back on the record. The next operations that were discussed in the Special Report have to do with surrepticious entry. And to repeat what we have done earlier, I would be interested in knowing what the objectives of the CIA were here if any. | Mr. Angleton. Let me read it. Mr. Johnson. The report leads one to believe that this was one of many NSA interests. Was that your perception, too, at the time? Mr. Angleton. It may have been only because of Admiral Gayler's abortive attempts to change Mr. Hoover's mind on. relinquishing this type of operation. But in actual fact we had as much interest as did the Bureau in the surrepticious entry. Mr. Johnson. Could you briefly explain why? Mr. Angleton. Because of the product. In other words, it is not solely an NSA product. The NSA would want the \ eryptographic assist. But on the other hand it could be bag and pouch reports that went through the air, and expense books, and identities of agents, and all kinds of documentation. In other words, it is probably the highest level of collection, both for espionage and counterintelligence purposes, that exists. Mr. Johnson. Is this kind of operation carried out by the bureau in this country? Mr. Angleton. I don't know. TI don't know what they had TOP SECRET
r 3 "9 é a Cc. c Cc ® SIG Vest Street, Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL ooo! . Warningten, OC. Sf Mr. Johnson. In the past, was this strictly a Bureau activity? Mr. Angleton. I think that they should be asked. What I am trying to say is that to my knowledge -- I may be wrong == XY don't think that they ever officially told us of their activities, although I think it was well known -- I mean, it was known to selected people. Mr. Johnson. Does the CIA use the technique of surrepticious entry within the US? Mr. Angleton. I have read the story, I think I have read in the press something about some disagreement with Mr. Hoover over some operation in Chevy Chase or something, I don't know. Mr. Johnson. According to the set of options on * surrepticious entry ~~ we are talking about mere than diplomatic embassies, we are also talking about the use of this technique against other urgent and high priority internal security targets. To your knowledge has the CIA ever used surrepticious | entry against non-diplomatic establishments within the US? Mr. Angleton. -I don't know. I am not an expert on that. I read that some of the security cases involved it, there are some personnel. And Mr. Colby has given a very lengthy numeri- cal thing as to how many times that is used or not used. Mr. Johnson. Why is it that the CIA and the NSA have relied upon the FBI to conduct surrepticious entry in most cases when TOP SECRET
ee gee ee | - ie ai ordi i a it comes to foreign embassies within this country? Why don't they conduct their own activities? Mr. Angleton. Basically it is because to be successful Prone (Area 202} 544-6600 requires an enormous amount of manpower and expertise. In other words, the process of surrepticious entry first requires sources. It requires identifying the time of the entry. It requires total hermatical sealing off of any people from that embassy from returning unexpectedly, which means that all parties that might return are kept under total surveillance, so that in the event that they decided they have left something back at the office, the team is warned. And it would be almost impossible for anyone to try to do it successfully except the FBI. They are the only ones with the assets and the 4 2 « a ¢ a & < = coverage. Mr. Johnson. At the bottom of the page of the Special Report, in this section on surrepticious entry, the FBI added a note. The naote is indistinct on the page or copy I gave you. But it is reproduced here. Do you find that a credible reason for eliminating this collection technique is the reason that the number of police guarding the embassy adds to the operational hazards? Or do you think that was a smoke screen put up by Mr. Hoover because he simply didn't want to use that procedure? .. Washington, D.C. 270003 Mr. Angleton. I don't know what he means by the increase in the number of police. 410 Forst Street, SE Mr. Johnson. He is referring to that executive protection TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 4 2 4 ih a a @ « x 20003 Lis) to a] & a of che. we 3 oO a 410 Forest Street, 5.6... Washingt force that came into existence dn Late’1970.77 Mr. Angleton. I really don't have any comment to. make on that. I don't think that the Bureau would have told -- they would have told the Attorney General and the President of the state of the art, but I don't think that Mr. Hoover would feel obligated to expose to the other principals an activity of this sort in which the Bureau is the primary beneficiary. In other | words, as the chief law enforcement officer charged with the domestic counterespionage, he would not to my way of thinking share the information until its use had been exhausted for internal security purposes. And this was an audience to which 1 don't think he was prepared to spell anything out. Normally he would handle that by seeing the Attorney General and the President. Mr. Johnson. He wouldn't have even shared his views with Mr. Helms? , Mr. Angleton. He was under no obligation to charter~wise or any other way. Mr. Johnson. The next set of options has to do with development of campus sources. And the list of options are here. And here is one specifically mentioning the CIA. TOP SECRET
M nash “¢gola lynch © Prone {Area 202) a > < a r) 6 & < z 210 Fast Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 70003 Mr. Angleton. I think this is mainly FBI language, that is, up until paragraph 5, up to that point it is involv- ing the problems of the Army and the Bureau running into the ROTC problems. And then I guess down to 5 ~~ of course, we have had experience for many, many years with the international concerns, and the troubles that the Ft. Myer outfit had in the Katzenbach report, we knew from hard core activity that the Youth Festival in Vienna, and that the Soviets -~ I mean, the Soviets ran the International Student Business and front organizations. Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, would this first option have been of interest to the CIA -- I am sorry, not the first option, but rather the second option? ” Mr. Angleton. I would put it this way, that I think it would have permitted the FBI to have gained much more intelligence. And as it opened up, to travel abroad for international conferences, it would give us the opportunity for recruitment, and opportunity to take those people over as agents. Mr. Johnson. But would you have wanted to develop your own campus sources? Mr. Angleton. No, we would rely on the Bureau ~~ we have selected once where, for example, it was a period this when in Mexico City Soviet intelligence was cultivat- Americans at the University of Mexico for espionage TOP SECRET
20003 S.£., Wastington, O.C. 4310 Furst Street, Prone {Area 202) $44-6000 purposes. Now, when we get a case of this sort, then we would be zeroed in on the hard core Soviet case. So, we were working from a broad back into the country. ' This would give us the strength of working from here outward. Mr. Johnson. In order to protect your own CIA re~ cruiters who were visiting campuses, did you ever think it would be useful to have your own CIA sources who might tell you what the student body was doing? Mr. Angleton. Personally, outside of the domestic contacts people, I would say at that time we did not have personnel or manpower. Mr. Johnson. The next and last set of options has to| do with the use of military undercover agents. ! { Would that have been of significance to the CIA directly? Mr. Angleton. It is the same way as the previous options, that the Agency would benefit from any hard core intelligence developed by the Army. And you have to keep in mind that over the years we had broken the Army cases of espionage abroad, in which the agents concerned came back to the U.S., and so on. They would pass the military counter intélligence to the FBI. In other words, we worked with them abroad, and then when it reverted to the U.S. we worked with the FBI. So any knowledge that they could acquire extending TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202} $44 e000 a > < a a Q a 4 z AIO Fiest Street, S.E.. Wasnington, D.C. 20003 this into the Armed Forces on campus, and so on, it is bound to have -- eventually these people would be assigned abroad. Mr. Johnson. would you have supported at that time an expanded counter intelligence role for the military within the U.S.? Mr. Angleton. No. We have always had first rate liaison with the military counter intelligence services. we have trained the original OSI people in the counter -~ by "we", I mean my people trained them. And that-was a cadre of people who in turn went out and trained others, we have refresher courses. Mr, Johnson. What I am really getting at is this second option in which it says, the counter intelligence mix of the military services should be expanded to include the active collection of intelligence concerning student- related dissident activities. Would you have supported that? Mr. Angleton. No. That is a matter between the Bureau and the military. We would get a by-product in a rare instance, I would assume. But that appears to me to be primarily a matter between.the military and the Bureau. Because I chink the military were charging the Bureau with all kinds of investigative leads and things of this sort. I don't think the Bureau had the manpower to comply. TOP SECRET
Ses Mr. Johnson. According to the tastimony of other wit- nesses, there were two other options that were discussed in some detail at these meetings, but not included in the special report. Prone (Ares 2702) 544-6000 One of these was surreptitious optical surveillance. Now, the questions that I would pose to you on this is, number one, what does it mean? 5 And nmumber-.two,how did it relate to the interests of the Now, I am just wondering if you thought it did. Mr. Angleton. Well, again, my understanding of the term, it is simply the accumulation of newsreels, the dissi- dent acts, and violence, and what not, when you acquire enough to identify the ringleaders, you can identify those 4 2 < . 4 Q « 4 E people who appear in all the different front organizations who are the stimulant in this. So, it narrows down your investigative target. Mr. Johnson. Was that <- is that being done already? Mr. Angleton. I think that -- my understanding at that time was that it may have been done ~- I don't know this from direct knowledge. I think that Downie did talk to that subject. Mr. Johnson. But you don't recall these specifics? Mr. Angleton. Yes, I can remember. I think that is Downie who mentioned something about the photographing of 410 Forst Street, S.E., Wasmengtan, O.C. 20003 TOP SECRET
Pnone (Araa 202} 344-6000 a 2 € a @ fe] « < z S10 farst Street. $.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 people who attended rallies and so on, where you can identify that this one person, this group of people who you see visually, who are actually doing the egging on here turning the car over, who are doing that, and then pretty soon you will find that they are in Washington, and they are in college and then some other place. Therefore, as in all that type of Fifth Column work, once you get the hard core of your real targets, then you can anticipate where the next action is going to be. There were publications then or later when they had the Washington thing, I mean the big hassle here in Washington, where the people that were putting on the show worked up militant plans of every conceivable type on how to handle the police and communications and all of that. The query was whether they dreamed that up themselvés or whether they had technical assistance from professionals. Now, I was not directly involved in that, but I did hear comment to the effect that it was too professional to just come out of the woodwork, that it had to be that somebody with a professional background to devise the strike action. I wish I could remember some of the verbiage that was in the cover of this. Mr. Johnson. I know what you mean. I have read that. Do you have any recollection why this option was re- moved from the special report? TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202) 544-4000 _4 > « a a Oo = 4 z O.c. 20003 ALO Farst Street, $.E., Wasnington, Mr. Angleton. No. I would say maybe the only reason it wa removed was simply that it was not regarded to be -- that it was a matter “of minor importancé. in. terme’of. the other matters. Mr. Johnson. The last option that presumably was of some importance in the discussions had to do with the investi- gation of diplomatic personnel. Now, I understand that before the FBI will conduct an investigation of diplomatic personnel in this country it will get a clearance from the State Department. it further understand that some of the members of the Bureau wanted to eliminate this clearance procedure, and so that was brought in discussion. Do you remember anything about this? Mr. Angleton. The problem has been a problem that goes far beyond this interagency business. The problem is that it was our understanding, rightly or wrongly, that this was a self-imposed restriction of the Bureau's. In other words, the Bureau was under no compulsion by law or procedures to clear these things with 5Tate Department, that they did it by way of protection, if anything went. wrong, then they could fall back on the State Department's agree- ment. Our objection was, number one, that we believed it to be a needless disclosure of counter intelligence data, and TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 m] P] < a & a & « z 5 - f 20003 *. O.C. APO First Street, S$.£., Wamingto: » ES i because in order to make your case with State, you had to put into their possession the most sensitive information. And from our point of view this was again gratuitous. And second, we didn't agree with their policies of leniency regarding the activities of the Soviet bloc per-~ sonnel in this country. Now, this was brought out in a very lengthy annual report by the President's Foreign Intelligence Board, in which they went down into all the problems and restraints as they dealt with the diplomatic community here -- the lack of reposit. And the thrust of their findings was that the State Department was leaning over backwards in order not not facing up to the Soviet bloc presence. That-was submitted, I believe, to McGeorge Bundy by the President's Foreign Intelligence Board. And answers were sent back from State to the Bureau and ourselves. The result of it was, nothing was done, and State argued and justified their position, but no higher authority arbi- trated it or moved in and made decisions. I think that is what it relates to. Mr. Johnson. But in the context of these others -- Mr. Angleton. It was an on-going argument, and probably the reason it wasn't raised is because it was so complex in terms -- I mean, the problem was known already, was known.to the Attorney General, it was known to the President's TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 z a « a e fe] r « 2 310 Forst Street, S.£., Wasnengton, O.C. 70003 4 Intelligence Board, et cetera. And I think probably again it was considered to be minor in Come coi: parison with the other. Mr. Johnson. I have put cthers down here. Do you renember any other options that were discussed and not included in the special report? Mr. Angleton. I know there were many others,but I don't remember any of them that stand out. You can't get a gathering of these people together.We knew very little about the original meeting, what transpired at the original meeting with the President -- and got a great number of proposals that were very far from target. Mr. Johnson. Do you find it ironic at all that the President was mainly interested in domestic unrest and ob- taining better intelligence data about radicals in this country, yet the meeting itself seemed to dwell at great length on foreign intelligence data? Mr. Angleton. No, I think his interest was equal on both, and I think he saw the problem very clearly in terms of both the intelligence abroad and at home. I think this is borne out by the fact that at some period of time my understanding is he met with Mr. Hoover at Camp David and expressed to him his dissatisfaction with the Foreign Intelli- gence coverage, and instructed him to increase his legal é attache representation abroad, which in fact was done against 4 SECRET
Phong (Area 202) $44-6600 2 3 < a € rs) « < z 310 Furst Street, 3.E. Wasnington, D.C. 20003 the protest of the State Department or Ambassidors in the fiel Mr. Johnson. And also CIA protests? Mr.Angleton. We were encouraged to join them, but we did not, because we had different points of view. In our view any American presence abroad, increased American presence abroad, working counter intelligence, is an advantage, as long as we get the product. And as long as they coordinate, and Mr. Sullivan's attitude <- and he knew that we disagreed -- was that it was hampering the Bureau by taking away personnel. He felt his people could be better ‘employed at home than abroad,.because he was hurting for personnel. I think personally ~~ I disagreed with him -- and he knows this very well -- it was because we didn't have strong enough personnel abroad. And then, the FBI, by virtue of the prestige of Mr. Hoover, and the kind of men they have, inspired a lot more confidence in many instances with foreign police, who really did have a very high regard for Mr. Hoover. And, therefore, his representatives were accorded a kind of professional treatment that wasn't necessarily accorded to us. And they would visit the U.S. and they would meet Mr,Hoover, and he in a sense was the leader in the non-Communiet world of law enforcement offices. And, therefore, it accrued to our advantage when the Bureau operated abroad, as long as we got the oroduct, TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 4 3 < a « a & < Ed Prireten] 310 Farst Street, $6, Wasnington, O.C. and as long under the charters, aa long as they coordinated in advance in the business. But there was also a tremendous amount of law enforcement business criminal in nature, which sometimes goes into the fleld of subversion, which only the Bureau can properly handle. Again, because of their personnel -~ they had lawyers, law enforcement, they know the chain of evidence, and how it has to be preserved, and basically because of Mr. Hoover. Mr. Johnson. The third section of the special report had to do with the recommendations, and the primary recommendation was for a permanent interagency committee on intelligence. How did the CIA feel about this concept? Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that we were in agreement that if the President -- I mean, I don't know, I don't know’ what our position was at the meeting, but I know -- I think it might have been -- and that is that if the President had set in motion Mr.Huston for a purpose, therefore, the implementation had to be controlled by somebody with the authority. And Mr. Huston was putting himself forward as that authority. There wasn't anyone to dispute his position. Mr. Johnson. What I really want you to address your- self to is the concept of coordinating intelligence evalua- tion and dissemination within the intelligence community by some kind of interagency body. TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 ad 3 < ry a 6 & i z 20003 310 Fest Street, S.E.. Wasmenatan, O.C. Is that a good concept? Mr. Angleton. =I don't know if this is an accurate statement of that, is it? (Referring to document.) Mr. Johnson. Let me show you the text itself in the special report. Here are the options. Mr. Angleton, Let me see how this gets introduced, I think it is self-explanatory. The attitude, as I remember, of the Agency was that the whole exercise wouldn't have been done unless the President had in mind evaluations of: finished intelligence. And there wasn't any such body in the government. Mr. Johnson. WAs there a hesitancy on behalf of the CIA to get involved in domestic intelligence which was primar-| ily topreserve the FBI. Mr. Angleton. After all, we are in a number of inter- agency meetings, that is, as observers or members, where the Bureau is the Chairman and so on. Mr. Johnson. Probably as blatantly oriented as this one would have been -- Mr. Angleton. I mean, the whole exercise was blatently domestically oriented, and everything stated there is true, that there wasn't any point whether this could be done, and if the Bureau didn't agree on a point, they each went their separate ways. TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 “ Pe) « a ci a & «< _% 316 Fiest Street, 5.€.. Wasnington, O.C. 20003 There was no one in authority to try to evaluate it and put it before the President as a decision, Mr. Johnson, Apparently Mr, Hoover viewed it as an encroachment upon FBI turf. Ivwonder if the cra viewed it that way, too, and were a little bit hesitant? Mr. Angleton. No, the CIA's attitude very definitely Ahitrd . was that Mr. Huston wasn't their except as the President's representative, and if this was what the whole exercise was { about you couldn't do all these things unless it was policed. And since it was the President's desire from calling the| principals together to get this thing embarked On, and at the end you have to see how it was going to be policed, who did you turn to? So,.as I say, there were different attitudes in the community on domestic problems, and to articulate what in fact existed, you had to have somebody, or you had to have some chairman in close contact with the White House who could submerge agency and departmental differences into common priorities, common objectives, and so on. And no one knew how it was going to he. At least it was one of the Options. Mr. Johnson. Do you recall any other recommendations that were made that were later withdrawn from the special report? Mr. Angleton. No. Mr. Johnson, Do you recall anything about how these TOP SECRET
an footnotes were included into the special report? Mr. Angleton. You mean Mr. Hoover's? Mr. Johnson. Yes. Do you know the story behind the footnotes? Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 Mr. Angleton. No. All I know is that I heard that caceneearmee eset nears rear the report had gone up to him, and he had taken an adverse position on every recommendation, that he had seen the Attorney General, and the Attorney General, who had been unaware of all of this, took a very strong stand against Huston, and either saw the President or something and got killed. Mr. Johnson. Did you know who were involved in the discussions that led to this special report, did they ever really think that it was going to get by Mr. Hoover? a 2 « a @ o « < = Mr. Angleton. I don't think anyone ever came to a consideration of it. Mr. Johnson. Wasn't it widely known 7 Mr. Angleton. Personally, as I said earlier, I had believed that there wouldn't have been any such meeting had eoo3 it not been worked out in advance between the Attorney * General and the President. That is the reason I still refuse to believe that the Attorney General was unaware of the exercise. Mr. Johnson. Were you surprised that the Attorney General was not invited to participate in any of these 410 First Street. $.E.. Wasningtes, B.C. TOP SECRET
proceedings. Mr. Angleton. I thought he was behind the whole thing. And it stood to reason, he was regarded as the most powerful Prone {Area 202) 544-6000 person under the President, and with a lot of special assign- vA ments. You would hear that such and such a thing,he was the one who was the President's advisor, or making the recommenda- tions. So when this thing came up, I thought that this was the Attorney General, and the President had had many meetings -- they had a meeting of the minds, and Huston was ‘ 4 chosen with the Attorney General's blessing. When I found out later that he didn't even know, then I knew that there wasn't going to be any -- Mr. Johnson. Didn't anyone ever ask at the Langley J a « a 6 o & f« z meeting what the Attorney General's views had been on some of these items? Mr. Angleton. There wasn't any reason to raise it. I wasn't going to disclose to people I didn't even know what I happened to know about domestic problems, the Bureau and 70003 the Atvcorney General. That wasn't the kind of forum for 4 that. Mr. Jcohnson. So no one at these meetings say, look, some of the things we are talking about here are illegal, and before we put them in an option paper to the President shouldn't we have consultation with the Attorney General's office? S10 First Street, $.€., Wasninaton, O.C. TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202} $44-6000 4 2 « a « a « « 4 A410 First Street, SE. Washington, D.C. 70003 Mr. Angleton. there may have been somebody that gaid :that, but it doesn't stick in my mind. In fact, the discussion of those meetings wag so eiuid and so many times off the target, that it was only when the Bureau brought back the finished draft of the previous meeting that it gave any cohesiveness to what really took place the day before, in other words, the fact that Bill Sullivan had a recorder present, one of his men who took the notes and papers and all that. Now, whether he had an ad hoc drafting committee I am not certain, but I think he might have had, in which Ober was a party to it. So, the coherency of the meeting became apparent the next meeting when the paper was circulated. And I think if you -wanted some insight into many questions you would ask, it would be to find the different drafts so you can compare what happened in the openirg meeting with what emerged out of the last meeting. and I am certain those were in being someplace. . Mr. Johnson. Have you seen these drafts youreelf? Mr. Angleton. I saw ~~ I was present when the Bureau would disseminate the next draft. And I will certainly ~~ I can't believe that they don't have a file dealing with this subject. Mr. Johnson. Do you have these drafts in your own
Prone (Area 202} $44-46000 a ) « a € oO g < z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think eo. They may be, but I haven't been able to find them, No, I don't think I have them on file. I think that Ober kept the paper, and you have to understand that one thing I would try to resist, since I have probably more paper than anybody in the business, Ober was the one who kept whatever materials we had. Mr. Johnson. Do you recall other second-hand or strictly hearsay anything about the signing ceremony in this document was signed by the four principals? Mr. Angleton. I don't think there was a, meeting. think that they ran it around by courier. I think this was a lot of pressure by Huston or somebody to get it signed, and I think there was also a question that all the principals were in town or something of that sort. But I don't think there was a meeting at which signed, there may have been. Mr. Johnson. Let me introduce into the record Exhibit A~-2, Mr. Angleton, Memorandum for Richard Helms from Tom Huston entitled "Domestic Intelligence, dated 23 1970. (The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-2 for identification.) TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 a rs) < a 4 a « « z “a00) 310 forst Street, $.£., Wastungton, O.C. Mr. Johnson. This is the so-called Huston Plan which Mr. Huston sent out to the intelligence community principals. And as you can see, he suggests in the memo that the President approved these various. options. Mr. Angleton. He said that he approved them? Mr. Johnson. Yes. | Do you remember the CIA reaction to this document? Mr. Angleton. I don't think I ever saw it, or I don't remember ever seeing it. Mr. Johnson. Do you remember when Mr. Helms told you that the President had approved it? Mr. Angleton. Let me just go through it, because it might come back. Let me ask you, before I reply to your question, some- thing on dates. This was dated the 23rd of July. When was Mr. Hoover's turndown? When did Mr. Hoover take all the exceptions? Mr. Johnson. He put his footnotes on the document around the 24th, 25th of June. And then the Special Report went to the White House on the 26th of June. As far as I can ascertain, the next response to the intelligence community was this document saying -- Mr. Angleton. A month later? Mr. Johnson. Yes. Mr. Angleton. I find that very hard to believe. TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202} &, . a 3 « a « 3 « «< = SEL, Wastington, O.C, 20003 410 First Street, Are you sure you got the right date, June? Mr. Johnson. The President received the Special Report at the end of June. intelligence community. Mr. Angleton, 20 June, You say? Mr. Johnson 26, Mr. Angleton, The 26th of June? Mr. Johnson. of¢ the record for 4 moment. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Johnson. Back on the record. Mr. Angleton. - Attorney General had not been Party to the Huston business, then the turndown ~~ it didn't seem Surprising, Mr. Johnson. Tell me, is it Surprising that & document of this importance which would have changed the intelligence community in many substantial Ways would have expanded their collection Procedures, is it surprising that such a docu-~ ment was signed over by a 29-year old Staffer as Opposed to the President himself, or Mr, Haldeman? Mr. Angleton, I doen't know how to respond to that, because I don't think I saw this. The only one 1 Saw was that no domestic intelligence be Sent to the White House to his attention. TOP SECRET
PALL WARD & 70003 S316 First Street, S.E.. Wasmingtaon, 0.C. Prone (Aras 202) $44-6000 ASE Mr. Johnson. what was your reaction to that parti- cular memo, the one you have just mentioned? Mr. Angleton. . My reaction was that he was working closely with the President and the Attorney General. It is inconceivable to me from anything that we knew and heard that the Attorney General was not the moving hand in the entire 4 business. | Mr. Johnson. Did you think it was a good idea that there was a domestic equivalent of Henry Kissinger to deal with | domestic intelligence problems? Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that there should always be somebody who enjoys the trust of the President who is accessible for high level counter intelligence, interagency disputes -- I mean, whether there is an independent co-equality there should be an arbitor, someone to whom the agencies in question have access. I am strongly in favor of an ombudsman of some sort on the National Security Council, which. ig not controlled by people involved in the foreign affairs, | distinct from it. And I think the internal security is a legitimate concern of the President, and requires full time or part time, a full time or part time expert who has access. Mr. Johnson. Do you recall being happy or pleased that the President had approved relaxation of collection traints? TOP SECRET
Phone (Ares 202} 344-6000 d 2 € a e o a « z 70063 $.£., Wastington, 0.C. S10 First Street, Mr. Angleton. | I imagine rt approved. I don't know. At first I didn't see that. Mr. Johnson. «Did you get the news by telephone? Mr. Angleton. I don't know if I got the news that way. I mean I am trying to remember, I don't recall any document that Huston signed of this nature other than the one where he said he was a recipient, to be the recipient. Mr. Johnson. He must have heard in some way the President did not approve the series of options that were to relax restraints? Mr. Angleton. I am not certain. I don't know. Mr. Johnson. Let me introduce into the record Exhibit A-3, Mr. Angleton, memorandum for Mr. McManus from Mr. Helms dated 28 July 1970. . (The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-3 for identification.) TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 344-6000 a 3 < a c Qe & < x 0003 310 Forest Steeet, S.0£., Wastungton, O.C. Mr. Johnson. ‘This simply indicates that Mr. Helms was returning to the situation room the previous document which I just showed you. And the reason I show this to you is, I am trying to recall to your mind any recollection about the recall of the Huston decision memorandum, We have a lapse of five days here. Do you remember any reaction of the CIA, the 23rd to thel, 1 mr. Angleton. But what day of the week was it?” Mr. Johnson. It was over a weekend, Mr. Angleton. You would have to know where the Director was -- Mr. Johnson. My point was simply, were you advised that the President's order was recalled almost as quickly as it was issued? Mr. Angleton. Not when I heard that Hoover went to Mitchell, and that Mitchell was unaware of the exercige. Then the whole house of cards became apparent. That was the first indication we had of what the détails, power politics were. Mr. Johnson. Let me introduce into the record Exhibit A-4, Mr. Angleton, a memorandum for the record written by Richard Helms dated 28 July 1970. (The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-~4 for identification.) TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 “od ? < a e o « « z 20003 310 First Street, $.£., Wasmington, D.C. Mr.Johngon. this, of course, refers to the meeting that you have alluded to earlier in which Mr. Helms found out that Mr. Mitchel did not know about the special report or the Huston Plan. I wonder if you could interpret this phrase for me in paragraph 2. Mr. Helms says: "J told the Attorney General that we had put our backs into this exercise". Now, presumably he is talking about the preparation of the Special Report. Mr. Angleton. . That is right. Mr. Johnson. And does that indicate to you that the Central Intelligence Agency was enthusiastic and strongly supportive of the options developed in the Special Report? Mr. Angleton. It is not a question of whether they were in support of all of the actions there, but were supportive of the fact that the President, in accordance with what Huston had to say, did not feel he was getting a picture on the domestic activities, hecause we didn't feel we were getting it. I mean,there was no question about that, but that goes in and beyond the Huston things or anything else, the atmos- phere in the community was the lowest possible thing in terms of domestic counter intelligence, or foreign, evolving around this split and the lack of liaison. TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 2062} $44-6600 ad 3 < a “ @ fe) 3 < z 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C, 20003 Mr. Johnson. The final area that I wanted to talk to you about is the aftermath of the Huston Plan. And when on speaks of the aftermath I think one thinks of the tnter- agency Evaluation Committee, and also subsequent efforts to relax intelligence collection restraints. Let's turn first to the Interagency «Evaluation Committee. You were a member of that committee, were you not? Mr. Angleton. Yes. Mr. Johnson. Could you deserjibe briefly the origins and purpose of this committee? Mr. Angleton. I don't remember the ~~ when was the meeting, can you tell me? Mr. Johnson. December 3. Mr. Angleton. The same year? Mr. Johnson. Yes. Mr. Angleton. I don't remember how this thing originated. I think the question of gaps which preceded the Huston Plan was still active on another level, in other words, there were many levels of express concern. It was the normal level of the lack of FBI liaison, and another level with the Huston Plan, and then there was something that generated or brought back to life this whole question of domestic intelligence. And I am not certain unless you have documents on how I was notified to be nominated for that TOP SECRET
coe . aan Prone (Area 202) $44-46000 . J 3 « ry a fe) & < 2 20003 S10 First Street, $.€., Wasmington, O.C. business. That is my first statement. It is possible that Ober or has .the papers, because I know that when it eventually came to having working bodies, Ober was the natural choice for taking that on. The first meeting, as I recollect, was in Dean's office. And I think that is when they had -- that is my recollection. And that is when Mardian appeared. And whether: it .was in that meeting or in a series of meetings, he proposed setting up ac and again this is all as though we were. working for the President in this thing, meetings were held there, and one meeting was held in the Vice President's conference room, nN and here was the counsel to the President doing the laying off of hands. And they had some judge from Seattle in mind, whom they eventually brought to a meeting who was to be the head of this evaluation business. And there was a lot of discussion on the cover he would have, and where he would be located. And it boiled down to the fact that he was totally out of his depth, he could not foresee his being able to do it the way it was proposed on the grounds that he had too many friends from the State of Washington who had come to Washington, and he had -- and there were questions of prestige invoived, and a question of what was he doing in Washington, and so on. TOP SECRET
So,I think that was the last appearance he made. But nothing seemed to be generative regarding these meet ings until Mardian .began holding them in the Triangle Prone (Area 202) $44-4000 Building. And his whole thrust there was that he wanted permanent representatives from each of the agencies to be there full time under him in some kind of a staff setup to work on domestic -- on the evaluation of domestic affairs. And this is when the thing began to become concrete, until he ran into problems with Mr. Hoover, and the Bureau took a very strong position that they would not supply a secretary. And as I recall, 1 was opposed to supplying personnel, and then there wére a lot of things that we were not privy to behind-the-scene things. And finally, George Moore, I believe, was the ad 3 « a & a & « 2 I can't recall whether he was the one nominated. In our case I reported to Dick, and I believe Tom Karamessines, and the result was that we decided on Ober. But with an understanding that it could not be full time, and a private understanding with him that he could handle it any way he liked. In other words, we didn't want him to go into a make- work situation. Mr. Johnson. What was the Committee doing, conduct- ing any operations? Mr. Angleton. I think it was pulling together all S10 Farst Street, S.E., Wasmingtan, O.C. 20003 TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 2 2 < a € [a] & « E 20003 410 Forest Steeet, S.E£.. Wasmington, 0.C. information on given situations. I can't even tell you the subject matter right now. But I think dissident newspaper things, I really don't know. I would have to see the papers, because they were about as incohesive -- I think they were the most inconclusive meetings I have ever seen in my life. And go the buck was passed to Ober, really. He had to arrange some way to go down there-- and I don't know how many times he went. And any papers, I don't think were verv informative. I don't think they ever came to any kind of conclusion. The people that had the best information to my recollection was the Bureau. Now, whether this got into the Berrigan case -~ the reason I mention that is that while all of this was going on, Mardian was running the phone all the time, and giving us -- telling us aside something about the Berrigan business. And that is about the extent of my immediate knowledge of that. Mr.Johnson. Did Mardian have a good grasp for intelligence problems? Mr. Angleton. , No, not at all. I think he was out of his depth. But he had connections. He obviously very powerful position, I mean in terms of being able what he wanted. Mr. Johnson. Did John Dean play an important role in the history of the IDC? Mr. Angleton. Well, he loaned his office and himself TOP SECRET
Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000 a 3 « a e a « «< x 0083 7 5S.E£., Wasnengtan, O.C. 210 Forst Steeet, to the launching of it. Mr. Johnson. Did he stay with it? Mr. Angleton. — No. He gradually withdrew, but the whole -=- those meetings which gave it a certain prestige:. and all the rest of it were those at which he was present. And then he gradually got out of it. Mr. Johnson. Why did you stop attending these meetings? Mr. Angleton. I had too much to do -- it was par- tially that, but also -- with my responsibilities I can't go to meetings. And usually I would send people to meetings. Mr. Johnson. Let me introduce the final exhibit to the testimony today, which is Exhibit A-5, memorandum for the files, John Edgar Hoover, dated April 12, 1971. ‘ (The document referred to was marked Angleton Exhibit No. A-5 for identification.)
Prone (Area 202) 544-6006 2 3 < a & o « < 3 = 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, o.c. 20003 Angleton. ‘What about this? Mr. Johnson. pid Mr. Helms ever diacuss with you this meeting that Mr. Hoover and Mr. Mitchell and Admiral Gaylor attended? Mr.-- Angleton.’ I am trying to cast back and latch onto somebody in ‘71 to get 4 feeling. | I am certain he did. Mr. Johnson. More importantly, do you have any recollection of a report being prepared for Mr. Mitchell as a result of this meeting, & combined CIA-NSA report, 48 was requested? . - Mr. Angleton. I think -~ what I am trying to remem~ ber here is whether this had to do with an operation that the Bureau was conducting in this country anmwhich they were going to close down, and which we were trying to save, and we were trying to save it in part because of the Director's responsibilities to the intelligence community. In other words, Dick was not necessarily speaking here as the head of CIA, he was speaking for the USIB. Now, I may be off on a different phase of life, but I think this is related, and this entailed our moving our man intoreplace Bureau men, and putting up money, and I think we used the Office of Security, if f recall correctly, if this is what was the outcome of all of this. put I know that there were many telephone calls about TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202) 544-6000 ) 2 < a é a « < z 70003 ALO Feest Steeet, $.E., Wasmengtan, O.C. 100 trying to make sure,that there was a problem of rent, and a problem of access, and so on, the time factor that was in- volved. Mr. Johnson, Do you remember the Helms-Gaylor report written for Mr. Mitchell? Mr. Angleton. But that is something that would normally be taken up with Staff/D, the people who are in liaison with NSA, or that could have been directly from Dick or his Deputy. | Mr. Johnson. Do you remember Mr. Helms coming to you and saying something to the effect, Admiral Gaylor is after me once again to try and get Mr. Hoover -- Mr. Angleton. This was going on all the time. there were probably hundreds of calls in reference to the problem about the NSA thing. I know that I strongly backed the idea of keeping the operation from dying. Mr. Johnson. Which operation? Mr. Angleton. The operation dealt with clandestine procurement. Mr. Johnson. Did that operation relate to any of the collection methods we have discussed today? . Mr. Angleton. I think so. Mr. Johnson. Surreptitious entry? Angleton. It was a bugging operation, I mean Johnson. Could you shed some light on this sentence =~ TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202) $44-6000 a 3 « a ¢ Q a <. 3 0003 ~ S.£., Wasmington, O.C. ALO First Street, 16 ds ay oe os a es Gannon af eerie Mr. Angleton. > at a, if what T.am discussing have ‘any reference to this. But this was a thing that Gaylor wanted’ to save, and I was called by people in NSA to give support to, and so on. That type of intervention. | Mr. Johnson. Could you shed light on this sentence: "There was his discussion upon the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage of mail". Mr.Angleton. No, unlesa it is dealing with black bag job operations. I think that means diplomatic mail in bags, pouches. TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 4 > < a 6 Qa 4 « E 2O003 +. 216 Farst Street, $.6., Wasnington, O.C. Mr. Johnson. I thought black bag referred to surrepticious entry. , | Mr. Angleton. No, black bag could be also steling a courier's bag. And you have a diplomatic courier, and he has got the code and the mail for an embassy. The plane doesn't leave New York, it is 30 below zero. And hewants to get warm. He leaves his pouch there for a minute, or half an hour. And the Bureau picks it up and photographs the contents. So the black bag ~~ what I amtrying to say is, Mr. Hoover could not ; use the same art forms that we would use. And I just am erying | to think -- Ke didn't say how long this thing went on. Mr. Johnson. Would this sentence imply that Mr. Helms is encouraging Mr. Hoover to reinstate a mail cover program? Mr. Angleton. No. I read it ~- my own view is that it would be more than mail. It would be black bag job operations. Now, those black bags would refer to the surrepticious entrance: into an embassy, the penetration of a diplomatic pouch in transit, and part of that of course, is mail. And the most secret of all mail is unciphered mail, in other words, it is mail that does not go out over the air waves, but where all the cryptonyms or identities only go by armed couriers with the identities. And then the correspondence goes through the air with those identities. And it makes no sense to an interceptor unless he has got the key. So I can’t imagine Mr. Helms referring to coverage of mail except in terms of the TOP SECRET
4 P] < a 4 fe] Ea « z 20003 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, O.C. proceedings in those black bags. Mr. Johngon. Why couldn't he be talking about a mail intercept program? Mr. Angleton. I don't think he was referring to it. Mr. Johnson. It notes there that Mr. Helms was going to respond rapidly, take care of the report rapidly. But you don't recall any response? In other words, it looks as though we were trying to work toward a resolution of the same issues as developed in the Huston Plan, and Mr. Mitchell is going to make a decision 7 Mr. Angleton. But those things were all going on -- what I am trying to explain is that people are reading a lot into the Huston Plan, and at the same time are unaware that on several levels in a community identical’ bilateral discussions were going on. In other words, the Huston Plan didn't affect one way or the other the normal flow of business. And when Gaylor was faced with Hoover's shutting off and cutting out « certain things ~~ there were time factors involved, the lease ‘of a piece of property, the personnel who would take over, the point being that if you didn't meet those deadlines that was the end of it. And therefore those were sort of frantic things. And I imagine that the reason that Helms said it would be taken care of very promptly was that he probably already had staff studies, and all it meant was simply boiling them down into a TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 2 2 < & € fe) @ < 2 270003 STO Sorat Street, SE. Washington, OC. letter and sending the letter. myself. But the principal person would have been: staffed, and probably a Deputy Director that he might have called in as a legman on it, and he might have told me somathing about the Gaylor -- what had happened. But I don't remember his discus- sing that with me precisely in the meeting with Mitchell and Gaylor. There was no reason why he should have -- with Hoover. Mr. Johnson. Were you aware of the series of meetings that! were very much like this one? Mr. Angleton. Not of a series of meetings with Mr. Hoover. Mr. Johnson. But a series of discussions going on at different levels? Mr. Angleton. Oh, yes. Mr. Johnson. Are you aware of any other specific meetings on this topic between Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover? Mr. Angleton. -No. I think that Mr. Papich, who has the best memorandum of record of anyone in Government, will surprise you by showing you how few times any Director of Central Intelligence evar met with Mr. Hoover. Practically never, except when it was a National Security Council meeting or i something by accident. Mr. Johnson. Why is it that Mr. Hoover would send a formal] Liaison over to the other Agency? Why didn't it work the other way? Why couldn't the CIA say, we are going to send over Mr. go and so to be liaison from the CIA to the FBI? TOP SECRET
6. c. co. c. Prone (Aras 262) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.£., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 We ts aah Si Ce : y Mr. Angleton. That was his own way of operating. In other words, Mr. Hoover believed that his statutory responsi- bilities were not negotiable. And he would not permit eny inter--gency committee to challenge or water down what he had by right. And therefore he never attended usual meetings, and he sent observers or someone, they may have been members in the end, but they were originally observers, and so on. And personally I feel that that was the proper way of operating, because of thea compartmentation-necdagary: for the activities of | the FBI, and the internal security. And he didn't want people who are here today and gone tomorrow wandering around in the FBI. And it was very tidy housekeeping on his part. Mr. Johnson. Let me end by just touching on one other topic. Couldn't one argue that if we could do away with a number of laws that restrain intelligence collection, that the quality of intelligence would increase dramatically? Aren't there certain barriers that keep the intelligence specialists from getting high quality product that they need? Mr. Angleton. My own feeling is this. This country can never work against the police state, or contain the activities of a police state, until there is a lot of relaxation in the law as far as counterintelligence and internal secuirty people are concerned. To begin with, in an open society you don't have the laws for protection of secrets. You don't have an TOP SECRET a
Prone {Area 202} 544-6000 ad > 4 a _@ fe] & < 3 Pereleieasy + 410 Faest Street, S.E., Wasnmengton, OC. official secrets act. You would not have penalties for disclosure, except the passage of unauthorized personnel to a foreign power. Now, President Truman made the comment tha it doesn't make any difference whether it is spies or newspapers who publish the secrets as far as the US Government is concerned. Washington himself was the greatest believer in intelligence. And he wrote about it. And he spelled out very clearly that intelligence was worth nothing unless it was secret. And he tried to kidnap twice Aaron Burr, once or twice. Benjamin Franklin opened the mail of the British. He was fired as Postmaster for doing it. In other words, there is a whole US tradition that believed in standing up to build up the national security. It has been wrecked these last years. Mr. Johnson. Don't we have a real tension here? Isn't there a danger of transgressing against the civil liberties of the American citizens when we relax those laws? Mr. Angleton. I am not proposing solutions. I am saying that first the law makers and the press -- let's leave the press out -- the law makers and the Administration, the Executive, have to know the danger of a threat. And I think’ they have to examine the laws in terms of those which are unrealistic in view of the threat. Now, that has never been done. And again, I come back to my original suggestion that there should be an ombudsman, a person who does have that access to the Executive, who is not shackled by inter-agency, TOP SECRET
Prone (Aras 202) 544-6600 a 3 «< a (6 a « «< z 0003 a 410 First Street, S.£., Wasnengton, D.C. internecine fights and all of that, and who is in a position powerful enought to take what he does know, that is communicate to him, and be able with the President work out legislation to meat the threat. And also counterintelligence should have a very direct bearing on the objectives of the Executive, I mean the realities. And if you do have, as I mentioned, the Rumanian intelligence working with the Soviets, then obviously you can't treat the Rumanians-as something apart from and speci in terms of the threat, because if they are arrested on Oslo working against NATO and against the West, and their activities are -~ I mean their questionaires benefit the Soviet Union strategically, then you can't make that differentiation. So you are not arguing philosophy here, you are arguing factual matters that derived from counterintelligence operations. Today there is total gap between the realities of counter- intelligence and the knowledge of the public and the knowledge of the Congress. Otherwise you wouldn't find them all going to’ Rusgia on jaunts and all that type of thing, there would be an entirely different point of view. In other words, today we are equating ourselves with the Soviets on so many levels. They are not equating themselves with us. What we regard today as having some permanence to them is the tactical. Those are not my words. Those are the words of the Soviet, and the. powers who are in the Sovit bloc in official capacities, and you have access to:documents and to party directives. So the TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 P) 3 « a 4 a & « z 20003 S.£.. Wasnington, D.C. 410 Feest Street, point I am coming back to is that I believe -~ I have not read his entire speech, but the speech that Kelley gave from Canada to the Lawyers Association, the Bar Association, was something to the effect that there had to be in the interests of internal or national security certain sacrifices of personal | liberty. And I subacribe to it all the way. I am not talking now about criminal activity, I am not talking about marijuana or otherwise. But where there is conspiracy, -- and their country is incapable of getting below the iceberg. We know a tremendous amount of illegals. And yet there has not been a true high grade legal case since Abel. And Abel didn't talk. And yet from what we have heard from people in the KGB the identity of high grade illegals are only maintained by the chief of the service and not known to the resident tourists. And those are people who assume the identities of the Americans. and who work for the opposition. You have to have a great deal of latitude in order to uncover these types of people, and to penetrate through the communications problem, how do they communicate. They need money . There are many ways that they can be discovered. But they can't be discovered the way we are hampered today, and also where we are breaking down compart- mentation. And I think the tragedy of all of these hearings and everything that has transpired from the beginning has been destruction of the secrets ag to the collection and modus operandi and techniques and the identity of individuals, TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202} $44-6000 2 2 « a 4 fe] Eg < z $10 First Street, S.E., Washington, 9.C. 70003 TOP SECRET et cetera. And I don't think we are going to recover fram without a complete housecleaning. But if you are going to have a complete housecleaning, no on is going to be left that knows anything, that knows the techniques and the training schools and so on. There is sa much sensationaliam -- to discuss cobra venom and all of that. It raises in everybody's mind, did the Agency receive a specific instruction to destroy the toxins? And did the, person who allegedly didn't follow through on the order, did he see a Presidential instruction which ordered him to destroy the toxin? It is inconceivable that a secret t intelligence arm of the Government has to comply with all of tha. nee TELE LEAT ST I TC TELCO SCTE Seyi tna AEE overt orders of the Government. er ane nee enna Mr. Johnson. So treaties passed that deal with other countries do not necessarily apply to the covert arm of the Government? Mr. Angleton. But you mean, first, you have an allegation that this will kill many thousands of people, we knot that to be a fact. We can just take that announcement. Mr. John#am. And what is the point to my question? Mr. Angleton. I sw saying that I think that if I am not mistaken -- and you can correct me -- I have not read the treaty ~~ I think it is of unilateral declaration by the President? But I may be mistaken. Mr. Johnson. That was my understanding. Mr. Angleton. But I don't think that the Soviets agreed TOP SECRET
“i ae 8 BY ean Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 PAUL é 6 « « z ALO Ferst Street. $.£., Wastongion, O.0, 70003 to it, did they? Mr. Johnson. We both will have to have another look at it. Mr. Angleton. I know in ita original context, I think it had an element of being a unilaterial affair. Mr. Johnson. But what if there is a bilateral or multi- lateral treaty? Do their provisions also apply to the covert arm of the CIA? Mr. Angleton. I only am taking this one instance up. 1 would say -- I don't know how to respond to that. It depends on what the substance of it would be. If, for example, we find | the other party of the treaty violating through thelr intelli- gence service the treaty, then I think it is a question that would have to be considered here, that we could not permit them to outdistance us. But let me put it to you another way. One Soviet -- we had a very high Level source who attended a general staff briefing of the Soviets, addressed by a three- star general of the general staff. And the subject was electronics. And this was in 1961. Ana the Soviet general stated that the US was ahead 14 years in the field of electronics. But he said that they would overcome us through three tactics. One would be through the increase of 2,000 staff officers added to their espionage side on the scientific and technical to exploit the openings of the West of scientists ana others going to the Soviet Union, for espionage and recruitment. TOP SECRET
Bear in mind that espionage is the highest art form in the Soviet Uhion. They came out of the cave by reason of what Soviet intelligence did in the atomic and other fields. And Prone {Area 202) $44-6000 here was a Central Committee directive of 1959 that 200 scientists would be added to the espionage corps: to exploit opening to the West. That was number one. And number two, as a weapon of overtaking us, would be disinformation, misleading us scientifically up blind alleys. where we would expend both monies and assets and capability and! manpower on impossible objectives transmitting disinformation. And number three, by tying us down with binding treaties which would blunt our technilegical growth. Now, that was \ the word. Before I left the Agency, perhaps a month before, a > «< e & (2) & < z gome American scientists and intelligence estimators, sat down and made an estimate that the Soviets were four years behind us in electronics. Now, you take the story of an agent who was present in that high level top secret meeting, and here are people who knownothing whatsoever about that meeting, who independently have brought out a study to the effect that they 0003 > are four years behind us. Now, my own view is that there will be a terrible reaction in my lifetime against what is going on today. Because there will be a period when there will be a shift in the balance ef power or there will be a confrontation with the Soviets 210 Forst Street, $.£.. Washington, D.C. where this country will back down, it will be probably an SECRET
Prone (Ares 2027) $44-6060 4 2 «< a 4 o cy « 5 3 79003 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, O.C. unpopular issue, and where there will be a new perspective directed at this period of time, and there will be a very stron reaction, because the damage can't be--seen now, it will be seu: then. And I have no doubts as to that being the case, because the long term Soviet objectives were directed and redirected in ‘59 to one thing, and one thing alone, the change of the balance of military power. And I stand on that. Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, I would like to thank you very | much for spending the afternoon with us today. ; Mr. Angleton. It has: been enjoyable, Mr. Johnson. Do you wish to make a brief closing statement. Mr. Angleton. I may some other time, but not today. I may really read the statement and see what I said, Mr. Johnson. You are welcome to at any time. Mr. Angleton. And I will direct it to the judge. Because I am embarrassed about one thing, and that is the lack of paper ‘regarding the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, I:maan the fact that there weren't files on it. Mr. Johnson. You will be given an opportunity to inspect the transcript of your testimony and to make minor corrections. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 5:28 p.m., the Committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.) TOP SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT (ICI AD Hoc ) I. Threet Assessment II. Options for the President Communications Intelligence Electronic Surveiliances and Penetrations Covert Mail Coverage Surreptitious Entry Development of Campus Sources Use of Military Undercover Agents Surreptitious Optical Surveillance Investigation of Diplomatic Fersonnel Others Recommendations ne IEEE TONS 1. Permanent Interagency Committee on Intelligence 2. Intelligence Review Board Prior to Nuston Plan Huston Plan Objective After Huston Mon x
SPECIAL REPORT INTERAGENCY COMMITTER ON INTELLIGENCE 2 {AD HOC) EDGAR HOOVER
June 25, 1970 © This report, prepared for the President, is approved oy all members of this commiliea and theie signatures are affixed hereto, rt on ar Hoover Director, aral Sureay of Investigation Chairman * Director, Central Intelligence Agency [sf Jobe General D. ‘Direcior, Derense Intellig oe } Director, Nati Sacuriiy A; COPY NO. Gg
cote, ie Weeta eS i wt © ahs ane + PART TWO RESTRAINTS ON USTELUICENCE COLLECTION ce noted that the President ha it clear doration ba given to any recu : es The Committ that he desired full consi : or procedures which tend to limit the effectivences al ‘3 in gence collection. ‘She Committee further noted tha tec $ : the pros and coas of such restraints clearly set forth so that policies, practices, cr procedures snould be made. sof the Commitles, a variety of limitations aa and restraints were discussed, Allof the a, enctres involved. Defense lnfelliiccence Avones GIA), the three military counterint ence services, tae Coutrel Seeurd Avency (NSA), and In the light of the directiv the While fiause, the sublect matters l- (te for the consdaeratiog end cs Comm
Bi ae err cd re eo According to NSA erprecation of NSCID-6, which basis of NSA authority for ce gpment-of communications intell the processin ications” sharply limits i : with resszet to those communientions in whieha Uy S. citizen senear ar recipi. such dala, the continuation of s vrecedura would nee and anv expansion cou! While a 2-by-CaSe8 Anproac din preercing production of comestic i in encronebrnentoon the jurisciction of the FEL, as set forth in aw Ewecutive clarifiesiion of “foreign” te inc! any comununications of anv dadividuadls using international facilities regardless of the natio the sander or recipient couid rectify this situation. Advantages of Maintaining Res } Estreme visilance weuld be required lo prevent e¢ coverare from straying into an appoiwrance of censorshin, 2. Pxpandsed coverage in this area, if disclosed, cue result in unfeverabla pu videreround by thage vin éd advaniag ihe supposed inviolabiliy ef norma! ¥ now fake calcul COMUNE SIS. ve ro breach op bis sarily Council Inte Directive mMuniber seould paduire Shout current ry
A retanation of ihe : ction sharoly : foreian haved. tL dt ii adwould parmit more processing 3t she and tas a ragre cme B : formation ag it is obtained, tion should be broadened rom fur coverage by NSA ons of U, 5S, cilizens using Prasent interpretation should be broadened fo permit and program for caverayve by NSA at the res rt FO! of tne communtcations ol U, using international facilities. More information is needad,
Ae ante yal Pree Seis Waee Sep eeBeenghgttin SEED eS eben ch pane & te tw tee B. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations Preliminary Discussio: iilances and The limited: : Ost collaction of valuable imoaortance to tne entire information of comonity., NSA has bgen particularly hard-hit ov th for the absence of electronic penetration of foret i ic Jishrnencs has saverely curtailed its canabilits fo exploitation ef potontially as i yence. Additionally, other avencios are deprived of access to high-low 1, diplomatic, and military information, as weil as value stile intelligence po! Tecan data regarding host aati lee operations, Nature of Restrictions Mlectranic surveil uy 7 twotrictions, ani basis. Igranch, arase as a result o tise fechnic: ftrictions Jostire and cinbarrassment to t! and/or the United Sistes is alwova tpee Such offen requic: i as ars foot val side yeen dm the esteblishiannl a rs the
1 Phe US. Goverament nas an overriding obligation to use svery atatlohle scientific means to detect and neutralize forces whica pase a airect brent i 2, Every nisior intalligen those of the communist bloc, use Li niques as an essential part ii neral public would suppori their use by the x | s2me purpose. 3. The President nistorieally has had the authority fo act inomitters of national s iy. In addition, Title Wf of the Omnibus Act of 1938 provides a Stalulory basis, obtainable from other lechniques or Sources, Such data includes matton wiieu minht assist in formulating forciun policy decisions, information leading Lo Une identification of inte!tinence and/or espion Vcowld well inelede the first dadication of intention to ov: 4, Intelligence data from clectronic coverage is not readily principals one ‘1 hostile action acuinst the United States, 5. vilia: : riat froin COMINT without veitlance techniques can provide, ilpossible at all, war yooxpensive. Pherafory, approngh could ras lt ig consic savings compared to collyoti meloods.
aie Bhy perrrn va “urivoillances wr SS continue, Present proctdures s intensification of covera Sroups inthe Uniterd Seats s threat to the internal Security, Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage. of forcign natlonals ay diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community, More information is needed,
Cc. ol Preliminary Discussion The use of mail covers can result in the collection of yalunble information relating lo contacts batween U.S, nationals and forciga governments and imeiligence services, CIA amd the military investinative waenc heya found this information partice arly heipfal dn the past. ok coverage is letal, coverace tavalves recorein, dniormation fromthe face ef envelopes. ig available, lermally, nv duly authorized Podoralor state investi- mative agency submitting ¢ written request ic the Post Gtfice Devartment and has been usad frequently by the railiturey irteliinence services, Covert mail coverage, also known as "sophisticated mail coverage, or ‘flaps and seals," entails surreptilious screerins and may include opening and ceanination of domestic or foreign mail, ‘This technique is7 based on high-level cooneration of tan echelon pustal officials, Insolar ng civilian vse is cancurned, only mel destunaust to dinlomatic ‘ostublishinents in the United States and airmids meidyessed ta specific ‘ ‘ hare are two types of mail covers: | while the secand--covert coverige--is not. tF forcign log@tions has peen covered, Nature Covert cavers coverage his been rede ce? re of routine mail coverage during legal eb ihe: vere ssianal t primarily as an ouiraveta of publicity arising from discla progr cdingys nih publiginy atiay hearings involvins necuantiens of overnmental invasion ul privacy.
Restrjet fons an remaved, Presen: restrictions An ce Sheiet he relaxed on Seleeted fires mntell HOLS of PRIOPELY for Hite SYACO and interns] Security Interest, Mert cova reaure Nore intormat ion is needed,
tinus Entre i ae NSA has a particular interest iu the use of surreptitious entry a3 0 tool for obtaining cryntocranhic materials necessary for deciphering imporiaut dislomane and loreizn intelligence servica traffic, indy dnssances enciphered messuses of this kind can 02 H a as clitously obtained, NSA vditional foreign governimen instituted, Nature of Restrictions Use of surraptitios entry, also referred to ag " sources: and “black bay joos, "has peen virtually climinatec clandestine « vy dato areas occupied by an individual, o Xe . Uiplomatic esiablishment to collect invellivence matariah In the Poreion intelligences ficid, inf ides the calleciion of vital ery plozrapnic deciphering of intercepted diplornaiic tr matoriul Advantages af Intaininge Restrictions J]. ‘The activity involves ileal entry and trespass, 2. Information which is obtained through this technique could not bo uscd for presecutive purposes, f this the inviasnt we i Innis,
been innumerabie, fitniifying nage agents, illegals, vital eryptomrarn i riintion Re wrrobtained, Witko- cryplogranhie saatoriad which offen con be olbtainac anly frorn these Operations, much siznificant diplomatic He cannot be decipnere: even WH fia most sophisticated exuloment. Such cry plouraphic ots matorial has vaca valued at nitlions ef dollars in teems of the savin in eryptamilytic resources and in terms of the high-level intelligence information which it produced, 3. Inthe past this technicue, when used against Subvecsives has produced valuable intelligene DECISION: Surrepiitisus Entry ee ee me, ne rte a ene Oe me me Present restrictions should bs continued, ha modified to permit procurement of vi ed foreign cryptographic material, Present restrictions should also be madified to permil selective use of this technique ayai not othor urgent and higo priority internal security targe 3. More information is neadad,
Peete eee & {oan Prelin evry Public disclosure o ‘the sus ontrifmacedh ty i qyegh Pssuwnc]e Ivarse lo ollivenc ~-relnted ¢ Associations c l have int on cag noted that the fea CIA from develo: on targets abroad. oO CAN PUSES Ia taenbac Res of the intelligence cainn aren campuses, college facuhics, leflist journo militant ere ste CONCO GF ation incresst vet of a USS. counterinielligence iio Nature of Restrictions The need for great circumspeclion in ma and enipla ti ] will shuc learnins infteiligunce obviews (rons . He tee . Revceeng tated VET, 3 sak jiforiicetita related mien develope colle iidi pote Htha fn tion tn l t WSenee wd student + time ma geureas are wiih: clanty among trictions currently in force Hmit certain other vunity access to sorne of the most trouble som foreign al domestic youth groups, if ee-type myouys, ements that tiese are Opp nfo the wens ey ect pboete . WSU Lae the requirein si! AYER 1s eof hard reese tee tte
hee» * oe RONG on any Goverament activity i sof infringement on acac freedam, They fOve Pamenta agencies and the resuliiny paiicdt! nor - misteadin portraying tie Governrigit! 2, Students are free tly tmmmature and unp They cannot be relied on to miainiain confidences or to act with dis: to the sume extent as adult sources, ede Advaniaues of Relasin Lo 1 substantial degree, militant New Left and aatisar a States are comprised of sindenis, focuty ment ith educational institulions, ‘fo a correspondin: ‘oof these yroups and activities depends upon ledweatie sources in the eatesories named, Th (his deveioument of know ranabiities which coula be of { -connection, tha military services oe . ; value to fhe bub rédars Which have oceurred yo planand mature. ates iL is c CQ & sources are avalaale 3 nib to develo cavance inforimution concerning Such violence, The doveloament of sources amonn st. wilh Mow Lot elements pire , ae.
TPE: fs We ws WHE makait possible to road by U.S, students and abou ohice Development of Camnus Sources arterial “5 on development of camps Sources suould be continue, Present restriztions showll be relaxed to perc expanded coverage of Viclence-prone ca Mpus aac studem-related groups. ree CIA coverage ef American Students (and Gthers) tse traveling abrond or living abroad should be Ingress: More information is needad, tapeat ia soe OOaYVOIsS ans SMES Soupee teat hea | ei vases, re na
Preliminnr The use of undercover 2 i hy g8 6 gt i 5 apse by gamestic intelligence is curt v timite atration of hyg2 members: iptiad “Lik: onnel aad whose tient tc Suni nipuses across collec ion t 5 Nature of Restrictions The use of underco ngents by the military lavestigative services to develop ¢ targels is believed beyond t terory intent of the Congress AS expressed in Title 10, U, S, Code, and in curreal resource authoviin- tions, The MPelimiiations Agracmeiny (949 sereement simied by tie Bede snonsibility for lonawe, cauniur- FIL, Aria, Navy and Air f rich eithor espionaie, suliver: of the POE ane tne ‘ assets to undartal ip rais unless essential serviceo-related counteriniaiiinence miss! -cuced, There is aizo concern icr marie tdisciniinary etione within the services should the sy coyeri operations bacome nuwwil, lncts the current missions seryiees. er, there ise lacho! istenes SUE COMALE TELE! misstea is roc ra obign 0:
perm eter regard to collese Chimous it will require corailary course of mititar: in civil courts. : sng of miliary Cated inter: 6 presen long rus Mzenciss have been furnishing inferniedic ah c tO nonmilicary investizative ago ic ‘ ivilian i+ ould certain, Oxporionee Since obticated servi from a poor vroup in whieh rea disciplinary problems can be anticies od, Advantaces af Relaxing Pestricticns 1, Lifting these restrictions weuld oxnand the se domestic intellimence collection ciforts' by diverting addition, vos for ie collection of information on coilese campus: Vicinity of military instaila ‘ Peover azents by the military counter- el fo localized larcets whore i ireGvar, i i threct is oreatand ikelthvod of exposure niiniowil, es controlled use of trysted parsonneal rarvine the service ty refuen te Colleges eculd expand the collection cagabilivies atan acetptable pi 3. Phe military services have nr Curtain number a pursuing special academic courses on CAMMGISS Dunivarsities peers SOc it obo for
merece rt rea Seneereeneatecnea, rainy stuctent. th provisions for No chinge she mission of tha Strvicos; however, prose should be relaxed to per nilitary personnel as F5I related dissic
ICTIONS : : HOA, CIA, DLA, FBI, countorintelligen i to collect ieegen ce lable ream : for qualified manpe WOT OF 1A : i itations or recent cuthacks have been acute, ments for some agencies, otlizr than the FBI, 2 reviewed assed unon by officials Who, in some instances, ma tbe ‘ened concerning intelligence requirements, CIA renorted that recent ard current manpower reductions: (the Balance of Payments and One ration | vequction oxercises) have rey lowered CA's capabilities abroad witha cor responding decrease in its level of operational effectiveness, Lo wered capabilities have eecurred ata time when the comraunist services are expanding in Wostern Europe, Africa, th Moar Rast, and latin America, ‘There has also paena serious lass in {h iouit ily of deployment and som loss of cover positions, The military services noted that cuts in budeat require for counterintelligence auiivities have the effect af Severaly hames the ability of Uiese ices ‘to aecomplisn of threats to Uns mitlonal ¢ tees nee aia time when aie SSUES aas ninior restriction an Manpos The ur is : i muunbers to conduel Weatle paves Wepiiet Une rapidly escalatiog suuyersive res riihe olte
In the event, as a resu collection requirements should , ba necessary to proyic For example, yerage af ’ servic set t . aSsistan it would activities of U.S. subver are called upon to provide not being furnished at pre budzets to cover the increased ¢ CISION: Budect and Manso rstrictions Each asency srould submit a detailed estimate as to projected inannower needs and other costs in the event the various investigaiive restraints herein wre lifted. ¢ ach agency must operate within its current budgetary or manpower limitations, irrespective as as) t of action required as result of this report. More information is needed,
Sane op | ef 8 4 ty TOP SECRET “PART THREE EVALUATION OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION neers eee tern ene oes ete eee P| PROCEDURES TO EFFECT COORDINATION There is currently no operational body or mechanism specifically charced with tho averall analysis, coordination, and continuing evaluotion of practices and policies governing the ncaquisi- tion ane disserninaiion of inielligence, the pooling of resources, aie! the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field, Although a substantial exchange of intelligence and research muterial between certain of the interested aencies already exists, much remains to be done in the following areas: 4) the preparation of cooreinat intellinence estimates ina format useful for policy formulation; (2) the coordination Gf intellizence collection resources af the member avencies and the establishment of clear-cut priceilics for the various avenci and (3) the coordination af the operational activities of member aeencies in developing the required intelligence, ' $ TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF be established to eHect coardivetion baleen ia various memiter gevencies. This group would define dha speciiic resrire- veTieved that an interagency group on domestic solves mnents of the various agencies, provide re Wier eyatuidions intehliccsney yelon veconinendations rolat lo policies @porsiions tathe fisld of domesde inbeltics , a Dire Rowould incovnoes domestic intelligence estimates Of tae eruntdnsd offerrg af tie eniiv: intelpie Bicualweee dda ba bis penta ave
the National Security Aroney, ata, counterictelligence usoncies of i! : . Navy, and Air Fores. Ine 2 7 int OF ntative of the White Housa would hav: iz Tne cor e2 would reno staff 3 rs nariodically to the would coarcdinal Nee Same manner fenry F ine Assistant to the Pre coordinates ioreign intelliaance on behalf of the Pres chairraan would ba appointed by the President, This interagency group would have authority to determina appropriate starl requirements and to implernent these requirements, subject lo the approval of the President, in ordar to meet the arey responsivilities and objectives described above. DECISION: Permanent Interazenty Groun An adhoc groun cansisting of the PRE CIA. NSA . a “ 3 3 , ' nef DIA, and tha military counterintellicance agencies should ba appointed and should serve as long as ti President deans necessary, to provide evaluntinns of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic dsmestic onan intelligence estimates, and carry out the other ohjeclives indicated above. A pormansat committee consis CLS DiA, and the railitary counlerintelliganda agencios should be app ido evaluations of riadic damantic ae carry aubk the Goines
Juty 23, 1970 ror I , } WARDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY pe Qn. MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE The President has carefully studied the Special Reporte of the Tuterapency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoe) and made the following decisions: , wo ', erpretive Restraint on Communications Intelligence. National Security Council Pntellipence Directive “umber ® CISCLD-6) is te he interpreted to permit NSA to proyvam for coverape the communications of U.S, citizens using international facilities, ' *. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations. the intelligence comminity is directed. to intens{ ¥ coverage of individua!s. and groups. in the United States tho pose a major threat ta the internal security. Alse, coverage of foreign nationals and diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community is to be.intensified. . . 3. ail Coverage. Restrictions on legal coverape are to be removed. kestrictions on covert coverage are to be relaxed to permitouse of this technique on selected targets of ptiority foreign intelligence and internal security interest, 4. Surveptitious Entre, Restraints on the use of surreptitious the technique is to he used lo permit entry gre te be removed, precurenent of vitally needed foreipm crytopraphic materfal and against other urgent and high priority internal security Carpets, Tor SECRIEE ~ #SC 06875-70
Tor_secrer , HANDLE VIA COMPNT CUANKELS ONLY -2- 9. Deve ie or Campus Sources Coverage of violence- prone campus and student-related Groups is to be increased, Al] restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed, Also, CIA coverage of American students (Cand others) traveling or living abroad is to be Increased, 6. Use of Military Undercover Apents, Present restrictions are to he retained, 7, Bude ipower. Each agency is to submit a detailed estimate as to proj manpower needs and other costs required to implement the above decisians, B. Domestic Intelligence Operations, A committee consisting af the Directors or other appropriate representatives: appointed by the Directers, of the FRE, CTA, NSA, DIA, and the military counter-dntelligence apeneies.is to be constiluted effective August 1, 1970, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic demestic fntelligence es imates, .carry out the other objectives arecified in the report, and porform such other duties ag the President shalt, from time to Cime, assign. The Director of the PLE shall serve as chairman of the committea, Further details on tie organization and operations of this committee are set forth in an attached memorandum, The President has direeted that each addressee submit a detailed report, due an September 1, 1970, or the steps taken to iuwplement these decisions, weitrther such periodic reports will be requested as circumstances merit, The President is aware that procedural problems may arise in the course of implementing these decisions.- llovever, he is anxious that such prehlens be resolved with maximum speed and minimus misunderstanding, Any difficulties which aye arise should be brought to my immediate attention in erder that an appropriate solutidn may be found and the President's directives implemented in Amanner cansistent with his objectives, TOM CHARLES HUSTON At lLachment ec: The President H.R. Haldeman
BGs a di in TOP SECRET . HANDLE VIA COMTNT CHANNELS ONLY seen CONT CHANKELS ONLY ORGALIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE INTEMAGENCY GROUP ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (1AG) I, Membership, The membership shall consist of representatives of the rHT, CIA, DIA, NSA, and the counter. intelligence apencivs of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Alr Feree, To insure the high level cousideration of fssues and problems which the resident capects to be before the Rtoup, the Directors of the respective apenctes should Serve personally, However, if Necessary and appropriate, the Director of a member agency may designate another individual to serve in his place, 2.0 Chairman. The Pirector of the FBI shall serve as chairman, He may designate another individual {rom his apency to serve as the FBI representative on the group, 3. Observers, The purpose of the group is to effectuate community-wide coordination and secure the benefits of Commun d tye wide analysis and estimating. When problems arise whieh invelve areas of interest to agencies or departments not members of the Broup, they shall be invited, at the diseretion of the proup, to join the fkroupy as observers and participants in thase discussions of interest te them. Such agencies and departments inelude the Departments of State (1 & R, Passport); Treasury (ERS, Customs); Justice (BRpb, Community Kelations pervice), and such other agencies which may have Investigative or law enforcement responsibilities touching on ~~ 2 domestic intelligence or internal security matters, moutse Liaison. The President has assipned to Tom respons bility for domestic intelligence and internal security affairs, We will participate in all activities: of-the Broup as the personal representative of the President, “5, Staftine. The proup will establish such sub-conmittecs or working groups as it deens appropriate, Te will ate determine and implement such statfian Vequirenents a5 it may deem necessary ta enable it te carry out its responsibilities, subject to the approval of the President, . TOU SUCHET
TOP SECRET WARDLE VIA COMINT CUAHNELS ONLY =2e- 6. Duties, The group will have the following duties: ; (a) Define the specific requirements of member agencies of the Intelligence community, (b) Effect close, direct coordination between member agencies, (c) Provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence, (d) Review policies governing operations in the field of domestic intelligence and develop recommendations, (c) Prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the intelligence comming ty, “ (f) Perform such other duties as the President nay from time to time assign, 7.. Nectings, The group shall meet at the call of the Chairman a member agency, or the White louse representative. ; 28 ri Knowledge of the existence and purpose of the group shall be limited on a strict "need to know" basis, Onerations of, and papers originating with, the sroup shall be classified "Top Sceret-flandle Via Comint Channels Only." De. other procedures as it believes apprepriate to the implementation of the duties set forth above,
aM HO, PUacis Soleo ye) > ieueia 700m Heid, tea bot wae at | I —_ t ayG 34.
Son 2c 2 mei iv & o> 2iali ry p wey G 2a8 whee = cond a ome {Q “s aon rw or Fs edoun t i ‘ ° ers Ons ceis som pee a“ sty cha tate re] ers C3: A ‘a hl ee «
fe aot Seiki fated stat UP apt se ~ eenurace, Porn ronromeretare CRAP. Te DIARGTAR es a seni Ne ae Seen arene See i ; Ys Fes a ca i coy AM, 1e aya WASIUINGTON, 1.¢, 20518 ° &. ng 4320! ra | Mr. Tavel “* Mer. Walters —..- he tas fi : Tele. Kein wee ley ty, . ras tf il On March 20, 1971, I attended a meeting with the Attorney . Misa Gs , Mr. Richard Helfits, Director of the Central Intelligence Apensyseseess3> (CIA), and Admiral Noel A, Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency, MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES en ne nen et HS ony a I This meeting had been requested hy Mr. Helms and was for the © “\ purpose of discussing a broadening of operations, particularly of the very en Contidential type in covering inlelligence both domestic and foreign, 2°" Admiral Gaylor stated Uhat he was most desirous of the FBI resuming the . ™ sv-called "blnek bay" job operations, There was some discussion upon the —. partof Mr. Helms of further coverage of nvail uur! Tr Gre 4 ry : T slated to the Attorney General, Mr, Helms, and Admiral Gaylor that Twas nofat all enthusiastic about such an extension of operalions insofar Jas the FBI was concerned in view of the hazards involved. The Attorney General stated that he thought before he could make any final decision in this matler, Mr. Helms should mate an in-depth examination of exactly what he and Admiral Gaylor desired and then submit to the Attorney General and myself the results of this examination, and he, the Attorney General, would call anolher ineeling of this particular group and make the decision as to what could or could not be done, . , Mr. Helms said he would take care of this very promptly, ee ye ely ’ . a a “John Edvar Hoover “ Director apo JEELSEDM (1)