HW 49061 ‘and’ Conakat parties) and the’ DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO:FOREIGN DISSEM which, in the name: of progress,.have sup- pressed opposition parties in their own coun- tries, By the. very nature of.the. UN's own code of public values, it had to endorse the parlia- mentary formula, The other major partner in preparation of the definitive constitution; the Congolese Parliament, also has.an innate predi- lection for perpetuation of the parliamentary system. ; : : : - The Congolese élite feels insecure and un- certain of its own values and the legitimacy of ‘its rule. It therefore clings to the external trappings of legitimacy deriving from a func- tioning parliamentary regime. Present alsoare the paradoxical phenomena of widespread anti- pathy to parliarnentarians yet indefectible popular attachment to the principle of parlia- mentarianism. These render almost inevitable the perpetuation of the existing institutional framework at the central level. — ' Proposed Central- Provincial _Division of Powers The most publicized facet of the’ Congo's constitutional quest lies in central-provincial ‘ relationships, ''Federalism" was a polarizing ‘political slogan in the purely polemic debate between the 'federalists'' (especially the Abako "centralists"' (incarnated by the MNC/L party) during the final phases of decolonization. Much of the controversy, ‘however, raged over such sym- bolic issues as who granted mining rights, - rather than the real problems of dividing the fiscal domain, distribution of the security farces, and the nature of the hierarchical relationships between the provinces and the central government. Before independence, “federalism! in its classical sense had two crucial limitations as a relevant “organizing theory for Congolese society: 1) Federalism implies ‘that the “building blocks of the federation are internally co- herent and constitute units which can reason- ably share power with the center. As subse- quent experience has shown, the six former provinces were all’ subject to uncontrollable fragmentary forces. 2) Federalism. also implies that the: fed- erating units seek to join together in order to share benefits flowing from a largér political community. There is probably no other con- ‘temporary example of a working federation resulting from the dismantling of as tightly centralized a colonial regime as the Belgian . Congo. The events of: the immediate post- independ- ence crisis, however, were to transform the situation. The whole machinery of centralized government broke down, aresult of the Katanga and South Kasai'secessions and the Leopold- ville-Stanleyville split, and of the loss of ef- © 10 SECRET/NO:FOREIGN DISSEM Page 19 d'Etat. ‘in fact never applied inits original form, which tions, ‘fective capacity to implement central govern- ment decisions, The old provinces dissolved into a series. of new entities which, despite their ‘administrative cost, are mainly more manageable and coherent entities: Moreover, they have been created through a willing act of community by elected representatives. Thus ‘a federal form of organization became not only relevant but virtually inescapable. The Loi-Fondamentale itself provides for significant decentralization, The provinces for the ‘first ‘time became’ organic entities, with | their own elected governments. The break- ' down: in ‘the centralized budgeting and fiscal system. of the Congo also forced an innovation ‘of great importance... For the first time, in March 1962, provinces were required to main- tain separate accounts, rather than debit the central government: for their expenditures. The provinces also were given lump-sum sub- sidies and responsibility for covering ex- .penditures. in the areas of their own com- petence, .,The UN draft moves. somewhat further ina federal direction. The. most important con- cessions to the provinces are: , 1) Suppression of the office of Commissaire This Loi Fondamentale provision was called for a representative of the central gov- ernment in each.provincial capital to represent ‘central authority and coordinate central serv- ices. However, the central government has named "special" or "extraordinary'' commis- sioners to deal with real or fabricated crises in the provinces. With some exceptions, the remedy has been worse than the disease. The commissioners have become involved in local politics and created additional tensions. The argument for provincial coordinators of central services is not convincing. The central"serv- ices'' in the provinces are the Congolese Na- tional Army (ANC), Streté, judiciary, Conseil Monétaire, postal services, and communica- ‘The first four in any case would lie beyond the control of a commissioner posted in the provincial capital, and the latter two can be coordinated by other means. 2) Sharing of revenues. Certain explicit provisions are made for sharing the fiscal domain. In particular, the provinces obtain half the export duties, and the proceeds of individual (but not corporate) income taxes. Since this is far from an adequate.tax base for the provinces, the presumption has been that there: would continue to be a supplemen- tary, direct federal subsidy. 3). Decentralization of judiciary. Under the proposed constitution, control of all but the highest level of the judiciary would be vested in the provinces, At present, with the excep- tion .of local courts delivering judgments ‘based on’ customary law, justice is a central government function. This alteration is par-
© HW 49061 eral District of Leopoldville, but DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO ‘FOREIGN DISSEM : ticularly significant in view of the large num- ber of-.corrupt .provincial political figures whose bulging. dossiers ate in the hands of the central government magistrature. Pre- sumably, the political: decisions ‘whether to prosecute - will: devolve.on the provinces,-re-- ‘moving a: potentially important central gov- ernment lever. 4) Consultation with ‘provinces. The UN draft provides for regular consultative con- ferences of provincial presidents, This would supply an institutionalized mechanism for the provinces to vent their collective grievances against the central government, Proposed Concurrent Powers The UN draft maintains generally the broad allocation of functions established by the Loi Fondamentale. However, the listing of powers is more precise, and federal authority re- mains paramount in the exercise of concur- rent powers. Table A, appended to this study, compares the enumerations of powers in the Loi Fondamentale and the UN draft. Defense and Internal Security A key power accorded the central govern- ment in the UN draft is the assignment to the Congolese National Army (ANC) of re- sponsibility not only for external defense but also for the gendarmerie function. This is a continuation of the Belgian system, under which the Force Publique was stationed not only in a series of large military camps, but also in garrisons throughout the country, with a small detachment in each territory. The deployment of the ANC is a vital brake on provincial autonomy, which would be un- restrained were the constabulary function entirely assigned to police forces. controlled by the provinces. Central government authority would befurther strengthened through the proposed creation of a federal police force. Its primary mis- sion would be to maintain order in the Fed- it could operate in a province on the orders of the central government or at the request of local authorities. Recent Collective Provincial Initiatives to Amend the Draft Constitution An important new dimension to the central- provincial debate has been added by the com- mon front of provincial governments that emerged after the end of the Katanga seces- sion. The resolutions of the 1963 Coquilhat- ville Conference of Provincial Assembly _ Presidents indicate a general, rising hostil- ity to central authority. Detailed amend- 11 _ Eondamentale ments were proposed by the conference for 64 of the .212 articles of the- UN draft con- stitution... If adopted, they -would: bolster pro- vincial autonomy... The most important de- mands were. for: ; : . 1) Provincial authority to fix jointly with the -central government the ‘levels of export duties. ; 2) Retention by the provinces of 75 rather than 50 per cent of export duties. 3) Elimination of the right of intervention by federal police in provincial crises. 4) Control over the local personnel of the postal, telecommunications, radio, and tele- vision services, 5) Provincial fixing of income tax levels for individuals and corporations. 6) Elimination of federal primacyin matters -of concurrent jurisdiction. 7) Assignment to the provinces of all tax revenues except import duties and 25 per cent of export duties. 8) Establishment of a statutory joint fed- eral-provincial commission of economic af- fairs ministers to allocate available foreign exchange. 9) A requirement that two-thirds of the provincial assemblies as well as two-thirds of Parliament ratify any constitutional amend- ment. Parliament has taken the position that the Coquilhatville proposals are not the product of any legally constituted body and hence are not to be taken into consideration. Parlia- ment also has amended the Loi Fondamentale to eliminate the requirement of ratification: of the new constitution by provincial as- semblies. Consequently, as noted above, it is likely that the constitution will hew closely to the UN model. This could well provoke a serious crisis in central-provincial re- lations and will place the new constitution under heavy and probably concerted attack by provincial authorities, Table B, contained in the appendix, pro- vides a summary comparison of central- provincial power distribution under the Loi and as proposed by the UN and Katanga draft constitutions and by the Conference of Presidents of Provincial As- semblies. The partition of the fiscal domain proposed in the UN draft is summarized in Table C, also in the appendix. Conclusions In sum, there can be no doubt that the pro- spective constitution will be a considerable advance over the Loi Fondamentale with two important reservations. The UN draft con- stitution entrenches a parliamentary system and hence weak, government at the center. It is also unlikely to provide a federal solution SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM . Page 270
HW 49061 Docld: 32626338 oO SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM acceptable to the provinces, especially in view of the unilateral, adoption procedures involved, The latter objection is somewhat : mitigated by the technical incapacity of the central government to exercise a number ‘of its enumerated powers. But, by the same token, it is too weak to impose a form of government without the - cooperation of pro- 12 There is certainly wis- vincial authorities. ; dom, based on federal experience elsewhere, in making provision for the gradual expansion of power exercised at the center as the capacity for its responsible exercise in ‘the’ interests of the community as a whole increases. But the survival of a federation will be hazardous without the consent of the federated. SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page ?1
HW 49061 _Congo DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM IV. FRAGMENTATION AND SECESSIONISM: THE 21 NEW PROVINCES The redrawing of the Congo's boundaries, and the criteria upon which it was based, have. transformed the character of the Congolese polity. For this reason we examine briefly the twin phenomena of frag- mentation. and secessionism; “and the nature of the 21 new provinces, Secessionism - Secessionism - is a spectre haunting many African presidential palaces, It derives from the artificial character of nearly all African boundaries, and the co-existence within them of disparate cultural groups. There dre two frequent causes for secessionist movements: 1) among large ethnic groups, such as the Bakongo or Ewe (of Ghana-Togo), a particu- ‘larly keen sense of cultural identity often persists despite the division of the ethnic group between-.two or three states; 2) uneven endowment in natural resources and economic development may enhance the economic in- terest of a region in getting the rest of the country off its back, particularly if it is so situated geopolitically that the rest: of the country does not have the compensating ad- vantage of political domination. Secessionism is most likely in areas situ- ated on the periphery of the state, In the secession would be unthinkable; for example, in Sankuru or Lomami as a political alternative in the Bas-Congo, Katanga, or . other fringe areas, For this reason, South Kasai, in the Congo heartland, only briefly referred to its recalcitrant at- titude as ''secession"; "autonomy." Latent secessionist. ‘sentiments in the Congo appear endemic in two primary regions, the Bas-Congo and southern Katanga. As these are the two'most.important economic areas of the country, the problem assumes agonizing dimensions. In the Bas- -Congo the motivating factor is the remarkable solidarity of the Bakongo tribe .vis-a-vis. other tribes. Bakongo cherish the hope of reuniting the fragments from Congo (Brazzaville), Congo(Leopoldville), and Angola in a single political kingdom. Secession would - become a much more immediate threat were there a serious possibility of achieving Bakongo reunification, which at the moment is not politically feasible. The key geographical loca- tion of the Bakongo, at the doorstep of the capital, also mitigates the secessionist threat. The Bakongo are well represented in the Leopoldville’ population and hold many top internal ° ' 1 Province’ (see Map D in appendix); whereas it looms thereafter it was termed : civil service positions. In addition, the Chief of State, Joseph Kasavubu, is of their tribe, and they have established a solid claim to the central government Finance. and Interior portfolios. Their ability to obtain satisfactory treatment under the existing national political structure is therefore substantial. Secessionism in Katanga was first a Euro- pean movement and hence was somewhat taintéd in African eyes. However, in an intricate metamorphosis, the non-Baluba Africans fused this European incentive with their own revolt against Baluba hegemony in the southern Katanga urban centers. The Conakat party, a coalition of southern Katanga tribes, provided the vehicle for the movement. Though Katanga's 1960 experiment in self-determination was terminated by. international intervention, temptations will almost certainly arise again, . probably less compromised by transparent neo-colonial influences than the European- backed secession of 1960. Katanga is simply too far from Leopoldville to obtain subjective satisfaction from partici- pation in the central organs of govetnment,. Moreover, the Congo government at the moment ‘is too weak and inexperienced to render to outlying areas functional services in pro- ‘* portion to the resources it réserves for its 13 own use. This is not to argue that there will necessarily be a future’ secession, or that the central government cannot and should not act to prevent it, But Leopoldville-Elisa- bethville relationships will continue for the foreseeable future. to be unsatisfactory, and a secessionist spirit will remain near the surface in Katanga. — Around the periphery of the Congo there are other, less pronounced secessionist pos- sibilities. Three are discernible as possible future: trouble spots: 1) Ubangi Province. The Sudanic population of this province has more in common cul- turally with the peoples of the Central African Republic (CAR) than with the Congo. A Ubangi delegation is said to have visited Bangui in mid-1961 to open negotiations. for annexation of the region to its northern neighbor, The CAR authorities were not at that time inter- ested and apparently gave no encouragement. 2) Kibali-Ituri Province. Several of the major Nilotic ethnic groups of this province, such as the Lugbare and Alur, straddle the Uganda frontier. Traditional economic circuits were entirely transformed during the period of the Stanleyville-Leopoldville rupture, and this region is now very closely linked with Uganda by (mostly illicit) trading relation- ships. Union with Uganda is not likely to be SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 2?