176-10036-10098 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM NARA : 176-10036-10098 National Security Files FROM : TO: " TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS : : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report : 5/18/1963 $3 DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2
: os . - a, 74aN + WOR ~c4 LAC Heh | TTITUNINFURMATION REPOxT} CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY * This material contains information effecting the Netional Gafente. of: the United States within tho meaning of the Eipi Tenege Lews, atte 18, U.S.C Sect. oe : W938 aad m4, the frensmission ar revelation of which la any meaner te an unaviherised person Is prohibited by law : ~ CONFIDENTI AL ICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTRO (when Pl NO FOREIGH io COUNTRY SOUTH. VIETNAM . REPORT NO. “TWCS-3/547 ,672 SUBJECT PLANS. FOR A. COUP. DETAT. LN. CENTRAL «DATE DISTR, «10 way 1963 VIETNAM BY THE REFORMED ¥NQOO . . PRECEDENCE ROUTINE DATE OF a REFERENCES | IN pata INFO. EARLY MAY: 1963, . 7 +1761 OnTE ACO. VLETNAM, -SA.LGON (13 may. 1963) ah - FIELD REPORTNO. Fys & _. THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT I$ TENTATIVE. SOURCE APPRAISALS {7.18 PROBABLY TRUE. THAT THE VNQDD 1S BEING REFORMEGS ITS CAPAGILITHES IN, CENTRAL VLETNAM ‘CANNOT. BE JUDGED. oy : HTB. 1. "SHORTLY AFTER THE 8 MAY 1963 INCIDENT. iN HUES NGLIYEN VAN Luc “RECEIVED A PLAN FOR A COUP DIETAT IN CENTRAL WAETHAH F | FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL VIETNAM: THOAT XAC PHON3. FRAO me ce i (1xPT), COMMENT... TXPT DOES NoT TRANSLATE MEANINGFULLY INTO. ENGLISH, THOAT HAS THE CONNOTATION OF GOING OUT. IN ‘MIND AND SPIRIT} XAC. MEANS BODY, 1.E.; PHYSICALLY; PHONG TRAO MEANS MOVEMENT THUS, THE MOVEMENT OF MIND, SPIRIT, AND BODY MIGHT BE ONE TRANSLATIONS | A BETTER ONE WOULD BE VN@DD.) - THE TXPT HAS BEEN DEVELOPING SIMS eC VIETNAM. GUOC PAN. DANG fy NQDD} VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PART oo FROM, THE fi. PARTICU ARLY THOSE ELEMENTS IN ceRFRAL VIETNAM, Sai CLASSIFICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTROLS _ ciow | aa é ves aul a _ | CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGI DSSeH ee] 3 TELEG RAM INFORM ATION “REPORT Tm “TEL EGRAM sy Oe Pe cst bon! _ 2 WTB Rice coe ge ge heeds GBR Saltebabeceate Pediat ace cen tee eeeeldn eta 2 SMB Leek aber et des a wad aa Sanitives | Mud: Ot 197 IO #
5 CLASSIFICATION ~ DISSEMINATION CONTROLS . z ONAN, ES CS TOCS-3/547, 672 THE VNQDD ‘STRONGHOLD. “THE TXPT, ALTHOUGH COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF FORMER VNQDD MEMBERS, WAS ESTABLISHED ESSENTIALLY AS A BUDDNIST ASSOCIATION: “AND HAS BEEN LEGALLY ENGAGED IN CIVIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES SINCE \TS FORMATION. CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION HAS PROCEEDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING NEW, YOUNGER LEADERS, AND OF DENYING THE OLDER PASSIVE TENETS OF BUDDHISM AS WELL AS YHE OLDER LEADERS OF THE VNQDD , THE ULTIMATE INTENT BEING & EvIvaS LIZED REV OLUT 1 ONARY SPIRIT. (FIELD COMMENT. LUC Is THE FATHER AND ACCOMPLICE OF NGUYEN VAN CU, ONE OF THE Two PILOTS | WHO DONBED TEE Pe SULT EAL SALE ON 27 FEBRUARY 1962.) 2. THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE REMINDED LUC THAT THE ORGAMI- ZATION WAS IN A POSITION TO HANDLE A COUP ACTION Inf CE NTRAL VLETNAM _ EFFECTIVELY, POINTING OUT THAT THOSE MILITARY UNITS NOT CONTROLLED _ COULD BE NEUTRAL IZED AND THAT THE AIR BASE “Fo DA NANG COULD BE CONTROLLED THROUGH THE AIR FORGE. THE COMMITYEF STATED THAT, AFTER i THE ANTI-BUDDHIST ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, YE PEOPLE WERE READY , .FOR AN UPRISING, BY TAKING NGO DINH CAN AND ARCHBISHOF NGO DINH THUC INTO CUSTODY AND BY GAINING MILITARY CONTROL OVER THUA THIER _ AND QUANG"NAM PROVINCES, SUCCESS COULD BE ASSURED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, THIS WOULD PLACE THE TXPT IN A POSITION OF USING PRESIDENT DIEM!S 7 TACTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST HIM, 1.E., HAVING GAINED CONTROL OVER’ ‘CENTRAL VIETNAM , THEY. WOULD OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH DIEM CLASSIFICATION — in) BAe set
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS CQNRDENTAL Be FOREIGN DISSER TDCS- 3/547,672 AND , AT. THE- ‘SAME TIME, THEY WOULD BE" MOUNT ING COUP AGAINST THE REGIME EN ‘SAIGON, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE NO LATER THAN THREE DAYS AFTER THE ‘ONE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, 3s LUC SENT A TRUSTED’ FOLLOWER, ONE VIET 9 TO “SAIGON TO DISCUSS THE PLAN WITH AN OPPOSITIONIST SYMPATHIZER AND GET HIS VIEWPOINT. VIET WAS ADVISED TO TELL LUC THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WAS PRECIPITATE AND DANGEROUS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE FORMER VN@DD MEMBERS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM HAD THE POWER CLAIMED, A COUP THERE, WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS ACTION IN SAIGON, WOULD LEAVE A VACUUM WHICH THE VIET CONG (vc) COULD IMMEDI ATELY USE TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. VC REACTION PROBABLY WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GAINING CONTROL OF ALL AREAS NOT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE COUP GROUP, WITH THE: ULTIMATE POSSIBILITY OF PART! TIONING CENTRAL VIETHAM, OF BEING IN A POSITION TO FORM A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND FINALLY, OF BEING ABLE TO CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS: THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO VIET, THIS FOLLOWED Luc'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HIS FOLLOWERS WERE NOT IN A POSITION’ 70 ACT IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. VIET THOUGHT THAT ‘LUC WOULD INSTRUCT THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN. CENTRAL VIETNAM TO TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME, AND THAT LUC'S ADVICE WOULD BE ACCEPTED. 4, FIELD DISSEM, STATE ARMY NAVY. AIR USMACV USOM MAAG USIS CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC 9TH FIELD STATION 2NQ ALR. DIVISION. CLASSIFICATIOQN— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSER