13-00000 SECRET Oswald 201 File Box 1: mostly FBI interviews/investigation notes; items sent by FBI to CIA prior to JFK assassination regarding Oswald's activities in New Orleans; State Department .correspondence regarding Oswald defection and return; Silvia Duran material; newspaper articles; Mexico City Station files; and other material. ~ Box 2: FBI background investigation of Oswald and his wife’ Marina's activities while in the Soviet Union. Box 3: FBI background investigation of Oswald activities in New Orleans; FBI interviews of Marina Oswald; information relating to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee; State Department actions ‘regarding Oswald's passport and visa applications; FBI tracing of: weapons connected with Oswald; information on Jack Ruby; and a toes. o£ the radio debate in which Oswald participated in August 63 Box 4: FBI reports on Oswald; FBI interviews with Oswald and Marina after the assassination; copy of Cuban government's protest to Mexican authorities ‘over the arrest and treatment of Silvia Duran; and an index to the FBI reports is included in the OR « ° - Box 5: FBI investigation of the assassination (3 vols. ye a copy Of Oswald's diary “while he Was in Moscow; biographic_ material on... Marina Oswald; a copy of Oswald's chronology while in the Soviet Union; and a copy of the questions for the Soviet government composed by CIA officials. Box 6: Oswald chronology; biography of Maxina Oswald; | Warren . Commission correspondence; — name traces of those who appear in Oswald diary; Warren Commission correspondence; Oswald Mexico-. trip; Oswald address book; Silvia Duran Mexican interrogation; newspaper clippings. Ct, Fos _ Box 7: FBI reports on Oswald; " Nosenko interviews; ~ ‘photos ‘of Oswald in Minsk; list of Oswald's apartment articles; and a name list of CIA traces for the Warren Commission. - . - Box 8: Photos shown to Marina Oswald for ID purposes; - SR/CI Studies for the Warren Commission;. continuing FBI - investigation, Dallas area; interview with Marina; Oswald/Ruby alleged association; attachments to Oswald chronology in USSR. Box 3: Copy of Marina Oswald's notebook with addresses; list of items prepared by CI on Oswald care for the Warren Commission; SECRET TE
13-00000 . SECRET _ Oswald's contacts in the Soviet Union; and an FBI report on Oswald's activities in Mexico; a CIA brief for presentation to the Warren Commission on Oswald; Soviet Government documents relating to Oswald; and a translation of a Portuguese book, A_ Box 10: FBI investigations; Nosenko material; anti-Castro activities in U.S.; CIA report of Oswald in Mexico City; CIA report on Oswald defection: CIA report of Oswald as Kennedy murderer}; assorted FBI items. Box ll: Bulky material, mostly SR/CI Studies for’ Warren Commission; FBI reports; Marina Oswald material; Oswald Cuban application; USSR radio and newspaper traffic; Silvia Duran interview;. foreign press reaction to JFK assassination and Warren Commission report; photos of unidentified man in Mexico City; Bernard Fensterwald FOIA case; assorted CIA and FBI material. Box 12: Warren Commission Log Book £rom National Archives; master list of Warren Commission correspondence and exhibits from National Archives; and copies of FBI reports on the assassination. Box 13: HTLINGUAL intercepts (Russian language with some translations); SE soft file on Oswald; Nosenko information on other Soviet defectors. Box 14: Copies of CIA documents still classified in the Warren Commission records held at the National Archives; Oswald's. activities in the Soviet - Union; ~ information relating, to! -Gilberto™: Alvarado “Source D“, Silvia Duran, and Oswald in Mexico; transcripts of telephone intercepts from the Mexico City Station. Box 15: CIA-Warren Commission released materials, 1964; background on Jack Ruby, Oswald; Oswald's Soviet medical record; National Archives list’ of status of CIA documents in Warren Commission records, 1967; Soviet press reaction to ; assassination; internal memoranda and other records of. the Warren Commission; transcript of executive session of the Warren - Commission; Oswald's Mexico trip, -Soviet defection; Oswald's alleged CIA connections; Warren Commission-material;~~“ kook" cases; follow-up on numerous .“leads"; Helms‘'s file on Oswald and Warren Commission documents (as of January 1964). : , Box 16: Garrison investigation, newspaper clippings, and other reports; Warren Commission memos. Mexico City Station files (8 bulky files) (Considered part of the Oswald 201 file; to be placed in box within Oswald's 201 file) a ; 10 . SECRET
13-00000 mea, : SECRET Mexico Station files on Oswald (P-files); Oswald chronology; mewspaper clippings; FBI report on Oswald in Mexico city; misc. material on Oswald in Mexico; Garrison investigation material (mostly newspaper clippings); Warren Commission testimony. HSCA Miscellaneous Folders (16 folders) (These file folders, which are unaccessioned at present, will be placed within HSCA collection, Job No. 80-T01357A) HSCA requests; information on Oswald -in USSR; Marina Oswald; documents on Roselli and Giancana. 11 SECRET
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE--~INTERNAL USE ONLY 27 March 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM: Historical Review Task Force SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Historical Review Program Declassification Guidelines 1. The accompanying report responds to your 13 February 1992 request that we form a Task Force to prepare declassification guidelines for the Historical Review Program. 2. Attached to the report is a revised Headquarters Regulation (HR 70-14), which establishes general policies and guidelines to ensure that the Historical Review Program has an impetus toward declassification. The guidance in this Regulation will enable the Program both to fulfill the expectations of the Congress when Mr. Casey established the Program in 1985, and to give the American people the expanded access to CIA‘s historical records that you announced in your 21 February speech in Tulsa. 3. We asked the deputy directors and independent office heads to select Task Force members who could address both general policy and declassification issues, and we asked members to express their components‘ views as well as their own. We have attached a list of Task Force members and of other Agency officers who took part in our work. The Task Force met eight times as a group, and we met separately with many of its members and consulted with other federal agencies, including the National Archives and Records Administration, the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Information Security Oversight Office. 4. Our report reflects a consensus of the Task Force members, and we are grateful for the knowledge, judgment, and good will that al] members brought to our efforts. We are prepared to discuss the Task Force's work and report at your convenience. | | | Ckiurrth Mrifh LA jo] ~ Of of iW ~{ J. Kenneth McDonald ~W. George famdson pt Chief, CIA History Staff Chief ion Division Co-chairman Co-chairman Attachment ADMINISTRATIVE--INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 % ’ MEMBERSHIP Task Force on Historical Review Guidelines Cochairmen: W. George Jameson J. Kenneth McDonald Chief, Litigation Division (OGC) Chief, CIA History Staff Members: Doug A. Chief, DO Component James A. Barry Deputy Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence Terry Joseph Busch Deputy Director of Leadership Analysis (DI) Lee K. Coyle . Chief, Information Management Staff/ Operational Support Group (DO) Kathryn I. Dyer Information Review Officer (DI) Eunice Evans Deputy Chief, Information Privacy & Classification Review Division (OIT/DA) Jane Bowman Fraser Deputy Chief, Program Resources Div. (OIT/DA) Information Review Officer (DS&T) Attorney~-Advisor (OGC) David D. Gries Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence Information Review Officer (DA) ne a / Fa Chief, Information Management Staff Litigation Support Staff (DO)
13-00000 Susan Kessler Office of Inspector General Frederick F. Manget Chairman, Publications Review Board (PAQ) Mary S. McAuliffe Deputy Chief, CIA History Staff 4 / ary Deputy Director (OCA) Becky L. Rant Information Review Officer (O/DCI) John H. Wright Information and Privacy Coordinator Additional Participants: Robert B. Deputy Chief, DO Component John Carver Classification Review Branch, Information Privacy & Classification Review Division (OIT/DA) George W. Clarke Counsel to the Inspector General Director, National Intelligence Council, Analytic Group “Chief Paralegal, Litigation Division (O0GC)
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY 27 March 1992 REPORT OF THE DCI TASK FORCE ON HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM DECLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES 1. On 13 February 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence asked W. George Jameson, Chief of the Litigation Division, OGC, and J. Kenneth McDonald, Chief of the CIA History Staff, to co-chair a Task Force to prepare declassification guidelines for a reorganized and expanded Historical Review Program. This report is the result of the work of that Task Force. 2. Premises: The DCI's speech on “CIA and Openness" to the Oklahoma Press Association of 21 February 1992 expressed the intent to make CIA and the intelligence process more visible and understandable in light of changing world circumstances, and from this the Task Force operated on the following premises: A. The Historical Review Program (Program) established in 1985 will become the responsibility of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). B. Custody, control, and declassification authority for records reviewed under the Program will be transferred from the originating offices to the Director, CSI, in order to accelerate declassification review. C. The Program will fully conform to EO 12356, “National Security Information,* and maintain the DCI's broad statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods. D. As part of CIA‘s movement toward greater openness, the DCI has directed that the Program have “a bias toward declassification of historical documents." E. The Program will review for declassification three principal categories of CIA records: @® All documents 30 years old or older (except for certain operational files exempted from FOIA search and review by the CIA Information Act of 1984). ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY ® All National Intelligence Estimates on the former Soviet Union 10 years old or older. @ Records (including operational files) on selected topics and events of particular historical value or public interest. F. On an annual basis, CIA will publish an index of all documents the Agency has declassified and approved for release. 3. Objective and Products: The Task Force's primary goal was to prepare guidelines to help this voluntary Program make sound and consistent declassification decisions and to ensure that the Program has an impetus toward declassification. Recognizing the futility of any attempt to formulate rigid instructions that dictate decisions for all possible cases, or exhaustive lists of categories of information that reviewers automatically must declassify or protect, the Task Force prepared for DCI approval a proposed revision of Headquarters Regulation 70-14 (attached), which establishes general policies and guidelines for the Program. The Task Force expects that the guidelines in this document will advance the Program's objective to declassify.and. release the maximum volume of information to the public consistent with national security by emphasizing clearly and specifically that: @ The Program is guided by a presumption for disclosure. @ The CSI rather than the components will exercise declassification authority for historical records. ® Reviewers may not automatically protect or. release documents. ® Reviewers may not withhold information without articulating with reasonable specificity the possible damage to national security expected from disclosure of the information. ® The guidelines, firm in principle yet flexible in application, identify certain factors that reviewers must consider in determining whether damage could result. @ The Program will continue to protect information, including intelligence sources and methods, that could damage the national security.
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY 4. Organization: The History Staff in CSI, after consulting with a wide range of historians, will select groups of permanent records (excepting certain operational files) 30 years old or older for systematic declassification review, and locate and collect for review records on specific events or topics of historical interest selected with the DCI'‘s approval. A new Historical Review Group in CSI will carry out declassification review in accordance with the Program's guidance. (The Program will ordinarily focus on inactive records, although on occasion it may be necessary to review ‘active files.) At the beginning of each calendar year, the Director of CSI will submit a report to the DCI on the Program's work during the preceding year, and on its plans for the coming year. §. Guidelines for Declassification: In preparing the guidelines in the Regulation to give new impetus to declassification, the Task Force focused on the following issues: A. Presumption for Disclosure: To carry out the DCI's commitment to the Program, the Task Force emphasized the presumption for disclosure. Since EO 12356 provides that information may be classified only if its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, an essential Task Force objective was to prepare useful guidance for reviewers to determine damage. Unless reviewers can articulate how disclosure could damage the national security, they must declassify information even if it concerns matters the Agency has routinely withheld from public release, such as CIA presence in a specific country, the fact of certain covert action operations, Agency organization and personnel, and information withheld solely on grounds of the “mosaic effect. Since most records will be at least 30 years old, and most operational records will be exempt from systematic review, the Task Force expects that the Program can declassify substantial amounts of information without damage to national security. B. Sources and Methods: The Task Force was careful to ensure that the Program's guidelines do not undermine the DCI‘s broad authority to protect intelligence sources and methods. The guidelines reiterate EO 12356‘s presumption that the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources, methods, or foreign government information will damage the national security. Such information, however, will not be automatically withheld under this Program. Although members were concerned about cover disclosure issues, the Task Force agreed that as an intelligence method, cover will be governed by these guidelines.
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY C. CIA Presence Abroad: The Regulation does not automatically protect the fact of the presence of CIA representatives in a specific country or relationships with foreign governments. Such information may be protected upon a reasonable showing of possible damage. The Task Force concluded that in many cases such presence or relationship might be disclosed by substituting for deleted particulars such terms as “CIA representatives" and "government officials" or “authorities.” D. Publicly Available Information: Under this Program, the extent to which information is already available to the public, especially information that the Publications Review Board has approved for publication, will be a significant consideration in declassification review. There is a presumption that information that has appeared publicly will not damage national security, unless a reviewer can articulate how official confirmation could cause additional damage. E. Protection of Unclassified Material: Reviewers may withhold some information even if it is unclassified. (Examples are information protected by discretionary privileges such as deliberative process--especially involving the Director and President--attorney work product, attorney-client, and witness statements.) This material also will not automatically be protected, and reviewers must articulate expected harm to US interests in order to protect it. Much of the information in this category will probably be disclosed. Information prohibited by law from disclosure (e.g., privacy data) will continue to be protected. 6. Procedures: To be effective in accelerating the declassification review, the Program will ensure that components are consulted. The Regulation addresses this and certain procedural matters as follows: A. Consultation: The CSI will advise the responsible components of its selection of records and consult with them as necessary in conducting its review. B. Appeal Process: Records approved by the Director of CSI for declassification will be made available to the appropriate deputy directors or heads of independent offices, who will have 30 working days to appeal any . decision to the Director, CSI. If the appeal is denied, they will have 10 working days to appeal that decision to the DCI.
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY C. Re-review: In its review, the CSI will identify records that cannot be released, and will review them again not more than 10 years later. D. Index: CIA will publish an annual index of all Agency documents approved for release (e.g., under the FOIA, but not the Privacy Act). This will serve both the public and the Program‘’s research needs. It has been suggested that CSI publish this index, but the Task Force is convinced that such an index will require ADP expertise, personnel, and equipment far beyond. anything available in the Center. Although the Historical Review Group will record its final review determinations, the Task Force recommends that the Office of Information Technology (OIT) be asked to develop and maintain this index. 7. Application to Other Review Programs: The guidelines will inevitably have an impact on the release of Agency information under other review programs, such as the FOIA. While standards need to be consistent, many different factors will determine whether CIA will release information in any given situation. The Task Force therefore agreed that the Program's guidelines for historical records should be taken into account Agency-wide, but that their specific application to other review programs should be the subject of future study. 8. Resources: The Agency's current means of recording declassification and other disclosure decisions are rudimentary, fragmented, and entirely inadequate. The Task Force believes OIT should develop and maintain a data base both to track all Agency disclosures and to facilitate the publication of the annual index. Additional resources for OIT may be required. Directorates and independent offices also will require additional resources both to conduct appeals of the Program's decisions, and to cope with the impact of the new declassification guidelines on their review of Agency information under the FOIA and other programs. 9. Conclusion: The Task Force recognizes that applying the proposed guidelines will raise some complex issues that CSI can only resolve by consulting the rest of the Agency as the Program actually gets underway. While making the Program succeed will demand extraordinary energy, commitment, and sound judgment, we believe that our guidelines give the Program the foundation it needs to begin its pioneering work. Attachment
13-00000 INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT HR 70-14 14. CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM SYNOPSIS. This regulation prescribes the responsibilities, guidelines, and procedures for the declassification review and release of permanent Agency records under the CIA Historical Review Program. a. GENERAL (1) (2) (3) (4) The Agency's Historical Review Program (hereafter, the Program) is established to make significant historical information available to the public without damage to the national security interests of the United States. This includes systematic review for declassification and release of: all permanent records 30 years old or older (with the exception of certain operational files); other records on selected topics or events; and certain National Intelligence Estimates. Reaffirming the principle that the US Government's records should be available to the public, this Program will declassify and release to the public the maximum volume of historical records consistent with: (a) The responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) under the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, to protect intelligence sources and methods and organizational and personnel information. (b) The requirements of Executive Order 12356 and successor orders to protect national security information. (c) Provisions of law that govern the public disclosure of information. The Agency will transfer records declassified and approved for release under this Program to the National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter, National Archives) for public use. The Agency will also make information available to the public in other ways, including the release of declassified records to the Department of State for
13-00000 publication in its documentary history series, The_ Foreign Relations of th i s. Such Agency material released to the Department of State will also be transferred to the National Archives through the Program. b. AUTHORITY. The Historical Review Program is established in accordance with: (1) (2) (3) (4) Executive Order 12356, which prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information, and provides in § 3.3(c) that the DCI may establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of classified information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods. The responsibility of the DCI under § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3), to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 403g, which exempts the Agency from the provisions of any law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. The CIA Information Act of 1984, 50 U.S.C. § 431, which exempts certain operational files from the search and review provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. . ©. RESPONSIBILITIES me?) (2) THE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE, has principal responsibility for the Historical Review Program. Custody, control, and declassification authority for all purposes of records selected and received for review under the Program will be transferred from the components to D/CSI. At the beginning of each calendar year the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence will submit a report to the DCI on the Program's work in the past year, and on its plans for the year ahead. In the Center for the Study of Intelligence the History Staff and the Historical Review Group (HRG) are responsible for carrying out the Program. ae
13-00000 (3) (4) (1) (a) The History Staf£ will both select groups of records for systematic declassification review, and locate and collect for review records on events or topics of historical interest selected with the approval of the DCI. (b) The Historical Review Group will be responsible for declassification review of records under the Program in accordance with this Regulation and additional guidance promulgated by the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, with the DCI‘s approval. (c) In conducting this Program, the History Staff and Historical Review Group will advise the responsible components concerning the selection of records to be reviewed under the Program and will consult as necessary with the Agency Archivist and responsible directorate and DCI area Information Review Officers. (a) To advise the Program on its policies and_ procedures the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, may from time to time convene the Historical Review Panel, which will include the Archivist of the United States, the Librarian of Congress, and representatives of the historical profession. The Agency Archivist will assist the Historical Review Group in maintaining the integrity of all permanent records (as determined by the Archivist of the United States) received or created by the Agency, and in preparing appropriate documentation to provide data for an annual index of all Agency documents approved for release under this Program or through other means. The Agency Archivist will transfer records declassified and released under the Program to the National Archives. The History Advisory Board will advise the History | Staff in its responsibilities for the Historical Review Program. CRITERIA FOR REVIEW PRIORITY The History Staff, with the assistance of the Agency Archivist and the relevant Information Management Officers, will use archival data and listings that. describe the Agency’s permanent records as well as
13-00000 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) -role in US intelligence, foreign policy, and on-site research at the Agency Archives and Records Center to identify and locate specific groups of records for review under the Program. The History Staff will determine the order in which records are reviewed, using as primary criteria their historical value, public interest in the subject matter, and their potential yield of documents that can be released. The Program will give special attention to records originated by the DCI or his principal subordinates and other senior Agency officials, finished intelligence, and disseminated intelligence reports. Priority for review will also be given to file series requiring prompt reproduction or other conservation action to ensure preservation of the information contained in the records. The History Staff will evaluate records in light. of the contribution their declassification and release can make to understanding the history of CIA and its q international developments. To determine historical value, the Chief, History Staff, will consider the recommendations of the Historical Review Panel, and of a wide range of government, academic, and private historians. The following records will be subject to systematic declassification review: (a) All permanent records held by the Agency that are 30 years old or older when reviewed, with the exception of certain operational files designated by the DCI under the provisions of the CIA Information Act of 1984. Included in this review will be files inherited from predecessor organizations and formerly designated files that have been removed from exempt status as a result of the periodic review required by the CIA Information Act of 1984. (b) All issues of Studies in Intelligence. In addition to selecting records for systematic declassification review, the History Staff will locate and collect for HRG declassification review National Intelligence Estimates on the former Soviet Union that are ten years old or older when reviewed, and with the
13-00000 DCI's approval, records (including operational files excluded from systematic review) on selected events or topics of historical interest. e. GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION (1) (2) (3) Executive Order 12356 requires that information be classified only if its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, and that it shall be declassified or downgraded as soon as national security considerations permit. The Order further states that information that no longer requires protection in the interest of national security shall be declassifed and released unless withholding is otherwise authorized by applicable law. There shall be a presumption in favor of disclosure except as provided in subparagraph (e)(4). Reviewers conducting declassification review of information under this Program who advocate the continued classification of information will bear the burden of identifying any damage its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause to the national security. Information may remain classified only if the reviewer can identify such damage and a clear connection between disclosure and the projected damage. .To show such damage with respect to information 30 years old or older, a reviewer must articulate how disclosure of the information is likely to affect, in a significant and adverse way, the US Government's current or future . ability to carry out its authorized activities. Unless a showing of possible damage is made with reasonable specificity, the information will be declassified, even if the information concerns Agency matters normally withheld from public release, such as: (a) The fact of CIA presence in a specific country abroad. (b) The fact that certain covert action operations were conducted. (c) The existence of foreign government relationships. (d) Agency organization, functions, names, official titles, and salaries, and numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. (e) Information withheld solely on grounds of the *mosaic" effect. Factors to be considered in determining whether damage to the national security reasonably could be expected to be caused by disclosure include the effect of the - 5
13-00000 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) passage of time on the sensitivity of the information, any. prior disclosures of the information, the link between disclosure and possible harm, and past experience with respect to disclosures of similar information. Under EO 12356 the unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information, the identity of a confidential foreign source, or intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security. Such information, however, shall not be automatically withheld under this Program. In accordance with the third agency rule, the Historical Review Group will coordinate its review decisions as necessary with other US Government agencies before taking final declassification action and arranging to transfer records to the National Archives. A significant consideration in reviewing information for declassification under this Program will be the extent to which the information is already available to the public. Information that CIA has officially acknowledged (including inadvertent disclosures) will not be eligible for continued classification. There is a presumption that information that has appeared publicly, including information that the CIA Publications Review Board has approved for publication even if not confirmed officially, will not damage the national security unless the reviewer can show how official confirmation could reasonably be expected to cause additional damage to the national security. The Historical Review Group will determine whether the information under review warrants continued protection, even if declassified, pursuant to statutory or other requirements. Such information (e.g. privacy data and information protected by executive privilege) will be released, except when prohibited by law, unless there is a showing that US interests will be adversely affected by the disclosure. . In no case will information be kept classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; or to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security. | 6.
13-00000 é. PROCEDURES (1) Individual documents will be released in full, (2) (3) (4). withheld in full, or released in part. When a document cannot be released in full, an effort to sanitize the document by deleting those portions that may not be declassified, or that may not be made public for other lawful reasons, will be undertaken. This procedure will be followed only when it will not slow the pace of the review unduly, will not obscure the record's essential significance, and will not distort the document‘s bibliographical identity, even if details of internal dissemination are excised. Documents that cannot be sanitized according to these criteria will be withheld in full. The Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review the determinations proposed by the Historical Review Group, and if approved, make them available to the deputy directors, heads of independent offices, or their designees, whose components originated or have a substantial interest in the records. The responsible official will have 30 working days from the date of receipt of such records in which to appeal in writing to the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, any decision to declassify and release information. If the appeal is denied, the responsible- deputy director or head of independent office will have 10 working days from the receipt of the decision of the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, to appeal that decision in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence, whose decision will be final. The Historical Review Group will maintain a record of all final determinations.
13-00000 (5) (6) At the time of review, HRG will identify Agency records that cannot be declassified. The HRG will again review such records for declassification at a date not more than 10 years later specified by the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence. That date will be marked on the document. This Regulation is intended to provide direction and guidance for those engaged in declassification review of records under the CIA Historical Review Program. Nothing contained in this Regulation or in any procedures promulgated to implement this Regulation is intended to confer, and does not confer, any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization.
13-00Q000 ¢€ cem-21,F 7 - QoP ye . 1 April 1992 Pr rations for Handling the Kenned Assassination P March, 10:00 A.M.: I met in CIA/HS with Mary McAuliffe, Jerry Haines, and Kevin Ruffner, at Mary's invitation. She gave me a copy of the results of History Staff's Survey of the HSCA Collection--the Summary, a Box List, and Finding Aids. These lists comprise the total of CIA's holdings on the Kennedy Assassination, we are told. Everything looks to be in order, and we can begin to get ready for this high-volume, high-velocity, early—product job. [A jarring note at the end of this session: Mary objects to my suggestion that we consult DO and OS experts regarding their concerns with these files. She says the whole point of this is that we own these files now; we don't have to show them anything. ] The job number is 80T01357A. Boxes 1-34 are the DO collection. Boxes 35-63 are collections located by OLC, IG, OGC, DS&T, and OS (but most documents are DO, FBI, HSCA originated). Box 64 is a collection of 72 reels of microfilm and probably equates to 72 additional boxes, but with a large likely overlap. | A separate collection of boxes (1-16) comprises the Lee | Harvey Oswald 201 File, and comes mostly from the FBI. There are 8 "bulky" files from Mexico City Station which also belong to the Oswald 201 collection. There are 16 loose files, miscellaneous material from the HSCA. These boxes are physically located in IMS/DO, where the HS historians did their survey. They are currently the property of OCA, but will presumably be turned over officially to CSI. History Staff (Mary) asked us to give first priority to the Oswald 201 boxes. I called Kathy Stricker right after the HS meeting to see what DO's understanding of this is. She said that Russ Holmes has been the custodi ecade (since 19637), but that he reports to and her deputy, | b _ (on green (44577). ‘is tied up on matters down town: should call who knows the case in detail. *She also counséreu-us~to k into related files that are mentioned in the Oswald/Kennedy files: the Ruby File, the Clay Shaw File, for openers. These are not included in the total collection we've been told about. 30 March, 1:00 P.M I held a meeting in HRS to pass on the word and copies of the survey and box lists. We decided to get ready to get to work right away on this, as soon as our new bosses give us the word. Taking the two-year deadline in newspaper stories of the
Joint Resolution soon to be passed as a starting point, and DCI Gates's desire to get this material out as soon as possible, we figured that we would have to show some product within a month or so and schedule the whole job to be delivered to the Board of Five in segments of 8-9 boxes each per month, which should ensure that the whole case would be in their hands in . manageable chunks and long before the deadline. This schedule is far faster than we have been able to work on the HS/HC and DCI Record File boxes, but we are assured that there are a. lot .O£ duplication, a lot of non-CIA material and newspaper clippings, and a lot of already released material, and we'll have more people to work on the job. Presumably, we'll also be working on other big jobs concurrently. . I called| to ask him to send us up the first two boxes from e Oswa iles, so we can see what the job will entail. I also invited him to give us a briefing on the contents on 7 April at 10:00 A.M. Late Monday afternoon, Kén McDonald came into Edgar's office to object to our procedures and timetables. Mary, who had been sitting.at Bill Zumwalt's desk reviewing material ready to go to NARA, had carried our plans back to Ken. Edgar called me in. Ken said this had to be a much faster job than “we were contemplating, that it had to get out right away, that the Joint Resolution would not allow us this much time. I mentioned that the Joint Resolution would not have the force of law. Ken said that a new chief for the HRG had been chosen and would be announced on 31 March. Then_we could get this Program moving. And would I kindly disinvite i 1 2 : : No announcement. Edgar says that Ken says Dave Gries would be in Ames on 1 April to look over the 4th Floor property. We'll probably hear then. . We received from OCA a copy of the Joint Resolution as it will be introduced in the House by Stokes this week. About 5:00 P.M., I got a call from Fred Wickham of IMS/DO. He asked if I was the one who asked for two boxes of Oswald. I explained what we intended to do. He said we would have to check with OCA in any case; they are the custodians. I told him we better hold off for a while on delivering those two boxes, until we learn more about what happens to the JR and what it will mean for how we do this job. *He told me that one of the Oswald boxes consisted of old microfiche, which would be hard to handle, but that DO had reconstituted this material in hard copy, and they could give us this for the review.
13-00000 "Church Committee"'s Final Report: The Investigation of the 08 April 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR: SUBJECT : a. Ancillary Files Lee Harvey Oswald, 201-289248 : b. Sequestered Files HSCA Collection 1. INTRODUCTION: In August 1976, Chief, CI Staff appointed the undersigned as the Staff representative on a Task Force established in response to DDCI‘s orders to the Deputy Inspector General. The Task Force's purpose was to review Book V of the Assassination of Presiden ohn F. Kennedy: Per mance © ~he , and to formulate comments, based upon an in-depth study of information available in Agency files, on statements made and questions raised in Book V. Since CI Staff, at that time. held Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, the CI Staff chief charged the undersigned with reviewing the file and preparing papers on a series of topics drawn up by the Task Force leader. 2. It quickly became evident to the undersigned that the so-called 201 file on Lee Harvey Oswald was much more than what a 201 file should be. In addition to biographic information on ' Oswald, the file included radio traffic between Headquarters and the field on matters pertaining to Oswald, information on known and possible contacts abroad and in the United States, | correspondence between the Agency and the Warren Committee, the “Garrison Investigation", etc., as well as internal Warren Commission documents containing Agency information. The file also includes some 500 third-agency documents (primarily from the FBI and the Department of State). 3. In order to get a handle on the welter of disparate material in the Oswald file, the undersiqned set up more than a few individual files to hold photocopies of documents dealing with such topics as Gilberto ALVARADO-Ugarte, Silvia DURAN, Waldemar Boris KARA-PATNITSKY, Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, etc. (See attached inventory — Tab A.) The undersigned considers these ancillary files, which include 9 folders from the former Special Investigation Group of CI Staff, as an appendix to Oswald's 201 file’. Its integrity should be maintained. [See paragraph 8.] 4. FIRST AND SECOND REVIEWS (October 1975 - c. February 1977): For the first time, in October 1975, CI Staff reviewed Oswald's 201 file to ascertain which documents could be released to Bernard Fensterwald who had requested all Agency documents on Lee Harvey
13-00000 Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. OGC, who was handling Fentserwald's request, considered the first staff review as inadequate and assigned a paralegal (assisted by a CI Staff officer) to do a more complete second review. At the same time, each Directorate was asked to forward to OGC any documents in their files, which pertained to the Kennedy assassination. These documents were included in the second review. 5. SEQUESTERED DOCUMENTS: By the time the Task Force had completed its report in August 1977, the House of Representatives passed a resolution setting up a Select Committee on Assassinations. Later, the House decided to limit its investigation of the assassinations of President Kennedy and Rev. Martin Luther King, III. Members of the Task Force now became involved in handling requests from the House Select Committee (HSCA). The undersigned worked closely with HSCA staff members and with the Agency‘s Principal Coordinator, HSCA. When the HSCA finished its report on 30 June 1979 (its report did not come out until later that year), the undersigned then moved to the Ames Building to join a group reviewing OSS documents for eventual transfer to the National Archives. 6. By Late 1981, the Agency had prepared its material gathered for the “larchive placement in sequestered storage in the Agency's Archives. The undersigned, though available, was not asked to assist in this undertaking to ensure all pertinent DO material had been included in the collection. 7. Later, after returning to Headquarters, at IMS's request to work on the many of FOIA requests for Agency documents on the Kennedy Assassinations, the undersigned recalled Oswald's 201 including the ancillary files mentioned above. 8. While preparing an inventory of these latter files, before returning them to IMS/Files, the undersigned discovered to his dismay, that not all pertinent files had not been included in the sequestered Collection in late 1981. Thirty-six of these documents had been clearly prepared in response to specific HSCA requests. The undersigned made a list of these documents to show the History Staff's group reviewing the HSCA sequestered collection. The documents include, for example a. Response to HSCA Request 77-0076/4, n.d. Subject: Tab C (Unsanitized), John ROSELLI & Sam GIANCANA. b. Response to HSCA Request 77-0084/1, 30 January 1978. Subject: Evaluation of Information in the Manuscript of Federal Prisoner Antulio RAMIREZ—Ortiz.
13-00000 c. Response to HSCA Request 78-1058/2, 09 March 1978. Subject: Items in Possession of Agency before Opening Lee Harvey Oswald's 201. d. Response to HSCA Request 78-2588/1, 15 August 1978. Subject: Comments regarding HTLINGUAL Watchlist Cards. e. Three volumes of (unsanitized) documents for HSCA‘'s use during Helms'‘s appearance before the Committee in executive hearing. Volume I pages 0000151 — 0001873 Volume II pages 0001874 0002071 Volume III pages 0002104 — 0003369 Annex pages 0003520 0003571 (Copy 8) f. etc. [See attached inventory, Tab B.] 9. The undersigned had prepared the remaining material [see paragraph 3 above] to provide background information, along with supporting documents, to the 1976-1977 Task Force. Since this material was available at the time of the HSCA review of Agency documents pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy, it was shown to HSCA staff members either voluntarily or in response to a verbal request to the undersigned. Each file contained a “signature sheet" for the staff member to sign, thereby acknowledging he had seen it. This material, in some thirty-five folders, includes a. DENIED Documents from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201. Contained in 5 vols., all reviewed. RELEASED Documents from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201. Four volumes of 16 reviewed by HSCA. b. Comments and supporting documentation regarding Ronald Kessler's article "CIA Withheld Details of Oswald‘s Call", The Washington Post, 26 November 1976. ([NB: Shown to Richard Sprague, Chief Counsel (before G. Robert Blakey), HSCA, 01 December 1976 c. CI/SIG (soft) File No. 568: HTLINGUAL material and memoranda relating to Lee Harvey Oswald et al (3 vols). dad. Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City: Background for Task Force Report, 30 August 1977
13-00000 e. Warren Commission: CIA memoranda addressed to Warren Commission - 19 February to 29 October 1964. [See attached inventory, Tab C] 10. It should be emphasized at this point that most, if not all, of the above files contain copies only of “original” documents found elsewhere in official files to which the HSCA had access and had reviewed. 11. PROPOSAL: In order to ensure that nothing is missing from, or out of sequence in, the sequestered collection, the undersigned proposes that he or an assistant be granted access to at least the 34 boxes concerning information belonging to the Directorate for Operation so as to a. Check the contents of each box against the inventory sheet contained in each box and note any discrepancies; b. Make copies of the “original" documents listed in the inventory under Tab C and place the “original” documents in one or more of the 34 boxes, if there is room ~ for not all boxes are stuffed full. If there is insufficient room to accommodate all the “original” material, then the left-over material will have to be placed in extra boxes - not more than four -c. If documents or folders are put in one of the 34 boxes, the subject and the number of the folder will be added to the existing inventory sheet; the folder number will follow the highest folder number on the inventory sheet. Russell B. Holmes Consultant
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE--INTERNAL USE OMLY . CSI 92 0201 13 April 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR: | [7 ; , ‘Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs FROM: J. Kenneth McDonald Chief, CIA History Staff SUBJECT: Center for the Study of Intelligence Access to All Records Relevant to House Select Committee on Assassinations Investigation, 1976-1979 l. In his 21 February 1992 speech to the Oklahoma Press . ASSocation the DCI announced that he was "transferring custody of all documents CIA possesses relating to the assassination of President Kennedy to the Historical Review Program,” which he assigned to the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) in the same speech. David Gries, the new Director of CSI, has asked CSI's Historical Review Group to begin work on declassifying the collection of records that CIA holds as a result of the 1976-1979 investigations by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA).of President Kennedy's assassination. ° 2. Pursuant to the DCI's. directions, we therefore request approval for all members of CSI (which includes the Director and his staff, the History Staff, and the Historical Review Group) to have access to all records that CIA holds relevant to the HSCA investigation. We understand that 64 boxes of material have been specifically designated as related to this“investigation. 3. Upon receiving your approval for CSI access to these records, the Director, CSI; would like the components neted below to transfer custody of the following 64 boxes of material related . to the HSCA investigation to CSI, when requested by the Chief, Historical Review Group, CSI: Box Nos. 1-34 & 64 Directorate of Operations. Box Nos. 35-36 Inspector General Box Nos. 37-38 Office of the General Counsel ‘Box No. 39 Directorate of Science and Technology Box Nos. 40-48 Office of Security Box Nos. 49-63 Office of Congressional Affairs ADMINISTRATIVE--INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE--INTERNAL USE ONLY SUBJECT: Center for the Study of Intelligence Access to All Records Relevant to House Select Committee on Assassinations Investigation, 1976-1979 4. We understand that the DO's Information Management Staff holds the 35 DO-originated boxes, and that the 29 other boxes are held together at the Agency Records Center. -J. Kenneth McDonald. cc: D/CST C/HRG/CST APPROVED: SL 21/9 2 Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs Date #¥ S11 2Glackicl creme. ADMINISTRATIVE-~-INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE ~- INTERNAL USE ONLY OCA 1180-92 2 LAPR 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kenneth McDonald Chief, CIA History Staff FROM: Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs SUBJECT: Request for Access to HSCA Records REFERENCE: Your Memorandum dtd 13 April 1992; Same Subject (CSI 92-0201) lL. In the reference, you requested approval for all members of CSI to have access to all records that CIA holes relevant to the HSCA investigation into President Kennedy's assassination. Upon receiving this approval, CSI would request affected components to transfer custody of the 64  °:_ boxes of material in question to CSI. 2. Today, I called Michael O'Neil, Special Assistant to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Mr. O'Neil serves as the focal point for questions arising with respect to the segregated HSCA collection. I informed Mr. O'Neil of your request, noted that the DCI had promised an expeditious review of these documents, and requested his concurrence to proceed with the transfer of custody. Initially, Mr. O'Neil wondered whether this action would frustrate the purposes of the Joint Resolution currently being considered by the Congress. Specifically, since the documents would be provided to a Review Board pursuant to the resolution, would transfer at this time to the CSI hinder that purpose? I told Mr. O'Neil that if the Joint Resolution passed in its current form, we would instruct the CSI to transfer the holdings to the Board. If the Joint Resolution did not pass, we would have a head start on reviewing the documents. ADMINISTRATIVE ~ INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY SUBJECT: Request for Access to HSCA Records 3. <I then informed Mr. O'Neil that the new historical review group would have at least fifteen officers and that this group would likely review the material. Mr. O'Neil then stated that he concurred in the transfer of custody and in the request for access by CSI personnel. 4. Based on this conversation, I have signed the reference indicating my approval of your request. During the course of your review, you should continue to coordinate closely with Litigation Division, OGC, and this Office to ensure that decisions to release are consistent with litigation and other requirements. 4. Please call me on x35467/if I may be of any further assistance. <2 ce: C/DO/IMS -C/LD/OGC . ORIG: DD/OCA: }ab:x35467. (21 Apr .92) Distribution: | Original - Addressee 1 - C/DO/IMS 1 - C/LD/OGC 1 - D/OCA ‘1 - DD/LEG 1 - OCA Record 1 “- (EPM} Chrono 2 , ADMINISTRATIVE ~ INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 SUS. tad (Gril CIA SPECIAL COLLECT lONS RELBY S$ 4N FULL Count of Pages in the Pre-Assassination Oswald/@@}File Which Was Delivered to NARA on 11 May 1992: TOTAL: CIA 2 Nov 3 Nov 18 Nov Number of Documents 34 il 59” 60% WG eK 60" WG WAKE _9 Dec 60”... 28 Sep 61 9 Oct 63” 10 Oct 63+ 10 Oct 63 15 Oct 63 16 Oct 63 24 Oct 63¢~/ “Bi: Oct 9 Nov. va) Nov 5 Oct a Sore Yan “3 13 Apr 26 May 6 wil Jul ywl2 Oct “25 May 13 Jul *.7 Sep .10 Sep 25 Oct 7 Nov & Nov 26 Apr v 7 Dec 61 “ 31 Oct 16 Nov 26 Nov 9 Jun te 4. 130 59S. Noy DH a4 590° W/NET @1ZSE 59 WIRE Tm [HUG 60M WARE A 61 W/AE_(ManCon) 61 A-193 61 ME o- Ob 6i- O- 6i- H~ 319 7 61“ whe 62 W/hE 63- LNG veg r 634 VG, “wg 63% “PAE 634 YG WPhE 62 “WPKE , 4 59 a“ 59” 59 62 DWN HRN eRe fot font fd nd bed bet bet GND et el et et ed Number of _-Pages _ "424 XANE 2LSIS- GHAR. EY SIENS CYAR IY —— Cory MENG MOTE - 2 ; eer ee with Oe-G00- R43 TERT, QUBPO—pvOf ENED OG — WO TE #22, reWihty 20/97 MEMO SITAM ES WIE val ego 4G FO ae WE CA LAC EF Mn cad ‘i | -
13-00000 bee eee Central Intelligence Agency Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20505 Date: 2 August 1993 pax: es | Phone: | (703) 874-3105 Number of Pages (Including Cover) 2 Comments: FYI, copy of Records Retirement Request of 22 August 1980 for the segregated collection. Note that it states: "The filmed portion of this collection is being retired separately." If I have more information on this in the Allen litigation file, I'll let you know.
13-00000 * 88 Bs oD CUTER BY & ene eo AE Cm. + ORION.» vceieememetetesie CONRAD 5 2 ae ame HA Se DG GET te eee deg ate om & Gomi ay nage aman TARA Gs 4 sity cian 1etatme ‘fries ceePe, ReeenerrateceerenentetErerTE <b, PT AOD ARP RETR eR ithertttn eet Bs colt Gat Oe ae; ae die Subendy aiipinpliond 4 copies to Recode Contes. Two copies will be retumed to tha | mesg serge jag offece, Addizioasl copies moy Ea Prepited os indicated by yous RMO. LCITE RESTUE TiOws On USE ory ieee q PF, Th PRA eees BESTE ees Oee pa RT RUE I ® CLE mm ¢ SOR Aiany eeste 9AM arg ** "ISS20ON OF: eo Legis risiath AUG Ge ’93 11: >3HN pee - Eee Recorps RETIREMENT REQUEST- 77> “= 8070 ‘357 0 For Relurence Sxevica on Recerds Tron steers dfe° Steroge Complete Form 490 and Refer TS Aheve~ t Job Number. . 6 tm aeae pf O° CR SSOPART I (To BE COMPLETED BY TNE RECORDS CUSTODIAN) : er the Fe eo. 8 FROM: Qeeouting OFFICE (DIV/BR/SEC) BATE ves & 22, August 1980 ; | Records Center Counsel Room BUILDING ZR Ese OL ae f APPLICATION 1S MADE FOR RETIREMENT OF THE RECORDS DESCRIGED BELOW i TO: __ OFschaP Tian OF FIL G SEMtESie DETAIL. BO WO” CITE RECOROS CONTROL SCHEDULE OE SCRIP TION, ULE FORM NO. 4094 10 1Ones 1 aG3aA, « : Consists of all. substantive paper dociments and other materials created.or reviewed | zs the result of inquiries made of the CIA by the House Select Committee on | Assassinations (HSCA) during its investigations into the deaths of President Kemedy' ' and Martin Luther King. ‘The collection includes all CIA files requested for review, . i docummts generated by the HSCA as the result of its reviews, correspondence } ) exchanged between the CIA and the HSCA, and pertinent supporting documentation. i 1 This <is_zn Agency=wids deposit. The Filmed portion.of this collection is being . - .- " xetired separately. *- : ad - i ante s . 5 ate “eet reer ews omen nner eee meme on . . os 3 Ses ote eee ao LIST MELUDED In TPANSE en ee om Pe) & the ‘Cane written on ies £ the LC the cc Eo the DDO; bie! written rmission Set the Cy the G e ‘the B/Sec- - om © ome Se nad fousrosiriow OF ‘THE deconas bes¢maeo REREON Has B BEEN MABE baad FOLLO ws: t 3 . be FA Gm ne i —, AUTHORIZATION: 3 t . ' =e : . - ® oo ee ~ . ee me we ee ee $ PARTIAL JOB DISPOSITION WHOLE JOB DISPOSITION : : al ce wy . ° . - > “- * ° eo . eed OESTROYVED ‘ a DESTROY ED- BOK NOS. TRANSF ERRED-BOX NOS. wp ee ee : To: i . ~ ' ® . . tf °. * eee emer © steenany gyenene ecmctam an fo Mt coy ee" "6's" a’ a’ a's" sea a's" oe" LRLLL TLIO 7 ~ we etehgteteteecerertrereeecererecerereeeemeenereebvererees oaetat ee ecececegerecen’ : . . 2 $0505 $¢ __.| . SEE ATTACHMENTSSL, - SEG_REMARKS, On ac SS ROO areteretetet POO Se ROKK Ke SKK POD ererere ee etatett eatsh oseeatehatetatstatety estat etotatate SR ELV eatetes KORN Ae 59508 eee POPPE Dave % SVATURE cure. Of SPO Sb TION, AGENCY Reconns ¢ Cin TER e FORM 149 PREVIOUS KOITIONS DESOLETE “> o wom a ee eed ey e : ae semen marten ot ome ems th en ey mem Lodiamine “ ue ne Ld oe m2 ore . - . —] -_— ; PART Hi Bro BE COMPLETED BY ARCHIVES) - Exhibit #3
13-00000 UNCLASSIFIED 27 June 1994 MEMORANDUM FOR: | | DA @oa FROM: [ "SUBJECT: JFK Database Extract for NARA ’ REFERENCE: On June 15, we met with Mike Getsey and Bill Grover of NARA to discuss improvements to the JFK database extract . The following issues were discussed and will require action. 13-6620 feo nceming the NARA requirement that restricted fields be released to them. — gal van <a VoL LS Steve Tilley fu e@ application, | Toa et ine will need to tak wi This could result in a modification ta Qs inc should also discuss with Steve Tilley the new exemptign codes and determine what effect they will have on the collection. This 2: . could result in a modification to the application. r er 4a +TCHRG should print 1D aids on white paper. — LM 5 yt — . NARA would like us te provide ar least one keywerd{subject) per document and any number of keywords per cument. NARA will be xt we ed expanding their keyword field ta 250 characters. Both of these items require a modification te the application. nel ede r. 9 “te | a” . i . j 5. NARA has preliminary plans to expand the fitle field from 60 characters to 80 characters: they de not want the field truncated. ( 2S 1) ? . } However, the title will still be truncated unfess HRG modifies their data to 80 character. This will tequire a modification te the = \ " application. a \ l 0 L ; PS : v PS (My 6 cm NARA fila Qu Reps. NARA wants the date time Se Sony removed from the 1D at i. This will require a modification tothe application. = ~~ COWRA <é ~9. NARA would like the Opening Criferia to Say a true criteria gs opposed te the current canned statement. This wil require a Os oe modification te the appfication and data poputaton byHRG. | - \o\ O i< Aan would like the box number and folder information prefixed to the comments field. This will requize a modification to the . application. m - . . . NARA will be faxing their new formats and examples to us this week. { will contact you to schedule a meeting to review the above issues. Thank you and { can he reached on 36417(5). cc: ( le DA pod & Shoe }— UNCLASSIFIED saree
13-00000 28 July 1994 Results of 25 July meeting with Mike Getsey and Steve Tilley re JFK database extract. The following item numbers are keyed to| ) memo of 27 June, same subject. #1. “restricted data" -- NARA will accept disk with restricted data withheld. Issues will be re-visited after a decision on disposition of CIA's classified (retention) JFK collection. #2. Exemption Codes -- The Agency is not required to use the additional exemption codes or add them to its system, however, they must be accounted for in the extract disk. Getsey suggested that this could be done by the extract program. Question: is it possible to add a couple of codes without a major programming problem? #3. White paper for Iden Aids - yes. #4. Keywords -- NARA has no problem with the length of CIA's 15 character field for keywords, however, with the current format NARA can only search on the first keyword. Each keyword needs to be a separate entity on the extract disk. ; #5. Title Field -- NARA is expanding the title field: to cut down on the number of truncated titles. Does not effect HRG system which is already 250 characters. #6. . "Identification Number" -- Move date/time ID number to Comment Section along with box numbers and folder information (#8). #7. "Open Criteria" -- Field can be blank.. Use only for special restrictions on documents; unlikely that CIA will have documents that require using this field. Need to delete canned statement.
MEMORANDUM September 16, 1997 To: ‘Review Board . From: T. Jeremy G Subject: Rdview of CIA Records I. Background The CIA Team has developed a preliminary timetable that we hope will provide a reasonable framework for completing our review of CIA’s assassination records by August 1, 1998.' We are creating this timetable for three purposes: First, to establish .our own working target dates to measure Review Board progress against the mandatory deadline established by the JFK Act. ' , Second, to provide CIA with our best assessment of the order and scope of our review _ so that it can make its own internal judgments on the proper allocation of its resources. We provided CIA prior drafts of this memo and solicited its specific advice and — suggestions for better ways to accomplish our goals. [We have not asked CIA to “agree” to these deadlines, but we have encouraged it to provide alternative suggestions on how best to meet the August 1 deadline] ; Third, to solicit the Review Board’s advice regarding “enforcement” of these (or other) targets. Although we surely hope that both the ARRB staff and CIA will be able to meet the targets, and although we certainly plan to make all reasonable accommodations for — _ problems that no doubt will arise, we nevertheless anticipate that it is possible that CIA might not be able to keep to these timetables. Thus, we anticipate that there may well be times when blocks of records scheduled for Board review will not have been fully processed by CIA. It is our judgment that, in keeping with our commitment to Congress and to the goals of the JFK Act, we may need to have the Board act on groups of records for which CIA has not completed its initial review. At the risk of over- repetition, the ARRB staff seeks to be as reasonable and accommodating as it can on timetables, provided that any proposed changes are consistent with our obligation to complete the task. We realize that this review. may have resource-allocation rerirewee ae ‘By establishing this target date, we will provide ourselves with a two-month cushion to handle possible appeals and miscellaneous issues that doubtless will arise.
13-00000 .consequences for CIA and we expect to refine this timetable both fe minimize the’ resource impact and to allow us and the CIA to proceed most efficiently with th _ review. We also take very seriously our commitment to Congress to complete’ our on schedule. Is the Board prepared to make decisions on Teconds if CIA has not : completed its review and to enforce those decisions? . oO II. Issues applying to all CIA record groups _ Records to be opened-in-full : | es During the course of CIA’s review, it frequently identifies records that Liste’ BO is prepared to open in full without Board action. Although there is a benefit in promptly forwarding such records to NARA, it is less expensive 7 for CIA to process these records during the summer months. = : - Accordingly, we are prepared to agree with CIA that it may delay. processing such records, provided that all such processing of open-in-full | ; records will be completed by August 30, 1998. Duplicates CIA will continue to identify duplicates and may process them after all other documents have been reviewed and transferred to NARA. If the ARRB is shown that any given record is a duplicate, CIA need not - complete the processing before September 30, 1998. Ill. CIA Record Groups A. Oswald 201 File (17 boxes) - Current status: - review completed (witha few minor. exceptions) _ B. CIA Sequestered Collection — 1. “The 63 boxes” - Current status: The ARRB staff has completed a survey of the 63 boxes (on the folder level) and has assigned each folder a relevance priority on a 1 to 4 scale. CIA has completed its declassification review of roughly 66% of the priority 1 folders. The ARRB Staff has completed its own review of approximately 50% of the priority 1 records and those records have been (or shortly will) be voted on by the Board.
13-00000 y seanets2 devine ot . ve ygee tam aft thse gO ES 988 ni Bs entrant antes anos EAS Seas ee ee ae ee eee Pe . 09/16/87 TUE 12:36 FAX 202 724 0457 — ARB -3- - target dates: Completion of final review ‘of 63 boxes by January 3 1998. ~ time line: 9/30/97 —_ box 40 (priority 1) 10/31/97 box 48 (priority 1) 11/30/97 box 56 (priority 1) 12/31/97' box 63 (priority 1) 1/31/98 = all priority 2,3 and 4 2. HSCA Staff notes (originally interfiled in the 63 boxes) ~ status: Record Identification Forms prepared for all documents. CIA review is 80% complete. ARRB staff completes its review shortly after receiving records from CIA. - target dates: Complete Board voting by November 18, 1997. re 3. Microfilm (72 boxes) ~ current status: CIA identified approximately 33% of these records as NBR. ARRB: staff has reviewed all CIA NBR designations, and has identified additional records that should be reviewed by the Board. The ARRB Staff will discuss with the CIA the preparation of Record Identification Forms (RIFs or “IDEN aids” in CIA terminology) anc develop a plan that will best facititate review.’ ~ target dates: CIA begins review by November 1, 1997 and completes review by July 1, 1998. . Compiete Board determinations by July 31, 1998. *The ARRB staff has.no objection to the records being identified entirely on the folder level provided that all records in the folder are open-in-full. If there are records in which the CIA is requesting redactions, those records must be identified individually. The remainder of open-in-full records may still be identified with one RIF. as being the contents of the same folder. eae f peste ant wh ya Oar No aAy BO! OA TPE IE 8 OMBRD. CES PP CREATE “OF 4 BER, RHP
= tentative time line: 2211/30/97 = boxes 16. 12/31/97 boxes 733° - 1/31/98 - boxes 14-19 2/28/98 _ boxes 20-25 - ; 3/31/98 boxes 26-31 & 44-45 - . (Boxes 32-43 contain LHO’s 201 file, which will be treated asa special case.) 4/30/98 —boxes46-51 ' 5/31/98 boxes 52-62 ° 6/30/ 98 boxes 63-72 . 4. Microfilm copy of Oswald 201 (approximately 12 boxes) = * - issue: ° The vast majority (if tot all) Oswald Microfilm records 2 are duplicates of records the Board has already reviewed under the JFK .. Act. To the extent that the records previously have been reviewed, there is little value in re-reviewing the records. The ARRB staff will - . survey the Microfilm 201 in an effort to identify any additional "records that have not already been acted upon by the Board. All - “records not previously acted upon by the] Board willbeso designated; a’ RIF will be prepared, and they will be sent for Board action. The remaining Microfilm 201 will be transferred to the JEK Collection at NARA and opened in full in 2017. : hag ~ status: Staff has completed i its initial survey and has thus far identified n no. Caraga fhe 201 Miczofln Gat ae no aloendy in he JK. - a yc See. bro Reo oF a Se FEF on “Working Files” Gndluding: “Russ Holmes” ‘papers, sete) ~ Status: No Record Identification Forms have been prepared. ARRB staff has conducted a general survey. ~ target dates: Work to commence by CIA on . October 1, 1997. CIA should "prepare Record Identification Forms for all records by January 1, 1998. Completion of review and Board determinations by March 31, 1998. .
_ »strategy: . - The “working files” i isa group of records hat was assembled at | CIA by Russ Holmes.. Although he was not asked formally by CIA to create this separate records group, he did so in order to facilitate". - his work and, perhaps, to satisfy his own curiosity. The group _ . contains many original records (copies of some of which are already in the collection) and it includes some records of which we = are aware of no other copies. It is the best-organized collection of |: assassination records held by CIA. Its value as a reference tool is greatest as a collection. Therefore, though the file contains many duplicates of records found in the JEK collection, the ARRB staff recommends that it be preserved as a single group. Duplicates and open-in-full documents should be treated in the same manner as they are in the rest of the JFK Collection. As with the microfilm from the Sequestered Collection, the ARRB staff has no objection to _ the records being identified on the folder level provided that all records in the folder are open-in-full. Ifthere arerecordsinwhich _ CIA is requesting redactions, those records must be identified _ individually. The remainder of open in full records may still be identified with one RIF as being the contents of the same folder. D. Additional Records - status: Research, requests, and negotiations continue to identify and. include additional CIA records for the JFK collection. Oswald Office of Security File. As a result of an ARRB staff request © for additional information and records, CIA located portionsofa previously undisclosed Office of Security file on Lee Harvey _ Oswald. This seven-volume file, of which six parts have been _ located, contains two volumes of press clippings, third agency material on Oswald, a copy of Oswald’s address book, and Marina Oswald's INS file. In the upcoming months CIA will begin to review and process these materials. « time line: Completion by July 31, 1998. - - strategy: Continue current efforts. . : Fi cL OP CRT REPOE SE AENEIIS SANT RES
13-00000 E. Referrals “\* L HISCA referrals (Numbered files, Security Classified Testimony, etc.) most of these records have been reviewed.. The database suggests that a percentage of them has slipped through the cracks. - target date: | | Complete Congressional tecords to be reviewed by March 31,1998, - strategy: | oe 7 | | | Continue to clarify the status of records. Review any remaining 2. Other referrals (EBL, Church Committee, LBJ Library, JRK Library, etc.) ~ Status and strategy: Records will be coordinated and reviewed on a case. by case basis. TG e:\...\cia\timetabl. wpd 4207 . oo te CLL be le
13-00000 SECRET 3 October 1997 NOTE FOR: Rich Warshaw Chief, ADD i SUBJECT: HRG Topics for “Watch List” Per your request, here are descriptions of our current, major declassification projects for use in your “Watch List. As these are first cuts, we may well revise them at some point. Following are the projects described: JFK Assassination CFOIR + EO) Bay of Pigs Office of DCI Records Guatemala Covert Action (1954) DI Soviet Analysis Soviet NIEs (brochure) Tf further information is needed, please contact Karen Galuska (x31816), or the action officer noted at the end of each project description. S John Pereira Chief /HRG Attachments cc: Lee Strickland, OIM FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS cL By /611637_/ CL REASON I. 5(c) DECL ON X1 DRV FR: LOC 3-82 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET FOIA 8 October 1997 JFK Records Review Project (U) The following is intended as a guide for those people whose work requires them to deal with requests for, and decisions concerning, Agency documents and materials that may already have been reviewed and released to the National Archives (in full or in part), pursuant to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Some of the records within the Agency's JFK collection are assassination specific, others are ancillary. They deal with individuals and events not directly linked with Oswald or the assassination;!but they are thought to have had a relationship to the assassination or investigation into the assassination. I. The Agency's JFK Collection. (U) The Agency's JFK records collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). There were eighty-one (81) Records Center-sized boxes in the original collection. Of these, the first seventeen (17) made up the Oswald 201 file. The next sixty- ‘four (64) are referred to as the “JFK files” or sequestered collection arid break down as follows: thirty-four (34) boxes of DO materials; nine (9) boxes of Office of Security files; fifteen (15) boxes of OLC materials; two (2) boxes each of OGC and IG materials; and one (1) box of DDS&T documents. HSCA originated material, including notes by HSCA staff members, are found throughout the collection. Box 64 contains seventy two (72) reels of microfilm. (U) The microfilm contains copies of complete files to which the HSCA had access during its investigation. In addition to the Oswald 201 file (12 reels), the microfilm includes: 201 files. on Cubans, Americans, and Soviets linked to Oswald, the JFK assassination or the various investigations (approximately 26 reels)and the Cuban Revolutionary Council and other exile group activities (approximately 13 reels); the personnel files of CIA staff employees (approximately 5 reels); and operational files on organizations, projects, and other subjects of interest to the HSCA investigation (approximately 16 reels). cL By:  (611637_/ CL REASON: 1.5 (c) DECL ON: X21 DRV FRM: LOC 3-82 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET (U) We continue to identify other collections of documents that properly belong within the JFK collection. These include: The Oswald Security File; Agency working files generated by JFK assassination investigations and requests; and CIA documents found by other agencies and Presidential Libraries and referred to CIA for review under the JFK Act. II. The Time Frame of JFK Assassination Records. (U) In general, the time frame of JFK records commences when Oswald arrived at the US air base (the U-2) at Atsugi, Japan, in December 1957 and continues through the end of the > Garrison investigation in 1968. Note, however, for information which is clearly related to the story of the JFK assassination or its investigations, there is no time frame limitation. Any document or request that deals with the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, or the various conspiracy theories should be referred to the HRG/JFK review project. III. Key Topics, Etc. (U) Certain individuals, organizations, places, _ projects, and subjects are central to the Oswald/JFK story ...and.the ensuing investigations, which causes a: number of ‘documents with no mention of Oswald or the assassination to ‘fall within the purview of the JFK Act. Clearly, it is not possible to list every category of document which may have - been reviewed and released under the JFK Assassination. Records Act. The following categories contain examples of information that are considered to be within the JFK review. * (U0) A. JFK Assassination Investigations: -- Warren Commission, 1963-64 -- James Garrison, New Orleans DA, 1966-68 -- Rockefeller Commission, * 1975; -- Church Committee (Senate) ,* 1975-76 -- House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79 ; * JFK Assassination, anti-Castro plots and CIA anti- Cuban operations only. B. Key subjects (S) -- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, JMWAVE Station, and CIA stations in those cities through which Oswald passed on his way to and from the Soviet Union, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies. SECRET
13-00000 SECRET (AIUO)-- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, etc.) if they involve JFK figures (see comment on Meagher's “index” below); most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant. (U) -- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures. -- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts); no limit on time frame. -- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames (see attached chronology). (AIUO) C. Key figures (the following individuals are considered JFK assassination-related, unless the context is clearly unrelated or outside the appropriate time period) -- AMMUG, Cuban defector; ~~ Maurice Bishop, alleged to exist (any reference) ; -- Silvia Duran, employee in Cuban Embassy, Mexico city; -- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee; -- Howard Hunt, CIA employee; -- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson, journalist; --- Valeriy Kostikov, KGB officer in Mexico city; .-- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt (all documents) -- Yuri Nosenko and the dispute over his bona fides; --. Michael and Ruth Paine, Dallas friends of Oswalds; -- David Phillips, CIA employee; ~- Richard Snyder, State Department Officer. -- Winston Scott, COS Mexico City For a more comprehensive list of subjects and individuals related to the JFK assassination, reviewers should consult Sylvia Meagher's Master Index to the JFK Assassination Investigations, The Scarecrow Press, 1980. (U) Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825) Attachment: Oswald Chronology - SECRET
13-00000 SECRET (U) Attachment: Oswald Chronology, “1956-1963 .--Joins Marines 10/26/56 --Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan 09/12/57 --Returns to US } ' 11/02/58 --Hardship discharge 09/11/59 --Departs New Orleans for Moscow 09/20/59 via LeHavre, London, Helsinki ~-Arrives Moscow 10/16/59 --Resides in Minsk 01/07/60 - 05/22/62 ~-Departs Moscow via train 06/02/62 -~-Departs Rotterdam via ship - 06/04/62 - -~-Arrives New York , 06/13/62 --+Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas” ' 06/14/62 - 04/63 -~-New Orleans 6, 04/63: ~ 09/63 --Mexico City 09/25/63 - 10/03/63. ~-Dallas 10/3/63 - 11/24/63 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET Executive Order 8 October 1997 JFK Records Review Project. (U) The following is intended as a guide for those people whose work requires them to review Agency documents and materials that may be subject to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records ‘Collection Act of 1992. Some of the records within the.Agency's JFK collection are assassination specific, others are ancillary. They deal with individuals and events not directly linked with Oswald or the assassination; but they are thought to have had a relationship to the assassination, or investigation into the assassination. I. The Agency's JFK Collection. (U) The Agency's JFK records collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). There were eighty-one (81) Records Center-sized ._ boxes in the original collection. Of these, the first seventeen (17) made up the Oswald 201 file. . The next sixty- four (64) are referred to as the “JFK files” or sequestered collection and break down as follows: thirty-four (34) boxes of DO materials; nine (9) boxes of Office of Security files; fifteen (15) boxes of OLC materials; two (2) boxes each of . OGC and IG materials; and-one (1) box of DDS&T documents. HSCA originated material, including notes by HSCA staff members, are found throughout the collection. Box 64 contains seventy two (72) reels of microfilm. (U) The microfilm contains copies of complete files to which the HSCA had access during its investigation. In addition to the Oswald 201 file (12 reels), the microfilm. includes: 201 files on Cubans, Americans, and Soviets linked to Oswald, the JFK assassination or the various investigations (approximately 26 reels)and the Cuban Revolutionary Council and other exile group activities (approximately 13 reels); the personnel files of CIA staff employees (approximately 5 reels); and operational files on organizations, projects, and other subjects of interest to the HSCA investigation (approximately 16 reels). CL BY: 611637 | CL REASON: ~-175 (c) DECL ON: X1 DRV FRM: LOC 3-82 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET (U) We continue to identify other collections of documents that properly belong within the JFK collection. These include: The Oswald Security File; Agency working files generated by JFK assassination investigations and requests; and CIA documents found by other agencies and Presidential Libraries and referred to CIA for review under the JFK Act. II. The Time Frame of JFK Assassination Records. (U) In general, the time frame of JFK records commences when Oswald arrived at the US air base (the U-2) at Atsugi, Japan, in December 1957 and continues through the end of the Garrison investigation in 1968. Note, however, for. information which is clearly related to the story of the JFK assassination or its investigations, there is no time frame limitation. Any document or request that deals with the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, or the various conspiracy theories should be referred to the HRG/JFK review project. Iil. Key Topics, Etc. (U) Certain individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects are central to the Oswald/JFK story .and the ensuing investigations, which causes a number of | documents with no mention of. Oswald or the assassination to. fall within the purview of the JFK Act. Clearly, it is not | possible to list every category of document which may have been reviewed and released under the JFK Assassination | ‘Records Act. The following categories contain examples of information that are considered to be within the JFK review. (U) A. JFK Assassination Investigations: -- Warren Commission, 1963-64 ~~ James Garrison, New Orleans DA, 1966- 68 -- Rockefeller Commission,* 1975; -- Church Committee (Senate),* 1975-76 -- House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79 * JFK Assassination, anti-Castro plots and CIA anti- Cuban operations only. B. Key subjects (S) -- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, JMWAVE Station, and CIA stations in those cities through which Oswald passed on his way to and from the Soviet Union, as they related to Oswald's activities or to - possible conspiracies. SECRET.
13-00000 SECRET {(AIUO)-- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, etc.) (U) if they involve JFK figures (see comment on Meagher's “index” below); most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant. Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures. Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts); no limit on time frame. Mafia, i1£ related to Gastro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames (see attached chronology) . (AIUO) C. Key figures (U) (the following individuals are considered JFK assassination-related, unless the context is clearly unrelated or outside the appropriate time period) AMMUG, Cuban defector; Maurice Bishop, alleged to exist (any reference) ; Silvia: Duran, employee in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City; Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee; Howard Hunt, CIA employee; Priscilla MacMillan Johnson, journalist; Valeriy Kostikov, KGB officer in Mexico city; Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt (all documents) Yuri Nosenko and the dispute over his. bona fides; Michael and Ruth Paine, Dallas. friends of Oswalds; David Phillips, CIA employee; Richard Snyder, State Department Officer. Winston Scott, COS Mexico City “For a more comprehensive list of subjects and individuals related to the JFK assassination, reviewers should consult Sylvia Meagher's Master Index to the JFK Assassination Investigations, The Scarecrow Press, 1980. Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825) Attachment: Oswald Chronology SECRET
13-00000 (U) Attachment: SECRET Oswald Chronology, 1956-1963 --Joins Marines -~-Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan ~-Returns to US ~-Hardship discharge --Departs New Orleans for Moscow via LeHavre, --Arrives Moscow London, ~-~Resides in Minsk --Departs Moscow via train ~-Departs Rotterdam via ship -~Arrives New York ~~Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas --New Orleans _~~Mexico City --Dallas F} Helsinki 10/26/56 09/12/57 11/02/58 09/11/59 09/20/59 10/16/59 01/07/60 - 05/22/62 SECRET 06/02/62 06/04/62 — 06/13/62 06/14/62 04/63 09/25/63 . 10/3/63 04/63 09/63 10/03/63 11/24/63
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL USE ONLY October 1997 Bay of Pigs Declassification Project Approximately 30,000 pages of records from DO, DI, DCI, DA, and DDS&T files, plus documents from outside CIA (mainly State, NSC, DOD). ' Scope: To “tell the story” of the paramilitary invasion at the Bay of Pigs, the HRG collection traces the genesis of the decision to conduct a covert action against Castro, describes the planning that went into the various phases of the covert action program, and lays out the post-invasion inquiries into the failure of the operation. Status: As of this date, approximately 1/3 of the collection has been reviewed and is ready for release. A selection of documents was provided to OGC in August 1997 in response to a special search for information pertaining to the crash landing of two Cuban exile pilots in Nicaragua. HRG expects to finish reviewing the remainder of the records in early 1998. All documents will be available for MORI processing following their release, although HRG does not have the staff to do the physical scanning and indexing. Key parts of the record collection include: e intelligence analysis of events in Cuba 1958-61 e records of meetings between CIA senior officials and counterparts in other agencies at which Cuban. developments and/or the covert action plans were discussed ¢ internal planning documents (virtually all from DO files) detailing propaganda ops, sabotage attempts, coordination with Cuban exile groups in Miami, and support for underground opposition in Cuba e cable traffic during the Bay of Pigs invasion ® training records of the Cuban-led 2506 Brigade that conducted the Bay of Pigs invasion e Agency records turned over to the Taylor Committee appointed by Pres. Kennedy to investigate the failed invasion ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL USE ONLY ® the internal IG report into the Bay of Pigs operation and the DDP response , e IG interviews with Agency employees involved in the covert action , e “official” histories prepared in CIA during the 1970s Action Officer: _} x81818) (secure) g:\hrg\hrgipcrd.doc ; i ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL USE ONLY October 1997 Declassification of DCL/DDCI files 1946-61 HRG selected pertinent job series from OPI 10 to review box- by-box, page-by-page. These boxes contain a variety of records, including: i ® appointment calendars and daily logs ®@ alpha files of DCI correspondence with parties outside CIA : i. : e® administrative traffic collected by the DCI/DDCI in their Capacities as heads of CIA ® records of Community meetings and boards, such as the Intelligence Advisory Board/Committee and USCIB ® Draft NSCIDs and DSCIDs ® DCI notes for NSC meetings 'e Reports prepared by various outside panels to study the CIA and/or the intelligence function in general x e DCI trip files and communications with overseas stations Status: Projected completion is 1 year. eh a Action Officer: x8.1818 /(secure) g:\hrg\hrgipcrd.doc ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL USE ONLY
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY October 1997 Guatemala 1954 Covert Action Declassification Project The main bulk of the collection is approximately 120,000 pages of hard copy materials spanning the period of 1951-1957. These comprise primarily Directorate of Operations records, but also including a small number of State Department documents as well as isolated equities of other components, both Agency internal and Department of Defense. There are also 22 archival (gray Hollinger) boxes with magnetic tape recordings, afew — maps, and some press clippings. Scope: To release to the public as much information as possible relating to the buildup of early 1950s-era policymaker attention to the“Guatemala problem;” the three main phases of the covert operation codeworded PBFORTUNE, PBSUCCESS, and PBHISTORY; and the immediate aftermath of these operations. Status: To date 1,400 pages have been released to National Archives, along with the 22 boxes.of tapes. The first release also included the collection’s most sensitive records . dealing with discussions of unimplemented plans to assassinate leftist officials of the Guatemalan government of President Arbenz. wer e Of the remaining unreleased records, some 18,000 pages of the most historically ' relevant material have been reviewed twice and await final review in HRG, and then by- the DO representative. When this task is completed and these records released to _ Archives, most of the “story” will have been told of US-Guatemalan relations in the 1952-54 era, at least as. concerns.CIA participation in the events. e With the decision to review the remaining 100,000 pages, mostly relating to the. administrative details of conducting the covert operation, the project will extend well into next calendar year. si Content of the Collection e Periodic intelligence assessments of the situation in Guatemala as it affected US interests . e Key strategic planning memoranda exploring options and recommendations for operations * Operational cables between Washington and the field stations, and communications among the field stations, including situation reports ® More detailed, less time-sensitive dispatches between the field stations and Washington ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY Instructions regarding propaganda themes for the black radio broadcasts of Operation SHERWOOD Contact reports and assessments of CIA assets in Guatemala and surrounding countries Post mortems and summarizing documents, debriefing reports, and other assessments | postdating the conclusion of operations :. State Department policy information statements and cables from the US ambassadors in the field Press clippings indicating regional reaction to 0 the events in Central America A large body (over 80 percent) of administrative documents concerming personnel matters, logistical support, iden cables, contact arrangements, etc. Action Officer (1817) ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 October 1997 Declassification of DI-Produced Finished Intelligence on the USSR The primary organizing feature of the collection is thematic: all DI-produced finished analysis on the Soviet Union. The collection exists in the form of hard copy . retained in the record-copy holdings at the Agency Archives and Records Center and, for the older period at least, is generally interspersed among records representing the full range of DI analysis on all other geographic topics and functional intelligence issues. e After 1981, the most relevant records tend to be concentrated in the holdings of the Office of Soviet Analysis and its successors. . To qualify as relevant to the Soviet DI project, a piece of finished analysis must have as its primary focus the Soviet target. This can be either stated or implied as, for example, in the monthly series entitled North Vietnamese Shipping Report since North Vietnam’s main trading partner for the period in question was the Soviet Union. We have also processed in their entirety pieces whose scope entails comment on “Sino-Soviet” themes. wees @ Intelligence Community-wide analysis of the USSR, NIEs and similar material, is outside the scope of the DI-Soviet project and is being done elsewhere in HRG. e An initial decision was made to focus generally on longer pieces with greater shelf lives and to avoid processing the daily “current” output. To date, however, there has been at least one departure from this approach in connection with a conference on 24 October 1997, for which we declassified a number of finished intelligence pieces that were published in dailies and weeklies during the period from 1946-1950. © vt Scope: To release to the public over the next few years as much DI finished intelligence on the Soviet Union as possible, beginning in 1946 with the creation of the CIG, and continuing chronologically to the most recent material. Most of the oldest material is releasable, including political, economic and military analysis. The duration of the project depends on issues as yet unresolved: e No final decision has yet been made with respect to a cutoff date for the project, and various options are currently under discussion. For the present, we are committed to review only records that are at least 25 years old. e If the cutoff date is set as late as the breakup of the USSR in 1991, there is some concem about giving away too much by declassifying the most recent analysis. One option is to move away from recently produced military/technical analysis based on the
13-00000 most sophisticated collection methods and to declassify the less sensitive political and economic analysis in the younger records instead. Status: An initial release of approximately 11,000 pages of finished intelligence has been through all stages of preparation, including internal review and external coordination with the Directorate of Intelligence, and is now ready to send to National Archives. In addition, some 75,000 pages of finished analysis has been selected and reviewed internally at least twice and is now awaiting final review or coordination with DI components or other agencies holding equities in the information. e The 11,000-page proposed first release contains material ranging in date from 1946 to 1972. Content of the Collection The collection includes both periodic and aperiodic finished intelligence and embraces most of the reporting genres which were produced in the Directorate of Intelligence. The list includes, but is not confined to: Research Reports (CIA/RR XX) Intelligence Reports (CIA/RR ER XX-XX) Intelligence Memoranda (IM-XX) Provisional Intelligence Reports (CLA/RR PR-XX) . Economic Intelligence Reports (CIA/RR ER XX-XX)  % ' Project Action Memoranda (Project No. XX.XXXX) Action Officer: \e1817)
NIE-43 NIE-95 SNIE 11-9-55 SNIE 11-11-55 SNIE 100-5-57 SNIE 100-6-58 NIE 11-7-60 NIE 11-61 NIE 11-1-62 NIE 11-10-63 NIE 11-10-63 M/H NIE 11-6-64 Unclassified 6 November 1997 Sanitized and Declassified Estimates Being Released to the National Archives * by HRG Strategic Importance of the Far East to the USSR Secret (13 November 1951) 13 pages RIF Probable Soviet Bloc;Courses of Action Through Mid-1955 - Top Secret . (25 September 1953) 12 pages RIF Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons under Diplomatic Immunity Top Secret 032514 (28 June 1955) 5 pages j Some Implications of a System of Armaments Inspection Secret (30 August 1955) 10 pages RIF Probable World Reaction to Certain Civil Defense Programs Secret (19 March 1957) 7 pages RIF Implications of Certain US Earth Satellite Programs Secret (29 July 1958) 12 pages RIF Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US TS 035913 (17 May 1960) 9 pages Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US TS 0036854 (6 April 1961) 24 pages The Soviet Space Program Secret (5 December 1962) 37 pages Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to . Chemical Warfare Secret (27 December 1963) 27 pages RIF Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare Secret (19 August 1965) 7 pages Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to BW Secret (26 August 1964) 11\pages RIF 1 1 Unclassified
13-00000 NIE 11-1-65 NIE 11-10-66 NIE 11-1-67 NIE 11-1-67 M/H NIE 4-68 NIE 11-11-69 NIE 11-1-69 NIE 11-1-69 M/H _ NIE 11-8-70_ NIE 11-8-70 NIE 11-1-71 NIE 11-8-71 Unclassified The Soviet Space Program — Secret (27 January 1965) 53 pages - Warning of Soviet Intention to Attack TS 0039208 (18 August 1966) 21 pages The Soviet Space Program TCS 6224-67 (2 March 1967) 41 pages The Soviet Space Program TS 0039284/1 (4 April 1968) 12 pages RIF The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US TS 190415 (13 June 1968) 11 pages Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities Secret (13 February 1969) 15 pages The Soviet Space Program ~ TCS 1049-69 (19 June 1969) 41 pages The Soviet Space Program — TCS 2916-70 (26 March 1970) 8 pages Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack (pages 19-108) TCS 190533 (24 November 1970) 94 pages [NOTE: Pages through 18 of this NIE were released in early 1995. For convenience we have included a copy of the earlier release with this package. The pages of the previous release are not _ included in the total page count for this 1997 release. ] Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack Annex I, Cost of poviet Force Models Secret TCS 2935-70/11 i (24 November 1970) 11 pages The Soviet Space Program TCS 2032-71 (1 July 1971) -60 pages Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack (pages 32-103) TS 190558 (21 October 1971) 74 pages [NOTE: Pages through Chapter II of the “Discussion” on page 32 of this NIE were released in early 1995. For convenience we have . included a copy of the earlier release with this package. The pages of the previous release-are not included in the total page count for this 1997 release.] — 2 Unclassified
13-00000 Unclassified Memorandum for Recipients of NIE 11-8-71, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental NIE 11/20-73 NIE 11-1-73 NIAM 11-9-74 TR 74-018 TIR 75-015 IIM 76-016 NIO IIM 76-0303 IIM 76-039] NIO IM 76-041 TIM 77-029 IIM 78-10018J NIE 11-1-80 NI 0M 8$1-10001D Attack, Cost of Illustrative Soviet Intercontinental Attack Force Models, TCS 889065-72 (9 March 1972) 19 pages The Soviet Approach to Force Reductions in Europe TS 833342 (11 January 1973) 25 pages — Soviet Space Programs Secret (20 December 1973) 26 pages Soviet Detente Policy, Secret (23 May 1974) 23 pages A Soviet Land-Mobile ICBM: Evidence of Development and Considerations ‘Affecting a Decision on Deployment TCS 889100-74 (October!1974) 40 pages Soviet Strategic Policies and Force Options Under the Vladivostok Understanding TCS 889068-75 (3 March 1975) 46 pages — The Soviet Statsionar Satellite Communications System: Implications for Intelsat Secret (April 1976) 38 pages Implications for US-Soviet Relations of Certain Soviet Activities TCS 8890999-76 (June 1976) 18 pages Trends in Soviet Military Programs TCS 889106 (October 1976) 69 pages Soviet Civil Defense Secret (November 1976) 110 pages Soviet Civil Defepse: Objectives, Pace, and Effectiveness Secret (December 1977) 153 pages --See also NI IIM 81-10001D-- Indications and Warning of Soviet Intentions to use Chemical Weapons during a NATO-Warsaw Pact War TCS 892764/78 (August 1978) 26 pages Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Space TCS 3166-80 (6 August 1980) 66 pages Soviet Civil Defense: Objectives, Pace, and Effectiveness M/H of 1IM77-029 Secret (July 1981) 73 pages ' 3 Unclassified
13-00000 NIC M 81-10009 SNIE 11/50/37-82 SNIE 11/50/37-82 SNIE 11/50/37-82 M/H NIE 11-16-83 -. NYE 11-1-83 NIE 11-1-83 NIE 11-1-83 . TIM-83 10005 IIM-83 10005 SNIE 11/17-2-84 NIE 11-1/7-84 NIE 11-1/7-84 Unclassified Evolving Soviet Strategy Toward LRTNF Negotiations Secret (September 1981) 10 pages Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Volume I—Key Judgments ' TCS 3060-82 (2 February 1982) 30 pages Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Volume 1]—Supporting Analysis TCS 3060-82/II (26 February 1982) 98 pages Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemical in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan Secret (1983) 39 pages The Soviet Approach to Arms Control and Implications for START and INF TS 833342 (8 March 1983) 30 pages Soviet Space Programs: Future Missions and Capabilities, Key Judgments Secret (19 July 1983) 15 pages Soviet Space Programs: Future Missions and Capabilities Volume —Key Judgments and Summary TS 833351 (19 July 1983) 29 pages Soviet Space Programs: Future Missions and Capabilities Volume I]—The Estimate TCS 5086-83 (19 July 1983) 98 pages Soviet Wartime Management: The Role of Civil Defense for Leadership Continuity, Volume I-Key Judgments Secret (December 1983) 18 pages Soviet Wartime Management: The Role of Civil Defense for Leadership Continuity, Volume II-Analysis TCS 3601-83 (December 1983) 171 pages Soviet Offensive Cheinical Warfare Threat to NATO SC 03938-84 (20 Novémber 1984) 24 pages Potential for the Transfer of Space Technology to the Soviet Union, Key Judgments Secret (26 November 1984) 10 pages Potential for the Transfer of Space Technology to the Soviet Union, Volume I—Key Judgments and Summary . SC 04127-84 (26 November 1984) 19 pages 4 Unclassified
13-00000 Unclassified NI IIA 84-10006 Soviet Approach to Nuclear Winter Secret (December 1984) 43 pages SNIE 11-16-85 — Soviet Strategic & Political Objectives in Arms Control in 1985 Key Judgments Secret (March 1985) 12 pages SNIE 11-16-85/L Soviet Strategic & Political Objectives in Arms Control in 1985 Secret (March 1985) 33 pages NIE 11-3/8-84/85 Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Mid-1990s, Key Judgments ; , SC 02190-85 (25 April 1985) 31 pages NIE 11-3/8-84/85 Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the . Mid-1990s, Volume —Suinmary TCS 4933-85 (25 April 1985) 77 pages NIE 11-1-85 The Soviet Space Program: Future Missions and Capabilities Key Judgments Secret (December 1985) 9 pages NIE 11-1-85 The Soviet Space Program: Future Missions and Capabilities Volume —Key Judgments and Executive Summary . TCS 5330-85/1 (December 1985) 22 pages Total Pages: 2,165 gAhrg\97nielst.doc 5 , Unclassified
13-00000 14 April 1998 “Seer Addendum to 3 October 1997 ADD Watch List: JFK Assassination Records Section 11. B. Key Subjects {items two and three]: ~- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, Bay of Pigs, Cuban exile organizations, etc.). { Although much anti-Cuban material may be considered ancillary or not related to the assassination (1963 documents are considered directly relevant), a significant amount of this material has already been reviewed and released under the JFK Act. For example: the Kennedy Administration’s Cuban National Security File(over 23,000 pages) was reviewed by a joint DO/HRP/ARRB/ STATE/DOD team at the Kennedy Presidential Library under the JFK Act; the 3% Volume ofthe History of the Bay of Pigs and the Bay of Pigs postmortem Taylor report and attachments have'designated as assassination records. ] “ -~ (No change in Castro assassination and Mafia guidance) =; ~~ ne