4 « J A w = 5 a + ™ 1 wn : wi fo} ~ ON t a 7 ~ Ps a lad ™ . a t3 Y = i 5 = oti D > 4 Ve 2 . = _ 19 so. rant Boo a te Ped is 2 a “te for > a 17 ~ . e183 n = 19 ~ Cc S 7290 21 bs oo a ma? 22 Docld: 32277215 iw a ‘ J thee t 1-67 Mr.Scelso. I do not think so. We requested the Office SIE Ry of Naval Intelligence for one, and I do not think they ever gave us one. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why they never gave it to you? 2M Mr. Scelso. No. | { i Mr. Goldsmith. In the middle of the page here, there | is a line that says C/S COMINT and then it gives a description. J | Mr. Scelso. That is the cable center. There is an } intelligence duty officer down in the cable center who, for | | | i | il | the senior officer: .who read the board, read the cable board, i | and do not have all of these references at hand, write a a | i 1 i phrase here to explain to senior people what this cryptic ' sentence means, and he made a mistake. Mr. Goldsmith. That is my next question. In attempts of { i} \ 4 { t Lee Harvey Oswald and wife to re-enter -- iH Mr. Scelso. He quickly looked at the reference and mis- I | Mr. Goldsmith. What was therreference here? Mexico " City 6534? Mr. Scelso. Yes. | | f (Pause) . . i | Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 193. Would you please read that, and identify it.for the record? } ; id : : { Mr. Scelso. This is a cable that I wrote and sent to i DEERE] —s-: 001848 age 68 ALSESSN RE: S COMPAAY
PCE MEETCEPe | 1-68 i Mexico on November 23rd. .Was. that the day after the assassina+ tion? 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Mr. Scelso. Asking them to send a staff officer to 2 5 | Headquarters carrying the photos of Oswald -- meaning the = 7 | oi = : photos of what they believed to be Oswald. | 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive those photos? : = : ‘Mr. Scelso. Yes, we did. We got. them some way. There : ; | was only one photo. It was a photo of the unknown man. I do : a not know whether it‘ came that way, or whether we got them i g i from the FBI. I think an FBI officer returned to seadquarters: é _ | carrying them. | © : 3 Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates, "Call Mr. Whitten, é52-6027% : al Mr. Scelso. That was my home phone. So if he came in | 2 | the middle of the night.to the airfield, I would go pick him | E “16 up and take him to headquarters. I think by that time, Mr. : . i ! Helms had appointed me and put me in charge of the whole i ser, S. “1 thing. This was when I requisitioned an electric typewriter, you see. A person in my grade could not operate a typewriter.. JON TIM STRERT, we) I am a good typist, so, by using my priorities, I got an IBM 2ST electric typewriter and I wrote most of these cables myself, Ly nin 4 ’ me hundreds of cables. Ro (es) Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look now at Number 194. Would re @ you please read that cable and identify it? Ww da ALQERSON whe wi Ae Y COMESSY - , Docld:32277215 Page 69
to de wt 2 - = 5 ™ { 5, WI Nw ~ GN ce = 7 ied ™N = a = OM es 3 cam) . + = iG 2 & ~~ 1 od 1 a ee = 14 Va = = 42 . a ‘= = — ts bee te = is gS e , = Vs = ni V7 =z 18 a = 19 ~ c S 29 ra Panera DQ RT os “ wwe 22 AR - oy “ 23 @ * <> a: “: ra Docld: 32277215 (Pause) Mr. Scelso. all of the tapes; to | Oswald. Mr. Goldsmith. | tion of the CI staff? it was supposed to do -- special investigations. not be handled by one of the area divisions. ve. | i | | | CIA counterintelligence investigations which were so sensitive Birch O'Neal was an officer of the CI staff | | | which was in charge of the Special Investigation Section and i he, too, was working on this case and asked Mexico to review | see if there was other information about | \ What. was the Special Investigation Sec- Mr. Scelso. The Special Investigation Section of the CI Staff was a section, for once with the title indicating what. That was or of such a general super-regional nature that they should And this, in particular, applied to investigations of CIA employees who were suspected for working for foreign intelligence organizations or where you had to work abroad. Of course, the Office of Security was mixed up with this, too. a Soviet defector comes out and says, i as in the case of Nosenko or Solzenitsyn, a high-level spy, j Wo For instance, 1 | 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelso. : | ‘Would it. be CI/SIG? | | It is up here someplace. | ‘ Mr. Goldsmith. They were together with us, Page 70 OM REPORTING COMFAMY this section would have had to have done all of the leg work. What would be the abbreviation for that? t to a certain: 001850
WR rete 5 — ~ ee See 3 he! | Jutaa @ 1-70 degree. For instance, this was the outfit that had access to Mr. Scelso.- On an American who had defected abroad? ~# | the letter intercepts and I think it was at the time of the | 3 | assassination that I was first briefed on the letter inter- i} t ! . \ ® 4 cepts, you know, which later became such a scandal, although 5 * | they did not tell me’they were intercepting the letters in ene | £ i | “a s | United States. _ a | & "| Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, would this 5 * outfit be responsible for opening.up the 201 file on a defec- | J 7 | tor? | 2 10 | Mr. Scelso. No. | g i . = oud Mr. Goldsmith. Why not? i Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. BULEDTBS , Cre) re . | ‘Me Scelso. IE do not know. They could have been assigned i | } it. Perhaps they were assigned that responsibility. I do not know that they followéd American defectors, or not. Wo REPORTERS ! oO a4; - Mx. Goldsmith. I am not saying they were, or that they 2 | | : 3 did not, but I am wondering, as a matter of routine, CI/SIG : i = a would --. | E 20 | Mr. Scelso. I do not know that. I did not have any | fee UE insight into their charter. I just happened to have enough | contact with them on a few cases where they questioned me about people that I knew, and so on, on differentcases, and then in this case. t ae a2 5 Mr, Goldsmith. Would there be anywhere at Headquarters | — SEGRET 001851 ALDERSON REPORTIN’ MARE Docld:32277215 Page 71
1-71 a charter, as you put it, written rules and regulations as nm were? se | | | | | to what the responsibilities of the CI/SIG section or branch | : Mr. Scelso. There should have been. There are such 2 7 operational plans, as they are called. I think they are ; z } : called that, which you write at the time that you put in your S 7 | budget that tells everything, and then usually each staff has | o 7 a charter. written and approved and:sso on -- sobemnized, and | : 7 then buried away and forgotten. - : 0 However, this came under Angleton and everything that : 7 Angleton did was so secret -- several times in my career I | ¢ 2 | Was appointed by Helms ox by Karamessinas to investigate or | © = 12 handle or look into investigations wkrere Angleton was running. | = i = 14 H This always caused bitter feelings, the most bitter feelings. | : | Mr. Goldsmith. For what purpose would they ask you to | z " look into Angleton's operations? : . 7 Mr. Scelso. Because Helms or Karamessinas suddenly found E 7 out about one of Angleton's operations and did not like the : ne | = 19 | looks of it. ! < ca | “Mx. Goldsmith. How would you go about looking into that | eet without Mr. Angleton's finding out about it? . - | Ooh i ez ; Mr. Scelso. He knew it.. They always told him. Afd | then they said, now, you go tell Angleton you are going to do ! this. I used to go in fingering my insurance policy, notify- ES a ie) ing my next of kin. This happened many times over the years. ORET 001852 i 3ANj RED od HRs oe aA Docld: 32277215 . Page 72 son bu GS COMP as
The first time I was a polygraph operator and then, later on, when I was in Headquarters, they put me, right out w : of the blue. Karamessinas, you see. Helms never forgot my | work as a polygraph operator from 1948 on for a few years. ' Hl i i Mr. Goldsmith. To summarize, before we proceed analyzing: Z > I was the first polygraph operator and I went. to Europe,» i 3 4 and T only ran the polygraph as a sideline. I was a case ! 5 7 | officer handling agents. And, of course, I had been a prisonex | 8 2 of war interrogator. And 1 was immediately given .all your | ; 7 really nutsy cases to go over, and I cracked one of them after | z 0 another. Helms never forgot this. | : 7 When various big cases came up, he used to assign me, | S 32 like the disappearance of the head of the West German Security| | 3 = 13 Service in 1954, Helms immediately gave me that. | z “| Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever asked to review the poly- | : is | graph results of the Nosenko polygraph tests? | 2 i | « 5 | Mr. Scelso. By that time I was out of the polygraph | 4 7 | business. The Office of Security nudged me out of it and : id took it over and thereafter tried to prevent me from running : 5 : 2a other polygraph cases. But when I retired, Mr. Helms | ¢ #9 | personally gave:.meva medal and he said he was giving it to ! come me principally for having successfully introduced the poly- : ga? 2 | graph into the agency. | | | a+ —_ cable here, which was originally by Birch o' Neal, which 4a was CI/SIG, which Q" Neal -- was he head?™ \ i } ey oy et | 001859 ALSERSON Sw etoae NG oo. MPARY Docld:32277215 Page 73
‘| Mr. Scelso. Yes, he was. i @ 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. CI/SIG was sort of a super -- | Mr..Scelso. Special investigations group. @ 4 : Mr. Goldsmith. Confined to sensitive counterintelligenc Es | operations? : 7 Mr. Scelso. Yes. g 7 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Mr. O'Neal would have a | sent out this particular cable? : . Mr. Scelso. He was probably writing this cable just - "9 before or after the meeting that Helms called and put me in = i E 7 charge of everything. : 2 | You see, Angleton immediately went into action to do all 1 i © = 13 of the. investigating and Helms called a meeting which Angleton j 2 I and a lot of others were present and told everybody that I : 7 was in charge and that everybody should report everything to z s | me and that no.one should have any conversations’ with anyone r + | about the Kennedy case without my being present, which was : 7 violated from the word go by Angleton, who dealt with the - | Boreas and the Warren Commission and John Foster Dulles him- é 20 | self. tt] Mr.. Goldsmith. Was there communication on a more or OSS . u less ex parte basis between the CIA and Dulles? < Mr. Scelso. Yes, between Angleton and Dulles. Mr. Goldsmith. How do you know that? Mr. Scelso. From Angleton. > ia 001854 (erpory : P don od 2S Bon | | . ALDEESON REPORTING COMPANY Docld:32277215 Page 74 e | | i { | i | ; | | 4 i : t
DoctlId: \ INA 7TH STRENT, So. REPORTERS BULLDTNG, UASHTHGTON, D.C, 20024 (202) S54u-23N5 ih to de LeTy ro 0) Oo We y a] 4 a Sars 32277215 Page 75 ~ mass f 4s erste ee, Mr. Goldsmith. He told you that? Mr. Scelso. Yes. On one or two. occasions I went to talk to him about the case, or he called me in. It was a very strange situation.. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way? Mr. Scelso. Well, Angleton ignored Helms' orders that no one was to discuss the case with anyone without my being present. He ignored that. I tried to get Helms to make him obey and Helms said,. you go tell hin. Mr. Goidsmith.. Why was not. Angleton reprimanded, or even dismissed, for failing to obey that order? contacts with J.. Edgar Hoover. He had his own direct ties to the Director at various times he was -- I believe he and his staff were intimately tied in with the House Subversive  AtFaaes. or whatever it is, Committee. And Angleton was a very formidable person to deal with. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what kind of information | Angleton gave to Dulles ex parte? ‘ 4 1 : Hl i 4 i i Mrs. Scelso. No. | | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know of any improper action by |Angleton? | . | Mr.Scelso. ‘No, except that he violated Helms' ALDERSON REPORTING COMPAAY Mr. Scelso. None of the senior officials at. the Agency were ever able to cope with him. He had enormously influential | } | | | | | ! ! { \ | | 1 | i | 001855
1-75 instructions. In view of the fact that he got away with it, w he probably figured it was condoned. | 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this first paragraph of the | | cable in CIA 194, it indicates: "It. is important that you | 5 7 review all envoy tapes and transcripts from 27 September." | : é 5 | My question, do you know why September 27th was picked | ~ 4 ; ~ 1 a 7 Mr. Scelso. That. date appears on one of the other | = . cables, does it not? | a i E tg Mr. Goldsmith. That date appears on the other trans- Fal ‘ 2 7 cripts. In other words that Oswald had been at the Cuban | i Embassy on the 27th of September and there were two phonecall Y ) 12 intercepts pertaining to Oswald? There is no traffic that | = 4 . z 1s ‘ indicates that Headquarters knew about the 27th of September ! PG i = 1s contact. - eo Mr. Scelso. I do not know. What is this cable? | ~ “ : “ 17 | 6453. Is that the original cable? | : Ia Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. -Mexico 6453 was the very first | = 19 one that I showed you. . | ¢ ° Mr.Scelso. Are we sure that nothing came in in the meant q time in any of those follow-up cables by Mexico City and he | i  ) cal 22 \ just: referred to the original cable and not to the follow up 23} cables? @ 24) Mr. Goldsmith. Really, you are in a position where you | i more or less have to take our word for it. We are relying SECRET 001856 i ALDSSSON REFSORTING COMPAAY Docld: 32277215 Page 76 t ’ t
1-76 upon what the Agency has given us. We have reviewed all the ~> | cable traffic and assembled it, and one of the reasons we | are asking you the question is we have not been able to find any intervening cables.referring to the contact by Oswald fo SS jon at STREMT, SoH. REPGRTEES RUTLDING, UASHITHCTON, DLC. 2002" (202) S54-2345 qn on September 27th, and that is why we wondered how. September j | 4 | 27th happened to be picked out. Is itepessible that there was telephonic communication? | 3 Mr.. Scelso. There could well be. | 5 : Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, you have no explanation? 19 ! Mr. Scelso. Or it could be the FBI set up information, | you see, that they got this from the FBI. The CI staff was | 4 +4 | in. very close touch with the FBI. Mr. Goldsmith. The third paragraph of this letter asks, 1, | this cable asks, whether the original tapes were available. { : | What was the response to that? | Mr. Scelso. I do not. remember. Well, the response was j fey sent in a lot of transcripts. I do not know whether == a they probably transcribed. them then. \ | 19 | Mr. Goldsmith. Were they able to locate the original | 39 | tapes? | | Mr. Scelso. I think so. | eS : | | r Ze? 21! Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what was done with those | \ 27 | tapes? : @ 22 | Mr. Scelso. No. 2 28 : Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever --* tos ya ; 0018 oy Sivael 288? Docld: 32277215 Page TT ALRESSON REZORTING CO: MBEANLY '
Mr. Scelso. I nevértheard them. Mr. Goldsmith. You never heard them? t i | | i 1 i \ i 1 } | _ | Mr. Scelso. No. | Mr. Goldsmith. On what basis do you say that the original Es *| tapes were found? . | : ‘| Mr. Scelso. I had the impression that after the assassina- 5 7 tion they did a lot of transcribing. I may be wrong. | i Mr. Goldsmith. When you say, "they did a lot of trans- | , | eribing," who are you referring to? | , : o “Mr. Scelso. Both the staff of the envoy and our Soviet ! : 1) | transcriber, our Russian transcriber. However, I am not at all | 3 2 | sure of that. I-was not looking for things like this at this : TF 2 He time. We were rushing ahead, being flooded with cables from | = oo 2 eau over the world. | : ss Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 208. Paragraph four : 1s | there, which indicates that the person who did the transcript, | =~ 4 : “i 7 [ane says, "Oswald is identical with the person in an earlier : 12 | paragraph who spoke broken Russian and called on 28 September." 2 4 | ‘That. indicates that. some sort of asvoice comparison was | 5 jade, | . . | a Mr. Scelso. Yes. Tapes were probablystill in existence, e cE? 2 ! Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 196. Woudd you please i | | 22 | read that? is (Pause) | 28 i. Mr. Scelso. Yes. 001858 Docld: 32277215 Page 7a
DoctId: 3 a | ° ! - | = Qe: ” ~ | “ : i i a p | wa ro) a | [nog a 7 | ~ | nw 203 e ~ = i ™ 1 i . ~ eo 7 < | : "| 3 li ~ a < = ia a i = 5 \ = 4 : \ = nN = 14 = tI = rf Zoo | & i a 4 ras ,200 a i) u = i zy. | iS: - ~ i - i s id 4 = | = 1g | Be ie H ¢ \ = « Ss 20 | 7 il - OSS i Sarees a i wae? 2 woN : i 234 | 24 | 1 ’ t ‘ 4 1 i i i ! , 32277215 Pa 4 \ { 1-78 Mr.. Goldsmith. It indicates "FBI says photos of man entering Soviet Embassy," et cetera, etcetera. | Was that the first time that you and Headquarters learned that the photograph. that had been taken in the Mexico City station of the man that they thought was Oswald in fact was not Oswald? Mr. -Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at. CIA number 197. Would you please read the first paragraph? (Pause) Actually, please read the first two paragraphs. (Pause) | Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. I have two questions for you. The first is here.thé station in Mexico City is reporting only the 9/28 contact and is not reporting the 9/27 contact. We still have an inconsistency here between what headquarters apparently knows and what the Mexico City station is sending up. Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mrs Goldsmith. Is there any way that you can explain that? Mr.. Scelso. It could have been -~- what were they speak- ing here, English or what? You see, it depends. Maybe one was being transcribed by one transcriber and the other by 4 another transcriber. One got finished first. foe tow ot ea SESSOCN REPORTING COMP ARLY ge 79 ALOES PASE 0018 1 t
1-79 Mr. Goldsmith. My impression is that the Spanish con- wv | ! | versations were only transcribed, they were not translated, | | | : ! and the Russian ones had to be translated. | ®@ 7 Mr. Scelso. Yes. | z 5 ) _Mr.GGoldsmith. In any event, this was well. down the | 1 i 2 6 line. This conversation was from September 28th. By then, - | 5 7 : everything would have been transcribed -- translated and/or | S 3 transcribed. | u 7 : Mr. Scelso. Not necessarily. They might just not have a z 10 gotten around to it. The backlog might have been greater. = in There was only | _ talk of an average backlog. | 4 = 12 | Mr. Goldsmith. Understood. The information that the | @ : 13 | Committee has received has been to the effect that the Spanish| z ‘4 transcription was received at the station within about three : = ; 13 days of the call, and the Russian translations came in about : = 1s a week within the receipt of the call, and this was November ! A 7 23rd, so we are talking about a period of between seven and : : 13 eight weeks after the receipt of the call. | e | Mr. Scelso. Yes. | S20 Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any way you can explain this | oe | discrepancy? @ ge? 32 Mr.=Scelso. Not everything they transcribed was sent ! a ; | 23 to Headquarters, of course. : @ 24 Mr. Goldsmith. rt. seems that. Headquarters already knew 2 25 " " about the 9/27 contact by virtue of the earlier cable. ALOER SON abel tet Beas Docld: 32277215 Page 60
DoctlId: D.C. 20024 (292) $5n-2345 WASTING TON , REPORTS BOTLDING, MW, s 300 7TH STRENT, oy oS ree) | acer es A 1-80 Mr. Scelso. It could have been through the FBI, parti- cularly since Birch O'Neal sent that other cable. Mr. Goldsmith. Why because of Birch O'Neal's -- | | ‘Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal was in the counter-intelligence staff which had direct liaison with the FBI. Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, I. am informed: by my researcher that the Spanish transcriptions were usually received by the station within one day of the receipt of the call, the Russian within two days. Mr. Scelso. if the conversation were transcribed. They were not all transcribed, you see? Only interesting conversations. It could be that they did not even transcribe this one. Mr. Goldsmith. This was a conversation involving an American. "ME. Scelso. That is true. Still, they may not have transcribed it. Mr. Goldsmith. A conversation involving an American would be interesting. Me. Scelso. Except. the people handling the tapes were Mexicans. They could have slipped up. Mr. Goldsmith. I am sure they were informed. Mr. Scelso. Yes. | { Mr. Goldsmith. If an American comes along, that is high, interest. or 001861 sede! ALDERSON Me roat NG COMPAR 32277215 Page 61
Doctld: 4 ; 4 3 w = g pa ) w 1 wr , w fo} =~ “Ss ' a SN 7 — ~ S a = ™ . a rn) , ~ met a ' = H G 1 = og = TY jt it — = el a = ~ = 2 - t= tS = a - ad L ca wo ae a * = 1A = 14 a = ! 3 ~ Cc = ae Pa) cae Es ars sme aa i= 7 “< as 4 ae <+ oa a: ~~ Mr. Scelso. That is true. They still may have delayed transcribing, or put it aside. Mr. Goldsmith. As I indicated before, the testimony we have already received is that everything had been transcribed } i ! \ j | | i 1 t | well before the assassination and had been reviewed well beford the assassination. Mr. Scelso. It could be they had just not sent it in. Mr. Golidsmith. Headquarters apparently knew about the 9/27 contact by Oswald by virtue of this earlier cable. Mr. .Scelso. Birch O'Néal's cable? Mr.©Goldsmith. Yes. Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal may have found that out after the assassination, you see. The FBI could well have sent up a summary cable based on the information they were getting hour by hour from us, and they may have come over, Or phoned over, because they have a gray line you know, and told the CI staff this. Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the second paragraph now, that suggests that one of the tapes had been erased, does it not? . | Mr + Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Does*that, in any way, aid your memory as to whether any tapes of Oswald's voice were obtained after the assassination? Mr.:Scelso. Sent -up from Mexico? 001862 ga me SeGind Sa aa cor 32277215 Page 82 ALDESSSON EFS 3G Comeasy { i i | | |
1-82 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Whether the Mexico City had we onhand any tapes of Oswald's voice? Mr. Scelso. I just do not recall whether they did or not. I am sure if they had had, we would have wanted to hear hem. Mr. Goldsmith. Your initial answer before was they did. Now you. are saying you do not know? Mr. Scelso. I am groping. I thought at the time that ree] they were transcribing some of these things down here. They 20024 (202) S54-23"5 ™N oa. tn ve B.C. oO | ' | 1 { 1 H | | H i 1 ! ' ! | | still had the original tapes after the assassination. In | other words. I do not recall their ever saying that they had erased all tapes with Oswald's voice. | Mr. Goldsmith. -In any event here, thus far, the only contacts by Oswald that have been reported by the Mexico City station to Headquarters are contact ‘of September 28th and 1 ! the contact of October lst. So, according to the cable traf- | 1 REPORTERS KUTLDING, UASUTHGTON, rat) Mia | | ! | | fic, anyway, Headquarters did not know about the 9/27. contacts, | t “ i | Mr. Scelso. Yes. 2 if : Sow Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at number 204, CIA o ! : a y = '? 1) number 204. © , ! S 204 (Pause) | | . : j vax a! This: cable. contains the transcripts from Oswald's r ox? i : 9/28 contact. and 10/1 contact. You might want. to skim through that. | | (Pause) Again, it would seem the Mexico City station is not SEpDr 001863 Docld:32277215 Page 83 ALDESSON REFORTING Boos Pany
Doctlda:: nN ir +e wt a GN a | wi oa 2 = 7 x 3! = i - 9 e \ tt WASUTHOTON, --e re) es REPORTERS BUTEDINS , ' j oO station, anyway, Mr. Scelso. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelso. Mr. Goldsmith. transcript. again. ip Sosebet Duran and Soviet Embassy, or consulate officials obtaining a visa. telling Headquarters, 1-83 for some reason, of the 9/27 contact. I do not mean to suggest that the reason is sinister or innocent, but according to cable traffic, the Mexico City is not telling you about it. Yes Let us look at CIA What was the nature of If you would like, Essentially, it was a ' number 211. that 9/27 contact? you can review the conversation between in respect to.Oswald's obtaining a visa and the problem of Reading through CIA number 211, can you identify that? Mr. Scelso... 15S = Mexico? Mr.“Goldsmith. Why. do you think that, a | bet 13 | = | GI = 1 t | og « S 29 | | -SE 21h Mr.. Scelso. pas 22 i a2 *~ | Mexico. i ** | got there -- no, || i i i 4 a i it i} i 32277215 Page 84 Oswald's contact to be important?. Correct. in paragraph I suppose this was the President. of 3, the person send- ing the cable considered the fact that*Litensor was aware of The fact that he was aware of it, and passing the information along would be important? You get into a psychological question. The iH it wasn't that. oN SECRET RE-SCRTING COMP ALY Chief of Station is called in to speak to the President of There had been a big fight when the new Ambassador It was a very peculiar situ- ation in Mexico whereby the Mexican President's primary contact 001864
nw DoctId: > w = 5 = 3 mM t am ’ w fo} a a . = = 7 — z . S 3 = ™ Pa 9 ra - 1A = id o S = 11 —_ 1 < = 14 te i Z = 33 var a 1 nd iw S = te iS = n i7 _ . S 13 “a = is ~ c Ss 20 71 esau OS h is ar ea 22 Ww ose 32277215 Page 85 - President of Mexico, whereupon the President of Mexico called 1-84 with the U.S. government was through our Chief of Station rather than through the Ambassadors. This caused no great problem with the then-Ambassador whose name I have forgotten. | Mr. Goldsmith. Thomas Mann? Mr. Scelso. Yes. He was a very fine guy and. recognized | the usefulness of this arrangement. The next Ambassador, | | Mr. Friedman, tried to cut Winn Scott out of contact with the | in Winn Scott: and said, I want you to send a cable to the White House telling them I am not. going to deal with this. jackass, | I want to deal only with you. | So, the result was, eventually, Winston Scott and : Ambassador Friedman went to the White House and talked to | President Johnson and straightened the whole thing out in | | | favor of Winston Scott. So Scott is just remarking that it is interesting that | the President of Mexico is aware of our telephone operation. Mr. Goldsmith. Heshould have been since it was a | : liaison operation? | | Mr. Scelso. Yes. But. you do not always know. whether: | he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed. | It is just significant that the person calls you in and says, | here is some intelligence about the Kennedy thing. , Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA 210. Would you please redd that? 001865 COMPANY
Doctld: 4 4 3 A 4 ww = 5 a 3 ~ ' re ws 4 ~ fot , “ 7 — “ o a a ™ . a o Y a - 1 2 a = ! = ad G orn = 7) te = & i = = ty - i - = 1S S = 7 is = “ 7 S 13 wn = 19 S Cc S 29 aa on OSS 2SF fev 72 if aN 34 3% 322377215 ss rad a e va = 1 2 a 4 ta io Sy Be DD (Pause) Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith... Would you identify this document? Mr. Scelso. This is a cover sheet for the cable from the Mexico station. Mr. Goldsmith. The cover sheet to the cable we just referred to? Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Winn Scott here indicates, due memo of my.meeting with Litensor. Mr. Scelso. It is addressed to.this person who is supposed to write a memo on it. Mr. ‘Goldsmith. Scott? That is Scott's signature. Mr.‘‘Scelso. Yes, he writes it back to himself and reminds himself to write a memo on.it. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever see the memo? Mr. Scelso. I do not think SO. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Scott about his meeting with Litensor? | Mr. Scelso. I do not recall having done so. Mr... Goldsmith... In any event, by this time, the Mexico City station still had not informed Headquarters of the 9-27 contact? Mr. Scelso. No. - Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA 213. Woulg OTR gee SECRET ALDESSON RESORTING COMPANY Page 86 ot
Doctld: tee) > wa = a} N t a wa § i ~ il ~ ! c 5 7 | ~ t . | ~ 2! co - 4 o ™“ tf gS F i Sc MK ed i = i = iti = iH n i = ‘| z i2 | = H = Ht = 1s 4 o. 7 it = i = aA ott - od 2 ia | = i in = 1g ~ i 1 Fog A i = av | i ewe at mal? 22 WD i (Pause) Mr. Scelso. This was all on the same day. Mr. Goldsmith. The cable traffic was pretty heavy on that. day, I would imagine. Mr. Scelso. Right. Mr. Goldsmith. This cable is the first time that the ; | Mexico City station informs Headquarters about Oswald's | 9/27 contacts. | | Mr. Scelso. Yes. | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that there is any connec- tion between the fact that this contact was recorded after ' | the Mexico City station became aware of the fact that Litensor | | t { | | | ! - knew about Oswald's contacts? Mr. Scelso. I would imagine that there were probably | many -- several Mexicans transcribing : reels transcribing things and some got finished before others. ! | Mr. Goldsmith. This was months ago. The conversations . have been transcribed and reviewed months earlier. : { i Mr. Scelso. What are the numbers of the various cables?! They were all going out in a series. They may have had | several analysts in the Mexico Station working on them. One | said you take this one and write a cable and the other said : you take that one and write a cable, and so on, and they went | | out and went into the COMM Center and the COMM Center sent them out in some order. Here. : . 001867 | 32277215, Page 87 — - ° oe ,
1-87 | Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware of any dissension within ; the Mexico City station concerning the amount of information that should be sent from Mexico City to Headquarters? on) Mr. Scelso. No, not then, or at any Later time. Mr. Goldsmith. Apparently you called him for some Pn § ‘ J& Wa 1 reason? Es 5 : Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA number 217, Winn s s | Scott, this document, has written something in the margin. : > | couta you possibly read that into the record? 7 Mr. Scelso. "I had a call from Washington, Jack Whitten : : at 620 hours on 23rd November. Scott. I told Jack Whitten : | at that at 1620 or 30 hours, our time, on 23rd November, : | that this would be enroute to him soon." E a Mr; Goldsmith. By "this," what is he referring to? Is rT 2 : 13 he referring to the cable? 7 z t4 Mr. Scelso. To the cable of the 27th? : as! Mr. Goldsmith. The cable -- : 7 mo Mr, Scelso. About the meeting, Oswald's meeting, on F 7 | the 27th. © o>.) mo, .! i z 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. The document, CIA number 217 nA i : 2 | indicates a telephone conversation between you and Scott. é = Do you remember the purpose of that™ conversation? . ae Mr. Scelso. No. > | @ at Mr. Scelso. Yes. I do not have any idea why. I may have been ordered to call him on any number. of things. 901868 Docld: 32277215 Page 6a