: /Aseaq yy wos Uayof ‘9. Hopuhy in. on. wpe A ae ’ This docure te cists of J . . “yy! . Hunber. a a rtewenseccouses: ’_spages. . : Cg | OL IM... AD... copies, Series... Le SECRET=SENSITIVE momo —sSCts=«éELES GLY February 23, 1965 ) . TO: Menbers of the 303 Committee ‘SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Support from Artime Group ' The Department of State strongly recommends that, in light of recent developments in the activities of the Artine | group, the 303 Committee adopt immediately the following course of action with reepect te that group: . a Artime will be notified without deley that, in con~ | formity with previous statementa made to him, US eupport for his. group will be terminated as of February 28, with phasing out of US assistance to be carried out as. quickly as possible, 2. Avrtime will be notified immediately, with respect -_ to his dealings with Curbela concerning the “internal operation", that (a) it 48 our firm estimate that under present circun- stances such an operation is impractical, unrealistic and almost certain to fail; (b) we cannot be certain that the participation by internal Cuban elements is not a provocation and a trap; and (c) in any case, we want it clearly understood that we cannot — and will not make any comritments in advance concerning US support for euch an operetion., 3. Through both diplomatic and Agency channels, the Nicaraguan, Costa Rican and Dominican Governments will be ine formed discreetly, but clearly, that (a) we are in no way sup- porting Artime; (b) he is on hie own; (c) any arrangements made with, or facilities provided to, Artime by the Governments con- ~ cerned are strictly between them and him; and (d) we would | understand end would have no objection if the Governments con- | ‘cerned were to refuse aesistance to him or withdraw present seaistance from hin. SECRET-SENSITIVE nites . Excluded oe a EYES ONLY downgr reding xg omatic: 1d:32423484 Page 200 deciassification SE
THE WHITE HOUSE bee TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY te WASHINGTON Z a March 2, 1965 fet MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY a ; G SUBJECT: Caribbean and Other Here are a few items which came up while you were away and which you may want to know about. | —_ 1. BG - Greenwood's New. Look - Attached at Tab lisa ‘cable from BG reporting on Greenwood's recent trip to BG. It is a pleasant thing to read in that it tells ' Y about Greenwood's growing disenchantment with Cheddi and growing admiration for Burnahm. Even divided by half, it sounds good. 2. BG Rice and our Covert Help - In order to help BG get rid of its rice export bottleneck which is causing serious difficulties for Burnham, we are in the midst of working out a deal whereby BG can sell some rice to Latin America. Itis going to cost us $200, 000 to break the bottleneck - i,e., to pay the difference between what BG has gotten from Cuba in the past and what Latin America is _ willing to pay now. Needless to say, this is all quite covert, _ 3, Cecil King - As of possible interest, attached at Tab 2 is a cable reporting V Del Carlson's conversation with Cecil King. King mentions a talk with Bill Tyler and you; he also makes a strong pitch in favor of a PPP/PNC coalition. 4, Secretary Rusk and Policy - The Secretary recently told John Crimmins / that he wants no new initiatives on Cuba policy for the time being. Apparently, he wants to keep tl the temperature low while we are sorting out our Vietnam problem. 5. Cuban Deals with Spain and Morocco - Cuba recently concluded long-term y sugar agreements with Spain and Morocco. The Spanish are willing to buy sugar at a higher price than the Russians are willing to pay (so they can sell ships), _and this especially bugs us. Some details on these two deals are at Tab 3. ’ 6, Covert Prog ram - You are likely to be faced with a full Cuba menu at your " y next Special Group meeting. . First, State will probably want to cut off Artime's” ' water and stay as far away as possible from any internal Cuban dissidents; CIA ry may feel differently. Second, there may be some discussion of whether or not TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Copy , “Lyndon 5B. ‘Johnson Library Docld: 324235484 Page 201
Docld: 32423484 Page 202 TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Mr. Bundy -2- March 2, 1965 it is desirable to maintain the CIA paramilitary capability which is presently on the shelf. CIA will probably say ''no" (fish or cut bait) and State will probably say "yes" (with world scene hotting up, it may be good to have this capability in reserve), Third, State, CIA, and DOD may ask permission to Yoffer some low-risk assistance to the new exile group, RECE (Oliva and Freyre). Iam against but thus far Iseem to be alone. My memo to John Crimmins on the subject is attached at Tab 4, f i 7. Communications Security Survey - The BOB study group has finished with yvthe Ranch and has completed about 2/3 of the Washington portion of its work. The balance should go fairly quickly in view of the fact that we recently blasted loose the information which the group needed on the telephone system at the ’ White House and EOB, The group will probably not examine the emergency locations. There is not much there that they can usefully do and it does not ’seem worth the time and effort to override Ted Clifton's objections; besides, _ this less urgent task can be done at some future date. ”’ The group is running behind schedule (report due on March 1). They asked for another month, and I gave it to them; I'm fairly confident they will meet the new deadline. OC Gordon Chase TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Re , | Copy: | - Lyndon B. Johnson. Library
Docld: 32423484 Page 203 TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY ‘HE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON March 4, 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba. 1, Artime Cut-off - As you 1 know, State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one for the usual reasons. DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluc- _ tant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off'and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. _ For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced. On this one, Iam inclined towards the DOD view. 2. Pesticides - The CIA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange to have diluted Cuban pesticides. State and DOD are both likely to oppose this one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange. Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of the many bases that would have to be touched. I don't like this one either. - 3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE, While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. One reason ~ some of the arguments which are spelled out in the TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Copy. Lyndon B. ‘Johnson ‘Library
DoctlId: 39493464 Page 2704 ( TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Mr. Bundy. = | -2- March 4, 1965 attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to com- promise its position on Artime (i.e., Lf you give aid to RECE, how can you stop aid to Artime?), State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault. We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have liked. I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that $17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off. 4, Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having. Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might _be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the job if it needs doing. “ While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con- traption. I am against it. 5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose CIA's proposal to dropits paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up againina very short space of time. oC Gordon Chase os . “Copy ; “Lyndon B. Johnson. Library: ee (oaes
aera aa WASHINGTON SECRET-SENSITIVE S/S .9698 June 18, 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR MR, McGEORGE BUNDY THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Summary Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba In response to your request, the attached _ summary statement concerning U.S. policy toward Cuba has been prepared by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, It has been approved by Assistant Secretary Vaughn and Deputy Under Secretary Thompson, . Grant G, Hilliker Acting Executive Secretary Attachment: . As stated, - SECRET-SENSITIVE © ‘Dockd:32423484 Page 205 DEPARTMENT OF STATE ‘oe / Lyndon B. Johnson Library
Docld:32423484 Page 206 SECRET-SENSLTIVE Summary Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba .» Present Policy and Courses of Action: Our ultimate objective has been to replace the Castro regime. The immediate objectives have been (a) to reduce the will and ability of the Soviet-supported _ regime to organize Latin America in a form inimical to our interests and (b) to prevent the use of Cuba as an offensive base. In practi- cal terms, we have been (a) trying to maintain pressure in order to exacerbate Cuban internal economic and political conditions; (b) try- ing to strengthen the Latin-American ability to withstand subversion; and (c) hoping for the breaks that might produce a major change which would serve both the immediate and ultimate objectives. Our principal pressures have been economic (the economic denial ef- fort) and paramilitary (externally mounted hit-and-run sabotage and '. harassment actions, either directly under Agency. control or through "autonomous" groups). Both kinds of pressures have been exerted only partially. The application of some economic denial measures has been inhibited, and the introduction of others ruled out, by the judgment that the risks of incurring political costs in our relations with allies outweighed the advantages to. our Cuban policy. Similarly, the paramilitary program involving ClA-controlled actions was set aside -even before it really started, and the program of the "autonomous" _ groups was abandoned after a reasonable trial, because of the decision -hat the damage to our broad interests, especially our relations with the USSR and the Vietnamese situation, would be disproportionate to benefits which we might obtain in terms of our Cuban policy. (In the case of the "autonomous" groups, moreover, there were, in practice, ‘very limited benefits.) The overflights issue has also been a major factor in the calculation. These judgments have been influenced by the belief that developments in Cuba and Latin America were moving, even though slowly, in the right direction. . With respect to Cuba, this belief seems no longer to be warranted. According to very recent estimates, the Cuban economy improved in -1964 and will probably continue to move upward in 1965, principally because of increased sugar production. The economy is probably now back at or close to the pre-Castro level. Our economic denial pro- gram, limited by broad political considerations, has had only partial effects, In 1964, when Cuba was flush with foreign exchange, we were unable to prevent its acquisition of Western goods up to the limits . of its exchange availabilities. In 1965, Cuban imports from the Free - World will almost certainly be sharply down as a result, not of the -denial program, but rather of exchange stringencies brought about by the very low world price of sugar. It is certainly true that we have vrevented sales of critical commodities, that. we have persuaded the a SECRET-SENSITIVE Lyndon B. Johnson Library
SECRET-SENSITIVE ~2- 1ajor Western powers to withhold further official credit facilities on the basis that Cuba was not credit-worthy and that we have ham- pered the development of the economy. But it has been a constant, scrambling struggle to do even this, and there are very recent re~ ports that the British and the French are considering granting large amounts ($50 million each) of credits, Moreover, we have always been faced with the possibility that the Soviets. will simply make additional foreign exchange available to Cuba. The large (6 million tons) sugar crop, the signs of economic revival in Cuba, the con- . tinued Soviet assistance, and the general lack of sympathy with our ‘economic denial efforts. indicate that the program, as constituted at’ present, will become more and more difficult to carry out and less and less effective, With the decrease in external economic pressures, the prospects for continued economic progress become brighter, even though the economy will probably continue to be far from healthy for the next one or two years. oo With respect to the internal political situation, the regime is sub- ject to some stresses, but its control is firm. Morale among anti- Castro elements is low because of the efficiency of the security apparatus and the apparent permanence of the regime. . Externally, frictions between Castro and the Soviets and. the Chinese exist and are potentially helpful. The community of interest is so great, however, as to override current difficulties, In the sub- version sector, Cuba, with Soviet acquiescence, if not encouragement, has been trying to step up the pace. At least in the short term, the Dominican crisis probably has improved the atmosphere in Latin — America for general Communist subversion, In spite of his uneasiness about our intervention in the Dominican Republic as an augury for himself, Castro almost certainly will try to capitalize on the situ- ation and to intensify subversive efforts. . We have three gross options: (a) to continue our present programs; (b) to increase pressures; or (¢) to adopt a "softer" line. a, A continuation of our present policy will probably mean that, barring some fortuitous development, we will progressively lose ground in terms of our objectives.‘ We will, however, incur rela- tively few risks with respect to other national objectives, b. On the assumption that we do not intend to resort to military action, we can increase pressure by either taking additional eco-_ nomic measures or returning to paramilitary activities. The ex- SECRET-SENSITIVE Docld:32423484 Page 207 | i Lyndon B. Johnson Li brary
( SECRET-SENSITIVE -3.- panded economic program could include (1) putting foreign firms crading with Cuba on a US proclaimed list, thus prohibiting business transactions in the United States (high political costs in our re- lations with our allies and limited effectiveness); (2) formally de- nying US Government contracts to foreign firms trading with Cuba (moderate political costs and potentially moderate effectiveness) ; . (3) vigorously applying the Cuban Assets Control Regulations in areas hitherto considered politically sensitive (moderate political costs and quite limited effectiveness); and (4) financially assisting Free- ' World sugar producers to compete with Cuba (small political costs, high financial costs and moderate effectiveness). In the paramilitary field, the Agency. could undertake a variety of actions involving sabo- tage and harassment designed to inflict economic and psychological damage and to create political tensions. These measures would be effective only if vigorously and continuously executed, They would involve serious political risks, particularly in our relations with the USSR. ec. The adoption of a "'softer!! line would entail a fundamental change in policy toward accommodation, Basically, it would involve the acceptance of a Communist state in Latin America, with a strong effort being made to curb its aggressive tendencies, probably in favor of a "Titoist" orientation, The chances are better than even that the choice of this option would be seriously damaging to our long-term interests, particularly in Latin America, kKeKE KKK KK KK There is a fourth, very broad choice: The cessation of Soviet sup- | port of Castro as part of a global settlement of outstanding ~ US-USSR issues, The analysis of this option is beyond the scope of this summary statement. . . " SECRET-SENSITIVE PEN oo GOP | DocTa: 32423484 Page 208 Lyndon °B. Johnson Library. — Ltn eee EER pe Se Ste meme
SECRET-SENSITIVE oe " 7) See 26, 1965: MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Covert Action Against Cuba T think you should know that Admiral Raborn has recom- mended reactivation of a paramilitary effort againet Cuba. This matter haa been considered in the 303 committee (the committee which monitors —_. all covert operations). Tommy Thompson, Cy Vance, and I are against _ _ the recommendation, but, along with Raborn, we have agreed to report __.. the matter to you in case you want to pursue it further. oe Be ‘The Rabom recommaniton cll for ha flowing eae i of operations: 7 . (1), Maritime raide by commande teams againat coastal targets. 7 . (2) Use of an underwater demolition team to blow up ohipe fs Cuban porte. oe (3) Night attacks on major Cuban merchant vesstie while | . in. Caban territevial waters. . . (4 iy ‘ponbing of colected targets Coke by corertsrevatt i: (3 . Daceptice eperations designed te give the tempression of oe inmminest invasion by U.S. forces. ay “qhe trouble most of us see in such cperations is that thetr international noise level outweighs their anti-Castre value. Especially — with the Dominican problem before us, most of us do not recommend - . eLeible violent actions against Cuba, I believe this is also the opinion of - Deas Rusk and Bob McNamara. Bat if yom deal differentiye we cas Dave Leave it alene for now : DocId: 32423484 Page 209°
MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRET -- SENSITIVE May 30, 1966 -- 1:00 p.m, MEMORANDUM BOR THE PRESIDENT ‘The noise level of Castro's charges of "threatened Yankee aggression" may go up as a result of two incidents which have occurred during the past 36 hours, 1. On Saturday night a CIA exfiltration mission ran into an ambush, The two Cuban agents being exfiltrated were captured. Two members of the exfiltration team, who went in to pick them up, were killed. The Havana radio is broadcasting stories on this incident. If past performance is any guide, the captured agents will spill the full story of their involvement, Castro can be expected to relate this incident to Guantanamo as further evidence of U.S, aggressive intentions. 2. From commint we learned of action by Cuban air and naval units against unidentified surface vessels off the northwestern coast of Cuba shortly after midnight this morning, The evidence is fragmentary. The Cubans appear to have intercepted a . launch, set it on fire, and picked up two of the persons aboard, CIA assures me that none of their units were involved. They speculate that the boat may have belonged to Cuban exile free-lancers, Nothing has come out publicly on this incident yet. r, Rostow f | SECRET -- SENSITIVE Copy” pocta:32423404 Page 210. - tyndon B.. Joh nson ‘Library ;
Jie to , . wee ty wile Liye . : 7 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY fe Ne WasHINeTon, D.C, 20508 . Thig 15 The aunt nestcd 7 by DCL A oun Moat, TUTE - PoJessu KAS - . 7 7 August 1967 | a Special Assistant for the President  -MEMORANDUM FOR: , , Mr, Walt W. Rostow Attached Memorandum Concerning Six Cubans on an Alleged CIA Mission aa” The attached memorandum is from Mr. Thomas H. - Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans. soe | : . , , — ; Ghin 1 : Ree, : rihis we < ree nie ee |b. east eri wenepenag 3 ee Lyndon B. Johuson Library Docld: 32423464 Page 2711
— fui 7 August 1967 “MEMORANDUM | | . SUBJECT: ‘Surfacing on 6 August 1967 of Six Cubans ; “on Alleged CIA Mission . 1. None. of the six individuals surfaced in Havana -on G August 1967 were on a mission for the CIA at the time of. their capture. The men were apparently captured whiio on _self-sponsored "family runs" or while on missions on aalf of indépendant axile groups (such as Alpha 66 ind the Second National Front of Esca&mbray). They were ‘obviously being surfaced at thig time for maximum propa~ / ganda exploitation before the delegates and journalists at the LASO Conference. , 2. Tho following are the names and pertinent preliminary data on the individuals who were surfaced; Ae ‘Francisco AVILA . . In March 1965 some. thought was given to using him on an exfiltration operation. However, he was never contacted nor used by CIA, °- ppopy -eirea 1946, Consolacion del Norte. | AVILA arrived in the U.S. by boat in 1962, resided in the Miami area, b. Pablo GARCIA - oo , a . oe - There is yo-zanrd of soyeaifiliation with a the Agency. He wag reported in April s- “planning a "family run" and was hoping to contact an alleged internal clandestine group to plot the assassination of Castro. DPOB: 24 May 1934, Las vitine Province. SECRET | ey the sina vn eer Fy a - Lyndon’ B. Johnson Library Docld: 324273484 Page 212
-2- ce Jose ROIG Rodriguez Subject, erroeously reported in the press as ROY, was trained as a radio operator and in clandestine tradecraft. He participated in two operations in September 1964 and July 1965 as a member of an infiltration team. a been . His termination was the result of a general cyutback.in Special Operations being -od ° : * conducted at the Miami Station. . DPOB: 28 January 1942, Havana. He was detained briefly by Cuban authorities in May 1962 on suspicion of plotting against the government. _ He arrived in the United States as a refugee on 21 August 1962. 7 . d. Alberto LAUCERICA Diaz There are no identifiable traces. Qe ‘Vincent GONZALEZ igoya Subject served from 5 June 1964 as an oiler ‘on the mother vessels used in maritime infiltration operations, In this capacity be participated in - BoMe pe eens six on the NV ROINA, which was sold in ; and ten on the MV EXPLORER, which is currently being sold. He was last used on an | - _ 4nfiltration operation on 21 March 1967. .He was — - terminated on 30 April 1967 because of the cutback - -{n Special Operations, It appears that he was . bring relatives out of Cuba. .. - DPOBY 19 July 1935, Cruces, Las Villas ‘Province,. GONZALEZ was a member of the 26 of July Movement in 1960 and later of the 30 November Move- ment until he left Cuba in August 1961. He reportedly was arrested twice for political reasons while in Cuba. In 1963 he made a "family run" back to Cuba hoping to get his family to leave. Hts wife and family were reportedly still in Cuba ag of May 1964. SECRET _ er opy az Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Docld: 32473484 - Page 213
£. Jose Ricardo RABEL{ Nunez ..As of 20 February 1969, Subject was used Rg a spotter and debriefer in the Miami area. [hn |. May 1964 he made an unsuccessful attempt to conduct an independent infiltration to bring out his family despite Miami Station warnings against such a mission, He was terminated on 9 July 1964, In September 1967 he made allother “iramily run” and was arrested shortly after his arrival.  -‘DPOB:. 7 April 1922, Havana. RABEL is the gon of a farmer and sugar planter. From 1938 to — 1940 he attended High School and Tulane University in New Orleans. In March 1941 he entered the U.5S.. _° Army and was honorably discharged at the end of ‘ World War II. After graduation from the Cuban . Military Academy he served as Cuban Liaison Officer with the U.S. Army Mission in Cuba in 1954 to | 1956, In April 1956 he was arrested for participation ia an attempted military coup against Batista. He was jailed for 35 days. He joined the Castro movement and after the Castro takeover became a captain in the National Institute of Agrarian — Reform. He defected to the United States in December 1962. co SURE Docid:32423484 Page 214 Lyndon: B. Johnson Library - ,
Docld: 32423484 Page 215 »iEMORANDUM (| i THE WHITE HOUSE Co / - WASHINGTON ; SECRET -_ YJ SENSITIVE Monday - December 18, 1967 ty ‘ i A NOTE FOR WALT ROSTOW SUBJECT: Cuba Last Friday I had a most interesting talk with CIA's new man on Cuba.. He is Dave Phillips -- one of their more sophisticated operators who performed so well in the DR following the 1965 revolt, Dave is revamping the Cuban operation. The apparatus mounted following the Bay of Pigs is obsolete. It was aimed at stimulating. Castro's overthrow from the outside with propaganda infiltrators, supplies, etc. For this purpose they had a large and not well- camouflaged establishment in Miami. The Miami operation is being phased out. The sizeable sea-borne infiltration-exfiltration capability | ‘is being dismantled and a small, more efficient one established for stand-by use. Radio Americas on the Swan Islands is being discon- tinued. - The new emphasis is on developing contacts within Castro's inner circle. We need to know more about who his main advisers are and what they are thinking, If there is to be a change in Cuba, it is more likely to come from defections in this group. If Castro were to start looking for accommodation, one of them would be the first to know and probably the channel for feelers. Dave agrees that Castro finds himself increasingly hemmed in. The loss of ''Che'' and the insurgency effort in Bolivia on the heels of the big LASO splash has beena serious blow, The outlook for the sugar crop this year is not good: only 5-5,5 million tons. Cuba is committed to deliver 5 million to the USSR alone. Relations with the Soviets are probably the testiest since the missile crisis, as reflected by Cuba's actions during the 50th anniversary ceremonies. All this makes it most important that we: ~~ develop our intelligence on what is going on inside the regime. - -- be alert to indications that Castro is looking for accommodation or his disillusioned lieutenants want to know where we stand if they move to dump him. Iam happy to see as politically sensitive an operator as. Dave Phillips on the Cuban job at this time. nn 6 00 e 8 le | WOBOW ayy’ “Lyndon B. Johnson Library
: page ; S| CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 12 June 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR: The President 1. On 7 June 1968, Guantanamo Naval Base reported that according to a clandestine source, a group of about thirty of- ficers and men from a nearby Cuban tank unit are planning to seize six or seven tanks, assault the communications facility and armory at the camp, and speed to the Guantanamo Naval Base seek- ing asylum. Along the way, they will fire against any resistance. The Base sent the informant back to the conspirators with the message that the United States does not endorse the plan, will not support it, and recommends that it not be attempted. Further, that if the operation is undertaken, the United States must have ‘more advance notice than the forty-eight hours cited, and that the group must stop their tanks outside the fence surrounding the Base. The Guantanamo Naval Base considers the exfiltration plan feasible if security is maintained until execution time, but estimates that there is only a fifty-fifty chance of this. 2. Germane to the Guantanamo report is a CIA dissemina- tion of June. According to several sources, Carlos Prio, former : Copy poocta:32423484 Page 216 . Lyndon B. Johnson ‘Library
President of Cuba, is sponsoring a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. This developed after two Cubans exfiltrated Cuba via Guantanamo on 16 April with a message from dissident Cuban mili- tary officers at the tank and artillery battalions near Guantanamo. They offered to eliminate Castro and proclaim Prio as President; Prio in return agreed to recognize the Cuban Armed Forces as the sole’ security force in Cuba. Two Cubans have now infiltrated Cuba from Miami to implement the assassination. At last report - 6 June - they were in Havana. (CIA has nothing whatever to do with these attempts and learns of them only through penetration of Cuban exile groups.) 3. Not related but relevant, CIA recently evoked a radio response from Manuel Pineiro, Chief of Cuban Intelligence, to a clandestine broadcast to him. The purpose was to provide him a private communications channel, should he be or become disaffected. The possibility that Fidel Castro approved of the contact should not be discounted. Discussions are being held with the Departnent of ‘State. on this development. ). _ Richard Helms Director , | | | Pte Copy Docld: 32423484 Page 217 ar , Lyndon B. Johnson Li brary.
MEMORANDUM / THE WHITE HOUSE te: WASHINGTON ; Thursday, June 20, 1968 SECRET-SENSITIVE a 6: 720 poem. ee _ LITERALLY EYES ONLY | bese _ -. MR, PRESIDENT: I discreetly checked with Nick Katzenbach about whether Senator Mansfield or ''anyone at State'' was doing anything to get closer to Castro at this time, Nick responded promptly and as follows: ~- he knows nothing about Senator Mansfield's activities in this field; -- he himself has taken only one step with respect to Castro: two. men came to our base at Guantanamo; told our people that “they planned to assassinate Castro; and they left to return to Cuba. CIA, Defense, and State agreed that, should an assassination or an assassination attempt take place, the U. S. skirts should be clean. Therefore, Nick empowered State to inform the Swiss that they might tell Cuban authorities that there had been recent reports coming to us of a Castro assassination attempt. Nick says that exhausts his policy connection with Cuban matters. co oO ty a8f Rostow SE CRET-SENSITIVE- LITERALLY EYES ONLY } “Copy “Lyndon ‘B. Johnson ‘Library. Docld: 32423484 Page 213. INFORMATION. ee en re a ne ee ow
RAT AY OG UUSHUYUE Bo MUpLi 4 kdog SECRET 25. ° There is no doubt that Castro's popularity and the morale of the civilian population have de- . clined somewhat this year and that there have been various, isolated acts of opposition and sabotage. But no evidence exists of an organized anti-Castro effort anywhe:s-e in Cuba. Moreover, there is no evi- dence of unusual activity or vigilance by Cuban mili- tary and security forces. Persistent rumors among refugees that Major Armando Acosta, Major Calixto Garcia, and others are leading antiregime groups in - ‘the Sierra Maestra have. proved to be the merest gossip. On 6 November, Garcia appeared at a public function in Havana and Acosta also seems to be in Castro's favor. There have been no indications, moreover, that regime officials who are certainly aware of the rumors spreading through the exile community are concerned about possible armed or organized opposition. 26. It is possible that a handful of disaf- fected Cubans have fled to remote areas of eastern . Cuba in an.attempt to escape the totalitarian con- trols of the regime. They may be escaped prisoners, army deserters, bandits, and brigands. It is also possible that a few exile infiltrators may have landed in Cuba. Such individuals, however, do not constitute a threat to the regime. Privately owned weapons have been very scarce in Cuba since the re- gime conducted several campaigns to confiscate them. “It is possible--as some refugee reports have al- leged--that individuals or small groups may have at- tempted attacks on small military outposts in the hinterlands. If that is true, or if army deserters were able to bring weapons and ammunition with then, there may be a few armed men in the hills. 27. %In any case, the military and security forces could easily isolate and quickly exterminate such individuals. The Interior Ministry's Mountain Troops, which were successful by early 1965 in eliminating a few counterrevolutionary bands from the hills of eastern and central Cuba, have apparently. increased their capabilities during recent years. They could call into use some of the approximately 100 air force helicopters to locate counterrevolu- tionaries. Thus, it is unlikely that an organized -12- SECRET