. . boeudete sh BINNEY GE y yf fu 4 ; roel Flea els Ska g 4 omatenatctineennceranatonetnanee, : Pav ee are i . gj . . . 4 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeling of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 4 October 1962 PRESENT: The Attorney General; Mr, Johnson; Mr, Gilpatric, General Taylor, General Lansdale; Mr. McCone and General Carter; Nr. Wilson , * . i ' — 1, The Attorney General Opened the meeting by Saying that higher authority is concerned about Progress on the MONGOOSE program and feels that more priority should be Biven to trying to mount sabotape Operations, The Attorney General Said that. he wondered Lf a new look is not required at this time in view of the meager results, especially in the Sabotage field. He urged that "massive activity" be mounted within the entire MONGOOSE framework, There was a good deal of discussion about this, and General Lansdale Said that another attempt will be made against the major target which has been the object of three unsuccessful missions, and that approximately six new ones are in the planning stage, Mr. Johnson said that “massive activity" would have to appear €o come froin within. He also said that he hopes soon to be able to present to the Group a plan for Biving Cuban exiles. more of a free hand, with the full realization that this would Rive more’ visibility to their activities, On this latter point, Mr. McCone said that he reserves judgment as to the feasibility. and desirabilicy of such a Program. (Mr. Johnson agreed that he has reservations as well.) : 4 2. Mr. MecCone then said that he gets the inpression that high | levels of the Bovernment want to get on with activity but stil] wish to retain a low noise level. le does not believe that this willbe possible. Any sabotage would be blamed on the United States, In this connection, he cited the enormous number of telephone calls that had- been directed at CIA at the time that the skin divers landed in Eastern Cuba and at the time Cuban exile students shot up the apartment house, He urged that responsible officials be prepared to accepe a higher noise level if they want to Bet on with Operations, In partial rebuttal, the Attorney General said that the reasons people were so concerned at the times Wientioned were: (a) the fact that the skin divers were Americans, and (b) that the student PROPERTY OF TRE WHITE HOUSE Gi Flee HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page 130
HY 50955 e activity was irresponsible and foolish, and if either of these had in fact been engineered by the U.S. it would have been a great mistake. He went on to say responsible people do wish to get on with operations but want to relate the possibility of attributability to the importance of the particular undertaking. He also questioned whether we are going down the right road or whether "more direct action" is not indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans be developed for accomplishing the overall objective. 3, Returning to Mr. Johnson's point about the necessity of Massive activity coming from within, Mr. McCone pointed out that internal security missions are now so rigid that internal uprisings are sure to be brutally suppressed. It was agreed that the current guidelines do not call for inciting such an uprising. 4, Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous efforts which are necessary to insure that an operation such as the sabotage one previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on the U.S. After considerable discussion, the Group agreed that it is not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to guarantee non- attributability and that short cuts will be acceptable. 5. Mr. Gilpatric reported that Defense is now working hard on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits will be trained for four or five months and will then be on call for any future action, 6, General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining various military contingency plans, based on a variety of possible situations. Such situations include: Soviet action against Lerlin; presence of Bloc offensive weapons in Cuba; attack against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere; and the establishment of a direct threat to the U.S. % 7. The Group then turned to the subject of reconnaissance of Cuba. (Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakle ey joined the Group for this part of the discussion.) It was pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using its high performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba, because of the SAM sites. It was questioned whether this is a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly when the SAils are almost certainly not operational. Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described for the Group | a spectrum of reconnaissance activities which could be undertaken, |. ranging from low-level Navy fighters through drones, up to the Agency! s | capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar countermeasures, PROPERTY oF , THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE Boclda: 324273626 Page i351
HY 50955 eet pa pitt ae wf 17 t ray asidhad The result of this discussion was that it was agreed that poD and C1A should gee cogether on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require coverage and, on recommendations as ro how to achieve this coverage. A meeting was sect For next Tuesday, at which time DOD and CIA should. be prepared to discuss all possibilities, including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc. a 8. There was some discussion of the desirability of mining Cuban waters, it was pointed out. that non-U,S.- attributable mines , which appear to be homemade, are available and could be laid by small craft operated by Cubans. — 9. Te was agreed that the Attorncy General should act as Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) at least for the time being. 10, (It was agreed that four major points emerged from today's discussion: il / a. We ought to g° all out for increased intelligence. \ b. There should pe considerably more sabotage: Ce Restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that training and other preparations can be subject to some short cuts. d. All efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime. Thomas A. Parrott cct General Lansdale Le buoyed ques wo Pa yoos> | CUO Ott oh eROPERTY Of | THE WTF HOUSE DFE | nomenon Docld: 327473626 — Page i132
HY 0955 te oC filter Ge 27 vd Operation MONGOOSE 26 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD ; , - SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 26 October 1962 PRESENT: Mr. McNamara, Nr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General Lansdale, General Johnson; the Attorney General, “My. Johnson, Mr. Martin; Mr. Bundy; Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey; Mr. Wilson. l. The wecting began with a discussion of the considerably- increased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch, of agent teams. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination; instructions were issued during the course of the meeting designed to recall the three teams already on the way. It was agreed that the first order of business with regard to these teams is to examine in detail the requirements toward which they could contribute. General Lansdale will arrange to get GIA: into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State Department for political intelligence requirements; (c) USIA for requirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually should be. 2. Mr. NcCone and Mr. Ilarvey said during the course of the discussion on apent teams, that the action taken had represented a unilateral decision by CYA and was not in response to specific military requirements. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere of responsibility, and particularly with respect to the firse three teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously- approved operations. Mr. McCone commented that internal security in Cuba is now [ar more stringent than L&E was two weeks ago, therepdy making agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore, tnat apent activity on this scale will only be justified if the responsible departments specifically require it for intelligence purposes, In this connection, General Taylor broupht out that the Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch bute had not been asked to review the operation in broader context. The Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated ay ot roy) ci “ rates f Mere ashe g, . . - , a praecely wth. THE WHEE Hubse Docld: 324293626 Page i135
HW 50955 Bocldad: 324273626 Page i134 i ” unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the - military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and | similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared cp tee ARS to do so if an invasion should be mounted. Mr. McCone agreed-that-" ) So Mae . ‘Uris possible: that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban operations -* ‘ Lk might..move under military control, but that such action is not 4 7f . _ indicated at this time. cote We ‘ rot of 3. Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dis-~- patches would not use up all existing assets. He said that “in the event of invasion, a sizeable number of Cubans could be trained quickly. 4. The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices if they are in support of an approved plan. . The Cubans do want, however, assurances that such activities are in fact approved at a high level. 3. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after any military action. He felt that there should be established with- in the government some sort of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which probably ‘should be placed within the Department of State. The activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale's operations but would be closely related to them. He pointed out that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head such an office. Mr. Bundy also said that he thought a subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee should be established to deal with MONGOOSE affairs. ' 6. Mr. McNamara thought that MONGOOSE in the short-term should be considered in the context of (a) providing support for action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a possible invasion. 7. Specific discussion took place on points raised in the paper distributed at the meeting, as follows: a. CLA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda facilities, although it was recognized that by the cCarget date of 1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other methods of delivery. ; . b. No major. acts of sabotage should be undertaken at this time. This decision will be reviewed in about a week. on, ae ane Tyee Uy ME : mee ith ML PROP: Me a 7" oe ey rie WHEE EO"
Cc. General Lansdale should develop further Plans to "help the Cubans Co help themselves," Mr, Morales-Carrion should _ be brought into this planning, “Hl d, Political Planning for the post-Castro period will | be assigned to the "Office for Free Cuban Affairs," ; : Ce Establishment of USTA's new 50 KW Cransmitter in ; the Florida Keys should be expedited, 8. -It was reiterated that General Lansdale is the focal point for all MONGOOSE activities, that he ls charged with their j Overall management and that he should be kept: informed of all Significant Plans and activities in connection with the project : lof Crd Thomas A‘ Parrote Distribution ‘The Attorney General Chairman, JCs DCL ¢ General Lansdale ~ Cu Betren geal telea - per HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page 135
HY 50955 ee! 1 “~ ) o - £. 2 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, 0.C. 31 October 1962 FOR THE RECORD By Brig. Gen. LansdaleSt_ Subject: Outline of Covert Operations Last night, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked me to give hima . brief outline, by this morning, of Operation Mongoose in the light of current US-USSR negotiations re Cuba. I was to cover present status of operations, resources, and sketch in future possibilities. I wrote the outline, based on current reports from the Mongoose operations team and my staff. Only two copies were typed. I showed the outline to Mr. Gilpatric this morning as he rode out to the airport, to catch his flight to New York. I noted the exceptional sensitivity of the information in the outline. He acknowl- edged its sensitivity, said the outline was precisely what he had in mind, and that I should hold the paper rather than his taking it. He then asked me to show it to Secretary McNamara and to the Attorney General. JI did so, today. 1 The outline was read by Mr. Frank Hand, Mr. Bruce Cheever, and by Lt-Col Patchell. I gave its general information toi General Johnson. Cheever said that the figures were the same he had given me, for CIA operations; he noted that CIA intelligence reporting was spotty now, due to lack of mail deliveries from Cuba! « © celle me ee ors aes i Ou a i, or a4 ony i organ PROPERTY OF De en eee ay Docld: 324273626 age HésW/HITE HOUSE OFFICE
HW 50955 Cee peleve £6 °S ye 7-85-76 Moose wed bad OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 31 October 1962 ~ FOR THE RECORD ae) tHE | we) By Brig. Gen. Lansdalé24_ a DP Subject: Outline of Covert Operations — My other memorandum on this same subject today describes the tasking by Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and the handling of this highly sensitive information. The acquisition of the information is noted in this present memorandum. After Deputy Secretary Gilpatric gave me the requirement last night, I talked to Bruce Cheever (who was acting for Bill Harvey while Harvey was out of town). I sketched in the purpose, which was to get a fix for Gilpatric as one of the U.S. negotiators with the Soviets on whether or not All actions (sabotage, etc.) had come to a stop. I mentioned that this was a sensitive point brought up by Adlai Stevenson when he talked with the U.S. negotiators in New York; he didn't want the U.S. embarrassed and Gilpatric wanted to be sure of this. Cheever commented that he hoped my memorandum wasn't going to be shown to Stevenson; I reassured him that I was writing itas an''eyes only" for Gilpatric, but it must be correct. I asked about covert operational asscts both inside Cuba and outside, if they had stop orders on actions. Bruce said that they all had such orders, but pointed out that some of the Cubans were quite emotional about stopping actions against Castro and he wasn't certain that everyone would hold to the orders. 1 then asked about assets inside Cuba, did they only have the two action teams there? How about any psychological operations ? Bruce said he believed there were only the two teams and would check further to be sure. He knew the teams were supposed to be collecting intelligence. As for psychological operations, all CIA assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use. I asked about the balloon operation. He said that this was not in being yet. =n weeey ~e pe i ee pe ee : Viet duet bat ge [ re Be Set stay 4g : yt - diasaaiibe ‘hf fo en oe aren on re .. nee Bo SG Remo Cui THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE Po! gece wees pene mavens! Docld:32423626 Page 137
es . This morning I talked to Bruce again, checking the points in my memorandum. He said that there were only the two action teams, -a small one (Central Cuba) and the big one (200-man in Western Cuba), but they definitely were on intelligence collection. I asked if all others were under control, no boats going out, etc, He said yes, but again pointed out that the Cubans were restive. I then asked if any independent groups were in motion. He said CIA couldn't guarantee any groups not under C1A control, but that the word had gotten around to stop actions at this time and none were known to CIA currently, although maybe there was one not known to CIA, I commented again that any action would embarrass the negotiations, which was why I was asking. Bruce said he understood, . : I then checked with: Don Wilson, USIA, who confirmed that all CIA psychological assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use and were being used as desired by the President, I checked with Bob Hurwitch, State, to see if he knew of any actions in preparation or on the way; he said no, everything appeared to be ata halt. I checked with General Johnson to see if any U.S. military activity might have a Cuban action group. He said no, there are firm orders holding such actions. I then wrote the "eyes only'' memorandum to show to Mr. Gilpatric, on "Outline of Covert Operations," sors eT ae ee “Teg Noe ste med, win ult J AW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 136 —
2) ‘) PN rere nee HY 0955 3 December 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Talk with General Lansdele 1. On Friday afternoon General Lansdale came to ‘see ne at his request. He had three matters to discuss: As Frank Hand, his performance, and whether or not it was desirable for lansdale to write a menorandum to the Director setting forth Hand's contribution to the Office of ‘the Secretary of Defense. JI asked Lansdale to write the memorandum by all means. B. General Lansdale told me that he was soing on © leave in Florida for a couple of weeks and wanted to be sure that it was not necessary that he meet General Walsh before departure. I told him that General Vialsh was still:involved in some indoctrination and trainin? -and that wé could arrange the introduction after General Iansdale's return from leave. CG. General Lansdale said that he thought Operation Nongoose saould be "wrapped up" and that is should be put out of business. He added that he had alreacy taken steps to relieve General Charles Jotmson of any duties in this regard and that he was simply awaiting an appro - priate time to come over to the Agency for the purpose of tidying up the details here. (I don't know what he meant by this and did not ask.) He pointed out, however, that although he thought he ought to disengage from Operation Mongoose, "they had not permitted him to disen- gage at this time". I asked what he meant by 'they", but he simply repeated his statement with a smile.- I could only assime from this that the Avtorney Generel or some- one of comparable rank had told Lansdale that he was not to disengage from Oneration Hongoose unless and until certain decisions were made. 2. General Lansdale during this conversation did not inform me of wnat I had recenbiy learned from the Pentapon, i.e. that he was due to retire in February, that he bad persuaded Nr. Gi Jpatric to weite a memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force arranging for SE 3 : : Ol soit x nS - ee ee Boclda:324273626 Page 139 au
> ~ 2 him to be recalled to active duty following the retirement. I rather that this would mean that he would be made a Major General at the time he is recalled. Distribution: Orig - DOr 1 cc - DDCI 1 cc ~ DD/P ) HW 350955 Docld:32423626 Page 140 Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans) er Aeed| We vive &
- t fo RITE Soh EE PRR AAT . ‘ LOp SECRET EYES ONLY | a vt bl yy MEMORANDUM Ie A sed x OR MR. BUNDy . Pretty Good, about the raids, the Players the Cxtent of the list Which i; “3s SCcret ir knowledge, idicate aries, s ary, George Ball, Averill Marriman, Ale Md Martin, Sterling Cottrett, John Crimmj Bill Bowdler ia deputy) knew SPCCificg about the Yaids, Che head Of the Mj is Cleared for this SOrt of info, Only in the Most &Cneral Way, xis Johnson, (Crimming! ami Office, IT are of our invol Suman, a Uvey vement aw Dick Phillips and Jim Gre told fo; the enfield in p ir own backg » in Preparat Tound that 1 ion for Press We were intere Weries, wo re Sted" jn the raids, i In INR, the liaison Men with CIA, Joe Scott and Al Carter, knew about the Taids, Presumably, Tom Hughes, George Denney (Tom's deputy) and John Plank also _ knew, 3 Defense ~~ Roswell Gilpatrie knew details about the raids and he told Secretary McNamara, : Presumably, Asa mem the raids: Cr Of the Cub-z ihe Prob e, Cy Vance knew details about ably told ne or both Of his two PCople who work on Cuba -. Joe. Califano and Lt, Col, Al Hlaip TOP sp Ps Ona _ 7 gq ~. an a wa ne. : A bon, wn WASHING TON “y Anti VR. September; 6, 1963 Loe “X1le Raids __ iD ~ “A . Verne 4 I refer to your interest in knowing the extent of knowledge within the Ment about the exile raids in which the U.S, i ‘Bive you a ers of al] pow » Ctc.) and which indicates ie ) Will take SOMe-time Co run down, Are You in- ( terested in such a list ?_ - - l, White louse —. The President, YOu, Tom Parrott, and [ knew SPeCificg . about the raids, 2. State -- The Secret
e~ LOP SECRET - EYES ONLY a fk, CIA -- On the operating side, obviously, a number of people knew about the raids, Also, a few intelligence people were given general information so that the events would not be over~played in the intelligence reports. For the same reason, a-few people in DIA had general inforrnation about the raids, Generally speaking, the intelligence people were told about the raids shortly before they occurred, , 5. Miscellancous -- The AG, Bromley, and other members of the Standing Group, not mentioned al nove, knew about the raids. Certain Navy ec elements in the operational area knew where the attack boats were going, but not the details of operation, A great many people knew there was something special about these raids, al- though they did not know the details. For example, the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS had to be told to leave the "comings and goings" of the operation alone Also, a very few people in DOD who had to procure special equipment, (e.g. cannons and mortars) for the group knew that some “hanky-panky" was poing on somewhere, linally, the intelligence watch officers on duty the night of the raids were told that we were aware of the raids; this prevented needless night- time phone calls. eN 5, CIA says that information about the raids is given to people who have a real ‘necd to know"; furthermore, , a person is given only as much detail as he needs to know. While Tom Parrott regards the above as a pretty tight control, I regard the apparent security of the two attacks as Slightly short of miraculous in view of the extent of knowledge around the government. However, I confess that I don't know enough about the total security sct-up to make a judgment as tow whether or not it could be made siynificantly tighter. CC Gordon Chase TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY te ty HW 50955 DBocld: 32423626 Page 142, —— —~ ~ a
_ SECRET/SENSITIVE my 8D ST 14.April 1967 | ; a “TO: The Director FROM: _John A. McCone . aye: 1. No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962 ' meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists. 2. Meetings of August 8 or 9 1962, in the ICs Operations Room (Penta gon) and August 10, 1962, in’ i: _were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase Il of opera - tion MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General ‘Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGeraid). At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room -- I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro . regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, _- =. stating that the subject was completely out-of bounds as far as the USG - '-. and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral ¢ or ethical grounds, 3. “Immediately after the meeting, 1 called on _ personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because operation MONCOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair <-- _ was under the operational control of 4, At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (augmented) 1 nor by any individual responsible for policy. 5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro,'! "remove Castro, ' "knock off Castro," etc., -and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and ' the replacing of it with a democratic regime. . Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government. John A. ~MeCone SECRET/SENSITIVE HY 50955 DBocld:32423676 Page 143
Dex A Muse | eee ee TL. Wea ut red 7 Ey hy q RT” Pareort 1 AES OU eres vem enna tan tmatie Teme simermene go roneimastat  et  ee Le er a HW 50955 Docld:324293626 Page 144 WA
- . ‘ ong ey on Crt! ees atin’ Re dans ane d ha tsb owenm oe a OEbtds bis ye ee 14 August 1962 e ae MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans) mu sussEct er Operation MONGOOSE “od. Action, None. This | memorandum is for your information. 2, “Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, ge concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. “« Attached is a copy of this.memorandum, excised from which are ...-: four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four | words: were "including liquidation. of leaders. " rare The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, oe "was brought up by — at the meeting of the a Special Group (Augmer _ It was the obvious cons: nted) 3 in, / jon 19 August. ensus at that meeting, in answer toa i cl a “comment by . . _.. |.» that this is not a subject which '. has been made a matter of official record, I took careful notes on ot) the comments at. this meeting on this point, and the Special Group “.'"" . (Augmented) is not expecting any: written comments ox study on — “this point. re ae Nw. Ww. 4, Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called : Lansdale! s office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand » ie the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document, Jadvised Frank Hand that, as far -” oas CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to “this and wotihizpa: st ~ strongly urged Hand to ‘recommend to Lansdale that he excise "- the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, in- _.-¢luding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly -@.e mmo open meeting discussing it. a thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so. 01449 Docld:32423626 Page 146
, Ss, For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in = view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the me a mo ymanie K. HARVEY = _ Chief, Task Force W o. Attachment ; . _ Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 s Aug 62 an et y . - . : 94120 . hay Tot ° { fa W/tass : 3 i : : ¥ ) Wout er) 8 7 - . . Gd 4g A ; _ . y . . . : Crh ay . ere rere ‘ a i el eee I) HY 50955 DBocld:327423676 Page 147
A (\° PROP SECRET-NOFORN | ARORA ESR ERO Sar . UVGQW EUR Gee OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE = a, ae WASHINGTON 25, D.C. —~ ca sees S - * 7 - “= ee a pet emen  ale eee me: ne oi > nH8 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CLA <—— RS “4% ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE | GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE.” _ DON WILSON, USIA | 0 yoy. From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale > on f 1 4/8 age . . rane See ee EO dye Fi an Subject:. Alternate Course B © ee BS jew ot ake \ ca : oo, a uo In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the var : ae 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce (+ +... am outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper So "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting Joo.) basis. Se re - eo) Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy “|”. gyfdance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only lois. ° .@ statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. N27 The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, oe Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military. - . ‘We will hold'an Operational Representatives work session in ~ “ my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts. . 4 ‘s Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting: € : : . aoe . A) , . SO ; .¥ a Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, RY bx. me . _), Economic (sabotage, limited u deception),..and.Paramilitary. . Also, any suggestions for inclusionr \ _’ In other sections of the paper. . ; . Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, ‘Political,. and i Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections ; of the paper. a a Woot doe Pm CALeL EXCLUDED FROM ‘AUTOMATIC Loans We an! . _ 4 | REGRADIUG; DOD DIR 5200.10 Sy y se eket ast - pee * “DOES KOT APPLY. ’ pee ’ . Vo” ST LTOR SECHET-NOFORN | _ Phts- document contains_-*__pages. HY 50955 DBocld:32423676 Page 143
HW 50955 senna at te ene gg EEC one) © prop secr™ “HoFoaN - am . SPECIAL Han DLING . a Gen. Harria: Feonomic (limited. decaption), Paramilitary “sflimited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion i in other sections of the paper. . Mr. Wilson: Psychological {including covert). Also,. any ; Suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. OU22 ieee TN em ee — Boclda: 3242936276 Page 149
° - . . ‘ 6 October 1961 f- - | MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 6 October 1961 PRESENT: General Taylor (items 1-5), Mc. Johnson, Mr. Dulles, General Lansdale. Mr. Gilpatric and Generaf Lemnitzer were present for items 1 and.2, Yoo, Air Resupply - North Vietnam ‘ ‘ vf Mr. Dulles reported that the plan to make the resupply drop ls oe into North Vietnem at dusk had proved to be unduly risky. Heasaid . _ that it is now proposed to fly the mission in the dark of the moon. The Group had no objection to this. f. - ce Ji. Cuba . . For the benefit of the State and Defense members, Mr. Parrott \ recounted the discussion that General Somoza had had with General Taylor, including the request for advice on the proposition whicn had been made to Somoza for the use of Nicaraguan airfieids in connection with sabotage raids over Cuba, It was noted that a pro- position had been made to CIA for support of these projected operations and that it had bean rejected. The Group agreed with General Taylor's advice to Somoza to avoid involvement at this time. tomy fecmenn cur - Mr. Parrott also told the Group that two other exe s progress in connection with Cuba ~ the preparation of a con >plan in [connection with the possible removal of jCastro. ir . Cuban scene and an updating of the overall plan for covert op. rections. | / O \ f rh qq. C2 oD Trend cae I rr] wr te ee 8 3 ’ vee) oF aad ae 4 Cue acme van PROPERTY of HE WHITE HOUSE aes, HW 350955 Docld:32423626 Page 150
a s en — saath tiedienad Wee Rg ee a one mn ‘ ve ©) . WASHINGTON P Y . October 5, 1961 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO, 100 TO: —_ The Secretary of State SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for Cuba In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba, McGeorge Bundy cc: The Secretary of Defense Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Richard Goodwin cc: Mrs. Lincoln Mr. Bundy's Files Mr. Bromley Smith Teo CepBe _ G-O-P-¥ ¥ faye ier areca hod ra Wiel HW 50955 DocId:324293626 Page i151
RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL 5 October 1961 _ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Cuba In accordance with General Taylor's instructions, I talked to Assistant Secretary Woodward yesterday about the requirement for the preparation of a contingency plan. He told me on the telephone he would be heaving for two weeks and, therefore, his Deputy, Wymberley Coerr, would have to take this project on. I then met with Mr. Coerr and outlined the requirement to him. I said that what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene. I said that my understanding was the terms of reference governing this plan should be quite broad; we agreed, for example, that the presence and positions of Raul and Che Guevara must be taken into account. We agreed that this was an exercise that should be under the direction of State with participation by Defense and CIA. I also pointed out to Mr. Coerr that Mr. Goodwin had been aware of this requirement. Mr. Coerr said he would get his people started on this right away. As to timing, I said that I did not understand that this was a crash program but that it should proceed with reasonable speed. He then set Monday as a target date for a first draft. I had mentioned to Mr. Woodward the President's interest in this matter, before General Taylor had told me he preferred this not be done. Therefore, I felt it necessary to tell Mr. Coerr, on the assumption that Mr. Woodward would have already told him. I asked that this aspect be kept completely out of the picture. He under- stood this fully and volunteered that it could be presented as an exercise emanating from his own office. I said I would leave this up to him but it was perfectly all right to attribute it to General Taylor. On the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned. I asked that this be re- lated to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and by higher authority in August. I did not tell Mr. Barnes of Presidential interest. However, during the time that I had been trying to reach him, he had seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about this requirement. Thomas A. Parrott RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 152
t ‘ ~e ee BOPATGRL VOR rl i PECORD Tn acenndance wieL Couoval Raylox! 3 dustructiors, LT talked to feslstunt Socretasy Vecduard yosterday about the requiresant fdr ¢ prapnnl Ki Of a cont tive ency plen. ila told ma oa the telerbons ha neha La tewing fer tvo ueels and, chevofove, bis Daypubyy, Uy lonley Coan, sont Phoava lak oka this pyoject on, Votben anak with far. Coorr and outidned the xogeblye ont to lide. { said that whet use wanted was a plan against the pened rooney hat Castro vwerld in cosa way or other ba evuved farce rhe Cuban seen. Cf oodd thet ny undereckouiddos wog tha te oar thig odour should ba La breads wed Sk LO bye ng poeccoca crab poalts mae quagy, tra dlaecce! Also pointed ous anant. * thin vale ‘corn edd ha would eer hia poonle sterted ea his aiche ho timing, Toendd chat Eodid not understend thet khis waa moto Det thee dt should wrececad elth ror pene.y as A terse date fee a fire Ciedouanttoned to tor, Coodverd cho Presidents alts manter, before Canaral Taylor had told io Le me te dong. Waorefoxe, I fol it useeuenny co tell My sgucetten that Pe. Ueadward vould brava alronty told @oihig naneckh ba hep coals ord eek of Tne phletuva, VMaounts cood theta fold 7 and volunbkeaned that 16 could be presented as ain Spee oA is eum offfea. Toendd T vould leave this rectdy ablloaulsht to fice lbuce dt to Ceoerarl C1 pha covert side, FT te fay teet en up-to-date reeort The pecs is cpeiye en and wiet ia belie planvad. Testbed that this ba a lated fo the bread plan that was arpreved by cha Cpectal Group acd by hither auchovity In Ancest. LDodid not tell It, Puy of Vyeeodd@cohtal foreracih, Fi wor, Guedipe Che thee thet fo hed bean ieydlug to peden hide, ‘he head casa be. Coocd: Acepeboeeteal Wydey eng ui 5 tha who lecl told btu aheat thag peqedvarncuk. eft. HW 50055 — Bocld:32473626 Page -153
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July 21, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group, July 20, 1961. PRESENT: General Taylor, Messrs, Johnson, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bundy (for items 1 and 2, and part of 3) Mr. Barnes was present for items 1] through 3. , #3, Cuba - Covert Program HY 50955. The DCI introduced discussion of this paper with the comment that the covert program must be keyed into over-all U.S. policy and that an aggressive set of clandestine actions should not be undertaken until it is clear what the general direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba is going to be. The Group agreed with this. Mr. Johnson expressed his under standing that essentially a stand-by attitude was in effect at the moment. In this connection, reference was made to the recent meeting of top-level authority with Dr. Miro Carcona, which evidentlv resulted in an understanding that. the Revolutionary Council would continue to be supported, for the present atleast. Under Objectives, the Group accepted Mr. Dulles' suggestion to reword paragraph 2a of the paper, to read as follows: "a, The basic objective is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S." Regarding the question of propaganda, Mr. Dulles said that he. thought CIA officials should sit down with USIA to coordinate plans to the. extent possible; General Taylor agreed that this would be useful. Mr. . Dulles cautioned, however, that USIA's appropriations for Latin America had been deeply cut and that, therefore, its capabilities were not very large. General Taylor then raised a basic question as to where responsibility for approval actually lies, in the case of several possibilities cited under the paramilitary section. After some discussion, it was agreed that any major operations in this field would be subject to jurther approval by the Special Group. Cm pROPERTY : ae yun eae meta rs € WiHite WO Cer ek LTLe Onl 1K ten tte og Docla: 32423626 Page 156.
nts we It was also agreed that sabotage operations, particularly, require a close™policy look. In this connection, the second sentence on page 8 of the paper was. changed to read: "Actual sabotage operations will be carried out only after policy approval by the Special Group." There was then a lengthy discussion on guerrillas, the Group finally agreeing that over-all U.S. policy must be more sharply defined on this point. It was the opinion of the Group, however, that supply of existing guerrilla elements, to the extent necessary to avoid dispersion, would be in the U.S. interest. This was interpreted to include such items as ammunition, food and clothing. Mr. Dulles undertook to take a sharp look at the recommendations and plans for guerrillas, with a view to discussing this subject at next week's meeting. The Special Group approved the budget as presented, with the following provisos: only 50% of each major item would be drawn down in the near future; the large itern’ for boats, under Paramilitary, would be eliminated for the time being, before the 50% figure was applied; expenditures for sabotage and guerrilla operations would be ceferre d, and both activities would be subject to next week's discussion. The DCT said that the Agency would come back to the Special Group with a progress report, across the board, in less than six months, at which time further “authorizations would be considered. It was the consensus that this whole program should be discussed with highest level authority. HY 50955 5. Dominican Republic - Political Action This proposal was agreed on, with certain clarifications. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Johnson made it clear that there was no desire to over- throw the Balaguer government at this time, and the former suggested that the recommendation should refer to action inthe Dominican Republic rather than against it. , oe Porn| Ok. vpetpc pe att * PPUPS MT oF THE WHITE HGUSD FEI Docld: 32423676 Page L570
It was felt that the Group should reexamine the project in not more than three months. In the meantime, State and CIA are to coordinate closely in its implementation. This matter was also scheduled for decision by higher-level authority. / HW 50955 Docld: 32423626 Page 158
22 November 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 22 November 1961 PRESENT: General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric., Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell vA Cuba : General Taylor reported on the results of several recent meetings with higher authority on possible changes in the U.S. covert approach to the Cuban problem. He said it appears that ali oe concerned have accepted the principle that the Special Group should ' serve as the main focus of policy guidance, and that any task force that might be established should not be so set up.as to take over actual command of component parts of any agencies or departments. General Taylor added that he believed it had been agreed that the task force concept should be subject to a trial period of perhaps two weeks; this is particularly pertinent in view of demands for General Lansdale's services in another part of the world, The Chairman concluded that the subject would be explored in further detail ac the Special Group meeting of next week, to which the Attorney General and General Lansdale will be invited. G ‘ V4. Covert Activities in Vietnam At the outset of the discussion of the paper which had been circulated on the subject of the Clandestine Action Service (CAS) it was agreed that the abbreviation should be changed to CLAS in order to avoid obvious confusion. ey In response to General Taylor's query, Mr. Bissell suggested that any reference in the paper to South Vietnam be struck out on the ground that activity in that part of the country should not be considered a primary mission of the CLAS or a reason for establishin it. The Group approved the paper, subject to this change It was ° noted, however, that occasions might arise when, by mutual agreement among all parties concerned, CLAS could assist in anti-Viet Cong. activities in the South. " ir. Bissell then gave a summary of other activities under way ; or planned by the CIA for Vietnam. Mr. Johnson said that he wanted ‘ ” poe PROPERTY OF wo THE WHITE HOUSE Qe ria ‘ HWW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 159
to discuss with the Secretary of State the proposed use of Chinese. Nationalists as trainers and pilots, under general CIA direction, as well as Diem's proposal for using them in connection with the Civil Guard. General Taylor then raised the subject of periodic reporting on all U.S. activities going on in Vietnam. After some discussion, it was agreed that CIA actions should be covered in an Agency annex to the Task Force reports. The Chairman urged that all reports emphasize the positive aspect rather than the negative, and Mr. Johnson suggested they should cover also what Diem is doing in response to our leadership. see ee ee gee /,, Congo wow weew en eye The proposal to support Adoula and his associates was approved. The Group noted that Adoula is not a particularly outstanding leader but that he appears to be the best there is at the moment in the Congo, It was also noted that five or six other individuals at the next lower level are relatively competent. The-Chairman said he would inform higher authority. Ja nes sees oe HW 50955 Docld: 32473626. Page 160 PROPERLY & THE WHITE BOUL
MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL &. G. LANSDALE, /\\c Chief of Operations, Cuba Project m4 Subject: Cuba Project 5 Reference: Menorandum from Your Office for BrigGen w. H. Craig, USA, subj: "Special rroject", dated 17 Jan 62 Ll. As requested in referenced menorandum, the position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors: a. National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during the meeting of 9 May 1961. b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in Cuba. ; C. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert, at least initially. d. Time favors the Castro government. ° 2. The basic military imolications of Castro's Communist government are as follows: a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly Serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat. b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will core under Communist control. Elinination.of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in: PROPERTY Ut THE WHITE HOUSE OFFIC: HW 50955 vebtl Peso eedateds Yea vp I (I A i " :
HY 50955 (1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere. (2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America. . (3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources i- of strategic materials necessary to our military capability. (4) An increased threat to US usage and control | of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage. 3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the. Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action witnin the capability of the Communists ‘ are considered: a. Tne Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba. b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads. ° 4, In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions oe Ba : RUPERT CBR? | PERTY OF O03 THE WHITE HOUSE ofrics 1ul 32427362 b Page
eo} Cc cS ESD Pry CD a! fF) ems] Oe) =<) Pry C2 aa 5 Soa | one | eae) ad aad ae nl i -) a, If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people. . b. If it is announced incident to-the overt military action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS nations. : ec. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Blioc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum, d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against ‘US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply. . J 5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases. oop Fk DD Ot ert PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE | 1 AE EQ AOR ’ Mt 18) HW 50955 vodril danse Ae ras oh j qu ae) =a = a) [= ao 4
HY 50955 16 March MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD Subject: with the President 4 1962 Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE, circulated and were used as The’ guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale atid the Special Group (Aupmented) were piven tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with guidelines, M.D... 22 Narch the 1962 This minute was vead to the Special Group (Auginented) today. The Group was unanimous in feeling that no autherization, , either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the Group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the Cuidelines. ° oni? VA Poe Ca. id o uy o Bocld: 324273626 Page 164 PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE Orcas
14 March 1962 i? Guidelines for Operation Mongoose 1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following assumptions: ae in undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous re- sources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S, military intervention. b. Such indigenous resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and there~ after to facilitate and support it. 5 Ze The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area, Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calcu- lated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other development “a 5 which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating the local leader and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere, and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengage- : os ‘ . : ment with minimun loses in assets and U.S, prestige. The JCS will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure uN ee Cy / of 10 Copies © OF inne PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE HH 50955 Docld:32493626 Page 165
a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention, At the and ,of this fiast period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the - program, 3. In order to get the covert: phase of this program in motion, it will be necessary at the outset Lo use U.S. personnel, bases and equipment for the support of operations inside the target area. ) However, the CIA will concurrently expedite the development of non- attributable resoyrcces in order to reduce or eliminate this dependence should it become necessary after the initial phase. & During this period, General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and heads Fi) agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks, Th of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal conmand channels to higher authority. General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning and, execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney Ceneral and the Chairman, JCS. The Special Group (5412 augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress. Note: Mr. Johnson has copy number 2. CIA (ielms/Harvey) has copy number 3. General: Lansdale has Copy nusben. Wh All other copies, except the ones filed herewith (1 and 5) have keen destroyed. od oan alae? - oo (nite aan OC AAR. PROPERTY oF TRE WHITE ober prcine HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page 166 :
HY 0955 Docld: 32423676 wos. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. April 5, 1962 Lye MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE There will be a meeting of the Mongoose group next Wednesday afternoon at 2 o'clock in the Secretary of State's Conference Room (the hour being subject to adjustment in case the Secretary of State has to go to the White House). You will be asked to give a progress report at the outset of the meeting, after which the group will go into executive session. The Special Group today decided to ask you to brief it bi-weekly on Mongoose and to furnish the members with weekly written reports in the style of the South Vietnam reports, that is, the participating departments and agencies would file with you separate reports and you would prepare for the principals a highlight summary along the lines of Secretary Harriman's reports on South Vietnam. Sometime before the weekend, I want to talk to you about Mr. McCone's "liberation plan". fro a PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OF Fick Page 167
13 April 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Operation Mongoose On April 13, General Taylor discussed with higher authority _ the Mongoose meetings of April 11 and 12, reporting the feeling of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that the Mongoose program should have no target date. Taylor pointed out the probable personnel problems which would arise if the schedule were completely indefinite. Taylor was informed that we would have to Live with the consequences of no date, doing the best we can to bolster motiva- tion. Taylor commented that we can probably carry out the first phase as planned, with a review of the situation about August 1, Higher authority favors a strong effort to recruit Cubans for the U. S. Army. He was told that a new look is being taken and that by lowering admission standards, we can do better than in the past, Maxwell D. Taylor No distribution . . s afk, ‘ PROPERTY Ut HY shoss Docld: 32423626 Page 168_ THe WHITE HOUSE UFFICE
HW 50955 7 May 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Report of Progress to Higher Authority I reported to higher authority the substance of Mr. Harvey's briefing of the Special Group (Augmented) on 3 May 1962, pointing out the very limited progress which has been made and the uncertainty of the ultimate -effectivness of our program. I mentioned the Duque incident as indicative of the morale problem. It was agreed that we would continue along the present lines until the terminal date of the present phase in August. TF ak! ‘ip xavier Docld:32423626 Page 169_
HY 50955 tere en a ms 5 wwii . ut i ree bad & thebhice loca y bee Me beg 3 August 1962 DOD TASK # 69 Ideas to beef-up course of action B, - DIPLOMATIC 1. Encourare Dom Rep to table its complaint on Cuban instigated subversion NOW --~ to the UN later, 2. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission limited documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics, 3 Third state pressures should be enoouraged — @.2., asylum, 4. State openly that Guantanamo will be used as a place of asylum for bonafide political refugees, ECONOMIC 1. Stop the tranist of Cuban sugar by anyone through the Panama Canal, 2. Publication of contraband list of items which we will stop - remove from ships - ff known to be going to Cuba (hard goods, war making potential). 3. Pressure the IND, IMF, and CATT to restrict vuban credits (©), loans, ete, Insist that US Allies demand cash payment for goods ~ no barter, 4. Preemptive buying and dumoing sugar on world markets, 5. Dump "soft" Cuban currency at discount prices, 6. Announce orohibitive tariffs on any items (tobacco primarily) of Cuban manufacture, ° 7. Announce fines and punishment for any importations of Cuban goods, 8. Introduce cheap marijuana into Cuba, PSYCHOLOGICAL 13 More small joint exercises in the Latin America — Caribbean -« southeastern US area with appropriate publicity, 2. Announce closure of Panama Calan to Cuban vesseks or vessels berthing in Guba, 3. Announce sea search of all vessels (actually selective and limited ‘to Sino-Soviet and Cuban vessels) to stop "illegal" arms importation into Western Hemisphere, 4. Shut-off civilian employees in Guantaname, >. Announce a misfire of a missile in Atlantic MiaBile Range "near" Cuban waters, 6. Increased naval patroling of the Windward Passage, 7. Step-up radio broadcasts = hit island from four sides simultaneously * . woe . ‘ NATE : &, Drop paru-dummies in selected areas. 9. Make hich altitude passes over and violations of Cuban air Spaces, LO,  Umepitit Den Pan chess ae Gubea intervention, Jl. Incre ose publicity on Cuban naredbice traco in UG, and ather countries, 12,0 Provide eren publicity on deteetion of Gibhane to Guentanasay art as harroasement of the workers, > PROPERTY OF a LAYS speee OF ETCH FRCHIDED FROM GDo pew eg. THE.WHITE HOUSE OFF yt emt YO gy Py et gem 7 a ee ee) Li a oo Bocld Oe oy 132742936276 Page 170
q : Teo i . Pees Ff a @adagy 2 en | BE We g BS Lh bye OP dep erg aeg yg PUr Ohba. ae tee We believe Castro can be overthrown only by the use of ‘ considerable external military Support. The objective of Operation Mongoose is the Overthrow of the Castro regime, If course of action B were pursued vigorously and the / ~Pesistance elements in Cuba were stirred to action without US military Support, then the assets presently in Cuba would probably be destroyed by Castro's effective means of repression, if, however, course B is followed with the intention of providing US military Support, when required, Simply not telling the Cubans, the following things could be done: (Cubans would do better tho, if they knew), Greatly increase VOA broadcasts to Cuba, | Supply more arms and equipment to Cuban guerrillas, Exert all possible influence on Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay to Severe diplomatic relations with Cuba. Exert all Possible influence on all friendly countries . to stop all trade with Cuba, . Increase program of information to Latin American countries on the evils of Castro's Communist regime and threat to themselves. | Take all possible Steps to assist other Latin American countries in economic progress, to increase contrast with Cuba, Drift sanitized floatimz mines into Havana harbor, Pay Cuban employees at Guantanamo Naval Base in pesos, foie Disseminate Maribu seeds in agricultural areas to choke out beneficial products. O80 ro “cgartinete testes Gnd hig heotess Of top man; Land more becistance-traineg Cubans. Encourage friendly nations to stop chartering ships BY Ay M4 + tee me cs aren os vo ae hOCD COouney bow LOD Cr aua Boh ad ete B® Intensify efforts to introduce damaging chemicals into petroleum Shipments to Cubs, - PROPLIIY | Elo. THe WHITE HOUSE UI a Oh Re ey Gy pe ey Th ry ’ fe REE 6 thas Pe me ay myne HW 50955 DBocld: 3242735626 Page ifi
ra CoQ my “ersati gn Wlth YOu, IT an, in favor Of a PLOP ran on MONGCOS RF Of Bx. Lodo NOC feaj Chet we know Yel what Peaction YOuld be Created 42 Cube Of an NClENSE Fieag PLORran There foxe, Loam in Lavoy £ Pushing ahead Pacher Chen Cakin, ny Step “ackward. “LOCOre]y bai ( IL 4 “yo NO , ROMA 3 E ry Keritedy iclated. oye, Che Celephone OY tha “clorney General Lom Che State of MeShingcon y ‘ 3 OR rea LOP SECR Rp 1d:32493626 Pag HW 50955 Docld:
F, Each day CASTRO gets stronger and his removal becomes costlier. G. While most-of the continent has broken with CASTRO, sooner or later ties with these countries will be re-established, H, Central America is "lost," I, Unless an action program is begun the CRC will disappear. 4. It was obvious during the meeting and in the statements \ Dr, MIRO made to the writer on the way back to his hotel that he is under great pressure by his colleagues in the Exile Community to launch a program of vigorous action against the Government of Cuba, . mn pe nema ers cas os ras “eae gb ea ae ppapessy OF OU GSG sup were rouse obit HY 50955 DBocld:32423676 Page ifs
ce a Hievey 4F \2 16 October 1962) — on, . . MEMORANDUM FOR TEE RECORD SUBJECT: MONGOOSE Meeting with the Attorney Gq@eral lL. At 2:30 this afternoon, the Attorney: Genéral convened in his office a meeting on Operation MONGOGSE consisting of General Lansdale — —_ and Colonel Patcbell, General Johnson of the Joint Staff, Robert Hurwitch of State (vice Ed Martin who was unable to attend), Hewson . Ryan of USTA, and the undersigned. - 2, The Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the Neeneral dissatisfaction of the President"! with Operation MONGOOSE. He pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been mo acts of sabotage, ; and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. he cei indicated that there hed been noticeable improvacait during tee yer in the collection of intelligence but that other actions hag failed to influence significantiy the course of events in Cuba. He spoxe of the weekly meetings of top officials on tnis problem and again noted the snall accomplishments despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNanara, General Taylor, NeGeorge Bundy, and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He aa traced the ristory of General Lansdale's personal appointment by the a President a year ago. The Attorney General then stated that in view roemee of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operetion MONGOOSE more personal attention. In order to do this, he witl hold a moot- ing every morning at 0920 with the MONGOGSE operational. respresenta- tives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwitch, Ryan, and General Johnson). 3. The Attarney General spore favorably of the sabotage paper whioh had been pregented by General Carter this morning to the mect- ing of the Special Group (Augmented). He obviously did not liko Uhs earlier memorandum, since he felt 4% showed no "push" in getting on with the acte of sabotaye. lh. When asked for my comments, I stated that we were prepared to get on with the new action propram and that we would axecute it aggressively. 1 pointed out, however, that the objective of Operation MONGOOSE would have to be detcrmined at some point since the Cubens HW 50955 Docld:32423626 ‘Page 174. _
»> a with whom We “have to work were seeking a reason for risking their lives in these operations. I retailed my conversation with the young Cuban from the DRE who pointed out that they were willing to commit thelr pecple only on operations which they regarded as sensible. JI defined "sensible" in Cuban terminolovy these daye ag meaning an action which would contribute to the liberation of their comitry, another way of saying that the United States, perhaps in oe conjunction with other Latin countries, would beil them cut mili- . tarily. My point was specifically echoed by Hewson Ryan. The At- _torney General's rejoindor was a plea for new ideas of things that could be done ageinst Cuba. In passing, he made reference te the change in atmosphere in the United States Government during the last twenty-four hours, and asked some questions about the percentage of Gubans whom we thought would tient for the regime if the country were invaded, 5. The meeting concluded with the reaffirmation by the Attorney General of his desire to hold a meetiny each @y, beginning tomorrow. He said that these meetines might later be chanied to ovary othor day wher. and if be finds a daily gat-together is not necessary. The noetings are to last ro more than one-half hour. | , Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans) Distribution: J Original - Mr. Elder for the DCI and DDCI les - Chief, Trw a lce - DD/P ; ; . HW 50955 “DocTd:32493626 Page 175_
_ oF oO tor me —- + Pare met eee no Pa . 1, When the President, in his letter to Khrushchev of 27 Octobar, ‘Ss NX gave ‘assurances against invasion af Cuba! in consideration of tha’ 3 3 Soviet removal of offensive weapons in Cuba under UN supervision, \ : Overation Mongoosa was on its death bed. When tha President stated 2 in his letter of 28 October' to Khrushcrev, "I consider my letter to a ‘ you of 27. October and your reply of today as a firm underta! King on N the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried y out! Operation Mongoose died. aN a ' Le , Lot ona Hea Uh ~~ Wwune f 2. If these agreements ars carried out it seems clear that | Guba will be dealt with as lanother denied area in a manner differing | ‘not greatly from that in whico ClAnhandles other denied areas, Lf the agreements are not carried out, mili tary action cannot long be delayed. in either event the Mongoose structure as ithas new existed in Government j is througa. 3. Looking back to tha origins of Mongoose one finds the ~ Attorney General and Mr.'McNamara seeking primarily to remove the political stain left on the President by the Bay of Pigs failure Both the A.G. and the Secretary of Defense felt it necessary for eA \ political reasons that some action S#u%s be taken with respect to : % ~ Guba to insure the President's future. In a nutshell, they were out a ~~ to.dump Castro or to make him cooperate. 4 NN aN 4. During the past year, while one of the options of the project ~~ & n was to crsate internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual QS : /) CaIeey HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Baye 17620 df ree FL. BLA OL pee U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intsrvention aspect but were generally avpre- hensive of sabotage proposals. The only senior official involved outside the Agency, who thought in terms of military action was Maxwell Tayler. Others lixs tha Attorney General, McNamara, Gilpatric, Johnson and later Bundy viewed the project in a strictly political light. Hindsight must now reveal to others, as well as it, has tous, thata Chief of Operations (i.e. Lansdale) was never actually needed. uy tL - 7S . 5. At present no senior U.S. Government official around town is interested in a future "Cuban Affairs Special Group." Sundy has already suggested tha creation in State of an ''Office of Cuban Exile Affairs" or "Free Cuban Aifaizs" which in itself is a mova outside of the Mongoose structure. All clandestine activities on tha part of t . fog bf | ttt i woot vate
FE ert a8 ae Gee Ve ne nee an ems mee ate oe WH 50955 Doclat 32493626 Page-T77 - “/ Corporates one. We should not go through bankruptcy which would '- have to be announced, but rather pass TRW through an unpubdlicized “Cuban Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve CIA of one of the most annoying and insoluble problems we have faced, This would , 4 ‘Placa problems of proposed Cuban Govarnment structures, provisional ; TEW continus ata stand down. Significant Steps have béen taken by the Agency together with the military for contingency Planning. USIA has moved into the propaganda fiaid under State guidance without relation to the Mongoose structure. Mongoose can only live again through "resurrection," 6. Given these circumstances and in the light of great Pressures elsewhere in the world CLA, internally, should move With great rapidity to distance Task Forca W from any external access, This would involve regularizing or institutionalizing TYW in order that this unique group which has been available to Lansdale asa ‘whipping boy" becomas a normal part of our monolithic Agency Structure. By such a move, neither Lansdale nor anyone else could get at these ae resources without going through regular channels. Within CiA we | er 7 would return Cuba to the Western Hemisphere and treat Cubaasa | oo denied area and relate it to over-all WH problems, (Throughout - Project Mongoose, this ia Precisely the manner in which State has handled thse problem. As a result Lansdale never felt that he had *. troops in State as he did in CLA.) 7. In accomplishing this, the only analogy I can think of is a -recelvsrship and reorganization. The need to realign m2ncowstr and "assets for demands in other areas would be sufficient Fe230n in itself, ' Zhe current stand down is a perfect setting for such a change in : '. Btructurs, governments, platforms, lexile politics,aad the like right where they _balong -~in the Department of State, .- -~ an id oo . j . 9. Absolutely no attempt on our part should be made to unseat Lansdale. Remember that the Attorney General waa fighting Lansdala's battle as tecently as two weeks ago. Secondly, McNamara and Gilpatric still look upon Lansdale as Something of a mystic and are
ote lye. on the defensive by virture of his relationship with the Attorney ts General, Practically everyone at the operating level agrees that vem Lansdals has lost his value. Bundy and Taylor ara not impressed ; with him. Bill Quinn and company obviously have his number as do we. With a political solution to the Guban problem in hand veflecting Great credit on the part of tha President, the A.G. will drop Lansdale like a hot brick. ; Therefors, while awaiting the outcome of the Cuban a talks, we must at onca deny Lansdale direct access to Pow. a Lansdala can have acce33 ag to all other CIA componenta through _ the DCI during tha Stand down period. 10. Lansdale's reaction to any reassignment is ant to be a Violent one. He undoubtedly realizes that he Never again will be in the position of a Special advisor to the two most powerful men in the country. Therefore, if we don't close ranks within CLA and put | TEW beyond his reach witnout delay (except througa the DCI) he might be abla to inflict serious damage tao CLA'g Standing befors his eventual demise. | ll. To summarize, the following action ia required: “a. Internally, institutionalize TFY. Grafp it into WH, . (Defense will then look to DLA for intelligence and DIA to us.) db. Push (through the DUl and Bundy) for the immediate establUsament of the Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in the Department of Stata. re . en wm cae ge wre nemy ~ a-aoy rein nee’ alg Z Ol4dd2 . boy re 8 : Pw ie Cae ie : i en! - ~ wie «2.08 ewe aiid ku od coe oe - - | Ta est. ow nay . :? WW 50955 | DocId: 32423626 _ Page 178.
HY 50955 @ 13. March 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962 PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey 1. - The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some or this language. , In explaining the additional actions which would be contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific proposals for approval tothe Special Group, which involve policy considerations. 2. General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Insti- tutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed, The sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved. The sections headed Phase Il were deferred. 3. The paper from General Lansdale to.the Special Group dated 12 March 1962, entitled '!Policy Question Operation Mongoose," was then considered and the following decisions made: a. Use of U.S. Military Installations, CIA was asked to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites “for the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the feasibility of using facilities at Isolation, : b. Arming of Cuban Guerrillas: The proposal to authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas” under the circumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval by the |Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be made to the Group. (This decision did not deal’ with the actual means of supply, which is covered in ¢ below.) PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE DoclTd:32423626 FP ge 173
pow oneal HW 50955 fe) (e) Bocld:324736276 Page 160 c. Use of U.S. Military Personnel and Equipment. The Group agreed that it would have to accept the proposition that re- supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft. This. point will be included in the Guidelines. General Lansdale will arrange with the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready by next week. In the meantine preparations should be begun for the selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries, such a “sheep-dipping.'' The Air Force will be asked to come up within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide one or two aircraft for use in initial operations. fn connection with small boat operations, the Secre- tary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was available within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be established. It was pointed out there are no PY boats available and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired. CIA will present a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the next few days. 4. Mr. McNamara then raised the possibility that a decision may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S, personnel. He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming that such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be permitted later on, The Group felt that the Guidelines should re- flect that, in the covert phase of this Operation, U.S. personnel, bases and equipment would be available but that the situation that would exist in the. face of a prohibition against such use must also be studied immediately. 4, At che Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or other means of destroying the Soviet boats which have been or will be delivered to Cuba. 6. The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the risk is virtually non-existent. 7. Lt was agreed that the Group should pive a status repore to higher authority this week, to include discussion of general principles and guidelines. Thomas A. Parrott ‘o distribution
Operation MONGOOSE ; . | | 26 October 1962 * DEMANANDIIN PAS SESSA SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 26 October 1962 PRESENT: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General Lansdale, General Johnson; the Attorney General; Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin; Mr. Bundy; Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey; Mr. Wilson. - 1. The meeting began with a discussion of the considerably- increased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch, of agent teams. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination; instructions were issued during the course of the meeting designed te recall the three teams already on the way. Tt was agreed that the first order of business with regard to these teams is to examine in detail the requirements toward which they could contribute. General Lansdale will arrange to get GiA-. into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State Department for political intelligence requirements; (c) USIA for requirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually should be. 2. Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey said during the course of the discussion on agent teams, that the action taken had represented a unilateral decision by CIA and was not in respomse to specific military requirements. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere of responsibility, and particularly with respect to the first three teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously- approved operations. Mr. McCone commented that internal security in Cuba is now far more stringent than it was two weeks ago, thereby making agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore, that agent activity on this scale will only be justified if the responsible departments specifically require it for intelligence purposes. In this connection, General Taylor brought out that the Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch but had not been asked to review the operation in broader context. The Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated ERTL Oe ON oie ag TENE a f - ry of PROPERTY OF 1 OE OFFICE i . {ls wor WITS at. Of HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 181 Pay YY
PT me aE A le ; “ 2 ~ . unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the ~ military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and , similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared nthe FO ‘ to do so if an invasion should be mounted. Mr. McCone agreed-that-" °° | Aas jt_is possible: that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban operations “¥s 7 | might,.move under military control, but that such action is not | -'« indicated at this time. ; wo the Pers , ao ets 3. Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dis- patches would not use up all existing assets. He said that in the event of invasion, a sizeable number of Cubans could be trained quickly. , 4. The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized - that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices if they are in support of an approved plan. The Cubans do want, however, assurances that such activities are in fact approved at a high level. 5. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after any military action. He felt that there should be establisned with- in the government some sort of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which probably should be placed within the Department of State. The activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale's operations but would be closely related to them. He pointed out that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head such \ an office. Mr. Bundy also said that he thought a subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee should be established to deal with MONGOOSE affairs. 6. Mr. McNamara thought that MONGOOSE in the short-term should be considered in tne context of (a) providing support for action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a possible invasion. fe Specific discussion took place on points raised in the paper distributed at the meeting, as follows: a. ‘CIA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda facilities, although it was recognized that by the target date of 1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other methods of delivery. . b. No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at ' -  ° this time. This decision will be reviewed in about a week. HW 50955 DocId:32423626 Page 167
Cc. General Lansdale should develop further plans to “help the Cubans to helo themselves.” Mr. Morales-Carrion should be brought into this planning. d. Political planning for the post-Castro period will be assigned to the "Office for Free Cuban Affairs." Go Establishment of .-USIA's new 50 KW transmitter in the Florida Keys should be expedited. 8. -It was reiterated that General Lansdale |is the focal point for all MONGOOSE activities, that he is changed with their overall. management and that he should be kept infdrmed of all significant plans and activities in connection with the project. u i) wth Thomas A. Parrott Distribution The Attorney General Chairman, JCS DCL General Lansdale ~ Ca dradruczerl ¢lalo3 - mei HY 50955 DBocld:324236276 Page 1343 , i
oe ['-5— 62) Mc Maas \S-3 0 & + “a art 1. When the President, in his letter to Knrushcnev of 27 October, Ns SO gave “assurances against invasion af Cuba. in consideration of the 5 2 . Soviet removal of offensive weapona in Cuba under UN Supervision, .\ y Ooeration Mongoase was on ita diath bed. When tha President Stated J XS : in his letter of 28 October to Abhrushckev, "I consider my letter to Ble. ia ~you of 27 October and your reply of today as a firm undertaking on ee N | the vart of both our governments which should ba promptly carriad oo ae - out!’ Operation Mongoose died. 3 é.. lf these agreements ar@ carried out it seems clear that \ Cuba will be dealt with aslanother denied area in a manner differiny ~ aN) not greatly from that in whica CiA handles other denied areas, Ij. y an toa agreements are not carried out, military action cannot long be YR delayed. in either event the Mongoose structure as ithas new existed —_——- 7), in Governmentis througa.! 2 3. Looking back to tha origins of Mongoose one finds the | -_ Attorney General and Mr.’ McNamara seceXing primarily to remove & the political stain left on the President by the Bay of Pigs failure,. i ~~ Both the A.G. and the Secretary of Defense feltit necessary for . \ political reasons that some action 1@@%8 be taken wilh respect to a ‘ ~ Cuba to insure the President's future, Ina nutgnell, taey were out yorum -? 4 ~ to.dump Castro or to make him cooperate. Lo , . an ‘ 2 8 nN “4, During the past year, while one of the options of the project . Qe & LO wags Co creatsa internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual . . SY ‘ U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymaxers not only shied ; 5 3.4 away from the military intarvention aspect but were generally appre- rs ° %  g hensive of sabotage proposals. The only senior official involved, ; yg ON outside the Agency, who thought in terms of military action was °- — S , & Maxwell Taylor. Others lis the Attorney General, McNamara, | one af ‘\ Giloatric, Johnson and later Bundy viewed the projectina atrictly AS political light. Hindsight must now reveal to otners, as well aa it’ ont a has tous, that a Chief of Operations (i.e. Lansdala) was never ; actually needed. i 5. At present no senior U.S. Goveramant official around towm ig interested in a future "Cuban Affairs Special Group." Sundy hag already suggasted ths creation in State of an "Office of Cuban Exiig ‘Afiaizrs! or "Free Cuban Aifaixa'l which in itself is a move Outsids of the Mongoose Structure. All clandestine activities on tha part of : ; / ~ . oo Jake Pers | O14LO | a Lb S75 ! yo’ ee eee a yoga HW 50955 Dagid: 324235626 Page 184
ae { | . TEW continues ata Stand down, Significant Stzo3 have been taken by the Agency Coxetber with the nmiilitary for contingency pPlanaing. US5iA has moved into the propaganda fiaid under State guidaace wi thout relation to the Mongoose structure. Mongoose can only live again through "resurrection, !! 6. Given these circumstances and in the igat of prea f oressures elsewhere in the world CLA, internally, snould move with great rapidity to distance Tas Forca W from any external access, Thi would lavolve regulariziag or institutionalizing TEW in order that this unique grouv whica hay been available to Lansdale aya boy" becomas a normal part of our monolithic Agency struc Such a moves, neither Lansdale nor anyones else could get at "whipping ture, By thesa resources without going through regular channels, Within CLA we would return ’Cuba to tha Western Hemisphere and treat Cuba as a denied area and relates it to over-all WH problems. (Trroughout Project tdongoose, this is Precisely the manner in which State has *. f[roopa in State as he did in CLA.) bandled the problem. AS a result Lansdala never felt that he had 7. In accomplishing this, the only analogy I can think of is a ~ - Corporate one. We Should not go through backruptcy which have to be announced, but rather pass TEW through an unpbu ot ‘recelvership and reorganization. The need ts realign mans #3sets for demands in other areas would be sufficient reas the current stand down is a perisct setting for sucha chanze in { '. structurs, oe 1 would dlicized | OWaer and nin itself. 8. Concurrently, the DCI Should endorse Bundy's suggestion “and he should encouragsa the immediate establigsnment of an Olifice of ’ Cuban Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve CIA Or one of the “most annoying and insolubdle Pprovlems we haves faced- This “place problems of Proposed Cuban Govarnment structures, would Provisional ~ governments, platforms, lexile politics,and the like right where tory me belong ~ in the Department of State. , 9. Absolutely no attempt on our part should he macs Lansdale. Remember that the Attorney General wag figaoting Lansdalaty to unseat battla as recently as two weeks ago. Secondly, McNamara and Gilpatric sill look upon Lansdale ag Something of a inystic and are 2 . tas “AQT ST op oe eg cen eee } core HW 50955 Docld: 32423626 Page 165 a
HY 50955 , on tha defensive by virture of iris relationship with the Attorney General, Practically everyon:: at tne operating lovel agrees that Lansdale hag lost his value. Bundy and Taylor arg not impressed with him. Bill Quinn and company obviously nave his number asa do we. With a political solution to the Cuban problem in hand reflecting great credit on the part of tha President, the ALG. will drop Lansdale jike a hot brick. Therefors, while awaiting the outcome of the Cuban talks, we must atoncs deny Lansdals direct access ta ew. -Lanscala can have acces3 as to all other CLA components through the DCI during tha stand down period. 10. Lansdale's reaction to any reassignment is aot to bea violent one. He undoubtedly realizes that be never again will be ‘in tae poyition of a special advisor to the tvo most powerful men in tha country. Therefore, if we don't clo3e ranks within CLA and put Te W beyond nis reach without delay (except thnrouga the DCI) he -mignt be abla to inflict Serious + damage to CLA's standing befors his eventual demise. | ll. To summarize, the tollowing action 13 required: a. Internally, institutionalize TFW. Grafy it into WH. (Defensa will then look to DLA for intelligence and DIA to us.) d. Push (through the DCI and Bundy) for the immediate estaplisament of the Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in tho Department of Stata. i 3 “Docla: 32423626 Page. 186
x é vA . : uo cs my TOP SECRET. Soo "Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Mecting No. 2/63, April 23, 1963, 5:00 PM -- Cuba The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr, Bundy entitled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives," Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance, it should consider whether the present policy we are following would produce a major change in Cuba. Ne expressed his firm vicw that Castro's position over the short term would improve if we took no actions other than those now under way or projected, He made clear his belief that the climination of the Castro reyiine was a require- ment and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall, we should develop a proyram for approval which would produce changes acceptable to us, The program should aim at creat- ing such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.S, to use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retalia- tion by the USSR on the West, / Mr. McCone surnmarized information leading him to believe that Castro's position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from now than it is at present. Hie expressed his belief that present policy would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve. Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of the Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of existing policy on the Castro repime, Ile cited evidence to indicate | that present measures are crippling the Cuban cconomy, leading to shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit full rations for Cuban militia, Mr, Martin saw no possibility of petting Castro to defect from the USSR, Ile said there was no way to finance Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds, had proved that he had broken his ties with the USSR, Jie said, for example, Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba carly enough to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut lowe from the USSR and not yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind of aman who might make promises and not keep them, i.e. he did not TOP SECRET HW 350955 DBocld:32423626 Page 187
TOP SECRET ~2- stay bought. The possibility of persuading Ciustro to leave Cuba was not feasible because Castro was a true revoluti:nary who could not be induced to give up liis revolution, The Attorney General proposed three studies: a. A list of incasures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting dowf of a U-2, ; b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in eiphteen months, ‘ c. A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next eighteen months, , Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba from the point of view of Cuba alone, We said the Cuban problem was a part of our relations with the USSR and with our plobal battle against Communist appression, He urped that our policy toward Cuba always be kept in this perspective, The withdrawal of Sovict forces from Cuba and the disappearance of the Sovict presence in Cuba was of major im- portance to us. USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a state- ment of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba. Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba we could live with if it wereno longer run by Castro or tied to Moscow, Hie said that American companies had written off their cxpropriated sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would own these properties in the event Castro and Cornmunism disappeared in Cuba, There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Comununist Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. ‘There appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result would be to raise the cost to the USSR of inaintaining Cuba. TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32423676 Page 189
yOP SECRET ~3- “ty Mr, Sorensen listed the seven bjectives raised at the meeting as a follows: a. Improve our present course of action by doing some things that we are not now doing. : b. Agree on military responses which we should make to con- tingencics, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane. c. Develop a program to get rid of Castro. d. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba. e. A program to induce Soviet withdrawal. {, The‘detachment of Cuba from Moscow. g. A proyrarn of support for dissident elements in Cuba, Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to the kind of a regime we would want to sce in Cuba post-Castro, Bromley Smith HY 50955 DBocld: 32423676 Page 189
HW 50955 a? re ee , 7 RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVEL | INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT : ASSOCIATION ' i Wl) QFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT og . i { | ! 1 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR OPMENT ' INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION?» ' I : , ‘ q ‘ . oe ae : \ : v —_ ae : ; . joa j too NX Docld:32423626 Page 190— ae i a) . wo ' ro, fad “4 . : ' oe
HY 50955 June 25, 1975 MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JOHN McCONE I explained to John that I would probably be called to testify before the Church Committee and that I understood the Committee would wish to question me about .a meeting on August 10, 1962, of which I had no recollection. I “stated that Mr. Belin, Counsel of the Rockefeller Commission, had informed me that: a. A meeting had been held on August 10, 1962, attended by Messrs. Rusk, Taylor, McCone, Bundy, Murrow, and McNamara, among others. b. The elimination of Castro had been discussed. | ec. A CIA representative, Mr. Harvey, had indicated in a memorandum prepared after the meeting, that during the discussion I had raised a question regarding the elimination of Castro. d. John McCone had discussed the elimination of Castro with me after the meeting, expressing his strong opposition to any such action and that I had strongly agreed with John McCone. [Although Belin did not say so, I had the impression that his knowledge of the conversation between McCone and myself had come from a.memorandum and I was informed by another person that such a memorandum had been prepared in 1967, ] I asked John if he could add to my knowledge of what took place during or after the August 10 meeting. He replied that: a. On August 10, 1962, a. meeting of "54-12 Augmented" took place in Dean. Rusk's Conference Room to consider reports of the movement into Cuba of Soviet nuclear missiles. b. He remembers that the elimination of Castro was discussed during :the course of the meeting, but he does not recall whether or not I raised the subject and he does not remember whether if I spoke in connection with it I was in favor of or in opposition to such a move. He does remember very clearly that when the subject was raised, first Ed Murrow and then he opposed further discussion of it. c. Two days after the meeting, Mr. Harvey of CIA received a memorandum from General Lansdale referring to the elimination of Castro; Harvey called Lansdale to ask that the subject be eliminated from the Lansdale letter and McCone called me. (John indicated that in August 1962 Lansdale was nominally assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, although he believes that following the Bay of Pigs, Lansdale had been staff director for a committee charged with considering ways to weaken the Cuban Government.) d,. When he raised the issue of the Lansdale letter with me, I had not seen the letter and was unaware of its existence, but when he explained that it referred to the elimination of Castro, an action which he (McCone) opposed, John reports that I shared his strong opposition to any such move. Doclda: 32423626 Page 191.
_ 2-0) e. In 1967, following a conversation with Jack Anderson held at Ted Kennedy's request, he prepared a memorandum of conversation which referred to some of the events surrounding the August 10, 1962 meeting, but that, contrary to the impression I had received from Belin and others, the memorandum did not refer to me ~= he will send me a copy of the memorandum next Monday when he returns to his office in Los Angeles. Robert S. McNamara HW S955) BDocld: 32423626 Page i92-
é bee INTERVIEW AND M iTING SUMMARY . Page 1 Seve. uu Dace: May 27, 1975 Time: 10:00 a.m. INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN Place: “Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of 1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America, instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late in 1965. l. Assassinations: In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as~ sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a-meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro, someone from the CLA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant HE 50955 Bocld: 32423676 Page 193
on INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY . Page 2 of 6 FILE: "Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reason able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown that. Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later, Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szule had with Kennedy in which the President pledged not to kill Castro. Szule reported that pledge in an _ article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only but- tress his position in Latin America. During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967. Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was in- volved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life. During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States -had severed diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominica Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be as- Sassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the govern- ment was surprised when it occurred. Henry Dearborn, the American Consul in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti- Trujillo forces. Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that WW 50955 Docld: 324273626 Page 194
INTERVCEW AND M.ETING SUMMARY . Page 3 of 6 FILE: the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by the Special Group. | Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field might regard killings of one sort or. another as within his mission in| supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone 4 might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g. by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA. 2. .CIA Activities in Brazil: Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congres- sional elections.On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further . ; Walters’ activities might have extended Goodwin did not know. HW 50955 Docld:3247936276 Page 195_ ; te
é ome, INTERVIEW AND M&STING SUMMARY Page 3. CIA Activities in Chile: The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic forces in Latin America were the only means.of combatting communist — influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was applied to Chile, and the U.S. switched its support from the conserva- tive Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only rarely, only if Latin America were the subject of the meeting. As he “remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were genera statements, policy papers, not descriptions of recipients of support or conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democrati political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know how much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, however, the assertion that the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washing ton since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the White House it did not seem so. 4. Changes during the Johnson Administration: Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy-- Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American policy, although the President did become active -in the two crises-- Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change in United States' policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 196 oan
‘ , ra ae INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 5 _ PILE: for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a ‘murder incorporated" in the Caribbean. The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he became President. 5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency: When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency was some- thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police throug AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point, ‘the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to power and. that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency). Latin American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin. _ America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia. HW 450955 Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little difference to the course of events in Latin America. - Cuba could not in any case provide support: to guerilla movements in South America without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla movements that began had little indigenous support. Docld:32423626 Page i9f of 6
HY 0955 * oo“, INTERVIEW AND MISLILING SUMMARY Page 6 In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that these éame out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Good- win often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on occasion, specific, indicating groups to be supported and the like. Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin America. 6. Goodwin Suggestions: Goodwin believed it impossible to centrol the activities of intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to- day operations. What is required is an active Congressional committee, on the model: of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional checks are required. With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub- director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Tad Szulc. In response to a question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interestéd in the Bay of Pigs through Cushman. He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of that. DoclTd: 32423626 Page i196_
i TOP SECRET 18 "1 i Mr. Schwarz. Now, Mr. Harvey was the man who had sort “2 of action responsibility for Cuba in the CIA, is that correct? 3. Hr. McCone. He was at that time, yes sir. 4 | Mr. Schwarz. And you had frequent contact with Mr. 5. Harvey during this period of time? 6 Mr. McCone. Mot frequent, but occasional. 7] | Mr. Schwarz. On any of, those occasions did Mr. Harvey 8 tell you that he was engaged in efforts to assassinate Cuban | 9 - leaders? 10 Mr. McCone. Wot that I have anv recollection of. lo» 11 Mr. Schwarz. You stated that the Special Group | 12 considered and approved a variety of means under the Mongoose ! 13) program for implementing the efforts -- would the correct wore | 14 be overtnrow of the Castro Regime, or was there some other | 15 objective? 16 Mr. MeCone. ‘Well, I think the ultimate objective was 7 the overthrow. . But I don't think hat any of the particular | 18 operations that the Special Group Augmented considered Or 19 approved would accomplish that objective of more harassment | 20 and making trouble. 21 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do we know who chaired the | 22 Speciai Group Augmented? | 23 Mr. Schwarz. Would you Gescribe tne membership of the | “4 | Special Group Augmentec, who chaired it and who staffed it, 25 Myr. HcCone? | TOP SECRET | HW 50955 Docld: 32423626 Page 199 _.
LO Ll Le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° el 22 25 HY 50955 sdica-ovesvene Page 200 | TOP SECRET 19 Mr. McCone. The,Attorney General chaired it. Mr. Schwarz. Robert Kennedy? . Mr. McCone. Robert Kennedy. And he attended it quite often, but not always. Mr. Schwarz. Who were the other members? Mr. McCone. As I said, the Secretary of Defense. - Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Nettamara? MYX. McCone. Frequently represented by his Deputy, Mr. Gilpatric, Rosnell Gilpatric. The Secretary of State -- Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Rusk? Mr. McCone. Mr. Rusk -- frequently represented by nis Deputy, Alex Johnson. ‘ tir. Schwarz. Nas General Taylor on that group? Mr. McCone. I think he was, if I remember, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Mr. Schwarz. And did Mr. Parrott staff it? Mr. McCone. Well, he participated in the staff rather as a secretary. Mr. Schwarz. And was General Lansdale a member or participant for the entire period of the Mongoose operation, or only for some limited period of it? Mr. McCone. For the entire period as far as I remember. at Mr. McCone, did the Special “oor Senator itlart of Colorado. Group Augmented keep minutes cf the meetinags? “3 wi Peas a . ae 3 Ged a Gd eo a
10 11 12 f 13 ua 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 WW 50955 seotareualen Page 201 - el Mr. Schwarz. Let's go back to the August 1962 meeting, August 10. And the Committee has in their folders three } documents dated August 13, August 14, 1962 and April 14, 1907, which deal with this subject. And the reporter has previously marked, and I would like him to hand to you, Mr. McCone, the thr: exhibits together. And I will just state for the record wnat they are. McCone Exhibit No. 2 is an August 13, 1962 memorandum from Brigadier General Lansdale to four persons, including William Harvey, CIA, a man from State, a man from Defense, and a Man from USIA, subject: “Alternate Courst Be MceCone Exhibit 3 is a memorandum dated August 14, 1962 from William Harvey for Deputy Director of Plans, subject: j "operation Mongoose". And McCone Exhibit 4 is a memorandum dated April 14, 1967 from John A. McCone to the Director. These memoranda, Mr. McCone -- you have had an opportunit»s to read those before this meeting, have you not? Mr. McCone. Yes, sir. Mr. Schwarz. These memoranda all concern a meeting which took place on August 10 concerning operation Mongoose, is that rignt? Mr. McCone. That is correct. Mr. Schwarz. Was the subject of assassination or liqui-~ dation raised at that meeting? : ‘ Fe Sy oem TU fay ral be! FAD SBCOE a) "i hs kee ‘et St A Oat
10 11 le 13 14 15 16 L? 18 19 20 Le 23 24 HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page 202 MJY Sewage a First, was that a meeting of the special group augmented? Mr. McCone. That is correct, Mr. Schwarz. Who was there at this particular meeting? Mr. McCone. This was a rather large meeting. As I have said earlier, it was called by me for the purpose of again expressing my concern about missiles in Cuba. But since at that time it had been decided to intensify the Mongoose program, it turned into a 54-12 augmented committee with several people there. And we discussed Operation Mongoose. And we also discussed this question of missiles in Cuba. Mr. Schwarz. During the portion that wes discussing Operation Mongoose who was present? Mr. McCone. Well, Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara. Mr. Murrow. I was there. And two or three people of my staff were there. Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Harvey included? Mr. McCone. Mr. Harvey was there. It seems to me ‘that there were others from State there, but I don't recall who they were. And it was quite a large mee ing. Mr. Schwarz. WAS the “Attorney General present at that | meeting? Mr. McCone. I can't say that from memory, but I have ! | | . £ _ { looked. over the list in recent weeks. And if I recall properly, ; the Attorney General was not there. tou Oba SA | ‘ cot wt bene mm ee kee ce nen none an A YE CCL A A i a mena meets Fess Be wien tome NALIN Tie Ee le pean. hc alta Ie Deere teins remtnehecter secre: ta epee ere ent: aetenecentevet, Aye. aap, Sree enone ne teen” ete, “eran ett te a
dnlu FOP SECRE 31 4 Mr. Schwarz. He was not there? 5 - Mr. McCone. That is right. 3 « Mr. Schwarz: Now, there are minutes of that meeting, 4 are there not? 5 Mr. McCone, Yes, I think there are, I think there is 6 something in the form of a memorandum summarizing the meeting, " : yes, sir. 8 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to recount for the committee a 9 Matter which is procedurally troublesome, I am told by the 10 White House it may not be substantively troublesome, but I would ll like to recount it for the committee. .o Mr. McCone and I met yesterday evening to have an. 13 opportunity to qo over these matters. And during the course. 14 of the meeting hr. McCone referred to tne minutes of the 15 August 10 meeting, stating that he then believed that those 16 minutes showed that there was opposition at the meeting 1 to the subject of assassination. 18 Now, Mr. McCone, is it your current understanding that 19 the minutes show that there was opposition to the subject of 20 assassination? | 2y Mr. McCone. I can't answer that. I haven't seen those 29 minutes, and I don't know what is in then. | senator Mondale. . This may be out of order, I don't ba know. In the August 14 memo point 3 says: "The question of 25 assassination, particularly of Castro, was brought up by ee) CG ra Fie ran pai ‘a 1H Gobi li: BY S0955 Bocld:324273676 Pag ows! wa
TOP SECRET | 32 | fis, 4 || Secretary McNamara.at the meeting of the Special Group | "| 2 Augmented in Rusk's office in August". 3 . Do you see that sentence? 4 | Mr. McCone. Yes. 5 Senator Mondale. Is that your recollection? 6 | Mr. McCone. I am not sure that McNamara used the word. | " "assassination". He could have used another word, | 8 elimination, or removal. And Mr. Harvey, in preparing this | 9 memorandum for Mr. Helms, who was then Deputy of Plans Informa- bo tion, used the word "assassination" rather loosely interpreting] 11 what Mr. Mctlamara said. | 12 I cannot say, senator, that Hr. Mctiamara actually brought | 13 up for discussion the question of assassination as such. He | 4 might have said elimination,. which could mean many other : 15 things. I am not quite clear on that. | 16 Mr. Schwarz. The written record uses the words 1" liquidation of readers. 18 Senator Mondale. That *s the Lansdale memo. | 19 Mr. Schwarz. Yes. The words were blocked out in the | 50 . Lansdale memo, but the Harvey memo, which is Exhibit 3, Says 21 those are the words. | ne The Chairman. And I might say that the memo of John lMeCone 93 to the Director -~ I take that to be a memo to yourself -- | 24 or Helms had then become the Director. 25 ie «rt cofitains the following language: | i HW 50955! Docld:32423626 Page
HW 50955" 10 il le 13 LA P 19 ir 20 ii 21 ae Docld: 32423 Li Page 205. Bod i CH ab me : GR aT mae TOP SECRET 33 "at one of these meetings, probably the meeting of the JCS group, I recalled a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the. Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the U.S. Government and the CIA were concerned, and the idea should not be discussed, nor should it appear in any papers, as the U.S. Government could not. consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds." | I take it, then, that according to your best recollec- tion the subject of liquidating Castro and possibly other top Cuban leaders did come up at this meeting, and you did take strong exception to it. | Mr. McCone. Yes. I was not alone in that. Mx. Murrow took exception. I remember that very clearly. Senator Mondale. Who made the suggestion to which you refer in your memo? Mr. McCone. According to the record, it was lr. McNamara, according to Mr. Harvey's record. Senator Mondale. Do you recall who made the suggestion? Mr. McCone. No, I can't recall from memory. I can only reconstruct it from the record. Senator Schweiker. And who was chairing that meeting? Who chaired that meeting? mek sor | | |
AQP Seawall - 34 f . | L Mr. McCone.I think Mr. Rusk chaired the meeting. The : 2 Attorney General was not there. | 3 Senator Schweiker. He normally would have chaired the ; 4 meeting? 5 . Mr. McCone. If the Attorney General had been there he 6 would have chaired the meeting. But he was not there. 9 Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, the memorandum of August 8 14, 1963, says that the question of assassination was brought 9 up by Secretary McNamara. Was it brought up in the context 10 of disapproval, or in the context of pursuing it further, or | 11 in the context of merely that it was something on an agenda that 12 was being followed in the course of the meeting. | | 13 Mr. McCone. Well, as I say, Senator, the purpose of the | 14 meeting was to discuss a new phase of the Mongoose operation, 7 15 intensified activity -- andI presume it was -- in exploring } 16 the alternatives that were available. 9 Senator Mathias. In other words, it was brought up in the 18 context. that this was one of a number of operations that the’ 19 group might consider? . | 20 Mr.McCone. I think that is right. And I immediately Pat said, well, that is one thing that we can't consider, and | 59 wouldn't consider. - Senator Mathias.. © If my own memory of that time is at all | | ; 2A accurate -- it may not be -- but this was about the time that | 3 a5 | Senator Keating was beginning to publish information about the | iu nr ° ay &S =) rR arcs HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 206 _ i
10 il Le 13 15 16 1? 18 19 el 22 25 24 25 14 20, absence pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that.as far as the CIA was " concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this, and would participate in no open maating discussing it. I strongly | urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase | in question from all’ copies of this memorandum, including — disseminated to Stata, Defense and USIA. Shortly shereaftar, | Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed, and | that he had done so.” | | I cannot read thos=s two paragraphs without concluding that i the principal concern expressed by Mr. Harvey runs not to the uestion of whether or not assassination might form a part of J an action plan, but runs rather to making certain that thers is no written record that would establish that assassination might be any consideration or such a plan might be underway. Do you read thosa two naragranhs the sams way? -Mr. McCone. Yes, I don't think that -- you can't read them any other way, Sanator. My action as I have reconstructs it is that immediately upon receiving the Lansdale memorandum .. of August 14 in which he -- there averal words deleted, C3 sl V7) and I have forgotten exactly what fhose words are. Mr. Schwarz. Including liquidation of leaders. Mr. McCons. Including liquidation of leaders. I calle@ Mr. McNamara and insisted that that memorandum aos "7 2a ee Es 1 ae fs Eey we) ‘ : “4 HW 50955 Docld:329493696 Page 2077
TOP SECRET 39. -i be withdrawn beacause no decision was made on this subject, and 2 since no dacision was made, than Lansdale was quite out of Ee 3 |.,ordsr in tasking the Central Intelligence Agency to consider 4 that matter 5 Now, the wording of Mr. Harvey's memorandum is subject £0 6 all kinds of interpretation, but you will have to ask Nr. ” Harvey about that. 8 The Chairman. Did Mr. McNamara aorse that the memorandun, 9 the Lansdale memorandum -- 10 | Mr. McCone. Most certainly. 11 _ The Chairman. ~- should be withdrawn? 12 ir. McCons. Most certainly. 13 The Chairman. And it was for the reason that you had 14 given him or for any other reason? 15 Mr. NcCone. Well, I cannot answer that, except that as 16 I recall our conversation, he seemed highly disturbed that this 7 matter should bs initiated by General Lansdale and readily 1g || agreed that it be removed, because it was not a matter that 19 “was given consideration. 90 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman? 21 The Chairman. Yes, Senator Schweiker. 22 Senator Schweiker. Mr. McCone, in view of hindsight and { 2% what you know now, someone obviously made a dscision to go 24 forward and to axcluds you. Who, in your judameant, from what 95 you now know, made this decision and why did they exclude you? eo re D> SaCiie va ‘ . ; aaa cee ea en OL eee fenestrae
TOP SaGaied b£15 7]. 51 | 1 “Mr. McCone. I would like to explain for the record this 2 memorandum of mine of April 14, 1967. } | 3 I came on here for a Committee meeting of some kind. I- 4 arrived rather late at night at the hotel, and received a call 5 from Senator Kennedy who said that he had been informed that 6 Jack Anderson was producing a column on this subject that. ‘yy |implicated that both the President and the attorney General, 3 and he wondered if I would talk with Mr. Anderson. And I said 9 I would, and within five minutes, Mr. Anderson called me on 10 the telephone. I remember the call very well, because he ll engaged me for an hour and fifteen minutes and brought it to 12 1:00 o'clock in the morning. 13 But I took the position with Mr. Anderson that the matter 14 had come up and had been promptly withdrawn, and then being 15 concerned about it, I went to the Director's office and dictated this memorandum. 16 17 Senator Mondals. Can you testify that it was not Secretary : | 1g || McNamara who made the assassination suggestion? | . | - Mcc - No. 19 Mr. cCone No ! 50 - Senator Mondale. So it could have been, you just don't I | know? el | 29 Mr. McCone. I don't know. | . | 23 Senator Jart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman? | ; . 24 Mr.. McCone, as you are well aware, recently General 25 Lansdale suggestad his authority to conduct these plans and/or | FEQLE ee) SIE ery ay | vis Ces bavi vz t | HW 50955 Docld:324236276 Page 209 _.
TOP SECRET t 18 | 54 1 he had a very fine record he seemed to be kind of a loner to 2 me and the CIA station in Saigon was a very big and very 3.i| sensitive station, and I thought a man who was trained in that 4 type of an operation should be the Chief of Station, and 5 || certainly that man should be selected by the organization and 6 |) not by the Ambassador. ? The Chairman. Mr. McCone, this Committee is going to call } 8 General Lansdale as a witness. Can you give us. your opinion ! 9 as to his credibility? 10 Mr. McCona. I think, Mr. Chairman, that for me to | Bhs Ll testify on the record concerning the credibility of another ' 12 man, and particularly a distinguished man who is a retired 13 Major General, would not be an appropriate thing for me to 14 do. ! 15 If you want me to go off the record, if that is permissible, 16 I would like to tell you ~-- | L? fhe Chairman. Very well. We'll go off the record. | 18 (Discussion off the record.) | “19 The Chairman. Let's go back on the record. 7 20 Senator Schweiker. I have a question. 21 The Chairman. Yes, Senator Schweiker. 22 Senator Schweiker. Mr. MeCone, in your April 14, 1967 “* 23.|) memo, you mentioned paragraph 3, Operation Mongoose, and you 24 say it is an interdepartmental affair, under. the operational 25 || control of DOD through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is —< TO ee SEcnray HW. 50955 Docld:38423626 Page 210_. es) Neg hb A KS
t 19 55 1 ‘your wording on paragraph 3 of your April 14, '67 memo. 2 . My question is, whenyou have an operation like this, w ‘S) would this have been set up by the Special Group Augmented, 4-!| or where did the authority to set up Mongoose come from? a) Special Group Augmented? 6 Mr. McCone. ‘No. I think the authority to set up Mongoose | 7 || came from the National Security Council. | 8 | Senator Schweiker. Is it unusual in setting up an | 9 Operation like this to have DOD have operational control of “| 10 say as opposed to CIA or something or not? Li Mr. McCone. Well, as I said sarlier, Operation Mongoose 12 involved several departments. 13 Senator Schweiker. Yes. 14 Mr. Cone. So it would have been rather wrong to have it 15 a CIA operation. CIA participated and CIA people were 16 || .secunded to General Lansdale. This memorandum of mine is 17 wrong in one respect. I say “operational control of DOD. throug 18 the Jcs." I was advised by General Lemnitzer when I appeared 19 before the Rockefeller Commission here @ month or six weeks ago 290 | that the lins of. authority went from the Secretary of Defense 21 through dan assistant and on to Lansdale. It was not through 29 || the JCS. 23 Senator Schweiker. So it went from McNamara, or from the 24 | Secretary of Defense, to whom? 25 Mr. McCone. Through some assistant to Lansdale, who was | | | A | | | | | | | | | OR en Oe Pa em pay pe TO ie SEL OeaLay HW SO955! BDocld: 32423676 Page 711.
- FSP SECRET 1 56 1 an assistant to an assistant to McNamara. — I don't know who 2 that was. 5 . ‘But the reason ~~ 4 . Ser tor Schweiker. Which wes sort of an unusual sect up 5 | in itself, I take it? 6 Mr. McCone. Well, he was a two star General, and I guess - . . 7 this was a proper way or a reasonable way to do it rather than | 8 to disassociate him from the Department of Defense, and put him | 9 someplace .else. | 10 The reason I had the impression it was through the JCS, , Li we would naive these meetings in the JCS conference rooms: all : | 12 the time. But General Lemnitzer corrected me, so this was 3 13 in error. 14 Senator Schweiker. And it was under Secretary McNamara's 15 || direction basically then? 16 Mr. McCone. Quite removed, quite removed. I think he was: 17 | housed there, but except for sitting in on the 54/12 Committee 18 or being represented on the 54/12 Committee Augmented, I don't 19 think Mr. McNamara axercised any direct control over General 21 Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 22. The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz? 7% Mr. Scwharz. I just want to pin down a couple of points t { | { { 20 Lansdale, or in fact knew what he was doing. | | \ t oa on the Castro story and move on to Diem, and then I'in finished — , | 25 || with what we have planned. | | | am mR CTS ga rey ms HY soot! Docld: 32473626 Page 212 _
HW 50955 Bocld: JOHN ALEX ME CONE Gt2 SOUTH FLOWER STREET LOS ANGELES 9OOI7 seattle, Washington June 25, 1975 Dear Bob: Attached is a copy of the 1967 memorandum we discussed on the telephone this morning. The circumstances are slightly different than] _ was able to recall for it appears from this memo that I actually called on you and we were in complete agreement that "Subject-A" was not part of any program nor was it to be discussed in any meetings of groups directing policy. I will be east for a meeting in New York on July 9th and am giving consideration to spending a day in Washington - perhaps July 10th - for the specific purpose of reviewing the transcript of my testimony before the Church Committee and possibly the Rockefeller Commission, if the latter is available. The rules of the Church Committee state that a witness can review his testimony for corrections, etc. , as is usually the custom of committees on the Hill. I will be in my office in Los Angeles on Monday, June 30th, and for the next several days can be reached at the residence of Justin Dart at Pebble Beach, telephone (408) 624-2097. Don't hesitate to call me if you wish to talk with me. With best regards, Sincerely, Enclosure HF f Honorable Robert S. McNamara ‘International Bank for Reconstruction and Development .- 701 19th Street Washington, D. C. Los Angeles, California June 25, 1975 ‘bb 324273626 Page 213—
ad HY 50955 a : oo ("14 April 1967 L- as \ TO: The Director FROM: John A. McCone od 1, No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962 , meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists. 2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS 5 Operations Room (Pentagon) and August 10, 1962, in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room were for the purpose of considering. staff proposals for Phase Il of opera- tion MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation ‘(under FitzGerald). At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room --I - recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on ‘moral or ethical grounds. 3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally and re~emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this. because operation MONGOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair -- was under the operational control of DOD through the JCS. 4. Atno time did the suggestion receive serious consideration °°? by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for oat policy. 5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms suchas "dispose of Castro,'' "remove Castro,'' "knock off Castro,’ etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and the. replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all-refer to a change in the Cuban Government. Docld: 32423626 Page 214.
HW 50955 JOHN ALEX ME CONE 612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET LOS ANGELES 90017 Seattle, Washington June 25, 1975 Dear Bob: Attached is a copy of the 1967 memorandum we discussed on the telephone this morning. The circumstances are slightly different than I was able to recall for it appears from this memo that I actually called on you and we were in complete agreement that "Subject A" was not part of any program nor was it to be discussed in any meetings of groups directing policy. I will be east for a meeting in New York on July 9th and am giving consideration to spending a day in Washington - perhaps July 10th - for the specific purpose of reviewing the transcript of my testimony before the Church Committee and possibly the Rockefeller Commission, if the latter is available, The rules of the Church Committee state that a witness can review his testimony for corrections, etc. , as is usually the custom of committees on the Hill. I will be in my office in Los Angeles on Monday, June 30th, and for the next several days can be reached at the residence of Justin Dart at Pebble Beach, telephone (408) 624-2097. Don't hesitate to call me if you wish to talk with me. With best regards, Sincerely, Enclosure HF £ ’ Honorable Robert S. McNamara Docld: 32423626 International Bank for Reconstruction - and Development 701 19th Street Washington, D. C. Los Angeles, California June 25, 1975 bb Page 215... ao eerie! hatin an ttn Bt eth onatertventerdtiet echenaertendiettrannatitestnenaadananditnstinementfianateratiabntinh fuumiivte +
HY 0955 } “MM April1967 ke y TO: The Director FROM: John A. McCone 1. No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962 meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists, 2, Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room (Pentagon) and August 10, 1962, in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase II of opera~ tion MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General Lansdale, with Wm, Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGerald). At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room --I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds. 3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed, I did this because operation MONGOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair -- was under the operational control of DOD through the JCS. 4, At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy. ; 5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off Castro," etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer toa change in the Cuban Government. Docld:324273626 Page 216. a ae Sen ~
HW 50955 Dbocld: 32423626 Page 217 COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Washington, DC 20500 April 15, 1975 ; a MEMORANDUM tHe wee | HE WHITE HOUSE OF Fier : TO : The File ; ‘ ; FROM : David W. Belin SUBJECT : Interview with Secretary Robert McNamara Belin: © Secretary McNamara, we've had a brief interview in your office on - late this afternoon - which is April 15, 1975, and I have asked you a number of questions and you have given me your best recollection for your answers, and I'd like to get a summary of our discussion on this tape and then send you a transcript for your editing, and then we will either prepare an affidavit or perhaps we will still ask you to come before the Commission, but I understand it is your preference not to testify formally before the Commission, because of the nature of your present job. Is that correct? McNamara: That is correct. I wish to cooperate with the Commission in every way. If necessary, of course, I would testify before them, but I would much prefer to present whatever information I have in the form of an affidavit. , B: Fine. During the Administration of President ‘Kennedy, you were Secretary of Defense. Is that correct? M: That is correct._ B: And were you Secretary of Defense commencing at the time of the inauguration of President Kennedy? M: Yes. Starting January 20, 1961. B: And you were Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy Administration. Is that right? M: it owas. B: -~-and into the Administration of Lyndon Johnson. M: until approximately March 1, 1968. B: During that time you were personally close with both the President and his brother, Robert Kennedy, is that correct? M: L was.
—~2- B: And you also were close to McGeorge Bundy? M: Yes. PR THE WHITE HULSE OFFICE BY AS I understand it there was what I am going to call a “camaderie" in the relationship among some of the top people in the Kennedy Administration. M: Yes. That is correct. B: / At any time during the Kennedy Administration did you hear any person ever discuss a plan known as an “executive action plan" which in substance was defined i as a capability plan for possibly assassinating any foreign leader? ever M: I have no recollection of /hearing anyone discuss , such a plan. B: Did you ever hear anyone discuss any particular plan concerning the possible assassination of Castro in Cuba? M: No. I have no recollection of such a discussion. B: Did you ever serve in any group known as either the MONGOOSE group or the Special Group Augmented? Does that ring a bell with you? OM: No. You mentioned, if I may refer back to our previous conversation that I was present at least one or more meetings of the Special Operations Group, I believe you called it. I have no recollection of being present at the meeting. I'm not suggesting I wasn't, but I have no recollection of it. FE do seem to recall that there was such a group, I doubt very much if I was a'member of it. B: You might have been a participant at one or more of these meetings? M: ' I might have been a participant. B: At any such meetings, did you ever hear anyone discuss as a possibility the question of possibly assasSinating Castro or any other foreign leader? M: No. I should interject here another point I made earlier, as I have no notes -~ 'I:did not take notes of any meetings I attended with rare exceptions, fand I have no other basisfor refreshing my memory and my memory of those ya ie 4 AS aren HW 50955. Docld: 32423626 Page 2196
4 Years is very bad. I'm not Saying this to in any way qualify What I am Saying except that ait isa fact that my Memory is POor in relation to the Period, B: I asked YOU whether OY not Robert Kennedy ever had any such discussions With you and you indicateg no, is that Correct? , M: ~~indicateg two things, Pirst that I have no re- . Collection whatsoever of him ever having discussed H @SSassination of anybody With Me~—or whatever YOu calleg Lt~~ action Which he considereg Contrary to the mora] traditions of this Society, ae WHITE HOUSE OFFICE Th B: Do you have any Other comments With regara to this whole Westion of POSSibly @SSassinating foreign leader M: You told Me that you Understand @ plan to a@SSassinate One or more foreign leaders Was in existence for an extended Period of time, during 1961~2-3 Said (a) fy existence Wouldn't have been known to the top Officials of the CIA, ang certainly if had known of Lt F am POSitive Ir would have made my knowledge known to the President, Robert Kennedy, neither Of whom Obviously Can testify nhow, but to Mac Bundy, to my deputy, Ros Gilpatric, and Probably to an ; ce 219 132423626 Page a ' Docld:324 HW, 50955
HY 50955 ; “4 problem of Cuban relations. lle played a major part in the Cuban missile crisis discussions because of his association with the Kennedys and his work with the Bay of Pigs follow-on. So I would urge you to talk to him about this as well. And on if Mac didn't know about it, and Max doesn't know about it os and Dean Rusk doesn't and Ros (Kilpatrick doesn't and I have —— no memory of it, I very much doubt that any such plan was known to the top officials of the Kennedy Administration. B: Well, assume for the moment that one of those people did know about such a plan, and assume for the moment that the CIA documents show that such a plan might ‘have been directed to be instituted by someone in the White House, who in the White House do you think would have had the authority to institute such a plan? ome M: Well, I have said before that I felt the attacks on the CIA -- CIA's covert operations were unjustified insofar as they assessed the primary responsibilities for those operations against the senior officials in CIA and absolve the rest of the senior officials in the Government of responsibility. I said that because it was my experience that all major CIA operations were approved by a group that subsequently became known as the 303 Group. JI don't know — what it was called during its early period, which included representatives of the -- the highest level representatives -- of the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the President's Security Adviser. B: That was Mr. Bundy. THE WHITE UF M: That was Mr. Bundy, during the period asia are talking about, so that I am almost certain that were an assassination contemplated, which seems to me, as I Say, extremely unlikely, if it were contemplated or any action been taken to move in that direction, it would have had to have received the approval of not just Mr. Bundy but other officials at that same level, including my Deputy, I think, and ny. Deputy never would} have approved anything like that without discussing it with me. B: What you are saying--at least if it came through ' the White HOuse, certainly Mr. Bundy would have known about it. M: I think he would have both known about it, and I don't believe that he would have approved it. by i himself. I think it would have been discussed with Dean Rusk and me-or my deputy and Dean Rusk's undersecretary. sera, He, AE Docld:3274293626 Page 220 t
-5- B: And if Mr. Bundy did not know about it, then the only other person in the White House that might oO have known about it, I assume, would have been the President. x Is. that a fair statement? M: That's a fair statement but I think that's extremely unlikely. I can't imagine that anything relating to-the CIA operation of this kind would be known to the President and not Mr. Bundy. I never knew of any such thing. B: So if it would have been known to Mr. Bundv it wonld have been known to the President. And vice versa? M: No, nono. I didn't say that. I said I couldn't ——— imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that wes known to the President and was not known to Mr. Bundy. EI can imagine something with respect to CIA known to Mr. Bundy, not known to the President either because they weren't that important or conceivably because it was thought desirable to protect the President from certain knowledge. B: With regard to the -- M: If I may ~- add one word to that. I can't imagine Mr. Bundy himself supporting assassination. TI- can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader, without mentioning it to the President, even though to do so would by that action involve the President. I say I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader without the President's knowledge because it is the President who would pay if that action were undertaken and it ever became known. Mr. Bundy recognized, more than the rest of us, the importance of protecting the Presidency as well as a particular president, and particularly protecting his ability to govern. B: Io want to correct one thing on the record. You referred to my statement about one or more assassi- nation plans. The only particular plan’ of assassination. that you and I discussed that I said I knew anything about as to be concrete affirmative plans involved just Castro. TI said there might have been indirect involvement in one other area, but =| the only direct involvement thus far that I know of at this time and that I discussed with you pertained hQuhastro. | | ¢ wouse OFFICE M: Yes, yes, you are quite right. rHe WHITE HO Oe ime ra or, PE t HW 50955 Docld:324293696 Page 221
Hi 0955 =6— B: Anything else you want to add-for the record? M: No, except I'm horrified by the whole discussion, = shocked by it and I just hope you will pursue all these leads some of which you may already have--I am saddened by it too. B: As a citizen I am horrified by it and I am saddened . by it, that my country which at one time became the land of the free and the home of the brave would be involved in situations of this kind, but we are trying to find out what the facts are and hopefully it will not happen again. Thank you very much, Sir. M: Thank you. (END OF TAPE) THE Wii jiyye. a PEE TD ‘Seeeere Docld:32423626 Page 222
-~G~ B: Anything else you want to add for the record? a Mz “No, except I'm horrified by the whole discussion, : shocked by it and I just hope you will pursue all ——. a eat some of which you may already have-= (ysis: cet Ca olde? , B: °. * As a citizen’ I am horrified by it and I am saddened by it that my country which at one time became the land of the free and the home of the brave would be involved in situations of this kind, but we are trying to. find out what the facts are and hopefully it will not happen again. [pp 2 jehank you very much, 9/7, | M: Thank you. . - ~ By . Af\ter conlpletion\ of tha interview ds I was about to\| leave pecretary McNalnara said that he wanted Oo everything he\could to show that Presidént \Keyinedy was \not aware\ of this. . Sif ; pe: (END OF TAPE) f. cf S a GAty53 HW 350955 Docld:32423626 Page 223
« 4 COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WIETEIIN THE UNITED STATES _ | Washington, DC 20509 2 Se | x ee : Nelson A. Rockefeller, i weed Chairman Jolin T, Connor CDougtas Dilfon Erwin N. Griswotd Lane Kirkland Lyman (., Lemnitzer Ronaid Reagan Edgar F, Shannon, Jr. Honorable President aa Dear Mr. McNamara: Enclosed April 15 interview for Purpose addressed, to me with for your ow Enclosure a4 Docld: 32742 HW 50955 Stamped Envelope to mall thi nd Signing the last Prepared for you t Anscript attached, Dovid w, Belin, Executiva Director - May 2, L975 C-h/-4 Robert M. McNamara The World Bank j 1818 H Street, NeW. 4 ‘Washington, 20433 S back The extra copy is * Should you so desire, J each page of Page with => I may Want to have © sign with Sincerely yours, 0 GE lil TE Davia W, Belin Executive Director PROPERTY (OF CU THE WHITE HGUSE OFFICE
HW 5095 INDEX OF DOCUMENTS FOR ROBERT S. MCNAMARA Tab K 1423676 Page.295 November 30, 1961, Memorandum from President to McNamara et al. (Tab 4 Lans.: Book) January 18, 1962, Memorandum from Lansdale to RFK re "Sensitive work''. (Tab 8 Lans. Book) January 27, 1962, Memorandum from Lansdale to RFK re "touchdown plays". (Tab 12 Lans. Book) January 30, 1962, Memorandum from Gen Wm Craig to Lansdale re ‘Operation Bounty". (Tab 17 Lans. Book) Minutes of SGA meeting of March 5, 1962, on Project Mongoose (attended by McNamara). (Tab 21 Lans. Book) Memorandum for SGA from Lansdale March 12, 1962, re inter alia arming of Cuban guerrillas. (Tab 24 Lans. Boo Memorandum for SGA from Lansdale March 13, 1962, re inter alia infiltrating agents with paramilitary skilis and problem of controlling them once they are inside Cuba (00207). (Tab 25 Lans. Book) - Minutes of SGA meeting of March 13, 1962, with Mc- Namara attending. March 16, 1962, Memorandum for the Record of Taylor re SGA. meeting with President on Taylor's March 14 Mongoose Guidelines. Contains March 22 amendment re 'no authorization, either tacit or otherwise. (Tab 27 Lans. Book) ft April 11, 1962, Minutes of SGA. McNamara present. (Tab 30 Lans. Book) August 10, 1962, Parrott Minutes of the SGA. “McNamara present. (Tab 38(B) Lans. Book) 1967 IG Report re August 10, 1962, meeting (Tab 38 (C) Lans. Book) August 13, 1962, Lansdale Memorandum to Harvey re "liquidation of leaders". (Tab 38(D) Lans. Book) August 14, 1962, Harvey Memorandum to Helms re Lans- dale "liquidation" memorandum. (Tab 38(F) Lans. Book)
HW 505 4 Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab M August 17, 1962, Gilpatric Memorandum to Lansdale (Tab 39 Lans. Book) August 23, 1962, National Security Action Memo No. 181 (Tab 41 Lans Book) September 12, 1962, Memorandum from Lansdale to McNamara re Phase II OPeration Mongoose (Tab 44 Lans. Book) October 26, 1962, Minutes of the SGA with McNamara in attendance. . November 5, 1962, Memorandum of George McManus referring to McNamara's view of Lansdale. April 23, 1963, Summary Record of NSC meeting No. 2/63. McNamara in attendance and spoke on Cuba: "elimination of the Castro regime was a require- ment.” April 14, 1967, Memorandum of John McCone to Helms re the August 10, 1962, meeting. (Tab 51 Lans. Book) April 15, 1975, interview with McNamara by David Belin of the Rockefeller Commission. May 27, 1975, Select Committee Interview with Richard Goodwin referring to McNamara's knowledge of "execu- tive action". June 6, 1975, testimony of John McCone before the Select Committee. (Only the portion that relates to McNamara.) June 25, 1975, letter of John McCone to McNamara. June 27, 1975, letter and memorandum of McNamara to John McCone.
vee Chronology and Issues for Testimony of McGEORGE BUNDY Biographical Background 1953-61 Faculty of Arts and Science, Harvary University 1961-63 Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs 1963-66 Special Assistant to President Johnson for National Seaurity Affairs 1966- Present President, Ford Foundation Chronology of Events ' Summary Outline Re Castro 1, January 1961 - October 1961 -- Cuba Policy - Inauguration/Bay of Pigs to Mongoose ~  (NSAM 100 Plan re Removal of Castro) 2. November-January 1961 -- Conception and Approval of Mongoose 3. January - June 1962 -- Mongoose Phase One 4, June - December 1962 -- Mongoose Phase Two (August 10, 1962 Meeting and possible Discussion of Castro Assassination) 5. January - November 1963 -- Post-Mongoose Policy (Seeming pattern of discussion and papers on contingency of Castro death) 6. December 1963 - August 1964 -- Special Group Investigation of Mafia - Cuban Exile Castro Assassination Plot. Boclda: 3242793626 Page 227 HY 50955
(McGeorge Bundy) Jan. 9-10, 1961 Jan. 20, 1961 Jan. 27, 1961 t April 17, 1961 May 16, 1961 Oct. 5, 1961 -2- ¢ Issues and Questions 1. Cuba Policy from Bay of Pigs up to Mongoose Origin Bundy arrives in Washington (Source: Bundy Interview) Bundy Appointment. Kennedy Administration takes office. McGeorge Bundy appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Bundy, Rostow and Bissell lunch at Hay Adams (Source: Bundy ‘ Was "Executive Action" discussed? Interview) Calendar note. « Was Bissell instructed re "Execu- tive Action"? Bay of Pigs. Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs. New U.S. Policy on Cuba. President Kennedy approved actions taken Was this basic context for later y the NSC at a May 5, 1961 meeting to establish U.S. policy toward U.S. Policy? : Cuba. The NSC "agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro and that since the measures agreed below | (CIA studies of weaknesses in Castro regime, diplomatic efforts to isolate Castro, improve relations with Cuban exiles, etc.) are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at inter- vals with a view to further action.'"' Source: Record of Actions by NSC on May 5, 1961.Ctab 8). NSAM 100. Bundy issues National Security Action Memorandum No. 100 Was "indicated contingency" related to the Secretary of State, subject: Contingency Planning for Cuba. to "Executive Action’? Did JFK The memorandum states in full: 'In confirmation of oral instructions authorize NSAM 100? What was JFK conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired instruction re NSAM 100? See next for the indicated contingency in Cuba." There is no explanation of entries below. the nature of the "indicated contingency.'"' Source NSAM No. 100, Oct. 5, Docla: 3242736276 Page 226 HY 50955
| ULE MO DULY fF 7 7 wd, Oct. 5, 1961 Oct. 6, 1961 Nov. 30, 1961 Jan. 19, 1962 6 Taylor Instructions for Castro ‘Removal’ Contingence -- JFK interest NOL to be Revealed. On General Taylor's instructions, Parrott outlines to Mr. Coerr of State a requirement for a "plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene."' Taylor tells Parrott not to indicate the President's interest in the plan. , Plan for Possible Removal of Castro. The Special Group (Bundy not present) was told by Mr. Parrott "that two other exercises are in progress in connection with Cuba -- the preparation of a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene and an updating of the overall plan for covert operations." Source: President Kennedy Decision to Begin Mongoose. ‘A memorandum from President Kennedy was sent to Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, General Taylor, General Lansdale and Mr. Goodwin, which summarized "the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operation.'’ The memo stated: ''(1) We will use our available assets to go ahead qith the discussed project in order to help Cuba over- throw the Commmist regime. (2) This program will be conducted under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Opera- tions. It will be conducted by him through the appropriate regular organizations and departments of the Government."' Source: Memoran- dum, November 30, 1961, (0069-70) .(See Lansdale, Tab 4). Phase One of Mongoose--Intelligence Collection, January-June 1962 RFK Urges Action. RFK tells Special Group (A) (Bundy not present) that solution of Cuban problem carries ''the top priority in the U.S. Govern- ment--all else is secondary--no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared." Source: Memorandum, January 19, 1962, from McManus to McCone. (See Lansdale » Tab te). Minutes of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1961, (See Lansdale, 1 ‘probably wrote this memo. Issues and Questions Was this the "indicated contingency” in Bundy's NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961? Is this plan the one referred to in Bundy's NSAM 100? Did it relate to a U.S. assassination plan? - 2). In a staff interview, Bundy recalls he Memo shows JFK approval for Mongoose. What was JFK relationship with Lansdale and JFK interest in Mongoose? Did RFK emphasis lead to assumption by CIA a Castro assassination plot had tacit authorization of higher authority? HY 50955 Page 225 Docld: 32423626
(McGeorge Bundy) March 5, 1962 March 5, 1962 March 16, 1962 - 4 - ; Issues and Questions Guidelines Outlined for Mongoose. -General Taylor's memorandum pro- If U.S. military intervention ruled poses Operation MONGOOSE was to be developed on the following out, must asSassination be considered assumptions: (a) in undertaking the overthrow of the target govern- as only way to succeed? ment /Cuba/ "the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will re- quire decisive use of U.S. military intervention. Source: Memoran- um by General Taylor, March $, 1962, 00188. CCee lLauscate » Tet 22). Special Group (A) Considers Taylor Guidelines. The Special Group (A) Establishes Bundy was familiar with including Mr. Bundy, agreed to examine General Taylor's guidelines Mongoose guidelines. for Mongoose for presentation to higher authority for information. Source: Minutes of Special Group (A) March 5, 1962, 00004. (see lausdate , Tab 21). President Receives Progress Briefing. "In the presence of the Why was it necessary to correct this Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report memorandum? Is there a second level on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were cir- of plausible denial, allowing culated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a pro- Special Group to deny a CIA action? longed consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." The memo is footnoted with the following item dated March 22, 1962: 'This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given igher authority. The members of the group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the guidelines.'' Source: Memorandum, March 16, 1962, by General Taylor, 00008. (Tas €). Boclda: 3242793626 Page 230 HY 50955
(eee BO DULY Y April 11, 1962 August 7, 1962 { August 8, 1962 August 10,1962 6 Bundy Cautions Against Fixed Target Date. LANSDALE gave progress re- port. RUSK and McNAMARA suggested that the current tarset date for bringing covert operations to a climax should be removed. ‘Mr. BUNDY cautioned that this could lead to an tmcontrollabel action internally, which might come to a head at a time which would be embarrassing or inconvenient for the U.S.'' Source: Minutes of Special Group (A), Meeting, April 11, 1962, 00015-17. Cras ©). Harvey-submits Plan. In response to requests from the Special Group (Augmented), for a paper on "stepped-up Course B" William K. Harvey submits to General Lansdale a ten page plan of covert activities. (Source: Unsigned memo of August 7, 1962 from William K. Harvey) (1st. 4). Lansdale Transmits Plan to SG (A). Citing the "major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose" as "removing the restrictions in the 14 March policy guidelines which keep our actions ‘short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area,''’ General Lansdale sends the requested papers (from State, Defense, CIA, and USIA) to the SG(A). 'The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped-up Course B." (Source: Unsigned memo of August 8, 1962 from Gen. Lansdale to SG(A) regarding stepped-up Course B). (See Lansdale, Tat 38), estion of Assassination of Fidel Castro raised at SG(A) Meeting. At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Mr. Risk's office, at which, inter alia, Mr. McCone presented ''an alternate plan (called... the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale,"' "/t/he question of assassination particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara....It was the obvious con- sensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not_a subjeft which has been made a matter of official record. /Mr. Harvey7 took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." (Sources: Memorandim of August 14, 1962, for Deputy Director (Plans) from William K. Harvey, Chief,. Task Force W, subject: Operation Mongoose; Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augnented) on Operation Mongoose, 10 August 1962, prepared by Thomas A. Parrott). (See Lousdete Tam 8, Lansdare Toh F), Issues and Questions Does advantage of having action controlled counsel for consideration of assassination rather than sabotage? Why did Special Group (Augmented) request a. stepped-up plan? Note Harvey involvement. (In his affidavit of April 25, 1975, pre- pared for the Rockefeller Commission, McGeorge Bundy states: "I don't have any recollection of where or how I heard about the poisoning possibility....Now, as to meetings where such things might have been discussed, the only one I have any recollection of -- and it is a refreshed recollection -- I would not have known about it a month ago -- is the one which we discussed yesterday on August 10, 1962 and I do NOT have any recollection of what specifically was said in that meeting ."’) . s Ue er Boclda: 3242793626 Page 231 HY 50955
| LEME AY DULY J - 0 Issues and Questions 2 ee _ Aug. 12, 1962  Lansdale's memo is amended, Four words, "Including liquidation of Le leaders ," are excised. General Lansdale distributes to Harvey (CIA); Hurwitch (State), Harris (Defense); and Wilson (USIA) a memorandum subject Alternate Course 8. . The original memorandum contains the following language: "Papers required from each. of you for me Tuesday meeting: "Mr. Harvey Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, _ including Liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion ' in other sections of the paper." When Harvey receives his copy, he calls Lansdale's office, points out how inadvisable the subsequently deleted language is, and the memorandum is thereupon recalled and the complained-of language deleted by General Lansdale. (Source: Lansdale's Memo- randum of August 13, 1962, to Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris and Wilson, Subject: Alternate Course B; Harvey's memorandum of August 14, “1962, supra. (See Lausdote, Tot D, Lansdave Tot F). Aug. 14,1962 Harvey memorializes Disaussion of Assassination of Castro. Harvey writes for Helms, then Denuty Director o ans, a memoran- dum "for your information.'"’ The memorandum records how the tonic of assassinations "particularly of Fidel Castro," arose and how Harvey thereafter vigorously and quickly objected to Lansdale's having circulated reference to it in his meno of the preceding day, August 13, 1962. CSee Lanrdaxe, Tet F) Paragraph 3 reads: "The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, ' Does Bundy recall this discussion? He was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the . has said (at his interview with Commit- Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 tee staff on July 8, 1975) that he has August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in no recollection, refreshed, revived, or a answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a sub- independent of any such discussion by ane, ject which has been made a matter of official, record. I took McNamara. careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point. | _ (Sources: Lansdale's memo of Aug. 13, supra; Harvey's memo, Aug 14, supra) EE ST wr wena: tenga eee weer © nn page so a aiete Coen 4 Docld:3242736276 Page 232 HW 50955
Aug. 23, 1962 Aug. 27, 1962 Oct. 17, 1962 Bundy writes National Security Action Memorandum #181 (NSAM #181). Bundy distributes a memorandum advising that the President has directed the following action be undertaken: "4. The line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. (Action: General Taylor) yore. "8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvan- tages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond MONGOOSE B plus, in the context of an ageravated Berlin crisis. (Action: Department of State, in consultation with Department of Defense)."" (Source: NSAM, No. 181, from McGeorge ° Bundy, August 23, 1962) CSee Lausdere, Tet ut). CIA Reports to Bundy on Progress in Complying with NSAM #181. Marshall S. Carter, Acting DCI, responds to NSAM #181 and informs Mr. Bundy that 'Mr. William K. Harvey, or in his absence, Mr. Bruce B. Cheever'' will be responsible for the line of activity projected for Operation Mongoose (and Plan B plus) as noted in NSAM #181. (Source: Memo of August 27, 1962 from Lt. Gen. Marshall. S. Carter, Acting Director, DCI, to McGeorge Bundy, Subject: CIA Action in Response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 181) Cea H) Bundy discusses with the President, Gen. Carter's memo for the Special Group Augmented of October 16, 1967. ter discussion with President Kennedy, selected aspects of Gen. Carter's memo, subject, Operation MONCOQOSE sabotage proposals, directed to the Special Group (Augnent on Oct. 16, 1962, are approved. (Sources: Memo of October 16, 1962, from Marshall Carter, Acting DCI Issues and Questions What prompted this NSAM? Did NSAM 181 result from the August 10 meeting? Note Harvey responsibility. Were other unwritten or unrecorded proposals discussed by Bundy to the President? N to Special Group (Augmented), subject Operation MONGOOSE/Sabotage Proposals; Memorandum of October 17, 1962 from Thomas A. Parrott for the Special Group (Augmented) subject: Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Gen. Carter, dated 16 October 1962) . CTat-E , Teb- bY i ! Boclda: 3242793626 Page 235 HY 50955
2: (McGeorge Bundy) - - § - January 4, 1963 January 22,1963" ra —F dead e Bundy Memo to President on New Cuban Policy. Bundy reports that, as instructed by JFK, he has met with an interagency group to work out new arrangement for handling "Cuban policy and action" in 1963. Time is ripe for this because the Bay of Pigs prisoners are out and Mongoose is at a dead end. Bundy proposes a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department to replace the Mongoose office. On policy, Bundy lists problem areas (economic pressure, refugees, communicat- dng with dissident members of Castro regime, "possibly in- “cluding even Fidel himself," and a reduction of CIA's role) which require decision. (Source: Memo, January 4, 1963, Bundy to JFK; JFK Library file) C Tas K). JFK Remarks to NSC. At NSC meéting, JFK points out "We must _always be in a position to threaten Cuba as a possible riposte to Russia pressure against us in Berlin." (Source: Memo- randum, no author or date, titled Remarks of President Issues and Questions Base line for 1963 context note Bundy proposes talks with Castro. 3 Role of.Cuba in larger context. Kennedy to NSC Meeting January 22, 1963; JFK Library file.) Cte&L). JFK Meeting on Cuban Covert Action. On April 3, 1963, the President met with a number of advisers for a "meeting on Cuba": "The President said he does not object to fexile/ raids if they really strike worthwhile targets rather than the "froth" which their acts to date have represented. The ‘President was told by Mr. Bundy that sabotage operations are hot now underway because "the special group had decided... that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it..." In connection with sabotage operations, Mr. Fitzgerald "made the point that recent exfiltrees have said that there is now no organized resistence inside Cuba." Robert Kennedy "asked whether it might not be useful to con- groups cou anded it “would probably be impossible for them to survive for any length of time....The Attorney General urged, in any case, that CIA survey all possibilities for aggressive action in Cuba over the next six months, assuming that the Agency could Muba_over the next six months, be given a free rein to proceed.” Does "All possibilities” include assassination? . Page 234 1324256276 Bocld HY 50955
LNCoeCULrye pDullay J nN April It; 1 963 Issues and Questions € The President summed up the meeting on Cuba by "directing the following: (a) The intelligence estimate on Castro's probable future strength should be completed as soon as possible. (b) CIA should examine exactly what might be accomplished in the field of sabotage during the next six months. (c) A meeting should be held next week to review the proposed sabotage program." Source: Memorandum, April 3, 1963, "Meeting on Cuba," (02842=43). CTa®m), President to Consider "Violent Solutions." Gordon Chase What is meant by "more writes memorandum to Bundy proposing enticing Castro over l violent solutions'? to U. S. side. Chase states: "I understand that, in the near future, the President will be looking at some more violent solutions to the Cuban problem." Source: Memorandum to Bundy, April 11, 1963, 4-130 (JFK Library file). Cres nN). Special Group Requests Destruction of Documents for Securit Reasons. On April 11, 1963, the Special Group (Bundy present) requested that comments by the Coordinator of Cuban affairs dated April 11 on three papers being considered at today's meeting be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. /The meeting discussed the "entire question of sabotage" and thus the papers referred to may have dealt with sabotage operations./ #¢ Why were documents destrovec The Special Group engaged in "a lengthy discussion of the Note unclear policy towards entire question of sabotage...the group recognized that a Cuba. searching examination must be undertaken...to determine whether we wished to change the present policy...Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations...until an overall policy is made clear and steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro." ‘Page 235 It was decided that on April 19 a presentation should be made to higher authority and a paper would be prepared out- lining "a proposed broad program for sabotage" examples of ; , * specific operations, the scale of activity and how such activity would fit into overall policy. Source: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, April 11, 1963 (02846-47) Tat. 0), 1324256276 Bocld AW 30955
ane e April 18, 1963 April 23, 1963 J TE ee ep een ee Issues and Questions 6 t Bundy Expresses Doubts Re Sabotage. On April 18, 1963, the Special Group discussed papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16, 17, and 18. The only reference to the subject matters of these papers was: "Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that the paper of April 17, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program’ consists basically of sabotage and of harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command. "Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half."...Mr. Bundy was not sure whether "it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U. S. policy." Source: Special group minutes dated April 18, 1963 (02848-49). Cte P). Chase Memorandum to Bundy Re "Short and Sweet" Action on Castro. request, comments on papers for meeting: "Assuming we are not nation? out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there a Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way to get rid of him-~a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky approach, or a combination of both.../blockade would be too long, thus/ "Generally speaking, any nasty actions we contemplate should be of the "short and sweet" variety." Source: Chase memorandum to Bundy, April 23, 1963, JFK Library file, 4-157. (Tot 2). RFK Proposes Study of U. S. Measures for Contingency of Castro Death. Discussion of Bundy paper titled "A Sketch of the Cuba reflect JFK policy? Alternatives," McNamara states the "elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement" and a U. S. program should arm to ‘create dissidence in Cuba" to allow the U. S$. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces..." Does such "short and sweet Prior to Standing Group meeting on April 23, Chase at Bundy's — action" refer to assassi- Does McNamara's hard view Page 236 1324256276 Doclda HY 50955
TIS eC eRe Se, eee 4 See! on gee eae Mriled Dtates Denate SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 84TH CONGRESS) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 pees i! i re rie rast i eaten? tS oe 2 As PSMA bese Nae
ete July 16, 1975 Mr. McGeorge Bundy — The Ford Foundatéon 320 East 43rd Street New York, New York 10017 Dear Mr. Bundy: We greatly appreciate the time you have devoted to cooperating with the Committee's inquiry. The Chairman has asked me to levy one additional request upon you, ‘ To complete the record on the events under considera- tion in your testimony of July 11 before ‘the ‘Committee, \ would you please prepare a notarized, sworn, affidavit answering the following questions: a 1. What recollections do you have concerning the subjects discussed at your meeting with Walt Rostow and Richard Bissell at the Hay-Adams Hotel on January 27, 1961? 2. Do you recall or have a record of any other meetings, whether official or informal, between yourself and Richard Bissell between November 1, 1960 and March 1, 1961? ‘Was there any discussion | between yourself and Richard Bissell upon \ any of these occasions or in phone con- : versations during the same period that | was related in any way to the establishment of a CIA project which included the capability i to assassinate foreign leaders? What was the content of any such discussions? Thanks very much for your help in this matter. L Sincerely, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr. Chief Counsel . | HY 50955 DBocld: 32423676 Page 239
MEMORANDUM TO : Files FROM : Bob Kelley reer DATE : July 8, 1975 SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH McGEORGE BUNDY SUMMARY On July 8, 1975, Mr. Bundy was interviewed at his office at the Ford Foundation in New York by Frederick Baron, Bob Kelley, and John Bayly of the Select Committee staff. The interview began at approxi- mately 9:00 a.m. and continued virtually without interruption until 1:30 p.m. The interview was conducted in three parts: 1. A review by Mr. Bundy of the principal documents in the attached chronology. 2. Mr. Bundy was told of the chronology of events relating to the Executive action and ZRIFFLE program, and was asked whether he had any knowledge or recollection of these matters. 3. Mx. Bundy reviewed documents relating to the Trujillo matter, and was asked whether he had any knowledge or recollection of that mat= ter. In summary, Mr. Bundy said: (1) He did not recall any of the docu- ments listed on the attached chronology relating to Castro, and it was his opinion, based on a reading of those documents at the interview, that they did not reflect any consideration by the White House or Cabinet level people in the Kennedy administration of a Castro assassination plafi. HY 50955 DBocld:32423676 Page 239
-~ 2 = Mr. Bundy stated further that those documents relating to the contin- gency in the event of Castro's death and similar language did not re~ late to any Castro assassination plan, but rather to studies of what “ might be the situation in Cuba should Castro die or leave office un- related to any U. S. effort; (2) With respect to the ZRIFFLE progran, Bundy stated that he was astonished” that this could have been going on without the approval by the Special Group, that he knew of no au~ thorization for such program, and that he never knew of a case where the Special Group process for authorizing covert actions was by-passed by Allen Dulles or Bissell to reach the President through another route. Mr. Bundy did state that he had a recollection of someone (he does not know whom) informing him of the "Executive action" capability, but it was his understanding that this was only a study of possible assassina- tion methods, and was not targeted against any particular individual or country. Set out below is a summary of Mr. Bundy's comments on the three areas outlined above. REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS RE CASTRO ON ATTACHED CHRONOLOGY NSAM 100 and related documents re "removal of Castro." Bundy had a no recollection at all of NSAM 100 and did not know what the words “in- _ dicated contingency in Cuba” involved” When shown the Parrott memorandum for the record, dated October 5, 1961, which states that Woodward was asked by Parrott to prepare a contingency plan on General Tayler's in- structions "against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene" and that General Tayler preferred - that “the President's interest in this matter" not be told to Mr. Woodward, —ENGANT 100 clearly reflects JFK's desires because Bundy would never write a NSAM without his approval, Bundy said. However, Bundy emphasized that JFK never asked him to look into or. develop a plan for the assassination of Castro. HW 50955 Docld:324236276 Page 240
-3- Mr. Bundy still did not recall NSAM 100 or its subject. Similarly, . when shown the Special Group meeting minutes of October 6, 1961 where Mr. Parrott told the Group that there was in preparation "a contingency " plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene," Mr. Bundy's recollection was also not refreshed. Bundy stated that his reading of these documents today makes him think that what was desired was only a plan of what might happen in a post-Castro Cuba, and did not relate to any attempt by the United States to cause Castro's re- moval. Bundy said he does not recall or know of any plan that Woodward or any other agency might have developed as a result of NSAM 100. Bundy suggested that General Taylor would be the best source for information as to why the Presidential interest in this plan should have been con- cealed from Mr. Woodward. Later in the interview, after reviewing for — Mr. Bundy the chronology relating to the ZRIFFLE program, and pointing out that it was on November 15, 1961 that Bissell is alleged to have instructed Harvey to arrange the assassination of Castro - some forty days after NSAM 100 was issued - Bundy stated there was no relationship between NSAM 100 and the Bissell-Harvey orders of November 15. - President's memo, November 30, 1961, launching Mongoose. Bundy had nd recollection of this memo, although reading it today he thinks we he may have written it. Bundy noted that General Tayler ran the Special . Group 54/12 meetings from June 1961 through October 1962, and Bundy J merely attended to represent the Presidential interest. Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and Special Group approval, March 5, 1962. Bundy noted that the Mongoose guidelines "recognized that final success will require decisive U. S. military intervention." HY 50955 DBocld:32423676 Page 241
r -4- It was suggested to Mr. Bundy that if an invasion was recognized as a ; requirement, yet was ruled out for political or diplomatic reasons, and it was also recognized that sabotage could not accomplish the over- : “. throw of the Cuban.regime, policy makers might have taken up considera- tion of a Castro assassination. Bundy said that today one could assume that there were "two forks't an invasion by U. S. forces, or a Castro assassination, but Bundy emphasized that the thinking in the JFK admin- istration was focussed toward an invasion by U. S. forces. At other points in the interview, Bundy emphasized that JFK policy makers never considered the possibility of assassinating Castro. In positing the “two forks," Bundy did not appear to mean that these two possibilities were considered during the JFK years, but only that one might conceive of the situation today in those terms. . — JFK briefing on Mongoose March 16, 1962. Bundy explained, although he had no recollection of this document, that this was the type of ef- fort made to create plausible deniability." Thus, though the body of the document states that the Special Group augmented was given "tacit authorization to proceed!’ The footnote corrects that and states no authorization was given by higher authority. Bundy said this reflected an effort to protect the President from disclosure of covert actions and was a usual practice. Bundy said that generally he would speak on a one-to-one basis with President Kennedy and get a‘tlear signal" from him on a covert action proposal. The understanding was that the paper record would not reflect this signal. The President would give a clear signal to the members of the Special Group in informal conferences but rarely at a formal group meeting. Bundy said we wanted the President to hear what we were doing with respect to covert actions, and then we'd” continue doing it; but his approval would not be recorded. MW 50955 Docld:3274293626 Page 242
~ 5 = In response to a question, Bundy said that there was not another level of plausible deniability between the Special Group and the CIA. In other words, Bundy was asked whether with respect to assassinations, ue a paper record might be created that showed no approval by the Special — Group even though they may have given oral authorization for an assassina- tion, so that in later years, the chain of command would not rise above the CIA. Bundy said that there was no such lower level of deniability, "We would be explicit with the CIA either way on covert action approvals, and such approvals would be reflected in the paper record." August-October 1962; August 10, 1962, Meeting Mr. Bundy was shown selected documents pertaining to meet- ings of the Special Group Augmented and Operation Mongoose. All were taken from the latter half of 1962 and principally from the months of August, September and October. Although Mr. Bundy was able to identify most of the documents as either his own or as those he received from others he was unable to state that any of them revived his recollection of any discussion or proposal concerning assassinations. More directly, — Mr. Bundy stated that he had no recollection, revived, refreshed, or independent, of any talk, proposal or discussion concerning assassina- tions during any Special Group Augmented meeting he attended during the months of August, September and October. Moreover, he has no recol- lection of hearing any reference to assassination made by any one, either seriously or jokingly, during that or any other period (Mr. Bundy con- tested that he was at a meeting on October 16, 1962, chaired by the Attorney General at which Operation Mongoose proposals were discussed. Review of pertinent documentation indicates that there were two-meet- ~ ings regarding Operation Mongoose on October 16, 1962. Mr. Bundy was apparently in attendance at the first, held in the morning; he was HW 50955 DBoclda: 32423626 Page 243
-6- evidently not in attendance at the second, held in‘the afternoon in the Attorney General's office for operational representatives. Mr. Helms' memo for files evidently records proceedings at the second meet- ing.) 1963 Documents re Contingency of Castro's Death Bundy explained that the January 4, 1963, memo from Bundy to the President, although he did not have a clear recollection of writing this memo, reflected .- the fact that Mongoose was not producing. Bundy said "RFK can huff and puff all he wanted to but Castro's house would not come down.’ Bundy pointed out that the whole Cuban environment had been transformed after the missile crisis. Kennedy was in a much stronger political position but there were still Republican critics who wanted continued strong action against Castro. The President recognized that he could not satisfy these critics completely but nevertheless, felt in- pelled to take some measures against Castro to show that he was aware of the problem and trying to do something about it. Bundy showed us an article from the New York Times by James Reston reflecting the President's opinions to this affect. Gordon Chase Memo to Bundy re'Violent ‘Solutiaons" Bundy said that Chase was his personal assistant with the special responsibility for Cuban affairs. (Chase left the White House for the Lindsey administration in New York City and is now at the Harvard Medical School.) Chase did not have the type of position or responsibility on Bundy's staff that would involve him in covert action approvals or in- volvement in anything as serious as assassination discussion. Thus , Chase's references to a ''short and sweet" approach have to do with actions HW 50955 Docld:324236296 Page 244
HY 50955 like sabotage, harassment or other covert actions far short of assassi- nation. Studies on Contingency of Castro's Death The documents in the period April - September 1963 which discuss con- tingencies after the death of Castro were simply the type of study often commissioned on developments that might ensue after a foreign leader passes away. They were not prepared in connection with any consideration or dis- cussion of a Castro assassination. For example the paper by Sherman Kent: was "straight estimating'' by CIA office of National Estimates. (It should be noted that a Select Committee Staff member who was a very senior ONE Officer believes that the Sherman Kent Paper was by no means a normal estimate. His experience tells him that this was a very closely held paper which would have been prepared by Kent personally at the request of the DCI and not circulated within the ONE board for comments.). In response to a question, Bundy could not recall why there was this seeming interest in the spring and summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death. Bundy said he tried to recall now whether there were reports of a decline in Castro's health or some other event that might have. prompted these . studies. He could not do so. Documents on Non-Governmental Assassination Plot Bundy commented on the Helms' memo of June 10, 1964: "a disingeneous memorandum given their earlier connection with the Cosa Nostra''. However, Bundy said he had no affirmative recollection of these documents at all. He does not deny that he saw them but he simply has no recollection re- freshed or otherwise. Bundy does not recall what RFK's reaction was when he was asked to hav e the Justice Department look into the plot as a matter Docla: 32423626 Page 245
of law enforcement, or any other out come with respect to the informa- tion received by the Special Group. vio After reviewing these documents referring to assassinations, Bundy — was asked if there might have been any connection between these documents and the developments they reflect and the October 5, 1961, NASM which asked for an indicated contingency, which, from subsequent documents,also seem to deal with "a removal of Castro from the Cuban scene one way or another". the first As he had done when documents were reviewed, Bundy again stated that JFK | "never asked me to look into an assassination of Castro."' Nor was his re- collection refreshed as to the 1961 documents--he Simply does not recall issuing NASM 100 or any discussion at that time with JFK or anyone else with respect to these documents. Executive Action Bundy recalls that he arrived in Washington around January 9 or 10. He was an old friend of Bissell. Bissetl had been his teacher in college and he had worked with Bissell in the Marshall Plan and knew him at MIT , re as well. His calendar book reflects the fact that he had lunch on January a 27 at the Hay Adams with Bissell and Rostow. He does not recollect this luncheon nor any discussion with Bissell about executive action capability. He does recall that someone informed him that there was such a capability but that no individual was targeted and no action would be taken without authorization. He thought it was unlikely that his lunch with Bissell re- lated to executive action, but he has no recollection at all of that lunch. He said Bissell and he are frank and candid with each other when they speak and there is no reason to think that Bissell interpreted any conversation with Bundy as authorization to proceed with a Castro assassination plot. WW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 246
"No one but the President himself had authority to give such an order in a valid way." Bundy has no recollection of AMLASH. He does recall the reference to "poison'' but as something that would be on a larger scale than an in- dividual assassination. For example, if such poison would be used it would affect an entire restaurant and not be administered to a single individual. Bundy had heared of the ball point syringe but does not re- call it in the context of Cuba. Nor does he recall any reference to high powered rifles. Lansdale-RFK-JFK Relationship ‘Lansdale did have a direct personal relationship with RFK, but not to JFK. Bundy pointed out, however, that there is a great difference between "RFK beating up on people and saying ‘go get poison'."" It was in RFK's character to press the bureacracy hard and want to "act agressively" against enemies, but out of character to discuss poison or assassination. Any in- structions that Bissell gave Harvey was a far cry from the "gung ho!’ sugges- tions that Bobby usually made. Mongoose and Assassinations. Bundy said he cannot say there was no connection between the Mongoose three-man teams and any three-man teams for assassinations. He does know that there was no 'witting authorization” of three-man assassination teams. He strongly disagrees with any suggestion (by Helms) that the atmosphere of the Special Group Augmented made it accepta- ble to plot Castro's assassination. Special Group Approval and Assassination Plots. Bundy has no idea how the reported mafia-CIA plot could have gone on without approval by the ~ Special Group. He is "astonished" if it did so. He said he never knew of HW 50955 BDoclda: 324273626 Page 247
-10- a'case where the Special Group approval process was bypassed like men ae like Allan Dulles or Bissell or where they took a back route to the __ President around the Special Group. He said he would have to exclude | the period before the inauguration on January 20, 1961, because he was not operating in the Special Group at that time. Trujillo , — Bundy had little to do with Dominican affairs. He did recall of being told of the January 12, 1961, decision to support Dominican dissi- dents and thought this was ''o.k. if the dissidents succeed." He did not - believe that support amounted to support for an assassination. Goodwin and Ralph Dungan would know about the Dominican Republic and Trujillo. Oo ET AR LEP IAS TSE ORIN ATES oe PEELE LEE PEE a FY TT HY 50955 DBocld: 32423676 Page 2749
HW 350955 Docld:32423626 Page 2749 Memorandum To: FAO Schwarz, Smothers From: Robert .Kelley SHORT SUMMARY -- CUBA McGEORGE BUNDY McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Kennedy throughout the Kennedy Administration. Bundy chaired the Special Group until Maxwell Taylor took over that function in mid-1961, and Bundy resumed chairmanship of the Special Group after Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in late 1962. Bundy and W. W. Rostow met Richard Bissell for lunch on January 27, 1961, although Bundy recalls no discussion of assassi- nation or Executive Action capability at that meeting. Bundy attended the August 10, 1962 Mongoose meeting where a Castro assassi- nation was reportedly suggested. . In October 1961, Bundy issued a National Security Action Memorandum referring to an "indicated contingency" which appears from other documents to have called for a plan in the event of Castro's removal. And in the Spring and Summer of 1963 Bundy and the Special Group considered papers dealing with the contingency of Castro's death. Mr. Bundy's examination should encompass the following questions and areas: A. In meeting with Richard Bissell in January 1961 was an Executive Action capability or a Castro assassination plan dis- cussed?
B. Was NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961 related to a Castro assassination plot or capability? C. Was the emphasis placed by President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy on the Mongoose Program such that the CIA may have assumed authorization, tacit or otherwise, for a Castro assassination. . . D. What accounts for the seeming pattern of interest in the Spring and Summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death? | | E. What were the Command and Control procedures for ‘authorization of covert actions in the Kennedy Administration? F. Was an assassination of Castro ever considered by the Kennedy Administration in the efforts to deal with the problem of Cuba? G. If an assassination was not considered or authorized, what explanation is there for the CIA Castro assassination efforts during the Kennedy Administration? HY 50955 DBocld: 32423676 Page 2450
HY 0955 TAB A TAB B TAB C TAB D TAB E ‘TAB F TAB G INDEX TO EXHIBITS RELATING TO 2/14/61 10/5/61 10/6/61 11/30/61 1/19/62 3/5/62 3/5/62 3/16/62 3/13/62 3/16/62 4/11/62 8/7/62 Docld: 32423626 2 ee Page 251 CGE BUNDY Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) Meeting NSAM No. 100 Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) Meeting Memorandum by JFK /cf. Tab 4, Lansdale Book/ Memorandum from Mc Manus _ to McCone /cf. Tab 10, Lansdale Book/ . Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) /cf. Tab 21, Lansdale Book Memorandum by General Taylor /cf. Tab 22, Lansdale Book/ Memorandum by General Taylor Minutes, Special. Group (Augmented) Meeting Memorandum by General Taylor Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) Unsigned memorandum by William K. Harvey AO : } : ; | i f Pd * ie poe
TAB H TAB I TAB J TAB K TAB L TAB M ‘TABN . TAB O 8/8/62 8/10/62 8/13/62 8/14/62 8/23/62 8/27/62 10/16/62 10/17/62 1/4/63 1/22/63 4/3/63 4/11/63 4/11/63 HY 0955 Docld: 32423676 Page 252 Unsigned memorandum from General Lansdale Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) Meeting Memorandum from General Lansdale /see Tab D, Lansdale Book/ Memorandum from Harvey to DCI Helms /see Tab F, Lansdale Book/ NSAM No. 181 from Bundy /See ‘Tab 41, Lansdale Book/ Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Carter to Bundy Memorandum from Carter Memorandum from Parrott Memorandum from Bundy to JFK Remarks of JFK to NSC Meeting Memorandum for the Record, titled "Meeting on Cuba" | Minutes, Special Group Meeting Memorandum to Bundy from Gordon Chase i
TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB 2-A 2-D Wo 4/18/63 4/22/63 4/23/63 4/29/63 5/2/63 5/13/63 5/28/63 6/6/63 6/19/63 7/25/63 9/20/63 9/23/63 10/29/63 HW 50955 Docld: 32423626 ae ae GE ag eS Page 253 Minutes, Special Group Meeting Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 2/63 by Bromley Smith Memorandum from Chase to Bundy Memorandum by Bundy ré 4/30/63 Standing Group Meeting Memorandum from Bundy to Members of Standing Group Draft Memorandum from CIA Office of National Estimates . Memorandum from Bundy to Standing Group Members Minutes, Special Group Meeting Memorandum from Parrott to Special Group re "Sabotage Program Cuba" Memorandum from Denney to Crimmins Memorandum from Chase to Bundy Memorandum from Bundy to Special Group Memorandum from Bundy to JFK
HY 50955 Z2-E 2-F 2-J 10/29/63 10/30/63 6/10/64 6/22/64 6/22/64 7/31/64 8/19/64 Docld: 324273676 = Page 254 Check-list for meeting by Bundy Cable, Bundy to Lodge Memorandum from Helms to McCone Memorandum from Jessup re pre- liminary meeting with Attorney General 6/19/64 Memorandum for the Record, re Minutes of the 303 Committee Meeting, 6/18/64 Memorandum for the record re Minutes of 303 Committee Meeting, 7/30/64 Memorandum from McCone to Bundy
TO: Fritz Sco \arz PE: July 10, 1975 FROM: Frederic. Baron oe McGEORGE BUNDY Jestimony of Richard Bissell on EXECUTIVE ACTION 1. -TAB S (pp. 48-54 -- 6/9/75) Bissell testified that when he asked HARVEY to create the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY it "could have been BUNDY" (49) or ROSTOW (51) who asked him to do this. Bissell does not recall any specific conversation (51). Bissell and Rostow are "the names of the two people from whom it /the request for such a capability/ is most Likely” to come from." (53). 2. TAB T (pp. 58-59 -- 6/9/75) Bissell said he assumes that BUNDY and ROSTOW would have been the bureaucratic channel for such a request (58). 3. TAB U (pp. 80-83 -- 6/9/75) Bissell testified that the "“urgings''for an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY could have come at the weekly luncheon meetings with BUNDY, ROSTOW, and represen- tatives from STATE, CIA, and DEFENSE (81-82). Bissell testified that as he normally operated, he would have replied to ROSTOW in such cases (82). "When I reported to him /ROSTOW/ it would have gone to BUNDY as well." (82). 4. TAB V (pp. 16-19 -- 6/11/75) IG REPORT, 1967: "On November 15, 1961, HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of these ZR/RIFLE programs to Cuba. HARVEY says that Bissell instructed him to take over EDWARDS' contact with the criminal syndicate, and thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO." Bissell testified that he did not recall directing the reactivation of the project but, he said, "I think I did, as part of Mr. HARVEY's responsibility for Project RIFLE, instruct him to take over the contact." (19). Bissell agreed that the purpose of the contact
-o- had been to assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain it /the contact/ unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation." (19). TAB W (pp. 42-53 -- 6/11/75) Bissell testified: ''There is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY." (46). Bissell said he discussed "all aspects of the creation of the capability." (50). “Bissell said it was "quite possible" that he discussed CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples of assassination targets. (50). When asked a final time, by Senator Baker, whether he recalled discussing the assassination capability with ROSTOW and BUNDY, Bissell replied: "I am not sure about BUNDY, but I think ROSTOW, yes, sir." (52).
Me . j l.cube Policy from Bay of Pigs up to Mongoose Origin FanUA byeedOq=a9 He Buncy-Appotrimert. Kennedy Administration takes office. , , McGeorge Bundy appointed Assoistant—to-the-President-for"Na thonckSecurbcyAtfabrs . April 17, 1961 Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs. _ May 16, 1961 New U. S. Policy on Cuba. President Kennedy approved ac- f£ 2 tions.-taken by the NSC at a May 5, 1961 meeting to estabiish Ue, Se | policy toward Cuba. The NSC "agreed that Ue p - if om, vont Since the - measures anrend below (OPS ee weaknesses AN) in “Castro regime, ciplomatic efforts to isolate Castzo, im- prove relations with Cuban exiles, etc.) are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action." Source: Record of Actions by NSC on May 5, 1961. July 21, 1961 Covert Action Program Proposed by CIA ciA. At a Special Group meeting (Bundy not present), Mr. Dulles presents a paper ’on the covert action program for Cuba. The program's objective is "to provide ‘support to a U. S. program to develop cpvosi- tion to Castro and to help bring about a.regimé acceptable to the U. $. Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, OO July 21, 1960. . Augusti3, 1961 ’ Special Group Approves Cuban Covert Action Program. The Special Group approved for consideration by higher authority a condensed set of recommendations summing up the proposed Cuban covert action program with certain reductions in the Sbudgetuidgures gpresented by Mr. Bissell. Source: Minutes ERENT E rh ro of Special Group meeting, August 3, 1960. October, 5, 1961 @NSAMUAOO: Bundy issues National Security Action Memorandum 1 No. 100 to the Secretary of State, subject: Contingency Planning Age. Cuba. ~The Laseneee states in full: een age Se ae teres eae SueMaetoutor Peamanstiedic aN ‘ontingent macupae ts ere is no explanation « of the nature d coin rere ; u of of the indicated contingency.’ Source: WNSAM No. 100, October 5, 1961. Bundy Chronology (draft RKelley 7/7/75 \ tp waht GxEc KT Yex TAn 25-6 | Harvey weets. with Cott t Qi luey lve} Page 257 232425626 Bocld HY 450955
Sage” Scotober 6, 1961 November 1961 November 3, 1961 Pian for Possible Removal of Castro. The Special Group (Bundy) not present) was told by Mr. Parrott "that two other exercises are in progress in connection with Cuba~-the preparaticn of rT ot ap tig a <contingencyeplantin connection with thegposstblesremovals, " oO muthesCubansscene’ and an updating of the overall Tn SE kN I I plan for covert operations." Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1961. Conception and Approval of Mongoose New Appraisal of Cuba Situation Proposed. Undated, untitled memorandum states that ‘this group /perhaps reference to Special Group/ has been "struck with the "Ras #1 pt eneral feeling that there can be qnowkongeter LENECHStTO as a f . Eis continued presence within the hemispheric Community is a dangerously effective component of Communism anc anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republic." ae ‘he memorandum posited "only two ways to view this threat the Castro Government/ “either to hope the time and internal iscontent will eventually end it, or to take active measures o force its removal." ..."neither alternative is attractive, but no decision is, in effect, a choice of the first." The. memo co cauded: "it is recommended that the Cuban situation be Beappratsed’ in the light of all presently known factors _anda&iemapunidaneesh eo rovided=rorkpolicucalyumidi tarygectnomtc:. lOnsaca: BS. " Source: -Undated memo- randum, (00081-82), no author listed. a 1 rt Quls andupropagandaxacttlensagainst aw rate Moe Le da Satcher Lansdale Assessment of Cuba Situation. In a ten-page memo- randum, General Lansdale reviewed: (A) Present and projected clandestine operations against Cuba; (B) Possible future courses of action; (C) Possible results.” Nov 7 ) ata ZR/ RIFLE sg ot Coa ty Page 2565 1324273676 Bocld HY 50955