13-00000 TOP SECRET Question: Why did you make this decision | with regard to Jake, coming directly to you and not going through King? Was it just a-matter of great efficiency, or what precipitated that? Mr. Bisséll: I think it was in part on ‘the model of the Guatemalan operation, and in part, I think, a feeling, probably on-my own part -- in some degree perhaps on the part of Allen Dulles -- that J. C. was not effective enough to handle this kind of very fast moving, quite large scale, quite complex, paramilitary operation. _ Question: Do you recall any instances where there was a serious conflict be- tween what Jake wanted to do and what J. C. King thought should be done? Mr. Bissell: I don't remember many, if ~ -any, and I believe that the relation- ships between Jake and J. C. were pretty good throughout. 10/ Certainly the’ written record bears out Bissell's. contention that King was fully informed and that the ‘relationship between King and Esterline was, if not love, at least mutually respectful.* x * The only point of contention between King and Ester- line that surfaced in the records concerned the degree to which William Pawley should be involved in affairs related to the organization of the Cuban exiles. At one point, Jake suggested to the DDP that all contact with Pawley be cut. off, but in sending Esterline's memorandum through channels, J. C. King noted that he was against cutting Pawley completely off from contact with WH/4. In fact, Pawley was in continuous contact -- even though in disagreement -- with both Jake and King until: the | close out of the operation. . - 39 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Another of the questions which must be addressed in setting the stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is views _..the failure of Richard Helms -- at that time Chief of Operations (COPS) for the DDP. -- to become more than -‘Marginally involved in the Cuban project. Oral inter- again provided the best explanations, and, con- sequently, are entered into this record in rather full- detail. Dick Drain, who became COPS/WH/4, made the following comments: Helms was COPS [Chief of Operations]. Either on his own volition, which I sus- pect or on order -~ which I doubt ~-- Dick Helms completely divorced himself from this thing. I.mean absolutely! The one time that I heard from. Helms during this entire _ project was ... I am sitting down there in my chair, as COPS of the project, ona Monday, having spent the entire goddamned weekend working with the quy who is now the head: of | | who was then the resident in Washing- ton -~ trying to get an airplane and some Cubans. out of Montego Bay before the Brits in Jamaica came back from their long. weekend ... I am sitting there con- gratulating myself that the plane is out, and the Cubans are out, and the British are back, and it hasn't hit the fan, and I get a telephone call from Dick Helms'‘s long time secretary, "Mr. Helms would | like to speak to you." Well, fine ... well, the whole thing on his part was so. -»- to me ... incredibly apologetic .... three times he said to me in different parts of the conversation ... "As you know, I have nothing to do with this project." What he did have to do with, ever since - 4QO — TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET the Francis Gary Powers thing, he had been a member of an inter-Agency com- mittee that met with periodic regularity to discuss air matters of any sensitivity. I guess he'd had enough to do with this project so that somebody [who] had [been] reading the cable traffic told him ... "Well, those nuts down in Quarters Eye seem to have lost an airplane this week- end." He was going to the regular com- mittee meeting that afternoon, so he had to ask me the details ... very apologetic- ally. The third time that he said, "You know I have nothing to do with this project," I said, “Well Mr. Helms, I don't want to be: fatuous about this, but I wish to Christ that you did have because we could use your expertise." He said, “Hahaha ... yes, well thank you very much," and that was the end of that. He avoided the thing like the plague. One of the reasons may have been that, of course, life went on; and if Bissell was getting ‘increasingly immersed in this one thing, somebody had to watch the whole worldwide store ... which of course Helms was damned good at. A less attractive suggestion is _ that Helms figured that there was a high likelihood that this thing would screw up, and he didn't want to have the tar baby around him. I don't know. 11/ , Bissell, in responding: to the question about. Helms' role during the course of the Bay of Pigs, com- mented as follows: I think that he [Helms] saw most all of the cable traffic and I think he was pretty well informed as to what was going on, very well informed; but he was really out of the line of command on this opera- tion. There was something of a tacit agreement between us, that he would be devoting himself to a lot of the other on - 41 -' TOP SECRET
13-00000 © ’ TOP SECRET going business of the DDP office, be- cause this was taking a great deal of my time. Question: This was a tacit agreement, _ this wasn't a session in which you and Helms ... Bissell: Let me say this was probably not that explicit. I would make an observation here, and I don't want you to infer anything really beyond what it says, it was not particularly easy -- I did not find it particular- ly easy -- to discuss things clearly and derive a clear understanding with Dick [Helms] about the division of labor between us when he was my Deputy. . I don't imply by this any sense of conflict or rivalry, but he would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters, and I would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters. ‘We saw one another, of course, all the time. Quite often I would consult him -about something that I was handling. I think rather less often he would con- sult me. I don't mean to imply however in that any kind of concealment from me ~~ I'never had that feeling at all -- but it really was our habit during the , whole time that we were in those posi- tions that the division of labor between us was more tacit than explicit. 12/ Simultaneously with the decision to create a separate Branch in WH Division to handle the anti- ' Castro activity discussions were begun by both the Special Group 5412 and on an inter-agency basis as to the nature of the anti-Castro effort. Among the many questions raised early in the game was whether - - 42? — TOP SECRET
13-00000. TOP SECRET the US program should be overt or covert, with the — overt implications being the ultimate application of US military force.to oust Castro. DCI Dulles emphasized that contingency planning should be under- taken by the Special Group, without necessarily in- volving either the President or the National Security Council. The Department of State was concerned that if Fidel Castro were deposed, perhaps “his successors, Che Guevara and Raul Castro, would be even worse than Fidel. As reported in subsequent congressional reve- lations concerning CIA's role in assassination plots, it was during the Special Group Meeting of 13 January 1960 that the Director of Céntral Intelligence “empha- sized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro, but rather. actions designed to enable re- sponsible opposition leaders to get a foothold." 13/ At this same Special Group Meeting, President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, predicted with uncanny accuracy the situation which would ultimately develop as one of the key weaknesses in the whole concept of the Bay of Pigs Operation. According to the report on the Special Group Meeting: - 43 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Mr. Gray commented that a problem would be posed for administration offi- Ccials if a decision should be taken to change our attitude toward Castro, as outlined earlier in the meeting. He acknowledged that any such decision ‘must be kept highly secret, but he foresaw difficulties which would arise, for example, during testimony by the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury before Congress, at public gatherings, etc., if they should have to give an impression that the US was not doing anything about Cuba. 14/ This in. fact, ‘was the “damned if I do, damned if I don't" position in which Richard Nixon found himself in the Fall of 1960 and the position in which the United States found itself with reference to both the United Nations and the Organization of the American States throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation as the myth of "plausible deniability" overruled common sense. Following the initial Special Group meeting, there was a flurry of activity seeking some solid proposals; and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960, Cc. Tracy Barnes (the. Assistant DDP for Action) , J. ¢. King, Jake Esterline, and Dick Helms among others, discussed a whole series of issues which would be basic to the program from this time forward: identi- fication of the principal Cuban leaders -- Ramon Barquin, Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would eventually ~ 4y ~ TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET head up the principal anti-Castro organization sup- ported by the Agency) were mentioned; radio propaganda operating out of either Third country or US areas was raised; the training program for both communica~ tors and for PM trainers at Fort Randolph in the Canal zone was discussed; and the possible acquisition of aircraft for support operations and the question of US business as a cover for the operations of the exile groups in the United States were all discussed. The possible involvement of US businesses to put overt. pressure on the US government for the possible imposi- tion of economic sanctions and as a covert means of raising money for the support of Cuban exile organiza- tions. also surfaced. This initial meeting also recog- nized the problem of trying to gain the support of the more liberal Latin American Governments (e.g., _that of Betancourt in Venezuela). 15/ Al Cox, one of the senior officers in paramilitary operations was in attendance, and he would subsequently note: Stringent security precautions were placed on JMARC, including the exclusion of the PP Staff and other Agency compo-~- nents from all cable and dispatch traffic and from access to correspondence between -~ 45 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET the project and the office of the DDP .-. -In point of fact, such restrictive measures were somewhat meaningless inso- far.as keeping awareness of the project's activities away from PP/PMG. The A/DDP/P granted permission to PP/C/PMG to read the daily project traffic, (with Esterline's knowledge and permission). Esterline personally knew the majority of the PP/PMG senior officers, and in no time he had Grafted six or seven of these, including the Deputy Chief, PMG, for assignment to JMARC ... This, of course, was valuable ‘aS a built-in penetration of JMARC in ‘the best FI and CI tradition.* 16/ ‘Early in February of 1960, Allen Dulles was briefed in general terms on the planning that was being initiated by WH. Division, and at the same time J. C. King told the Director “that the Branch concept was used [in establishing WH/4] rather than the term Task Force for greater security and to simplify chan- nels of command." The Director subsequently explained to the Special Group (3 February 1960) some of the ‘activities that were being undertaken, noting that within the next week or two, the Group would receive * The crypt for the WH/4 anti-Castro operation was initially JMARC. Following compromise of this crypt, the project became JMATE (sometime in the period be- tween 6-13 December 1960). Throughout this volume the project will be identified as JMATE, except in direct quotations. - 46 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 ‘TOP SECRET ‘a paper outlining the Agency's thoughts on the programs. which had been initiated against the Castro Govern- ment.* 17/ | | | | The proposals of which the DCI had spoken were discussed in a.DDP review session on 1l February 1960 which was attended by Tracy Barnes, Jake Esterline, Al Cox, Dave Phillips, and Jim Flannery. The focus was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry,** propa- ganda broadcasts, and funding. Noting that WH Division had roughly $50,000 available for immediate use, it | was speculated that the “ultimate magnitude” of the anti-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars =-- an estimate that would, in effect, be some 40 million short of the eventual cost. It was stated, however, that funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency reserve to meet any shortages. At this planning ses- - sion, the training program for the PM cadre at Fort ‘Randolph in Panama was given-minor attention; and * In addition to the Special Group, which included a DOD. representative, WH/4 worked directly with other representatives of DOD regarding current developments and the possible coordination of activities vis-a-vis Cuba. 18/° Co ** "The big sugar sack?" -~ 47 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET here, too, the seeds were planted by Tracy Barnes for an attitudinal survey of “Cuban society" which could have (and. should have) caused CIA planners to re-think the whole anti-Castro effort.* 19/ A very similar briefing, with somewhat more emphasis on possible paramilitary action, was given to a high level group from DOD on 12 February 1960; . _and the agenda for the 17 February 1960. meeting of the Special Group, again emphasized that the Castro Government was dependent on sugar revenues for, both continuation of popular domestic and hemispheric subversion programs. *# 20/ It was further suggested to the. Special Group that dissidents within Cuba might. also be stimulated .to sabotage, with the ulti- mate result leading to Castro's ouster. 21/ The recommendation that the DCI made to the Special Group was as follows: * This refers to the Lloyd Free Report, which is discussed subsequently in this Volume, see pp. 222-226. ** The DOD representatives who were briefed were the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Douglas; Mr. John Irwin, Assis- tant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; General Erskine; and General Lansdale. ~ 48 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 1 TOP SECRET That CIA be authorized to initiate operational planning, including covert spotting and assessment of potential agents, for eventual sabotage of both ‘Cuban and American-owned sugar mills. Should this course of action prove. feas- ible and desirable, the operation would be designed to deny Castro as much as possible of the revenues anticipated from the 1960 sugar crop. 22/ Interestingly enough, although the briefing for DOD had placed considerable emphasis on paramilitary planning, apparently no mention of the subject was made to the Special Group. On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presented the sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group, he em- phasized that he was not asking for permission to engage in action, only that he was looking for a Special Group approval. Mr. Irwin (Assistant Secre- tary of Defense for International Security Affairs) _ noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr .. Douglas were all for the plan; and the Group agreed to present the plan to the Secretary of State and to Gordon Gray so that the latter could get the Presi- dent's. reaction. President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic about the sugar sabotage plan, reportedly doubting that the loss of. sugar revenues would impact on - 49.— ‘TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Castro's ability to continue to finance subversive activities in other Latin America areas: President Eisenhower also objected to the focus on economic ‘sabotage, and he would not agree to the plan to identify assets specifically for sabotage operations against the sugar industry. Eisenhower was willing to support a program to identify assets for the sugar industry " and other things as well ... including — even possibly things that might be drastic." In addition to identifying assets on a broad basis, the President also requested that a comprehensive covert action program be prepared by Mr. Dulles. This, it was suggested, should go to the Special Group; and if they approved the plans, then the President wanted to discuss them. In any event, action on the PM pro- gram would be delayed until Eisenhower returned from . “his upcoming Latin American visit and gave his specific approval.* 23/ | * The Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 17 Feb- ruary 1960 also noted that . Mr. Joseph Scott of State also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the same point. This appears . to have been. one of the few instances where Department of State representatives indicated support for possible direct action programs rather than political solutions to the Cuban problem. ~ 50 - TOP SECRET
13-00000, TOP SECRET .Despite the rather positive doubts that the President had about the sugar sabotage activity, J.. Cc. King charged ahead almost immediately following the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960. On. 18 February, King and Milo Perkins had a detailed discussion concerning the disruptive effects which | might result from interference with the Cuban sugar operation. Perkins was planning meetings with Am- bassador Hill and Thomas ("Tommy the Cork") Corcoran, and King brought to Perkins's attention that Corcoran had been willing and able to provide valuable assist~ ance to the Agency in the past. Later in the month, ‘Col. King met with Thomas Mann, the Assistant Secre-~ tary for Economic Affairs (subsequently Assistant . Secretary for American Republic Affairs) who reportedly was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct sabotage of Cuban sugar mills. According to King, Secretary Mann also would support both cut backs in us oil companies deliveries to Cuba. and actions which might cut back on us tourist trade with the island. 24/ Col. King also consulted with former Ambassador William Pawley, whom he asked to make arrangements for the publication of Diario de la Marina in Miami, - 51 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET and also "to raise at least a portion of the money, which would be needed for this operation." In addi- tion to Pawley, King also contacted Henry Holland in _ New York City, suggesting that Holland raise money, through Cuban exile Justo Carrillo, to help pay for the propaganda efforts of New York radio station WRUL. King agreed that Holland could tell prospective donors that the “money was going to be used on behalf of non-Batista groups who were going to make a serious effort to remove Fidel Castro." 25/ In addition to J.C. King's high level con- tacts, Jake Esterline and Mr. Dulles had a meeting with Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the US In- formation Agency who had requested a briefing on the current state of activities in.Cuba -- Washburn was - concerned lest there be a conflict of interests be~ tween USIA and the CIA's ongoing effort in the area. Washburn presented the Agency with a copy of some proposals ‘which the State Department had approved | for implementation by USIA in Cuba. USIA's pitch would be that the long-standing friendship between Cuba and the United States was being endangered by the infiltration of Communists and Communist ideology — 52 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET -into Cuba -~ at the same time not denying that the US was sympathetic to the need for a change in Cuba. The Director and Mr. Esterline agreed that it would _be advisable for Mr. Washburn, who-was planning to visit Cuba, to meet | COS Havana, and out- line the USIA program for | benefit. * 26/ As the propaganda activities were being pushed forward, as plans were being made for training Cuban exiles, and as the possibilities of sabotage, PM action, and other: measures against Castro were being contemplated, - a cautionary memorandum apparently was drafted by one of the individuals most closely con- . cerned with the potential anti-Castro operations. The memorandum ,’ undated and unsigned, reviewed the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in Light of what — was being planned. for. Project JMATE. It noted some of the similarities or differences with respect to “the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in contrast to the pos- sibilities of removing Fidel Castro; and in light of the ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs, some of. the ~ * One result of the meeting with Washburn was a de- cision to turn over a planned USIA. anti-Castro car~. toon effort to CIA. - 53 -. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET key points made in this memorandum are worth repeat- ing -- even though it is not known who read the piece. Among Other things, for example, the author of the memorandum stressed “the unique coincidence of favor- . able factors" with reference to Guatemala and suggested that it was unlikely that any of these would operate with reference to Project JMATE. It was noted that the Guatemalan leadership was “unusually inept"; that’ "Communist support for Arbenz came from the local Communist Party, which was immature, badly led, and generally weak"; and, that: “we had. un- believable luck." 27/ The memorandum also noted that there were a number of circumstances which would not recur during the course of the anti-Castro activity. Specifically pointing out that where Arbenz was a . weak leader, Cas'tro was obviously a strong leader; that, Castillo Armas was a Guatemalan leader of high character and standing, but no one of similar stature had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro; and that in Guatemala Arbenz had made no changes in the armed forces of Guatemala, and when the crisis came, he could not depend on his army. Castro, on the other hand had eliminated the Batista influence, and filled - 54 — TOP SECRET
13-00000 _ TOP SECRET the key military positions with his own followers and "introduced a system of intense ideological in- _ doctrination." Furthermore, the unknown. author pointed out that while Moscow's interest in Guatemala was compartatively mild -- the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico City was the nearest Soviet official available to the . Arbenz Government -- in Cuba, the heavy economic and propaganda support from both Moscow and Peiping were a matter of record. 28/ | The memorandum closed by pointing to three areas where the writer claimed that tactical -- not strategic -~ errors were being made. It stated that the blunt — propaganda attacks on Castro were forging all anti-US elements in Cuba into a united front and US efforts should be attempting to drive a wedge between Castro, asa victim of international Communism, and the Com- munists both Cuban and foreign. Secondly, it was pointed out that the propaganda broadcast out of US commercial radio stations, even if the time were legitimately being purchased by Cuban exile groups, would be a "kiss of death" for anyone: who tried to ‘deny US intervention in Cuban affairs. In part re- lated to the propaganda activities, the planned use ? — 55 aad TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET of US business groups as a cover for the Agency's support of the Cuban opposition, particularly the use of US business as a funding mechanism, was also hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum under study. If the author was correct in assuming that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny, it would mean that the anti-American contingents would. have additional ammunition to use against the US. The memorandum suggested that many of these risks could be eliminated if propaganda activities were moved to Third countries ‘and if fund raising activi- ties were, run out of Latin America or Western Europe. 29/ - Based on the language, the familiarity with the Guatemala activity and the nature of the critique, it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum in question. “the inémorandum may have been prompted in part by the increasing attention which the OCB and the Cabinet had been giving to fire bomb attacks on the Cuban cane fields by Light aircraft flying. out of the United States. The Agency fully supported Gen- eral Quesada's effort to put an end to such flights.* 30/ * Quesada was Director of the Federal Aviation Agency. - -~ 56 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - ‘TOP SECRET From 2 March 1960, when the Director briefed Vice President Nixon on Agency activities in Cuba and. the state of Cuban affairs, until 17 March 1960, when President Eisenhower formally approved the cov- ert anti-Castro plan, CIA personnel most closely involved inthe anti-Castro effort. were fully immersed in the efforts to define -- and refine -- a US policy - which would .be acceptable to President Eisenhower. In the course of this two week period, they were en- - gaged in efforts to satisfy the. 5412 Group, the National Security Council, and themselves that they had developed “a viable program which would lead to the downfall and ouster of Fidel Castro and his principal cohorts, Che Guevara and Raul Castro, and the elmimination of Communism from the island of Cuba and, in effect, from the Western Hemisphere. | During this period of evolution of national | policy, WH/4 held its first official meeting as a ‘ branch on 9 March 1960. J. C. King and Jake Esterline were in charge of the meeting and outlined the general | nature of the programs that were going to be put into. operation (propaganda activity, PM training, commo . training) and they emphasized the need for cooperation _- 57 = TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET and support from all of the offices that were repre- sented at. the. meeting, including, among others, the Office of Training, the Office of Communications, the Comptroller's Office, the DDS, DPD, the PP Staff, Personnel (particularly the Military Personnel Divi- sion), and the Office of Security. At this initial meeting, Jake Esterline mentioned that Bob Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, Dave Phillips, Propaganda Officer, Phil Toomey, Political and Psychological. Stategist, | the Economist, and Ea Stanulus, his Plans and Ops Officer, would be the principals who would be in contact with other Agency elements which would -_ be called on for support. In addition, Esterline also noted that liaison channels would be established with other elements of the US Government, particularly with the Office of Special Operations of the Department Of Defense. 31/ It was during the period between 8-17 March 1960 that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro pro-~ gram which Allen Dulles had agreed (on 17 February 1960) to provide to the Special Group evolved. Among those in the Agency having a direct hand in preparing a suitable paper for the Director's presentation, were - 58 - TOP SECRET
13-00000: TOP SECRET C. Tracy Barnes, Richard Bissell, Dick Helms, Jake Esterline, J. C. King, and Tom Parrott, among others. Those who figured most prominently among the Special Group representatives at this time were Livingston Merchant, Department of State; John Irwin, Assistant Secretary -for International Security Affairs, Depart- - ment of Defense; Admiral Burke, Chief, Naval Opera- - tions; and Gordon Gray, the President's National Security Adviser. Other than the more than a dozen memorandums and drafts and other papers related to the development of the policy paper, perhaps a note from Richard Helms to C. Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960 best illustrates the seriousness with which the Agency approached the task of writing a paper for the Direc-. tor. Mr. Helms's note to Mr. Barnes read as follows: Tom Parrott gave me for security late this afternoon the attached paper for the 5412 Group outlining the proposed covert action program against Fidel Castro. After reading it, I asked Tom to. defer consideration of. Cuba until next week since I feel that this document needs re- drafting whether it is used by the Direc- tor for an oral briefing or handed to the designated representatives for their en- lightenment. A I think you will agree with me that the paper is poorly drafted and needs considerable pointing up in various - 59 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET places. I do not disagree with the listed recommendations in paragraph 6, but I do feel that the backup material in paragraphs 2 and 3 needs recasting. For example, the reference to a “short-wave radio station patterned after Radio Free Europe", is no way, in my opinion, to describe what we have in mind. Also the paragraph on covert economic action is not sufficiently precise and raises more questions than it answers. There are other points, but there is no sense. in belaboring them in this note to you. . May I ask that you take this matter in hand and advise WH how to put it in suit- able shape for use by the Director with the 5412 Group next week. 32/ In the paper to which Mr. Helms referred the problem facing the US was stated rather simply as follows: To replace the present Government of Cuba, headed by Fidel Castro, with one that will be acceptable to the United States; and to cause this change to occur in such a manner that anti-US repercussions are not induced in Latin America. 33/ _ - Throughout the discussion of the Agency's role in the anti~Castro activity, there was a tremendous concern that there be no “anti-US repercussions," not only in Latin America per se, but particularly among the Latin American representatives in the Or- ganization of American States and in the United Nations. The constant quest for plausible deniability would ~ §0 —- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET become the holiest of grails -- constantly, and un- successfully, to be sought throughout the course of the operation by Agency planners. The proposed paper for the Special Group (the paper which Mr. Helms found somewhat lacking) empha- sized those areas highlighted in previous Special Group sessions -- anti-Castro propaganda, disrup- tions of the Cuban economy, including large scale sabotage operations, and the development of instructor cadres to provide both communications and PM training cadres to resistance groups already extant in Cuba. Interesting, too, is the fact that at this early stage of US planning mention was made of the offer from the Guatemalan Government of a training site for the PM cadres, or “action groups" as they were called. A financial annex included in the proposals for the Special Group indicated the need for $900,000 for ‘the remainder of FY 1960 and $1.6 million for FY 1961.* 34/ * Apparently Mr. Helms failed to read the financial ' annex carefully enough, for the estimated requirement for fiscal. 1961 which is shown as $1.6 million, was: either a typographical error, or a mistake in addition -- the sum of the parts shown for FY '61 is $1.7 million. It also was noted that for the remainder of FY ‘60, the Agency reserve funds would have to be drawn on to meet these “non-program requirements. -~ 61 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - “TOP SECRET . As the paper was being prepared for Special Group consideration, J. Cc. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division had forwarded a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, providing him with additional information for use during the Special Group discussions; and the transmittal to the DCI recorded that this paper had been used to brief Mr. Nixon on 2 March 1960. King's memorandum covered much the same ground as the paper which went to the ' Special Group, but contained considerably more de- tail about the activities of the Castro Government which were directly aimed at overthrowing the legiti- mate. governments and replacing them with Communist oriented governments. Col. King's paper also re- vealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua -~ the only _two governments in Latin America which were to throw their. full support behind the Agency's anti-Castro . activity -- had made offers at this time for both radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and, also, for training facilities for anti-Castro groups which the Agency might wish to sponsor. 35/ Despite President Eisenhower's previous objec~ tions to the over-emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET sugar industry, King's paper did reflect considerable emphasis on disruption of that economic sector. Another. item which Col. King saw fit to include in his memorandum was the following: We have available, a drug, which, if placed in Castro's food, would make him ‘behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damag- ing results to him.* 36/ — Even as the Special Group was planning its ses- sions on the anti-Castro program, so, too, was the National Security Council being geared up for discus- sions of the same situation. Again, there was great concern over the question of possible loss of prestige should the US act independently of the international - organizations. There also was interest in protecting US business and in the protection of US lives, and the question of viability of the Guantanamo Base was . of considerable concern to the President's National ~ Security adviser, Gordon Gray. The policy that Gray was advised to recommend to the National Security Council regarding US bases stated: Take action as necessary, including military action, to insure the continued * For comments on this subject see Part VII of this 7 volume. - 63 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET availability to the United States of bases: and base rights in Latin America that are considered vital to “the secur- ity of the United States. 37/ An additional aspect of the basic national .secur- ity policy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was being encouraged to promote with the National Security Council on 10 March 1960 recommended that: In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control from within, take all feasible measure[s] to thwart it, including military action if finally re- quired and appropriate to cope with the situation.* 38/ Following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National Security Council on 10 March 1960, President. Eisenhower approved the following rather innocuous actions: l. Every effort should be made to in- ‘fluence the other members of the Organiza- tion of American States to recognize the dangers involved in the Cuban situation. and support action with respect to them. * Mr. Gray also was advised to play. both sides of the street for with reference to the disruptive efforts of non-Communist groups, the position he was being urged to promote was the following: The United States should be prepared, if required to protect US interests, to take similar actions against subversion or armed rebellion by non-Communist elements hostile ‘to US interests. -~ 64 - TOP. SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET 2. The responsible Departments and Agencies should keep current plans to deal promptly with likely contingencies which might develop with respect to Cuba, especially those involving the safety of US citizens in the.Guantanamo Base. -3. The developments with regard to the situation in Cuba should be reviewed by the’ Council’ each meeting, for the immediate future. 39/ "Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960, Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special Group had set aside a 2-hour session on 14 March “to discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities in Cuba." 40/ Prior to the 14 March meeting, Messrs. Bissell and King received a somewhat strange memorandum from Allen W. Dulles offering “some suggestions as to possible added ‘starters’ for our Cuban paper; use your own judgment as to adding them." 41/ Among these starters was Dulles's suggestion that the International Transport Union somehow be induced to refuse to load “dangerous” munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles made the following rather unusual suggestion:* * In addition to the International Transport Union, Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to in- duce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives that were sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out, Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the dockworkers refuse to do the unloading. - 65 ~ TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Stress point that while the dynamism ~ is running out of the Marxist-Leninist revolution in Russia, it still remains in China. This explains ChiCom special ‘interest in supporting the Cuban revolu- tion and expanding it, with the ultimate aim of facilitating mass emigration -of Chinese to the Latin American continent to meet their over~-population problem. (This may be premature, but there may be something to it.) 42/ As promised by Gordon Gray, the Special Group Meeting of 14 March 1960 focused exclusively on the Cuban problem, and Mr. Dulles presented the members with the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba." Much of the ground was already familiar to the participants, but the memorandum of the meet- ing reflects a number of items worth review. Even though Dulles's paper placed heavy emphasis on the propaganda needs, even greater emphasis was urged for covert and overt propaganda activities, not only through WRUL, the commercial broadcasting operation, but also through the efforts of USIA's programs for Latin America -- programs which apparently had been sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question of location for the Agency's covert broadcasting activity was again raised and discussed, the question being whether it should be somewhere in the Florida -~ 66 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET Keys, in some Caribbean country, or elsewhere. Somewhat more attention was focused on the para- military plans during this discussion than had occurred before, and Mr. Gray was particularly concerned by the Agency estimate that: "it appears no large scale para- military effort (other than wholly overt) will be feasible in less than 8 months"; and he wondered if - a crash program was feasible to speed up the training program. 43/ The questions of economic sanctions, OAS and individual Latin American country involvement, the. ‘choice of the proper Cuban exiles to represent the government in exile, and the question of a budget -- the $900,000 for fiscal 1960 and the $1.6-1.7 million for 1961 were also the subjects of discussion. One additional subject of disucssion at this Special Group meeting as recorded by Col. J. C. King was: _ What would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevarra[ste] should disappear simultan- eously. 44/ In the reported context of the discussion it is not believed that the term "disappear" was a euphemism for assassination, but rather referred to the ouster of = 67 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Castro's government from political power. The para- graph which had raised the question then continued: Admiral Burke said that the only orga- nized group within Cuba today were[sie] the Communists, and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Dulles felt that this might not be ~ disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. Colonel King said that there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified. One pos-_ sibility was Nunez Jiminez, the head of the Agricultural Reform Program. No other names were widely enough known to. be men- tioned. * Other discussion, notwithstanding, the focus of Mr. Dulles's recommendations on 14 March 1960 was that the Central Intelligence Agency should be authorized to take a number of steps which were specifically re- lated to the development of the guerrilla capacity of the anti-Castro groups, both within and without Cuba... The Agency should be responsible for broadening its contacts with such groups and attempting to unify % * This comment and one made five days earlier (9 March 1960) by J. C. King that “unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package -~ which is highly unlikely -- this operation can be a long drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force" were discussed (pp. 93, 114-116) in SSC report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, and it is apparent from the recollections of the participants in the meetings that assassination was not the issue in these two instances. - 68 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET them to direct their efforts against Castro. The DCI proposed that CIA should take the lead in assisting these groups to develop friendships among various of the Latin American Governments which were skeptical of Castro and that the Agency should be responsible for identifying and training -~- in facilities in the United States or elsewhere -- those who would be the leaders of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups. At the conclusion. of the 14 March meeting, it was agreed that the Agency would revise the paper on the basis of the discussions and plan to present it to President Eisenhower later in the week. 45/ As part of the effort to improve the paper on the proposed anti-Castro operations, the Agency pre- pared additional backup material which could be cranked into the version which would eventually go to the President. On 14 and 15 March, the records reveal copies of two drafts of such a paper, one of which was labeled as “revised version, done by [C. Tracy] Barnes, evening 14 Mar," which went into more detail on both the political opposition to Castro and on the propaganda activities that were being mounted against Castro. These papers also noted that paramilitary - 69 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET activity would "take the longest to become a usable asset." 46/ The most important difference between these papers and the covert action plan presented by Dulles was that the Financial Annex showed a sharp, upward increase in the anticipated costs for FY '61 _~- from $1.6-1.7 million to $3.5 million -- with the heaviest increment coming in terms of the proposed paramilitary operation. The sum for PM operations was revised from an estimated $500,000 in Dulles's 14 March presentation to a total of $1.3 million for that same year. From the time Allen Dulles enunciated the covert action plan (14 March) until President Eisenhower ap- proved it (17 March), there was an interesting bit of bi-play between the National Security Council and the Special Group 5412. One of the principal concerns of the National Security Council was the proper US re- sponse should the Cubans try to intervene or inter~- fere with operations of the Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, including a possible takeover of the Base. On 16 March 1960, after Gordon Gray had been fully apprised of the proposed plan for covert action submitted by | Allen Dulles, Gray was the recipient of a briefing -~ 70 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP.SECRET note from a member of his own Staff, Samuel E. Belk, for the planned National Security Council meeting of 17 March which again focused exclusively on the situation at Guantanamo Bay. It appears as though Mr. Belk, even though he was a member of the NSC Staff was completely in the dark as to the planning that had already been undertaken with regard to Castro's ouster. At a time when the President had already indicated that proposals for economic action or direct. sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry were less than what he desired, Mr. Belk, for whatever reason, suggested again that with the new sugar legislation, perhaps Castro could be straightened out. In addition, Belk suggested a plan which was “unconventional and radical" ~~ having President Eisenhower send a message directly to Castro telling him that’ he was concerned over the deterioration of relations between the two countries and suggesting that Castro have private conversations with an emissary whom the President would personally designate. Staffer Belk believed that this was a “can't lose" situation for the US. If Castro refused to meet with Eisenhower's representative, then he would - Jl = TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET | be condemned throughout Latin America. The US on the other hand would receive the blessings of the OAS and the UN for its efforts. If Castro did agree to meet with the President's representative, then relations between the US: and Cuba probably would be improved. 47/ Mr. Belk's suggestions apparently never went beyond Mr. Gray. At 1430 hours on 17 March 1960, Mr. Dulles pre- sented his covert action plan to a combined meeting of the National Security Council and the principals of the Special Group. In attendance with the Presi- dent were Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Rubottom, Secretary of Treasury Ander- son, Secretary Irwin, Admiral Burke, Richard Bissell, Colonel King, Gordon Gray, Major John Eisenhower, and General A. J. Goodpaster. Based on General Goodpaster's report on the meeting: The President said that he knows of no better plan for dealing with this situa- tion. The great problem is leakage and breach of security. Everyone must be pre- pared to swear that he has not heard of it. -He said we should limit American . contacts. with the groups involved to. two or three people, getting Cubans to do most of what must be done ... He under- ‘stood that the effort will be to under- mine Castro's position and prestige ... ~72- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET The President told Mr. Dulles he thought he [Dulles] should go ahead with the plan and the operations. He and the other agencies involved should take account of all likely. Cuban reactions and prepare the actions that we’ would take in response to these ... The President said he would like some groundwork laid with the OAS to let the Latin American countries know that 'if the Cubans were to start to attack our people in Cuba we’ would be obliged to take action ... The President said that at the next meeting, he would want to know what is the sequence of events by which we see _. the situation developing -- specifically what actions are we to take. He said our hand should not show in anything that is done. In the meantime State should be working on what we can do in and out of the OAS ... Essentially, the job is to get the OAS to support us. 48/ During the course of this meeting, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the welfare of the US firms which had investments in Cuba; and he was pushing for US intervention to protect these private property rights. The President, how- ever, cut him rather short on this. vice President Nixon, too, indicated some concern with the American business interests in Cuba; and suggested that steps might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital in- . vestment by US firms in Cuba, terminating private - 73-- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET businesses already there, and reducing American tour- ism.* 49/ President Eisenhower's approval of the 17 March 1960 covert action program against the Castro regime thus set US policy. Briefly restated, the four major courses of action called for the formation of an anti- -Communist exile political opposition located outside of Cuba which would be the focal point for all of the anti-Castro elements, provision for a powerful propa- ganda offensive against the island, perfection of a covert intelligence-in-action network organization within Cuba, and the development of a paramilitary force outside Cuba, with the necessary Logistical support for covert military operations on the island.** * ‘Col. King prepared a memorandum on the same meeting, but, strangely enough, failed tq include a list of the participants. The fact that the President, Vice Presi- dent, and Secretary of State were in attendance could not be known from King's memo alone. 50/ Not in attend- ance’ at. this meeting was Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. This was one of numerous instances where higher level personnel ~- in this instance, the DCI, Col. King, and Bissell -- were the principals in a meeting at which Esterline would seem to have been an equally legitimate participant. ; +** Even as President Eisenhower was approving the anti- Castro effort a Special National Intelligence Estimate was in process and would state that Castro was not "demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement." (SNIE 85-60, 22 March 1960, p. 3. S.) . - 74 = TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET It is particularly important in light of changes which were subsequently made in the covert action plan to note the language of the approved policy with reference to the paramilitary operation: Initially, a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase, a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations - outside of the US so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance forces recruited there, both before and after the establish- ment of one or more active centers of resis- tance. At no point in this Presidentially-approved plan for covert action by the Agency is there any hint of invasion. ‘The paramilitary activity was clearly to be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leader- ship and training to the dissident activities inside Cuba being provided by Cubans trained by United States technicians. * Finally, with reference to the approved * Colonel Jack Hawkins (USMC) who was Chief, WH/4/PM ‘correctly noted in his memorandum for record of PM operations for Project JMATE that: The only approved, written policy governing paramilitary action against Cuba is contained in paragraph 2d of the Policy Paper approved by the Presi- dent on 17 March 1960." (Emphasis added by author.) 51/ -—- FJ5 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 | TOP SECRET plan, the overall budget for the remainder of FY ‘60, and FY ‘61 of $4.4 million was approved with the caveat that should there be cost overruns, these could ‘be drawn up from the Agency's reserve for contingen- cies.* * A copy of the approved Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime is given as Appendix B.. (Appendix B, page 300). The reader is also urged to examine Appendix C, a set of correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Livingston Merchant, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. (Appendix C page 311.) Admiral Burke apparently had become ex- tremely agitated about the rise of Castro to power in Cuba; and on 26 February of 1960, he had forwarded a paper on US action in Cuba, to both Secretary Merchant and also to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Irwin, in which the Navy's senior officer took it upon himself to examine the various options available to the United States to reassert itself in the Western Hemisphere vis-a-vis ‘the growth of Communist power represented by Castro. Admiral Burke outlined a series of options that were available to the United States, such as multilateral action through the OAS, unilateral overt action by the US, or covert unilateral action by the US. . Leaning heavily on both the Monroe Doctrine and Article 5 of the Inter~American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947) Burke made a series of recommendations covering the same ground -- propaganda, organization of the anti-Castro exiles who were in the US, or direct US military inter- vention -~ which had already been considered at high levels and were already familiar to both Secretaries . Merchant and Irwin. On 10 March 1960, Merchant replied to Burke's memorandum noting “a marked degree of simi- larity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning: the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve (footnote continued on following page) ~ 76 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET With reference to his action of 17 March 1960, President Eisenhower subsequently wrote: this result." Merchant then went on to review the bidding that had already been done, particularly in the Special Group, on the question of how to handle _ Castro, emphasizing, of course, that State was very much concerned that precipitate action against Castro's government would work, if not immediately, certainly in the long run, to the detriment of the United States, particularly in its relations to the other governments of Latin America. Whether the. response did not satisfy Admiral Burke or whether he Sincerely believed that the Navy, more than any other US Agency, should be principally responsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is not known. In any event, on.16 March 1960, he forwarded another set of proposals for US action in Cuba to both Gordon Gray,. the Special. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles. Burke's comments on the transmittal sheets to these two individuals are interesting. To National Security Adviser. Gray he wrote: ‘Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of a memorandum on U.S. Action in Cuba which may be of interest to you. Sincerely yours, Arleigh Burke. To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote: Dear Allen: Enclosed is a memorandum my Staff prepared containing some sugges-— tions which might be useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not agree with quite all the comments contained in the memorandum but I know that you will for- give the impatient young lad for his de- sire to make sure no opportunity is left uncovered. Warm regards. Sincerely, Arleigh Burke. - Why one.of the recipients was cautioned about "the im- patient young lad" and the other was not is something (footnote continued on following page) - 77 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET On March. 17, 1960, less than two weeks after my return from Puerto Rico, I ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to begin to organize the training of Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against the possible future day when they might return to their homeland... More specific planning was not possible because the Cubans. living in exile had made no move to select from among their numbers, a of a mystery. Certainly the proposals by one J. E. Pond, Jr., reflect at least, Pond's youth and immatur-_ ity. For among other things in his memorandum, Mr. - Pond suggested that the Navy: “Accept Mr. Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of a complete briefing of State Department activities vis-a-vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster. Or, with reference to action that the State Department should take, he suggested: “Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. nationals going to Latin America on the Kommunist [sic] threat in Cuba for further dissemination to host country personnel." Two items which had not appeared in other of the papers related to the evolution of US policy to oust Castro which were introduced by Mr. Pond, were that the IADB (Inter-American Defense Board) ' become involved in the anti-Castro effort -~ an exceed- ingly naive suggestion considering that the members of this group were far from unanimous in condemning the Castro Revolution. And the second unique contri- bution of this paper which Admiral Burke saw fit to forward to two very senior members of the Executive Branch, was the spelling throughout the paper of Communist with a “"K". These last proposals that Ad- miral Burke had forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence ended up in the files of Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. The memorandum having been sent down from Mr. Bissell's office, with the following notation to Col. King: Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March, and@ the latter handed [it] to me. I do not believe it requires a reply,.but pass it to you for any value it may have. ~ 78 = TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET leader whom'we could recognize as the head of a government in exile.* 52/ * In preparing this comment, the former President ap- parently had to call-on his own memory, on the memory of. Gen. Goodpaster, and the memory of Gordon Gray. Based on his own recollections Eisenhower said that neither his own nor Goodpaster's records contained anything about the 17 March 1960 meeting. Similarly, Gordon Gray wrote to Eisenhower: You may recall that not .so very. long after I became your Special Assistant, in a meeting you had with Allen Dulles and .me you gave instructions that activities of the so-called "Special Group" should not be recorded. in any place except the files of the Director of the Central In- telligence Agency. You did not ‘wish that there be other copies. It was for this ‘reason that I did not seek a copy of. the ~March 17th paper for my files, nor did I ' make notes at that meeting. Subsequent to March 17th, I began to make memoranda of every meeting on that particular subject. because I had a hunch. that someday these might be important, and I intended to put them in your hands at the appropriate time, understanding, of course, ‘that you might wish to have them destroyed. Incidentally, there were no carbons or ‘ other copies made of these memoranda. By not making copies, and by planning to put the documents in your own hands for what- ever, disposition you wished to make of them, I sort of rationalized my violation of your instructions about not making such memoranda. I hope I need not assure you that it was not my practice to violate your instructions and this is the only instance ‘of such that I can recall. 53/ TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET -B. . Forging the Tool Following President Eisenhower's approval of the anti-Castro program which had evolved from the numerous discussions, meetings, and briefings pre- viously mentioned, the Agency's leadership then faced the problem of acting directly to implement the anti- Castro program. Problems which had been discussed philosophically prior to this time now had to be put to the test of practicality. Among the problems of principal importance during the period from March to September 1960 were the following: The establishment of ‘the leadership of WH/4 and the acquisition of personnel for WH/4; - Extensive coordination between Agency representa- tives and representatives of other US Government Agencies and, at the same time, a high level of intra- Agency coordination. | | ‘ The initiation of a paramilitary training program for those Cubans who would be directly involved in help- ing to dispose of the Castro Government: Attempting to establish project parameters and to give proper consideration to possible changes in the concept of the program as time passed; - 80 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET And, finally, to retain the credibility and viability of the operation despite numerous wild haired proposals that were being put forward at vari- ous ‘times ‘during the months under study ~- proposals which never should have been offered let alone given any serious consideration. | AS previously noted, WH/4s was established by. Col. King in January of 1960; however, it was not | until 24 March 1960 that Mr. Bissell apparently of- ficially got around to approving the new Branch, for in a memorandum for the Deputy Director for. Support (DDS), it was noted: The SSA-DDS has advised of the DDP's approval of the creation of a new opera- tional Branch, the abolishment of an existing Section, and the creation of a -new Section within the WH Division Head- quarters Staffing complement. — The 15 new positions required by the Branch would be more than offset by the decrease in the. DDP complement. The same memorandum indicated that the Wage and Salary Division of the Office of Personnel had approved the various grades that had been proposed and then the .memorandum went on to state: The approval limits the usage of the requested positions to the duration of the - 81 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Cuban crisis; after which all the positions in the new Branch and Section will be re- viewed for reclassification purposes. 54/ The question of financing and budget for project ' IMATE had already caused concern among those responsible for the formulation of the anti-Castro policy, and soon after the President's approval of the project, the question of budget and finance surfaced. By 24 March _ 1960, the Deputy Director for Support noted that: “Jack Earman advised me that the Director had approved . of the paper calling for the release of $900,000 from the reserve. for Project JMARC." 55/ Indeed. the Director had signed such a paper calling for the $900,000 as "an unprogrammed requirement for which other funds are not available." 56/ | In his memo to the Comptroller concerning the release of funds from the Agency reserve, the Director was also careful to point out that it would be the responsiblity of Chief, :WH Division to certify that . the funds had been expended as specified for the project; that additionally, the’ DDP or his designee would have to approve each certification; that the > only Headquarters file on the budget for the project would be maintained by WH/Division; and that the - 82 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 | TOP SECRET ‘file would be complete as to the purpose of the expend- iture, the date, those who were involved as payees, and any other details; and finally that access to this financial file would be “limited to persons specifically authorized by the Deputy Director (Plans) ."* 57/ In the. first meeting following the Presidential approval. of the anti-Castro. program, Jake Esterline called the members of WH/4 together to announce that the program had been given the crypt of JMARC; and he | further pointed out that 1 May 1960 was the target date for the beginning of training at Fort Randolph in Panama. (This date was predicated on the assump- tion of a satisfactory report from the Inspection Team which was to travel to Fort Randolph on 27 March.) Medical. and security officers wate to be assigned to the training base and the communications link was to - x be established with Headquarters. In this early * Unlike some suggestions that had been forwarded by the WH/4 Finance Officer, Michael King, the Director's Memorandum placed budgetary responsibility with the _ DDP and Chief, WH Division. Chief, WH/4 was not even included on the routing. for the Director's Memorandum. The WH/4 Financial Officer, on the other hand, had suggested that certain of the responsibilities for approval of funding be given to the project Chief, or the Chief, WH/Division. 58/ -~ 83 - TOP SECRET |
13-00000 TOP SECRET meeting, Esterline emphasized that training at the Fort Randolph and Fort Sherman areas of Panama was” going to be extremely limited; and since there would be no training areas in the United States; third country training activities would need to be estab- lished. He emphasized again that secrecy was of paramount importance if the operation was to succeed, . and stressed that the establishment of a Government- in-exile was a key point to making the planned opera- tion credible. Esterline further indicated that such a government hopefully could be announced by the early part of April and that the Headquarters for such a government could be located.either in Puerto Rico or Costa Rica. Esterline also made an appeal for personnel to staff both the Panama training activity and Base Two, the Coral Gables Headquarters which later would be known as JMWAVE. . One interesting point made at this first meeting was that: Mr. [Scudder] Georgia reported that the DDS Offices concerned had nominated nearly all of the personnel required by 1 and 15 April respectively. Action was being taken to make all these available at once. ... [and] it was agreed that DDS . representatives would meet once a week - gy — TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET to review activities, determine the status of commitments, and prepare a brief. re- port for Chief, Branch 4. 59/ In another Branch meeting soon after the one just ‘mentioned, Esterline reemphasized, as he and others would do throughout the course of the operation, the need for security practices designed to protect ‘the fact of Agency involvement in this covert opera- tion. He also indicated the considerable degree of cooperation which already was being required from other services. Dave Phillips provided a specific. example of this, emphasizing that without the close cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have been difficult to transport the _two radio transmitters which were going to be installed on Swan Island. Moreover, Phillips reported that a crew of Seabees would be responsible for constructing the facilities to house the transmitters and the quarters for per- sonnel who would conduct the propaganda effort. from | Swan Island. ‘Because the activities then established on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal Aviation Administration, C. Tracy Barnes. (the A/DDP/A) was to meet with the Director of FAA, Gen. Elwood Quesada, to clear with him the problems that were - 85 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET involved in establishing this Agency activity on the island. 60/ Coordination also had to be effected with the United States Coast Guard in order that -there be no interference with maritime activities; and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was alerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cuban defectors. 61/ . As attempts were being made to establish the parameters for the operations against Castro, a most prescient memorandum was directed to Chief, WH/4 _ from Paul Oberst, Chief, Covert Action, WH Division. Oberst apparently had been associated with PBSUCCESS, the project which resulted in the ouster of the Arbenz Government in Guatemala in 1954; and recalling some of the “pitfalls and counter-productive aspects" of that particular operation, Oberst wrote as follows: I have the impression that our basic JMARC plan commits us to a rather firm timetable. In my judgment, we should have great flexibility in deciding the appropriate time for kicking off any paramilitary operations. Before such operations are initiated, we should have firm evidence that our propaganda and political action operations have irrev- ocably undermined Castro's prestige, both in Cuba and abroad. We should not initiate paramilitary actions until we are convinced that they will not enable TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Castro to recuperate lost prestige and rally local and foreign sympathy and sup- port. Generally speaking, current area attitudes toward the Castro regime are Satisfactory from our [CIA] point of view. However, this could change radically and rapidly, if there are any premature para- military actions. When the time comes ‘for paramilitary activity, we should make every effort to conceal any invasion actions. To avoid or minimize Castro's counter propaganda, the paramilitary operations must appear to be an internal uprising by'dissident elements within Cuba. This, of course, would require clandestine infiltration of personnel and. arms before the hostitlities begin. In my opinion, Castro will inevitably charge the US with responsibility for JMARC operations, and many Latin Americans and other foreign observers will be in- clined to accept such charges with or without supporting evidence. Therefore, what we need is a massive diversionary effort that will either obscure the fact of our involvement or make our involvement palatable. This diversionary tactic might be accomplished by exploiting unanimous Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo regime ... If it became known, or strongly suspected, that we were supporting opera- tions to bring about a transition to demo- cratic government in the Dominican Republic, the waters would be suitably muddied, and a climate prepared for the Cuban effort.* 62/ * Debatable though Oberst‘'s philosophy regarding the Dominican Republic might be, serious attention to his initial comments regarding paramilitary activities against Castro might have halted -- or at least seriously altered -- the operations which would ultimately con- clude at the Bahia de Cochinos.. As with other of the cautionary and restrained proposals which would be put forth prior to launching the invasion, little heed (footnote continued on following page) - 87 . TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET In mid-April of 1960 WH/4 made the first presen- tation for the DCI since the basic program had been approved by President Eisenhower in mid-March. In attendance in addition to the DCI were: Gen. Cabell, Mr. Helms (C/OPS), Herman Horton (CI Staff), and C. Tracy Barnes, Mr. Bissell's Deputy. This high level group was informed that broadcasting activity from Swan Island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 and that very special operations. were being carried out in order to provide stories for propaganda use. Ac- cording to Dave Phillips who made the presentation apparently was paid to Mr. Oberst's proposals. About the same time that Oberst's memorandum was going forward, the DDP was calling for WH/4 to prepare daily progress reports as one way of eliminat- ing the need for crash-type responses or actions. In discussing the contents of such reports, it was indicated that: The Progress Report should generally not exceed one page in length, and that we should not hesitate to include it in items which were not favorable to our progress, in other words, setbacks or handicaps which we might have encountered. 63/ Also, by way of keeping informed about develop-~ ments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituted a series of weekly meetings with the operational ele- ments of the DDP “for the purpose of insuring opera- tional coordination similar to that achieved by the meeting of support elements every Tuesday morning." 64/ -~ 88 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET on propaganda, excellent results were being obtained. The reports, on the evolution of the government in exile and the. buildup of the stay-behind network and on paramilitary activity indicated that much work still remained to be done to get these activities off the ground. Further, it was pointed out to the DCI and the DDCI that budget estimates were rapidly escalating, principally because: Direct costs of nonexpendable equipment {were] being charged against the project which, in fact, was the major cause of the project’ S over-obligation. It was the. opinion of all concerned that such property should be held on a Memorandum Receipt - basis without cost to the project, and that. charges, if any, should be reflected as direct costs only if property was found unserviceable or was not returned to com- munications stock supply after the project is terminated. The DCI was advised that -this matter would be discussed with the Comptroller for resolution. 65/ Most important ‘in’ connection with this briefing, was the DCI's comment that: With respect to personnel needs, he assured all, no matter whether personnel were overseas or in the US, he would arrange to obtain personnel required in ‘Support ¢ of JMARC. 66/ The meaning of Chief/WH/4's comments to the DCI, was made quite clear within a few days when Admendment _No. 1 to the project was submitted to the Director - g9 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET for approval. The amendment concerned the need for more money and pointed out that: Not only has the initial $900,000. already been expended, but it is cur- rently estimated that an additional $1.0 million is immediately required to carry the activity. through 30 June 1960 --- Note is also made ... of possible . contingencies amounting to an additional $1.4 million for which no funds are re- quested at this time. 67/ In addition to an early updating for the DCI, WH/4 also. undertook to educate the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban problem very soon after the Eisen- hower approval of the anti-Castro program. On 8 April 1960, General Cabell headed a CIA delegation including Mr. Bissell, Col. King, and Jake Esterline which briefed a very high level group of Department of Defense representatives in the JCS conference room at the Pentagon.* General Cabell made only introduc- tory remarks, and the bulk of the briefing was con-. . ducted by Mr. Bissell with some assistance from * Included among the Defense participants were Thomas Gates, Secretary of Defense; Gen. Twining, Chairman, © JCS; Gen. Shoup, Commandant U.S. Marines; Admiral Burke; CNO; General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S. Army;. Gen. White, COS/USAF; and Gen. Woolnough, repre- senting COS/Army. 68/ 99 -. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET J. €. King. Apparently Jake Esterline, the man who had the monkey on his back as project chief sat quietly by. The suggestion which had been made by Paul Oberst that the "waters be muddied" by making it appear that the US was backing the anti-Trujillo forces in the Dominican Republic was not introduced during the course of this briefing of the JCS, even though the Dominican Republic was included as a part of the overall briefing. What did emerge with refer-_ ence to the Dominican Republic was a concensus that _if Trujillo were ousted, there was a strong possibility that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic where he probably would be received as a conquering hero. In the course of the discussion which followed the briefing, Admiral Burke emerged as the principal “hawk, “ indicating his willingness to move fleet units into the Port au Prince, Haiti area because the sug- gestion had been made that. if Castro went into the Dominican Republic it would only be a few days time before he also would be welcomed into Haiti. In ad- dition, Burke made it quite clear that should the -~ 9] - TOP SECRET |
13-00000 TOP SECRET Cuban government launch an attack on Guantanamo, the Navy was prepared to. defend that base. In Burke's opinion, the Navy had adequate force available to do that.* 69/. Whether a direct result of this briefing of the JCS or. not, there was’ a noticeable improvement in WH/4"s relations with the military services be- fore the end of April 1960. On 19 April, for example, $150,000 was to be funneled from the CIA's Director | of Logistics ‘to the Comptroller, US Army, ostensibly as a working fund for the[ | This money, of course, was to bé used for necessary construction, renovation, procurement of material, and hire of native labor as necessary to improve Fort Randolph as a training site for the PM insturctor cadre. 71/- Before the end of April 1960, the Joint Chiefs N of Staff had approved, in principle, the Agency's * This briefing for the senior personnel in the Depart- ment of Defense, would have taken place in any event; but it may have been prompted by the reluctance of the designated DOD liaison officer with WH/4, Capt. Burns Spore (USN), to do much more than listen to WH/4's re- quests for the assignment of DOD personnel to the project and for real estate for use in the training program until he received a green light. from the | SecDef. 70/ - 92 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET request for overflight photo coverage of the islands offshore of Cuba. The decision on this matter was x taken up, not only with the Air Force, but also with J. Lampton Berry of the Department of State.* Al- though the ‘authorization and plan for these overflights, presumably by the U-2, antedated the shootdown of Francis Gary Power's U-2 in the Soviet Union, it was recorded that: . Ambassador Berry had called to say | that the Department ... had approved the mission, but insisted that extremely tight security be exercised throughout and that Col. Benson (USAF/Operations) inform Ambassador Berry before each sortie so that the Department would be properly prepared to respond to any emergency. 72/ The first flight, incidentally, ‘was tentatively sched- -uled for the weekend of 30 April - 1 May of 1960.** In April of 1960, in addition to working with the Army, the Agency representatives also began to work with the Covert Limited Warfare Committee of * Berry was a Career Minister and former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. (AE&P) to Ceylon who was at this time. assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. ** Powers was shot down over the USSR. on 1 May 1960. ~ - 93 - TOP SECRET |
13-00000 TOP SECRET the Office of Special Operations, Department of De- -fense. One of the particular problems of concern in this relationship was that of covert sea transporta- tion which might be necessary to lift anti-Castro forces back to the. island of Cuba. Even though all _the planning about which there is a record at this time concerned only cadres for guerrilla warfare training and the infiltration of communications ex- perts, on 25 April 1960, Savilion Chapman of DDP's Maritime Branch met with a Captain Thomas (USN) and a Col. Anderson (USMC) who were members of the DOD/CIA Covert Limited Warfare Stockpiling Committee, and discussed among other interesting: subjects: The acquisition from the Navy of two Landing Ship-Tanks (LST) and four Air- Sea Rescue Craft (AVR), the training of the Cuban crews for these vessels, and . the means; of covert transfer of the vessels from the Navy to the Agency.* 73/ In addition to the requested overhead reconnis-~ sance of the Cuban coastline by the Air Force, the * It is rather strange that at this early date in April 1960 discussions were being held concerning the acquisition of LST's. There had been no discus- ‘sions concerning the movement of a large body of Cuban troops back into their homeland; and, consequently, the discussion re LST's seems highly out of place. - 94 — TOP. SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET | Maritime Branch representatives also discussed beach gradient problems with the Marine Corps and repre- sentatives of the Navy's Hydrographic Office. It was ascertained that much work needed to be. done in order to upgrade information suitable for planning the use of LST's for beaching and landing of troops ‘and vehicles. 74/ In the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's announcement of the anti-Castro policy, the Department of State seemed to be operating: in a world.of. its own ~~ making elaborate plans for Cuban briefings and the flow of information on Cuba's internal developments. On 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, was the originator of an elaborate memorandum which provided a check list of current. operations and ten categories of activity related to developments in. Cuba. From the tenor of the paper itself, it seems as though Rubottom was ignorant of the Cuban issues before the Special Group, of the discussions among CIA, State, and Department of Defense, and of the President's approved plan for covert action. Nor was there any evident awareness of the various overt ~ 95 — TOP SECRET
13-00000 © - TOP SECRET programs with reference to the Cuban problem. 75/ About this same time, Allen Dulles made known to ‘the Special Group his displeasure that the Depart- ment failed to consult with the Agency prior to announcing the reappointment of Philip Bonsal as US "ambassador to Cuba. 16/ The Rubottom plan apparently had some impact, ‘for by the end of April 1960, Gordon Gray was calling on Douglas Dillon, the Undersecretary of State, to find someone in the Department -~ Dillon himself -- ‘to be “constantly seized of the Cuban problem and who would take steps. to assure that all of the activ- . ities of various groups were in harness and that all needed decisions were made when needed. "# 77/ Mr. Gray also specified some of the problems which would face a Chief of Staff on the Cuban activity, noting: [Livingston Merchant] has set up two groups, one under the chairmanship of Mr. Mallory. In addition, there is the Special Group, of which Livie is a mem- ber, and in his absence Ray Hare sits. Further, there is a special activity * This, of.course, apparently ignores or disregards the creation of WH/4 and the responsibilities desig- nated. to the Agency by Gray's boss, President Eisen- hower. -~ 96 — TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET proceeding under the chairmanship of Bob Anderson, with which you may or may not ‘be familiar. Allen Dulles has a particu- Lax liaison with Bob in this matter. The Defense Department, of course, has -many interests. 78/ “The suggestion that Undersecretary Douglas Dillon be made Chief of Staff responsible for coordinating the ‘programs with reference to Cuba did not sit well with- the Agency; and after the matter had been surfaced at — t, a meeting of the Special Group on 28 April, Chief, . WH/4 prepared a memorandum stating in part with reference to Dillon: The Agency. would not look with favor on this arrangement. Mr. Barnes and the -Director, therefore, plan to go over to State on Monday afternoon [2 May 1960] -and head off this new development. Mr. Barnes believes that a short paper setting forth what we are already doing in the fields of coordination and liaison should be adequate to support their point of view. 79/ Whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon become Chief of Staff for the nation's anti-Castro program was in itself distasteful to the Agency or whether it was simply opposition to the idea that State should take over the direction of a program which would basically be carried out by the Agency is not revealed in the records... Presumably both elements TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET entered into the picture. In any event, Gordon Gray seemed cavalier in disregarding the creation of WH/4 and the liaison arrangements which had already been made. (See Appendix D.)* But whatever the explana- tion, Mr. Dillon did not become Chief of Staff for the nation's Cuban program. Although it was not. included on the list of ‘Agencies with which CIA maintained liaison and con- tacts at this time, mention should be made of the CIA-FBI contacts concerning Cuba. Technically the FBI was prohibited. from engaging in intelligence operations overseas; but in mid-June 1960, Chief, WH/4 revealed that the FBI reportedly had. plans for installing a stay~-behind network -- using Mexicans and Cubans “~ to be activated in case diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief, WH/4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch with the FBI Liaison Officer, Sam Papich and ask for an explanation of the Bureau's plan. 80/ About the _ same time that Chief WH/4 was evincing concern about FBI activities in Cuba, Chief, WH Division noted in o* Appendix D, page 332. - 98 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET a memorandum for the Acting Director of Central In- telligence that: A thorough investigation has been made of the relations between the Havana Station and. the Havana Office of the Federal Bureau. ‘of Investigation. It has been concluded that the operations of the FBI have neither interferred with nor conflicted with the Station's operations. 81/ Col. King's memo also stated the Bureau's long-_ time contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit to both the Bureau and to the Station pointing out that frequently the Station was called on to participate in, or actually undertake, the debriefing of various individuals who had come into the FBI offices to volun- teer information. on occasion, the Bureau had even .. turned over specific operations to the Station. Chief, WH Division went even further when, during the course of one of the -weekly interdepart- mental meetings in State, it was suggested by Mr. Gray and Mr. Mallory that the FBI was exceeding its jurisdiction, and that perhaps this should be brought before the NSC for consideration. Col. King reported that he remained non-committal at this time, but did point out that he thought the jurisdictional issue should be “soft-pedaled.“ He did say, however, that ~ 99 —- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET the memorandum he had prepared on this subject was being held in the files should questions about this ' particular Bureau activity ever be raised. King also recommended that the Agency not take the initia- tive in raising the question. 82/ Neither Col. King, nor anyone else involved in the anti-Castro operation ever registered a formal protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana area. By mid-summer 1960, the relationship became even closer, particularly as the Agency expanded activities. at the Forward Operations Base, JMASH (later JMWAVE) in Miami. ‘In one report concerning the number of the. Cuban exiles in the Miami area who were under suspicion of -- or were -- working for Castro, or who were trying desperately to get sup- port from one or another US Agency, an FBI agent made a rather interesting forecast to the CIA repre~ sentative with. whom he was exchanging information. According to the report from Miami, an FBI agent told me that his personal opinion was that it would be virtually impossible, if not completely impossible, to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime using Cuban exiles. He thought the only solu- tion to the problem, and the one that stood the best chance of success, was to ~ 100 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET go in with the US Marines. He admitted - that this was only his personal opinion, but he felt that in view of his experience and contact with the Cuban exiles, he had a good point. I could not help agree with him. 83/ : Agent George Davis apparently was extremely interested in full cooperation with the Agency, quick- ly accepting the Agency representative's proposal - that they visit the FBI offices once or twice each week to compare notes; and the CIA field: representa- tive, in turn, agreed to pass on to Mr. Davis in the FBI any “information which the Agency might acquire pertaining to’ FBI interests.* | * The Forward Operations Base (FOB) opened in May 1960 in Coral Gables, Florida, and it was the second FOB that had been established since the formation of WH Division ~~ the initial base having been set up _. during the anti~Arbenz operation in Guatemala in 1953- 1954. in general, the Miami FOB paralleled the organ- ization of Headquarters with FI, CI, CA, Support, and PM units. FOB reported directly to the Chief, WH Division, not to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. Ini- tially the satellite communications center for relaying commo between Headquarters and the field -- including facilities in the Florida Keys concerning the maritime operations --. was established;. and ultimately the commo link would connect Headquarters with the operations in Guatemala and Nicaragua. The cover firm for the base, | was Clarence A. DePew & Sons, a notional cover:. for an organization engaged in classified research. A series of some 32 reports has been prepared on - the FOB, and the reports aré available through the Records Management Officer of WH Division. These (footnote continued on. following page) - 101 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET In addition to its concern with the interests of other government agencies in the Cuban problem, in mid-summer of 1960 the Agency also was required to provide intelligence briefings for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates of the major politi- cal parties. ‘While the intelligence briefings were scheduled to consider. the world situation, consider- able emphasis was being given to both Cuba and the Dominican Republic. In preparation for Mr. Dulles! briefing of the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, on 23 July 1960, WH/4 prepared a detailed Cuban brief- ing paper touching on the principal aspects of the exile organization, the propaganda plan, penetration of Cuba by personnel from communist countries (includ- ing the Soviet Union, Red China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany) , and the play that Castro was making in the Latin American world for pro-communist sympa- thizers. In addition, emphasis also was given to the reports deal basically with the period between 1962 and 1968; and while there is some feeling that the story of the Bay of Pigs operation should go into extensive detail on the initial operations of the FOB, this author has chosen not to do so, focusing instead on only those broad aspects of the problem relating to the Miami Base. 84/ ~. 102 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET planned program for paramilitary training and opera- tions under the aegis of CIA. “Insofar as can be determined, however, there is no indication that in his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential candidates that Mr. Dulles went into any specifics on the Agency's anti-Castro plans. 85/ As'mentioned previously, one of the continuing - problems requiring coordination within the Executive Branch was the increasing budget demands for Project JMATE. From an estimate of some $2.5 million of budgeted and reserve funds, which had been made avail- t able for the program by mid-August of 1960, Mr. Bissell. appeared at a special Group meeting, requesting that an additional $10.75 million be released from reserve funds to meet the ever-increasing needs, particularly for the paramilitary and propaganda programs. The decision of the Special Group following Mr. Bissell's appeal was that: _ This matter should be laid before the -appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was be- lieved to be wise, not because any. actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon. become committed to various substantial expenditures which - 103 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET should not be undertaken without a reason- able assurance that the operation was to go forward. 86/ On 22-23 August of 1960, after discussions with Mr. Stans and Mr. Macy, the Agency was notified that the requested $10 million for FY 61 would be made avail- able from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.* 87/ Cc. Cooperation and Challenge As already mentioned, immediately following the Eisenhower decision to promote the anti-Castro program, there was a considerable degree of coopera- tion between ‘CIA ‘and other of the concerned Agencies -- the Department of Defense, the Department of State, . the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and others. As WH/4 continued to expand and develop the various programs -- propa- AY ganda, covert. action, staybehind networks, and para~ military operations -- there were ever increasing contacts between CIA and the representatives of other * One explanation for the sharply increasing demand for reserve funds may lie in the fact that materiel was being written off upon issue, rather than upon consumption -~- an aspect of the operation that was explained to the author by William E. Eisemann, formerly Chief, Support WH/4. 88/ ‘ é - 104 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 . TOP SECRET ‘government agencies. Perhaps the best way to describe the period from the summer of 1960 until the early fall was as a period of cooperation and challenge. _ Cooperation because the needs of the Agency represented National Policy. Challenge to most if not all of CIA's proposals -- proposals which concerned the nature of the propaganda effort, the size and make~up . of the exile military force which was being organized, the location of training sites, the types of technical materiel (including. aircraft) being requested, and, most important by the end of this period, the specific ¢ nature of the military operation which was to be mounted against Fidel Castro. By early June 1960, the program for paramilitary training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to 500 or more trainees ~~ even. though the actual train> “ing of the. initial instructor cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama had not yet begun and the FRD was only in the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo “training facilities in Guatemala. It was anticipated ‘that the increased number of PM trainees would be recruited out of the Miami area, from other Latin American countries where Cubans had taken up residence, ~ 105 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET and from others who might be recruited inside Cuba. The emphasis on the PM training at this time was to be on weapons, demolitions, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare tactics; and the weapons familiarization was to be with the M-1 carbine, the Garand and Spring- field rifles, the Thompson sub-machine gun, and the © -45 Colt automatic pistol. This, of course, was the weapons mix in the Agency's stockpile of standard arms packs. 89/ It must be presumed that the call for increases in the number of PM trainees was related to the con- tinued importation of Soviet weapons and technicians and the increasing strength of the Communist Party in Cuba. An NIE written in mid-June 1960 on “The Situation in Cuba," for example noted that the Castro regime was “@eeply and increasingly influenced by Com- munists .. no longer any prospect of democratic govern- ment under his [Fidel Castro's] regime." As was past estimates, this particular NIE was unable to answer the question of whether Castro himself was a Communist. The NIE also mentioned that no strong opposition leader to the Castro regime had emerged, nor did the opposition at that time “pose a serious threat to - 106 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET. the regime." One weakness touched on by the National Estimate concerned the Castro militia which was char- acterized as “only partially armed, and for the most part poorly trained ... {and] appears to have little, if any, effectiveness aS an organized combat force. in conventional operations." For either of. the fore- going reasons, perhaps, an, increase in the number. of PM personnel might (a) assist in bringing a strong dissident leader to the fore, or (b) develop the capability to overcome the Castro militia. 90/ The question of an increased number of PM | trainees surfaced in a late August briefing for Presi- dent Eisenhower, Secretaries Gates, Dillon, and Ander-— son, and Generals Persons, Lemnitzer, and Goodpaster by the DCI and Mr. Bissell. After President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, summarized developments since the March announcement of the anti- Castro program, Mr. Dulles provided some specifics concerning the organization of the FRD and its prin- cipals, noting that the Headquarters for the FRD had been established in Mexico City, in lieu of the invi- tation of President Ydigoras of Guatemala to permit the FRD to operate from his country. “Mr. Dulles - 107 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET noted that at this time, it was particularly important that the US presence in Guatemala not be revealed. When the discussion turned to the PM forces, the De- partment of Defense representative, Mr. Gates, made it quite clear that he was concerned about the pos- sibility of US military personnel being involved directly in the military operations inside Cuba. Mr. Bissell responded that US military personnel in third countries would be used only as instructors -~ not as cadre leaders for either an invasion ora guerrilla warfare effort. Bissell did stress, however, that there was. need for a standby force, preferably of non-Americans, with. special training in guerrilla warfare to pro- vide a leadership complement to the Cubans when “push" came to "shove," a recommeridation that provoked some differences of opinion during the course of this briefing for the President when it was suggested that US officers might be required to direct these forces. Mr. Dulles proposed withholding this dis- cussion until the Agency and the JCS could talk the matter over. Mr. Gray seemed to be determined that the issue of the force level and make-up be resolved -~ 108 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET at this particular time. According to his own report _ of his position at this meeting, Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be unwise to mount any kind of an operation without the determination to see it through and that. an abortive effort would be worse than no effort at all. He there- fore thought that if this backup force “was essential to ultimate success, full consideration should be given to it at this stage in the planning. Mr. Dulles again urged that a decision on this be deferred.* 91/ In support of Mr. Gray and in some contradiction to Mr. Bissell's view that perhaps the Cuban PM force would be able to carry off the effort without any out- side help, the President was reported to have indicated that . . He would go along so long as the Joint Chiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think we. have a good chance of being successful. | He wouldn't care much about this kind of . cost [the $10 million increase noted | : @arlier]; indeed, he said he would de- . fend this kind of action against all | comers and that if we could be sure of freeing the Cubans from this incubus, | $25 million might be a small price to pay. * In light of today's relations between the United States and other of the major world powers with. the third countries, Gordon. Gray displayed -- in the ‘Summer of 1960 -- a degree of foresight with which . he has never been properly credited. For he noted at that time that if the US failed. to deal firmly with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other . small nations would be encouraged to undertake harass~ ments of the major powers. 92/ ~109 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET The President concluded the meeting, by saying that he would like to urge caution with respect to the danger of making false moves, with the result of starting some- thing before we were ready for it.* 93/ One of the most persistent problems which was to surface. by early fall of 1960 concerned the need for the anti-Castro operation itself, and the bulk of the questioning came from the Department of State, - principally from Thomas Mann, who soon was to become the Assistant Secretary of State for American Repub- lic Affairs. Mann already had been involved in some of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for * ‘In his memorandum of a meeting with the President on 17 August 1960, Gordon Gray noted that in discuss- ing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August, that in addition to Messrs. Dulles.and Bissell, a third CIA officer might possibly be in attendance; and he also noted that the Vicé-President had been invited to at- tend the briefing. According to Gray's record, how- ever, neither the Vice-President nor the third CIA representative were in attendance at the briefing of 18 August. The attendance of the Director and Mr. Bissell, but with no CIA representative from WH/4, was further: illustration of Jake Esterline's criticism that at too many high level briefings, CIA's repre- sentatives were individuals who, high ranks notwith- standing, were the furthest from the operation -- yet they were responsible’ for informing the nation's policy- makers about the details of the anti-Castro program. gu/ It is also interesting to note that this off-the- record meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray lasted only 23 minutes, and this included at least a short time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary ~- Powers. 95/ - 110 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 _ TOP SECRET Economic Affairs. In early September of 1960, Chief, WH/4 learned from a member of the Department of State that Mr. Mann was going to ask for a restudy of the basic concept of IMATE, or, if he did not ask for that re-evaluation, he would ask for immediate review and rescheduling of the timetable for the IMATE oper- ation. At this time and in view of the lack of prog~ - ress both in developing any great cohesion within _the FRD in organizing the dissidents within Cuba, _the questions seemed in order. The reaction of Chief, WH/4 however, was that an attempt should be made to blunt Mr. Mann's efforts, noting for example: _ The degree to which we are already com- mitted in JMARC would pose a monumental | security. problem alone if we were suddenly instructed to cease and désist from further activity. As of this moment, they. have well in excess of 200 people engaged in air, ground, and communications ‘training in Guatemala. Additionally, our across- the-board propaganda activities are being: stepped up daily. A drastic rescheduling of either activity, therefore, could bring about serious repercussions. 96/ - The precise nature of these “serious repercus- sions" was not spelled out. As time passed, however, it would be charged that the cessation of the Agency- sponsored training activities would loose a flood of - lll - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Cubans back into the exile community; and they would charge that the United States feared to undertake the task of ousting Fidel |Castro. This, in turn, would mean that the US would lose face in the eyes of the Democratic Latin American republics. Jake Esterline speculated that Mann did not believe that the. Cubans were willing to support an insurrection against Castro. A suggestion which was made to counter the possible Mann proposals was that: To strengthen our position, therefore, we are bending every effort to get at least one supply airdrop into the target country, prior to the Assistant Secretary's return to the United States ... Success~ ful action in this area should weigh heavily on Assistant Secretary Mann's alleged new attitude. 97/ Just how one ~~ Or even more -- successful air drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about the receptiveness of the Cuban population to a pos- sible insurrection effort was not explained. ‘That there were dissidents on the island was unquestioned, the problem was. the degree of strength and effective- ness that they might be able to demonstrate.* * Fortunately for the continuation of Project JMATE, _ the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred | did not set the criteria for the continuation or dis- ‘solution of the project. This air drop was a complete (footnote continued on following page) ~ 112 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Mr. Mann would continue to raise questions con- cerning the feasibility of discontinuing the training in Guatemala, and ,in on-going meetings with Agency representatives. including the DCI, the DDP, Chief, WH, . as well as Chief, WH/4 ana others, Mann continued to raise questions about the effect on Project JMATE | should all the American trainers and Cuban trainees be pulled out of Guatemala immediately. Mann also questioned the exact timing for Project JMATE. As he raised such questions, the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs was informed by CIA that they would much prefer that the training of the Cuban exiles take place in US bases, both for purposes of security and for efficiency. But they also pointed out that it had been the decision for the Special Group and the "highest levels" that such training should take place in third countries, rather than in the US. Mann persisted, however, suggesting that the question of maintaining the training base in. -and total. bust, the supplies being dropped to the guerrillas fell into the hands of Castro's forces; and the aircraft itself made a forced landirg in Mexico and. was not recovered. See Volume I of this history, Air Operations. ~ 113 ~. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised again with the Special Group. The Agency's repre- sentatives agreed to this suggestion “with the strict- est proviso that no move from Guatemala could or should be made until adequate staging facilities in the Zone of the Interior have been prepared." 98/ Tracy Barnes put the question of moving the base from Guatemala to the Zone of the Interior in a somewhat different context than had been suggested by Esterline and J.C. King. Barnes recommended con- sideration be given, among other items, to: The fact that a move from the present training sites to the US should not be made too hurriedly and the importance of avoiding a decision at a later date that the training in the US is a bar to opera- tional use. I realize that this latter point would be a complete contradiction of the present theory but, after all, there is an intervening election; and political views can shift so that every- thing possible should be done to avoid our getting ourselves into the box where we move to the.US fot one reason and then find that the US move is used against us to prevent or limit ultimate operations.* 100/ One additional point which was made’ by Jake Esterline and J. C. King in their conversations with. Source reference No. 99 not used. - 114 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET Secretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the training program in Guatemala might very well lead to the overthrow of President Ydigoras by the pro- communist elements which were already in evidence in opposition to the Ydigoras regime. It was indi- cated that should the troop training be moved from Guatemala to the United States, 300 Guatemalan troops. would be trained as a special security force for the Guatemalan government. 101/ During these discussions in the late fall of 1960, Mann also raised the issue of. economic sanctions which had been touched on in the early spring. At this time however, the Agency's representatives be- lieved that Mann was talking in terms of a one to three year quarantine period, in an attempt to dis- rupt the Cuban economy -- a quarantine, however, which would not interfere with the flow of goods from the Communist countries. This was a point of some contention between State and CIA, with the Agency people convinced that the Soviet Union would make up any deficiencies that tended to impede seriously the economy of Castro's Cuba. 102/ In the context of a possible move of the train- -ing facilities to the United States, Chief, WH prepared - 115 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET a memorandum for the DDP indicating that the need for training bases to be located in the southern part of the United States. should include an infantry training base capable of handling 3,000 men with range facilities, tactical training areas, an air- field for training air and ground crews in the utili- zation of B-26, C-46 and C-54 aircraft, aerial gunnery. and bomb range facilities, and maritime training and staging facilities. It was suggested that the air- field logistical base should be located in southern Florida, and permission to use Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico to stage black over-flights to Cuba should be obtained. The maritime facilities would be located on Vieques Island, ‘Puerto Rico and also ‘in southern Florida. In a meeting with the Special Group, the Deputy an Director for Central Intelligence put forth the pro- posals concerning the movement of training bases to the United States; and although he was supported by the Department: of Defense representatives -- Mr. Douglas and Gen. Lansdale -- Livingston Merchant of the Department of State, normally one of the hard liners of the Department, seemed to have ambivalent ~ 116 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 i ; TOP SECRET feelings at ‘this time about the training program. Possibly Merchant was succumbing to Mann' S arguments suggesting that the time for military action was so far down the line that US efforts should be concen- ‘trated on economic sanctions at this time. 103/ Adolf A. ‘Berle, who would become one ‘of the Kennedy administration’ Ss” “principal advisers on Latin America, - also Seemed ‘to be swayed by Tom Mann's argument in favor of economic sanctions, Berle suggesting that the embargo be expanded to include the shipment of arms and ammunition both ‘to Cuba and from Cuba to other parts of Latin America. 104/ Although it has been indicated that the Depart- ment of Defense would apparently support the Agency in its. ‘request ‘for the establishment of training facilities in the continental United States, DOD did - balk-at the use of military personnel in third country | areas in support of Project JMATE. Although Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas began to ques- tion whether his department had actually been committed to support CIA's anti-Castro effort, it seems clear that policy approval. for the use of Department of Defense personnel in Project JMATE had been established - 1ll7 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET with the approval of the President's comprehensive program of covert action against Fidel Castro in March 1960. 105/ | The difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense. concerning the assignment of Special Force trainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan training bases has already been spelled out in considerable detail in another volume, but even as the Department of Defense was taking a negative attitude toward the possible use of DOD personnel in either training or combat activities, the Agency was proposing the re- cruitment of either American or foreign volunteers to serve as combat troops for Project JMATE. The Bureau of American Republic Affairs of Department of State, however, put the quietus on the plan for obtaining foreign volunteers; but J. Foster Collins, the Chief of the Covert Action Staff, suggested to the Deputy Director for Plans that possibly he (the DDP) could convince Livingston Merchant of the need to re-examine the Department of State policy.* * The problem of the Special Force trainers is dis- cusséd in Volume II of this history, Participation -in the Conduct of Foreign Policy. ~ 118 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET . Collins was particularly enthusiastic about the pros- spects for recruiting Germans, Greeks, and Turks to serve as volunteers; but in the end, State's view prevailed, and there were no contingents of either American or foreign volunteers. 106/ During the period of buildup and organization of WH/4 for the JMATE effort against Castro, the Agency encountered some problems with the US Navy, but none of these were as serious as the difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense per se, the Air Force, or ‘the United States Army. The exist- ence of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba presented an unusual situation in view of the planning that was taking place. Apparently, however, there was no disagreement between the Agency and the Navy that prohibited Guantanamo from being - used to mount anti-Castro activities or from being used as a safe haven area for those who might have _ been detected engaging in sabotage, propaganda, or other anti-Castro activities. The purpose of such restrictions, of course, was to prevent the Cubans from claiming violations of the legal and binding international agreement between the United States - 119 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET and the Government of Cuba over the lease of Guantanamo Bay. So serious was this issue in fact, that the | Agency agreed | | | that. all Cubans participating in over- flights of Cuba would be told that Guan- tanamo Naval Base was not to be used as a safe haven, and that if they landed there, they would be turned over to the Cuban. authorities. 107/ The - Guantanamo Base also presented | a major aift- Ficulty for the Department of State. Evidence of this surfaced in early October of 1960 when it was reported that during a meeting of the State Working Group on Cuba a suggestion was put forward that the US try to. “influence Latin ‘American nations to approve US reten- tion of the base. One proposal had been made that this: be done through the Inter-American Defense Board (TADB) , where a resolution apparently was “about to be introduced asking for a definition of the relations between Cuba and. the USSR, with. the expectation that \ this might force Cuba's resignation from membership on the IADB. According to Col. John F. Mallard, the Agency's. liaison officer with the State Working Group: ad In addition, State desires that the IADB, make some statement on the impor- tance of Guantanamo Bay to Latin. American hemisphere defense. This statement would, in effect, give Latin American approval to U.S. retention of this base. 108/ -~ 120 -. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET This frame of reference concerning Guantanamo Bay led the Executive Officer of WH/4, Ed Stanulis, to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief, Western Hemisphere Division raising some questions which are as pertinent to CIA today as they were when they were raised in 1960. Stanulis wrote as follows: 7 I realize that this Agency is an implementing arm of the Executive Branch and has no right or privilege in the area of formulation of U.S. national policy. - I believe that within this framework we who aré part of this’ Agency are permitted to comment on certain State Department or other Executive Department propositions that appear, on the basis of our own personal observations and experience, to be counter-productive to the best interest of the United States. I am convinced that the course of action, described in paragraph 1 [that the U.S. use the IADB to win Latin American support for the U.S. retention of Guantanamo] is in fact within this category. It is high time that the U.S. take an understandable public position in matters of international agreement, compact, con- tract, and treaty. The rights of the U.S. to the Guantanamo Bay area have been clear- ly and legally described in several docu- ments which bear the signatures of the then reigning. and cognizant governments of the United States and Cuba, respectively. Certainly the assistance of any single or plural Latin American national: entity (ies) seems to me to be indicative of an admitted weakness on the part of the United States - 121 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET and its conviction of its legal inter- national rights. I suggest that this Agency make known to the State Department its feelings in this matter, as described above (if ad- dressees agree). I realize that consider- able discussion could be waged in terms of legally and/or logically presenting our’case. This memorandum is not intended to meet these requirements. _. One observation that might be included is the fact that the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, has on at least two occasions in U.S. mass Media of sizable. circulation stated that the United States would not tolerate any invasion. of Guantanamo or hostile abroga~ tion of our treaty arrangements to the base. No I believe it is significant to note that ' no responsible member of the Executive Branch (including the President of the United. States) has contradicted his state- ments. On the basis'of this evidence, it would appear to me that the official overt position of the United States is crystal clear and we need not at this time place. ourselves in a position of indebtedness or vulnerability with any other Latin American nation in terms of the Guantan- amo issue. 109/ By early November 1960 Secretary of State, Christian Herter, had decided that the matter of Guantanamo needed to be discussed at a higher level; and, consequently, he introduced the subject on the agenda for the National Security Council meeting of 7 November: 1960. The Secretary emphasized the need for coordination of military and political planning - 122 - TOP SECRET |
13-00000 . TOP SECRET KD in case of an attack on the naval base. Herter. indicated two extreme possibilities: one, that in case of an attack, the United States respond with only sufficient military force to protect the base itself; and another, that the United States decide that an attack on the base was in fact an act of war and apply “such military power as necessary. Herter also suggested, of course, that there would be possi-~ ble responses between the two extremes, with activities. in the OAS or the UN possibly having some bearing on the US response -- the sort of contention that undoubt-— edly must have raised the hackles on Mr. Stanulis again. The Secretary of State did specify, however, that the US response to an attack on Guantanamo would be the result of a decision made by the President of the United States. As will be pointed out subsequently, the Cubans would make charges about Guantanamo being the center for anti-Castro activities, and there would be a few instances where anti-Castro Cubans were able to find refuge within the confines of the base. Overall, however, there was a surprising degree of neutrality with respect to the naval installation during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation. | ~ 123 - TOP. SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET It is also important to mention at this time the Agency's relations with the Commander in Chief, CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison. Before the end of October 1960, the Admiral had made it clear to the Agency's representatives that he believed it impossible for him to conduct the affairs of the Atlantic Fleet in the Cuban area properly until he received further - information. ~~ specific information -- about the Agency's planned operations against Castro. When this report on Dennison was brought to the attention of the Chief of the Agency War Plans Staff, F. P. Holcomb, Holcomb assured the Admiral that any request for information which he cared to lay on the Agency would be promptly answered. By this time, Dennison indicated that he had already been in touch with General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, and the expectation was that such briefing on Cuban affairs by CIA was being laid on. . | Holcomb, .quite truthfully, indicated that neither he nor the Agency's liaison officer to CINCLANT, Commander Ray E. Millard, were privy to the planned operations of WH/4. Once having assured the Admiral of the willingness of CIA to cooperate and provide -~ 124 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 . . . . TOP SECRET -him with the necessary information, Holcomb then noted: ~ It was the impression of the CIA officers present that Admiral Dennison is a cooperative officer and favorably and objectively inclined towards CIA, and that if his needs can be met, he will undoubtedly follow a positive and helpful course. 111/ On 2 November 1960, Richard sineett, Jacob Ester- line,, and Colonel Jack Hawkins traveled to Norfolk to Admiral Dennison‘'s headquarters. The CIA representa- tives received a general briefing by the Navy on con- tingency plans for Hispaniola and Cuba, and in return, they briefed the Navy on Project JMATE. Mr. Bissell gave an overview of the CIA operation, Esterline dis- cussed the political and propaganda aspects, and Hawkins talked about the PM program, including the plan for a 1,500-man invasion force to seize a lodge- - ment on the island of Cuba. -Hawkins emphasized that this last objective could not be met until March or April of 1961.* 112/ * In a telecon with the author of this history on 15 May 1978, Admiral Dennison indicated that it was extremely late in the course of the Bay of Pigs oper-— ation before he received any briefing from CIA on the anti-Castro operation. He made it sound, in fact, . aS though he was not briefed until shortly before the (footnote. continued on following page) - 125 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET D. Personnel and Training . From the time of the official approval of the anti-Castro policy by President Eisénhower until the collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question of personnel and personnel management for Project JMATE was of constant concern. Even though the Director of Central Intelligence “emphasized the significance of the Project, by saying that he would recall Agency personnel from any station in the world if the individual's abilities were required for the successful achievement of JMATE objectives," some of those who were closest to the personnel problem be- lieved that DCI Dulles failed completely to keep that promise. 113/ Jake. Esterline, Chief, WH/4 has re- marked as follows: It was obvious that as the operation began to increase in size that the Divi- sions didn't have the personnel, the senior personnel; to staff out the organ- ization; or if they did have them, they | ‘weren't about to release them from the | LSD (Landing Ship Dock) which was to carry the landing craft to the area of the Bahia de Cochinos was ready “to load at the naval base at Vieques for the invasion. As the text above confirms, however, the Admiral was read into the act relatively early in the game and should have had plenty of time to make preparations for the activities of April 1961. ~ 126 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 sions. 115/ ~TOP SECRET things they were doing, because they were considered indispensable, which was probably correct. It was on that basis, I think, that when people like Dick Drain came ‘back home from -- in Dick's case, I think he came in from -- where he had a pretty good record -~ but he was not re- turning to Headquarters to go into an -assignment, and Dick Bissell put him in the operation with us. Gerry Droller had been around Headquarters for a long time, had been quite a bit of a replacement problem. He was very bright, he was a German specialist, had a pretty good political background; and Gerry and Howard Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of -selected, not by us, but they were told they were going to be the people who would handle the political aspects of the operation. 114/ Esterline also noted that the shortage of compe- tent personnel became particularly critical when the operational concepts began to change and to expand. He claimed that when serious problems. came up none of the GS-18 case officers were available to make deci- Bill Eisemann, Chief/Support/WH/4, was more specific in his criticism of the personnel management for. Project JMATE. After emphasizing that Colonel L. K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS), did insure that the support elements got the best people for Project JMATE, “he [White], directed all Support office heads that if there was a need for any - 127 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET senior officer or any position to be filled that they would fill it without any hesitation whatsoever." 116/ _ But, in contrast, Eisemann pointed out: I can't say that was true on the opera- tional side of the shop. A Contingency. Task Force, a program developed by the > Clandestine Services, was designed to make available Agency personnel who could be pulled out of any position that they were assigned to and moved into any urgent,. _high priority type of project. JMATE .Project, was a high priority project; and the Contingency Task Force concept, in my opinion, failed at that point because the Clandestine Services did not provide the top quality people we needed for the posi- tion to be filled. After JMATE Project ... the Contingency Task Force was completely abolished. . Many people in the Agency were designated from the Support and the Opera- tional side to fill various positions as they would come up, but it didn't work from the Clandestine Services side. We had real _problems, trying to get qualified ... top qualified people ... to de those jobs. In my opinion, the Contingency Task Force was a failure. It was set up and designed so that qualified personnel would be completely immunized and processed and ready to go with passports at any given time. But you couldn't get the people you wanted -- I'm talking about qualified key professionals in:the Clandestine Services ~- because the Division heads in the Clandestine Services would not release those people. 117/ Dick Drain, who became Chief of Operations for Project JMATE-.was among the severest of the critics with reference to the personnel assigned to Project JMATE. Pointing to his own case; Drain stated: ~ 128 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET I don't mean to be unduly immodest, but really, I didn't have any qualifications for this [WH/4] except that I was there and unemployed -~ had no Spanish language whatsoever, and my entire exposure had been punching cows in Arizona in 1940. That doesn't really bring you up much on Latin America and latinos, and any of that ... I had never been on an amphibious operation, and if that was characteristic of my quali- fications, it really characterized the whole damned operation ... about which, it seemed to me, there was a good deal of well-meaning hypocrisy. Allen Dulles, always meaning what he said, would say repeatedly, “now, I want the very best people assigned to this project ... there is nothing more. important that we are doing than this; and I want directed assignments ... I want people pulled out of tours overseas if necessary, this thing must be manned." Everybody would solemnly nod and, then, much like the case of Vietnam ... humans being humans ... we would tend to get the. people that the area Division Chiefs ‘found “excess" -- which normally meant “found insufficient." With many notable exceptions, we did not get the very best people avail- able. 118/ Although Drain levelled his broadside at all of the Divisions in the DDP, he was most critical of the Western Hemisphere Division: More of this staffing would have come .from WH if-there had been more competent people within WH. WH suffered, in my opinion, from a surfeit of ex-FBI officers who had been picked up at the time that the Agency took over from the Bureau in Latin America ... but there were damned few of them that had any particular ex- perience ... One of the main things that plagued me was that I could never - 129 ~ TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET figure. out, because nobody» ever made it clear, where the hell the project stood ‘vis-a-vis WH ... J. C. King never was told, I think for understandable reasons, to. what extent he was in it, and to what extent he was not in it. 119/ . As with other of the principals who were involved in the WH/4 effort, Drain was extremely complimentary of the Support element assigned to WH/4, stating as follows: This is a little ironic, because with Bissell as the DDP, you would have thought that if the directed assignment thing worked anywhere, it should have worked within the DDP. It worked less well there than'it did within the DDS. Red White, soldierly-like he was, took absolutely sincerely, what the Director said, when he said “I want the very best people assigned to this." So we got Mike King _to-run the finance, not some stumblebum with garters on his sleeve ... the best finance officer they had. Our logistics support and Bill Eisemann, they were really hand picked by Red White ... The DDS or | the DDA, whatever they called it then, deserved very high marks for being uniquely the people to put their back into it. The DDI really wasn't. asked; and that was too bad, because we could have used, ‘ it seems to me, some input from the DDI. Our own intelligence report structure was not Chief, FI was a nice "' old guy, and we had some reports officers Who were quite competent in the DDP sense; but the thing was so compart- mented from the DDI, in any event, that the idea of drawing down on DDI talent . to get in on this, was not well received. I had suggested it because I had been ~ 130 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET in the DDI and I knew where the talent was. For example, on just such a mundane, but important thing, as topography and geography and beach stuff ... Christ, I well knew from the time that I worked for Lofty Becker ... that there was in old ORR ... in the geographic thing ... Jim {[Brammell], ... Otto Guthe ... I mean, _ they would have been glad to supply people ... and we didn't ask. So you can't say that DDI didn't provide, unless you understand that they didn't provide because they really weren't asked.* 120/ Although the Agency's own personnel assignments have been criticized, the assignment of two of the key military personnel involved in the JMARC operation proved to be quite successful. Col. Jack Hawkins, United States Marine Corps, and Lt. Col. Frank Egan, United States army, were in charge of the overall PM activity (Hawkins) and the PM training (Egan) for the Cuban. exile brigade. Hawkins, who was serving on the Staff of the Marine School:at Quantico, Virginia at * Drain's suggestion that.the DDI was left completely in the cold during the Bay of Pigs operation overstates the case. As early as January 1959 there is evidence that Mr. Helms agreed to cut the DDI in on “useful intelligence to which it would be well for the DD/I to have access" from State cable traffic on Cuba being carried over CIA channels. A “massive" study of Cuban telecommunications facilities prepared by ORR in the fall of 1960 led Mr. Bissell to send a memo of commendation for the Communications. Branch through the DDI. Obviously the DDI knew something was a- foot. 120a/_ - . : - 131 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET the time that he was assigned to Project JMARC, had taken part in the battles of Bataan and Corregidor; had been taken prisoner with the fall of Corregidor; and escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war camp at Davao, Mindanao; and joined the Philippine guerrilla forces, leading raiding parties and harassing attacks against the Japanese army in the Philippines. After seven months of such activity, he was evacuated by submarine from the Philippines in November 1943 and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for these actions. After returning. to the United States for additional training, in November 1944 Hawkins again returned to the Pacific area where he was an assistant operations officer taking part in the assault ‘and capture of Okinawa. For this service, he received a Bronze Star Medal. During the Korean conflict, he was Commanding Officer of the lst Battalion, lst Marines; and he led the Battalion in combat ‘during the Inchon landing and in subsequent operations in Korea. For his participation in the Inchon-Seoul op- eration, Hawkins had received the Silver Star Medal for heroism. From March 1956 to the summer of 1959 when he entered the Naval War College, Hawkins had - 132 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 . TOP SECRET served as liaison officer with the Amphibious Forces Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia -- a pertinent assign- ment for his transfer to Project JMARC. Lt. Col. Egan's military record showed a well- trained infantry officer who had served overseas in the European Theater during the course of World War Lv II; an infantry officer including an infantry train- _ing officer in much of the period following World War II; and a staff officer in the Special Warfare Division of the United States Army in 1958, serving . with the Director of Plans, in Washington from 1958 to 1960. Immediately prior to his assignment to Project JMATE, Colonel Egan had been on: the Operations — and Training Staff of a Joint Support Group, head- quartered in’ Washington. Egan EOD'd with Project JMATE, 27 June 1960, and Hawkins on 29 August of 1960. 121/ Both officers received high marks from Mr. Bissell and Jake Esterline, and particularly from Dick Drain, who stated: I thought they [Hawkins and Egan] were first rate ... I mean first rate, not com- pared with the jaded World War II memory, but first rate in terms of officers then serving in the armed forces of the United States. The Hawkins selection was an excellent one. .I don't myself, know how - 133 - ~TOP SECRET
13-00000 ‘TOP SECRET one could have found a better man. People have said ... “Well, the son of a bitch just worked out in the Philippines as a stay behind ... what did he know?" He knew a lot. He had written a book on guerrillas. He was sharp, he was smart, and honest, and not overly ambitious. I am sure that he saw this as a way to further his career, of course. Military men, I ‘think, tend to maximize that more than Agency people. But that was not his: motivation -- or his primary motivation. He had around him some really first rate help.... not very high ranking ... but _we didn't need an awful lot of high ranking 2... we needed some hard workers. Frank Egan, who went down to do the training, was the man that I. would have picked. He was probably the most disputable of the bunch because he was pretty volatile. He has been condemned for leading the Cuban manpower to believe that they were going to get more support than he had any right to let them know about. Well, I wasn't there, but I know damned well that if I had been, I would have been priming up the Brigade to do this tough job, not by ‘counseling them as to the difficulty of it ... at least, exclusively «+. OXY, Giving them lectures about now you will really have to do this on your own, because you are not going to get one iota of assistance from the armed forces. You don't normally train a group to conduct an operation. of this sort by playing on their fears. If, down there at the end of the line -- first in Guatemala and then in Nicaragua -- Egan led them to believe that they were going to get them more help than he had any right to let them know, well, I can understand why that’ would have happened.* 122/ With reference to Colonel Hawkins, Jake Esterline has noted: (footnote continued on following page) - 134 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET , By way of illustrating some of the problems encountered in acquiring adequate personnel for the JMATE operation, on the very day that President Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro program, a memorandum was being sent to the Deputy Director for Plans from the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division noting that two individuals assigned to the Office of Training were ‘urgently needed for service in WH/4. Colonel King reported to the DDP that although Colonel Matt Baird, Director of Training, was agreeable to. the release of the two individuals to serve as PM trainers, Baird insisted that the men could not be I guess that it is only fair to say that that assignment [Project JMARC] cost him his general's star, and a good many other things in terms of his record. 123/ The author of this history attempted to arrange oral history interviews with Colonels Hawkins and Egan, but in neither. case would the individuals consent to such interview. In addition, the author also asked each man if he would be willing to respond to a series of written questions, and neither would agree to this. It was made quite clear to the author that both indi- viduals harbored considerable resentment about their relationships and association with the Agency at the time of the Bay of Pigs. In a similar manner,. Col. John F. Mallard, United States Marine Corps who was Liaison Officer between the Agency and the Depart- ment of Defense, at the time of the Bay of Pigs, also rejected the author's request for either an oral inter- view or a response to written questions. ~ 135 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 _ TOP SECRET released until suitable replacements could be found to take over their tasks in the Office of Training. King, therefore, appealed to the Deputy Director for Plans for their immediate release. 124/ Not only did the Clandestine Service encounter difficulty in obtaining personnel from within its own units to serve in WH/4, it also appeared to draw blanks in terms of Cubans willing to volunteer for the strug- gle against Castro. In response to a November 1959 memorandum to all WH field. stations and bases asking that they supply the names of Cubans who would be willing to work as agents against the Castro Govern~ ‘ment, WH/4/FI reported the results of its search, stating that as of June 1960: Many of the Agents who were proposed by other WH Stations for use in Cuba were either found unacceptable, or did not want to accept such an assignment.’ Other sta- tions were unable to come up with any assets who might gain access to the de- sired targets in Cuba. 125/ The problem which Col. Baird had raised back in March concerning replacement for personnel who might be assigned to Project. WH/4 was not actually resolved . until June of 1960 when: Colonel. White announced that DDS per- sonnel on full time detail to JMARC -~ 136 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET would be transferred to the project Table of Organization, effective the beginning of the first pay périod in July 1960. Employees on detail to the project from the Clandestine Services offices will not be transferred since DDP considers them temporary assignments with the personnel returning to their parent office when the project is completed. Colonel White pointed out, that although DDS personnel would be transferred to the project, there- by relieving. slots in the various DDS ele- ments, each office head should keep in mind that his employees will be returning to him, and he should pian accordingly. 126/ Colonel White's comments are quite understandable in view of the fact that of 104 personnel’ on duty with JMATE on 7-8 June 1960, only 32 were Clandestine Serv- ices careerists; and excepting a few with DDI career designations, the bulk of the personnel were Support - careerists. By 14 June 1960, Colonel King was appeal- ing to the DDP for an increment which would bring total JMATE personnel to 234, including 131 employees “who were “to be in the field. Apparently, however, the Deputy Director for Plans approved a-total ceiling of only 158 staff personnel by the end of June 1960; and.in August. of 1960, Chief, WH Division forwarded a revised staffing guide, calling for a total of 274 positions and requesting that “as soon after 15 Augast as is possible, a total of 40 additional staff personnel" -~ 137 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET be added to the 158 who were then on duty -- making a new total of 198. | Although Mr. Bissell approved the recommended increment, he nonetheless wrote a memorandum to C. tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A, suggesting that Barnes and Dick Helms (surprisingly) take a close look at the JMATE staffing pattern to see if there were areas of duplication, particularly between the field bases and Headquarters. The DDP suggested that in the areas of FI and PM there might be slots in either the For- ward Operations Base in Miami or in JMOARSMAN -- the Panama Training Site -- where possibly the staffs could ‘be transferred during slack periods to conduct similar operations in other parts of the JMATE opera- tion. * 127/ * Lest the reader be confused by the term “Forward Operations Base," this was the JMWAVE activity in the Miami area, which continued to operate subsequent to the Bay of Pigs. At the same time that the Bay of - Pigs operation was. getting under way, there was con- siderable emphasis from various individuals in Head- quarters for establishment of a “Forward Command Post," which also might be located in the Miami area, possibly in the communications complex. Some even suggested the possibility of establishing a sub-command post in a third country. In any event, no Forward Command Post was established. 128/ - 138 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET By early November 1960, as the concept of the operation was shifting from one of guerrilla warfare and infiltration to invasion, the staffing pattern for WH/4 was again increased. Mr. Bissell authorizing a total of 308 positions. Even as he signed the approval, however, Mr. Bissell noted his reservations, _ Saying: I have signed this request to indicate my approval, but do. so with a good deal of. concern. I realize that this is a very major and top priority activity and I also realize that the senior officers engaged in it continue to be heavily overworked. On the other hand, I am fearful that the addition of large numbers of personnel will not in fact reduce the load on those indi- viduals who are most overworked, but may instead create additional burdens of management without contributing signifi- cantly to the success of the underlying activities. I am concerned also that we may be simply running: out of suitable people in the Agency in certain categories. Accordingly, I urge you to re-examine even the double-starred positions in the staff- ing guide submitted with your request to see whether they are all in fact of a high _ order of essentiality.* 129/ * Much of the staffing problem, of course, traces back to the failure of the DDP to insure early on that ‘only the best people be assigned to the WH/4 project. As early as August of 1960, it had been indicated that the DDP might be leaning toward the use of directed assignments, but nothing ever came of this. 130/ - 139 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Even before. Mr.. Bissell's memorandum of early November 1960, indicating the possibility that experts in certain areas might no longer be available from within the Agency, proposals had gone forward request- ing permission for the use of American contract person- nel in the maritime operations. Unlike the brouhaha that was precipitated by the early suggestions for the use of American volunteers from the ground forces, the authorization for the use of US contracts: in mari~ time activities apparently was granted without much debate. The statement of the. requirements for the ‘ use of the US contracts indicated that US citizens would be put under contract to act not only as trainers for the crews of LCI's, LCU's, LCVP's, and SK's, but | also, that they would serve in key positions as LCI captains, LCI diesel engineers, and _LCU ¢oxwains during training and operations, where qualified Cubans cannot be obtained. This would require their entering Cuban coastal waters and, on occasions, touching on Cuban beaches, when operations so re- quire. It is essential for operations that these key positions be held by qualified and dependable men. At this time, it is not expected that Cuban trainees qualified for such positions’or possessing the necessary aptitude and character to permit successful training will be found. If. - 140 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 : TOP SECRET. they are located, the use of U.S. contract ' personnel. will correspondingly be cut down. Staff personnel will assist in the training of all crews but will not be used in opera- _ tions. 131/ . Not only were such contract employees authorized, but by early November 1960 a cable from Headquarters to the Forward Operations Base noted: . In view degree risk involved rendezvous-. type mission request Case Officer advise ‘all Maritime contract personnel bonus this .- type mission be hereafter $100.00. Bonus for Cuban territory beach landings or caching would remain $500.00. 132/ By the early fall of 1960, the question of rota- - tion of staff personnel for Project JMATE had become a serious matter. Many of those who had initially joined the project had come in on 90-day rotation periods, and in a cable to Headquarters, Ernie Sparks, the overall Liaison Officer for Project JMATE for COS Guatemala, requested that Headquarters approve a ro- tational plan since: | Most personnel adjusted family and business problems to period they told they be absent and fact they on. duty seven days a week as well as being con- fined.to training areas which lack “recreation facilities. 133/ Bill Eisemann, who was. Chief of Support for WH/4, was particularly critical of the 90-day TDY assignments, saying: - 141 -— TOP SECRET
13-00000° TOP SECRET They [the DDP] would bring a man in, and then another man would come in to replace him. It was really a tremendous task to keep up with. it, because a lot of these people had. personal problems. . In ‘some cases they would cable and request release from their assignment for personal reasons. We attempted to satisfy most of these requests. Herb Juul.was the assigned Personnel. Officer within the project. He had to constantly keep a check on the loca- ‘tion of our personnel, and when their time was up for replacement, he would then visit with the Clandestine Services, and also the Support components, and give them a list- ing of the names of potential TDY returnees. The Support components and Clandestine Services then provided names of people who would be replacements. That was a hell of a task, now, believe me. When you have a Lull time project running 15 months or more, you have people returning on a 90 day basis, and. constantly being replaced ... you can't expect the greatest efficiency in opera~ ' tions. 134/ - = 142 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 » TOP SECRET Part III Changing Concepts It has already been pointed out that the initial planning for paramilitary operations against Castro | was to be based on extremely small units. Two or three man units, including a communicator, would be trained and infiltrated (or dropped) into Cuba to work with a dissident group. ‘One trainer would be the adviser for the types of guerrilla warfare activities which the anti-Castro dissidents might undertake safely and. reasonably securely. There had been some signs of dissatisfaction with this particular type of program prior to the summer of 1960. By the late summer of 1960 and through the fall there was to be a complete and radical shift in the concept of the paramilitary operations’ in which the forces backed by CIA should engage. In late August-September, there were some clues that changes in the nature of operations were being contemplated. ‘During the last week of August and in the initial week of September 1960, -Savilion Chapman claimed that he and a Col. Evans, Acting Chief, PMG/DDP, were “briefed by WH/4 planners on the - 143 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET approximate number of troops, tanks, and vehicles for which sea transport would be required." In that same period Lt. Col. Frank Egan and Commander Norman Imler of the WH/4. staff ‘reported they asked the Mari- time Branch to draft a memo to the DDP giving infor- mation on the foreign cargo vessels that would be required for troop transport, including their owner- ship, their costs, and on the methods of their acquisi- tion. 1/ Inasmuch as Egan had been requested for the proj- ect to become the trainer for the PM forces, it was | apparent that. some changes were contemplated. The reference to the use of vessels for the transport of tanks would indicate that something beyond hit-and-run exercises were being contemplated. Before mid-October, Lt. Col. Egan and a representative of the Logistics Branch of WH/4' had spelled out some additional details for the Maritime Branch of Special Operations. At that time, according to Mr. Chapman's report, WH/4_ was talking about deck loading of 3 LCV's, with 5 armored tanks, 5 2-1/2 ton trucks, one caterpillar dozer, and two gasoline tank trucks -- hardly type of equipment which would be required for 2-3 man guer- rilla teams. 2/ = 144 - oe TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET By the first week in November 1960, it had be- come clear to the most senior planners of the anti-~ Castro effort -- Jake Esterline, J. C. King, Tracy Barnes, and Richard Bissell -- that decisions were going to have to be made about all aspects of the | paramilitary program. The basic question being whether a paramilitary program under CIA aegis ‘should be launched at Castro, or whether, at this time, such | a program should become a joint operation between the Department of Defense and the Agency. In the dis- cussion among Agency personnel, in the discussions between Agency personnel and representatives of the Special Group, and in discussions within the meetings - of the Special Group, the whole gammut of options was being explored. Barnes, apparently deferring to Bissell, suggested that rather than small team activi- ties something: on the order of 10-20 man teams be formed and tried out. Barnes was very emphatic that what was needed at this time, was a willingness to run some risks --. including the risk of defeat. Barnes was critical of the Special Group, pointing out that the apparent belief of the Group was that every opera- tion had to succeed; and that if ‘there were “losses, ~ 145 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET failures, or mishaps," the Special Group seemed to ‘want to cancel everything. This was contrary, com— pletely, to Barnes' concept of operational activity. What both Barnes and Bissell supported in terms of the smaller team activity were that: The implementation of such teams would indicate whether the dissident elements in Cuba were Likely to rally around such groups, once it had been established that such groups could provide guidance and supply for the anti-Castro activities. These teams also would provide a test ‘of the Castro forces. Could Castro's militia or his army contain. the guerrilla forces, if such forces were led by cadres trained by the Agency? Or would the Castro resistance crumble in the face of effective dissident elements? 3/ Even as this discussion was going on, it became ‘clear that the small team concept was going to go by the board; and when the Agency tried to jump the op- tion to a 3,000 man force for making a lodgment in . Cuba in the conventional manner (e.g., amphibious - 146 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET assault), the plan was rejected by the Special Group in a meeting of 3 November 1960. The Department of Defense supported the Agency, but State objected and suggested that perhaps the point where covert intervention was ‘possible had passed. Gordon Gray even went so far as to raise the possibility of a fake attack on Guantanamo as a means of justifying overt us intervention. It was at this same meeting that Mr.. Livingston Merchant of the Department of State raised the question of whether plans were being made to assassinate Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Che Guevara ~~ at which point General Cabell, _ the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, | pointed out that such activities as assassination were extremely difficult to manage and that the CIA had no, capability for such an operation. 4/ Even as the size of the Cuban exile force was. being debated, Headquarters cabled to Guatemala (4 November 1960) that the small team concept had gone by the board and that planning should begin for _ training a conventional amphibious assault force of at least 1,500 infantrymen. Outlines sent to the infantry training base in Guatemala. (JMTRAV), emphasized = 147 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET the need to instill an esprit de corps among the trainees. To do this JMTRAV was urged to provide for unit separation, competition in the military arts, and specific identities for the individual -units “through the use of scarfs,. caps, or some other de- vice. This new training program was to be instigated in November 1960 and to be completed by the end of January 1961. Sf . | Even as the discussions over the changing con- cept were going on, the Director of Central Intelli- gence and the Deputy Director for Plans were scheduled to brief President-elect John F. Kennedy on 18 Novem- ber. 6/ The concept to be presented to the President was that a force of 600 men would be landed by. LST on © Cuban shores and that these men would move inland to create “a safe area in a mountain fastness. These men, with possibly another 600 man unit in another area, and those who* joined them from within, would be resupplied by air drop." 7/ In addition, there would be new recruits in the pipeline to provide sup~ port for those who had landed. An airstrip in Nica- ragua would be used to support air operations,. and it was intimated that the US and possibly allied ~ 148 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET governments would recognize that the force lodged in Cuba and its nominal leadership was the Provisional Government of Cuba. 8/ One strange and contradictory note which appeared. during WH/4's staff meeting on 15 November to plan the briefing for the DDP prior to his participation with the DCI in briefing the President elect was the following item stating: Our [CIA's] original. concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. ‘There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned. Our second concept (1,500- 3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be ‘unachiev- able, except as a joint Agency/DOD action. Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed. 9/ How, if in mid-November 1960 the concept of the a 1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beachhead with an. ‘airstrip was envisioned by the senior. personnel in WH/4 as “unachievable" except as a joint CIA/DOD ef- fort, did it become "achievable" in March 1961 with only 1,200 men and as an Agency operation? What was being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 be- came the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs - 149 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Operation in March 1961. Certainly there was no lessening in the controls that Castro had instituted, nor in the efficiency of the military forces and militia that he had at his command by April 1961.* One of the principal problems posed by Project JMATE -~- both before and after the concept changed in November 1961 -- was whether the training activity at JMTRAV and JMADD in Guatemala should be, or could be, continued without reflection upon the position of the United States Government. Thomas Mann of the State Department became increasingly concerned about this situation; and the discussions within the Special Group and among the concerned Agencies during the period from the middle of November until the end of the year, focused very frequently on this question. Considering the continuingly favorable reception to Agency activities from Ydigoras Fuentes, Guatemala's * During interviews with the author of this history, Messrs. Bissell, Esterline, and Drain had only slight remembrance of the details of these meetings of 15-16 November 1960 when they ruled out what. would be, in effect, the invasion plan implemented in April 1961 at Playa Giron -- and at that time it was minus the joint support of the Department of Defense: This point was completely overlooked by both the Inspector General and the Taylor Committee post mortems on the © Bay of Pigs. ~ 150 - TOP SECRET on ey
13-00000 TOP SECRET | President, State's concern that the training “places . too much strain on the government of Guatemala" appear unrealistic. The Department's real concerns were _with potential criticism from the OAS and the UN. ‘Certainly Ydigoras was. not interested in the removal of those military units which could most. effectively Py guarantee his continued reign as President of Guatemala -- the Cubans in training for both air and ground -activities.* 10/ Even as the Special Group was trying to determine whether or not the forces in training in Guatemala should be removed, the Agency proceeded apace with plans for the staffing necessary to put a 600-man ‘strike force in training. Chief, WH/4 Personnel estimated that in addition to 14 staffers, there would be a requirement for 146 military personnel if such training were to succeed. Well prior to the officially agreed-to change in concept, Chief, WH/4 had anticipated a significant increase in funding * The internal situation,in Guatemala vis a vis the training operations is discussed in detail in Volume II of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Opera- tion, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy. - 151 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET for JMARC requesting of the DDP that: With your approval, in the interim period [as new budget estimates were being prepared], project funds will be used as required to meet operational necessity without strict adherence to the preliminary estimates of last June [1960].* 10a/ Although Mr. Bissell approved the request, he made this interesting comment: What is disturbing is that the overrun reported' in your memorandum seems to have . occurred long before you could be feeling any effect of the (planned expansion] in {PM] plans. 10b/ Contrary to suggestions that the President of Guatemala was concerned, about the Cuban training ac- tivity, a cable of 22 November 1960 to the Director from Guatemala indicated that the ground training ' base was undergoing a major reorganization because permission for the establishment of a tactical train- ‘ing area at another of the fineas (estates) controlled _by Roberto Alejos -- this one near San Jose -- was being undertaken. Inasmuch as Alejos was Ydigoras's right hand man and conducted the liaison with the > WH/4 representatives for the establishment and operation * The increased budget being suggested was on the order of $42 million compared to $3 million being discussed | in June. - 152 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET of the Guatemalan training bases, the contradiction. in positions between State and the Agency was obvious. 11/ As the Special Group discussions were going on, Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 was in Guatemala taking a first-hand look at the air and ground training bases. As noted in another volume, Esterline went strongly on record in support of the Office of Logistics en- gineer who had been responsible for the reconstruc- tion of the airstrip at Retalhuleu. Jake noted that even though there had been a sizable cost overrun, the task had been performed on time under the most adverse weather conditions; and, consequently, sug- gestions from Headquarters that there had been gross inefficiency were unwarranted and unfounded. * Ester- line's review of the Situation at JMTRAV, the ground training base, indicated that the situation there was considerably more difficult than what he had encountered at the air training base. He noted, for example, that there was a severe lack of qualified senior trainers, stating: * For details. on construction of the airfield. at Retalhuleu, see Office of Logistics, Engineering Staff, RECD, Ageney Engineering Activity, 1947-1966, Vol. I, 63-67; Vol. II, 132-193. DDS/HS OL-1l1, Feb 72. S. - 153 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET . While a few of these men [from the Domestic Operations Base in Miami] impress me as being good-types,, for the most. part I found them to be too immature and lack- ing in experience to qualify for the job at hand. In any event, they are not in my judgment worth the $1,000 per month which we have to pay them. I would like most of them to be GS-4, 5, and 6 students that [sic] we trained at Fort Benning in 1951-52. Under’ no circumstances would I consider putting these people into Cuba with the Cubans. In closing his report on the visit to Guatemala, Esterline presented the following critical observations of the situation as he saw it. Reflecting on the mission and on the resources available, he wrote: I also reviewed the problem in the light of the many gaps in policy approval for. JMARC, all of which complicate project planning. By the time I arrived back at Headquarters, I had fairly well convinced myself that it is unrealistic for the _project or the Agency to try to "go it alone" in opening up another major base -in a third country to train from 1,500 to 3,000 Cubans for a major invasion effort. I discussed my thinking with Col. Hawkins at length, and found that-he shared my view. As a result of this discussion, we re-evaluated our capability and presented you {the DDP] with the recommendation that we limit ourselves to preparing a force of 600 maximum to be used in the manner we outlined to-you on 16 November. I still feel this recommendation is quite valid given the limitation on real estate ‘that we are presently working under. If it turns out that we can acquire policy. approval for the real estate in the interior, ~ 154 -— TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET I would then agree that, with limited additional help from DOD, we could train a maximum of 1,200 and commit them along the line outlined during the.16 November meeting. Even our present scope of op- erations, however, continues to be en-' dangered by the gambit that Mr. Mann and Mr. Merchant are engaged with in the [State] “Working Group." I cannot empha- size this too strongly: if we are re- quired to evacuate Guatemala for reasons of high policy or because of the situation, the project will be seriously damaged unless we have immediately available real estate where these people can be put to work. 13/. Some relief would be provided for the ground trainingprogram with the opening up of Alejos finca near San Jose, but the adequacy of the training facil- ities for the ground forces would continue to plague JMARC through the course of the project. + Moreover, even though the discussions concerning plausible deniability reached near fever pitch during the. dis- cussions of November 1960, at no point did the Special Grotp of presidential consultants ever step forward with a firm recommendation that the United States assume responsibility and so admit. The most persistent advocate of this position was Thomas Mann, of the Department of State, and why his proposals were never pushed more seriously is one of the unresolved -~ 155 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET questions concerning the Bay of Pigs Operation.* Esterline's visit to the bases in Guatemala was almost immediately reflected in the correspondence between the field and Headquarters, with specific emphasis being placed on the assignment to the ground training base, JMTRAV, of senior training officers. Similarly it was stressed that there was a priority need to secure Special Force trainers from the Army, on an ASAP basis. Requirements for materiel jumped, particularly in the number of personal weapons which would be required for added numbers of troops in - training. With the acquisition of the additional training. site in Guatemala from Roberto Alejos, re- quests immediately came forward for trucks and jeeps to transport troops to these training areas. The. * There also is evidence that at least one of the principal Agency planners, C. Tracy Barnes, contrib- uted to the November confusion. At one point, when serious consideration was being given to the possi- bility of increasing significantly the training activ- ity that might be done in Nicaragua, Barnes introduced what amounted to moral objections to the association -- or to strengthening the association -- with the Somoza Government. Barnes emphasized that this would go down hard with the more liberal elements in Latin America. 14/ This argument, of course, was very much in line with the position being advanced by the Depart~ ment of State -- Thomas Mann excepted. ~ 156 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET field was aware that the increasing number of trainees would create problems, but at the same time, there | were indications that the trainers were hopeful that the infiltration teams that had been developed could be held intact.:15/ Just as there was confusion within the Headquarters area over the nature of the program, so, too, was con- cern reflected in the field's messages to Headquarters. AB cable of 28 November 1960 from COS Guatemala to Headquarters requested: Recent cable traffic suggests. major changes in near future and COS feels it would be of great assistance to have complete story to assist in dealing with Alejos and Ydigoras..16/ Even as COS Guatemala: was requesting information, the situation in Washington remained in a state of flux. On 29 November, Col. King made a specific at- tempt to obtain positive guidance through the office of the Deputy Director for Plans. Chief, WH/D, out- lined his understanding of the paramilitary planning as follows: (a) On or about 1 February 1961, land by amphibious means a guerrilla force of about 600. trained Cubans to establish a perimeter defense and resistance center in a selected -area of Cuba. - 157 = TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET (b). Continue present operations of. in- filtrating small paramilitary teams to. organize, train, and lead resistance forces and report intelligence informa- ‘tion. — (c) Follow up this effort by providing - air logistical support to the 600-man guerrilla force in Cuba and all additional guerrilla elements who join to collaborate with this force. 17/ Having outlined his understanding of the planning, Col.. King then went on: ‘The following major questions must now be resolved by the Special Group or referred _ to the President for decision before pro- ceeding further to implement the paramili- tary aspect of this program as described above: a. Does either the Department of State or the Department of Defense view the proposed paramilitary concept as . not in consonance with policy or for any other reason open to question? If so, why and what alternatives are pro- posed; what course of action is ap- proved? ; b. If there is agreement as to the paramilitary concept,. then is there agreement that training shall continue - ain Guatemala? c. If continuance in Guatemala is disapproved, will -DOD air-lift the. present trainees at once from Guatemala to Saipan for training and provide ‘Similar air-lift for up to 300 additional "men as they are recruited? . The entire group would later be returned to a stag- ing area in Nicaragua for the amphibious operation. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET (da) Will the DOD also provide the following: (1) Thirty-eight Special Force officers and enlisted men to be used as instructors in Guatemala or in Saipan, or both. (2) One reactivated LST. _(3) . Supplementation of logistic ' xesupply air-lift to resistance after l February. (As detailed an estimate. as can be made will be forwarded to DOD if the paramilitary concept is approved. ) 18/ Col. King then closed this memorandum to Mr. _ Bissell by noting that if the paramilitary concept was approved, certain policy approvals would be re- quired. These were listed as follows: ‘a. To use one Florida base, such as _. Opalocka, for air supply missions in sup- _port of guerrilla forces in the target country. — b. ‘To use a small number of American’ civilian contract personnel in air and _ ‘maritime operations. (No such personnel are to be used in ground operations.) c. To mount air strikes against Cuban air and other military targets. 19/ . Whatever else can be said, it is clear that by the end of November 1960, the original concept of the Agency's anti-Castro effort as one focussing on the ‘use of small teams infiltrating Cuba and working with - 159 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 . TOP SECRET the dissident elements located within the country had gone by the board. What was now to be undertaken was an amphibious assault in strength -- the strength as yet to be determined ~- with the concomitant require- ment for heavy ‘air support for resupply and possibly for military support as well. Indicative of the con- fusion which surrounded this period when the concept was changing were Jake Esterline's remarks shortly following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs when he testified before the Taylor Committee. It appears as though Esterline had been informed -- incorrectly as it turned out -- that in his testimony of 1 May 1961 Lt. Col. Frank Egan had indicated to the comnit- tee that the strike force concept has been in being ‘since his EOD in June 1960.* In rebutting what he thought Egan's testimony had been, Esterline reported: My recollection is that Lt. Col: Egan . came to us about June 1960 and that he * Egan had actually testified that following the Guatemalan revolt he had been sent down to organize the brigade, and he stated that the number of Cuban trainees had been on the order of 420 on 20 November 1960 and had risen to nearly 600 by the first week of December. 20/ ~ 160 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET arrived with certain ideas which he carried from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the Cuban problem. This, however, did not con- “stitute JMATE policy. I am sure you [Col. Jack Hawkins] ~~ or more particularly, mem- . bers of your staff -- will find that we had ‘no approved philosophy of the operation within the Project until well in[to] Sep- tember. The training program which Rocky Farnsworth conducted in Panama was directed solely toward training an instructor cadre. in small unit or “guerrilla type" opera- tions. This cadre, when it arrived in Guatemala, in. addition to working on build- ing the camp with Carl Jenkins, continued to train the first recruits in the same kind of training they had received. Another example of my positivenéss that we were not, at Project level, think- ing of the strike operation is the first conversation that we held in my office in Barton Hall when I referred to the fact that the PM staff had been talking about . the development of a strike operation, but that I, myself, was not convinced of it at the time and that I preferred to put small teams into existing units at the appropri- ate time. As I recall, you [Col. Jack Hawkins] had an open mind at that point; although without positive study of Cuba you leaned to the concept I outlined. It was at a. somewhat later date, therefore (probably before the first of October), that we talked ..again.and you [Col. Jack Hawkins] stated your conviction that Castro could not be overthrown without a major or catalytic effort being made against him. After deliberation, I came to the same ‘conclusion, and we then began to think. in terms of expanding the force to the strength — of a reinforced battalion, more or less. The foregoing is important only be- - cause General Taylor is going into very - 161 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET fine points in his analysis of government policy. It is incumbent upon us, there- fore, to get the record straight in this manner, and, although Lt. Col. Egan may have had in his own mind the idea of a strike operation -- and I believe he came to us with some idea on hitting the Isle of Pines -- this nevertheless was not approved Project or Agency policy until quite a few months later. In point of fact, as I look back over that period, I am sure during that period I found myself drifting along, devoting myself merely to creating basic capabilities in a variety of fields. without any clear-cut idea of what national policy would permit us to do.* 21/ Richard Bissell who was the Deputy Director for Plans at the time of the Bay of Pigs operation has a * In a discussion with the author of this history in the fall of 1975, Esterline introduced another thought ‘about the change in concept to wit: That the small team concept had been planned to be put into operation early in November of 1960, and Esterline seems to believe that this would have been feasible. ‘However, the Presidential election of that year made the Eisenhower administration extremely cautious about anything that might have an impact on the outcome of the election: and, consequently, such delays as were incurred gave added time for the build- up of Castro's internal forces. By the time that the election was over, it had become apparent that the small team concept was no longer viable. Esterline, in fact, suggested that the emphasis for the buildup in the brigade forces came from the White House. But even though Gordon Gray -- in various meetings of the Special Group during the period from November to the end of the Eisenhower administration -- did support the idea of increasing the size of the force, there is no evidence to indicate that pressure to do this came from the White House. 22/ - r62 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 » TOP SECRET | rather more positive recollection of thé change in concept, having noted: That.decision as to the character of | the operation was rather gradually modi- ‘fied during the late autumn [of 1960], and it's very difficult, even for someone who.was close to those developments, to put a finger on the exact moment when a clear decision was made, or the circum- stances, or, really, the people who made it. It was a decision rather forced by ‘circumstances. 23/ — When discussing the. situation in October of 1975, however, Bissell volunteered the following observations about the change in concept for the operation. He said: One of the clearest impressions I have of the whole planning period and of this change in concept was that by November {1960] ... and I don't think Esterline bought this view either as completely or as soon as I did ... I f{also] remember the feeling that I was well ahead of King ... in my belief that we had to place Nearly exclusive reliance for the initial phase on whatever force it was possible to land... So, I also remember very clearly -~ and I think as early as November -- where I think there were probably under 500 people "in the brigade in training -- I remember. repeatedly saying to Hawkins and Esterline that if we are really going to have to place this heavy reliance on a landing force, this is an all together ‘prepos- _terously inadequate number ... I remember being told that people did not see how it would be. feasible to get up to the size I was talking about in the time period; but secondly ... I have a clear recollection that he [Jack Hawkins] had a lesser sense- - 163 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET of urgency at that point about a buildup in numbers than I did. .I felt that I ‘was consistently urging upon Hawkins the necessity. of a larger buildup than the plans then contemplated, and I. also re- member, at a later stage in a somewhat similar fashion, urging upon Beerli, the | necessity of a significantly larger air arm than his plans contemplated .... I think that Hawkins likewise felt that he had to rely on what the recruiting mechanism would turn up, which wasn't really his direct operation, and that | he wasn't at all sure that he could get the sort of numbers that I was talking about. But I do remember an awareness of what seemed to me to be the inadequacy Of our resources in the light of an altered concept of the operation. 24/ = 164 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET . Part IV: . Presidential Resurgence The previous section of this volume has examined the activities that occurred during the period from the early fall through November of 1960, with the shift away from what was to be exclusively a guerrilla warfare type operation to a new concept emphasizing amphibious invasion. During this period most of the discussion and the decisions, aside from those within CIA, were at the level of the Special Group. The principals involved from the Department of State were at the Under Secretary/Assistant Secretary level at the highest, and at the Agency, both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Plans were involved. On 29 November 1960 the level of in- volvement of the US Government escalated sharply with the sudden resurgence of interest on the part of | President Dwight David Eisenhower. In contrast to the period from July 1960 through the Presidential election of early November -- when, as noted earlier, _ there was, at most, minimal attention to the develop- ing anti-Castro program at the White House level -- - 165 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET suddenly the President emerged as one of the principal decision makers in the period prior to the take-over by the Kennedy administration. When asked for an explanation of this sudden resurgence, Jake Esterline, then Chief, WH/4 stated: I can't explain it ... but I will say . this, it probably had a political basis. They [the Republican administration] realized that they had lost, and they realized that they were going to have to brief a new administration along with the British on the things that had been going on. I suspect that they didn't want to brief on something that would emerge that they hadn't been giving anything other ‘than their full support. I am guessing, but I would think that was a pretty good guess. 1/ , On 29 November of 1960, the President had a meet-+ ' ing which included Messrs. Dillon and Merchant of State; Gates and Douglas of Defense; Gray and Goodpaster of his own Staff; and Dulles and Bissell of CIA. In his report on the session with the President, Mr. Bissell, the DDP mentioned among other things the following two points of particular interest: The President made it clear he wanted all done that could be done with all possible urgency and nothing less on the part of any department, ... and the Presi-~ dent led a discussion as to how best to organize the total US effort against the target. There was some feeling that an ~ 166 - TOP SECRET.
13-00000 TOP SECRET overall coordinating executive might be desirable, but it was left that the Director would make Mr. Barnes available to work closely with a State Department - officer to be designated. It was also -felt desirable to use Mr. Pawley's services. initially in connection with possible covert assistance. 2/ The points of view attributed to the President at this time by Mr. Bissell reflect very closely the position of William D. Pawley who had met with the President immediately prior to the President's ses- sion with State, DOD, and the Agency's representatives. According to Livingston Merchant, who had a long . session with Mr. Pawley.on the day prior to Pawley's meeting with President Eisenhower: Mr. Pawley said that two things are necessary, and I inferred that these would constitute his [Pawley's] principal recom- mendations to the President. (1) The President should appoint a single experienced individual (he said he was personally qualified and would be available for the job if asked) to. conduct ' the entire covert operation. In this con- nection, he cited the role which he had played in the Guatemala case. (2) We should recruit several thousand good young Cubans in Florida and give them basic training. This could be done in five or six weeks, rather than months, according to him. He was extremely impatient at the thought of moving any Cubans who may now be in Central America, expressing himself - 167 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET forcefully as being sure their host would object. -I asked if he was proposing overt in- tervention by US armed forces. He said absolutely not. The essence of his plan would be to land in Cuba, presumably in the next month or two, a force of 600 trained Cubans, following up this land- ing with additional Cuban elements and then installing a government in the bridge~ head which would call on us for financial and logistics support. .He mentioned a number of names which were unfamiliar to me of Cubans who he said are politically unblemished in Cuba, neither pinks nor reactionary rightists.* 3/ On 30 November 1960, a Special Group meeting was held at which time Gordon Gray: *. Considering that discussions within the Agency and within the Special Group had only recently arrived at the figure of 600 men for an invasion brigade, plus ‘\ the fact that this brigade would establish a bridge- - head from which a provisional government opposed to Castro might be announced, .one might speculate on the source of Pawley's information. Jake Esterline has tended to denigrate the role played by Pawley during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation; but, nonethe- less, throughout the course of the operation Jake was charged with maintaining close liaison with Pawley. ‘ JMATE records indicate not only the numerous. face-to- face meetings between Pawley and Esterline during the course of the operation, but also reflect an amazing number of telephone conversations between the two during the life of the operation. In terms of the operational plan per se, Esterline appeared to be most cagy in handling this subject during the dis- cussions with Pawley. The recorded conversations focus on the potential leadership for the FRD -- with Pawley's "best" leadership choices usually being far to the right. ~~ 168 °- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Solicited the Group's assistance in - arriving at a concensus (sie] of views _ as. to what exactly had been decided as a result of the. high level meeting [the meeting with the President] of the day before. 4/ According to the memorandum on the meeting, there was agreement that the US would deny its partic- ipation in any training activities in Guatemala, that there would.continue to be a prohibition on the train-~ ing of Cubans in the United States, and that evacua- tion plans. should be kept in readiness in case the Cubans in training in Guatemala had to be evacuated ~~ the plan to evacuate was not clear as to whether the Cubans would be taken into Florida as ordinary refugees or whether ‘the. evacuation would call for ‘transporting the troops to |training base. The problem that apparently created the greatest difficulty at this Special Group meeting was the Presi- dent's suggestion that a single individual should be placed. in charge of the anti-Castro program. The Special Group decided that there should be two indi-. viduals with principal responsibilities ~- one to handle the overt and the other to handle the covert activities. After reviewing a list of potential candidates: | -~ 169 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET It was finally decided that, taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick availability, Ambassador | Willauer would probably be the best choice. On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recognized that these nominees would have to be checked: with .Mr. Gray's associates. 5/ When Mr. Mann suggested that Ambassador Willauer “might. also assume responsibility for contacts with the FRD, Mr. Dulles rejected this out of hand, emphasizing that this liaison must be done covertly, and that it - must be done by the Agency. There apparently was unanimous agreement that Mr. Pawley not be given any official status with the US Government, but no one objected to Pawley's plans to visit Argentine Presi- dent Frondizi in his capacity as a private US citizen. 33/ Following the President's suggestion of 29 Novem- ber, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon forwarded a memorandum for President Eisenhower on 2 December 1960 recommending that, because of the differences in responsibilities, two senior officials, rather than one, be charged with managing the anti-Castro ‘program. Dillon suggested that Ambassador Whiting Willauer be named as a Special Deputy to Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs, Thomas Mann, to.act as the officer responsible for the US Government's = 170 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET . overt position vis-a-vis Cuba, and with the responsi- bility of coordinating the covert activities of the Agency into that US position. On the covert side Dillon followed the DCL's suggestion that, C. Tracy Barnes should be appointed “to devote full time to the direction of the Agency's program with. respect to Cuba, and to concert with Amb. Willauer." 6/ Dillon's memorandum then went on to recommend that the members of the Special Group ~~ Dulles, Gray, Douglas, and Merchant -- should continue to exercise general supervision over the covert opera- tion and to provide the Agency with general guidance in the operation, and -- now at the tag end of the Eisenhower administration -~ went on to say that the Group should continue and intensify its general supervision of the covert-operation ... {and] maintain close and regular liaison with Secretary Anderson of Treasury or ‘his designated representative ... [and] should: meet, together with the member's individual principals, with you from time to time as it deemed necessary or as you desire. 7/ In response to this recommendation, the Presi- dent wrote: I approve of the suggestions regarding the reorganization of the government's - 171 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET © program with respect to that country {(Cuba], except that I think Mr. Willauer should ,have a position directly subordi- nate to the Secretary of State for so long as Cuba remains a critical problem in our foreign relations. There should be no doubt as to the authority of the Special Assistant to the State Department (Mr. Willauer) to subordinate covert and overt activities, nor as to his responsi- bility for conveying policy guidance to the operating agencies. In their broad outline, these policies will, of course, be subject to the approval of higher authority. 8/ An interesting aspect of the Eisenhower memoran- dum is that he elevated the position to be assigned to Mr. Willauer from that of being a Special Deputy to Assistant Secretary Mann, the Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs, to that of being direct- ly subordinate to the Secretary of State. When Thomas - A. Parrott who acted as secretary for the Special Dale's a Group meeting | transmitted a copy of the draft’ of Buttes' tei tha f we wt. bow eg pele f J . memoratidiiti “to ‘Wracy Barnes, Parrott . had been made aware of the possibility that Eisenhower was in favor of raising the position of Willauer. In an aside to Barnes in his transmittal note, Parrott indicated that even if Eisenhower did want Willauer made directly responsible to the Secretary of State, in fact: “He [{Willauer] will be instructed that he - 172 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET darn well works for Mann anyway, regardless of the title."* 9/ Even as the negotiations just mentioned were “underway, by early. December 1960 the Agency's posi- tion on the nature of the PM action decidedly hardened. On 8 December at a meeting of the Special Group, Colonels Hawkins and Egan proposed a military program | which combined the use of infiltrated small paramili- tary teams as a test to see if the dissident elements would rally ‘round and, also recommend a training program for a force of 600- -750 men possessing extremely heavy fire power for amphibious assault. Prior to an amphibious invasion, however, it was agreed that there would be sorties into Cuban ‘air space but the precise nature and number of these was disputable, ranging from possibly 100 a month for a three month period beginning on 15 January 1961 -- and including some B-26 sorties to bomb and strafe military targets -- to an undefined minimum of sorties for a three week period to soften up the opposition. * “The Agency ‘apparently thought that it had a pretty . good handle on Willauer because of his long. term associ- ation as Executive Vice- President, President, and Vice- Chairman of the Board of Civil Air Transport (CAT). ~ 173 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET © in the course of these discussions of ground and air operations there were some’ interesting contra- dications among Agency spokesmen as to what was needed or what was wanted. Tracy Barnes seemed to have a great deal more to say than was warranted by his knowledge and apparent understanding of the planned action. In one discussion with Secretary Douglas, when Barnes was pushing for the use of an increased number of troops, he stated that the number of anti- Castro dissidents who might rally round the invaders would be no different if the size of the invading force were 600 men or 3,000 men. A rationale such as that and Barnes's comment to Gen. Lansdale when he for- warded one proposal _— Please recognize that this proposal is a draft and is off the top of the head. without any detailed knowledge of possible applicable regs and procedures ~- help make understandable the consternation within the ranks of the Department of Defense concerning the Agency's understanding of which end was up.* 10/ * There was also an ongoing discussion during this time period regarding the assignment of US Army Special Force trainers to the Guatemala bases. This is discussed in detail in Volume II.of this history, Participation in the Conduct of Foretgn Policy. - 174 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET In one of the longer and more detailed papers being prepared toward the close of the Eisenhower -administration, the State Department drafted the polit- ical action recommendations. and suggested collective action through the Organization of American States to effect the ouster of Castro. Failing in that, State then outlined a unilateral political action. program for the United States. The paramilitary and covert action segments of this paper were prepared by the CIA. Neither the State nor the CIA paper introduced ideas that had not been thoroughly dis-_ cussed. These recommendations were made just as if the Secretary of State, the Special Group, and the President had approved, or would approve, the courses of action that were being outlined. This being the case, it was suggested that the concurrence of the President-elect: should be sought for the proposed program. In the best of all possible worlds one could hardly find fault with this optimistic approach -~ in the pragmatic world it is difficult to under- stand that anyone would go on record with the expec- tation that such recommendations might be followed - 175 - TOP SECRET é
13-00000 - TOP SECRET | across changing political and administrative lines.* 11/ With WH/4 in the throes of revising. the anti- Castro program on the basis of the increased efficiency “of the Castro military forces, an SNIE, Prospects for the Castro Regime, was issued, belaboring the obvious ~- that Castro was firmly in control of Cuba. _ The SNIE also proceeded to make the following observation about Castro's military forces: _ The militia's overall combat efficiency is low; many units are still on a part | -time training basis. However, there appears to be emerging a nucleus of well organized, - well equipped, and well ‘trained units loyal to Castro and strongly Communist-influenced; we believe that within the next 12 months or so, these units will develop into a reasonably effective security force. 13/ The estimate continued, noting that the Cuban Army was still disrupted and "combat effectiveness of the Air Force is virtually.nil." 9/ . The concept for Project JMATE, however, had shifted from small unit guerrilla warfare to invasion because of evidence of * President Eisenhower wrote that on 6 December 1960, “Senator Kennedy“ came to the White House for a brief- ing and that among the subjects discussed was Cuba, — this being one of-.the first three items that Kennedy wished to talk about and that: “He [JFK] had previous-. ly been briefed by Allen Dulles a number of times and had some familiarity with the details." 12/ -~ 176 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET increased: efficiency of Castro's forces and it would appear that the operators and the estimators were not making evaluations from the same intelligence information. Despite his promotion early in the month, it was not until 23 December 1960 that Ambassador Willauer called a meeting with the Agency's principals to ex- plain both his role and some of the problems that he anticipated the President wanted him to handle. Ap- parently it was an inauspicious beginning, for accord- ing to a memorandum of the meeting: | Mr. Willauer stated that his role, as explained to him by Secretary Herter, was to be that of the chairman and major shareholder of a corporate board with Mr. Tracy Barnes, the executive director for operations and minority shareholder. Col. King asked for clarification on this point, noting that Mr. Esterline is the director for operations ‘for CIA with the chain of command going from the Director to Bissell to Col. King to Mr. Esterline. Mr. Barnes is a coordinator with. the other interested agencies. Mr. Willauer agreed that this was the case, noting that he had used the term operations in the looser sense of overall coordination. L4/ Once having had the pecking order set straight, Ambassador Willauer then proceeded to a discussion of various problem areas, indicating his very strong bias in favor of Agency ‘positions as opposed to - 177 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET positions being taken by the Department of State. For example, Willauer noted that there was a strong aversion to attempts to set a firm date for D-Day, with the opponents basing their arguments on the fact that the oas would be sure to get in on the act and, moreover, that military planning should be deferred until it could be determined if the economic sanctions would work to Castro's disadvantage. On the question of economic ‘sanctions Willauer pointed out to the people in State that since the Soviet Union was so - strongly committed to support the Castro government, economic sanctions would have little or no impact on . Castro's position. Willauer also argued that there was going to be revolutionary activity in Cuba, whether the US had a hand in it or not; and he empha- Sized that, in any event, the US would be blamed for it. Both Jake Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins pointed out that another reason for firming up the D-Day date concerned the logistics. of the troop movement; and . both urged as early a date as possible because of the already mentioned improvement in the military capability, equipment, and training of Castro's = 178 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET forces. Esterline also emphasized that most of the arguments urging delay: of PM planning, particularly concexn re the OAS, had been debated with State for ~ months, and the time had come for direct action. The WH/4 representatives also stressed that the period of training for many of the Cubans had been extended and re-extended, and that to hold them be- yond 1 March 1961 increased the problem of maintain- ing high morale among the troops. Esterline took the position that the Cubans the Agency was training knew that the US had the force to throw Castro out any time that it SO desired, but the months and months of. training was indicative, to them at least, that the US was not really interested in the welfare of. the anti-Castro Cubans. | During the 23 December 1960 meeting, Willauer's expertise and familiarity with air operations .led “him to ask almost immediately “why the project is 'so thin in the air'." Willauer was told that the rules of the game were that only Cuban air crews could be used, and this was the reason for the Agency's efforts to obtain permission to use contract American ~ 179 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET crews for both resupply. and combat .* The air opera- tions were the subject of considerable discussion. Concerning the possibility of launching air strikes for three days before the invading force landed, Willauer objected, pointing out that this would give the OAS ample time to get involved in the act. Wil- lauer then raised the question of whether all of the tactical bombing could be done on D-Day. The answer to that from Col. Hawkins was "no," but Hawkins said that it could be done on D-2, if permission were given | for dawn airstrikes to..take out Castro's air, force and military targets, with additional sorties during the course of D-1 and follow-up raids on D-Day prior to the landings. Moreover, Hawkins pointed out that _ iff an attempt were made to withhold the airstrikes until D-Day, the Castro air force would have an op- portunity to attack the ships which would be carrying the invasion troops. « In a Similar manner, a strong case was made for the use of the Puerto: Cabezas, Nicaragua air base to * Hawkins wanted “pilots who can work over key targets without tearing up installations we will later need." ~ 180 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET launch strikes against Cuba. Apparently there was some discussion of limiting use of this base to only two or three days -- at least some of the State De- partment people pushed this idea -- but WH/4 pointed out that it was inconceivable in view of the nature of the planned air operations, that the air support ‘operation could be in and out of Nicaragua in this period. It was pointed out to Willauer that efforts had been made to get permission to use US bases, or other closer bases to Cuba than Nicaragua, but with- out success. Willauer, himself was positive that no US bases would be made available for the strike against Castro. One other interesting aspect of this initial . meeting with Willauer, concerned the transition be- tween the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Willauer stressed that the ground rule at the Depart- “ment of State was that the Kennedy people could not be sought out to discuss specific problems unless they initiated requests for information, and it was Willauer's opinion: | That the only practical way to get de- cisions. on the project before 20 January would be to have the Director [the DCI], ~ 181 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET whose position re the new administration is different than Mr. Herter's, to go to Mr. Kennedy in person and seek to get him committed. It would be very difficult for State people to’try to approach Mr. Kennedy via Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles. 15/ During the 21 December 1960 meeting of the Special Group, Allen Dulles briefed the attendees on a meeting that he had participated in the previous: day in New York, with a group of American business- men. The meeting had been called by Henry Holland, who was one of the principal fund raisers for the FRD, and in attendance at this meeting were the Vice President for Latin America of Standard Oil of New Jersey, the Chairman of the Cuban-American Sugar Company, the President of the American Sugar Domino Refining Company, the President of the American & Foreign Power. Company, the Chairman of the Freeport Sulphur .Company, and representatives from Texaco, International Telephone and Telegraph, and other American companies with business interests in Cuba. The tenor of the conversation was that it was time for the US to get off of dead center and take some direct action against Castro. Suggestions were made. to sabotage the sugar . crop -- the question being whether to burn the cane - 182 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET fields or ruin the refineries; to interrupt the electric power supply; and to put an embargo on food, drugs, and spare parts for machinery. Dulles opposed the embargo. on food and drugs, but the feeling of the business group was that it was time to get tough and, hopefully, the blame for an embargo would be laid on Castro. Another interesting suggestion volun- teered was that the US Navy should blow up a ship in Levisa Bay in order to force the shutdown of the nickel plant at Nicaro which formerly had been owned and operated by the US Government. 16/ In his usual cautious manner, Gordon Gray suggested that the | Special Group not authorize any action until he had cleared the matter with his "associate." | This group of businessmen also indicated that ‘they were going to undertake the publication of specific papers on issues and programs. related to , the post-Castro Cuba, which would be designed to -help US policy planners. Mr; Dulles, of course, emphasized that policy. planning was not his respon- sibility; this was the responsibility of the Depart- | ment of State. He did comment that “what he was interested in was getting rid of Castro as quickly -~ 183 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET. as possible and in this field he had direct responsi- bility. and would welcome any ideas or suggestions on how this might be achieved." 17/ The high-level business group which Dulles met with was also extremely concerned about the possible orientation of any anti-Castro government in exile, particularly that it should not be left-oriented. Michael Haider, Standard of Jersey's Vice President ‘for Latin America, for example, forwarded a.memorandum to Col. J. c. King in early January 1961 identifying as members of an extreme leftist group which had formed in Miami to oppose Castro, Manolo Ray, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, Rufo L6pez Fresquet, and Dr. Raul Chibas among others.’ Mr. Haider worried that unless more positive steps were taken to force ‘the conserva- tive Cuban exiles into a cohesive organization, that any post-Castro government would automatically be in the hands of the leftists.* 18/ In addition to strong positive suggestions from US businessmen, Brigadier General Lansdale, Office of * Haider was consistent at any rate -- "leftists" with Fidel or “Fidelistas sin Fidel“ were held to be equally bad for US business interests. - 184 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, also had some suggestions which he made. to Mr. Bissell about the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program. For whatever reason, in late December 1960 Lansdale forwarded to Bissell a number of suggestions which . had been presented to him by an Army reservist who had put in two weeks of active duty with OSO at Lans- dale's direction researching Cuban political objectives. Inasmuch as the Agency had devoted many months to the study of this subject, and all other aspects of ‘the anti-Castro effort, it appears a rather gratuitous insult that Lansdale would have forwarded this kind of paper to Bissell. 19/ What response, if any, ‘Bissell made to this memorandum is not known. The Special Group held its last meeting of 1960 on 29 December, and there were, in addition to the standing problem of the use of US air bases to sup- port the operation against Cuba, the questions of the use of a Nicaraguan air base, the political organ- ization of the Cuban exiles, and considerable discus- oN sion about the possibility of initiating action against Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. It was emphasized that Mr. Pawley was strongly in favor of intervention - 185 - TOP SECRET |