AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Date 08/07/98 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Released under the John . Eennedy JCS Lssassination Records 202-10001-10171 FOIA SERIES DOC 172 AGENCY INFORMATION oOllection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). ase#: NW 54214 Date: DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY 00/00/00 24 OPERATION MONGOOSE MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET 1B, 1C RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/30/98 Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. Reviewed by CIA, State, OSD. NOJOINT STAFF OBJECTION | TO DECLASSIFICATION HW 542714 DBoclId: 324274902 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page 1
Date : 06/22/98 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER DATE ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE : DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA HW 54714 COMMENTS AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 202-10001-10171 FOIA SERIES DOC 172 DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD BRIEFING FOR MR. ROBERT KENNEDY 00/00/00 24 OPERATION MONGOOSE MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET REFERRED 2ys97QWED WV [GUCT 03/09/98 Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. Remainder of document requires review from i a oh. Docld: 324274902 Page 2?
order within Cuba; b. If we announced incident to ( going in; that we were moving in to Bo) restore order and hold free elections; and that we would withdraw from Cuba as soon as the new government advised that. they had he capability to main- tain order without further assistance from OAS nations; C. if the operation was conducted ** > as quickly as possible and with suf- i | -/) ficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective minimum. We feel vay stronaly that without damage to their international } position book and establish an overseas military a 4 book and esse Ty base or bases in Guba. This would _ yy *, greatly increase our national vulner- ee 7 abitity a and our defense costs as forces ce would have — to he developed or shifted — HW 542714 DBocld:32424902 Page 4
FI : oH LOTTE teresa _ ter to meet this threat from the south. It would also provide the Communists with a secure base for espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout the entire Western Hemisphere. > The Soviets have an 0 tion on which — Gr they can foreclose at an time. They cai ee aS a eed make the decision to establish military —_—_—_—_ fo bases in Cuba at their will and pleasure me and if they exercise this option, we . would likely be unable to. remove them without initiating World War }tt. Con- i sequently, we feel it is mandatory that y Ce face the facts _squarely now, and determi wee Sere oF —™as early as possible | whether we can rid Cuba of “Communism by “covert support of Cubans within Cuba; and it is equally . mandatory, for logistic and planning /,/p purposes, that. we have an early decistor as to whether we definitely intend to use military force, if covert means fai: “We also feel strongly that the Unitec ' States should intervene to preserve ~ Cuban nationals identified as being HW 542714 Docld:324274902 Page 5 ~~ 7: . sos . . 2 . -——,
essential to the establishment of a nn. wee ee. friendly Cuban government if they are wewwewe ee in danger of being exterminated by a widespread Hungarian type blood purge. = In furtherance of - -the pon/Jcs polry (ZB, that any military intervention should be . ‘conducted as quickly as possible, and with. sufficient force ‘to minimize the | Communist Bloc's capability to react, we are working with CINCLANT in attempting to reduce the reaction time of his con- tingency plans for moving into Cuba, and at the same time to beet up his capa bility so that there will be no doubt as to the US ability to move in and take over | crapidly_ regardless of the opposition we may meet. oe Our primary plan can be activat Bcc, froma condition of no warning iv HW 542714 DBocld:32424902 Page 6 wo ——,
with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life. | A secondary, plan can beac byated from w a condition of no warning ff are / i  CINCLANT. is planning to reduce these _ forces and acer atlfisnis piannine ett mame sees * Honey met hg SOT Wnt ae yoo! we od should soon provideUs a basis for deci- sion concerning the extent we wish to go in prepositioning without endangering security and the element of surprise to an unacceptable degree. | | We feel that there is an alarming lac! G of appreciation that time is running out that we cannot let this operation drag on for an indefinite number of years, _ hoping to develop a massive resistance capability within Cuba. We are concerne: Ay; jthat the new proposal de- -emphasizes the time factor by waitino until July before HW 54214 DocId:32424902 Page 7 po ie a a a!
—_— a decision is made as to what to do next. This would permit the Soviets (Communist regime in Cuba) additional time to fore- close on the options open to them, viz., entry of Cuba into the Warsaw Pact, and/ or the establishment of Soviet bases in mee nee Cuba. Fither one of these actions would ee ‘y 4), ‘add new dimensions to our. problem, and tne tee er introduce ‘considerations which wauld postpone positive action indetiniteiy + age OF ere not preclude for the foreseeable future tol ae the elimination of the Communist regime. In the event that the coming months in BN) 73 is sugge: Prked with initiat: an “internal, revolt gmt omese = oo'% ed that Phase 11 might be “iy the execution of a Cover and Deception Plan. Normal training of US forces wou be the primary cover; the deception wou ibe concurrent efforts to convince the in fact invading Cuba. This course of action could provide adequate orovocati | | Communist Cuban goernment that we were an 1) 8 | | HW 54214 DoclId:32424902 Page 8 Le on nen nee Te naes 6 rr eT arant for US intervention depending, of a’