14-00000 MOMORALUOM POR THR RECORD SUBJLCT: Tnlk by Prnesto Betanccurt a% the Cooperative Porus, 1, This fe a report fru: memory of the highlights of the talx given by Dr. Erncotu Betancourt, Wecneccay night, 26 feptenber 1:62, end of the ' question and anewer pertod followiug it, at the Cooperative Fersn fa Washington, DeCe 2. Dre Betancourt was announced ng the political advieer of Eiercito — Libertador de Cuba, “an organization af young Cuban aflitary leacers in exile.” Currently hie full tine cccupation was stated as that of a coordinator in the Departnent of Econonle Affaire of the Org nisatiog of American States (OAS). In the early days of the Castro regine ue had been an enthusiastic "Fidelista" and hed served as bireetor of tie Central Bank . Of Cua (pre Che Guevarra) and as one of Castro'a first representatives da the U. & He soon becane disenchanted, defected and becane a leader fia the’ anticCastro movement. a Based on mental notes of Betancourt's speech (about 40 minutes) and of his cnswers given to questions from the audience (a typical, distinguished cross-section gram found at the Forum), the. folloving . appenred to be the most significant. statemontes a. There are no “easy” ansvers. ‘to the Cuban probdlea which has becone iocreasingly complex. o. The singly cost important Soviet objective in “taking over” Cuba is to discredit the U. 8. by alternately denonstrating its "weakness" and ite “wickedness.” By showing that the U.é, fe willice to. remain supine eves in the face of a nilitary-aid “presence” in Cuba, the Soviets believe they can scsre a psychological victory which will isprese other Latin American countries and , perhaps other developiug aress in which the U, 8) , has. an ioterect. -Sinultaneously the Commniate continue to écrict the. “gringves"” as creas, money-seek ing ioperialiets. who want to “do in* poor little Cuba, This creation of an usfavorable image of. the U. &. da far more important to the ; ‘Krenlio thas any. other reason for their now large ° . Cuban effort. Eveo the possidle uge of Cuba as a missile bage is of secondary importance. ce. As for maxing Cuba a Cocmunist * showcase" ’ Betancourt believes the Soviete have no such hope or evea intention. - They do however intend to use Cuba as the CP "headquarters" for Lotin ° America and have io fect been doing so for som time. . ad. The attecpted invesion was a disaster all around - militarily, politically and ideologically. Among other causes. of thie failure vaa CIA's “kidnapping” of the Revolutionary. Council so that any effective ' anti-Castro leaderahip was rendered powerless. ,
. reer ere ee Ss w wie «De 2 Octuter 1,62 Talx by Ernesto Betancourt at the Cooperative Forua. f. ge he She mpuncling” of the fnvetton waa la part due to the “communications void” that existed so far as eettins anti-Cagtro informatioa throush to the Cubsa people. In the meantime Castro had full | eootrsl] over his internal cocmusieations and “pat. areted” the air waves with pro-resine propaganda coucerning the invasioa. Castro is still the real “boss” in Cube even: though be is eurrounded by Cousunists and is generally obedient to Moscow's orders.. The Krealin has not pushed him too far - in fast they have in some instances pulled hin back for they feel that: ‘he has a tendency to be reckless. For instance, the Goviets did not really vant hin to break with the U. 6 and would have wanted him to be a clever "Marxist® tactician. The Kremlin fe soart enough to realize, however, that if Castro were elininated hia entire regiza would collapse. 60 while - dictating to hin in certein respects, they also have to give hin leevay. In other words the Communists are “ueing” Castro but at the sane tine are being used by hin for the echievecsnt of hie ova ego-pover objectives, | Econonie conditions in Cuba are really very bad. In the general disarray of the Cubsu econony, acriculture is faring worst cf all. For the first time in Cuban history, food is betog severely rationed. Alec for the first time the susar crop has not been planted this year, due to the ceneral disorder and the inability to provide inceatives for the sugar plantation peons. Soviet economic aid ts inaufficent thus far to have any vicible effect in lifting the econozy. The Soviets are apparently giving much more military than economic aid. Betancourt is opposed to military interventica by U. S. oa general principles but feels that: ‘if-the U. 8. did decide to intervene. it would be far more justified in the eyes ef Latin- America than would have been the cese before ‘y the Soviets decided to intervene eilitarily. i. One ‘at the best propaganda targeta froa the US. point af view is the Castro militis. According to Bsteaccourt the militiamen are “restive” about the Comuaist corination of Cuba. A large number of these ued were ardent rebels but not Coumunista. They fought with Castro agninst the Batiata dictatore ship but sot in order to establish a Comminist regize, nor even to maze Cube a “socialist” state. .
(ee ce eaten emanate ac (Set tink -3- Talk by Ecnesto Betancourt at the Cooperative Forum, } Cetober loca These allittanen vould be mich sore responsive ' 69 U. 8. appeale if they did sot feel that in the event of auti-Castro take cover they would be Mgquidated. They feel that the U. 3, and rebel Propaganda hae depicted then all as major Suenies and inmecinte targets for destruction. Betancourt believes we should proceed to correct this propaganda error at Ounces. « de. Betancourt feels that the GAS could be much more “ | ".  @ffeetive than it has been so far if only as a forum for airing the truth about the Castro ‘regime and for hardening the attitudes of the west. of Latin America tovard the expansion of Soviet satellites in the Nesters henlephere. Betancourt belfeves that the overt Soviet datervention in Cuba has Jarred the Latio Azericans for more than the facet of the - triumph of Comunaisa, per se, ia that country, Distributions ‘ Richard elas, DOP 2+ De. Ray Kine 2 & B O081/LED/CED/ALR rapoh (1520) ~ 9 October 1962