cee CUEHETS LA eHeAD eRe SHE WHITE HOUSE UbciC | © : . H S oT 21 November 1962 = . PA ; a 2S MEMORANDUM. FOR: Director of Central Intelligence qe £02, © ; 9 oan a THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans) | z Cc : . oc . , <a ; ~ SUBJECT: Chronology of the Matahambre Sabotage XY Operation REFERENCES: A, Memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) from Brigadier General Lansdale dated 14 November 1962 B. My Memorandum to you dated 14 November 1962 ‘1, Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Pursuant to your request relayed through Mr. Walter Elder, set out below are additional comments referring to the chronology in referenced memorandum. These comments are keyed to the paragraphs concerning which you raised specific questions Lat Ge (9) My operational diary reflects that Lansdale was advised of our plans for re-run of the Matahambre operation on this date, In addition, the memorandum dated 19 September 1962 to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence referred to in paragraph 10 of referenced memorandum specifically states that the information contained in that memorandum was passed informally to Lansdale on 18 September 1962. AUMWdAIT Guod “YH aTWwuaD FHL NOU Xa0D0L0Ha Spx g Attached is the original of the 19 September -1962 memorandum to the Acting DCI with his notation concerning briefing the Special Group (Augmented). You will note that this memorandum reflects that the information therein was passed to Lansdale on 18 Septem- ber 1962 and that the memorandum reflects that a copy thereof was sent to Lansdale. The Special Group (Aug- mented) was, aS you will recall, advised of our plans (10) HW 53244 Docld:32204625 Page 2?
to re-run this operation at its meeting on 4 October 1962. . (11) Attached is a.copy of General Lansdale's memorandum dated 20 September 1962 which was in re- sponse to the memorandum referred to in the above paragraph. My operational notes reflect that this memorandum, after receipt, was discussed with Lansdale and the major question was whether or not the team could not have performed an alternate mission at the time it was inside. He was advised orally that in view of operational conditions it could not have. (13) Attached is a copy of the 11 October 1962 memorandum to Lansdale. (16) My operational diary reflects that Lansdale riefed on 17 October 1962 on our plans to re-run ration within the ensuing few days. this meeting, also was b the Matahambre Ope Mr. Hélms, who was present a recalis this. , 7 a a7 a GHL WONT AdODOLONA (17) The advice to the Attorney General on > | 18 October 1962 in the presence of Lansdale is re- &% flected by my operational diary notes, Hr. Helms. KL who was also present recalls this. al diary reflects a long dis- 1962 with: Lansdale, in which he that we were re-running the. that the Matahambre Operation along with the Galefre Bridge Operation, which we then were still considering, were the only two sabotage operations which we felt we could undertake at that time in view of the changed conditions. (21),. (22), (23), (24) This chronology was not fully known to Lansdale at. the time, nor was it fully known to Task Force W until the return of the operational team to the Miami area on 24 October. (27) The 24 October 1962 Weekly Report which d the general comment on this operation ale's office and other appropriate Special Group (Augmented). (19) My operation -cussion on 20 October was specifically told Matahambre Operation and AUWddIT aor rive containe \ did go to Lansd members of the Feit ¢ aaa dasa Nn aig " CocrasjQh 104 HW 53244 DoclId:32204625 Page 3
(28) I have carefully questioned Mr. Halpern, _ Executive Officer/TFW, on this briefing and he. distinctly recalls advising Lansdale orally on the morning of 26 October 1962 that the Matahambre Operation had been re-run; that we had not heard from the team; had not been able to recover the team, and must presume the team to be either lost or in hiding. (29) The mention of the Matahambre Operation, as best I can recall, at the meeting. of the Special Group (Augmented) came up in an aside, I believe. from General Taylor, who asked in effect, "Whatever _ happened to that sabotage operation", and was advised ‘9. orally that it had been re-run; that the caching part $ of the operation had been successful, but that the pe} sabotage team had not been heard from the must be Ms presumed lost. Unfortunately, my operational diary notes on this point reflect only that the Matahambre Operation was mentioned casually at the Special Group (Augmented) meeting. 3 WOU’ AdODOLOHA ( | All of the comments contained in the chronology in 3. reference memorandum are substantiated either by memoranda, operational notes, or operational diary records. “a aiwugo 4, As you are aware, my memorandum to you dated 14 Novem~ ber 1962 was prepared prior to the receipt of Lansdale's ‘memorandum and was not designed as an answer to it. Set out below for your further information are pertinent comments concerning the specific points made in Lansdale's memorandum. AMVddIT aqaog a. With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum as reflected by reference chronology, the statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific reference is made to the penultimate paragraph in Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report from CIA which he used as a basis for a memorandum dated 31 October 1962 to Mr. Roswell Gilpatric. This refers to the tele- phonic conversation on the evening of 30 October 1962 between Lansdale and Mri Bruée'Cheever, Deputy _Chief/TFW, which is referred to specifically in a HW 53244 DoclId:32204625 Page 4
paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memo- randum, I have discussed this matter in detail with oe. Cheever and he clearly recollects that his con- versation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum, During this conversation there was no discussion of previous. operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and Lansdale did not, according to Mr. oCheever'sS recollection, ask any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have lead to any further discussions Matahambre Operation. . “at that time of the WILLIAM K, HARVEY Chief, Task Force W Attachments cc: DD/P ppcr KVAGIT Gdod “x aT : Od “Y GIWYES FHL WORY? ABDOOLOHE HW 53244 DoclId:32204625 Page 5