Date: 10/10/01 Page: 1 oO JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM fo 2 IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION Released under the John AGENCY : CIA . Kennedy RECORD NUMBER : 104- 10438- 10238 Assassination Records RECORD SERIES : JFK : ; ollection Act of 1992 AGENCY FILE NUMBER :. RUSS HOLMES ‘WORK FILE (44 USC 2107 Note). woe eee ee ee ee LLL Wee een eee ee ee eee ee ase NT 55216 Date: | DOCUMENT INFORMATION 6-08-2017 ORIGINATOR : CIA FROM : TO : . TITLE : DELETIONS MARCHETTI "THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE" CARDS FILED BY COMPONET DATE : 04/07/77 PAGES : 108 . SUBJECTS : CARDS NBR 7. . | ) n DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : ee _——_- CURRENT STATUS. :.. POSTPONED! DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99 OPENING CRITERIA : ls COMMENTS : JFK-RH06:F119 1999.01.05.12:55: 54:826128: NOT BELIEVED a ' RELEVANT (NBR) . . HW 532716 DBocld:32395536 Page 1
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9 oO: +. CLIPGRAGBR BE Then Ss oe orn a 7 ey oh 4° Set , Li THE VIEM FRO LANGLEY, 13 SEPTEMBER 1974 2 SR2'. > _ L2 ADDRESS TO THE FUND FOR PERCE CONFERENCE ON CIA AND COVERT ACTIONS BY WILLIAM E. CO Ley * y | . t COL ' 3 (RE HAVE ALSO BEEN. AND ARE STILL, CERTAIN SITUATIONS IN THE WORLD IN WHICH SOME DISCRE ET SUPPORT CAN ASSIST AMERICA’S FRIENDS AGAINST HER ADVERSARIES! IN THEIR CONTEST FOR © ONTROL OF A FOREIGN NATION’S POLITICAL DIRECTION: WHILE THESE INSTANCES ARE FEW TORBAY COMPARED TO THE 195@°S, I BELIEVE IT ONLY PRUDENT FOR OUR-NATION To BE ABLE To ACT IN SUCH SITUATIONS, AND THEREBY FORESTALL GREATER DIFFICULTIES FOR US IN THE FUTURE. IN OTHER SITUATIONS, ESPECTALLY AFTER NIKITA KHRUSHCHEY’ S ENTHUSIASTIC ESPOUSAL OF THE TH ESIS OF "WARS, OF NATIGNAL. LIBERATION," THE UNTTED STATES BELIEVED IT ESSENTIAL ‘TO PROY IDE PARAMILITARY SUPPORT TO CERTAIN GROUPS AND NATIONS. IN- 1962, PRESIDENT KENNEDY, FO R NATIONAL POLICY REASONS, DID NOT WANT TO USE THE UNTFORMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STAT Th A BUT ALSO DID NOT WANT TQ BE LIMITED TQ A MERE DIPLOMATIC PROTEST AGAINST T iT TH PRESENCE OF 5. @00 NORTH YIETNANESE TROOPS IN LAGS IN ¥IGLATIGN OF THE GEH ACCORDS. AND THEIR EXPANSION OF CONTROL OVER COMMUNITIES WHO WISHED TO RESIST THEM a THUS, CIA WAS. DIRECTED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT To THOSE COMMUNITIES, A DUTY WHICH GREW T PO AMAJOR EFFORT, KNOWN AND APPROVED BY THE LAG GOVERNMENT. BUT NOT CONFRONTING HORTH AQYVIETNAM AND ITS ALLIES WITH A DIRECT AND OVERT U. S.. CHALLENGE. NRF. BANFMANN HAS TOLD WOU OF SOME OF THE TERRIBLE HUMAN PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN ANY HAR WHEN IT GROWS TO A CONV ENTIONAL SCALE INVOLYING ARTILLERY. AIR BOMBARDMENT, AND SO FORTH. WHAT HAS PERHAPS NO T BEEN FULLY PERCEIVED IS THAT THE AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO THIS EFFORT INYOLYED A SMALL COMMITMENT OF CIA AMERICANS AND A SMALL EXPENDITURE OVER THE MANY YEARS IN WHICH THIS ACTION WAS UNDERTAKEN, ANG THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENSIVE EFFORTS OF THE FORCES 5 UPPORTED BY CIA. THE BATTLE LINES AT THE END OF THE PERIOD WERE ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED FROM THOSE AT THE OPENING. AS WHITH THE BAY OF PIGS. WHEN THE ACTIVITY BECAME Ton LARG E. IT NO LONGER REMAINED SECRET. BUT I THINK THE CIA PEOPLE WHO CONDUCTED THIS EFFORT DESERVE THE PRAISE OF OUR CITIZENS FOR THE EFFECTIVE BUT MODEST. MANNER IN WHICH PRESID ENT KENNEDY’ S MISSIGN WAS CARRIED OUT--R HISSIGN - ° pa pete tb i ee eee ~~ e te yee : Le eee ee ee ee we eee 1 2 , CQURSE, FUR CONGRESS TO DECIDE, AND I HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT A FULLY. SATISFACTORY , SOLUTION WILL EVENTUATE. FHOENIX: THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN BADLY MISUNDERSTOOD IN PUBLIC * DISCUSSIONS. I TESTIFIED FULLY ON THIS SUBJECT IN 41974. BUT SELECTIVE QUOTES FROM THA eT TESTIMONY HAVE BEEN USED TO INDICATE THAT I DIRECTED A PROGRAN OF ASSASSINATION, MUR | 7 DER, ETC., RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF OVER 20,860 VIETNAMESE. I THEN DENIED AND I STIL ord L FLATLY DENY SUCH A CHARGE OR SUCH AN INTERPRETATION OF THIS PROGRAM. PHOENIX WAS ON °E OF A NUMBER OF PROGRAMS UNDER THE GENERAL PACIFICATION EFFORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ¥ TETNAM. ON DETAIL FROM CIA TO THE DEPARTMENT CF STATE; I WAS THE PRINCIPAL ADVISER: AND SUPERVISED AMERICAN SUPPORT OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THE FACIFICATION FROGRAM WAS FOCUSED ON SECURING THE WILLING FARTICIPATION OF THE POPULATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM AGA NST TERROR AND INVASION BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE VIET CONG. THE GVYN*S PACIFICAT TON PROGRAM CONSISTED OF: --ASSISTANCE To THE LOCAL TERRITORIAL’ FORCES TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OF THE VILLAGES: --THE DISTRIBUTION OF A HALF MILLION WEAPONS TO THE POFULAT ION TO USE IN UNPAID SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS ¢I KNON OF FEW GOVERNMENTS IN THE WORLD WHICH HOULD UNDERTAKE SUCH A YENTURE AND HAYE IT MEET WITH SUCH SUCCESS); --THE INDUCEMENT, RECEPTION AND RESETTLEMENT OF OVER 260,680 DEFECTING MEMBERS OF THE VIET CONG: --THE TEMPORARY SUPPORT AND RETURN TO VILLAGE OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES; --THE EL ECTION OF LOCAL VILLAGE CHIEFS AND PROVINCIAL COUNCILS; --THE DECENTRALIZATION OF ECON OMIG DEVELOPMENT FUNDS AND PROGRAMS TO LOCALLY ELECTED OFFICIALS AND COUNCILS INSTEAD OF SAIGON BUREAUCRATS. ONE OF THESE PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES WAS THE PHOENIX PROGRAM, AIMED AT IDENTIFYING, CAPTURING, RALLYING AND, IF NECESSARY, ATTACKING THE LEADERSHIP EL . i
D “oO O + CLIP@aeed4 ) A ‘SRA . TAM / (4 FEBRUARY 1. 1976 CHICAGO TRIBUNE BOB WIEDRICH INTERVIEWS WILLIAM E. COLBY z SR2 L2 AS COLBY LEAVES CIA. A WARNING ON RUSSTANS W “OTE WE COUNTERED THE MILITARY THREAT WITH NAT@ AND THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH THE WARS HALL: PLAN. SUBVERSION WE MET WITH CIA-HELP TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS. AND IT WORKED. L ATER, IM LATIN AMERICAN. HWE FEARED THE SHEEP OF CASTRO’ S COMMUNISM AND CHE GUEVARA. WE OVERCAME THAT WITH POLITICAL PROGRAMS THROUGH THE URGANEZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. EC OMOMILC ASSISTANCE, MILITARY AID TO. GROUPS FIGHTING INSURGENCY. AND THE HELF OF CIA _INT ELLIGENCE. LATIN AMERICA PID NOT FOLLOM CASTRO. SQ WE WON THAT. TOO. THE CIA CAN HELP AMERICA’S FRIENDS WITHOUT INVOLYING AMERICANS. HO AMERICAN SOLDIERS GO ON CIA OPRERATIO NS. THE AMERICANS MERELY SUPPLY ANG ADVISE. AND VERY FEM OF THEM GO THAT. GENERALLY. I N eile FOR EXAMPLE. THE CIA WAS ASKED TO HELP BY GUR GOVERNMENT IN 4963. WE DID 50 FO R ARS. WE NEVER HAD MORE THAN THO OR THREE HUNDRED MEN THERE. THE BATTLE LASTED A DECACE. CURING THAT TINE. THE HORTH WIETNEMESE INCREASED THEIR FORCES FROM 7: 68@ TO ? @; 606. YET. THE BATTLE LINES AT THE END NERE THE SAME AS IN THE BEGINNING. AND A RELATIVE HANDFUL OF OUR MEN ACCOMPLI SHED THAT, HELPING THE LAQTIANS FIGHT OFF A FOREIGH COMMUNIST INVASION OF THEIR HOMELA ND. PEOPLE CALLED THAT A SECRET WAR. BUT FOUR COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS KNEW ABOUT IT. AN ND THE LACTIANS FOUGHT IT. HOT AMERICANS. I7M PROUD OF WHAT bE HAVE DONE. WE MADE OUR M ISTAKES. WE ALSO HAD GUR VICTORIES. AMERICA WILL NEED MORE SUCH VICTORIES IN THE FUTUR E. FOR THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH. UNQUOTE _ woe ee — ae -- come a tee choo eee cee: \ 1 t S :
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