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sents are included within. its governess... “opinion, the Court made cléar ‘that ‘iba vas dealing with - a soa vas we . . ° re i. - . |“... Of wiretecping, it had earlier characterized as “Lilicit :¢ both Nerdone ace SIONS» i,@.5 wiretapping for the. purposes of Schecover, " et 100, fun ° "Thus all thet Benantsstends for is th - . 2. . . . . “oe e y oe « . “of a “La eu interception would eo stitute a > violation of se . . . oe "e, ees . foe: Jo + expressly refused to reach the issue _reache woe . te ee wee whe a pojority in + this case ~- ody 28s, whether path interception ‘and | a ~ ste " @i:valgence are hetessary elements of a § 6065 violation, 355 Uv. ~ se . “ 7 . . ~ va Ss corn 10 _we ‘ao not me an: to be’ iw ; licitly st NS ti there was, in fact, amy such | Veuve _ use much Jess thet "2 substantial portion of the.casea" ag : - Ivenov was thé fruit of the wiretap in issue, As- either Court or the District Court can readily datemine in CAmers., .' Wiretep materials are wholly irrelevant to the issues aiia. evicencs “. in‘this casa, - oN . Meta TET Uta
> ~ oN 2 we - 2 Ad - * a : 4% also decided in Pathbun v. United Siatse, 365 U.S. 10 ME ek Seo Po - * antended. the word to, “be used" an Ey UeS.Ce §°605;, sta’ « - vy “(e)very statute must be. interprete a in ‘the ‘Ligne of 3 i oe es _ common under standing ae ‘reach the ‘results. inte nded. H. vat 1093_In ‘tha te ase; over a stro ng. dissent, the Cov "thet wihere “one pax ty to a 2 telephone ‘conv vatsation give se authori ity to listen in on en ‘extens ion, _ there has bee ception Mes Congress intended the word’ to he used,” (Bmp SAS 2adea) See also United States ae Sus den, . 281. (oth Cir. 1955). affa per curien 351 U.S. “916 (495 ~ (horaing Lt | would ‘defeat the policy of. § 605 GO bar as to the con ntent © OF. an, Anverce ted illegal private b: Bs: ‘therefore, ne ither rv Benanti nor United Sta “ee oplon, “185 Fi2d 629 (28 cin, 1950) ». also relie | a majority requir ra é hearing in this case béce: se neith . ad ° e oo @ n ct od fe) . -addre ssed the > Legelity of she ‘Wiretads [mage Ade ems corr ectly notes with specific re eference to , tithe court merely assumed that the surve Jance itself was , under section 605." ide Stich an assumption, is not proper the facts ‘of this case and; ‘inde ed, is flatly inconsistent . a OO a HW 55084 DBocTd:327989547 Pagé 62 ; : ‘oe Oe hs
¢ Ww 55084 DocId: 32969544 ences STATA? Cerra en ey ermenngee prmnmemend
; on. “cen ie. HO, v deter ttTs 1 “ED nna Ba Dries CL RPBEES : DISSEBEINATION /NO DISSEMINATIUN ABROAD — ; :.l =< Mr S. Miller - Mr. Baker —— * Memorant: tt70 , aa - Mew 3 “A. Brannigan ‘Cus — . Ni. Cleve. tt x ed sae 8 J. A. Mintz Sa. Cars . td io Tiel ‘ge! oe a a . ee . Br. Jerki- — yo :Mr. E. S. “Miller a it Ee, DATE: Wnay/73 ie erga : . : pit ee a . Sh. Miller. ZS. - mort OG J- Mr. J. F. Miller re Tboeesce — . - - Walters Tele. Roce: “FROM :T. J. smith 8 supjecr: U. S. VS. JOHN WILLIAM BUTENKO AND . ae ee — i sole IGOR A. IVANOV, IGOR A. IVANOV,. Soe ES st 5s yal Herne : ‘ ™ , Mis. Hogzs on June 21, 1973, the U. S. ‘Court of Appeals for the - phird Circuit reversed the conviction of Ivanov for violations B of 18 U.S.C. 794 (a) and (c), and 18 U.S.c. 951, and the court _ xemanded the case for further proceedings. syle “BACKGROUND | ar WE Eas Be Se at os an : ° tesa 6 ke hn a eres et ee . * . . . . . - Ivanov, an Amtorg Trading Corporation chauffeur, and ; - Butenko, aU. S. citizen, were originally convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 794 (a) and (c) (espionage) and a ‘ conspiracy violation of 18 U.S.C. 951 (by causing Butenko to . °act as an agent of the Soviet Union without prior notification _ to the U. Ss. Secretary of State). ss - * On appeal the Supreme Court found the electronic surveillance issue in their cases was "nearly identical" to ‘the electronic surveillance issue in Alderman et al v. U. S., and considered it in conjunction with that case (394 U.S. 165).. ' (Alderman had been convicted of conspiracy to transmit ; : murderous threats in interstate commerce.) ; 7 j ; In Alderman the Supreme Court, noting that no evidence . or evidence obtained from leads which were obtained from an illegal electronic surveillance i.e., one which violated a defendant's 4th Amendment .rights, could be utilized in a criminal trial, disregarded the Government's contention that a trial court's in camera inspection of electronic surveillance records was sufficient, and held that the defendant was the only one in a position to adequitely knowingly review such records to determine if the case against him was built on electronic -Surveillance. Consequently the defendant was to be given access in a discovery hearing to illegal electronic surveil-- lance records of interceptions of his conversations. CURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure _ Subject. to Criminal Sanctions. NATIONAL SE Sem grormyee = on ont mei Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, distinguished between routine criminal cases and foreign intelliiaence-espionage criminal cases, arguing that While full disclosure to the defendant was acceptable in the JEM: ka SECRET "CONTINUED - OVER (6) NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD HW 55084 Docld:32989541 Page 64 Fn AA ONE RE Ee Aim Bora
-: former, it was not in the latter and might prejudice on~going "1, intelligence operations vital to the national security. In of only those portions which the trial court in camera found “°F: Dastrict Court, 1) to determine whether there was electronic “. rs gurvelllance which violated either defendant's 4th Amendment .. Yights and 2) if so, to determine whether any of the interceptec.., -" conversations were relevant to his conviction. The Supreme i “Court stated that if the District Court found 1) that there “was electronic ‘surveillance but it did not violate the defendant’ ° 4th Amendment rights, or 2) there was electronic surveillance . which did viclate the defendant's 4th Amendment rights but his ‘-Conviction was not tainted by evidence obtained from that surveil- - of FBI electronic surveillances on which Ivanov was monitored ‘during 1963: 1) 2 microphones at the homes of Ivanov and Karatsuhs. .a KGB officer and neighbor of Ivanov (for the sake of argument, HW 55064 Docld:32999541 Page 65 STW ee mes. ~ ° . ~ » - . oe, . ue : . . Heke mH tae ee “ate ve tery 4 * a so. oe F ane * Ca . . . t . » ek eta at te i ei ha a . wy pe ry ’ a ns cof . . “ - a oceey se, wort . e . 2-7 Ue ‘ 7 * " ‘a te me +The my . ” - . "sy . wat . aR ne to oy ° Te randum to Mr. E. S. Miller .. based on the existing record, along with its further findings, ’ thus preserving the defendant's right to further appeal. ment procedures did not require to be authorized by the Attorney _°> ,General, were conceded by the Government to be illegal, thus -, falling within the disclosure requirement of Alderman The built on evidence from these microphones. Re: U. S. vs. John Willian Butenko and : a _—. Igor A. Ivanov, Igor A. Ivanov, a ae - Appeltant oe etate yt See CEE ee ne a or ai . * he tee 4 these cases, he argued on behalf of disclosure to the defendant “arguably relevant" to the Government's case against the defendant. The Ivanov and Butenko cases were remanded to the m lance, the District Court -should enter new judgements of convicticn Nee ate er oe ~ ’ On remand in Ivanov the case revolved around two sets the District Court held them both to be directed at Ivanov), and 2) a wiretap on the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, and a wiretap and a microphone at Amtorg. The residence microphones, which at that time Depart-. District Court held that the Government, on remand, made fuil disclosure on these microphones, after some argument, and ruled that the defendant had not shown, and the Government had carried its burden to refute, that Ivanov's case was _ The more important issues. related to the other set of Surveillances. The Government contended that those surveillances were duly authorized under the President's national security “SECRET .-2- CONTINUED ~ OVER oN “
PS . Memorandum to MOJE. S. Miller . Re: U. S. vs..gohn William Butenko and “ — i o. oe Appellant * wat . - ae . aie _- . - A tne : sy, » : ~ . oa ot. . ew oe aie ek ae and oma tt we gt yt ey et ‘vs oe 4% NE Re ee See Pore Coast wt eet ge Serene oe . Pape bs . - se ee aot Lee " * Tent . 7 ee - -* ne a powers to obtain foreign intelligence, thus were legal and - <<" therefore it was not required to disclose the logs to the wuz defense or to participate in an evidentiary hearing regarding ‘these surveillances. The District Court, by reference to its -£inding on remand in Butenko (318 F. Supp. 66), agreed, finding that these surveillances and the Government's use of the logs _ from. them did not violate Section 605 of the Communications . Act of 1934 or the 4th Amendment, and upheld the Government's ; , refusal to disclose or participate in an evidentiary hearing. : The District Court in Butenko found that 4th Amendment ., rights are not absolute, that there are exceptions to the warrant “requirement, and that the President's responsibility for foreicn affairs and national security do not: preclude him from authorizins _. a Warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillance. - "It also found that, since Title III of the Omnibus Crime Contzroi ! “and Safe Streets Act of 1968, specifically 18 U.S.C. 2511 (3), .- *. +. Glearly showed Congress' inclination not to limit or interfere ; “Vows. with the President's power of obtaining foreign intelligence bv I _ electronic surveillance, Section 605 also must not have intended _ to limit this power. . | 4 Loo i “ OPINION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT ‘OF APPEALS, JUNE 21, 1973. : fhe Court of Appeals makes it clear at the outset thet $e is not considering Title III since the interceptions in issue occured prior to passage of that Act. Both the Government and the appellant agreed that the governing statute at the time of ‘the interceptions in issue was Section 605 of the Communicaticns Act of 1934. . The Court of Appeals found no error in the District ae  Sourt! s ruling that the Government had given full disclosure ‘on the concededly illegak microphones, and that these did not “taint Ivanov's conviction. . The Court of Appeals cites Alderman for the provositicn that the question of whether or not the Government's evidence was obtained from electronic surveillance could be resolved - . only by an evidentiary hearing, and because the Government wouls not participate in a hearing on the second set of surveillances the Court of Appeals - felt it had to assume “in the present posture of this case" that the Government had intercepted con- . i ~ . . . . SECRET CONTINUED - OVER fed HW 55084 Docld:32969541- Page 66
ote ae Igok A. Iv oaBY Appellant a . + "Ft waa ees Meee, ae Sate . ~ . . — rr = = . . nnn eine | - Memorandiim to Mr. E. S. Miller t ; hn William Butenko and Re: -U. S. vs.’ By, Isor A. Tvanov, we munications and utilized the results from them in the criminal proceedings against Ivanov. (The District Court made an in . camera review of the second set of surveillances, but never maée a Written finding that none of ‘the Government's case was based on information from these surveillances; he only found in camers that they did not violate the 4th Amendment or Section 605, and therefore could not "...properly be considered on the taint issue" (342 F. Supp. at 931).) ae (Note that Alderman ruled only on "iiiegal" electronic . - gurveillances, and instructed the District Court that if, on -. remand, it found the defendant's 4th Amendment rights had not *. been violated it should reimpose judgment of conviction. The ‘Supreme Court did not discuss the. eftect of Section 605 on the AE Se ere ——OOO issue of whether or not the President has the power to authori -£Loreign intelligence warrantless electronic surveillances. G4 cases , before it in Alderman.) 3 ‘The Court of Appeals states that. it is not defining ; the parameters of the President's national security surveillance powers under Section 605, but that the limited issue before it, with respect to the second surveillance is: assuming a constitutional power of the President to have ordered electronic surveillance of foreign agents in 1963, was it permissable for -the -Government,.under -Section. 605.,..to. utilize the praducts..of. such surveillance in a criminal prosecution. ‘Phe Court of: Appeals then decides the case on this evidentiary: issue and thus avoids the larger 4th Amendment 3) The Court of Appeals recognizes that the President activities and to obtain foreign intelligence, and assumes," solely for the sake of argument, that he had the constitutional power to authorize:-these surveillances; however, the Court. “OF Appeals draws .the distinction, that was drawn by the Govern- ment for years, between the President's power to authorize Such surveillances and the power of the Congress and Court to Make an evidentiary rule excluding evidence obtained from such surveillances in criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeals holds that the Supreme Court opinion in U. S. vs. Nardone (308 U.S. 338), interperting Sectisn 605 as being a complete bar to the introduction of electronic .Surveillance results into evidence | in a Federal criminal proceeding, was governing. . Tee Bee ne _ CONTINUED - OVER DoclId: 327989541 Page 67 an nce en ey
Dt ‘Memorandum to M@E. Ss. Miller e, Ye "Ret U. S. vs. ae William Butenko and Igor A. Ivanov, r. de ke tvanov, ct gL akeaalt + ¢ Appellant mer oee gbluwtedsttg hp aye ee ea tee Da N cant eae ths “, “Section 605 states that ",.. no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge...the existence, contents, substance, purport, _ effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any ‘‘person." The Supreme Court in Nardone held that "no person” _ encompassed federal agents, and "divulge...to any person" Oo barred testimony in court. . _ a, ‘This Court accepts the interpretation that what -° Section 605 prohibits is the interception and divulging, i.e., . that both elements must be present to incur the prohibition of -« Section 605. Thus, the President is not violating Section - 605 if he only intercepts the conversation, but he is - prohibited from also divulging the contents of the interception» in court. : re ; , a re Since this Court assumed ‘that intercepted electronic ' surveillance information was used in the trial and therefore \ was divulged in violation of Section: 605, Ivanov's conviction | was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings, '  -yviz., to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if in fact w ou... 2any, of the. Government,'s case was. built.on, electronic. surveillance. —_ “information. , - In further defining Naivulging" | the ‘Court of Appeals accepts the argument that, the President himself will not conduc: ‘. the interceptions, but that agents of the Executive Branch, acting as his representatives will, and that many others within the Executive Branch can also be his representatives to receive the results of such a surveillance, and that therefore it is " not inconsistent with Section 605 to consider the Executive .- Branch (or at least all persons within the Executive Branch C. with a right to such information) as "a person", so that dis-~ closure within the Executive Branch does not violate the. Section's prohibition against divulging the contents of such interceptions.) ‘ MINORITY OPINION, THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, JUNE 27, 1973 ee Ne Judge Adams, disagrees that Section 605 on its own, , . OY as interpreted. by Mardone, requires the exclusion of evidence obtained from a Presidentially approved warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillance in a Federal criminal ° proceeding. Sa ee a s . ° . . eet * awe wot eo 8 es P. - . s a . . Teves oon og ates Pn 2 wwe CONTINUED ~- OVER t HW 55084 DoclW’:32989541 Page. 68
. Memorandum to M E. S. Miller *, .’ Re: U.'S. vs. ®: Williom Butenko and ; ais, 7 Igor A. IvasOyv, Iesr i. Ivanov, | A 7 “ “i vy "' B - _- Appellant ; atinee os thew he adel ve Meese . .. Py leet tee nO, "-He argues that Section 605 itself, its legislative. history, and subsequent case law do not indicate that Section 605 intended to prohibit the President from utilizing electroni —. J... gurveillance to gather foreign intelligence or to use the | ook _information gathered in cases involving a defendant's foreign . intelligence gathering. He traces the legislative history of the - Communications Act and finds its main purpose was to establish “a Communications Commission and that it extended to wire -eonmunications almost the identical provisions of Section <. 27 of the Radio Act of 1927, which was thought neither to asoly wooo toe federal officers nor to bar testimony relating to the “- "+ +" gontents of radio messages intercepted by them. Judge Adams “notes there was no Congressional debate over the meaning of the provisions of Section 605, implying: that if it had been intends aie to limit the President's foreign intelligence powers, there eS | Probably would have been debate. Doses Similarly, Judge Adams finds that in. response to eRe ue - Government's argument in Nardone that "a construction be given ‘... Section 605 which would exclude Federal agents since it is ".. improbable Congress intended to ... impede ... the detection ‘and punishment of crime.", the Supreme Court concluded "that “the question is one of policy." Judge Adams argues that wher the Supreme Court might, as a matter of policy, find that . ‘Congress intended to exclude electronic surveillance evidence in run-of-the-mill domestic criminal cases, there is no evice nce oft zeg fe: ee eee a = =f 4 EF Hy bh a of foreign intelligence. Additionally, this surveillance not aimed solely at securing evidence to convict a person co crime, but at gathering foréign intelligence deemed essenti to the security of the U. S. He thus concludes that the Na interpretation of Section 605 is not applicable ‘to this king -of case, and argues that in view of the breadth of the President's authority in foreign affairs, Section 605 should be interpreted to limit that power only if Congress' intent to do so is clearly manifest, which he argues it is not. fs t-# 2 “Judge Adams then addresses the constitutional question avoided by the majority, viz., does the 4th Amendment allow the President to authorize warrantless electronic surveil-- lances in foreign intelligence cases. He concludes that it . Goes. He argues that constitutional rights are not absolute; they must be weighed against competing rights; and the 4th Amendment prohibits only | unreasonable searches and seizures. Ny See neat tm ce se snte : Le « 1 P See 4% © ten eh tee ty we eee Sy wt tele st es 8 a er, ne re E stee & te ee - LoS o CONTINUED — OVER ___ a 35064 DocId: 32989541 Page 69 ree
So : OLVUITE a : we oe pe . . wo '.e oe" . nd . t “st. Memorandum to MrNug. S. Miller ane - _,,.Re: U. S. vs. John Wi'*2 1 Butenko and \ dl > no 27 leanne .Igor A. Ivanov, Igor A. Ivanov, aca! ae wa _ Appellant oe ate te —_ Pe Judge Adams finds. that the constitutional responsi-~ “pility to conduct foreign affairs is vested in the President; that the gathering of foreign intelligence and the protecting against foreign intelligence activities is concerned with the very existence of the nation; that as a result, the President has great latitude in this area; and that to require a ‘judicial warrant prior to his use of electronic surveillance presumes that a warrant could be denied, thus interjecting the courts into foreign affairs decisions,. in effect over- ee 2 eee the President ina field where he has the responsibility “and * ‘they do not. ; , - oY Le ree w a . Thus concluding that the Ath Amendment does not and _ the courts cannot, prohibit the President from utilizing -@lectronic surveillance in foreign affairs, Judge Adams argues that a defendant's 4th Amendment rights can still be reconciled SM with the President's electronic surveillance power by a judicial \  .. post surveillance review. If the court finds that the surveil- nee is related to the conduct of foreign affairs it would, 7 ipso facto, be reasonable and therefore not in violation of the . bt “ath Amendment. If unrelated, it would be unreasonable, and its. ; ° “results excluded’ from a eximinal trial. © 7. ae oes - : se ‘ : ° oe g.ege”’ . * . ase “e “fee Sy Bae *, ey hee, Nt s “. es % ota*te . ry ont et a ee TT ete tf gt co . ee. eta, fF ee oe = feee, rr oe 4 ont tte . the were TNO oF Nels Ste yg 8 s oes Sete. ere CONTINUED - OVER HW 55084 Docld:32989541 Page 70 7 7
QUT? BE. S. Miller U.S. vs. rain William Butenko and . . a _ Egor A. ivatfov, “or A. Ivanov, re a a ANALYSIS Be ee, | 7 As previously noted Alderman dealt exclusively with | dllegal electronic surveillances, i.e., surveillances in - YWiolation of a defendant's 4th Amendment rights. It did not distinguish between "routine" criminal cases and foreign intelligence-esoionage cases when it required that full disclosure of all interceptions of the defendant be made to him so that he, in an adversary proceeding, might determine if “the Government's case against him was "tainted." Justice Harlan, -ebjecting to full disclosure in foreign intelligence-espionage cases, and on behalf of disclosure only of portions deemed "arguably relevant" to the Government's case by the trial court after an in camera review, did not raise the issue of "legal" _vs. “illegal” electronic surveillance, so presumably he was ‘also talking about, and intending to limit disclosure even on _surveiliances ‘which violated the 4th Amendment. ; - ‘' fhe Third Circuit Court of Appeals assumes the " - Ivanov surveillances in issue were legal, but still cites : | Alderman as requiring an evidentiary hearing, and without that mae “hearing feels it must conclude that Ivanov’s conviction was piv. based on electronic surveillance evidence, introduction | Of — in- cy. which: must be excluded under Section 605. .. - At the conclusion of Alderman, when remanding te Ivanov, the Supreme Court instructed the District Court that if it found the surveillance in question did not violate the Gefendant’s 4th Amendment rights it should reimpose judements . of conviction. The Supreme Court did not consider the effect of Section 605 on the cases before it in Alderman. The case has been remanded for further proceedings, q., apparently an evidentiary hearing on the second set of surveil- , lances. The Government can opt to save Ivanov's conviction by participating in such a hearing, since none of his case - was actually built on surveillance information; however this “ would require disclosure to Ivanov of his interceoted conversa- tion at the Mission and Amtorg, a disclosure concession we don'+ want to have to make because of the impact it would have on diplomatic relations, ongoing counterintelligence operations, and possibily on future prosecutions. Additionally, the ! Salvaging of Ivanov's conviction falls far short of the original purpose of continuing the appeals in this case, viz., to obtain SECRET . CONTINUED - OVER “ 8 - HW 55084 Docld:32989541 Page T1 .
Memorandum to M jE. S. Miller Re: U. S. vs. John William Butenko and’ . ow eee Igor A. IvV@pv, Igor aA. Ivanov, @ ' . “ad ay eth sh te ott . . a . - seat ae oo ec) ‘ . oat Ve tte soy ae wea ws nr re te te . : ao ge tte - = ode: ” a oy i a supreme Court ruling on "the legality of Presidential warrantless ‘foreign intelligence electronic surveillances. Consequently, the Government probably will either ask for dismissal of the "case or appeal the Third Circuit's ruling to the Supreme Court. yes . If Ivanov is appealed the Supreme Court will face three possible issues, the 4th Amendment issue of the resent of warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillance - the disclosure issue, and the Section 605 evidentiary issue The Court could seize onto the Section 605 evidentiary issue, “not considered by it in Alderman, to dispose of the case without reaching the 4th Amendment or disclosure questions; or it coul stand on its instructions to the District Court and rule on the -District Court's remand finding that the surveillance did not violate the 4th Amendment. are . Z£ the Supreme Court found the surveillance illegal, : presumably Alderman's requirement of full disclosure would avol and the case would be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to exclude any electronic surveillance evidence, and the Section 605 issue would be avoided. ' Bea o If the Court found the surveillances legal it could: NO ae. res TSE Sgete eg ae ey ee a athe atu ae aT: > ve mor Q) extend Alderman and require. ‘full ‘disclosure of al interceptions even if legal, possibly arguing something to tha effect that Congress.in Title III has imposed the requirement of full disclosure in those cdses, and that a similar safecuaré Should be imposed on Presidential surveillances; ” | | oe 2) allow in camera review and require disclosure limits: | to elements "arguably relevant" to the Government's case; 3) not require disclosure at all if the Governne no _ proved in camera that the surveillances were related to fore intelligence, possibly arguing that since the defendant! S$ ri against unreasonable search and seizure were not violated, h has not been injured, the Government's case is not illegail-v "tainted," therefore, disclosure is not necessary, and, accit on- Git: ally, disclosure would be very damaging to national security. , - Even if the surveillances were found legal, however, the Section 605 evidentiary issue would remain. A Hearing or an in camera review would have to determine whether any of th Government's case was built on electronic surveillance, ee ta the Section 605 evidentiary bar decided with respect to * intelligence- espionage cases. Since the Ivanov case is SECRET oo | CONTINUED - OVER - 9 - tn Q @O-~ ty’ ts 3 ° { QQ) fs esd thy ad tH aod fe) { if a] HW 55084 Docld:32989541 Page 72
. , 5 - N Fe ‘3 Memorandum to ) E. S. MilleWhUNE E “: Rez, U.S. vs. @pn William Butenko and ss s8m 2 Toor A. Iveepv, Igor A. Ivanov, a Appellant _— So electronic surveillance evidence, presumably the convictions would be reimposed; however, supposedly the. Supreme Court does . not know this, and it would conclude that if the District Court ...". found electronic, surveillance evidence to be involved, it would "7". .-he bound by the Third Circuit's finding that the Section 605 baz 7; "' @id apply, and the case would find its way back to the Supreme ‘-Court for a final determination on this point. Thus if the Supreme Court chose to rule on the 4th Amendment issue and foune . the surveillance legal, it would. have to rule on two issues - dmmediately, the 4th Amendment issue and the disclosure issue,. /,and might eventually have to decide the third issue, the Secticn .- 605 evidentiary issue; if the Supreme Court affirmed the Court -o£ Appeals, it would have to decide only the Section 605 mt evidentiary: issue. os -_. . So . . | : | wot Ss fey “23 HRT ge ey eR er tae ade ht feo Oe 2 & a - > * Pas « \ “P nn ae ane ot AE te a edteblgte oe eth cite MT be ale, Te T Eh ope tes Batre de te ad Syctstase. uge te Fe ea, CONTINUED - OVER . = 10 - HW 55084 DocId:32989541 Page 73
Memorandum to Be S. Millen" ; _° g Re: 9. S. vs. n n Willian Butenko and a . 5 igpr A. - Igor A. Ivanov, ot — CONCLUSION roe ee ad fe) The constitutional issue here is, as was the issue’ “$n Nardone, a policy question. Given today's climate and public attitude towards electronic surveillances in general, unchecked Presidential (White House) power, the distinction between use of electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes .vs. use for criminal vrosecution, and the Supreme Court's tradition of avoiding constitutional issues if it can decide a case on lesser issues, I am inclined to think the Court would .: gyasp the "out" of the Section 605 evidentiary issue, thus .* leaving the constitutional issue unresolved and allowing i+, . Presidentially approved foreign intelligence electronic surveil- Peo! langes to continue for the time being.. fhe practical result of this of course would be only . to reverse the conviction of one man, Ivanov, presently at hone “din the Soviet Union. This ruling would not preclude post 1968 prosecutions based on foreign intelligence electronic surveil- . .lance information, since 2511 (3) presumably expresses “| Congress’ intent to negate the evidentiary effect of Section { . 605 with respect to such cases: "The contents of any wire or ; + Orval communication intercepted by authority of the President in i “the exercise of the (powers enumerated in the statute, generally wh, dE Xelating.to foreign intelligence. and efforts to unlawfully over- ‘throw or endanger the structure of the Government) may be received in-evidence in any trial, hearing or other proceeding - only where such interception was reasonable..." With the Section 605 evidentiary obstacle presumably disposed of by 2511 (3), it would seem that a post 1968 case on facts similar to Ivanov,:or preferably one actually built : electronic surveillance information, would be the best vehicle \ for eventually getting a ruling on the 4th Amendment issue. - ' For information. SECRET an i HW 55084 Docld:32989541 . Page T4 * , ACTION: Ly oe feng. ee = ieee & as . Re ee eee . - . « ° .,” . . feet "Ze . a* eases ~ rer me
HW 55064 ca @ INQUIRY # 3 DoclId: 32989541 Page 75
- 1 - Mr. Baker 2 a _ 1- Mr. E. S. Miller : ; | 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith September 17, 1973 . William D. Ruckelshaus _ The Deputy Attorney General - Designate Director, FBI 1 - Mr. Sizoo / & \esseaemrn ISSUES. REGARDING THE/FUTURE OF THE FBI oO _ F. A 4 Z. CZ. Reference is made to your memorandum to me captioned “"Substantive Issues Regarding the Future of the FBI" dated July 20, 1973, enumerating issues on which you desired the Bureau's comments... re Vu ‘ ‘ Men epee hantenes oe ye a fe yo, a rr Concerning Issue Three in your memorandum, I call your attention to memorandum from me to the Attorney General captioned "Scope of FBI Jurisdiction and Authority In Domestic Intelligence Investi~. gations," dated August 7, 1973, as well as my August 24, 1973, memo- randum to you under the same caption. . ~ i My August 7, 1973, memorandum proposed an Executive order to define FBI responsiblities concerning Federal statutes relating to national security. Mr. dack Goldklang, Office of Legal Counsel, Depart - ment of Justice, pursuant to his analysis of fhe proposal in my August 7, 1973, memorandum, requested a copy of Section 87 of our Manual of Instructions concerning Investigation of Subversive Organizations and individuals, as well as a copy of a study prepared in August, 1972, at the request of former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, iy. These were furnished with my August 24, 1973, memorandum. 5 er « Inasmuch as this Bureau's extensive analysis regarding authority for our intelligence gathering was previously furnished for fan the Department's consideration in August 7 and 24, 1973, memoranda, (ata Datbed snsran adel ann aS endive a? 9K re tene Wal Mert hina AllbeCAe Ra ATA ded NL nents Cerne Ad Abed Laisa Nit, ale tear tn be beet, * eee ~. : ' an i assume that your needs to study Issue Three can be met ed reference _ 3 to those communications without additional submissions. "a ats ZY SY fb nO nsec, Bie — . P . . , a REC- 52 rae JMS: rle fixe ae ne a i Admin. —___ 1 Comp. Syst. , (7) YZ < P 19 1978 Ext. Affairs J Pilon & Come = ye | Gen. Inv. NOTE: Ident. as - Inspection ; inal See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller dated ' wy Leboretony —— 9/13/; 13. Ss SEES TES, es above, prepared by JMS:rlc. '} Spec. Inv. ‘ Telsion hls dg cument is or Conte oad t your requessgand is not for dissemi | Legat Coun. fofttsile your ont rttee, s limited official proceedings by Telephone Rm, — ere Opi mmittee and the content or be disel, to unauthorized pere f Dlsetor See’y MATL ROOM [—]} aTupmuMTielexpress approval of the FBI . aM! Tr Page 76
i Legal Coun. | Research — . AV 13 1973 SEE NOTE PAGE EIGHT ” eng? . Asst. Dir: 1~- Mr. Mintz 1 ~ Mr. Baker The Attorney General August 7, 1973 J SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION — AND{AUTHORITY INYDOMESTIC “ y fi, TJuritadsaiiscd INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS CURING | Se mem eo . een neal ee eR ISN Ee wm During our meeting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion you had with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, dr., of Maryland during your con- firmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBI and the Department of Justice in the field of domestic intelligence investigations. You then asked My. William D. Ruckelshaus to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that research was being performed on this subject at the present time and that we would be in 4 ‘ touch with Mr. Ruckelshaus with regard to this matter when we have completed . the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI. ‘ : Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two i years as to the scope of FBI ete and authority in domestic intelligence. investigations. When Mr. L. Patrick Gray, lil, was designated as Acting Director of the FBI, he inetructed that a position paper be prepared concern- ing the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence ~ authority of the FEI in this field is based on legislative enactments, even though we may have publicly relied heavily on Presidential directives as the basis for such authority. Mr. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The following is a summary of that report. Pr no 6k~66727 7~/ 52% Over a period of several months there were a number of public statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic intclligence-type investir ations, particularly where there is no Cloar-cut lecislative authority apparent. One of the inost searching inquiries was con- tained in a paper presented by Pruiessor dcun T..bute ata L tworday eonference at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by ‘the ' Com inittee for Public latell. Justice, - Laboratory . f {- TE AUG 8 873 Plan, & Eval. bores re ay e. th ob 7, es t resporlser ory DUP eine hs ts “not for a Spec. tnvene “niatio “ f “Bel taunt rout the ea aS not Pe isola to unauthorized person- S " EBE cote RN Assoc, Dir, Admin. Comp. Syst. Files & Com. Gen. Inv, Ident. Inspection Yr take gf -, were an roy - BPM L a 8 £ » tye ors ter ot lanea aweinetatedst et Andee £ ae Cong. Serv. Corr. & Crm. r yy investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that : by on
my The Attorney General : ’ ¢ ry . A major thrust of Professor ElHff's paper concerned FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in - September, 1939. Professor Elliffis of the cpinion that the 1939 directive, which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnified by the ' FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type investigations. Senator Sem J. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the nature and extent of FRI inteligence-type investigations. Senator Ervin had even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any person without thet individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest in FBI investigative activities. , Our study reveaied that the FBI had declared publicly over a long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field ere authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives, and instructions of the Attorney General. The Presidential directives are obviously the 1) directive dated September 6, 1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943; duly 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953, and 2) Executive Order 10456 dated April 27, 1853 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605 dated July 2, 1971). . . 7 TART TRL yE car iqwerentenmmnenaeannmnrm ne RE Wate Nansen teen ETT MITER TORT IReya te cumeme weet Ze Poti Toe ORME Se ter ORT ’ ag bot aeettsl tae! In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent dircctives are all hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FRI by these directives. It appears that while the 1935 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already have from legislative enactments. : It is difficult to read into this directive or in any of those which followed any authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments. + i ss ' HW 55064 Docld:32989541 Page Té
‘ . ’ : . x The Attorney General % As a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in August, 1936, did request former Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct investigations of subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt that any record of it was made outside the FSI. This request, or Presidential mandate, was based, incidentally, on the fact that the law provided that the FEI could conduct such investigations if the Secretary of State should so request. . anys ~ 3 The study revealed that while the 1939 et seq. directives did not grant any special intelligence-gathering suthority to the FRI, we were respon- sible under these directives to collect all intelligence information furnished by iccal, state, and Federal iaw y enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens and to sift and ecordinate all such information for indications of subversive activity covered by Federal statutes. pcemene rennet AE RRDIY weeeNM mm Hipsters BE a ee ee on The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to con- duct whatever investigations are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious ecn- spiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes affecting the national security have been viclated. In this connecticn we note that in 2 letter dated September 14, 1967, the Department of Justice advised that the FBI is continually alert to the problem of recurring riots and is submitting intelligence reports to the Department of dustice concern- ing such activity. This letter enumerated several Federai statutes and . Btated these could be applicable in using maximum avalisble resources, investigative and intelizence, to ccilect and report all facts bearing on the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity. regener ng mapery wana orh © “yun eanefimedennanh tne sneernyh, ete heres ry H t i t i ' z _In other words, the Department was requesting all possible intelligence-type investigative activity based_on the existence of certain statutes. We see this as being no different from our intelligence~type investigations relating to plans of groups or individuals to overthrow, destroy, interfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of national, state, and local governments. . SRT TI eee, weer mere anerreremenreeeey rT HW 55064 Docld:32989541 Page 9 —, _ _ _ _ : eres
Tho Attorney General i - x . . ' * . Based on this study, we believe thet had there never been a single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have conducisd and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelli- gence-type investigations as were conducted from 1839 te the present date, We also beReve, however, that in order to counter the criticism and skepti~ cism of such individuals as Professor EM and Senator Sam J. Ervin that an up-to-date Executive order should be issued clearly establishing a need - for intelligence-type investigations and delinesting a clear authority for the FBI to conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the Attorney General and adhering to constitutional principles. . The study concluded with two basic recommendations. 1) That the Department of Justice be requested to sponsor comprehensive legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative euthority in the collection of intelligence information relating to the national security and; 2) that the Department of dustice be requested to seek a comprehensive Executive order which would cover any possibie gap between statutory authority and Executive necessity in protection of the national security. At first glance these recommendations may appear to contradict our position that we already have statutory authority to conduct security-type investigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative enactraents , nor do we need an Executive order. Eut being realistic we think that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs. Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 2383, 2384, and 2386 relate to the national security, but the legislative history of 2383 and 2384 indicates that they were designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century, and Section 2385 has been reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unques- tionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced . aS H.R. 6646 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain longuage which should fill our statutory needs, except perhaps for those groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but never- theless are tcialitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally ruaranteed rights. - HW 55064 Docld:32989541 Page 60 ~4G~ ty et tet zi AAA ENE ORATOR TLE Ntno tect mtnener ue eA EW ETH OCETE TES HERAT PBTIOCPEAP PRET EMO PETS LRN STE, RA Date Pep A OE He SER LRA CON RN
aaa The Attorney General t , - As to the need for an Executive order, we think that two issues are involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a definitive requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelNigence data he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory ' authority. In other words, there is a need, from cur standpoint, for both authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes give us the authority. The Executive order would define our national security objectives. ‘ Merabers of Congress, including such men as Senator Rebert C. _ Byrd of West Virginia, have proposed legislation to spell out jurisdiction and authority of the FBI in this field. It would appear that the President would rather spell cut his own requirements in an Executive order instead of heving Congress tell him what the FBI might do to. help him fulfill. his obligations and responsibilities as President. ‘s The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from . disclosures coming out of the Watergate hearings could present an obstacle te getting any such Executive order signed in the immediete future. However, the rationale is nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines which have heretofore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward with this. ra We therefore propose and recommend that an Executive order along the following lines be submitied to the White House with a strong recommendation for approval. The language which follows is merely to iMustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate and dces not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should be submitted to the White House. EXECUTIVE CRDER "whereas the Constitution of the United States was established to insure, among cther things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common defense; and to promote the general welfare for the people of the United States; and i 2 [ . ‘| HW 55084 Docld: FEISI GET —Paye Bk tg te ie eee Fee oe sts fe sone Ness eunlbnat eT binnas bobbie se  o4
i The Attorney General < ® imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the Government thereunder; and "Whereas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the common defense, and jeopardizing the general welfare of the people of the United States; and "Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as treason, sedition, sabotage, espionage, insurrection and rebellion, seditious conspiracy, civil disobedience, rioting, assassination, kidnaping, deprival of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; and "Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally imposed responsibilities; "Now by euthority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that; "The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to sub- versive activity and other such activity affecting the national security, domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States." , The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions; HW 55064 Docld:32989541 Page 62 Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally a : i oo . +1 Ateweeepm ogT samementins neath fom ertate ereneymeneneneneermmenrerrairemgemne 2 aeeatenl wnneteemamines mmmaritutaana fovnare anna nnevanpectmnmennnemetiam/ttes :biMt renin watt neetratrem te tmeeanne TAP 1 Be . a a ne Sate wt eee i wre sot we ny + ’ awe . com mee vn at maar are +
PR Tr. UETUINENoTLm TCS TDTUNVUNEINSERSnIE IO ~y * @ ” @ The Attorney General killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic establishment; hijacking of aircraft in furtherance of revolutionary movements: terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishments; and open declaration of war on our form of government are only. a few of the violent acts which have been perpetrated by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or * seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were - once confined to far away places and related to problems of no immediate con- eern of ours are now possible in this country. Foreign terrorist groups in collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for an airport massacre of the type which recently occurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements have laid plans for terrorist attacks on American soil. Already one foreign official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists. It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on the concept of investigation only when there is reason to believe a crime involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must obviously anticipate the crimes deseribed above. We believe that in -order for the Government to be in position to defend itself against revolu- 55084 ‘Docld: 32999541 Page 83 1)? tionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it, the FBI must have sufficient investigative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further defining the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance information concerning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolu- tionaries who seek to overthrow cr destroy the Government. However, we also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney General's expressed interest in laying more formal guidelines te our work in areas where definition is not now clear. We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delineating our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intelligence information relating to the national security to be a very important and high priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important. . Shee nee menenrrteernmne te teres 7 ve yeaa Sr creme ses emer ema re oere EROE Ae 1 ep eareneetene enn eee re eeen Sere “Dc dee dS U5 TEER a arte
oS 4s & . Sal * The Attorney General s For your information, our own investigative guidelines as con- tained in our Manual of Instructions relating to domestic subversive investiga- tions have been completely rewritten to conform with the concept that our domestic intelligence-type investigations are based on Federal statutes. These ‘guidelines provide that in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specific statutes relating to the national security. A copy of the new guidelines was previously provided _ to the Department of Justice in connection with the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy to obtain a copy of the FBI's Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions. i The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973. ie I : sere ae oe se Seat, oe AYO -1- The Deputy Attorney General ~ -NOTE : See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S.. Miller dated 8/6/73 > captioned as above, prepared by TJS: bjr. - HW 5084 Docld:32989541 Page 64 wee we a ote
Ni he niet eae ce a ESL aan Renee Oa a ae z ‘ i awe Ebay nadaernere onal tle wn Se ee rere rr op or FERRED aoeares UNO WEL lesteoia Mode ha barre at SRR algae Wh orbiales bite EAS HT OAV BLE We OF Tada a mare saree tsa? ooh aid are Plans Bis I es sh netsbo ik wer ted abres ables Siren 164 p19 bean 3 7Ua hdr arene seaeied heb Ta IR A a TS OT eecace ae co a OAR sheets Masieetf 10) wba phd nad pate HW Mr. J. B. Adams 5/0/74 W. R. Wannall RUCKELSHUAUS! ISSUE 49: ' SHOULD THE ISTELLIGENCE GATHERING FUNCTION OF THE FDI BR SEPARATED FROM THE LAW ENFORCEMENT FONCTICN OF THE FBI? ry Reference my memorandum, 4/16/74, Lo Referenced memorandum enclesed a lengthy analysis of the above issue, which contained recommendations for in-house censideration. hr Adams asked that an abbreviated version be prepared for referral to the Department of Justice, containing the conclusion that all three missions of the FHI, viz., law enforcement, internal security, and counterintelligence be retained by the FBI. ACTION: ae eaad , Attached is abbreviated position paper for referral to the Department of Justice, - - | Enclosure . ® ‘This document ‘t nod tag anf ee ; ae - nation outed ns. prepared m Lesponse to your request and is not for dissemé~ wai Conte, bout C jomaanitee, Its vse ‘5 limited to’ official proceedings by . e2, me rod t eter’ imay not b2.diselosed ‘to wiauthorice son Rei witheut the express ‘approval of the FI vauhorized person _dEM: vb re . Se, (4) - 4 . . a . oe 7 . iw Me, W. BR. Wannall _i-~ Mr. A. 8. Fultoa T (1) Me. 3. F. Milter Docld: 32989541 Page 65 . . .
The Deputy Attorney General . October 1, 1973 (' j Director, FBI : y + Ow A TENURE OF THE DIRECTOR jj ¢ —--—~ —_ | ne YF aA4, In response to your request, the following is submitted eoncerning the tenure of the Director of the FEI: i. The problem: tn view of the unique position ocenpied by the FBI Director, ig it in the best interests of the Government and the Nation to limi the term of office 7 rr see a, ary wy ao” 1b REN et RG tery, 2. The present policy: ~ By statute, the Director of the FBI shall be appointed by the President, by aad with the consent of the Senate. There is no specified term of office. Mee. & Ths issues raised: - - S:_The inaues vateod feb 6 3- 2725-/7K There bave been a number of bills introduced in * the last \, fifteen months proposing legislation limiting the tenure of the Director / to varying terms up to fifteen years. There has been RO ) affirmative : action taken on any of them. MAILED @ OE Se A “m w OCT \ 4, Options for future policy: OCT 8 - 1973 % 1973 ‘ kr e mae FRE cae BRETT TMMIAAR Baran, (ene The options are whether thé tenure of the Director of the ea Clone PRE should have no imitation or that 2 fixed term be established. CDE. > rn Os sete - In my tastidtény’ Halbre the Committee on the Judiciary Adnin. —— in June, 1973, L indicated, that I felt independence is. achieved through re. tenure, and expydashd hy thaught that nine years “ould be a proper te Files & Com. term. ~ ett ne" ——~ GLM:iimm (6) on ae Inspection 1 - Mr. Cslahan (Direct) \ ; vad mBageton Memo Walsh toMunsinger, 9/28/73, GLM:pas. VA f vissomt OC. AS ~ aval Co . This document is prepared in response to JO aap yg porter disse by ooo 2h be discloged to unauthorized person- { & ne the content may nut 0e | anaes wm AOE 8 G73 ERs nress approval of the FBI .  t fifa cld: 32989541 Page . 24% i Gen. Inv. Intell, I f Leborotory 1 - Mr. Walsh (Direct) Hic a nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited Felephone 1 r TL
Pd . t ’ The Deputy Attorney General After assuming the office of Director I have had an opportunity to afford further thought to this question and arpreciate that there are some substantial considerations that question whether the Director of the FBI should be restricted to a given term cf office. From a practical standpoint, it is doubted that Legislation to specifically restrict the term of office of a Presidential appointee is necessary. We know of no clear-cut authority te remove an official who has received a Presidential appointment. However, in the final analysis, the President would likely get his way bccause he has the power to appoint a successor, in this case the Director. In effect, in absence of tenure, the Director will be serving at the pleasure of whoever is President. i f i } iy : Should the position of Director of the FBI be singled out for E restriction as te term of office? An informal check by this Bureau has f disclosed no restrictions on the tenure of heads of cther investigative agencies; namely, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement i Administration, and Secret Serviee. Accordingly, to single out the j Directorship of the FBI would be in effect an exception. To previde i tenure for the Director of the FBI would be tantamount fo placing him ! in the same category as heads and commissioners of regulatery bodies ; and the Interstate Commeree Commission who do serve for specific periods. The latter officials make regulatory decisions affecting the Nation and specifie terms of office have the effect of assuring 4 continuing balance of political power. The office of Director of the FBE is not political. | | | | i : i E Experience has. shown that cooperation by other law enforcement agencies and the general public has been instrumental in FBI investigative success. While if cannot be precisely measured, the degree of confidence inspired by the individual serving as Director influences the quality and quantity of such cooperation. The office of Director, a non-political one, has been charged with the responsibility of providing factual information upon which administrations of diverse _ political persuasions could formulate prosecutive policy and look after . the internal security interests of the country. Singling out the position w Ju meet viene ye paves meyers rere HW 55064 Docld:32989541 Page 66 SS a Ss et
HW 55064 that appointment of any Director was political in the sense that the The Deputy Attorney General of Director of the FBI for 9 restricted term of office could suggest that perhaps the confidence heretofore placed in the FBI is no longer merited. Whether this would have any impact on the confidence and cooperation by the public would be problematic. &fter welehing the foregoing and considering the unique role of and r:.gerd for the Director of the FRY, it is my conclusion that the Nation would feel comfoertabie with tenure for the Director of the YR, and tenure would contribute toward countering any construction Directorship would not necessarily change hands with sach administration. T feel the incumbent sences a greater independence through tenure. i feel that tenure should be for a period such as nine years to minimise the occasions when apncintive consideration would coincide with a change in administrations. Such a period would also brovide the incumbent a sufficient fecling of independence. Eowever, this Bureau defers to the Department on the subject of length of time. 4 «3 DoclId: 32989541 Page 39
rhiankp ee bgmeper eee ey ‘eats the federal Bureau of Investigation. e an Independent Agency 2. a in response to your request, the following is submitted : ; Sssn je regarding Question #5, "Should the FBI be an independent agemy sige oe or continue as part of the dustice Department?” eS, S o 1. Problem: Should the FBI be an independent agency or continue . st S28 2 as part Of the Department of Justice? BS os =. a ; , S88 x 2. Policy: At the present time the FBI is a bureau within the Depart’ = os . ment of Justice and, as such, is responsible to the Attorney General. - © YS “ R Sere. i 3. The Issues Raised: The question has arisen on several occasions 3 aie * whether the FBI, with its vast resources and knowledge, should be Se B under the control of a political appointee, the Attorney General, or $858 . separated frora the Department of Justice and established as an ses independent agency within the Executive Brapeh. . 2 Sf ass -> 64}, Options for Future Policy s%.Tie main : options for the future of seinen x a is) SET are two: (i) Remove it from its position as an integral part of the S88 3” “lpepartment of Justice and establish it as an independent agency, or &g¢s = (- : @) maintain the present status of the FBI in its role as the investiganS's 9 S ~ five arm of the Department and, as such, responsive to the directives § aS : pe the Attorney General, 20 OCT 19 1973 S22 Ss s ; A brief look at history indicates t that in 1903 Congress 'vireat ees wt ' the Bureau of investigation and designated it as a part of the Department & «. Assoc, Dir of Justice. The main reason for this action was that a certain void S§ % Aeeh Die - existed prior to this time in the enforcement function performed by the S ge Comp, Syst. Attorney General. While the Department traditinnally bore the responsi- - Fiee&ten. bility of enforcing the laws of the United States and prosectiting violators /) \v ren: lave of and jaws, Vy existed no permanent group of individuals whe “til inspection intl ‘a FA: é (6) . Ke Cover memo, Baker to Callahan, yi Zz ion & Bod : 10/4/73, re "Issues Raised by Spee AER ae \saas ae aha Mr. Ruckelshz . re future of " Training = 33, 1s aker (SFA: esh) » ie . Legal i Miry Raker \e ; ~ Telephone Rm. We wy 35681 arene out on) G u The Deputy Attorney General October 18, 1973 cf 3 Director FBI Wa vat toy
The Deputy Attorney General _ conduct the fact-finding investigations necessary to sustain successful ° prosecutions. The creation of this “detective” force by Congress : aimed . to fill that void, ' Over the years the responsibilities of this agency, which eventually became known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have increased tremendously. From a smail agency charged with the task of conducting investigations regarding relatively few matters, the FRI has develored into an agency held accountable for investigating violations of over 189 categories of Federal Law. In addition, the FRI has become more than just an investi- gating agency, due to its maintenance of various data in certain areas indispensable to a criminal justice system. The proposal to make the FBI an independent agency within the Executive Branch has been voiced on several occasions in Congress. Within the very recent past two bills were introduced in the Senate to achieve this aim. Additionally, as far back as 1947, Congressional sentiment existed to separate the FBI as an independent agency. The proponents of this move have made it clear that the possi- bility of a politically motivated FBI has caused them great concern and led to the introduction of measures which they feel would go a long way toward preventing undue political influence. The argument is made that the Attorney Generai is almost always a political appointee of the President, whose views generally conform with his own. Those espousing this argu- ment point to recent events as examples of how an Attorney General could use his position to political advantage and fear that because of this mctivation he could easily manipulate an agency possessing vast amounts of sensitive information and substantial resources, such as the FBI, and easily misuse this organization which is subject to his directives as a part of the Depart- ment he heads, The question arises at this point whether removal of the FBI from the Department of Justice is the proper means of assuring its justifiable degree of inderendence and freedom from undue political pressure. The WW 55084 Docla:32989541 Page 93 “ou . Pe ta “Se tat Wye iy ona tee Matte at ea ds aiden : x ye, 4 a “ *. ord Apert «se Poa ko » t one ’ a7 ag oon te, yt te “te, _ a3 ae = ens Fe <h a. <- - 1 ae + ea 3 % re tl © PME Tae £ q e A s Sas x FAO Me
oon ° _ The Deputy Attorney General rk we ’ '- ease with existing independent agencies, There appears to be some pi e—“—‘“CSs—s—s—S . : F ; m4 ‘ . , oo 4 , ak ‘ae , zfs ead . 1 . . oA "et - a yt att : aa te of ~ an OB tua + ne . “ designation of the FBI as an independent agency would simply mean . og that the Director would no longer report to the Attorney General, but a would instead be responsible directly to the White House, as is the serious doubt whether an FEL Director would ke more or less subject to political pressure when placed in this posture. The FBI must be responsive to the desires and needs of the American public and in this sense only should it be considered politically responsive. The danger of becoming enmeshed in partisan political dealings might easily be increased by removing this additional layer of Executive Eranch responsibility which now exists in the person of the Attorney General. Opponents of these proposed Senate bills note that, while some danger does exist in the FRI's reporting to a political appointee, a far greater danger would exist ifthe FRI, performing as an independent agency, became the arm of a politically motivated Director who was responsible to no one but the White House. ' When one considers the possibility of an independent FEI, it is difficult to ignore the specter of a national police force at the disposai of the incumbent administration, a condition a generally repugnant to our citizens. a The relationship between the investigator and the prosecutor is avery delicate, yet vital one. Neither can properly fulfill his role ‘without the wholehearted assistance of the other. So itis with the FBI .and the Department of Justice. A close working relationship has developed and must be maintained if the responsibilities of each are to be met. , The FBI does need a certain amount of independence and this fact has been recognized by even its most severe critics, In addition, Congress, in creating a new Subcommittee on FBI Oversight, has in ; effect insured a certain degree of FBI independence. a Ja a ae DoclId: 327989541 Page 93
ra ‘ - ee The Deputy Attorney General : In consideration of all the foregoing, it is believed the FBI LE - should remain a Bureau within the Department of Justice where it can a . properly perform its function to investigate violations of various = - Federal laws and report its impartial findings to those who will conduct the prosecution of these violations in our judicial system. wey ; -4- : : ~ 7 © , Ag 7 HW 55084 Docld:327969541 Page 94 , . ; a _ AWE odes Docid:s2gegodt Page ;
af “ ~ @ INQUIRY # 6 HW 55064 Docld:32989541 Page 95
~ ‘ * e The Deputy Attorney General = October 16, 1973 0 . Director, FBI ” UESTANTIVE ISSUES REGARDING. fe Reference is made to your memoranda to me, captioned S. as above, and dated July 20 and August 20, 1973. * " . "Attached hereto is the FBI response to Issue #6.- / ‘ Enclosure <:-": Vo oo beh ° - a are a = , x Te a vy : ne . ve * os ; vet : : . * - . . . > = = Assoc. Dir, ___ Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. Ext. Affoirs —— Files & Com. — » Gen. Inv. ident. Inspection tnteli. Laboratory Pion. & Eval. Spec. Inv, Teaining Legal Coun, Telephone fm. ~~ Fl ttt Se - directo Shey & Oifale Bou {Q73 revervesunr—J 9° Jf. an HW 55064 DBocld:329899541 Page 96 THE FUTURE OF THE NOTE: Mr. Ruckelshaus' memorandum of 7/20/73 enumerated i1 issues regarding #RI organization and operation being studied by him. ‘The 8/20/73 memo/set forth the format for response. Issue #6 concerns the relationship between the Director and the Attorney General, assuming - that the Bureau remains a part of the Justice Department. 1 -Mr. Callahan 1 - Mr. Baker 1 - Mr. Emery Aes PN i" 3 i Ph Iv aaa ee — i ° your, Co i ZS | ] nel without the express approval of the FBI .- a ument is prepared in. response to your: request and is not for disse utside your Committee.:..Its use. is limited 16 official, proceedings wmitiee-and_the content may not be disclosed to untuthorized persor-
- Issue #6: Assuming the FBI remains a part of the Justice Department, what should be the relationship of the Director to the Attorney General? Ali the organizaiionai and substantive relationships should be examined. . | a 1. The problem: By Congressional enactment, the Attorney General has been designated the head of the Department of Justice and has been charged with the responsibility of supervising and directing the administration and operation of that Department. Further, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been placed in the Department of Justice with the Director of the FBias its head, The FBI, through Congressional enactment, Executive Order, and Directive of the Atlorney General, has been charged with the responsibility of performing certain duties subject to the general supervision and direction of the Attorney General. The Director of the FRI, a Bureau chief within the Department, having been granted enormous responsibility, musi atiain a proper balance between independence and responsiveness in order to properly discharge this responsibility. 2. The present policy: Disclosures of political and business corruption and unethical practices during the investigation of land-fraud and antitrust cases in the early 1900's, coupled with the recognition of the need for an investigative arm within the Department of Justice subject to its control, led to the creation of the Bureau of Investigation (fcrerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) within the Department in 18028. In an effort to reverse a trend of political influence within the Bureau and the Depariment, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone in 1824 appointed J. Edgar Hoover as Acting Director of the Bureau. Shortly thereafter Attorney Generali Stone dictated that the Director of the FBi be directly responsible to him with respect to the operations of the Eureau asa whole. in addition, it was understood that the Bureau was to operaie iree of political influence and limit its investigative activity to certain violations over which the Bureau had jurisdiction. This pact was formed to give the Director, charged primarily with delegated investigative responsibility, a degree of independence recognized as so necessary for him to properly discharge his duties and JFH:CSH (6) - Attachment to memo to Deputy Attorney General, 10/16/73, captioned "Substantive Issues re Future ae onchosbt ares 2/72 Baa 4) _ AW 55084 DoclId: 32989541 Page 97 <! x, ame - 4. " Re beet, ? a rr a fy son ap eat vpn a Sa, Ladieaumcdig dpa ‘ pre a ‘ So ye aL x te Tare Tis beatae +h ook : . Y ahs ® Ot ne nn ae : fob w ent eA NC ee tRNA NO,
still remain subordinate to the Attorney General, who had been charged primarily with a prosecutive function. Codification of duties to be performed by the Attorney General as head of the Department oi Justice, and the Director | as head of the FBI within that Department, plus recognition that both must attempt to perform their related duties within the criminal justice system to the optimum, has led io the necessity for a subsiantial degree of inde- pendence on the part of the Director, balanced with a responsiveness by him to reasoned counsel, guidance, supervision and control by the Attorney General. . ‘3, The issues raised: (a) During the “Princeton Conference” it was said that time and practice have made the FRI a totally separate power answerabie to no cone. More specifically, the Attorneys General, Presidents and Congress have granted power and responsibility to the FBI bui have failed to direct, guide and control it. (b) During the course of the FBI investigation of the “Watergate break-in, * allegations were made that the FEI has been too responsive to demands made upon it, particularly those of a political nature. 4, Options for future policy: The Director of the FBI, as head of the princiral investigative Eureau within the Department of Justice, roust be permitted to discharge his responsibilities iree from political or unethical pressure. This must be balanced with his responsibility to remain responsive to the Attorney General's leadership and direction of that Depart- ment having as one of its princigal functions the enforcement of the Feder -law through prosecution. A Congressional oversight committee, available to give the FBI counsel, guidance and direction, couid greatly assist the FBI in achieving and maintaining this balance. There must be an efficient working relationship, with free and open channels of communication between the Director and the Attorney General, due to their mutual and interlocking responsibilities in the criminal justice field, primarily investigative on the cari of the PEI and prosecutive on the part of the Department. This relationship should generate, at descending levels in the Department and the FBI, a commitment to accomplish an efficient work flow, in appreciation of the impact of this interaction on the Qn x - NW 55064 BDocld:32989541 Page 96
_ ’, the same time providing necessary FBI services to other elements ofthe ._—y eriminal justice system. So a '. entire criminal justice system. - bilities of the FBI, the Attorney General-Director relationship and the “regard, and to cite only one of several examples, is evidenced by the opera- ' the Attorney General-FBI Director relationship, the FEI head must communi- “y « whoa “ woe 4 ao ' ve . y Daan ae eg ato C ’ *“ - we nt! .* * a . a ae » - ' . ye fas Tt «,t . +t a ‘a ~“ . ~ . mF, od tof z . ‘ e 4 2 * 47 Ys og Because of the muitiple and varied responsi- wee. ion take ayes atte borse- raged 2 ee nee nee ; rae counterpart division relationships should insure a smooth and coordinated effort which will enable the accomplishment of major objectives, while at is 3 * - 2 , s a Fae 3 we oe That we are well aware of our role and responsibilities in this we tion of the Computerized Criminal History Program which provides much needed data to all branches of the system. Thus, to the extent possible, these relationshits should be such that both objective achievement and mutual assistance between components of the systems are enhanced. te ee ¢ rete? With regard to other continuing relationships having a bearing on an ‘ YE ophaee ey eate directly with the Fresident on occasion, and with the recent establish- ment of 2 Congressional oversight committee, direct contact will be main- ws tained with this group. Concerning uitimate alternatives in the relationship, = - * _ the FBI Director must be in 2 position to ragister reasoned disagreement at times and, if the situation dictates, to take up important matters of disagree- « ment with the President and with the Congressional oversight commiitee. _ at - oo te . ~ rey oe woe wy so = vote de . - “ “oo” a tc soe oe -, wot fe vote vam tat ote? 2 os . a4 x nen. ° sae ae se . 1 a es toe ., eons . — . ee = v wile a we mee . wy BF . ee /. . . . . 223” “ . a en te . ae ae tata wwe aoe > ene soe eS . . ie 7 ee wad . - Ae, , tee rote -° wees es A » . . ° < ES ~ . ae va - ye fe. om Pare > os 7 ” ¥ - - a we . - 8 a ' - * soy ef - . . - = a tee 7 « . . . ~ : . ‘ Be deve . - so > re Log + 7 wy “ . .? 2, 2 tem ~ OL a re x “So cee te : uh . * . . S o* é ert 2 oo * . * we “ rG sate a wan oe ~~ = * oe a wee ‘ oJ ¢ ~ ef o . ~ “ . 7 can - ” - an fa OM me re woos “* ’ ‘ 2 ' . . . . “ an "2° “ee " ee ~ Oo . - : wae soe : - . > ; : . - : - wale ' a ee y, re te : tk », soe : . er : <  te as Y oe! . - . “¢ . * wig worl San Whee ose - + . tae tacos . : nn, ary wee . ar : - rr a en : rae ee Le fare " voy . as, im ato oe x . - og - . . ot wee # . tose ° Toa ene me ad - a SO Fae ves Sooo . . x yw ee sot mote » “ r, Mae a 4,4 . od . yo. 2 . : . m- : ra ae ee : : CODE ee arate st an . we woos wit. wa ped mot on" ' a ~, me a y * + ty wee os 0 ¥ . . . * a wena a rr) ed : : ~ ye er res . a - : : . : te ee mee “ omen 1. a ot ane on e . eR “Oe ao . - wee. woe a 5 an ** € - Ay Toe a a Te owe To Fe BO See af 0 Ay “ ~ so Sou F 5 a ton Stee > . 8 af 3 “ow * as “ . z - 3 F ‘ 7, fas ‘ep 8 wots ees TO. . . “ae « "ent - sk a. es raee . . 2 . - ‘ Oe ~ wee wae, - ‘ . ° - : 2 Se * aa 2 eas . wee woe we Bee ’ 2. « “ue - wo ‘ ne "7 a : . . 6 . a : : . at “ - ~ _ “" aa : tee . oo ca ~ + “ os ’ -* “ se : ‘ ” or . ~~ al . , ony 1 - . . . 7 . . « * su 2 “ : s . Ns . stg eT . .- = ~ oF ve - way e* » er, an Poe tL 7 . - , eo + . ~ wee » * f am * <. ~ - - ’ . ‘. “4 “~ - ad . 2 : wo. fe 1 , - 6 3a we ° 7 . . . has . » . . x . + ~ oe . an . eee . . : > . . " .* bs - -y - te * . - . ~ . . a - . + . ' ares + ate . - “ 7 ao. . ~ 7 . Peo : + . . 8 wa “ 74 = ae re toe we ty . . ~ ' ve on . >, a . ot ee * . en 8 sf a ee . > ™ ' * rey ~_o™ . . oo a . “4 . . ae + - - a we oote a ~ ‘ - we = -t . - ‘ . : . od . a" we an > ‘ 4 ey . : .¢ . . . : - = : * ” . Lf ats ole rr-< * ' . a "ame » ™ gh ad a » . . t a , ~+ on . a x coal . et mo fe a he . sees. _ - -4 . . . . soe 4 . ta Z Ny bo a . . ' . ~~: ’ » "8  . ae “Ts . moe os * - Smo, ‘ ‘ “ * . eg % . : . a . 3 - at, . ove oo 5 * ” 2 ‘ se . . . ‘ . * . ~ moe ‘ - wo an ? , . . Lv: . i . - * *. rote ' ee ox ‘ bd . + “4 . 7 8 . . 0 tO . x. 4) Doclid: 32969541 FP 99 , :
a “ty sty, ww, ocho: ¢ * 1- Mr. 1- Mr. l- Mr. mil Wannall Mintz T. Smith December Hl, 1973 Sx The Acting Attorney General 1 - Mr. STA REC-38 4 - AYIT2 - 35 Director, FBI STUDY OF FBI PROGRAMS AND POLICIES Reference is made to your letter of December 5, 1973, RSS captioned as above. | 38 = " i fully support the idea of a study being launched for the . aa S88 purpose of considering the need for additional legislation to enable « $&§ the FBI to counter violence in the time of crisis such as existed at the } Se § time the FEI implemented the COINTELPRO - New Left. os Ss So ° As you know, the FBE has conducted an in-depth study x FJ uy iy Bas of the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority and it was concluded , ly ne “- Ss that additional legisiation is needed to enable us to more fully nla L. _ - 82 -. discharge our responsibilities relating to the national security. \ oN 18 aS Copies of this study have been furnished to the Department. ~ “ . i os 4 S- 0} ~ oss As for the general study of programs and policies of the ~» SN S28 FEI which was initiated by former Attorney General Richardson and ey . & sn former Deputy Attorney General Ruckeishaus, we have completed = 8 § s compiling most of the information requested. However, as pointed z 2 S388 ‘out during our meeting on December 5, 1873, information requested ‘ ~Sss = in item No. 7 relating to Investigative Techniques was so broadly 3 | 8088 requested by Mr. Ruckelshaus that it encompasses extremely sensitive 3 +8888 foreign intelligence collection techniques. Such information is so Qa 2 y ~. closely held in the FBI that it is handied on a strictly need-to-know basis. A aes We therefore do not feel that the information should be included ina Q ASS ss study of this type which will be beyond the control of the FEI. id Sess a nade S Mr. Petergen noted at the meeting that such information Lies ° ag RSS is needed if we expect to get legislation which would give us the tony. authority we need in the sensitive foreign field. We recognize this ne AS y cciwe = T3S:mah () E>" gee Norm, pacETwo! | ne Inspection MAILED. 2 , : a “Fe ee . vee — ws DEC kaidio any yy wf ‘Plan. & Eval. . 4 Le | <h Spec. Inv. 2 . c . rinse - 8 ig Te A ivf a) vs 4 <u egal Coun. k ; i eer . NW SHANBSA =, S8,uN Mp ageenmrsve owt if Mas :
a . . * x re” = - be * : . » nO TP * ~ , . we <> ain - «4 . ” . oh, “a ; se, . “i 1 - * ‘ ” oa . « Py . = 7 Saye! * od . . . o “ a wt, we ‘ ‘ re ve zi af one . ” ed oe + : - he Acting Attorney General | ' but we feel that such could be handled during oral briefings during high-level conferences. in this regard, you have designated - SUR kn s « Messrs. Henry E. Petersen, Robert Dizon, J. Stanley Pottinger,. reana:! . . and Irving Jaffe to be availabie for consultation and advice. gee ‘ eo - ia Tam designating Assist: ant to the Director-Deputy _ Associate Director Edward S. Miller; Assistant Director W. R. Wannall, Intelligence Division; Insvsctor John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel; and Inspector Thomas J. Smith, Intelligence Division, to meet with the aforesaid for the purpose of resolving § issues bearing ¢ on FEL programs . +. . and policies. Ce a ee oe ee feos, : - , I feel that it would be , highly profitable if the Department - _ . ° cand FBI representatives could arrange a two- or three-day conference . -  “. away from Washington, possibly at our Quantico facilities, where ' ss an uninterrusisd discussion of the various problems could be held : and during which reeommendations for positive action could be © 2). formulated. if you agres, I will try toa arrange something for soon is after the first of the year. ae ‘ LA conference was held 412/ 5/4 3, between Mr. Bork and 1 the: Py Director. Aiss present were Assistant to the Director Edward S. en Miller and Inspector Thomas J. Smith from the Bureau and hla Moen od. Mr. Henry E. Petersen. Relet was discussed at the conference. _~ * “ts The letter was deemed necessary because of the Carl Stern suit ee _ involving his request under the Freedom of Information Act for eg ee . @ecuments relating fo the COINTELPRO - New Left. Mr. Bork feels oH that tee Bureau and Department should study need for future a _ legislation in connection with issues relating to the COINTELPRO. tag : “Ay Aa it “4 ~ ~ sf ~ * : . : in & : ~ * 2 . : a” . . ~ “ne . . * . ar . . ~; - S Loy > “ cn ees . te atu . a : ra s go a a + ‘ af, : oye . an os we Nee er aera bia thieic siete ie nik kien " uf HW 55084 Docld:32989541 Page 102
Assoc. Dir. Asst. Dir: Admin: - Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs Files & Com. __ Gen. Inv. Ident. Inspection fntelf, * Laboratory Plan. & Eval. __ Spee. Inv. i eS | | TO > Clarence M. Kelley, Director DATE: December Federal Bureau of Investigation *DJ-150 ~ U4 s6- 65) ° * Loe : ““ “UNITPD STATES GOVERY Memorandum FROM : Robert H. Bork, Acting Attorney je? 13 General ; H { re | ] SUBJECT. Study o&.FBI Programs and Policies . it Ay ie aa NA, MBE {Am LS ‘ Training Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. _.. Director Séc’y __| : a ee tee As youtknow, a general study of the programs and ,, policies of the FBI was initiated in July by former Attorney General Richardson, ~ former Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus, and yourself. . . ia: As Acting Attorney General, I have continued con tA ee this effort and you and I have discussed various ( wo wig eee aches to further implementation of the study. In addition,, -I have discussed the matter with Senator Saxbe to assure that , —_ he is properly advised of on-going matters pending hefore the we Department. As a result of my conversation with him, I am ws Me certain the study will continue to receive the highest priority. “* t when the new Attorney General assumes office. i} Nog O- A new dimension was added, however, as a result of ~% 2 { a suit filed against the FBI under the Freedom of Information 2 s Ret by a reporter for the National Broadcasting Company, Carl Stern. Thé suit brought to my attention certain information Sich demonstrates anew the importance of the study. In my . capacity as Solicitor General, I decided that the law and the J t vars Pod fv i real Wome R Ee > 3 { . public policy expressed in the Freedom of Information Act did XA N n not warrant appealing the district court's decision that the =O % INK documents in question must be provided to Mr. Stern. I under ->2 :) » stand that the material is in the process of being turned overs 9 LL :  ¢4,. 4p i to Mr. Stern. ~~O } '@ el . ST-114 REC-38 (> - -~ 3 Y/ OQ - -35lo™8 0 | pas — Meanwhile, it <3 appropriate-~indeed imperative-- = ¢ ys that you complete as rapidly as possible the inquiry into “es 9 Legg i investigative techniques that you and Mr. Ruckelshaus had j (eis i begun. As you and I have agreed, the study should focus in SEX em particular on the programs and activities referred to in the Glin _ documents involved in the Stern litigation. I ask that YOU 6 cecaas peal report on these matters as expeditiously as possible, and a lb ij that your report include a detailed summary of conduct in ‘they Is 1973 . Oey past under such programs and actions taken to insure that t the a that ¢ ‘| rights of individuals are not violated while essential FRY Tt msn be, it | investigations are pursued. In terms of priority, I think oo sort a Pm, This document is prepare nation outside your Co your Committee and nel without the express. HW_55064 Docld:32989541 Page in ako to your request and is not for dissems- TLC Cage Hiasgse is limited to official proceedings by ax . it raat t be disclosed to unauthorized. “eMgOMTS, UNTE Le GRen sae rf) fe FBI. ; that the program COINTELPRO--New Left should receive “ae wy /
2 af cae 2 # | consideration. I also seek your recommendations as to any corrective. action that should be taken’ either by you or by the Attorney General. It may be that the best solution would be additional legislation. In addition to the general support of the Depart- ment and its personnel to assist you in your undertaking, I am specifically designating four Department officials ‘to: make themselves available to you, individually or as a group, for consultation and advice. They are Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Robert Dixon, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, and the acting head of the Civil Division, Irving Jaffe They will also be available to the incoming Attorney General for the same purpose. . I know that you agree with me that it is critical ' t0 the national interest that the FBI be able effectively to counter violence in time of crisis and that there be no occasion for public doubt concerning the legitimacy of its actions. : Hoey, VE gama eens ape
. - eesatecniee nsstente butte: water nimates matt Janceheareroseebiamaseuneenedurbinye eh AA Hite Slt Juan hyahs wit Tet Vath atend e méeteh aii enmarnss Hoan Lita BS meen theta ont shtetaebinietA amanitraretinl gs terta aS bimarerie SEL i cnern: * FILES AND THEIR DISCLOSURE I. Problem: Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus, in item #8 of memorandum to the Director dated 7/20/73, stated, "The whole question of files and their disclosure must be studied with a view toward understanding why files are kept, what categories of files there are, wnat information is contained in the files and whether the purposes for maintaining files are being met under present policy. In the issue of disclosure, when, where, and to whom must also be thoroughly examined." , As problems involved in creation and maintenance of files and disclosure of information contained in them are rather complex they are being discussed separately. Identification Division records consisting of fingerprint cards and identification records (Rap Sheets) are not considered to fall in this category of "Files" and their use is not being commented upon. ' i, Present Policy A. Why Files Are Kept: Age of information in FBI files covers a relatively short span of years. FBI had very few files until the President in 1939, directed the FBI be responsible for the Internal Security of the United States. In view of this, and as the number of violations of law over which the FBI has jurisdiction has nearly doubled since 1939, the vast majority of FSi files have been created since 7939. Regulations of National Archives and Records Service, (NARS) General Services Administration, which are based on Title 44, Chapter 33, Sections 3301 and 2302, U.S. Code, govern the tyne of material which we must maintain, Record material is described as including "all books, papers, maps, photographs, er other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, mace or received by an agency of ti.2 United States Governmont under Federai Law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its levitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of-the Government or because of the informationa value of data contained therein," . I'his document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi- nation ovrtside your Committee. Its use is limited to-official proceedings by your Convmittee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized person- nel without the express approval of the FBI . : “ A | (CONTINUED - OVER) HW 55064 Docld:32989541 Page 106
SS Zaide cbbabdincaclcdincrbies Kitnancend Sem" Fon . e . eo . ° * ‘ . e 2 . . °° % °% Qe . : . . : . . . . In view of this definition of record material, we are required to retain any material which we have made or received during the course of public business, and which has been preserved or is appropriate for preservation. In 1969, NARS surveyed the records of the Department of Justice including those of FBI and subsequently instructed that certain categories of FBI files at FBIHQ be retained indefinitely. Included were files which would have historical value and would document policies, procedures, functions, budgetary policies, etc. In addition, vast majority of investigative files must be kept indefinitely although it was prescribed that only a representative sampling of certain types of violations at five year intervals be retained. These require- ments apply only to filés at FBIHQ. NARS has previously approved destruction of closed field files as all pertinent information is in file at FBTHQ. Asa practical matter, however, field investigative files are retained 20 years before being destroyed. ss , ; - . to The FBI has an active program to keep its records at FBIHNQshe barest minimum, While certain categories of our files, as previously mentioned, must be retained permanently, some are obsolete and valueless. With approval of NARS we destroy certain categorics of such obsolete material. Examples of the larger categories are: Results of investigations over 25 years old regarding alleged subversive and espionage activities wherein complaints were nebulous and no derogatory information was developed, and investigations where the perpetrators of the crimes were never identified. bt Seaman earn EI lA nnihamnarnon Matt ho hy te iA te ty Malretbl od attend Nine dtd LA SAAN Sank! tbe RIA titleist Re et er A OES BE TG RE = In order to reduce ~mount of storage space required for files we microfilm, with approval of NARS, majority of files regarding criminal violations which are over 10 years old. Material is filed into one of the following geeneral types of files: B. Categories of Files Main Files \ A main file is opened on an individual, organization, or subject matter when there will be an adequate volume of mail or the matter is deemed of sufficient importance to be assembled in one place. Main files are referred to as "Case Files" when we are making an investigation, HW 55084 Docld:32989541 Page 107
General Files General files are used for nonspecific violations, complaints over which we have no jurisdiction, and miscellaneous matters, General files-are also maintained on various individuals; organizations; foreign, local, and state law enforcement agencies as well as Federal agencies (for information regarding cooperation, liaison, general organization, etc.); associations; patriotic organi- zations such as the American Legion; newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations which cooperate with the Bureau in publishing fugitives.and to whom we give press releases; and activities of foreign nations such as Soviet and satellite activities, etc, Control Files Control files are maintained for the purpose of having all information regarding a specific matter immediately available without the necessity of reviewing numerous case files, An example is Threats Against the President, '* Individual case files are opened for each threat on which we conduct an investi- gation; however, a copy is placed in the control file so that all such threats are recorded in one place, Policy Files A policy file is maintained for each violation over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction along with various specific programs arising from this jurisdiction, ‘Administrative Files Administrative files are maintained on statistical reports, appropriations, conferences, training schools, FBI National Academy matters, and related subjects, Set-up Files These are files which are set up by locality or special « utegory with subs for field offices, states, continents, or foreign nations, Almost any type of file can be made a set-up file if the volume of mail expected is great enough or if the supervision of the subject matter is divided among several Special Agent Supervisors according to locality, AW 55084 Docld:329899541 Page 103
- C. Type of Information Contained in the Files . , Generally speaking, there are no limits as to the type of information in our files. The FBI, by the very nature of its jurisdiction and its worldwide reputation as an elite law enforcement agency, attracts information. In addition to being responsible for investigations relating to interstate criminal activity throughout the United States, the FBI is also responsible for the Internal Security of the United States. Any intelligence organization survives on information uncovered by investigation or received from other sources. Citizens write to the FBI regarding any matter which they feel is against the best interests of the United States or where they feel an individual or organization might be violating alaw. The average citizen is not aware of the jurisdiction of the various investigative agencies, local,state or Federal and many of them bring their problems to the FBI. The FBI will promptly disseminate any matter which is under the jurisdiction of another agency to that agency. The nondisseminated information is either acted upon and filed, .or filed because no action is required. In addition to the filing of material relating to criminal and security matters, the Bureau is responsible for a number of applicant-type (background) investigations and the information developed during these investigations is filed. D. Disclosure of Information in FBI Files 1. Responsibility for Proper Utilization of Information Among the foremost of the FBI's responsibilities is the prover utilization of information received either through investigative activities or through other mens as this information may be of vital interest to another Government agency or a local law enforcement agency. It is extremely important that the FBI keep these agencies informed concerning matters in which they would have a legitimate interest. Information is disseminated at both field and Headquarters level, with PFBIHQ makine the information available to Federal agencies at the national level, 2. Basis for Dissemination a, To Government Agencies The FBI is under cbligation to act as a clearing house for information which affects the Internal Security of the United States. This obligation is based on the folowing: HW 55064 DBocld:32999541 Page 109
, ° oe ‘ . . . ‘¢ ° . ' . . . . Rha SR ALATA Titel dventasrvstadine ana on old pedo wat nna. Mn hn dni schis ize va id anise kin cio a i ye te ema et 6 1. ‘Beginning in 1939, various Presidential directives requested all law enforcement officers to report information regarding espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters to the FBI. These directives charge the FBI with the responsibility of correlating the material and referring maiters under jurisdiction of other Federal agencies to the appropriate agencies. 2. The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the Armed Forces intelligence agencies provides that the responsibilities assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest. In addition, a supplemental agreement provides that certain information of general interest to the intelligence services of the Armed Forces be furnished them. ~ 3. The National Security Act of 1947 provides that upon written request from the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the Bureau shall make available information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination essential to national security. 4, Executive Order 10450 (Security of Government Employees) requires the FBI to check names of all civil applicants and civil incumbents of any department or agency of the Executive Branch against records of the FBI. 5. Supplement Number Four (Revised) of Departmental Order 3464, signed by the Attorney General in January, 1953, classified all official records and information of the FBl as "Confidential. "’ However, in accordance with long-standing policy concurred in by the Attorney General, the practice of passing to other Government agencies information coming to the FBI’s attention jin connection with the conduct of investigations normally within the Bureau's jurisdiction was entirely appropriate and correct. The Attorney General advised the Bureau it would be remiss in its duty if it failed to pass along information which might prove of interest to the general welfare. b. White House Requests ° Pursuant to requests from the White House, the names of individuals who attend, serve or perform at White House functions, or who may be considered for Presidential appointments are checked against Bureau files including Identification Division records for any derogatory data which indicates the indi- vidual might pose a threat or embarrassment to the President or members of his family. Such requests are handled expeditiously and any derogatory infor- mation is reported directly to the White House staff securily officer by appropriat communications depending upon the time factors involved. At the request of the White House, the FBI conducts background investigations on Presidential appointees, White House employees and persons having regular access to the White House, ~5-
For a number of years we have followed the practice of furnishing significant intelligence information, both in the domestic and foreign areas, on a timely basis directly to the White House concurrent with the dissemination of the same data to the Attorney General and other interested agencies. The Bureau disseminates by teletype to the White House and other interested agencies summary data concerning civil unrest and acts of violence as they occur in the’. ° U.S. We also provide the White House by letter or teletype, as circumstances indicate, top-level intelligence data developed through our sources when it appears the President or senior members of his staff would have an interest. Much of this originates with our Legats and through our coverage of foreieon establishments in the U.S: Simultaneous dissemination is made to the Attorney General who is advised of our dissemination to the White House. jt is noted that frequently the value of information being disseminated . _depends entirely on the timeliness of our dissemination. Therefore, direct and immmediate dissemination to the White House is the only effective way to handle these matters. FBI Legal Counsel on 7/20/72, set forth the opinion that the FBI had no legal basis to disseminate information to the White House concerning a current cviminal case, itis the cbligation of the FBI to keep the Attorney General fully informed and leave further dissemination to him, Acting FBI Director Gray instructed this policy be followed and we have been complying with this direction. c. Exceptions 1. Congressional Committees The Attorney General on 6/14/54, ruled that the FBI shall make name checks and investigations of individuals being considered for staff positions of the following Congressional Committees when such requests are made by the chairmen: a. Senate and House Appropriations Committee ~ b. Senate and House Judiciary Committee c. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy _ (Cooperation extended to this Committee pursuant to ‘the Atomic Energy Act of 1946) . d. Senate Armed Services Committee ” \ | HW 55084 Docld:32989541 Page 111 m5 (a) -
. pc obey eens decades btcens . . — ‘ oo @ @ . semenlaanns | e. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2. Supreme Court The Bureau conducts name checks for the Supreme Court, which checks are normally limited to employees such as charwomen, elevator operators and individuals of this type. 3. Foreign Intelligences Services As a matter of cooperation with friendly intelligence services, the Bureau conducts name checks for the following such agencies who have liaison wepresentatives § stationed in Washington, D.C. “ Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Canada) MI-5 (British Security Service) 2m AT ATA SAR ANTE PML CTT om Australian Security Intelligence Organization 2 Australia) New Zealand Security Service (New Zealand) e. French Foreien Intellic ence and Counterespionage Service on ae f, MI-6 (British Secret Intelligence Service) | g. BESS (Bureau For State Security) “(South Africa) In addition, name check requests are conducted for cooperative foreign. police and intelligence services through the Bureau's Legal Attaches stationed in foreign countries. In avery limited number, name check requests are handled for cooperative foreign police agencies by direct correspondence. ” d. To Local and State Law Enforcement Agencies The FBI traditionally has csoperated with local and state law enforcement agencies in matters of common interest. Pertinent information regarding local criminal matters if furnished to local and state law enforcement agencies when such dissemination will not jeopardize FBI investigations or informants. During riscal Year 1973, 189,910 items of criminal information were furnished by the BI to local and state law enforcement avencies. ar ee ARNO NOG YO ACE | ANE OOS EN NITE LE ELON EEL GANADO MEO ttre her ests iar acti At RAN ie math pict TO NLS sa Ronenatanerdnadles ieananberneentdindialdi lin tite babes Mins diac Du omen * eo e HW 55064 Docld:329899541 Page 112
meaner entry Stet Seer oF tbiRed Shanna tetra inane fat ontnl nt chad oan die nab hAL Sie parinhan DS teeen Pvtentehinennng bers se find # nek ite i Day STAM Tea 425 WA oaereande Pea ele anreynatnty myer ermirars wetuinenermenr weenie ermrneenreoe: Sid el antanenod Sateen? aacttinmcitciinavcom nt heat fowekn, AW ayaa fae - 4% oo. . x . ? e "ae » © : WEEDS files. AR Nar careers IE. Tyve of Information Disseminated Name check requests received from agencies within the Executive Branch, as a general rule, are checked against FBI files for "subversive-type" ~ references only and criminal-type references are not reviewed. However, for some agencies, at their specific request, all references in Bureau files are reviewed. All agencies are aware of the limitation on the type of search made as they are furnished a copy of an FBI booklet describing procedures for requested name checks. The policy of disseminating only "subversive-type” information is based on the fact that any agency desiring to obtain a copy of the individual's identificatio record showing his arrests may do so by submitting a separate request directly to the Identification Division. A second reason for limiting the search is due to economy as searching criminal-type references would require additional personnel and an increase in the cost of conducting name checks. In response to name check requests, the Bureau disseminates the results of Bureau investigations, information received from reliable sources concerning membership in subversive groups, pertinent public source information, and. information which good judgment and common sense dictate should be furnished. Information falling in the category of rumor or gossip which is found in Bureau files is not disseminated unless a compelling reason exists therefor, and when such information is disseminated to a requesting agency, that agency is alerted to the nature of the information and the fact that it has not been verified by the FBI. Derogatory information on Federal employees is furnished to the Civil Service Commission and where common sense dictates, it is also furnished to the employing agency. . ¥, How Dissemination is Made - I. Name Checks When possible a copy of the FBI communications is furnished to the requesting agency. A record is maintained on the original of this communication. that a copy was furnished to the particular agency. When information is located in numerous FBI communications, the pertinent data is abstracted and summarize into a separate communication. A copy of this communication is retained in FBI
2. Other Than Name Check Requests Any information received by the FBI which is of interest to another - Federal Agency is furnished in writing to that agency. G. Protection of Information Disseminated When reports or letterhead memoranda already in the file are disseminated to a requesting agency, each such document contains the following statement: "This document contains neither recommendations - ' * nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of -- the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.” Data abstracted from the files and disseminated by letter or in letterhead memoranda form contains, in substance, terminology appearing above. t itt. Issues Basic issue appears to be whether FBI should retain and disseminate information in its files which is not acquired as a direct result of its investi- gations. Harte od nbb sel rena eres Otek ahd ahi Sarma wat tennis term aeutteJanaweeee snewe’Waenserrnnmantegemen ores tab ¢ wid ntanmnmnstsneumachas ware € shai AAS RAL ad Sih L ade ated tenia Bias ashatbeienincat alan IV. Options There are no options. We are required by law to retain information which has been made or received in connection with the transaction of public business and which has been preserved or which is appropriate for preservation as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities or because of the informational value of data contained there. With respect to the dissemination of information to Federal agencies, we are required by law, Presidential directives, and instructions of theAttorney General to furnish information in our files to agencies of the Executive Branch. The exception: cited previously are logical and no change is believed necessary. Likewise, the welfare of the general public requires that we continue. our policy of furnishing pertinent information regarding local criminal matters | to local and state jaw enforcement agencies. puesrayen a | WW 55084 Docld:32969541 Page 114 ws 8 we
1 - Mr. Baker -1- Mr. E. S. Miller Pe Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus OO September 19, 1973 The Deputy Attorney General - Designate 1- Mr. T. J. Smith Director, FBI 1 - Mr. Sizoo a mt F os Reference is made to your memoranda to me captioned as above and dated July 20 and August 20, 1973. Attached is the FBI's response to epasran ISSUES REGARDING T E FUTURE OF THE FBI Og. & -[ ee, * es as we NRA REC A ma cbne aah latnhs ths leone AH LILA NASD abneaiatintvellihe len Aad tab Ui nas dU a "oS we Ss . . aa . af aly - Issue Nine of your July 20, 1973, memorandum. ; Lu Enclosure . 7 JMS:zle ue a i < Y . . ® . . o ep — ee FLL a 7 a REe.99 bg. BWIT2- B34 uf BO Mr. Ruckelshaus' memorandum 7/20/73 enumerated 11 issues regarding FBI organization and operation being studied by him. The 8/20/73 memorandum from Mr. Ruckelshaus set forth the format for response for Issue Nine, which concerns the qiréstion of a Civilian Review Board over FBI intelligence gathering activities, Our response opposes creation a of such a board. a . Ste : ; .t . ; . . ‘ ww ‘ . aye tarsus ae ve ae 20 j973) § i Me JA | : os ; ‘ : - soe . ' es] Assoc. Dir. ate . a : . . . . . : ; . * 3 Comp. Syst. : ; . “ * aed IRs : Ext. Affairs 1 ; ‘oo. . wee i moh . Files-& Com. .- * ete : at a ‘ Gen. inv. “ . . on : vs . Ident. . , se > Inspection ; 2, UA . Re intell. of p fom Laboratory : 2 : LK. Plan, & Eval, as document type ared in responshS your ‘request and is not for dissemi ‘ Spee. Inv. agtson, outside yous (Committee. Its use is limited -to official - proceedings by [ Troining Be 4s re) E p 2. your Coimmyitee and the content may ‘nut be disclosed to unauthorized persone. 39 . Telephone Rew = 4 t@7agithoug‘the express approval of the FBI . veg whit “Director Sec'y —. MAIL ROOM [__] 1g TYPE ‘ONET CJ . Hy 55084 DoclTd:32999541 Page~116
& 9. Problem - The question of a Civilian Review Board for the intelligence- gathering activities of the FBI should be examined. This is a recurrent ise suggestion which came up at the Princeton Conference, — in addition to other ce forums « , ee licy - There is no Civilian Review Board to monitor the FBI inasmuch * as ~ estou checks and reins are available to check or control the FBI, tee (See Options) & Issue - Is it necessary to have a group of civilians review the FBI's “E policy and activities to insure that nothing improper is being done and to = handle complaints regarding the FBI? Rage Options ~ No Civilian Review Board is required since numerous means- exist to control the FBI. These specifically include: a Senate Oversight o Committee, the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, the Office ~ of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, the President's 2 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Civil Service Commission, the = Attorney General, the Department of Justice, the Federal Courts, the hews "s _ Media, and of course public opinion. The President's Foreign Intelligence : Advisory.Board is in reality a civilian review board for the President. s Its members are non-government personnel qualified in matters relating z . to national defense on the basis of their knowledge and experience. 4 Especially is the FBI opposed to the concept of civilian boards exploring ef ' the field of FBI counterintelligence and intelligence-gathering operations ” which would adversely affect this Bureau's relations with foreign intelli- & gence agencies. In general, we feel that the Congressional oversight a concept should have put this question to rest. . . 3 a NOTE: ae * S s See memorandum to Mr. Ruckelshaus, captioned "Substantive € Issues Regarding the Future of the FBI: dated 9/19/73, prepared by JMS:rlec. " ‘ ¢€ . 2 7 - & . . . a?) 4 : a . | ENCLOSURE ¢ : L ' AW 55084 Docld:329¢9541 Page 117 4 . * . . Hany
I. “THE PROBLEM: a ‘What should be the relationship between the Federal Bureau of | *. . §nvestigation and the other Departments.and Agencies of the Federal Govern- - anent? To what extent should the Federal Bureau of Investigation keep tabs ‘on other Departments and Agencies through the development of sources and anformants in those Agencies? IL THE PRESENT POLICY: ; . = . oo - 7 A, Relationship between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Departments and Agencies of the Federal .Government ‘The Federal Bureau of Investigation enjoys a 1 close working _relationship with the other Departments and Agencies. of the Federal Govern- . -ment and traditionally has cooperated fully with local, State and Federal agencies in matters of common interest. ‘Cooperation among the Federai Bureau of Investigation and other Federal Departmenis and Agencies takes-a variety of forms, including high- Jevel coordinating committees, contractual agreements, and written guide- _lines for investigative jurisdiction in areas in which the Federal Bureau of investigation and one or more Departments or Agencies have concurrent juris- ; diction and share responsibility for enforcing a Federal Statute. The purposes , of the committees, agreements, and guidelines are to promote the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the involved agencies, to insure there is no duplication of effort in-eny field, and to insure that proper coverage . is maintained. . , ' Yn addition to the above cooperative means, the Federal Bureau’ -of Investigation maintains the following programs relevant to its relation- ship with other Federal Agencies and Departments: meee NA RF 1. FBI Liaison Program In order to insure adequate and effective liaison -arrangemeni!s wilh other Government agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation main- tains a Liaison Section within its Intelligence Division at Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters. ‘The objective .of this section is to insure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's business with other U. S. Government Agencies is accomplished promptly, effectively, economically, and with a minimum of jurisdictional or policy problems, through appropriate high- level liaison ¥ sith key officials of these Agencies. ~ « Se Eh DI gs document | is prepared mH Y response Fo" your request and $s ‘not. for dissemé: nation outside your Committee. Tip use is Limited to official proceedings by your Conimittee and the content may nut be disclosed to wnauthorized person ial ee the, PgPress approval of the FRI. HW.55084. Docld: adgfistt eR rr gn ern sree tt ee errs ~2 |
“By the establishment of effective liaison contacts, we recognize. and solve minor problems before they become major preblems, requiring . - .  ->protracted and expensive negotiations between the Federal Bureau of investi- -gation and other Agencies. These objectives are achieved by placing experience ~ FBI representatives in contact with officials at the highest levels of other Government Agencies where the Federal Bureau of Investigation either needs assistance or has concurrent interests. The Federal Agencies with which the ‘Federal Bureau of Investigation currently maintains direct personal liaison are: fa) The White House (b) Office of the Vice President -_ {c) National Security Council _.{d) Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board - ” -{e) Drug Enforcement Administration -(f) Central Intelligence Agency - - — .{g) Postal Inspection Service | . a {h) Department of Defense os Oe (includes direct liaison with various elements of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine’ Corps) “€i) National Security Agency ms (j) Atomic Energy Commission i 4k) Department of Transportation 4Q) Defartment of State . ~(m) Department of the Treasury . (Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of ‘ . Alcohol, Tobacco. and Firearms, Secret Service) ~ ~({n) Immigration and Naturalization Service _{o) U. S. Marshal Service — Liaison with other Federal Agencies is handied by receiving -telephone calls and visits from representatives of those Agencies, and by ~contacts with them .on an irregular basis as the need may arise. In addition to maintaining close liaison with various Federal Agencies at the Headquarters level in Washington, D.C., FBI regulations . ‘call for an effective liaison program at the field level. ‘The Special Agents in Charge (SACs) of the FBI's fifty-nine field offices are directed to speci- ‘fically designate an Agent (or Agents) to be responsible for developing and maintaining liaison with other Federal Agencies represented locally. In each instance, liaison contacts are developed to include a close friendly relationship, mutual understanding of the Federal Eurcau of Investigalion ; and Agency jurisdictions, and an indicaied willingness by the Agency repre- | Sentative to coordinate activitics and to discuss problems of mutual intercsi. se \ tee a . “wus . = | | , : _ AW 55084 Docld:32989541 Page 190 °°": +. - 2 , ne mT, 3
2. Dissemination of Information ' "The proper utilization of information received by the FBI, “either through investigation or otherwise, is foremost among our responsi- bilities. Such information may be of vital interest to another Government Agency and/or local law enforcement agency, and it-is not FBI policy to withhold from dissemination information to which other agencies are justi- fiably entitled. Dissemination of information to other agencies is handled at . the Headquarters level in Washington, D.C., as well as in the field. - ‘The FBI serves as a clearing house for information affecting the - internal security of the United States. This is based on various Presidential directives which have specifically requested all law enforcement officers to xeport information regarding espionage, sabotage,- subversive activities, and related matters to the FBI. These directives charge the FBI with the responsibility of correlating this material and referring matters which are: under the jurisdiction of any other Federal Agency with responsibilities in _this field to the appropriate Agencies. — ; ‘Various 2greements between the FBI and other Federal Agencies -provide for exchange of information of mutual interest and require that the ¥BI disseminate certain information to other Departments and Agencies of -the Federal Government. An example is the agreement between the FBI and U. S. Secret Service concerning protective resonsibilities which requires ‘that we disseminate to Secret Service certain information which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the President's safety. Under provisions of Executive Order 10450 the FBI checks names ‘of all civil applicants and civil incumbents of any department or agency of the - Executive Branch against FBI records. In August, 1972, the FBI instituted a program aimed at providing effective and expanded coordination of efforts with the local, state and Federal Agencies having direct responsibilities in the narcotics field. Each FBI - office has designaicd an Agent to act in a liaison capacity as a narcotics -zoordinator and FBI Headquarters has designated a national narcotics coordinator io expedite this program. Any information received by the FBI concerning narcolics is prompily disseminated to the Drug Enforcement Administration, which is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the various drug laws. HW 55064 Docld:32969541 Page 121.
HW 55064 - Laboratory are made available on a -cost-free basis to all Federal Agencies in 3. Cooperative Services 3n its traditional role of seeking professionalism at all levels ~of law enforcement, the FBI is enthusiastically committed to providing -expert assistance to local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies. “Some of ihe facilities of the FBI available to Federal law enforcement vagencies are: (a) The FBI Identification Divisidn. The FBI is the central repository for “fingerprint identification information. Data from the identification records are furnished to law enforcement and governmental agencies at the Federal, State, and local levels for official use-only. {b) The FBI Laboratory. The FBI maintains a well-equipped technical laboratoz at its Headquarters in Washington, D.C., for the investigative and probative use of local, State and Federal law enicrcement agencies, and prosecutors throughout the United States. An excellent working relationship now exists between the FBI Laboratory and the laboratories of other Federal Agencies for the exchange of technical data and procedures. The services ofthe FBI civil and criminal matters, and to State.and lccal law enforcement agencies in criminal matters only. Expanded programs of scientific aid and tr2iningto State and local crime laboratories are presently under development and will involve the continuing, close cooperative efforts.of local, State and Federal Agencies and the FBI, (ce) The National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The FBI's NCIC isa computerized information system established as a service to all law enforce- ment agencies--local, Stale and Federal. The system operates by means “of computers, data transmission over commmunication lines, and telecommunica: tion devices. Its objective is to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement through the more efficient handling and exchange of documented police informa- tion. Inthe beginning NCIC contained data concerning stolen property and wanted persons. In November, 1971, NCIC operations were expanded to | include a file of offenders" criminal histories, which is known.as the Computeri Criminal History (CCH) file. {(d) The FBI National Academy. Since its establishment in 1935, the FPI National Academy has provided a professional training program of highest quality to career officers from throughout the law enforcement communiiy. At its new training facilities at Quantico, Virginia, during Fiscal 1973, 1,044 officers from various local, state, Federal and friendly foreign law enforcement agencics completed the intensive 12-week course. This course is designed io enhance an officer's capabilities as a law enforcement “administrator and to better prepare him to teach -his fellow officers. Docld:32989541 Page 122 ,
orga Although many officers from other Federal law enforcement agencies attend the FBI National Academy each year, the number in attendance is limited due to the mandate that the FBI provide this service to local and state law enforcement officers. B. Extent to which the FBI should keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies through’the development of § sources and informants ‘Gn those Agencies ‘The FBI does not have the authority or responsibility to keep ‘tabs on other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government; therefore, it does not have any policy whereby it checks on other Depart- ments and Agencies. Because of the lack of FBI jurisdiction to keep tabs on other Federal Departments and Agencies, no effort has ever been made _ for the development of sources and informants in those Agencies for that ‘purpose. Although the FBI does not keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies, it has long been an accepted procedure among other Agencies of the Government that the FBI would conduct investigations of violations of ‘Federal law in those Agencies where primary investigative jurisdiction is ‘vested in the FBI, and we do so ona regular basis. Violations of Federal law involving personnel of other Government Agencies over which the FBI has statutory investigative jurisdiction include bribery, civil rights, Fraud Against the Government, Theft of Government Property, and Federal Housing Administration matters. This is not a situation unique to the FBI A comparable situation exists in which the U. S. Secret Service is charged - “with investigating the theft of a Government check. It carries out its © ‘responsibilities not only in its own Department (Treasury) but in all other . Federal Agencies as well. - THE ISSUES RAISED: A. Relationship between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government No issues are known to have been raised relative to the FBI's -present policy regarding its relationship with other Departments and Agcncies ‘of the Federal Government. = \ _ . al Ben HW 55064 | Docld: 32989541 Page 123 )
‘B. Extent to which the FBI should keep tabs on other Departments and Agencies through the development of sources and informants _in those Agencies In regard to the present policy of not developing sources and -informants in other Federal Departments and Agencies for the purpose of -keeping tabs on those agencies, no issues are known to have been raised. IV. © OPTIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY: A. Relationship between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government , tt is imperative that there be.a friendiy, cooperative association between the FBI and other Departments and Agencies of the Federal Govern- ment, There must be an efficient working reiationship, with free and open channels of commynications, among all Federal Agencies. The Director of ‘the FBI and the heads of other Federal Agencies should confer periodically on matters of mutual interest and definitely work together on all occasions. | In order to avoid duplication of effort and problems of jurisdictional responsi- bilities there should be a clear delineation of duties and investigative limits for all Federal investigative Agencies. A prevailing cooperative spirit throughout the entire Federal Jaw enforcement community is a vital necessity in our Nation's war on crime and subversion, ‘The rapid escalation of serious crime and the complexities of upholding the law in today's society have made it imperative that information, expertise, and resources be freely and expeditiously shared ‘by all Federal investigative Agencies. Coopera tion is a bilateral obligation. If the FBI does not continue to cooperate and reciprocate in exchange of - information and resources with other Federal Agencies, it cannot conduct @ Successful operation. “Therefore, it is my recommendation that the FBI -continue its policy of working closely and cooperating fully with other Depart- -ments and Agencies of the Federal Government. HW 55084 Docld: 32969541 Page-124- 9 --. . . rr
.B. Extent to which the FBI should keep tabs on other Departments ‘and Agencies through the development of sources and informants in those Agencies | -- Inasmuch as no issues have been raised regarding the FBI's | current policy in this area, and since a change in policy involving the FBI keeping tabs on other Federal Departments and Agencies through the ° development of sources and informants in those agencies could be most ‘detrimental to all concerned, I recommend there be no change in the FBI's present policy in this area. “ road a . - — - -. . t a © * s s = a : = . . 1.) OU . . .2 . " . aad Flea DRIP Le Ole = : - . : pte wt . . . eae to 2 Tae 3 a era! . we oan “am, eee F * 1 + o ™ * “* z . * = HW 55084 Dd6Tat32999541 Page 125°, . 5
J ‘ The peputy Attorney Geneval October 1, 1973 he BIE 0M ou ais tea Kee | L Di irector , EBI ‘ | - Mr. Baker | Ks 1- Mr. E. S. Miller { SUERSTANTIVE } ISSUES REGARD: Wer, ; 1- Mr. Boynton PRET ROTURE GE THE FBI... eid Eline Leal? Mr. T. 5. Smith INE FORMATION Rik cuomanouni? “a 1-Mr. J. M. Sizoco Reference is made to your memorandum to me captioned as “ee above and dated duly 20,1973. Attached is the FBI's response to Issue - Eleven of that memorandum in the format requested in your August 20, ms 3 1973, memorandum captioned as above. .i8 Enclosure ~ ss IMS: rle/bjz sy, | x D> Ns (8) . } ; m 4 ey Mr. Ruckelshaus' memorandum 7/20/73 enumerated H issues regarding FBI organization and cperation being studied by him. The , 8/26/73 memorandum from Mr. Ruckelghaus set forth ‘ne format for response for Issue Eleven, which concerns bg feelin pf egal attac! es.abroad . to carry. ont EB! st responsibilities . Our’ response rec CS GARAIA AI mends retention of “Hie Legals Attaches. ta! ~ << _— & \ a J, | ae OS AN EERE RE SLE RS EA OS if oe ‘Dir, 7 { REC ZL : or one _ 2 Rae f _ A eae attorns os A os 8 ocr 4.1973 : Files & Com. __. . of a ig Gen. Inv. Saori ° { . x qa pce MAS EAI orig: for = 5 Loborstery | « af - ; AMA a iad t is prepared in response to yous’ Fequest and is not for dissems- —~ Hon 02 uiside vour Committee. Its use ts fimited to official proceedit ds by. . ~ é Plen. & Evel. XK 4 Tyee. hiv. aoe . 3 % raink: some “8 8 gel Coun get” Your Congmiappeyand the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized.person- “4 fephone Rm. nel without theseapress approval of the FBI . . ‘ eo Sec'y_ MAIL RCOMC_] TELETYPE UNIT [_] © esa @ (WN) ete OVA g ” 4 im. DAL. AP Bere Abed ane
— IMsirle (/¢. This document is prepared in respons ¢ nation outside your Commitiec. Ics "sse ts intted to g NG your Committee and the conter: may not be disclosed to urd. nel without the express appr oval of the FBI . ef a y Ls a [YS LD [5 yy, ; a 1 -_ J HW 55064 - Policy - The FBI has had Agents stationed abroad in American Embassies . ton from normally confidential records of foreign agencies, apprehensions _ tradition, the FBI has found it necessary and in feet invaluable to have a A} 13. Problem - Should the FBI have foreign officers reporting directly to the Director? ‘ : : . . fou since 1840. This has not been a secret cr classified fact. They are known as Legal Attaches and are not operational. They do not conduct investiga- tions but depend upon law enforcement and security agencies of the host government fox coverage of FSI leads overseas. They maintain regular liaison with such agencies in countries where stationed, as well as in other - gountri es that they” visit on road trips. . # ‘Legal Attaches are 5 vegularly calied upon to secure in-depth cooperation from foreign agencies on criminal and security matiers which are frequently of a complicated and sensitive nature. These matters fre- quently include requests for surveillances, complicated interviews, informa- and informal deportations. In order to handle such matters effectively, a Legal Attache must be proficient in the language of the foreign country involved and must have an extensive knowledge of its culture, customs and judicial process. On the other hand, he must have a thorough knowledge of FBI jurisdiction, regulations and policy. This knowledge, which can only be achieved “through ‘years of experience as an FBI Agent, is extremely broad. ‘In addition, in order to maintain the cooperation of foreign ‘agencies, Legal Attaches assist these agencies by having investigations con- ’ ducted in the United States concerning matters of interest to the foreign countries invclved. These matters frequently involve major criminal cases, espionage and terrorist cases which ¢ are often of substantive interest to the “ . Numerous problems arise in connection with handling leads abroad and matters in this country on behalf of foreign countries. Since each country is different with regard to its laws, customs, language and man stationed abroad, on the scene, who can insure that prompt and efficient action is taken and that cooperative relationships are nurtured and protected. Seas . , . 7 We . NS (7) Elvi, SEE NOTE PAGE 6 e our request and is not for dissemi- non st sfinigh Bhoceedings by srized person- ; DoclId: 329894541 Page 128 Fas “CLOSURE
te While our representatives abroad are still FBI employees, they are well aware that the American Ambassadors hold authority through various Presidential directives over the entire American presence in their - respective éounties of assignraent and that all matters pf interest must be ecordinated with Ambassadors and their staffs. This includes political . intelligence information acquired by Legal Attaches. | / | | I | I HW 55084 ees | Issue ~ Is the FBI to continue using Legal Attaches to meets its responsibilities abroad? . Options: .i. Retain FBI representatives to carry out functions which have - served since 1940 to assist the FBI and U.S. law enforcement agencies in their responsibilities having foreign ramifications, as well as to assist foreign law enforcement and security agencies. The liaison function of FBI representatives serves to develop . and maintain close, cooperative relationships with police and other investi- gative agencies of the countries covered. In the modern-day world, with the speed and facility of communication and transportation, crime has taken on immense international aspects which require constant liaison attention. Accomplishments attained by the FBI through the liaison activities : 7 of the Legal Attaches with foreign law enforcement agencies in the past fiscal ' -yeax (1973) include 1,047 FBI fugitives located; 109 fugitives located for state, iecal and other agencies; 167 automobiles recovered; and total property recovered worth $2,260,725 .00. . . ‘Retention of Legal Attaches will permit further accomplishments, guch as in several specific cases set forth below. It is firmly believed that these successes would not have occurred in the absence of personal and direct EBI liaisen with foreign police agencies in the countries involved. SEMSITIVE FOREIGN /NTELLIGENEE Soukee The Legal Attache, Beirut, has obtained through contacts a considerable amount of vital information concerning Arab terrorist activities which have become in recent years a major law enforcement problem through- . out the world. The Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department have congratulated us on the intelligence information developed by this e Docld: 32989541 Page 1279 | Wane 8 whee be, Bebe to eet 88
particular Legal Attache. In addition, he recently uncovered an international _ ear theft ring involving the theft of over 180 ears stolen in i the U.S. and valued at $708, 006. . x . » The Legal Attache, Buenos Aires, located and is currently ‘attempting to. arrange for the return of a subject from Argentina who was involved in a $200,080 fraudulent traveler's check case, This office has alsc been successful in tentatively identifying two individuais in Argentina who have been involved in the disposition of part of $8,000 worth of securities and blank money orders stolen in Chicago in 1971 during a robbery in which the owner was shot. This Legal Attache was commended by the American Ambassador in Buenos Aires for the part he played in the successful recovery of a hijacked American airliner in Buenos Aires which occurred without loss of life or damage to the aircraft. The Legal Aitache, Buenos Aires, also played a leading role in preventing Meyer Lansky, the financial wizard of U.S. organized crime, from receiving asylum in South America. This action resulted in Lansky's return io the U.S. and arrest by the FBI on Federal criminal ecn- tempt charges. ‘ ‘The Lee al Attache, Londen, has valuable contacts not only with [sex acto 14) |put also with all major police departments in ' Great Britain. Tne end again his office has acted as a conduit in major cases involving British British and FBI interests. He also maintains close Maison . ane with British intelligence services. The recent rash of letter bombs, one of ge of of which wounded an employee of the British Embassy in Washington, has gore ‘called for immediate and close liaison with authorities. FBI bomb | wert | experts collaborated closely with in London to the benefit of $° both agencies. Since the U.S. and Great arian are prime targets of Soviet | espionage, numerous instances of cooperation in this very delicate end - secretive field have cecurred between the FBI and the British intelligence service. This would | be most difficult had we not hada Legal Attache stationed \ in London The Legal Attache, Madrid, th through the cooperation of Spanish awe police, was able to effect 24~hour coverage on an Arab Al Fatah representative ee ie” _. from Puerto Rico who visited and made contacts in Spain in June of this year. pole eh He also was able to arrange similar coverage on a visit to Madrid in 1973 of ys pee” John Joseph Lombardozzi of the Carlo Gambino family of La Cosa Nostra. The HW 55064 DBocld:32999541 Page 130
HW 55064 Docld:32989541 Page 131 ri “a : . S38 ss gS. ’ his apprehension by Mexican authorities on a visit to that couniry. '. however, through investigative guidance established the identity of the kid- _ the above-mentioned locations. The foreign police agencies involved had of this case. . extensive police work needed for such coverage would certainly not have been put forth by the Spanish police had they not had a close personal friend- ship with and confidence in our Legal Attache in _diledrid.. SEMS/ITIVE FOREIGN ' INTELLIGENCE Souat& ‘The Legal Attaches in Manila and Mexico City combined in a joint effort which resulted in the capture and return to the U.S. of a fugitive in connection with the theft of over 1 million doMars in California, This individual had fled to Australia in 1970 and extradition was impossible. The Legal Attache, Manila, who handles Australia, determined that subject regularly traveled to Mexice. The Legal Attache, Mexico City, arranged for - Another example of the importance of foreign offices concerns ‘the kidnaping of a Mexican child in Pueblo, Mexico, by an American citizen. . Rensom in the amount of $105,000 was paid in New Orleans and the child was ‘safely recovered in a motel in Louisiana. Mexican police authorities developed very Hitle information concerning this matter. The Legal Attache, Mexico City, naper and the fact that he had an estranged wife residing in Australia. The ‘Legal Attache, Manila, working through Australian police had this woman inter- viewed with negative results. Australian police authorities were then guided into checking her finances and determined she had received large sums of money from Tel Aviv, Israel. . ; The Legal Attache, Tel Aviv, through Israeli police located the subject, recovered part of the ransom money and arranged for his extradition to the U.S, where he is awaiting trial in New Orleans, There is no doubt that this case would not have been solved had we not had Legal Attaches in come up with negative information and only through personal contact and on-the~scene counsel by our experienced Legal Attaches, were local author- ities able to produce the information required for the successful conclusion The Legal Attache, Tel Aviv, has effected a close working ‘ yelationship with Israeli police and intelligence agencies and regularly farnishes information which is vital to our coverage of the militant Jewish Defense League's activities in the U.S. and of Arab terrorist activities. It | is extremely doubtful that we would regulariy receive such information were it not for the presence of our representative in Israel.
Ms The tracing of Watergate funds by Legai Attache, Mexico City, through established Mexican banking sources, is another example of the capabilities developed by our Legal Attache system. ! : 2. Attempt to accomplish FBI responsibilities with foreign ‘ramifications by having other Embassy personnel handle FBI work. This option, while removing FBI personnel from foreign embassies, would require an increase in State Department personnel to assume a work load, based “ . on August 31, 1973, figures, of 4,283 FBI cases in the 20 FBI posts abroad, , j including 734 in Mexico, 527 in Hong Kong, 498 in Canada and 401°. in Great Britain. Expenses involved in the returning of all FRI personnel and equipment in these 20 offices would be considerable and wovld be doubled hy similar expenses to assign additional State Department personnel abroad to handle the work formerly handled by FBI personnel. More important, such a change would result in the FBI being represented abroad by personnel with no experience in law enforcement _ and no knowledge of the internal policies and regulations of the FBI. It “would also result in a person outside the Bureau, not under FBI control, becoming intimately acquainted with numerous sensitive matters and thereby _ opening the gate to leaks or other embarrassing situations from a security ‘point of view. It is not believed that Foreign Service officers who differ greatly in background, experience and training from law enforcement officers | could effectively represent the FBI with foreign law enforcement and security . ‘agencies. . ; 3. Have FBI interests abroad handled by the Drug Enforcement es Agency, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Customs Service, ; oe ' U.S. Secret Service or other Federal law enforcement agencies which currently ~ | : maintain liaison offices abroad. None of these agencies have the broad scope _. of investigative jurisdiction which the FBI is required to shoulder. Their " , Standards, policies, methods of operations, investigative techniques and | calibre of personnel differ greatly from that of the Bureau. Some of these ; agencies are actually operational abroad. No matter how well intentioned such _ a representative might be on behalf of the FBI, it is not felt that he would have the necessary experience and/or knowledge of Bureau operations to _ suecessfully function as a representative of the FBI. lt is, therefore, not - believed that this option would be advaniageous. : " “+ “ e HW 55064 DBocld:329899541 Page 132 — PE PS POE EO PTE OT ATEN G EO POUT NOTA ONT Tw Te
4. End all FBI pursuit of foreign ramifications in criminal and security responsibilities by FS! personnei stationed abroad and conduct them by direct communications, This option does not appear to have any edvantageous _aspects and ‘would tend to stifle effective foreign-liaison. Only a man on the *  seene can be thoroughly aware of the local customs, tradition and judicial process of the numerous foreign countries involved. Each country is different . - and the unique understanding of these differences is vital for successful “  gommunication and cooperation. It is not believed that a supervisor stationed ‘in Washington can adequately grasp these unique situations. If such an option is adopted, it is felt that our present outstanding relationships with hundreds of foreign police agencies would quickly disintegrate. Furtherfhore, such communications, because of a lack of direct cable connections with foreign countries, would force the FBI to utilize direct mail or public cable systems as opposed to secure methods presently being utilized. This would not only ereate long delays, but would alse pose serious security risks. This option is, therefore, not acceptable . a Conclusion ” For the reasons set out above, it is felt that the only effective way for the FBI to discharge the full scope of its responsibilities is to maintain its liaison posts abroad. ‘+ NOTE: ” wet oo, See ‘memorandum to Mr. Ruckelshaus dated 10/1/73, a captioned "Substantive Issues Regard ing the ‘Pature | of the FBI, " me prepared by JMS: rlc/bjr. ~§- HW 55064 Docld: 32989541 Page 133 , Pere : wathenr men. FEET HED TET fence rma arate aLincen ne wl eenieaet muase bined. 19 Ie ideal cman beaanetl at ataleid emanated” 12482 ty: wee menos awit ey ery Siet nmet. ple, ba, MSG tae ater ted en Rte Ae acca pte 3