The report also says, here, "none of this other activity would seem to warrant Castro's associating that activity with U.S, leaders to the extent that he would threaten the safety of American leaders aiding the plans.'' We note without exception. Page 33. Footnote *, The Cuban Coordinating Committee was a group for coordinating implementation of established programs. By memorandum of 22 May 1963,. McGeorge. -Bundy, Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs, designated the State Depart- ment Coordinator of Cuban Affairs as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba with the specific responsibility for the coordination of day-to-day actions regarding Cuba. Membership of the Committee con- sisted of representatives from State, USIA, DoD, CIA, Justice, Treasury and ad hoc representatives as necessary. Footnote **, This seems to indicate that the FBI learned! of CIA's operations on 10 October 1963 (a ‘mew date?) and that this led to termination of the AMLASH operation. Of course, that happened much later. - Page 34. "Special Affairs Staff"! should read "Special Activities Staff." | a Page 41. SASICI should read SAS/CI. Page 47. Testimony of Karamessines is quoted, in which he is asked a hypothetical question about use of AMLASH, and that he answered hypothetically, but the presentation seems to treat it as fact. ; Page 53. Reference to cial | collection capability in Mexico City should be deleted. Simply delete the \ word This small point is a sources- and-methods question. JUN 10 {8° 2 pecurintt HW 50955 DBDocld: 32262238 Page 2
HW 50955 Page 120. Page 122. Page 129. Page 133. It is requested that(Gk Ort aise DRE, JURE and the 30th November Movement groups be altered to a generic description of anti-Castro groups. Persons identified with them in some circles could suffer from official confirmation of the connection, This is still considered as classified. It is noted that CIA did not have an. operational interest in “ fe SNFE or Alpha 66. a ae The Agency effort to obtain FPCC stationery T | for use in a deception - operation is still classified since it involves sources and methods. That the SAS Executive Officer views the AMLASH operation as having been an assassination plot is not very helpful, unless the time sequence and evolution of the relationship with AMLASH/]1 is made a part of that view. His account in 1967 supported FitzGerald's story of what happened in the 29 October 1963 meeting. That SAS/CI speaks broadly may not be all that helpful either, if the extent of his knowledge, and when he knew what he says he knew, is fixed in time. That he wrote a memorandum in 1965 on the security of the operation, does not _ qualify him to address where things stood in 1963. In fact, he is quoted at page 139 as saying that he could not recall the time frame. The draft report states that in October 1963 the FBI knew of the "assassination aspect of the’ AMLASH'' operation. As is noted éarlier, there was no such characterization that applied ‘to it then, so how it could have known is subject to question. eer e > FROM TOP SECRET | Boclda: 32278272738 Page 3
. oe TOP SECRET Page 161. The 1967 IG report did not consider the issue of when the operational relationship with AMLASH/1 developed to the point where AMLASH/1 could feel he had CIA support for his plans. It simply dealt with events as they unfolded. The report was used as a primary source for the brief capsulized summary of the AMLASH operation that preceded this detailed series of comments. General. Itis requested that reference to cables follow the general practice employed in the SSC report on alleged assassination plots. The date the cable was sent, the quoted portion, — and fhe country. of origin should suffice. i Saag fice erence as ig! “a nnd™s shoud le Pe yy a abe meimoyedy This technique for treating cables permits: the basic story to be told without providing unnecessary and harmful, from a security point of view, information. Instances in the draft presenting the question were noted at pages 41, 46, 49, and 57. In addition, although JMWAVE has already been identified officially in SSC published reports, the basic treatment of communications cited in relation to that Station should otherwise receive similar technical treatment; see pages 19, 19a, 56, 106 and 138. Special. epee irritating g embarrassmentstosthe er, JUN iu 1976 TOP. SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 322822938 Page 4