SUMMARY OF FACTS INVESTIGATION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN PLANS TO ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS 178-10004-10189 178-10004-10116 178-10003-10355 178-10003-10241 HW 532744) Bocld: 322703996 nee ended Ta Patek CTT Page The Scope of the Investigation le Determining Jurisdiction 1 2. Patrice Lumumba 3 3. President Achmed Sukarno . . 4 4. Concurrence of the President on Interpretation of Authority 4 Participation of CIA Personnel in Plans to Attempt to Assassinate Fidel Castro 6 1. Flying Cuban Exiles into Cuba 7 2. 1960-61 and the Phase I Plans 8 a. When the Plans Began 8 'b, The Development of the Phase I Plans According to the May 14, 1962 Memorandum to the Attorney General 10 ‘c. The Carrying Out of the Phase I Plan 13 d. The Balletti Wiretap--Why the May 14, 1962 Memorandum was _ Prepared 15 e. FBI Memoranda Concerning CIA Assassination Plans 19 £. Additional Statements of Colonel : Edwards re May 7, 1962 Briefing 23 ‘g. Statements of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge Inside CIA 24 'h. How the Plans Got Started 24 i. Possible White House Direction or Approval of Plans 26 (1) The Testimony of Richard Bissell 26 (a) Eisenhower. Administration 26 (b). Kennedy Administration. 26 (2) The Testimony of Gordon Gray 29 (3) The Testimony of Walt Rostow 29 (4) The Interrogation of the Phase I Case Officer 29 Page 2? AMVddIT qyoa “ad GIVAID AHL WOYT AdODOLOHA
HW 535244, DocId: 32203996 Page 3 | Page (5) The Interrogation of Colonel Edwards (6] The Testimony of McGeorge Bundy (71 The Subsequent Interrogation of McGeorge Bundy : (8) Documents of the National Security Council (aJNovember 3, 1960 Minutes of Special Group Meeting (b) Other Documents - dune 13, 1961 Taylor Report » Relationship of Phase I Plan with Bay of Pigs 1. Knowledge of Phase I Plans Inside Cuba m. Termination of Phase I Plan n. Other Plans During Phase I 1962-63 and the Phase II Plans a. Possible Authorization--the Testimony of Richard Bissell b. The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer (1) Developing an "Executive Action" Capability (2) Discussions with Edwards and . Helms (3) The Phase II Plans ‘ec. The Testimony of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge of Phase II a. Knowledge of John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence re Phase IT e. The Testimony of Richard Helms re Phase II f. The August 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) (1) The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer (2) Interrogation of Robert M. McNamara (3) The Testimony of John McCone ~ii- 29 29 32 33 35 36 36 36 37 37 .38 39 39 39 39 40 40 43 43 44 45 46 47 49 _AMVdaIT quod -ad aiwagS FHL WONT AdOQOOLOHd
Page (4) The Affidavit of General Lemnitzer 49 (5) The Testimony of General Lansdale 50 (6) Additional Testimony of General Lansdale > 50 (al Discussions with and Written Proposals to President Kennedy 51 (b) Cuban Exile Groups 51 (c) Requests for "possibility" Plans--but No Authority to Carry Out 52 g. Interrogation of General Taylor 53 h. Testimony of Richard Helms Re Unseat~ ing Castro Government and Possible © Plans 54 (1) White House Pressure > 54 (2) Possible Assassination Plans 55 i. The August 16, 1963 Memorandum to John McCone about Phase I 56 4. Miscellaneous 1963 Schemes 59 . 5. The Phase III Plan--1963-1965 60 6. Miscellaneous 1964 Schemes Involving Cuban Exile Community ~ . 65 7. Summary 69 C. The Dominican Republic 70 1. The Chronology 70 a. The Background © 70 b. The Rifles 71 c. Explosives 72 d. Revolvers _ 74 e. Carbines so 77 f. Submachine Guns _ 79 : g- The Policy Statement 82 2, Summary © 85 D. Conclusion - — 86° -iLiw- HW 532744 DBocld:32203996 Page 4 AMWdGIT quod *y divwdad aHL WONT AdODOLOHA
HW 535244 ay yy Dele. fia 6/5/75 SUMMARY OF FACTS INVESTIGATION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN PLANS TO ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS The following is a summary of facts gathered by the Executive Director of the CIA Commission concerning possible CIA involve- ment in plans to assassinate foreign leaders. A. | The Scope of the Investigation The first knowledge that the Commission had concerning possible involvement of the CIA in assassination plans directed at . foreign leaders was when the CIA informed the Commission staff at the outset of the Commission's work, in response to an overall staff request for possible unlawful activities of the CIA, that such plans existed. The Commission staff was told that there was no evidence of murders or plots for murder against persons in the United States carried on by the CIA. However, the Commission staff was told _ that there had been discussion of plans for assassination attempts involving overt acts occurring within the boundaries of this country with regard to attempts on the life of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. 1. Determining Jurisdiction Although there was some question whether or not an assassination plan aimed ata foreign leader fell technically within the charter of the Commission, even though overt acts may have *This summary of facts was prepared by David W. Belin, Executive Director of the CIA Commission, except for the portions on pages 70- &§5 pertaining to the Dominican Republic, which was prepared by Marvin L. Gray, Jr., a Counsel to the Commission. The statement of facts has AUVdaTT qadod "a AIWaaDS AHL WOYT AdODdOLOHA not been reviewed by the staff nor has it been reviewed by the Commission. DoclId: 32203996 Page 5
HW 535244 taken place in this country, the Commission and its staff determined that because of the nature and seriousness of the matters involved, the doubts would be resolved in favor of undertaking an investigation of the facts. Only after such investigation could the Commission make an informed decision as to its jurisdiction. Cn the basis of the investigation, the evidence shows ‘that agents of the CIA were involved in planning in this country with certain citizens and others to seek to assassinate Premier Castro. The evidence also shows that the CIA was involved in shipping arms from this country to persons in the Dominican Republic, who sought to assassinate Generalissimo Trujillo (who himself had been involved in an attempt to assassinate the President of Venezuela). No evidence has been found involving any other attempts ‘to assassinate any other foreign leader which had significant overt activities within the United States. However, the nature of the activity. and the degree of secrecy and compartmentation within the Agency is such that it is difficult to find any evidence of this kind unless specific facts are brought to the attention of an investigative body. With regard to activities outside of the United States, no evidence has been found of CIA participation in plans to assassinate foreign leaders, except as described in the next four paragraphs. However, the DoclId: 322703996 Page 6 AUWdGIT QUOT “YH AGIWYED AHL WOU AdODOLOHA
HW 3352744 investigation in such areas, which had no domestic aspect which might bring it within the Commission's jurisdictional mandate under the President's Order, has not been extensive. 2. Patrice Lumumba In the course of the first stage of its investigation to determine its jurisdiction, a preliminary investigation was made of charges that the CIA was involved in the death of Patrice Lumumba, who was killed in early 1961. No evidence was found that the CIA participated in that killing, although there is evidence that prior to . Lumumba's death some CIA personnel and others discussed the possibility of undertaking a plan to assassinate Lumumba. * According to Richard Bissell, who was the CIA Deputy Director of Plans at the time, he was aware of discussion of plans within the Agency concerning the possible assassination of Patrice Lumumba and that ''a case officer was directed to look into the possibilities. He reported back in a matter of weeks and convinced me that this was probably unfeasible, and probably an undesirable course of action. According to the case officer, who is now retired, *In an affidavit, C. Douglas Dillon, a member of this Commission, ~ stated that while he served as ‘Under Secretary of State from June 1959 . until early January 1961, he heard no discussion of assassination attempts against anyone, except discussions which occurred in late July or early August of 1960 at a meeting at the Pentagon which covered a great variety of matters in which "'...a question regarding the pos- sibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not under - take this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject." DoclId: 32203996 Page 7 “a QTWuadS AHL WOYI AdODOLOHA AUWdEGIT auyod
Bissell asked him to go to the Congo and there murder or arrange for the murder of Lumumba, and the case officer said that he told Bissell that he refused to be a party to such an act.* Bissell said the Agency had nothing whatsoever to do with the death of Lumumba. .3. President Achmed Sukarno Bissell also testified that there was discussion within the Agency of the possibility of an attempt on the life of President Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia which "progressed as far as the identi- fication of an asset who it was felt might be recruited for this purpose. The plan was never reached, was never perfected to the point where it seemed feasible.'' He said the Agency had "absolutely nothing" to do with the death of Sukarno. a With regard to both plans, he stated that no assassination plans would have been undertaken without authorization outside the Agency, and that no such authorization was undertaken for plans against either Lumumba or Sukarno, 4, Concurrence of the President on Interpretation of Authority Since no evidence was found to bring the Sukarno and Lumumba matters within the scope of the Commission's investigative ce OE *The case officer gave this information in an oral telephone conference at which time an appointment was arranged for the taking of his testimony before a member of thé Commission staff and a court reporter, The case officer failed to keep his appointment. HW 53244 DBocld:32203996 Page @ AdWddIT Gaod -e ATwaaS AHL woud AdOD0LOHA
authority, no further investigation in these two areas was undertaken. | However, sufficient domestic aspects in the Castro and Trujillo plans were found to constitute grounds for undertaking additional investiga- tion. The President concurred in the approach of the Commission to interpret its authority so that the Commission would (1) ascertain whether the charges of assassination plots have a basis in fact and involve unlawful domestic CIA activities and (2) determine whether existing safeguards would prevent activities of that nature in the future regardless of whether they might involve domestic or foreign conspiracy. The following is a summary of facts pertaining to CIA participation in assassination plans to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro and CIA participation in the shipping of arms to persons in the Dominican Republic who sought to assassinate Generalissimo Trujillo. The facts have been developed through a review of the internal investigation of the CIA, examination of documents, and interviews and testimony. The Executive Director requested complete access to papers of the National Security Council including papers | of the Forty Committee and its predecessors and papers of any special groups or special operating groups. Such access was not granted. Also, time did not permit examination of documents that might be available in the Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson presidential HW 535244 ‘Docld: 32203996 Page 3 AUVdaIT Guod “A GIwaaS AHL Nour AdODOLOHG
\ libraries. Consequently, the investigation is not complete with regard to the question of who, if anyone outside the CIA, authorized or directed the planning of any assassination attempts against foreign leaders. However, with particular reference to the plans directed against Fidel Castro, the investigation is sufficiently complete to show that plans were undertaken by the CIA. B. Participation of CIA Personnel in Plans to Attempt to Assassinate Fidel Castro In the late nineteen-fifties, there was increasing dissatis- faction with the government of Cuban leader Batista. As Castro's influence increased, attempts were made to persuade Batista to resign and turn over the reins of government to a group that was more attuned to the needs and desires of the Cuban people, particularly in areas of y democratic government and social reforms. According to an inter-~ view with the former Chief of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, an unofficial ambassador from this country approached Batista in AuWdaTT quod °ad aTwugS AHL WOUg AdODOLOHG December 1958, asking that he resign and turn over the reins of govern- ment'to new leadership. This request was refused. Fidel Castro shortly thereafter took over the Cuban govern- ment. There was great concern on the part of American leadership } , . about the presence of a government so closely aligned with the Soviet Union barely ninety miles from American shores. HW 53244 DoclId:32203996 Page 10
Therefore, the CIA, with appropriate authorization, under- took the development of an operation in support of Cuban exiles seeking to overthrow the Castro Government, the culmination of which became the Bay of Pigs disaster in April 1961. As the plans for the attempted overthrow of the, Cuban govern- ment were developed, one of the considerations related to Fidel Castro as the dominant figure. i, Flying Cuban Exiles into Cuba There has been testimony before the Commission staff that at the request of the CIA the Air Force provided a plane in late 1959 or early 1960 which was used to fly, two Cuban exiles into Cuba. The witness was unable to provide names of these two Cuban exiles or names of any CIA personnel which he said were involved. However, at the time of the events the witness was an Air Force officer who had liaison functions between the Department. of Defense and the CIA. He testified that he believes a plane was provided and that the two Cuban exiles were to carry with them one or more rifles with tele- scopic sites to be used in an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro. The Commission staff sought to investigate this matter. In a''Memorandum for the Record'' dated May 15, 1975, the CIA | admitted that in reviewing its files relating to Cuban operations HW 532744 DBocld:32203996 Page 11 “a GIWUADS AHL WOU AdODOLOHd KUWdadIT auoa
HW 535244 during the period 1959-1961: ‘a number of documents were found that referred to the intent on the part of some of the Cuban teams operating inside Cuba to attempt to assassinate Castro....Additionally, the files indicate that there was considerable interest in procurement of “Helio Courier (the civil version of the ‘L-28), but there is no definite indication that they were intended for Cuban operations. Also, there is mention of the air drop of Springfield rifles with telescopic sights." 2. 1960-61 and the Phase I Plans The Phase I plans involved the preparation of poison botulism pills by the CIA; the delivery of those pills to organized crime figures who in turn were to get the pills delivered to contacts they had in Cuba for placement in a beverage to be drunk by Premier Castro. a. When the Plans Began There is some disagreement about exactly when the Phase I plans began. The two people in the CIA who were the most intimately involved were Richard Bissell, Deputy Director of Plans, who was the person in the CIA who had direct responsibility for the Bay of Pigs operation (April 17-19, 1961), and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, the Director of the Office of Security of the CIA. Docld: 322703996 "Page 12 AUVdGIT GuOd “AY GIWYAD AHL NOU KdODOLOHA
WW 53244 According to Richard Bissell, the plans relating to Fidel Castro started in "the very beginning of 1961" when he said he became aware ''of the possibility that an assassination attempt might be planned using Mafia resources, or syndicate resources, My very uncertain recollection is that I first heard of this possibility from ' Shef Edwards." According to Sheffield Edwards, his first contact with these plans ''was about the time of the Bay of Pigs. : He said he did not "remember exactly" if it was before or after the Bay of Pigs, but when asked whether or not it was in the Eisenhower Administration: or the Kennedy Administration for purposes of determining the time of the inception of the plan, he said that ''It was in the Kennedy Administration. "! Although oral testimony of both said that this began in the early stages of the kennedy Administration, there is docu- mentation which indicates that these conversations took place in the latter part of 1960 during the Eisenhower Administration. This documentation includes a May 14, 1962 ''Memorandum for the Record!! entitled "Arthur James Balletti et al -- Unauthorized Fublication or Use of Communications, ''. The opening sentence of the memorandum states: ''This memorandum for the record was prepared at the request Docld: 322703996 Page 153 AMWddIT GuOd “WY GIWUAS AHL WOUd AdODOLOHA
HW 535244 ll Sheffield Edwards "and asked to establish contact with a member or members of the gambling syndicate to explore their capabilities." — The approach was to be made", ..to the syndicate as appearing to represent big business organizations which wished to protect their interests in Cuba.'! The contact was made with a 'syndicate'' member who ''showed interest in the possibility and indicated he had some con- tacts in Miami that he might use.'' The syndicate member supposedly told the CIA intermediary that the syndicate person ''was not interested in any remuneration but would seek to establish capabilities in Cuba to perform the desired project." | ‘The memorandurn continued: “Towards the.end of September 1960" contact with. another‘ syndicate member from Chicago, Sam Giancana, was made, and in turn an arrangement was made . through Giancana for the CIA intermediary and his contact ''to meet with a 'courier' who was going back and forth to Havana, From information received back by the courier the proposed operation appeared to be feasible and it was decided to obtain an official Agency ‘approval in this regard. A figure of one hundred fifty thousand dollars » was set by the Agency as a payment to be made on completion of the operation and to be paid only to the principal or principals who would conduct the operation in Cuba." DoclId: 3272703996 Page 15 :ad GIWYaS AHL WOU AdODOLOHA AMVdGIT ayod
i2 The CIA intermediary reported that Giancana and the other contact "emphatically stated that they wished no part of any payment. The undersigned (Sheffield Edwards) then briefed the proper senior officers of this Agency of the proposal. Knowledge of this project during its life was kept to a total of six persons and never became a part of the project current at the time for the invasion of Cuba. There were no memoranda on the project nor were there other written documents or agreements. The project was duly orally approved by the said senior officials of the Agency. 1 The memorandum continued that during the period from September 1960 to 1961, "efforts were continued" by the CIA intermediary and the Mafia personnel "to proceed with the operation. The first principal in Cuba withdrew and another principal was selected as has been briefed to the Attorney General. Ten thousand dollars was passed for expenses to the second principal. He was further furnished with approximately one thousand dollars worth of communi- cation equipment to establish communications between his headquarters ‘in Miami and assets in Cuba. No monies were ever paid" to the syndicate personnel. There was expense money paid to the CIA intermediary. The memorandum stated that After the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through" the CIA intermediary to the HW 53244 Docld:32203996 Page 16 AUVdHIT Quod “WY GIWYAS AHL NON KdODOLOHd
HW 53244 13 syndicate personnel ''to call off the operation" with the further direction that the syndicate person ''was told to tell his principal that the pro- | posal to pay one hundred fifty thousand dollars for completion of the operation had been definitely withdrawn.'' Only two copies of the memorandum were prepared -- one for the Attorney General and one to be retained by the CIA, c. The Carrying Out of the Phase I Plan The following facts primarily come from inter- rogation of Colonel Edwards and the Phase I case officer: The particular means by which the plans were to be carried out was "by placing botulism pills in his food." The syndicate personnel were to get the pills to a person in Cuba who would have access to Castro. Supposedly, the reason ipills were used was that the syndicate personnel could not recruit personnel to undertake the assassination through gunfire because the chance of survival and escape was small. However, the case officer felt that it was the Agency itself that desired to have pills used rather than gunfire. Colonel Edwards said that he, hims elf, checked out the pills on some guinea pigs ''because I wanted to be sure they worked," DoclId:32203996 Page i? _ KAVdGIT GUOT “YX GIWUD FHL WoUd AdODOLONA
14 Corroboration of the Phase I plans was also made by another retired medical officer who was familiar with the pre- paration of the pills inside the Agency. Edwards said he did not know of any plans other than those that involved the use of these botulism pills. Edwards did not have any first-hand knowledge about whether or not the pills ever got to Cuba. According to the Phase I case officer, he delivered the pills to the syndicate member and was subsequently advised by the syndicate member that the pills were in Cuba, but the case officer | had no direct knowledge of his own that the pills actually got there. Richard Bissell said he did not have any personal recollection as to whether or not poison pills of any kind were ever delivered into Cuba. According to the case officer and the CIA Inspector ' General files, there were two passages of pills to Cuba in the first part of 1961. The first passage was in late February or March from the syndicate through their courier to a Cuban who supposedly had a he: Cuban -PrimesMintsterssoffi¢e where he had access to Fidel Castro. According to the interview of Sheffield Edwards with ‘the Executive Director, the Cuban asset ''got scared" and did not try ~ HW 532744 DBocld:32203996 Page 18 “ad GIWaaS AHL WOW AdODOLOHA AUWVdGIT quod
HW 53244 15 to pass the pill. Pills were subsequently delivered to another "asset" . who was ina position to slip the pills to Castro at a restaurant where the asset worked. This took place in the March-April 1961 period. Fidel Castro ceased visiting that particular restaurant at approxi- mately the same time the pills purportedly arrived. The case officer s aid it was his recollection that there were two passages of pills to. Cuba, the second one which was made to someone who had access to a restaurant which Castro frequented. After the second attempt failed, the case officer said the pills were returned to the CIA. d. The Balletti Wiretap - Why the May 14, 1962 Memorandum was Prepared _ ‘The factual situation underlying the preparation of the May 14, 1962 memorandum was that sometime in the fall of 1960 Sam Giancana asked the CIA intermediary to arrange for putting a listening device in. the room of an entertainer who at the time was in Las Vegas and who Giancana thought was having an affair with another entertainer, who was reputed to be Giancana's mistress. According to the Phase I CIA case officer, the request by Giancana came at a crucial time when plans were underway for Phase I, Giancana supposedly stated that if-he did not get help to install the listening device, he would have to go to Las Vegas Docld: 322703996 Page 19 AMVdGIT Guod *Y GIwaaS FHL WoNd KdODOLOHA
HW 535244 16 himself. The case officer said "this would have interrupted the project at a very critical time,'' and therefore he sought the assistance of the CIA intermediary to get a private detective agency to undertake the | installation of the listening device. | ‘The CIA intermediary passed the request over to another private investigator, who in turn contacted Arthur James Balletti (the name of the subject of the May 14, 1962 memorandum for the record given to Attorney General Kennedy). Instead of putting a listening device in the room, Balletti put a listening device on the telephone. The listening device was discovered and Balletti was arrested by the sheriff of Las Vegas, Nevada. At the time of the “incident, the CIA did not know of the specific proposed wiretap, According to the Agency investigation by the Inspector General's Office in 1967, Edwards had once told the Agency intermediary that if the intermediary ever got in trouble he could say to the FBI ‘that he was working on an intelligence operation being handled by the Agency. An FBI memorandum on that matter stated that the inter- mediary claimed the telephone tap was ordered on behalf of the Agency's effort to obtain intelligence through hoodlum elements in Cuba. The Agency investigation file also states that a March 23, 1962 FBI memorandum confirmed a meeting with Sheffield Edwards in which DoclId: 322703996 Page 270 “ad GQIWaS AHL WOYI AdODOLOHA AUVdadIT aquor
HW 53244 17 Edwards told the FBI that the intermediary wes involved in a sensitive project and that the CIA would object to prosecution because it would . 7 necessitate CIA information and it could embarrass the United States Government. Subsequently there was a meeting between Sheffield Edwards and Sam Papich, the FBI liaison with the Agency, in which Edwards advised Papich that it would not be in the national interest to prosecute, At the time of that meeting, according to Edwards, those who had initially authorized the assassination plans (Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell) were gone and no one else in authority (including Richard Helms, who replaced Bissell) had been ''cut in on the operation." Thereafter, Sheffield Edwards briefed Lawrence . Houston, General Counsel for the CIA, who in turn briefed General Carter, McCone's Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. “(General Carter, who is now retired, lives in Colorado. When interviewed by a member of the Commission staff by long distance telephone, General Carter said that he had no recollection of this.) . Edwards, in his 1975 recorded interview, said that there was nothing that he knew about the plan to assassinate Castro that he didn't tell Attorney General Kennedy and that the briefing lasted 'about a half an hour, at least.'' He said that he told Attorney DoclId: 32203996 Page 271 AMWdGIT GuoOd “ay GIWaaS FHL WOU AdODOLOHA .
HW 53244 to General Kennedy "everything,'' and that after the briefing was completed Robert Kennedy had no comment to him but Robert Kennedy ''cautioned Larry Houston to the effect that he was to know about these things. Words to that effect." When asked whether or not the Attorney General had told Colonel Edwards that ''you shouldn't do this at all," Colonel - Edwards replied ''No.'' When asked whether or not the Attorney General in any way said "that he disapproved of whatever was done: in the past,'' Colonel Edwards said "no." ‘Lawrence Houston testified, 'I was briefed on this subject after it was dropped. I was not party to nor was I asked in advance about it....By the time Iheard about it, I think it had been terminated some little time, but there were personalities involved... who were both regarded as part of the Mafia organization, and these They were people'' that the CIA intermediary "had introduced to us.. had former gambling interests in Havana, and at one time thought gf they may be able to take action against Castro. my recollection is that ‘they had potential criminal indictments" against the Mafia people "and it seems to me that the bug in the Las Vegas hotel was involved more peripherally, but I cannot remember the details," DoclId:32203996 Page 22 After it fell through | AUWdaIT Gdod “a aQTvda5 AHL Wows AdOD0LOHd.
19 Houston also testified that he told Edwards "that I thought the only thing to do was to go and tell the whole story to the Attorney General. So with the approval of the Director at the time--, well, it was '63, it must have been McCone. We went down to brief Mr. Kennedy on the full story" that the Agency "had set up a project with its aim the demise of Castro, that the project had fallen through, that these following people were involved, and we gave them the names, and this is what made him unhappy, because at that time he felt he was making avery strong drive to try to get after the Mafia. And so . his comment was to us that if we were going to get involved with the ' Mafia, in the future at any time, to make sure you see me first.". | (This is the only evidence in the record to show that John McCone knew about the existence of any specific assassination | plan in 1962. There is evidence in the CIA files to show that the actual person with whom the matter was discussed was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and this evidence is supported by an August 16, 1963 memorandum from Helms to McCone, which will be discussed in the Phase II portion of this report. ) e.. FBI Memoranda Concerning CIA Assassination Plans According to a May 22, 1961 FBI memorandum entitled 'Arthur James Balletti, et al!': HW 53244 Docld:32203996 Page 23 AUWdHIT Guod -aY aIwug9 aHL nour AdODOLOHA
"On May 3, 1961, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) furnished the following info rmation: J "Colonel Edwards advised that in connection with CIA's operation against Castro he personally contacted Robert Maheu during the fall of 1960 for the purpose of using Maheu as a ‘cut-out! in contacts with Sam Giancana, a known hoodlurn in the Chicago area. Colonel Edwards said that since the underworld controlled gambling activities in Cuba under the Batista government, it was assumed that this element would still continue to have sources and contacts in Cuba which perhaps could be utilized successfully in connection with CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro government. As a result, Maheu's services were solicited asa ‘cut-out! because of his possible entry into underworld circles. Maheu obtained Sam Giancana's as sistance in this regard and according to Edwards, Giancana gave every indication of cooperating through Maheu in attempting to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba. Edwards added that none of Giancana's efforts have materialized to date and that several of the plans still are working and may eventually 'pay off. '" The memorandum then went into the Balletti situation and reported that Colonel Edwards had no knowledge of the wire tap. HW 532744 DBocld:32203996 Page 24 AUVdaIT qadod “a GQIWaaS AHL Now AdODOLOHd .
HW 453244 21 The memorandum concluded with the following paragraph: "Colonel Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Deputy Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the Giancana- Maheu ‘activity in behalf of CIA's program and that Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' contact \ with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell, during his recent briefings of General Taylor and the Attorney General in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation told the Attorney General that some of the CIA's associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro. Subsequently, on March 6, 1967, J. Edgar Hoover sent to the Attorney General a letter with an accompanying ‘March 6, 1967, FBI memorandum entitled "Central Intelligence Agency's Intentions to Send Hoodlums to Cuba to Assassinate Castro.'' The memorandum referred to the Balletti wiretap matter and stated that the FBI ''checked matter with CIA on 5/3/61 and learned CIA was using Robert Maheu as intermediary with Sam Giancana relative to CIA's ‘dirty business' anti-Castro activities. “By letter 5/22/61 we furnished former Attorney General Kennedy a memorandum containing a rundown on CIA's involvement in this. The original Docld: 322703996 Page 25 AMWddIT Gdod *a GIWaID AHL WOUT AdODOLOHA
_ AW 455244 22 of the letter and memorandum were returned to us for filing purposes. A copy of that memorandum is being attached to instant letter being sent to Attorney General, 'On 5/9/62 Kennedy discussed with the Director a number of matters, including admission by CIA that Robert Maheu had been hired by that Agency to approach Sam Giancana to have Castro assassinated at a cost of $150,000. Kennedy stated he had issued orders that CIA should never undertake such steps again without first checking with the Department of. Justice and stated because of this matter it would be difficult to prosecute Giancana or Robert Maheu then or in the future." The memorandum stated that the FBI had learned on June 20, 1963 that the CIA contacts with the Mafia had ''continued’ up until that time when they were reportedly cut off."' The FBL memorandum also stated that it appeared that one Mafia member _involved in the plans "is using his prior connections with the CIA to his best advantage.'"' A contemporaneous FBI memorandum dated March 6, ‘(1967 stated that Robert Kennedy following his briefing in May of 1962 informed the FBI on May 9, 1962 about the br iefing. "He R&R obert Kennedy) indicated that a few days prior thereto he had been advised by CIA" that an intermediary had been hired by CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire some gunman to go into Cuba and kill Castro. DoclId: 322703996 Page 276 The memorandum further continued © AMVdadIT. quod “a GIwagS AHL woud KdODOLOHA
HW 53244 23 that "Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring (the intermediary) and Giancana with the Department of Justice he issued orders that CIA should never take such steps without checking with the Department of Justice. | "Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosection against _ Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact that the United States Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro."! f. Additional Statements of Colonel Edwards re May 7, 1962 Briefing When Sheffield Edwards and the CIA's General ~ - Counsel briefed Robert Kennedy on May 7, 1962 concerning the Phase I assassination efforts by the CIA, there is no evidence to indicate that during that briefing Robert Kennedy told the CIA personnel that he already had known of this information because of prior information received from the FBI. Colonel Edwards in his 1975 recorded interview confirmed the statement in the March 6, 1967 FBI memorandum that Attorney General Kennedy stated that the CIA should never under- take the use of Mafia people again without first checking with the Department of Justice because it would be difficult to prosecute such people in the future. DoclId: 322703996 Page 277 AUVddIT GuOd *Y AGIWaaS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA
HW 535244 24 g. Statements of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge Inside CIA According to Edwards the CIA people that knew about the plans while they were going on were himself, his case officer, Bissell, Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence until '. November 1961, and General Cabell; Deputy Director of Intelligence during this period of time. Both Dulles and Cabell are now dead. h. How the Plans Got Started There is inconsistency between the testimony of Richard Bissell and Colonel Edwards concerning how the plans got started, According to Bissell the original approach was made to the Agency by the syndicate personnel because ''they had their own very strong. motivations for carrying out this...they had been powerful under Batista in Cuba, and they had a very lucrative set of interests for the syndicates, and they had in effect been thrown’ out, and so they had the strongest sort of reasons for anti-Castro sentiment on their own.'' Bissell said he first learned about this from Sheffield Edwards and that he had also talked with Allen Dulles ) about the matter. Docld:3272703996 Page 26 ANVdd IT quod °“u GIWaaS FHL WONT AdODOLOHA.
HW 535244 - Zo Whereas Bissell testified that he first heard of this possibility (of using Mafia or syndicate resources) from Sheffield Edwards,'' Edwards testified that his first contact was a request by Bissell who asked Edwards "If I had any assets...that would be avail- able into:the syndicate." When asked about the inconsistency between his own testimony and that of Sheffield Edwards concerning whether or not. Edwards approached Bissell first or Bissell approached Edwards first, Bissell stated that "it is possible that my recollection is wrong...I think I will stand on that as my recollection... but I seem to remember ‘rather clearly that it was from him (Edwards) that I first learned of the possibility of this operation, and that he came to see me for this purpose rather than my sending for him.. Now, could I just say that I had several conversations with Shef Edwards on this matter, and it is very possible that I, that in a subsequent conversation I did take the initiative and send for and discuss it with him." The Phase I case officer stated that he believed it was Bissell who first approached Edwards about making the contacts with a CIA intermediary. The case officer further stated that although ‘he ultimately became aware of the fact that the people contacted by the CIA intermediary were ''syndicate'' members, initially neither Docld: 3272703996 Page 29 AUVddIT Guod *a QTWaadS AHL WOW AdODOLOHA
26 he nor the intermediary knew this to .be the fact. Rather, he said he thought these people whom the intermediary contacted were gangster- type people who were not necessarily members of the syndicate. i. Possible White House Direction or Approval of Plans | (1) The Testimony of Richard Bissell (a) Eisenhower Administration When asked whether or not he had any discussions with any official in the Eisenhower Administration con- cerning the development of an ''executive action" capability, Bissell replied, ''not to my recollection, and I think Iam almost sure that I did not.'' Bissell stated that he had "no clear recollection of any discussion with anyone in the Bisenhower Administration concerning any possible plan to assassinate Castro." but there could have been. He said that if it would have occurred at all during the Eisenhower | Administration, "it would have been with Gordon Gray." ' (b) Kennedy Administration Bissell testified that although my recol- lection of this is far from clear...1 am satisfied that very early in the Kennedy Administration I did participate'’ in conversations with someone in the White House concerning the planning of what was called an executive action capability, which was defined in substance. as a AW 53244 Docld:32203996 Page 30 AMVdaIT quod *y aTwadS FHL Wows kdODOLOHa
27 capability of the Agency to carry out assassinations, if required. | When asked with whom these conversations occurred, ‘Bissell said "YT am almost certain it was either Walt Rostow (Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security) or McGeorge Bundy (Presidential Assistant for National Security), or probably the former, and possibly both." When asked to state what specifically was discussed in these conversations, Bissell said: . ''My recollection, which isn't too specific, is that this was a discussion of the desirability of developing such a capability within the CIA that presumably would be - a small, special unit, and highly compartmented from the rest of the organization." Bissell said that he had no specific knowledge but that he “had a great deal of confidence that the two gentlemen whose names I have mentioned, would not have dis cussed this discussed with me or encouraged any course of action that they were not confident.the President would approve. " Later in his testimony Bissell said that the possibility of using syndicate people to carry out an assassination attempt against. Castro ''was discussed by me, again I think probably with Walt Rostow. It may possibly have been discussed directly with HW 532744 DBocld:322703996 Page 31 | AMVdaTT qdod °ud AIWuaD FHL WoUd ‘KdOD0LOHd
HW 535244 28 McGeorge Bundy, but I suspect that it was through Rostow, who was then Bundy's assistant and on his staff. My impression, but again I must emphasize that this is uncertain impression, was that I was _ encouraged to go ahead with the investigation and planning of this operation, and by investigation I mean simply to find out what would be involved to make some eee of the likelihood of success, and other aspects of the matter." | According to Bissell, he was "vague as to the final outcome of that attempt.'' He said that he had "no recol- lection of a specific authorization that it should go forward. I believe, however, that we probably did move to be in a position to carry it out, or authorize it, if-authorization were received." He said that he believed ''my own recollection of the final stages of the plan is vague'! because the plan involved furnishing probably some money and such items as pills or other devices through a number of cut-outs or intermediaries to a group which we ourselves, of course, did not, in any direct sense, control. This was not an operation of sucha character that. the communications would run through Agency channels, © or that authorization on the spot would be by Agency personnel, or that the Agency could precisely and tightly control it." DoclId: 32203996 Page 32 AUVddIT GuoOd “AY GIWYaS AHL Woud KdODOLOHA
HW 535244 (2) The Testimony of Gordon Gray Gordon Gray testified that he had no conversa-. tions with Richard Bissell or anyone else pertaining to assassination plans. “ (3) The Testimony of Walt Rostow Walt Rostow testified that he did not have any recollection of having any dis cussions with Bissell pertaining to any | attempt at assassination plots. (4) The Interrogation of the Phase I Case Officer The case officer stated that he had been told that the project had been approved by Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, but he (the case officer) had no knowledge of whether or not there had been any discussion or approval from the White House. (5) The Interrogation of Colonel Edwards Edwards said that he believed the plans were developed by Bissell and that he was ''sure that there were not" any people in the White House that knew about these plans. He also said that he did not know of any attempt of plans to assassinate people other than Fidel Castro. (6) The Testimony of McGeorge Bundy McGeorge Bundy said that he was never aware . of any ''actual decision" to go about seeking to assassinate any foreign DoclId:322703996 Page 353 AUVddIT Guod °-Y GIwaqo FHL WOU AdODOLOHA
HW 535244 leader. However, he said that he did "have a vague recollection of the existence or the possible existence of contingency planning in this area. Iam sorry to say I cannot help you much with details about it because I can't fish them out of my memory, but I could not exclude that there were contingency plans, and a contingency capability of some sort, or plans for such a capability at some time." He said that he did not know of any case where plans went beyond the con- - tingency |stage ''and I know of no such authorization or any involve- ment by anybody in the White House staff or anybody else, for that matter." When asked whether or not he ever heard any discussion concerning a plot or plan to assassinate Cuban leaders, Bundy replied, "Not that I can remember.. -I certainly cannot exclude the pos sibility that you could have had the kind of discussion in which one or another individual would have said it would be, that there is a possibility that.thus and such a Cuban group, if landed and infiltrated, might have as one of its missions the following, which might have included an attack on one or another Cuban leader. Ido not have any direct recollection that this did happen, but I cannot exclude that it did happen." ‘Docld:327703996 Page 34 | AUVdGIT quo4 “ad dIwWaagS FHL Wows AdOD0LOHE:
HW 535244. Bundy testified that he did not know of any decision to go ahead and actually undertake a plan of assassination. '"That contingent capability may have been authorized in this field I cannot - exclude, although I have no direct recollection of it. It is the decision to go ahead that I am sure Ido not remember." . Bundy said that he would have been ''surprised'" if any effort to assassinate a foreign leader had been undertaken without his approval as the President's Assistant for Security Affairs, and said that he himself would "not have authorized anything of that kind “without much higher authority than my own, I could not exclude that there would be communication with the President by other channels, Neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson always used any one channel.'' There was direct access of the Director of Central Intelligence to the President, according to Mr. Bundy. | He said that based upon his experience, "'I would not have expected, .. the Agency would have undertaken anything like an attack on the life of a foreign leader without direct order from higher authority"... it did not happen in the time I was there... but I can conceive of the President saying to somebody, Ido not want to make this decision but giving some indication of the kind of decision he wanted made." Docld: 322703996 Page 35 AYVddIT GuOd “a GIvWaaS FHL WONT KdODOLOHG
(7) The Subsequent Interrogation of McGeorge Bundy After Mr. Bundy completed his testimony before ‘the Commission, he contacted the Executive Director the next morning and volunteered that in thinking about the matter overnight “I have had a vague recollection, which I cannot pinpoint in time, that there was discussion that I knew about at some time of a proposal or scheme or project!’ in-relation to the Castro regime "that did involve poison, and the characteristic that sticks in my memory is that it would have - involved a rather large scale use of poison and, as I recollect it, it never came anywhere near approval.'' Proposals under the overall plan with regard to Cuba "which did come from time to time (mostly not with respect to assassination) were reviewed in the first instance for practicability and only after that for wisdom or political rightness, and I recall no proposal for liquidation that ever got past the first stage to the second." A memorandum of the interview with the Exec- utive Director was prepared the next morning to record these addi- tional comments. In this memorandum which was signed by Mr. Bundy and. sworn to before a notary public in the form of an affidavit, Bundy said that 'I simply have no recollection of plans" that "existed in January or February 1961!' which involved the attempted poisoning of any Cuban leader. "I believe my memory tells me in a more general |, HW 53244 Docld:32203996 Page 36 AdvdaTT quod. °u GIWYaS AHL WoUd AdODOLOHA
43 The Phase II case officer stated that he knew of. no other plan to assassinate any other foreign leader except Castro. c. The Testimony of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge of Phase II According to Colonel Edwards, at the time of the May 7, 1962 briefing of Attorney General Kennedy, he did not know that the Phase Ir case officer, whom he had earlier briefed, was undertaking another plan along the lines of Phase I. Therefore, he did not tell the Attorney General ‘at the time of the briefing that there was a Phase II plan underway. \ dad. Knowledge of John McCone, Director of - Central Intelligence re Phase II The Phase II case officer stated that sometime ‘ prior to August 1962, he had a conversation with Richard Helms, who had succeeded Richard Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans. AUVdaIT dod “Y AIWYXD AHL WONT AdODOLOHG The case officer said that the question was raised whether - or not the new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, should. be briefed of the operation. "T. @id recommend to Mr. Helms that since this ‘operation' and the possible repercussions from it all stemmed from actions which had taken place long before either Helms or myself had had any personal connection with it, and before John McCone had had any connection whatever HW 532744 DBocld:322703996 Page 47