157-10044-10083 ana 000s nnee anas egg ahd NERY SE XD TRAP TD ony crit CUE OTD ce rae sty tir NONE AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ce ane wre sey tien Onee inete wr mmm AnMD Anat ene Sake GK GRE GE GEE OO EEE ETS cre ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS ewe ee ane gene anes ees es ems FED SEE EV SOL OUT Orme WN. ETE cane Moen ane 08/06/95 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM ene pane Gu AED Gea CD RD to cen AED UES TD ED rent res orth OO FO WOR ee me meee YS “OED Fee im pe ne ene GEAR GAR GEA SEE OTE EE ens mate FE SUT ETT Gems ween ween emt eter eran aeey em came came maw wae carm ait Ghd Gout mans wn AGENCY INFORMATION SSCIA 157-10014-10083 HEARINGS © 11-H-02 rer cee cove erwe one sith sane (oa sane san VOR sabe OE SEED OTE KET YH Fan) A SD WE SET Tee er weet OT er See cops mie mm me nly ty na he ens nen TD ny ein etn air cera YE Gem amas cus ree rey craw eu aig woe em Ne DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCIA SCELSO, JOHN 05/07/76 87 CIA ASSASSINATION, JOHN KENNEDY OSWALD, LEE, POIST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO MEXICO CENTRAL AMERICA TRANSCRIPT UNCLASSIFIED iA RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/21/98 Box 4 a> xan wean extent Rr cera ct fete rth Pury tpt SAMS AAS A get cee SUD ER RD ne Sr GEES Pre ne rere th one cm lh Ma ny ams as a) SARL)? ZY em mm EEL ene} wees wR umn my ery rns at Anan ung caer Sane Ga MA =P: GE cent HY 50955 Docld: 324233471 Page 1
Friday, May 7, 1976 Washington, D.C. (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 3017 WILSON BOULEVARD ARLINGTON, VA 22201 (703) 844-0860 TOP SECREY wae sa
a aa Os J ad st] a. o “Tastinon of: John Scelso + Ww a ge INys UY Ouwe COOGE 3° "Worburuttes "ES “LeBS stg OTe
WARE & PAtE, 416 First Street, 3.€., Wesmingtan, 0.C, 70003 3 Friday, May 7, 1976 5 u United States Senate, 6 | , Select ‘Comittee to Study Governmental 9 . -Operations with Respect to 8 Intelligence Activities, 9 - Washington, D. Cc, 10 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:28 ©'cloct: 11 a.m., in’ Room 608, The Carroll arms Hotel, the Honorable je} Richard S. Schweiker presiding. 13 Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding). 14 Staff: Jim Johnston and Paul Wallach, Professional 15 Staff Members, 19 20 21 22 235 TOP SECRET
BWARG & PAUL g we ¢ 8 © 2 2 a & £ 4 = z w “4 g 4 - rd = % 2 = =: Senator Sciweiker. Would’ you stand and raise your right hand, please. . Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give dis the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? . - oO Mr. Scelso. I do. Senator Schweiker. Be seated. Mr. Johnston. Mr. Scelso, you are here today testifying under an alias, is that correct? TOP SECRET
Mr. Scelso. “gnae te correct; 3 Mr. Johnston. And we executed prior to going on the recor 4 a-form where the Agency keeps your: true identity on xecord ay § there, Our records will just. reflect “your alias. Mr. scelso. ghat is ‘ny understan ing.” 6 7 Mr. Johnston. And your ‘full ‘alias is what? =" 8 Mr. Scelso, John scelso, S-c-e-1-s~o. 9 Mr. Johnston. And you understand that you have the right - 10 to counsel. 760M 140413 11 Mr. Scelso. Yes, I do. 2 12 Mr. Johnston. And you are appearing here voluntarily : 13 without counsel. | ° 14 Mr. Scelso. I am. 15 Mr. Johnston. You also understand that at any time if you 16 desire counsel, you can cease answering questions and ask to 17 consult with counsel. 18 Mr. Scelso. That I understand, yes. g - Mr. Johnston. And you understand that in the course of a 20 tnis investigation you have @ll your constitutional rights, i: : 21 you desire to avail yourself of them, : 22 Mir. Scelso. Very well, thank you. i 23 Meg.’ Wallach. Just one more thing. This transcripe ther eG é oq | We are taking will be a classified docunent. It will be = available at Committee offices for your review. it will net ie TOP SECRET
Z a < a 4 a * < & 410 First Street, S.€., Washington, O.C. 20003 ‘avaliable’ for’ anyoné, eles before you heave, want to" review it; te should be ‘available within a day or two for your review here. Senator Schweiker, if you desire. Mr. Scelso. I would’ Like to review it. Mr. Johnston. Now, “you ‘ee rebizéa from the Agency, ds that correct? Mr. Scelso. Yes. ‘Mr. Johnston. And you are retired under cover. Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Johnston. So I will not ask your present address. As you know, the purpose of the inquiry today is the Comittee is looking into the investigation of the.assassinatio: of President Kennedy, and in the course of that, your name came up as being involved in the CIA's investigation. Would you state your capacity with the CIA in November wo! 1963? . Mr. Scelso. I was at that time the Chief of Branch 3 of the Western Hemisphere Division of the Dbr, the Clandestine Services, and had under ine mexico anc the octaer Central fer. : states, down to and including Panama. Mr. Johnston. And to whom were you responsible? ME. Scelso. I was responsible to the Chief of that Division. Mr. Johnston. And that was? TOP SECRET
410 Fest Servet, $.8., Washington, B.C. 20003 WARD & PAUL Ps nA ao 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 lé 19 20 21 22 rR) 24 Mr. Johnston. And. Mr. King in turn answered to the ppp. Mr. Scelso. The DDP was Mr. Helms. I might add that all. Statements. I make in this matter are based on purely my menory, because ; I had Lette or no contact with the Oswald Lnveatigation, the Kenedy Anvestigatio after the end of 1963, and I have not reviewed any records at 811 except the few documents which you showed mé this morning. | | Senator Schweiker. Wag this because of a transfer of | duty or assignment or what? | Mr. Scelso. It was because the investigation was turnes | Over to another staff in the Agency, to the Counterintelligerc. | Staff. I ean explain why it was turned over in much more detail if you'd like. i ! Senator Schweiker. Well, maybe briefly, if you would. | Mr. Scelso. I was put in charge of the investigation in j the first place because of the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald had been in Mexico, and the foreisgn entanglements seemed to “eenter there, Also, I was put in cnarge of it because Tona:, H eee Lor Mr. lielms, over the years of ty association wi nh the Ages, aah conducted and been in charge of geveral very important majoc ; me investigations. Probably the most lusportant one was the i investiyation of the disappearance of the Chief cf the west German Security Service, Otto John in 1954. ‘I think Mr. Helms felt, and he told me personally that he gave me the jo. TOP SECRET :
HW a 10 il 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 410 Firat Street, $.€., Washington, B.C. 20003 24 12 you with the Kennedy case, be concealed. 23rd, 1964. Mr. Johnston. Now, let me ask you. Mr. Mr. Scelso. That is possible. The. turning point came when I finished an initial report on the case and distributed it to the people who were concernea within the Agency.” Mr. Johnston. How large was that report? | Mr. Scelso. Oh, it might have been 209 Pages long,.and summarized all of the things which we had discovered abroad, Just at the time that this report being circulated, Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach notified the Agen that the FBI or De finished, was being finished and was partment of Justice report on the case was and invited the Agency to send representatives to read it in his office. I went over -- Mr. Helms as$igned me and one other gentleman to go read. it. Mar. A a Staiz. Johnston, ecelso. Wno was the other man? ‘ir. Burch O'Neal, of che Counterintelligen wee We went to Mr. Xatzenbach's office in the Department of Justice and read this very thick report I learned a myriad of vital facts about Oswald! For the first time, s background which apparently tne FBI had known throughout the initial TOP SECRET Rocea, who follewda dates his involvement as about January
2 ) « a 4 6 & < 3 416 Ftest Strost, $.£., Wathington, 0.0. 20003 ii 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 1g 20 21 22 23 24 25 $ I would Like to add that dn the initdaiphase of the investigation, when I was commissioned with the job, Mr. Helms called me and Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Angleton and a number of others into his office and told them in the clearest terms te sees ‘possible that I was to be in charge of the investigation, that no one in the Agency was to have any conversations with anyone outside the Agency, including the Warren Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, concerning the Kennedy assassi nation without my being present. I was to he told and given an Opportunity to ga to everything. I did talk to members of the Warren Commission, I an certain, although I cannot prove it, that Mr. Angleton througic di the entire period discussed the Kennedy assassination regularl; with FBI representatives, never notified me of any of these Meetings, and never passed on to me any of the information that he yained in these meetings. The Bureau did send us, during this initial period -- senator SChweiker. Wow, wait a minute. What period of time is this you are saying? Mr. Scelso. This is the period of time -- Senator Schweiker. When you were in charge of it? vir. Scelso. When I was in charge of the investigation. Senator Schweiker. What would have been his role or reason to do that-at that time? TOP SECRET
counterintelligence state ‘and had almost  aadly yy meetings with th FBI representative, the liaison officer to us, Mr. Sam Papich. These meetings were held in Mr. Angleton's office. 4 6 The FBI did send us hundreds of reports of miscellaneous 6 people during this period, most of “hom were by ‘te very nature : of things not even involved in the | case, but reading Katzenbach s 8 report I for the first time learned that the FBI was in —— 9 possession of diary-like material which Oswald had had in his 2s “40 possession and was found after the assassination. ~ 1 I learned for the first time that Oswald was the man whe _ F 42 had taken a pot shot at General Edwin Walker, two key facts in © 2 3 the errcire case. All ‘the ballistic evidence was there, and © , countless other pieces of information. Xone of this had ever Cc 2 been passed to us. a Senator Schweiker. What timeframe was that that you saw this report, roughly? 17 Mr. Seeiso. I saw the report as soon as it was finishe., : 18 { ‘ | accorGing to Mr. Katzenbach, and wy recollection was that it 19 | i was around Cnristmas of 1963. £6 1 ra { N Senator Schweiker. And you had at that point completes i 21 | your initial report or now? 22 | - H Me. Sceiso. We had compicted an initial report based a. | : 23 4 I everything we had learned up to that tine. It was not *o tow 24 ; 410 First Street, $.£.. Wathingion, 0.C. 20003 a final report. It was an initial report. 25 TOP SECRET :
10 ii af = i 12 € G & 13 z 14 15 16 17 18 3 3 19 3 ° 20 ° e & 21 = 4 22 3 a as z @: e Mr. Wallach. Do you remember if it was a two-volume report? Mr. Sceiso. Wo, it was about 20 pages long. Mr. Wallach. I'm sorry. “was asking about << - Mr. Scelso. The FBI report tiay. have been two volumes. I can only recall one, but it may have been a volume of exhibits oer something Like that. Mr. Wallach. And your report was a 20 page report? Senator Schweiker. Twenty page? I don’t think we've seen it. Mr. Scelso. A 20 page report. Mr. Wallach. Copies to whoni? Mr. Sceiso. Copies to Nr. Helms, Mr. Angleton, 1 think Mr. Murphy, the Chief of the Soviet Branch, of the Soviet Division, and possibly others, possibly to the Director. Mr. Wallach. Was there a title? Mr. Scelso. it swamarized ~~ there was nothing in thac report which was not in the material that you have. Senator Senweiker. I was going to say was there anyth: ..- significant in the report in retrospect that sticks out now in view of what we Know now that might be helpful to us? Mr. Scelso. Hothing, nothing. In fact, much, much ior is now known than I was able to put in that report, obvious... Senator Schweiker. Did that deal with Mexico City, or TOP SECRET
WARD & FAVE 426 First Street, $.€., Washington, B.C. 29063 10 11 12 15 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 a1 22 20 24 Mr. scelao.’ ‘te dealt with a eummary “of ‘the Mexico City situation -- Senator Schweiker. : Did it deal with his activity in the Soviet Union? Mr, Scelso. “No. gust" the: fact that’ he had § been there, because we knew next to nothing about it. See, we > had. in our possession -- I had in my possession at that time only the fragmentary information which we had gotten at the time from the Navy Department when it was realized that Oswald had defected. Senator SChweiker. Did the report deal, for example, with the polygraph test that was given to Alvarado? | Mr. Seelso. Yes, I think so, yes. . Senator Schweiker. The person who alleged that there was a $6500 payoff? Mr. Scelso. Yes, yes, I am sure it mentioned that. It mentioned the Alvarado case. Whether it mentioned the fact that he had been polygraphed, = don't recall. Senator Schweiker. Was he, ag you recall, was he polygrapned according ‘to your recollection? Mr. Scelso. He was definitely polygraphed by a polyyre.-« operator by the office of Security of our organization. Senator Scnweiker. The Office of Security of -- Mr. Sceleo. Of the Central Intelligence Agency. TOP SECRET _
WAAD A PAUL 410 First Steoet, 5.€., Wathingtan, O.C. 20003 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Senator Schweiker. -In Mexico City. Mr. Scelso. In Mexico City. Senator Schwai best of your récollection;* conclusive or not? Mr. Scelso. THe results were unclear. ‘Senator Schweiker.. Were what? Mr. Scelso. I might add, Senator, that I was the first polygraph operator in the Central Intelligence Agency, and that I knew and Still probably Our Office of several years after I got into it and tookkit over exclusively. See, I was an operations officer in the espionage and counterespionage business, and was trained on the side as a polygraph operator. Senator SChweiker. polygraph. vir. Scelso. you rignt now, one Office of Security clandestine personnel, had one or two very gifted operators who were superb people were rapidly promoted out of the polygraph business inte ver, Mr. Scelso. “Yes. Unelear. I was very taiiliar with it, and I can tei ji ker. .And were the results,: according to the do know a great deal about the polygraph. Security took over the polygraph business So you were quite familiar with thie of my beefs over the decades was that tn: never learned how to test agents, that 1s. geatisfactorily. The Office of Secur:: ° TOP SECRET sneer ee ee
occasions during my operational career, I had to take over and repolygraph important agent personnel who had been polygraphed by Office of Security men over and over again and had beaten the polygraph, ‘and t had'to'take thé Sver'and’polygraph them 5 renee. a bo rye ren ae and get them to confedss It:happened n a humber’ of ‘occasions in very, very major cases, and I just felt at the time Alvarado was polygraphed that the man that they sent down there =~ I donje remember his name but I know him -- just bungled the job completely. Senator Schweiker. And so when you say the results of the polyyraph test was unclear, in your mind it was. unclear becaus:: it was poorly administered? F 2 ¢ & é oC & < & Mr. Scelso. Poorly administered, yes. Senator Schweiker. So you really couldn't conclude whetne he was lying or telling you the truth from that. Mr. Scelso. From the polygraph, no. The operator, . believe, came out and said he really couldn'ttell whether ¢:-- man was telling the truth or not. fir. sonnston. Is it difficult te polygraph Latin ameris Hr. Scelso. No. It is difficult to polygraph fabricate: assuming, as I did at that time and still do, that Alvarade was a fabricator. A polygraph operator has to analyze the <. 410 Fasst Sireet, 5.€., Waanington, D.C. 20063 in front of him on the basis of its merits, the evidence at hand. The polyyraph is only an interrogation aid, It is no: TOP SECRET
EMH Be SQL “a magic 1 machine. "y was the only ‘polygraph ope ater ‘bat: for who was trained by Leonard Keeler, the inventor “and ‘developer of the polygraph. Most of the others, I think, were trained by a bunch of charlatans who succeeded him. Our Security peopl just did not know how to polygraph fabricators, and I’ could explain to you why they didn't and how you shoald polygraph fabricators. 7 Senator Schweiker. Well, let me ask a more layman's question. In view of the polygraph test being unclear, what kind of conclusion or analysis did you put in your 20 page report as to the authenticity or not authenticity or lack of authenticitz, of Alvarado'’s testimony? a 2 < a 6 r] & 4 B Mr. Scelso. I and my staff came to the conclusion that Alvarado was a fabricator. Senator Schweiker. Now, why did you do that in view of test being unclear? Mr. Scelso. Well, Alvarado confessed to Mexican authorit..}.. later that he had fabricated this. Senator Schweiker. Was any of our personnel, CIA or 4 there when he did this? Mr. Scelso. No, but we talked to hin later. Senator Schweiker. and what cid he Say? Mir. Scelso. You see, Alvarado was a Nicaraguan inforran:z 410 Faeat Sicoot, $.€., Washsneton, O.C, 20003 as you know.’ TOP SECRET
f 7° v & ao. fo) . om ~ 410 First Street, $.2., Wathingtas, 0.C. 26003 WARD & Pauy Mr, Scelso, r  don' t E think. that we knew. I ‘am pretty sure we didn't. we had never heard Of Alvarado before he popped up in this case, and the Nicaraguans came to us either in Mexico City or in Nicaragua. Senator Schweiker, . well, ‘we’ saw’ ‘sone report | Satend and maybe this will help refresh your memory, maybe it was an FBI report saying that -- x thought it waid that CIA had used him in the past and he was 80 percent réliable, whatever that means. Mr. Johnston. ret me clear that up. The confusion is the deletions in the FBI report. The frue fact was that he was an informant for Nicaraguan intelligence, and they suid he was 80 percent reliable, Nicaracuan intelligence told CIA that he was 80 percent reliable. Senator Schweiker. He was not our infcrmant. Mr. Johnston. He was not oilr informant. Senator Schweiker, ['m Sorry... Mr. Scelso. yes. Now, here again I am relying exclusively on my recolly.- of tne facts, Senator Schweiker, Well, we will request the reports, Li will help us to Get the Gist of what you thought. ‘Ir. Seelso,. Alvarado was an informant of the Nicarac... service in Mexico working for Nicaraguan intelligence of:: in Mexico City and his mission was to, I think, get to Cxb. TOP SECRET
embassy and consulate, trying to get a visa. to" go ‘to ‘Cuba. He obviously had been in this building and in the courtyard of it 4 because he could describe it. That was part of his mission. 6 He reported regularly to his Nicaraguan case (officers in 6 Mexico City about what he was doing. After ‘the Kennédy 7 jj. &88sassination became news, public news, Alvarado went to his 3] Nicaraguan Contacts and told them that back in October of that 2 9 year he had been in the Cuban consulate, r believe, and had 10 there sean Lee Harvey Oswald, whose picture by that time had 11 been on television in Mexico, and had sean him in conversation leaf with a group of people, among them a red-headed Negro, and WARD & PALE 23 | 24d boasted that all of them were too cowardly to carry out 14 some mission but that he would do it. And a sum of money was 15 || Mentioned -~ I don't remember the sum of money. Was it 16 | $3000? 17 Mr. Johnston. $6500. oihae eq | Statement that Oswald had been discovered to have a savings 18 Mr. Scelso. $6500, Something like that, some $3000 Stucn | 3 | in ny menor; | | é 19 | Ye o . i 6 20 But this puzzled us until 1 think we learned from our c o g 2) Station in Mexico City that Mexican radio stations had broace:.:: 3 : “ 22 [| among the auadreds of faces and nonfacts that they were putiic . | s g a E Ps ° = i t ; 22 | eut about the Kennedy assassination, had mentioned Or had tha : account in Gexas with this amount of money in it. TOP SECRET
4 2 < e @ a £ < z 410 Fiett Street, §.£., Wathingion, 0.¢, 20003 radio, and the fact that this Nicaraguan source, Alvaradog had not reported this incident in any way, Shape, ¢ or form, back an October when he had Ailegedly . seen this: ‘occurrence. in the Cuban consulate, but had only come up with. this: after ‘the Kennedy assassination. Senator Schweiker. In other words, he didnt report it to his intelligence service when it occurred, Mr. Scelso. No, he didn‘t. Mr. Johnston. Just let me Clear one fact up for the record, His report was that. he Saw Oswald on’ September 13th, not in October. Mr. Scelso. Yes, something like that, Mr. Johnston. And I reviewed the record, and I just want to be Clear that one of the reasons CIA had for discounting as story was the FBI information that Oswald was in New Orleans co. September 19th. Mr. Scelso. That's right, that's Yight.. That comes bac: to me now. ur. Wallach. Lec’s go off the record for a minute. (Discussion off the record.) Senator Schweiker. Excuse me. -Now, you were explaining . to me why you felt, in Spite of the incomplete results, why you discounted Alvarado. TOP SECRET
amy iow ‘that the FBI established ° that on the day that Alvarado” ‘alleged these eventa had taken Place, he, Seward, 3 haa been 4H lew Orleans. - That comes Back, to me eg 4% ay < ae ete cn many fabrications: in my obtains in the early “s Senator’ Schweiker. ”: Houta “there have been any possibility and this is ‘just speculation : m= that Cuban intelligence would have had an inside person in the Mexican police, and it our personnel weren' € present, Played some Sames there with getting him to reverse his story? Mr. Scelso. f don't think’ 50 because f& think that the WARD & tau Person that interrogated him Was &@ very, very senior officia: ef the Mexican police. Senator Schweiker. In whom YOu would place high reliability? Mr. Scelso, Yes, yes. aA very, very senior person. [ dont remember who-it was. [t was a Person that we carried oan & code .name a) It was ‘somebody very, very senior, Senator Schweiker. Se you had high Credibility in the inside source there, | | Mr. Scelso, Yes, 410 First Serest, S.E., Washington, 0.2, 20003 Now, it is true that this person that ~- they didn't TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32423471 Page 20
gstery, but they did give him e pretty. good Dutch uncle talking to. Senator Schweiker. Well, I would expect that, Mr. Scelso. Which shook him up. To me, in my judgment, and as an interrogator of some z a, a fT Il ~= and «2 tens of thousands of German prisoners of World War 8 a lot of them were fabrieators, and a Polygraph operator who 9° had tested some thousands of People and uncovered quite a bit 10 of fabrication in the early years before we cleaned Our payroll: I 11 of such people, f felt that I was very confident that Alvarade | 12 had made up the Story based on his knowledge of the appearance, 13 the inside appearance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico, his WARS & PAUL 14 knowledge of what their employees looked like and the type of people that went in and out of the place, and the fact that he 15 1 W4S a trained intelligence agenty trained in reporting, 6 : enabled him to fake up an interesting~sounding, semi~plausibi~ i? report. 18 3 My. Johnston, Let me go back to the meeting you said ; g 19 . i g yOu had with Mr. Helms, and VOU pul tr. Ancieton there, os ¢ 20 . : g° . E Can you recall the date of thal meeting? ; § 21 ‘ . ; x Mr. Scelso. That meecing was a very short time after tix | * 22 i 1 assassination. : a 23 ' Fi Mr. Johnston. On the afternoon of the assassination? i z= 24 e Mr. Scelso. Possibly it was, TOP SECRET
ba cS. 10 a 11 12 13 WARS & Paw 14 LS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4130 First Street, $.£., Washington, 6.. 20003 next morning? ° Mr. Sceleo. 1 cannot be sure... The: assassination’ took place on: fmareday? “ could have been the: next aay.” Br. Johnston. - flow: about the 24th, was the day Oswald was assassinated. Had" that! meeting. taken place ‘before Oswald was shot? . : : . Mr. Scelso. yes. Mr. Johnston. And You put Mr. Angleton, Mr. Karamessines, and Mr. Helms at that meeting. Mr. Scelso. Yes, Myr. Johnston. Was Mr. Fitzgerald there? Do you know Desmond Fitzgerald? i - Mx. Scelso. Oh, I knew him very, very well. I don't know what Mr. Pitzgerald's position was at that time. I don't know. whether he was then the-Chief of the Western Hemisphere Divisic: or whether Colonel 3. «a, King still was. x Mr. Johnston. Did you know any other Capacity Mr. Fiteger. Mr. Scelso. Mr. Fitzgerald, as £ recall, was the Chic? of what we called orc. or later called the ca Staff, the Covere Action Staff, had at that time besides being -- | i \ that is the other side from espionage, and ther “y TOP SECRET
er) Far Eastern Division.-: z don't’ remember when he became ‘Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, 4 Mr, Johnston. Have you ever heard the words Special g | Affaire stage. fea 3 8 / Senator. Schweiker, ; 7 Hr. Scelgo.... Yea} but I don't recall what it meant. i Ce 8 Mr. Johnston. bid you ever associate Fitzgerald, Desmond ~ 9 Fitzgerald as being in charge of the Special Affairs Staff? c 10 Mr. Scelso. You are just asking me more than I can aad 11 { answer. I am on just completely mushy ground here. 12 Mr. Johnston. Did you know on November 22nd, or on the 33 | ay you got this assignment, November 23rd, did you know tha: WARD & aus 14 there was a special group within CIA dealing solely with Cus: 15 affairs? 16 Mr. Scelso. Oh, yes, yes, indeed I did. 17 But I don't remember what it was called. 18 Mr. Johnston. And who do YOu associate with that group : 19 in that time period? mr. Pitzgerald? g & G 20 Mr. Scelso. Well, 1 associate Mr. Willian Harvey with r 9 5 £ but I could be wrong. é 21 3 z , ‘ ‘ : J Mr. Johnston. The chronology is that that would have Len.. a 22 . 3 23 in 1962, and there was a changeover, and Mr. Harvey was mov... wi é out. 2 24 @ 25 t Mr. Scelso. And Mr. Fitzgerald took it over? TOP SECRET
“your recollection. is who else -- 1£1you"had! needed -something on Cuban matters, who would you have gone to? | Mr. Scelso. I doa't recall, I just don't reeall. Mr. Johnston. Did you have knowledge of those people? Mx. Scelso. oh, yes. I dakit with them’all of the time, but I just don’t remember. Mr. Johnston. Did you know Hal Swinson? Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Johnston, Did you associate him with Cuban affairs? Mr. Scelso. Yes and I dealt with him on a number of Cuban problems that affected my area, my area and Centrai America, where a Cuban base in Miami ran agents in my country. 2 > < a « e « < B in Mexico and Central America, and there were constant little problems about this, you know, that necessitated our talking ts each other. Mr. Johnston. Well, let's go back to the meeting, then, on what was probably November 23rd. Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Johnston. Was there anybody fron the Cuban Affaice. - Mr. Scelso. Not that 1 recall. Mr. Johnston. In that meeting. Hr. Scelso. Not thar I recall. Mr. Johnston. So that although you were ordered co vu. 416 Firs? Street, $.€., Wasningion, O.C, 20003 given charge of the investigation -- TOP SECRET
348-8608 (7 Phone (Arse 202} a 3 « & @ a & L4 EY 410 Ferst Strom, $.€., Washington, B.C, 20003 Mr. Scelso.° Yes.” Mr. Johnston. _So far as youlknow, that was not communicat to the Cuban affairs people? Mr. Scelso. Oh, I am certain they knew it. Mr. Johnston, But do you directly know? Mr. Scelso. I do not recall how they" ‘leaned: t: Senator Schweiker. Under your investigation at vat point in time, would Material, for example, Oswald had a debate and & run-in with the DRE group out of New Orleans, with Bringuier and some other people there, and CIA was working with this group at the time, and I believe they did turn some materials Of a debate over to someone. Would chis have come under your investigation Or net? Mr. Scelso. it would have come to my attention. Senator Schweiker, Do you recall the extent of any investigation that you did with anti-Castro groups such as DRE or Alpha 66 that had any bearing ‘at 4ll on your lavesti:: Mr. Scelso. i recall that cur tliami station and the Office of I think the Counterintellivence stuf’ and the Of: Of Security passed us information on this and that steps wi. x‘ Caxen to interrogate Cuban exile figures with whom we were contact on what they anew abouc Oswald's run-ins with othe: . Culpa: groups, aac thac all of that material dic cross ny desk, Senator Schweiker. Did any significant material come TOP SECRET
3 2 « a a a & « x 416 First Steet, 5.£., Washington, B.C. 20003 4 | report? Mr. Scelso. I don't recall anythign significant except th general fact that Oswald had been agitating in New. Orleang ina Pro-Castro way, and. that this had excited comment and opposition from Cuban _groups ‘on the. other side of the fence, ‘Senator Schweiker. bid you know -- in this investigation, Was this done under your auspices? Mr. Scelso. Yea, Nominally or actually,” nominally I. was in command of it. I sent out cables all Over the world Ordering steps to be taken to do this ana do that and uncover records, make inguiries, surveil people and so on in connection with this Organization, Senator Schweiker. One of the things that came to our attention in the course of thts investigation was a Customs agent who was detailed or has been detailed to the CIA by the name of DeEstado, out of Miami, and we understand that he, after the assassination, was actually interviewing Cuban exiles for any information, or naine checks or something or Other, . . Does that name ving a bell, Or would thac be Part of wnat you probably were sitting on Cop of at the time? Hr. Scelso. I don't recall ever having heard of the man, and I wouldn't have known his true name anyway. Senator Schweiker. But that would have been part of wins: _TOP SECRET
wat 2. aha Senator Schweiker. Part of what ak on fat the. time. Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, ‘I have a cable from the Director =- I'm sorry, from Mexico City to Direétor, dated 24 November 1963, and the Mexites ' ‘Cty number 7085, and it reports on name traces of certain people contacted “by the Soviets in Mexico City. Firstof all, do you specifically recall receiving that or seeing that cable at the time? ; {the Witness reads the document.) Mr. Scelso. I have no recollection of ever having seen this cable. 2 3 < a « o £ z 8 Mr. Johnston. Is it possible you saw it? Mr. Scelso. it is certainly possible. Mr. Johnston. And according totthe distribution, would you have? Mr. Scelso. .The WH division got two copies, which doesn't mean that I got a copy. It is not -- it is slugyeu, ‘the indicators at the top would not automatically have Bent to me. As a matter of fact, Soviet operations within the Ayency were highly compartmentalized, and I frankly wo Whe “Alferiev? Mr. Johnston. He was a Pravda correspondent who was wi:. ‘ 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, 0.¢. 20003 in contact with Kostikov, and that is the reason for the TOP SECRET
Prone (Aran 202} a 2 c 4 a « a & < B 420 Firtt Streei, 5.2, Wothingtan, 0.0. 20003 My question to you is this. ihether Or not you actually Saw it, given the fact that you were in charge of the investiga tion, what do YOu assume would have been done with this documen once it had arrived? What action was. required on it? Mr. Scelso. It would have been: Bent to"1 me ‘and my staff, certainly. Mr. Johnston. And then what would you have done with Mr. Scelso. We would have analyzed it and traced the people concerned. i-had a large staff of analysts working Mr. Johnston. What I'm getting to is you definitely would have traced the names in that cable? Mr. Scelso. Well, yes, I'm pretty sure we would have. 1 see a 201 number written here on the cable. I can't tell which file. Mr, Johnston, That 411 comes out of the Oswald 201, which may be the Kennedy assassination file, Mr. Scelso. Well, this is the Counterintelligence HESca. . and Analysis staff, that is Ray Roced's stafé copy. vir. Johnston, My question to you is are you confidenr, Given the procedures in operation at the time, that when tx.:: arrived, either your staff or the Counterintelligence Staff would have made name traces? TOP SECRET
+8 +z) 3 od A x i fives ge 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, O.¢, 70002 WARD & PAUL 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 235 24 25 depends on how -- whether there proved to be anything significant. traced through CIA records because he was in contact with eens Ske Me ps ” te . nt ‘eure -about “tha eg SNe + . * a & . Vals Mr. Johnston. What about the name Rolando Cubela? Mr. Scelso. It doesn't ring a bell. Mr. Johnston. It doesn't ring a bell? Mr. Scelso. No. Bae Mr. Johnston. Would you be confident that that name was : Alferiev? Mr. Scelso. I would say that it should have been done by routine procedures and probaby it was done. Mr. Johnston. And to whom would the name trace -- he was a Cuban. tho would the namettrace have been directed tc? Mr. Scelso. It would probably have been traced by the Soviet Bloc division because they are the ones who had the action on this cable. Mr. Johnston. And who would they had to have request: the name trace of a Cuban on? Mr. Scelso. They would simply Save done it through . © \ Central Registry System. Mr. Jonnston. ~ Through the 201 fiie? Mr. Scelso. YVhrougn the 20] fide. Mr. Johnston. And if thuc woule nave shown a name -- I'm just trying to understand how this operated ~- if char TOP SECRET
a 3 < a @ o « « = 410 Fleet Street, $.£., Washington, D.0, 20003 - a dealing with Cuban ere would’ ae then ee have gone to the Cuban task force to get the name trace? Mr. Scelgo. NO, no, not at ali. Mr. Johnston. WHat if there was an Operation involving th Cubans? Mr. Scelse. Then they would have gotten an answer back from the registry which would have indicated that:.somebody hac an operational interest in the man, which might mean that he was a security suspect or closely aligned with an agent, or even an agent. Mr. Johnston. Would that deal with -- would the Office « 2 Security be the central point tor that? Mr. Scelso. No. The Central Registry of the Clandestisa Services. Mx. Johnston. Let me ask now with a Separate capable, is one dated 26 November 1963, to a variety of European Stations, and its number is Director 85133. 1 just call your attention to Paragraph 3 of thac. “ly guestion being, do you recall thac message ‘goiny _through to you? (The Witness reads tne document.) ‘ir. Scelso. No, I don'c. i cannot see from the indistinct printing at the botto:. whether it was coordinated with My branch. I do not recall TOP SECRET
5 8 c x G oO ~ WARS & PALL 410 First Sieeet, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20603 we Now, this is a message "=~ you read that for the record? Mr. Scelso. Paragraph 3: “Because of obvious significanc any scrap information which bears on President's assassination, desire addressee stations screen carefully all audio tapes since 22 November 1963 for comments and cable any significant info so obtained." Mr. Johnston. And that is asking for what? Mr. Scelso. That is asking for our stations which might have had microphone or telephone tap operations on Soviet, Cuban or any other type of targets to look at the tapes made on those days and see if there were any references or allusions to the Kennedy assassination. Mr. Johnston. Do you recall receiving any feedback from those tapesaaad the European stations? ‘Mr. Scelso. No, I don't recall any. Mr. Johnston. Now, I asked you wher we were off the and your answer was no, is that right? Mr. Scelso. Neo. I have written friends in the states and asked the: + send me copies of all of this stuff, anc they say it is unobtainable. Mx. Wallach. I'll say for the recorc we will give you copy. TOP SECRET
whom you probably know, who married my: aecond éoitein, and I'l have dinner with him tomorrow. Senator Schweiker, Weft. make sure. you, ‘get'a.copy. Mr. Scelso. tli. be. ? Mr. Johnston, were conducting’ the Kennedy assassination vestigation that the o CIA had engaged in plots to assassinate Fider" castro? Mr. Scelso. I wag not. 4 Senator Schweiker, You were not? Mr. Scelso. I was not. I did know that in the course of our Operations we were landing armed agents on the coast of Cuba from time to time, although I was not privy to these operations, and I do know that either then or afterward in that time, historical span, aa ©. er 3 ~_ ¢ a @ : < ck a oo] lo Fidel Castro used to allege, Cuban prepaganda used to allege that we were sending agents ashore to kill Castes. To my knowledge at thae ‘time and to my later knowledge wher. I was in a higher capacity in the Agency and reviewed all of the Agency's clandestine operations regularly, I did know thee ws. A were Sending in Paramilitary groups attempting: to place agen.. abroad to do all kinds of things, but not that they attempre: Or that we were going to kidnap Castro. Senator Schweiker, Bot if you had known that, would that ha--- 410 First Steeet, $.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 made a difference in the thrust or the kind of investigatio, TOP SECRET
Se STR EL ACY eal Fe f, oon WARD & PAUL 420 Fist Street, S.E., Wasningion, 0.¢. 20003 we HE would have: ‘condu ted “4 the Mr. Scélso, It would certainly have caused ‘me arid the oth vo E who were thinking about the assassination to view some -possi- bilities in a different tight, and it would have had other drastic effects on me “and my ‘career, ‘00, I F mph ‘aga, I feel very violently about inte. Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, just because of your background as a polygraph operator, did you have any contact with Victor Espinoza's interrogation? Mr. Scelso. I have never heard the name, Mr. Johnston. Did you have any reason to believe at all that the Agency might actually be engaging in assassination Plots against Castro? Senator Sahweiker. Other than the paramilitary things which you just described to us. Mr. Johnston. No, no indeed. -As a matter of fact, after the Kennedy assassination which affected all of us very profoundly, because I, for example, had been in Charge of the responsibility of planning the security for two Kennedy tripe to Central America, one to Central Aserica -- one to Mexice “and one to Costa Rica -- I had been up to my neck with the Secret Service, and nad participated in training courses fur the body yuards of any aunbers of foreign dignitaries in tt: Far East and all over the world. All of our «= there were discussions about this between senior people in the Agency, «...; TOP SECRET
WARE & FALE, ALG Firat Sireet, 3... Washington, B.C, 2060) es o ®& 4 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 ig 20 21 22 25 24 25 we don't do anything like that. And it would be impossible in an Agency like our own, because you couldn't do anything like that without Helme or indeed the President's approving it. That was the tone of everyone's conversation. Mr. Johnston. Do you, when you said the knowledge of the. fact that the Agency had engaged in plots to assassinate. - Castro might have affected your attitudes -— | Nr. scelso. It would have cranked other factors, you see, into our reasoning process: L don't think, however, in retrospect, that it would have changed our conclusions. Mr. Johnston. And you received a verbal order from Mr. Helms to conduct’ -- te be in charge of the investigation? Mr. Scelso. Yes. . Mr. Johnston. And for everyone at that meeting to cooperate with you, is that right? Ae. Scelso. That's right. Mr. Johnston. Did you know that on November 22nd, 196:, about the time Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA case officer was passing a poison pen, offering a poison pen to a high level Cuban to use to assassinate Castro? Mg. Scelso. .Ne, 1 did nor. Mr. Johnston. Would you have Grawn a link in your mi:: between that and the Kennedy assassination? TOP SECRET pen
Tcertainly think that. that. would have been Mr. .Scelso;” become an absolutely vital factor in analyzing the events Surrounding the Kennedy assassination. Mr. Johnston, rf I add to that the. fact’ that on October 5 29th, 1963 Mr. Fitzgerald met with this Cuban and assured hin 6 as a personal representative of Bobby Kennedy that his scheme : % for the overthrow of Castro, possibly including Castro's $ 8 assassination, had the highest U.S. Support, would that have i been a major fact? Mr. Scelso. It certainly would. Li Mr. Johnston. And let me add to it, the reason I asked 12 | you about the name traces that are on Mexico cable 7045, the 13 name of the Cuban thar they were meeting with onnNovember 22: WAAD & Pause is included in this cable, and that a name trace on him, if conducted, as you say, would have led to his file which indicated the meeting and the assassination Plot. Senator Schweiker. And it also might have indicated -- 1a fi Well, this is very debatable, but it might have indicated WASTE. 19 |} Or not we were dealing with a double agent, which some peoplu - 20 Il. air. Scelso, It would have certainly opened up that 21 question. \22 senator Schweixer. Are you aware that that person now 23 is consivered possibly a double agent? 24 Mr. Scelso. No, I had never heard of the person. 410 First Street, $.€., Wasningtan, O.C. 26003 25 Senator Schweiker. Or at least a source thac Castro might TOP SECRET
a > < ry 8 Fed £ « B 420 First Street, $.€., Washington, 0.6. 20003 some way. Mr. Scelso. Yeah. ~ Mr, Wallach, I take it you would also not be aware of the fact that the FBI through its informants learned about this operation. Mr. Scelso.. io knew nothing about it. Mr. Johnston. Given “~ did you assume that Oswald might be pro-Castro? Mr. Scelso, Oh, yes, Mr. Johnston. And did you assume or did you speculate that the Cuban government might have been behind the assassi- nation? - Mr. Scelso. We weighed this possibility, and at the Stage ut which I turned over the investigation to Mr. Rocca, on Mr. Angleton’ S staff, my inclination was still to reject that possibility. However, just at the time that I was turning it over, saw for the first time the FBI report from Mr. Katzenbach’ office and discovered something I haa never known, and tis: is that Oswald had taken &@ pot snot at General Walker, ane immediately started to wonder, did Oswald tell the Cubans in Mexico and the Russians in Mexico that he was the man Whee had takea &@ shot at General Walker? Did he use this heroi. deed to build himself up in their eyes. as a person who the. TOP SECRET
should welcome | n what he was after? tt ncomed to mas of psychopathic personalities, exactly what he would have done. But at that time I was turning the thing over, and I might add that at that time f had the Panama riots of January 1964 on my hands, and plenty of other things. 12 was still running my whole branch all through this investigation. “ Mx. Johnston. At the time you were conducting your investigation, was it brought to your attention, the fact that Castro had talked to an AP reporter by the name of Daniel Harker on September 7, 1963, and threatened to eliminate or said that U.S. leaders who were trying to eliminate. him anc that he threatened retaliation? WAAD & PAUL Mr. Sceiso. I think thet dia come to our attention. —“ TT = rand xr c a> N 4 | Or-it came to my attention pexsonaily- , ao | Mr. Wallach. Let me show you a COBY of an. article the: | appeared in, among other papers, “he New Orleans qimes-Pice f-+| and if I might, just pefore giving it to you as a way of | backgrounGa inform you that within ~~ are my FacteicOorrec:, Jim, within a day OF two before this article, a CIA represe 1 | tative case officer had met with Cubela who “Was invelvec $.£., Washangian. 0.0. 20003 assassination plot against Castro in Brazil. Senator Schweiker. And the cryptonym for that was AMLASH. ALG Ftest Scere, mr. Wallach. And then that meeting took place in Brus TOP SECRET
f one is sure that Cubela was a double agent, “ana ‘Let 1 me “show ¢| you this statement that Castro made in September -- or the article speaks for itself. {The Witness reads the document. } I don't remember seeing this article. Mr. Scelso. Mr. Johnston. I will call to your attention ~~ Te Mr. Wallach. May I ask one -- 8 LS . 9 Mr. Johnston. Well, just to refresh your recollection, I 10 will call to your attention a Mexico City cable 7055, dated 25 November '63, paragraph 2 of that cable reports 3 12 ‘the essence of the newspaper story. : 13 Mr. Scelso. Yeah, I must have scen this. , 14 Mr. Johnston. You do feel, then, that although you 1s may not have seen the newspaper article, you knewaabout the incident. Me. Seelso. Yes. 17 Mr. Wallach. I take it you did not know of any meeting — 3 down in Brazil shortly before this. g 19 - PS Mr. Scelso. I knew .sining about tare > operations.  Cuuc: ¢ 20 | ? operations were, completely compartmented within the Agency, & 21 ; * ane even after 1965 when I was put on’ the Foreign Intelligaace | 4 22 3 Staff and had the job of annually reviewing all of the opers cs a 25 } . e é and projects in the FI, Foreign Intelligence field, ang Moet - ° a = of those in the counterintelligence fielé which we knew abou:, : | TOP SECRET
MH. Part) Ta AE I et a atte “2 2 . CS no) Nay rm WAHO ® FAIL Ald Strat Streat, S.€., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 attention either. Mr. Scelso. Well, it did not come to mine, and I gather from conversations I have had with colleagues, retired colleaguts, here in Washington and with Mr. Phillips and what Ihave read in the papers, that Helms was knowledgeable of all of this, and undoubtedly Helms, with whom I kept in very close touch throughout this investigation -- it was pretty much a one-way atreet it seems now -~ probably was analyzing this 24 hours a day. Senator Schweiker. I'll buy that pretty well. Mr. Wallach. Do you know if Helms or anyone else was conducting an investigation separate and apart from yours cf the assassination of President Kennedy? Mr. Sceiso. No. I would be pretty -- as sure as I could be of anything in the Agency, I could he pretty sure ne was not. Mr. Johnston. Could he have conducted one through Sas that you would not have knewr about? Mr. Scelso. davdly. i nad so many friends in SAs, ! would have found out about it ang it would have been beca..-- of the tremendous flow of information back and forth, the I.a- that cables were misrouted and people get to see cables they are not supposed to see and so on, it would have been very unlikely that I would not have heard of it. TOP SECRET
Johnste discussed previously to the European stations, Director 85133, which says review the tapes, audio tapes, a return cable on Prone (Aree 202) y November 27th does not cite this cable but does .report the ‘tape from Paris audio tapes. It carries a conversation relatin« to Cubala. | Could that cable have comé back in withéut it being routed through you? Mr. Scelgc. Sure, Mr. Johnston. I don't have it. I don't have the Novembes 27th cable. Mr. Sceiso. i am pretty sure. I didn't know that any such cable went out to Europe. I didn't know at that time th-- a > < a € a & < ¥- we had any operations against Cuban targets, any audio opera-~ tions against Cuban targets in Europe, although I later learner about it when I was reviewing all of the operations several years later, and I am pretty certain that I never Saw any of f the take fran any such overations. Mr. Johnston. Let me then finally reconstruct. You know of no investigation inte the assassination othe: the .one you conducted in that tine period, — rr. Sceliso. In that time period, correct. Senator Schweiker. Within the CIA. _ Mr. Scelso. Within the CIA, that's right. 410 First Street, $.€., Wathington, O.C. 20003 Mr. Johnston. And your investigation did not TOP SECRET
hoa ig Es ee Se - account ‘or an ongoing ‘CIA protring. with: vhigh ‘level Cuban to assassinate Castro. Mr. Scalso. It did not. Prone (Aree 202} Senator Schweiker. Because he.did-not have knowledge. of ig. Mr. Johnston. You did not. have. ‘Rnowleage « of it. Mr. Scelso. That's right. Mr. Johnston. And-that was not at all considered in your investigation. Mr. Scelso. That is right. Mr. Johnston. And to the best you can put yourself back to November 23rd, if you had known the bare fact of a meeting and the facts I have explained today about the meetings with AMLASH, would you have drawn a link between the Kennedy a 3 < 2 @ 2 £ « R assassination and the AMLASH operation? Mr. Scelso. i would definitely have brought into my reasoning this very significant. factor, and have scrutinized the case and all of the logical possibilities from a different viewpoint, and I might well have urged any number of operations) steps, investigative steps to help resolve these factors. I would certainly, for example, have urged to get ahols of this agent and polygraph him. Johnston. How about the case officer? Would vou have: interviewed the case officer that met with him on November 22n. senator Schweiker. Which agent do you mean? A1G First Street, $.£., Waimingion, O.0. 20003 Mr. Seelso. Cubala. I gather that is his name. I have TOP SECRET
Senator Schweiker. - Right. Mr. Wallach. Well, let me ask you -- ry Mr. Johnston. Well, let me. Would you have interviewed the case officdr? Mr. Johnston. I have not. § 6 Mr. Scelso. Who did‘ you say the case officer ‘was? ? 8 Mr. Scelso. I would definitely have wanted to talk to 10 Mr. Johnston. And ask him what, the substance of his LL meeting on the 22nd? 12 Mr. Scelso. Yes, find out all the details about it. 13 ' Mr. Johnston. Would you have been interested in whether WARD & PAUL 14 || Ox not the agent took the poison pen that was offered him? 15 Mr. Scelse. Indeed. 16 Mr. Wallach. Would you also, having become aware of this, 17 asked senior CIA officials, maybe Mr. Helms in particular, abo. other assassination attempts that te have documented such a: 18 nm . . : § 19 the CIA's use of the Mafia against Castro? f mean, you wou!ls { ws , 4 . é fe) have yone inso a new area? i € 20 ; 3 . wo i § 21 Mx. Scelso. I would definitely have wanted to know ail | = . . i * b ti ; about tnat. 4 22 : 23 I did know, by the way, about our involvement with the “a gz . %. 2 24 @ Mafia concerning Cuba. , : ; oe Senator Schweiker. In what respect? Fi TOP SECRET a
‘before the Kennedy assassinations. = wa called over to” the Department of Justice to talk to a high official who was in charge ¢ of the. anti=racketéering’ eciiad r don! t: reniember-‘the man's name bie he was’ “and” seia'd a 212 a public figure. Mr. Wallach. Was it Herbert Milter? Mr. Scelso. No. te was an Irishman, I remember, a young fellow, a young trishman who was a ‘erony of Bobby. Kennedy|{s and was trying to run down the Mafia and the Las Vegas gamblers were what we were working on at that time, and it had been discovered that these Las Vegas gamblers were smuggling cash, which they skimmed off the top of their daily take, to é > < 2 4 oe « < 8B Panama and putting it in numbered bank accounts, which Panamanians, among their other cultural developments, have copied this from the Swiss, although why anybody would trust a Panamanian bank with his money I don't-know, and this man, this Department of Justice official asked us ~- and someone else was with me, but I: don't remember whom -- whether Cra had any way of finding out all about these numbered bank accounts, in other words, wno owned the accounts. It so happened that at that time we were in an excelle position to @o this, although it would have been a delicate 410 Farst Street, 5.E., Washington, O.C. 70004 matter, and I came back, although it was purely a criminsa: matter with few, if any overtones, of counterespionage interes
rd 2 < & a 4a « < 5g S10 First Street, $.2., Warmington, O.C. 20005 back’ all bristisg ‘to. eine with this .. Gedane ‘it was a great idea. and promptly this came to Mr. ‘angieton' 8 attention, and we had to brief him on it, and he said, well, we're not going to have anything toddo with this. This is the Bureau's business. And whammo, end of conversation. We were called off. I went to Colonel J. Ci King, who wag at that time the Chief of the WH Division, and told him this, and J.C. King said, well, what do you expect? And I said, well, I don‘t know i didn't expect that. He said, well, you know, Angleton has these ties to the Mafia, and he is net going to do anything to jeopardize them. And then I said, I didn't know that. And he said, yeah, it had to do with Cuba. This has stuck in my memory. I was quite confident at that time -~ we are, I am sure, no longer in a position to do this -- but we could have done it then. That is how I knew this. Mr. Wallach. But insofar as you knew, you didn't know any of the details of the ties. “ar. Scelso. I didn's know any details of it whatsoever. I do know, I do recall that these were Mafia people who were TOP SECRET
2 Mr, Wallach. Let 3 me ‘ask: you thie question,’ Phone (Aran 202) : Did the CIA conduct an investigation to determine whether or not there was Cuban involvement in the assassination of 5 President Kennedy? » 7 — Do, 6 Mr. Scelso. ves, to the extent that. you could see it on F the record, we did analyze and investigate Oswald's connections 8 with the Cubans in New Orleans and in Mexico City. 9 Mr. Wallach. Forgetting, for a second, Let Harvey Oswald, 10 | you talkedi:before about if you had known of certain facts that 11 || we have discussed here, you would have sent out different at F 12 || Operational leads or requested different operations. ‘ e 13 Mr. Scelso. Yes. $ 14 Mr, Wallach. I think there is a distinction between 15 retracing Oswald and his possible contacts, and conducting an 16 investigation to determine if a country, a foreign country was 17 involved in the assassination of one of our Presidents. | aie 18 | Now, going to the latter point, was such an investigatic:. ee , . oe 8 19 conducted that you know of by the CLA? x 3 | er . | Mr. Scelso. Well, nere We are yettiny down to fine porn: .j : $ . z 21 | of semantics. I still insist that -- of course, you Can see 3 : ui 22 the Central Intelligence Agency did issue orders to go over .- “i - . Z 23 audio tapes, obviously, on Cuban and Soviet targets. That i. 4 1 i | Ee FS . : P - @ ° 24 investigation. fa * Senator Schweiker. I think we are talking here a matter TOP SECRET
F > < a é & £ « 3 416 Firat Street, 5.2., Wasnineton, O.C. 20003 had 1 know these facts, our investigation of the Kennedy assassination would have ) d, and we would have undertaken Mr. Wallach. Such’ as what? Mr. Scelso. Such as querying, making sure all of onr Cuban sources were queried about what they knew on it, that this operation, this agent that was offered the poison pen, was thoroughly interrogated to the Limit that that was possible. [ don't know what his capacity was or where he was physicall: located, that he would be polygraphed. Senator Schweiker, And the case officer. Mr. Scelso. And his case officer interrogated, obviousl;. Mr. Wallach. Do you Know whether or not any of the Agenc; sources, agents, etc., inside Cuba were ever levied with the ‘requirement of trying to find out whether or not there was Cuban involvement? air. Scelss. I don't know this for a fact. ft wouldnatt nash geen the traffic, but IL do know that ali stations were urged to explore everything with all sources. . Pn Mr. Wallach. You're familiar with the JMWAVE station. Mr. Scelsc. Yes. Mr. Wallach. We've had testimony from persons there that they did not ask their sources, either inside or outside TOP SECRET 6 =
Prope (Area 202} 8 2 3 < cy a fe] & « z S10 Firat Stroat, S.E., Washington, 0.0. 20003 there was this noreatgt litt was taken of.a man 1 entering. the Soviet embassy in Mexico city that was sent’ out as supposed]; being Oswald. . Mr. Scelso. Yes. Senator Schweiker. And then, of course, as soon as Oswald's picture came out, it was obvious that it was not Oswald. Mr. Scelso. Yes, uh<huh. Senator Schweiker. Can you enlighten us as to how we whet happened with that picture mix-up, and was the person who was supposedly Oswald ever identified? Mr. Scelso. I can answer to that to the extent that as long as I was enyaged in it, we did, as you know, have a pac surveillance on the Soviet Embassy's main entrance, and I think we also had one in the Cuban consulate; as I recall, the same person was seen going in both of these installatice.: and photographed. Unknown to us in Washington, our Mexico City station TOP SECRET
“Oswald was known to ‘have been in Mexico and con visited the Soviet embassy, picked out the only possible photograph that could have been here ~~ that is, a Caucasian male == and showed it to. the FBI office» in| Mexico | city, andi an. FBI man, all of this unknown to haadqusttors here, took. ‘the: ‘photograph and flew to Dallas with it, where the photograph was shown to various people. This photograph was of a -- you've seen it --. Ir sized this guy up as a merchant seaman or a Soviet seaman from his build and his clothes, who was going into these places to get visas, or he was a seaman from someplace to get visas to get on and off ships. That's the only thing f£ could think of. a) 2 < ry a 6 & « F 3 Senator Schweiker. Why wouldn't Oswald's photograph have shown up there? | Mr. Sceiso. Simply because these people operating, these photograph centers didn't photograph everybody who went in anc out. Senator Schweiker. They did not? Me. Scelso.. No. It isa problem of management. We had a number of observation ports. we have had and may still have these things all over the world. It is extrem: Gifficult to find, motivate. crain and control people to sit in these places day after day, looking out of the window, WOK: 430 First Streei, §.£., Washington, D.€, 20003 cameras. It is an extremely difficult and unrewarding passtim.. TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 2 > <q: o 4 Go « « z 4G Flest Street, $.E., Washington, 6.6. 20603 - we ran thease things as sort of school problens in ordex to establish the best methods and managem ent methods and: technique: , at and so one ‘put ‘they were by no means, “anfatitore. Senator Schweiker. ‘De. you. ‘remember. after the’ assassinatio a Cuban policy review that the Central Intelligence Agancy conducted? What timeframe would that have been? Mr. Johnston. Mid-December, 1963. Senator Schweiker. Of all its Cuban operations. Mr. Scelso. I do not recall. I would not have been involved in it. Senator Schweiker. You probably wouldn't have been inw: vb I just wondered if you recalled any Cuban policy review at tin high levels of CIA. Mr Scelso. I wouldn't have known about it anyway, almost certainly, unless I heard about it, you know, through scuttiebutt. Mr. Johnston. Going back to Pa ul's “question, whict. basically was the nature of investigation of possible Cuban involvement, 1 showed you earlier this morning before we went on record a memorandum for the Assistant Deputy 7:- of Plans from the Acting Chief of the SI division, datec 23 November 1963. I will show that to you to refresh you TOP SECRET
recollection “ne In essence, that memorandum reports ‘on Kostikov, who was one of the men CIA, one of the Soviet men CIA believes Oswald talked to dn Mexico City, and I show you that document to jog your memory, to. ask whether itis your. sense that anvelaborate counterintelligence investigatién ‘directed atthe Soviets was conducted, at least during the time you were involved. Mr. Scelso. Well, Kostikov was put under surveillance at once by the tremendous apparatus we had working in Mexico. I guess you know now that our Mexico station wag the most elaborately equipped and effective in the counterintelligence 12 field of any we had in the world, and they went on to this target all out, immediately, and I remember the cables vaguely 13 WARD & PAUL about Kostikov's activities after the assassination which were completely unrevealing, huwadrum. Mr. Johnston. While you were involved, was there contact mace with various KGB scurces in order to find out what they knew? 3 9 Mr. Scelso. EI don't Know that we hac any KGB sources. & 1 : g have heard since then -- let's see, thar was 1963. We may Lees | € 20 . z had KGB sources, and I have known threugaout my career about & 21 , 3. @ number of our KGB sources while they were still in operati.... “i 22 ‘ . ; F3 but not about many of them because tnis was completely a 23 . é compartmentalized. i S 24 2 * I do know ~-- I nave heard at some juncture later that a 25 : TOP SECRET * 3
a > < a 4 a « « z 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, 0.0. 20003 you have heard’ this ‘story: Mr. Johnston. Nosenko. Mr. Scelso. Yeah, TAve heard dt fourth, ‘hand, Jana you' ve heard it third hand,.: e Mr. Johnston. “tly | question. was: more directed at ‘the fact that while you were involved, aid you have a a feeling or a sense that there was a major effort to determine whether the. Soviets were somehow behind Oswald? Mr. Scelso. Yes. Hr. Johnston. Did you have an equal sense of an effort to determine whether the Cubans were hehind Oswald? Mr. Scelso, No, not a corresponding effort. Mr. Johnston. And is that in part due to the fact that Mr. Angleton was such a strong personality and dominant in the Agency? Mr. Scelso. Well, in the early stages Mr. Angléton was not able to influence the course of the investigation, which waS a source of great bitterness to him. He was extremely embittered that I was entrusted with the investigation and ine wasn't. I was equally embittered because [ had plenty to do anyway, although I was proud of having the assignment. Anclece then sandbagged me as quickly as he could, and I had@ -- threa.- out my career I have on a number of occasions been forced te investigate major operations run by Mr. Angleton. Mr. TOP SECRET
WARD & PAUL @10 First Siroet, $.£., Waihingtan, 0.0. 20003 jobs very reluctantly, but once a had them, I went all out, and every time they ended up, 1 Angleton came out Covered with you Mr. Johnston. Che of: the ‘docunents: I t showeaiin previousi: this morning was a memorandum for the record which. you prepared "On 23 November 1963 about the arrest of Silvia Duran. Mr. Johnston. And according to your memorandum for the record, you received a report that the Mexican government was going to arrest Silvia Duran. Mr. Karamessines didn' t want th: to happeh, and ordered you to cable Mexico city to hold off the ‘arrest, and you objected and wrote this memorandum for the record objecting to it. Do you recall this incident? Mr. Scelse. Yeah . . _ Mr. Scelso. After seeing this memorandum, recognizing it -- I think I even typed it myself -- the difference betwee: recognition and recall, I ‘recognize it. It must have happene-i. Mr. Johnston. But do you recall Mr. Karamesyines oréeria.| you to? Mr. Scelso. No, I do not. felt it necessary to write a memorandum for the record about :1. t | | Mr. Johnston. Do. you recall why you objected andswhy 2. | Mr. Scelso. I objected to telephone calls on security TOP SECRET
oe ‘everyo e elge tn the Agency assumed ana I wags absolutely convinced that they went over land Lines; they went. by radio-telephone. You could see the antennas 5 {| all over. the jorta. “and: t habitually objected to this. 6 Karanessines, = an ‘sure would rarely resort to that. Why I wrote the memorandum for the record, I don't know, ‘because 8 I very rarely” wrote’ qnemoranda for the record. “Y showed you previously this morning “- 9 Mr. “Johnston. 40 excuse me. The flash message to Mexico City, Director 84916 of a 11 ||. 23 November 1963, which was authored by Karamessines and ‘ at 2 nr a é 12 Chief of WH 3 that's you. @ 1 £ Mr. Scelso. That's me. £ 13 P 14 Mr. Johnston. Was the authenticating officer. 15 Mr. Scelso. That means I wrote it. 16 Mr. Johnston. You wrote it. 17 Mr. Scelso. He signed off on it. 18° Mr. Johnston. "the arrest of Silvia Duran is an extreme. ; 3 19 serious matter which could prejudice the U.S. freedom of | ‘ . a. 20 action on entire question of Cuban responsibility." | £ 21 What did you mean wher, you wrete that, and I will siiow { Fy a | “ 22 you ‘the cable. 3 Mr. Scelso. It is hard to say. my w a @ é Mr. Johnston. ft don't understand,,.and maybe you can - ° explain to us what the great concern was with the arrest of TOP SECRET
po ewe Ri Taw ee Chee CET, Ne Oe tee mene ee “silvia. I mean a Mexican employee of “+-*" Prane {Arca 202) $£4-6500 Mr. Scelso. -I don't think we knew at that time that she wags a Cuban citizen, :.We'assumedi : Mr. Johnston.’ ‘think ‘she: was. a‘ Mexican citizen employed by the «= Mr. Sceliso. We didn't realize at that time she was a + Mexican citizen, and the arrest in a foreign country of any consular official ~- Genator Schweiker. You. thought she was'a Cuban. Mr. Scelso. We thought she was a Cuban citizeneand a Cuban consular official. tt turns out that shé was a local employee. | Senator Schweiker. And that would have been the basis of your concern? xy | Ty — 2 < cs ©. : < 4 .& SNe ™ Mr. Scelso. Yeah, the fact that she was -- well, we were, one, concerned about blowing the ~- revealing our telephoje taps, prematurely revealing knowledge that, revealing our knowledge that Oswald had been in the Cuban consulate at ail. Of course, that all came wut later in the papers and so on, at this juncture, when was this, the 23rd, the next day, *¢ were keeping the lid on everything because we didn't know which way the thing was going to go. Also, the arrest of consular officials is an extremely serious matter. S10 Clest Street, $.£., Warhingion, O.C, 20003 Mr. Johnston. Was there a concern expressed to you or TOP SECRET
if Cuban ene were “uncovered? 3 Mr. Scelso. Well, I don't think ~~ nobody came to me and told me that. Tt. was: just. in the air. Everybody knew that tha would be a: matter! of. cerucial. ‘tnteinational importance. Senator schweiker. Welty. ‘aia anybody ever “suggest to you to either downplay or -not. push too hard or to not follow up something for that reason? Mr. Scelso. No, indeed. Absolutely not, although in a very short time, I or.we came to the conclusion that Cuba was 11 |} mot involved. I now say rightly or wrongly, I still think © 3 12 rightly, incidentally,--~ &. : 13 Senator Schweiker. Probably after the Alvarado analysis? HS a 14 Mr. Scelso. Well, after we got the full gist of all.of Ne 15 the telephone conversations which, were cabled up to us and a 16 we were getting more and more information about Oswald, althou,! 37 | 25 l say again, we got none of this vital information the 18 Bureau was getting until at least Christmas, maybe later than g 19 that. If Recca says that he, took the investigation over in : 20 January, he took the investigation ever right after I saw : 21 this Katzenbach report. So no one sugyested that we tone the | : 22 thing down, although we did within a very few days, we came uw i 23 tne conclusion ~~ and I wrote an initial report of three or | a eo é 24 four pages which went directly to President Johnson, maybe — 7 . two ortthree pages -~- giving our conclusion that this was a | TOP SECRET
a > < e a o z < 8 410 First Straat, $.€., Warningion, 0.C. 20602 Mr. Johnston. pla £8 go to president Johnson in the form that you wrote it? Mr. Scelsa. +g believe it was. Jhand-carried by the then Diréctor, vic. MeCone I guess, 8 senator Schweiker. ‘te that the one we Baw? Mr. Johnston. No. Senator Schweiker. We saw some report. That was within the next day. Mr. Johnston. No, this report was one that went to the ‘President of Mexico. Mr. Scelso. Well, there was a short report, and it was going out on a limb, and it was a ~~ it didn't hedye too mucn. Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this. 3 . Senator Schweiker. Well, now, wait a minute. We saw another report. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Scelso. The report would not contain any infornat:-¢ of the facts you don't know, but it would throw light on our reasoning and our conclusions drawn at that time. Mr. Wallach. May we got back, and I want to ask a Couns: of sort of logistical questions. In the investigation that you were heading up, were An! of the persons working under you, had they been working unde Mr. Harvey and Mr. Fitzgerald in Cuban Affairs before? vo TOP SECRET
4 2 < e 4 a « < bd _ 830 Firtt Street. 5.€., Washingian, OC. 20003 Mr. Scelso. I ean't recall. Mr. Wallach. But yor dont wenttte underneath you Mr. Scelso. ‘No Mr. Wallach. | Do you know have any explanation, can you effer us any explanation as ¢0'why Hx. Helms did:notttell you of the CIA‘s assassination plots? - Senator Schweiker. If might say that he did not tell the Warren Conmission. Mr. Scelso. I am sure the Warren Commission never heare about it. Well, Mr. Helms was very closed-mouthed. He knew a lot of very, very important things which I did not know. Mr. Wallach. But he also asked you to run the investigatis#:. Mr. Scelso. YEs. Mr. Wallach. In that context I am asking you whether you have any explanation as to why he would net have told you cr why OSasmond Fitzgerald, who you said was your friend, woul. a: have told you? | Mr. Scelso. Well, at that time i was net a close frien Mr. Pitzyerald. I never was 4 real intimate friend of his. Mr. Wallach. But going back to Hr. Helms who had put in charge, and you said, giving .you full authority as you a: TOP SECRET i
FT ale 760 RAR & PALL E10 Elvst Street, S.E., Wasningion, bc. 70001 wold not have cord you. about those ploter * Me. Scelso. Well, aside from the various ‘obvious ones that he realized that 2b would reflect very pearly on the Agency and very poorly on. ‘him, and that - it nightindeca tuinssut that the Cubans’ ‘had: “undertaken ‘thls ‘assassination as retaliation for eur operations to ‘assassinate castro, ‘this woud have a disastrous effect on him and the Agency, I think ‘those’ are the ' + obvious human explanations, plus the fact 1 think Mr. Helms, knowing me, would have had some concern about my reaction to th revelation because he knewewhat kind of person I was. Mr. Wallach. What was explained to you as your juris- dictional basis for investigating? I mean, that is sert of a legalistic term. How was the investigation éxplained to you in terms of what the FBI was doing, what the CIA was doing, just your general, overall understanding? Mr. Scelso. Well, my overall understanding, Mr. Heliss told me in the presence of these others that I was in charge of the investigation, that everybody was to feed all infermut.-- to me. I was to report-directly to him, that no one was to hold any meeting with anybody else outside of the Agency on -t-. Kennedy assassination without m; being present, and that c2 course was violated fron the first day on. Mr. Wallach. Well, let me ask you this and then Trail TOP SECRET
the CIA is not a law enforcement agency. Did Mr. Helms at any time discuss with you what allowed him to ask that anninvestigation. nn eee Mr. Scelso. || } was thoroughly familiar. with. the . ground rules astecting our operations internally and externally. We had in our area, my area, countless operations targeting on Americans which were worked out elaborately within the ground rules. Helms was very, very firm on his insistence, which came-up from time to time, that we do not operate ayainst Americans outsid: 4 of the United States unless we are specifically requested to a > a rs 4 o £ a z by some other Government agency which is empowered to do so. Mr. Wallach. I think somehow my question has been mis- stated. We have been told by persons familiar with Cuban activitie} there, including people at the JMWAVE station, that it was their belief, whether they were told or not, that this. investiyation was within the ambit of tie FSI, and that they were not investiyating the assassinaticn of President Kenned~ Mr. Scelso. I think that they meant == and that was true, that the investigation of things which had occurred ins: . the United Suates. Mx. Wallach. They were talking generally, worldwide. 410 Fiest Street, §.£., Wasmingion, O.C. 20003° was my understanding. TOP SECRET
- 1 Tyee Ne Pe mes se te eadwcc ne . rath tw dow ne ae x “ 'seelse:: Yes, ‘I ata, too: i take tek back: . = definite y did. I saw Mr. Papich, the FBT ifaison officer, on’a number of occasions in the company of Mr. Burch’ O'Neal of the CI Staff. Mr. Wallach. Mr. O'Neal I believe at that time was in Special Investigations, and Mr. Angleton's CI Staff? Mr. Scelso. That's right. WARO & PAUL Mr. Wallach. You mentioned before that Mr. Helms laid down ground rules that no one was to talk to anyone outside the Agency. | Mr. Scelso. About the Kennedy case. Mr. Wallach. What were the reasons for ground rules? Did he ever tell you? Mr. Scelso. Well, he didn't specifically tell me. he just wanted me to know everything that the Agency knew abou: the investigation. Mr. Wallacn. And you said before that you had reason to believe that someone was talking to persons outside the 410 Fiest Strout, S.E., Wathingion, O.€, 20003 Cia. TOP SECRET
2 > « & .@ F¢] € < z 1 3.E., Wainington, D.C, 26003 410 First Street ashy “Andependently ‘discussed a case with Menbers a the Warren in ‘includiy-: Mr. Allen Dulles, Wallach, Do you know { anything about. the details of those discussions? ; Mr. Scelso. Not one ‘thing. he angie ge on to me no information. - oo Mr. Wallach. pid Mr. Dulles ever make any Tequest of you?! Mr. Scelso. No. f was never in contact with Mr. Dulles, Mr. Wallach. po you know if Mr. Bulles made any requests independently of the Agency for any information? Mr. Scelso. I don't recall, I don't recall his ever making any. Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not Mr. Dulles knew about the -- well, you wouldn't know-the answer -- about the 4@sSassination plots. . Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Wallach. Why were you taken off the investigation? Mr. Scelse. £ had finished my initial report, which was Simultaneously outdated | and made redundant by she FBI's repor: which contained this vast amount of information from Oswald's diaries, and the information about Oswald's other activities in the United States which was not known to me when I was writing my initial report. I circulated copies of this report to Mr, Angleton, to the TOP SECRET
ee: Alec fiteiomant Stheeds Sip ‘ 4 “ a € ‘necting’ in Mr wcHe ma | FREELY an feta tele ‘Mr. - Karariessinea Mr. Waltachs Do ‘You recall dnyond 4 ‘from the: Cuban: aréa? Mr. Scelso. ‘No. Mr. Wallach. I'm sorry, go ahead. 1 interrupted you. fir. Scelso. And Mr. Helms asked for comments. I had also on the cover sheet of my report, which I had circulated a 2 < a a 9 « 4 F several Gays before, asked everyone to give me their comments and point out any errors, and I had gotten no comments. And Nr. Angleton then said his comment was that my report was so full of errors that we couldntt possibly send it over to the FRI -- or excuse me. JI had said in advance that they had my report. I gave them my resume of what I remembered from Katzenbach's report, and I said my report is obviously useless. } I sugyest that the Soviet angles of this case be followed uy -by the Soviet Bloc Division which is much better able to analyze Oswald's diaries; meantime the Soviets had turned ove. to us a dossier which they had on Oswald, I had just learned 416 First Street, $.£., Wathingion, 0.C. 20003 that. And I said, my report is-meaningless, and I propose th
WW 50955 Phone {Ares 2023 - 3 errors in ie’ we * ‘can of t posalbiy ‘send ie over to “¢he- FBI, whic. 46 was never ; supposed to. ye sent to. the Pat. 4 Mr. ‘angleton and Me, Roéea . Mr. Wallach. “And: you. went ‘pack to your regular assignment. “Mr. Scelso. Tf went ‘pack: ‘to. my regular assignment. Mr. Helms then privately thanked me very much for what : 10 1 X had done, and stated he had the greatest confidence in me J. 2 12 Mr. Wallach. Did you ever have any contact with the s° “ ‘ € . 8 13 or any members of the Warren Commission yourself? “ < z wy 14 Mr. Scelso. Yes, I had many contacts with them during 4° > : d ; 15 this period. ~ . 16 Mr. Johnston. If I'm going to be redundant -- excuse me 17 for just a minute -~ if you've answered this one when I was 18 talking to the Senator, please tell me so, but when Mr. Angl2i: 3 19 spoke up and said this should be carried on by the Soviet 6 CL Staff. € 20 be N : 21 Mr. Scelso. I said that. x . d Mr. Johnston. You said that? 4 22 3 23 Mr. Scelso. Tf suggested that the Soviet aspects of i: “a é 24 be gone over by the Soviet Bloc Division. ts] . . sd Mr. Johnston. I'm SOrry- I thought you said that TOP SECRET iu
prune {Ares 202) $44-60005.4 . Ss ai ® 10 il 12 13 WARD & FAULK 14 15 16 17 18 19 2c 21 22 23 24 410 Fira’ Street, $6. Wasmingion, O.c, 70003 25 HF ro aceadare request. You see, with: the. ‘receipt of the FBI report with: the vast amount of: information about Oswald's activities iin the United States, including shooting at General Walker, the ballistics evidence, the opening up of all of his activities in the Soviet Union, this scope of the investigationwwas far greater than Tf could handle from my position as chief of this branch in the Western Hemisphere Division. I felt that I he: very satisfactorily investigated the Mexican aspects of it, ane handled all of the other worldwide aspects of it in the time that we had had, being ignorant, as I was, of our attempts to knocx off Castro, and I was quite happy to get out of it. | i one of the reasons that Helms gave ime the case in the place Was that Angleton was 50 clus "Go th: PBL.and there also initially the possibility that the FBI was in some wa; derelict or involved or something like that, and Angleton -- He Luis wanted someone to conduct the investigation who was in pad with the FBI, and i was not and Angleton was. Mr. Wallach. What was the discussion that you talked aw TOPSECRET «ct
WG Ou WARD & PAUL 410 Firsi Street, $.£., Wastington, O.C. 20003 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 20 24 25 by that the handling of: ‘the. Oswald security case? | Mr. Scelso. This was a theoretical possibility. In othe: words, we knew right off that the FSI had been ins touch with Oswald because we got regular =. the FBI sent us ‘copies of ai. of their reports on “people ‘that might. be: bt: dnterast to us, including Oswald, and masses of ‘stuff. These reports had not come to my desk before the assassination, you see, or perhaps they had because, of ‘course, we knew Oswald had been in ‘Mexico. Maybe we did get it, but I know they never came across my des® personally. And we knew, of course, that an FBI special age:. was meeting Oswald at infrequent intervals to find eut how he was doing and so on. Therefore, there was a possibility that in some way, she. or form, the FBI might have been derelict or culpabic or something like that, and of course, we never developed anythi:. : like that. Mr. Wallach. Did you ever have any discussions with anylo: about why the facts you have labeled as significant in that report when Kaczenyach showed you the FBI veport, were arcve. \ . brought to your attention at any earlier date? Mr. Seelso. I mentioned it to Helms, and I mentioned : the meeting, tnis climactic meeting, and no one comuentec = it because it was par for the course. The FBI could he extremely clannish and protective of their own interests, <:.. TOP SECRET
HY 50955 rs 410 barat Steers, - 10 ii 12 15 14 15 16 i? 18 19 "20 21 22 24 25 very sure “that they could not be criticized,’ ‘and. they wanted all of the facts before ‘they would let anybody know anything. Mr. Wallach. You mentioned before that you. talked . to certain monbers of the: ‘Warren 1 Commission, ; Do. you remember who chose , were? Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. you had? Mr. Scelso. iI recognize their names. They were lawyers. Wallach. Staff members. Scelso. Staff members. Wallach. bo you remember the type of conversations I know you can't remember the specific conversation. Scelso. Yes. We did not pass to them in writing at that time the information that we had telephone taps én Mexico on the Cuban and Soviet embassiea, nor that we had photasurveillance. We passed this word to them verbally. Senator Schweiker. Was there anything else that number cc. you didn't pass, that you had taps, you didn't pass the fact you had photo surveillance. Was there anything else? Mr. verbaliy. Sceiso. We didn't pass it ia writing. We told the: » Senator Schweiker. Was there anything like this that +: . treated in that way that you can recall? ad. Scelso. The nature of our intimate liaison with th. Mexicans, we didn't put down in writing. We told them ali verbally so they had the benefit of it. I was authorized b: TOP SECRET | - |
ure 3 i : ~ g ©. 10 vw: il ao 2 2 : 12 @ @, : € 13 B C3 14 We) 15 fs. 16 17 18 8 19 mi * a 5 21 : 4 ¥ 22 3 z 23 E j 2 24 ; * HW 50955 ° a) A a *, aw we af security: of the Warren , Comission “was ‘going to be’ ‘and so on. Fortunately, the interrogation of sdivia Duran came out and corroborated everything that was in.the telephone calis, ft ft ey think, ight down to “ene: teat nails ” and we, "yore, able to pass detaiis of the interrogation then ‘in writing, and'of course, we showed them the transcriptions of the telephone calls. Mr. Wallach. Was there ever any discussion out at the Agency about whether or not there was a Nicaraguan involvement in the plot to assassinate president Kennedy? Mr. scelso. I don't recall any. Hr. Wallach. TI mean especially after the Alvarado ineident, he being a Nicaraguane obviously trying to pin blame on the Cubans. -Mr. Seelso. 1 don't think anybody dreamed that the Simosas were within rifle shot. Actually, as Tf yecall at th time, the relationship between the Yicaraguans and the U.5. Government were pretty; yood. Mc. Wallach. You essentially saic before that one of you did Jook into wert Cswald's contacts in Mex: Yes. nc. wallacn. Wnat was your understanding as to who wes runniny which agency Was running the investigation in Mexic.: Qswaid! TOP SECRET City with respect to g activities? ae cee en ne ene ee tne EmeTTS
10 1i 12 7560M%01 40478 17 18 19 20 el 22 23 Aro Firat Stroat, S.E.. Warhington, &.C. 20003 vow eaten HY 50955 - 130 bus trip in and his s bus trip out, and they worked very with the Mexican services on this. This was & departure from It, was | worked cut by our station down theje “aye ordsaary procedures. by Winston Scott: and his Br ‘comrades. Mr. Wallach. Do you know if Mr. Scott was. “reporting to Ambassador Mahan? . . Mr. Scelso. I am sure he was. Mr. Wallach. “pid you ever have any conversations with Ambassador Mahan? Mr. Scelso. Did { have any? | Mr. Wallach. Do you recall? | { | Mr. Scelso. No- x met Ambassador Mahan on trips there, but net on this case. Senator Schweiker. Do you recall at one point the Ambass ' dor at one point felt very strongly there was Cuban invelvemen 7 Mx. Scelso. Oh, y?Ss very definitely. It comes back to me. He felt that very, Very fefinitely, and we got that in i a cable from win Scott, I pelieve, in which he felt the pinbassador was certain that this was the case. Senator Schweiker. bid ne have any basis other than tic Alvarado incident, other than that that you came across? Hr. Sceiseo. {1 think the Alvarada incident was the main thing that got him started. ne nnn ene aA TOP SECRET
KARO & PALL 4 &10 First Street, $.€., Wasnington, G.C. 29003 ee o © 39 &@ a: 10 11 12 13 14 16 16 17 18 -19 20 ai 22 235 24 25 Mr. “Scels0.. "senator, Schweiker pid | the Cuban 1 Enbassy furnish Oswald a place’ to stay i: Mexico city, the question is, seer this paper, the one that went to the President of Mexi I have seen, it here today. We came’across this elsewhere is ; It is reliably reported that Oswald did not know his address in Mexico City, buttthat the Cuban embaasy aid know his address in Mexico City. As recalt, that is actually on the phone conversation very clearly. We saw a transcript of it. Isn't that unusual « itself? Didn't that strike you? Mr. Scelso. As I recall it -- and you are triggerin. things off in my memory which I haven't thought about for 13 or 14 years, Oswald had known his address wnen he was az the Cuban embassy, and had tole them his address. By the t-° he got to the Soviet embassy he had forgotten it, and the Soviets got it from the Cubans who had written it down. Senator Schweiker. There were Some allegations of ‘ relationsnis, Jim, that Oswald had with Silvia Duran. Do you want to pnrase that question? Mr. Johnston. that the Mexicans Oswald may have had some kind of a relationship with Silvie I don't mnow if you recall during the at least seemed to have information that TOP SECRET
WARD & PAu 410 First Street, $.¢., Watnington, 0.6. 20003 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Mr. Sceleo. = I don’ t ‘recall that. Senator Schweiker. A sexual relationship. Mr. Johnston. — And the. Dorticos and Armis telephone call, there was 4 question of whether, ‘the: Mexican ‘poltce’ taikea and asked Duran about “having @exual relations with Oswald. In 1967 for some reason, Silvia Duran said publicly, or-at least through a source, that she had had sexual relations with Oswalc while he was there, | Mr. Scelse. I draw a complete blank on.that. I certainty think I would remember if it had been alleged, or we had believed there was any substance to it. Senator Schweiker. The other question on the list was, dill Oswald ever travel to Cuba from Mexico City? Do you know why that question might have been put on the list, and does that refresh your memory about any possible trip that Oswald made to Cuba? . mix. Scelso. We wevld have asked the Mexicans that so that they would check their records to see if he had gone froin Mexico to Cuba. This was because of some hanky panky. we actually had passenger lists on everybody who went through Other sources of ours, but these sources were not run jointl; with the Mexican government. So Win Scott was probably going tarough the motions of asking what appeared to be a logical question. The absence of that question might have TOP SECRET
‘) WARD a PAL 410 Forse Street, $.0., Wattengion, TE. 70003 10 1) LZ , 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Mr. Wallach. Did you ‘yourself have a chanes: ‘to. ‘review the tapes of Oswald's telephone conversations? Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Wallach. Is it your belief that those tapes | were erased, or what happened to those ‘tapes? eds Mr. Scelso. I don't know what happened to it, Mx. Wallach. I just really have one more question. © Did you have any contact yourself during this period with anyone from the White House staff such as Bundy? Mr. Scelso. No, I don't think I did. I have never mev McGeorge Sundy. Mr. Wallach. And did you ever have contact with McCone? Did you ever talk to McCone about the Kennedy assassination? Mr. Scelso. io. Mr. Johnston. You mean during this whole time everything went through Helms? Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Johnston. Let me show you Director Cable 86054 to Nexice of 30 November 1963 which I showed you earlier this morning on this aircraft flight, and this cable reports infur- mation that was obtained from a foreign diplomat who apparent :- was on the aircraft flight, the Cubana flight on November c-:.., going from Nexico City to Havana, was delayed from 1700 to 2200 hours awaiting an important passenger who arrived at TOP SECRET rn eo ne ee eee ee et
Hy WARD & PALE 410 First Street, S.£., Washingtan, 0.6. 20003 10 12 12 13 14 i5 i6 17 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 25 in the pilots cabin to Havana.” eee an) Wee EY Mexican ime rand that the passenger ‘transferred to the Cubana i i craft without going ‘through Customs or Inmigration, and traveled We have’ attempted ‘to tina what follow-up went on \ this. Mr. ‘Scelso.’: fT have fe recollection of this. Oh, I have -=- zt can't say whether I recall it or not, Mr. Johnston: You did not originate this cable, right? Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Johnston. And are you on distribution? Mr. Scelso. Yes, Chief, WH-3 is on it in the middlé there at the bottom. Senator Schwéiker. Wouldn't this have had some significance in view of what we now know? Mr. Scelso. Yes, although I am not sure what significance it might have had. The Mexicans were always -= the Cubans were always shooting people in and out of the country in strang ways. The link from Havana to Mexico City by air was at that time the only air connection that Cuba had to the Western i Hemisphere. And countless people, important foreigners, news: | ‘ 3 paper people, Mexican government officials, went in and out : through this way, and the Cubans often made attempts to conce.: who they were. We were watching them like hawks and kept tabs on'the travel of Americans, Europeans, Asiatics, and $0 on ta Cuba. TOP SECRET
WARD & PAUL 410 Fiesi Street, $.2., Waimingtan, G.C. 20003 iL 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 29 21 22 23 24 25 was the only pessenser 6 on a: Cubana Airlines flight - -- Mr. Scelso. “Well, he was te the only passenger. Mr. Wallach. Well, I'just wondered if there would be some significance in that fact. . Mr. Scelso. Well, that signaled the arrival of somebody; who was important enough to hold up a plane, and he came in on a private plane. Ofccourse, there is a great deal of private plane travel around Mexico because the road network is so bac. wr. Johnston. Butiit seems to me just vital, and f guess I asked who had action to follow up on this, to see if there was a follow-up. It seems the basic question you wouls ask is where the twin-engine aircraft came from, and that is certainly within U.S. Government capabilities to determine i where that aireraft came from, and 1 ask why that wasn't Gri 4 and who had responsibility for following that. Mr. Scelso. Well, the Mexico City station should have . 4 that. Whether it was done -- what is the date of that cui. Mr. Johnston. 30 November. i | Mr, Scelso. 30 November. Whether there was a follow-._. | TOP SECRET |
Senator Schweiker.” That would have meant what, the Chief of Station: ‘there? a oe! 6 6 aad a Senator Schwetker. And of coarse, with Ambassador Mahan 8 breathing down his neck. . 9 Mr. Scelso.: Well, Mahan wouldn't have been that cable. 10 Senator Schweiker. But breathing down his neck about 11 Cuban involvement, he would have been pretty sensitive to this. 3 12 Mr. Scelso. I think that by that time, we, Mexico and ; 13 Ambassador Mahan no longer placed@ much -- , 14 Senator Schweiker. By the 20th? 15 Mr. Scelso. I think so, yes. 16 Senator Schweiker. When the FBI guy came back. Well, I 17 thought the polygraph didn't occur until the first week of 18 December. 19 Nx. Johnston. I think that's right. Jot 20 Senator Schweiker. I think the FBI guy went down there 21 around the 30th and came back around the list or second, anu the polygraph I think was taken a few days after that, which 3 22 23 Means that he was still pretty -- ; : : i : 24 Mc. Johnston. Let me ask you a second Strange movemen: 410 Fost Street, $.£., Watnington, 0.C. 20003 that -has concerned us is that a man by the name of Gilberto TOP SECRET = ,
ra nna ARRRAntn IOI RERFE OEE sme} OKRUG nee ene 50 140 493 7 RARE & PAUL 416 test Street, $.€., Wasnengton, O.C, 20603 15 16 1? 18 19, 20 2h 22 23 24 25 ‘Lopez, and there is quite. bit of cable trafic at: the time you were involved == basically the story reported by Mexican authorities to CIA in Mexico City is that Lopez crossed the border from Texas inte Mexico on November 23rd, 1963, the border having been closed the afternoon of the 22nd, that he arrived in Mexico City on November 25th, and departed ; as the only passenger on a. late evening flight to Havana, and that the Mexicans reported to CIA that he looked, "suspicious" according to the cable. We do know that CIA checked passport records here, foul that he was traveling on an invalid passport, that he had ie-it Cuba in 1960, had been born and raised in Cuba, although he w:: allegedly an American citizen, and had Spent some time in tivi:. country hefore going back to Cuba, a young man with no particular background. Do you have any knowledge of -- a ’ | Senator Schweiker. We also know a little bit about his q travels in Hiami. E Mr. Johnston. That was developed later, afterv’he lel: tne case, and £ wondered whether vou had any reeoellection «: : Gilberto Lopez? mr. Seelso. I have no recollection. Senater Schweiker. fill nim in on che rest. ee Mr. Jonnston. Subsejuently the F8i in its investiygaesiu determined that he was living in Tampa, Florida, and was a: ~— TOP SECRET
WARD & Paue 416 iets Stross, $.€., Wasnington, B.C. 26003 10 il “12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19° 20 2) 22 23 awaiting an important phone call from. Cuba which Was supposed to tell him whether he could return or not, and at least until 5:00 p.m. that day, the phone call had not gotten there. President Kennedy was in Tampa on the 18th of November. - On. the 20th of November, Lopez Spplied for and received an entry visa or entry permit into Mexico, and then we next have him | crossing the border at Nuevo Laredo on November 23rd, apparentl}, aithough there is no border crossing record, but they assume i t he crossed there, and I think those later facts about him wers Probably available to Rocca but not to you. 4A subsequent report by Mexican police authorities was that Lopez was somehow involved in the assassination. Mr, Scelso. Well, they would Pick up things like that. There was a tremendous flow of people back and forth to Cube during this era, you see, constantly, any number of Cuban refugees wanting to go back to Cuba, enormous traffic across tne Mexican border. Senator Schweiker. we also got a report that he's living the Life of Riley in Cupa, not doing very much work there, er. Johnston. Our last report he was playing dominoes. senator Schweiker, Literally. _ ; Mr. Wallach. I have One point [ would like to go into, and I realize this is, this information came to another agers" attention way after you left this ia 4967, bat I want to asi i ‘TOP SECRET >
ee ee tite = ron! T J oom é é oc: © § c We) mn 416 First Street, $.€., Wasningten, O.C. 20003 10 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 i9 20 21 22 25 In essence, another Agency was told that a group of Cuban refugees had been sent by Bobby Kennedy to Havana for the purpo:du . of overthrowing Castro, and subsequently killing Castro in) 1963, that all the members of that. group had been captored, they were tortured, and: ‘confessed, ete., and Castro, ‘in’ retaliation, sent a team of assassins over ‘here to this country and that the other agency was informed, and this was never verified that indeed two of these assassing, or indeed assassins or labeled assassins were living in New Jersey. Now, at any time while you were ifvolved in this, do you recall whether or not it was checked whether Cubans, «3, unusual about any Cubans that had come into the d¢ountry;? checks run throught WAVE to see if there was any information that possibly an assassin would have been sent into the U.S.? Mr. Scelso. Well, from the FRI and from our WAVE Station there was a constant flow of reports about the activities of Cubans in the United States. I don't recall anything on this group that you mentioned. ‘ik. Wallach. Do you recall heariny anything generally a group of Cuban refugees being cazcured in the spring of ‘63 and being tortured and confessing that Bobby Kennedy hoc launched that boat in essence? Mr. Scelso. I don't recall that. Mr. Wallach. Whether or not that's true, I'm not sayin. TOP SECRET
7600 140496 e ‘ WARD a Pau 5.£., Woshington, &.c. 20003 420 Fiest Street, 10 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 that Castro, #8 I recall, alleged that they were Sent in to the Cubans alleged this, x dont know, Mr. Wallach, 7 don't have anything further. Mr. Johnston. I've just YOne one more Major point that 4 want to ask YOu about, and that is, after Your testimony today ana what we have discussed, to go back to your Tecollac~ tion of whether YOu dealt with Hal Swinson, Or who in Sas pPersonaliy, Mr. Johnston, Would you name the People on YOur staff to the best Of your recollection? Mr, Scelso. ar that time? far, Johnston’ Yes, Now, this L135 on WU-3. 0 orn Other Words, you jus: took WH-3 une used that> Nr. Scelsa./ Yes. = used the entice branch as a task force, or Working on the kennedy 4884a8sination, and wa ran OUr country WOrk on the Side, One of tho key people working for Me was Charlotte 8ustos-Vidella, Mr. Wallach. rg she stil] With the Agency? TOP SECRET
WARD & PAUL 410 First Stroet, %.E., Washington, G.C. 20003 as Prone {Aras 202) 364-6006 ~ 3 5 € oa —2 10 il 12 13 14 16 17 18 i9 “20 21 22 25 24 Mr. Scelso. I don't know.” 3 and I think she was mentioned in Agee's book, along with a lot of other people. She was an extremely gifted woman who handled all of our name tracing. It was. to her work that the Agency thank's the fact that when Oswald did appear back in September or October in our cables, this ¢nformation: was promply disseminated ina routine fashion to other government agencies. She is the one who handled all of the name traces and brought things to my attention. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall being informed that some of Oswald's letter had been intercepted, or letters to and from Oswald and his wife Marina by the mail opening operation the. we now know the CIA was conducting in New York City? Mr. Scelso. I recall being informed that letters hac been intercepted, and 1 learned from Mr. Burch O'Neal ~~ it way have been in connection with this investigation or soe Fh investigation -- that mail to and from the Soviet Union, of to and from tne United States was hneing intercepted, anu : have seen intercepts, but Il never knew that this intercept ©. piace in the territorial Ule, ia New York vor anyplace else, 1 assumed that it took piave ; Lundon. Mr. Wallach. @y gquesvicn was whether or not you knoe that any of Cswaic's mail -- Mr. Seeiss. 1 seem to recall that some of these this TOP SECRET She was transferred to Mexico, in European capitals Llixe Par: rm aitexy
(Ne dame a een 7 6 9] ll, | 4 0 48 9 WARD & PAUL #10 Fiest Stroet, $.€., Wasnington, O.C. 20603 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 were available and that'I saw’ them. Mr. Johnston. And for me I just want to Clarify the significance of that point, and that is that you had or you we privy to something that was at that time as sensitive as th 4 mail operation, Mr. Scelso. Yes. I was specifically “= you had te be specially. briefed on it. e Xa Mr. Johnston. But you were not privy to the assassination plots, Mr. Scelso. No. Senator Schweiker. Well, we want to thank you very much. You have certainly been very straightforward and very coopera tive. “ir. Scelse. I would like to add something if I may, Senator. Senator Schweiker. Sure. Mr. Scelso. I would like to give you a typical exampzie -- you may have heard this story before. Please Stop me if so. de -- of how Agency officers like myself and others -- Senator Schweiker. Do you want this on the record? \ ‘Ir. Seeiso. Any way you want it. senator Schweiker. It is up to you. Mr. Scelso. -- react to orders to assassinate yeorie. In 1965 at the time of the Dominican crisis -- you hua have heard this from Mr. Phillips because he was a witness TOP SECRET + A
WARE A PAUL 410 First Street, $.€., Wathington, 0.¢. 20008 1 2 13 14 15 16 1? 18 i9 20 21 22 23 24 R58 it -- when: the..Doninican.crisis:broke, Tat that. time, my branch, because of my outstanding work, had expanded until i had the entire Caribbean, except for Cuba, thrown into my branch. It was the largest geographical branch in the Agency. Because of the landing of the American troops and sO on, we set up a war room adjacent to our communications center, and we had our own teletypes and wa had charts on the wall, and were sitting around there. And you may remember that at that ¢ the Central Intelligence Agency had uncovered some 50 or 60 Communist trained saboteurs and agents who had been infiltrate: back into the Dominican Republic by the Cubans under aliases in order to kick off a revolution. Somebody waved the flag. By chance, sone military nuts started a revolution prematurely because of petty grievances, and these Communists came out of the woodwork and took over the revolution. They just came out of their hiding places and took everything over and had everything organized, and it was a very danyerous Situation. U.S. troops set up a periphery around the City of Santo wollnAyo, and nobody could go Llnoue ost of the City without being checked. Just at this tine ao new Director of Central intelligence took over, and 1 Yeyret Naving to mention his nas: it was Admiral Raborn, 2 man with ne Preavious intelligence exyerience, and an outstanding Naval officer -- and during che first hours of his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence, ‘4: TOP SECRET one
She ry as 760 01 4 94990 | WARD & FPauy 410 Fiest Street, $.£.. Washington, O.¢. 26003 10 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 ig 20 21 22 23 24 eame into our war room Where Ty Mr. other people who had been on our feet for days and days and days, were reeling around in a groggy state, and we showed him our maps of Santo Domingo and described where the Communist Phillips and four or five headquarters were and what they were doing, and he said to us there was no shooting going on at that time, everything had quieted down. There was some sniping occasionally. And Raborn said, obviously. not realizing what he was saying, all xight, I want you to send teams in by sea and knock those guys off. And for the second time that day, Helms stepped between me and Raborn with his back to me so J wouldn't be able to Say what I was about to say, and kxaborn was a very positive fellow, so he left. Present at this scene was a member of our paramilitary staff at the Agency and they set up a war room and they blew up photographs of Santo Domingo almost as big as:that wall, taney had everything on it, and after a week they said we are busy plunning sending those teams in to knock off the Comaies. I said, fine, just keep on Planning. Let me knw. en you are finished. Then every week they would call me up and say, well, ares are still planning this. Nobody had any intention of Cervos.. out Raborn's orders, but we weren't going to go tell hin t..: TOP SECRET we weren't going to do it because he would have fired us ai. : i
WARD ® FAUL 41D Firtt Stroes, S.£.. Wastangton, O.C, 20003, 10 il 12 14 is 16 17 24 put ether people in there.” This was the normal reaction of average officers of the Central Intelligence Agency to an order to commit assassinations. And that would have been my reaction if I had been mixad up in this Castro business. Senator Schweiker. Well, we certainly appreciate knowing this, and it is vety helpful to us to get a balanced perspective of the situation. But you really have been most helpful to us I think in terms of what you had available to you at the time. You have Shed as much light as anybody on exactly what did happen an: how it happened, and what happened, and we certainly appreciate it very much. And thank you for coming in. Mr. Wallach. We have a couple of more questions. (Discussion off the record.} (Senator Schweiker left the hearing room.) Mr. Johnston. We have just a couple of more questions, and incidentaliy, you have a right not to continue your ! testimony in the absence of a Senazer. 1 | Mr. Scelso. JI will waive chac. | rev. Johnston. If am yoing to yive you of £ the record tne { t name of the case officer who inet with AMLASH on Novenwer 22ib., and ask ~~ let's go off the record. (Discussion off the record.) TOP SECRET ater eaenraron
760% 1 10492 76 COOH O YQ J 3 : 12 @ [+] g 13 2 14 15 16 17 18 3 19 g ¢ 20 g é 21 = “ 22 3 5 23 i 2 24 Was that case officer involved in your investigation? Mr. Scelso. I cannot answer the question because this name, while it means something to me, does not give me a picture of anybody, and have you ever seen the man? Me. Johnston. Yes. Mr. Scelso. And as I recall -=~ {Discussion off the record.} Mr. Scelso. I can say that I know absolutely nothing. ile may have been involved in the field in some way. Mr. Johnston. At least you did not talk te hin in connection with your investigation. 0 Mx. Sceiso. No. Mx. Johnston. And his name never came up as a CIA officer who might have knowledge. Mr. Scelso. Not to my recollection. I would be pretty 1 Sure. { Mr. Johnscon. Onay. : Mx, Wallach. O24 you know during the course ef your invesvigation whether or not ‘cine agency Nad fiigh level sources within the Cuban vgovermacat or within Cuban inteli, . . | yence? . , “ir. Seelsu. jo Aave AnGwia at at a@ mumber Of junceupes my career, because these peoyle entered my area aid were Inet there. i knew a lot about it later when 1 #4as inspecti; TOP SECRET .
pawnnithe meet: utente hee OAMANERR ROE Re hp Octane BA tadinyeetererie s Rann + t t 7 & 0 a | 4 8) 4 9 : WARD & FALE 810 First Steeat, $.€., Wainmngton, O.C. 20063 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 i8 19 20 21 22 24 25 and going over all ‘the operations in the Agency, and when Cuban operations were opened up to usllater on. My impression was at the time of the Kennedy assassination wes that we did not have any very hays scves seou-ve3 an th. Cuban intelligence service, and that we had only a couple.in the entire Cuban government who were high level. Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you whether or not at any time after you left that assignment, handling the investigation for the CIA, you had any contact at all with the investigation again? Mr. Bcelso. Yes. From time to tine Mr. Rocca would call me. and I would go down and talk to him, and we would kick around a couple of things, especially when this State's Attorney down in New Orleans ~~ Me. Johnston. Jim Garrison? Mr. Scelso. Jim Garrison started his convulsions. We talked about things. Rocca seemed to be convincec that in the early days of the investigation when I was running it, a yreat deal of information must have come in bearivy au the people in the. Orleans that were mixed up in tne -aresson ACCUSALCIONS, «+... tL tolu Rocea not to my recolieetiei, that nobedy chat was tivere mized up, ancludiay the celio player ana Clay Shuv tne bald-headed pilot who died wysteriously, and sO on, ever come up in the investigation «as long as i was hand1L::.- TOP SECRET
WARD & FARE, B10 First Siceet, $.E., Wastongtan, B.C. 20803 190 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 ai 22 24 ‘basis in your regular capacity with anyone at your lavel at Mr. Wallach. Were you ever present at a meeting attended by President Johnson and Mr. Helms? Mr. Scalso. Never. i've never been in Mr. Johnson's presence. Mr. Wallach. Did you ever hear of an occasion on which Mr. Johnson or President Johnson chewed out Mr. Helms? Mr. Scelso. No. I know Mr. Helms had some very tense | meetings in the White House. I have heard him talk about ther | on the telephone in my presence, but I have never heard anything specific. | Mr. Wallach. More specifically, did you ever near any discussion as to whether the President was annoyed at Mr. Helms for not telling him about assassination plots? hr. Scelso. No, I never heard anything about that. i . ‘ Mr. Wallach. Did you have any contact on a continuls: | i the FEI, or was that all handled through liaison? Me. scelso. Almost a1) handled entirely by the Liaiss:.. Thad telephone contacts with the FEE from time to time. fr. wallach. Have you eves weucd the name Thomas 4:-.. A thet as a professor out in Colurado who mysteriously isu; .- i in 1967? ; a Ar. S“celsu. Ne. sx. Wallacna. To mave no further questions. Bo you? TOP SECRET : *
Prone (Aron 202) WARD & PAVE 810 First Street, S.E., Washington, B.c. 26003 o wn 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Johnston. I don't have any more questions. I want to thank you very much for coming back for this. Mr. Scelso. Well, you kiiow, I don't do anything anyway, and I'm very glad to come back. | I am very, very dismayed and shocked in the Agency's involvement in some of these activities, it is so reprehensible and unforgivable. (Whereupon, at 12:42 o'clock p.m., the interview in the above-entitled matter was concluded.} ee et tt A LE IO EES ae TOP SECRET