. ggh 5 8 bg 8 1 revolutionary and violence-prone groups. N o N $ 2 Now the Committee has received testimony that the New ¢ . P 3 Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher 4 authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress. 5 Do you have any information in this regard? 6 I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances, ” but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record 8 seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systemati 9 information flowing upward through the chain of command to 10 Director Hoover's superiors? L1 Mr. Kelley; May I ask that I be given the opportunity : 12 to substantiate that with documentation? & c 13 Senator Hart of Colorado. ‘sure. 3 14 ‘Mr. Kelley: Or respond to it. is Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in 16 passing, do you agree with the statement made by President 17 Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy 18 Dr. King should be brought to justice. 19 Mr. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whcse orders 209 || the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say 21 that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar 92 || as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said 23 to do it and those who are responsible. 24 I.took the responsibility for any such program and I 25 don't expect that those under me would be not acting in HW 54955  DoclId: 32969494 Page 212
Q Jt Ho nn i) Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 25 e @ | | 2500 accordance with what they think is proper and may even have some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that responsibility. I think that it should rest on those who instructed that that be done. Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people who give the orders should be brought to justice. Mr. Kelley. I do. The Chairman. Aren't they all dead? Hr. Kelley. No. The Chairman. Not quite? Mr. Kelley. Not quite, Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Nr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator, Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three basic questions. Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for the future, what I would think would ke our constructive legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what we learned in that investigation. ana one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of the United States have from time to time ordered the FBI to HW 54955 Docld: 397989494 Page 213 ee 6 ee re
t un Phone (Area 2029544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 ~ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? “18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 e a e 2501 ~~ obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the necessary surveillance to obtain .and to have a purely political character, that they simply wanted to have for their own personal purposes. I think that you would agree that that is not a proper function of the FBI, and you agree, Yet it's awfQlly difficult for anyone in the FBI, including the Director, to turn down a President of the United States if he receives a direct order from the President. It is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist, I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man serving in your position, particularly if the President puts a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or even invents some excuse. It is alwavs easy for him to say, you know, I am considering Senator White for an important position in my administration, and I need to know more about his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's been doing lately. It's difficult for you to say back to the President, Mr. President, that's a very questionable activity for the FBI, and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition Docld: 37989494 Page 2714
3 re Phone (Area 2033 544-6000 LO Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 @ ® 2502 to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and you want to get something on him.. I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that way, and I'm wondering what we cquid do in the way of protecting your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this basic charter that we write. | Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one or two of mine. I would like your response. If we were to write into the law that any order.given you either by the President or by the Attorney General should be transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain those written orders and that furthermore they would be available-.to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the joint committee on intelligence is established, that committee would have access to such a file. So that the committee itself would be satisfied that orders were not being given to the FRI that were improper or unlawful. What would you think of writing a provision of that kind into a charter for the FBI? Hr, Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order issued by the President that is a request for action by the Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my Opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in HW 54955 Docld: 3p969494 Page 215
ec Oe, Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 WW 54955 LO LL 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 L9 20 el 22 295 24 25 2503 contemplation of this there would be some that will Say yes or some that will say no, but I think we could define an area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could do that. Now as to the availability to any oversight committee of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request for something of high confidentiality that the President might put in writing such as some national or foreign security matter. I would like to have such a consideration be given a great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would present a problem. I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every- thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight committee. I welcome that. The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we proceeded with this Committee. It has worked pretty well, I think. Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the Nartin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since Dr. King has long since been violently removed from the scene, Docld: 39989494 Page 2716
Phone (Area 20a) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 19 ake) Li 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 25 Docld: 39989494 Page 217 2504-2505 why are they preserved? Why aren't they simply destroyed? Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never have connected the person with any criminal activity?’ And yet, all of that information just stays there in the files year after year. What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's not the problem, then what is? ‘Why are these tapes still down there at the FBI? Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, we do have the rule that they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is ‘your question and why right now are they maintained? Since we do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until that's lifted, we can't destroy anything. I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines ,or legislation and ayain, as I have said, there should be some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there might he some areas wherein that the subject of the investigatio himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence. I think you have to Celiberate this very carefully, but it can he done and we are willing to be guided by those rules. The Chairman, Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees ~
a Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ae] LO Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 L? 18 19 20 Al 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 295 HW 54955 Docld: ® | e 2506 ~~ to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr. so and so, who's being considered for an executive office. And we have a very brief conversation in which -I tell him that as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that is about the extent of it. Then when this file is completed and the person involved is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him. What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever? Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial and is developed in cases involving certain members of the Executive Branch of the government. I see no reason why this would not be a proper area for consideration of legislation. | The Chairman. Can-you give me any idea of how much -- do you have records that would tell us how rach time and money is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments to Federal offices? 29899494 Page 2716
250 8 8 3 1 & .g2 Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not N g z have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost Fy _ . : £ ° for the investigation of Federal appointees -- 4 The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other 5 information that would indicate to us what proportion of the 6 time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of | ¢ ivi activity. 8 Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, hut 79 Wr can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the 10 || approximate expense. il The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is a 2 . é 121 a matter we need niore information about. And when you supply Q < 13 || that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number 14 | of such investigations each year? 15 You know, I don't expect you to do back 20 or 25 years, 16 || but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example, 17 1 enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the | 18 || reach of these investigations may be. o . o °o & 19 Mr. Kelley. Through '70? oO . . ra) A 20 The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think. § al The other matter that is connected to this same subject a 22 || that I would like your best judgment on is whether these a £5 || investigations could not be limited to offices of sensitivity. it = £4 || That is to say where legitimate national security interest might 25 be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on HW 54955 Docld: 37989494 Page 2719
Phone (Area 2dg) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 10 Ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 Ro 24 25 DoclId: e | ®@ 2508 ~ past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief. I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI checks. And so when you respond to the series of questions, I wish you would include the offices that are now covered by such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the Pederal bureaucracy this extends. Could you do that? Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Fine. Now there is a vote. The vote always comes just at the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additiona questions for the record, and there may be other questions, too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will ask Mr, Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going to be tied up on the floor with votes. But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony, fir. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of }- ct n investigation during the past months, Mr. Kelley. Thank you. The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for 999494 Page 270
a eo a AHW/smnl t. 2 Phone (Area 202) 544-60 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 _ 10 li 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 Al 22 235 24 25 2510 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief. On page 5 of your: statement _ - Mr. Kelley. What? Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then to question about what you said. "We must recognize that situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the future where the Government may well be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or property." Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what kind of situation? And can you give some concrete examples under your general principles statement? Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent threat to human life or property. Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going Docld: 30989494 Page 232
| Phone (Area 202) 544-60d} WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 | HW 54955 i) 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2511 to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and he is on the way down there with the poison in his car. Is that the presumption? Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you can extent it. Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest. Mr. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this. Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts, are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of human life or property? Mr. Kelley. I think so. Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act: to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there is not by definition any threat to life or property. Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this busines a long time. I've-heard a number of threats which were issued, and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think - take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times they have been acted upon. I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to Doclda: 33989494 Page 2235
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL, ” ° Ss ° N g [a] ¢ 6 2 a £ <= uw 0 > ul 7) = o J he = a ~ uw = re ° wt t 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 295 kill me, that just means one thing. Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you. Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreéing with me. You're sayin on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where . we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don’t say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that we should act independently because maybe we don't have the judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do think that we should report it and thereafter see what can be done. Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of our discussion the standard on page 5. On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat. Mr. Kelley. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible threat. Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat. Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right. Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have in mind? 989494 Page 224
w ~ Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 2 & WARD & PAUL ” ° ° ° a g a < 3 2 a £ = wv i] = ui vi - a J - = 7) ~~ w" = Ls ° al ¢ A aon a LO | 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 R25 2513 Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing. Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or -- Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be. Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion. Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps. Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with a standard which said you would have to have an immediate threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal crime involving violence? Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation. Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from what you think would be an acceptable standard. Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might be, by virtue of the word “immediate" that he's going to do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for you to, not with the presence or the possibility, not able to do anything except put him under arrest or anything. Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course. And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action. Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.
Phone (Area 202) 544-6dfo 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 24 410 Fist? Street, S.E., Washington, D.C, 20003 25 2514 Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening of an investigation into a domestic group. Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving violence? Mr.Kelley. To open a domestic security case. Mr. Schwarz. Yes. Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States. Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious federal crime involving violence? Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and they have been well defined as to what is the possible opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances, but there are other criteria that are used, yes. Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be? Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the most used of thebasis, and then you have, of course, some intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of short duration. If there is no showing of this into action HW 54955 DBocld:3¢999494 Page 276
5 Phone (Area 202) 544-6090 LO 11 12 WARD & PAUL. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 e ® . 2515 or a viable intent. Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the intelligence investigation? Mr. Kelley. . By intelligence investigation, yes, you are looking to prevent. Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined with an intent to take an issue? Mr. Kelley. And the capability. Mr. Schwarz. And the capability. All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and I appreciate very much your time. Mr. Kelley. That's all right. Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has - been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti- mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the political views of a person on the other? Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex HW 54955 Docld: 3P989494 Page 227
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000, | LO Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 54955 Docld:4P989494 Page 223 2516 lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or some view that advocates violence or the overthrow of the government. Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political views? | Mr. Kelley. What? Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence or advocants of overthrow? Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging, but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's a member of some other organization. Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything might be relevant, but don’t you think that as a function of balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's justifiable to collect that kind of information on American citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes? Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been included in some reports as a result of the requirement that that is what is required by our rules, that when a person reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar
‘ ‘ ® : Y ) 52 mne 2517 4 % 1 as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later, 8 . F 2 I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether 5 : E 3 or not this is something we should retain, and we would not , 4 object to anything reasonable in that regard. 5 Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question. 6 Taking the current manual and trying to understand its 7] applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King 8 case, under Section 87 there is a ~- permission is granted to 9 open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive 10 || groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is 311 || received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to 12 || systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group 13 || OF organization, an investigation can be opened." WARD & PAUL 14 Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used 15 in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership 16 Conference in the 1960s, so that invéstigation could still be 7 open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual. 18 Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of 19 clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch 20 as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil- 21 trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered 22 organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the 23 benefit of the country. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that 25 under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be 51955 Page 229
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 WW 54955 Docld: 379969494 Page 230 : ® a 9 2518 opened today? Mr. Kelley. I think so. Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question. Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investil- gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals or people who come into contact with it? Mr, Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely. you mean that we go into the non-subversive group, that we then investigate peopie in that non-subversive group, not the infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation of them without any basis for doing so other than that they are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessar Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much. Mr. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of ingtiry, Mr. Kelley. I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel. was raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions. . Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort, indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects a» 6: 1%. \ to distinguish some of this has been made.
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 ¥ 54955 2519 Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage 2 effort, and looking strictly at what we have ‘been calling the this = Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's 5 law enforcement position? LO 11 12 13 Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the backgroun of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which | all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is help- ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type of an operation. 14 15 16 I subscribe to the present system heartily. Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission if within the Bureau guidelines were established that 1? effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of 18 19 the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist 20 al the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question that there should be access to it. 22 25 24 25 s» DoclId: 37969494 Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing of lines there with the information legitimately needed for Page 231
* «» smn ll © . |) 2520 1 law enforcement? . > 2 Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 3 dissemination, because that just numerically increases the 4 possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything 5 of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile 6 to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to 7 close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of. 8 Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you. 9 We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about 10 the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department 11 regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the 12 || King case in particular. 13 As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel WARD & PAUL 14 I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some 15 insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow. 16 What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that 17 an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved 18 improperly? 19 Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it 20 routinely referred to the Justice Department? 21 Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of 22 procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for 23 Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the 24 great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual 54955 Docld: 39969494 Page 232
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 54955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23. 24 25 DoclId: 34969494 e © 2521 occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up, perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is handled internally at present. Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary step? . I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all, I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the Bureau police itself, and then secondly, is the Department of Justice involved in the police determinations? For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered the action against King should be the subject of investigation and maybe prosecution? How does the interplay work there between you and Justice? Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those activities which we construe as improper or possibly. illegal. There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own investigating, and this is something that we feel is a decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we have within our own organization sufficient capability to handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled independently of us. Mr. Smothers. Thank you. Page 2353
2 ot a3 © >? 2522 1 That is all I have. . ~~ 2 Mr. Schwarz. Thank you. Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 3 (Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed 4 subject to the call of the Chair.) 5 -— - = LO Ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 295 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 HW 54955 DocId:39989494 Page 234
eR NER AN ca lin Sal at ae, Dane nena Mba tine ANS RETA SE AS aden ae FO pater het RA A ham ee GY Routing Slip 0-7 (Rev. 12-17 TG: SAC: {] Atlanta (Copies to Offices Checked) é (] Kansas City + C_) Pittsburgh é OLE 3 () Albany (—} Houston {_j Oklahoma Cily a Bocat ({} Albuquerque [7] Indianapolis (_] Omaha f Bern (] Alexandria) =} Jackson {_] Philadelphia fj Bonn {7 ] Anchorage C_] Jacksonville Phoenix {] Brasilia {_] Buenos Aires (_} Baltimore (_] Knoxville C_] Portland | (_] Caracas {] Birmingham [7] Las Vegas C] Richmond (_] Hong Kong ["] Boston (_} Little Rock {(_] Sacramento £7] London (_} Buffalo Cj Los Angeles C_] St. Louis {| Madrid {_} Butte (_] Louisville ([] Salt Lake City (__] Manila i—] Charlotte (_] Memphis {_] San Antonio {—] Mexico City (_1 Chicago CL] Miami Cj San Diego [} Ottawa f } Cincinnati {_j Milwaukee {_} San Francisco [_] Paris {_] Cleveland fF] Minneapolis ([) San Juan {} Rome f_] Columbia [_] Mobile {_] Savannah (_] Singapore (_] Dallas C) Newark {_} Seattle f"] Tel Aviv {_] Denver {__] New Haven (_] Springfield [3 Tokyo f_} Detroit C_} New Orleans (_) Tampa. . _| El Paso (__] New York City (£] Washington Field {—] Honolulu [_j Norfolk CJ Quantico . DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT HW 54955 COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975 Retention (C] For information 77] optional 7] The enclosed ‘is for your information. sources, [—]} paraphrase contents. For appropriate , (C] action (_] Surep, by. If used in a future report, [7] conceal all ([] Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _. dated Remarks: ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75. Enclosed for each Office and Legat is one copy of the transcript of questions which were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance, Keliey's answers to of /7 Brons ba- A3l Bofile | Urfile
Tn Rovtine Siz 0-7 (Rev. - 3) (Copies to Offices Checked} ® Wy Ato = 7 TO LEGAT: [ZW Albany {_] Houston (Lj Oklahoma City = p-7 Bek m7 Albuquerque [7] Indianapolis Omaha - im Berm “~ Alexandria  “{_} Jackson (C1 Philadelphia (i Bona ; Anchorage ' Atlanta (_j Jecksonville C_] Kansas City Cu] Phoenix {-j Pittsburgh {_] Brasilia f{_] Buenos Aires :) Beltimore L_} Knoxville [_] Portland [ Careeas ~"“, Birmingham [_j Las Vegas i__} Richmond £-] Hong Kong ~.} Boston {_j Little Rock {__] Sacramento {_] London (_} Buffalo {_j] Les Angeles (_] St. Louis (J Madria C7} Butte (_} Louisville (_} Salt Lake City {| Manila *~} Charlotte (__] Memphis (_] San Antonio {_] Mexico City “~} Chicago ~_] Miami (_] San Diego __] Ottawa (_} Cincinnati r_] Milwaukee (_] San Francisco {_ | Paris m7 Cleveland Minneapolis fF} San Juan fj] Rome Co. Columbia L_} Mobile [_} Savannah (__] Singapore f_]} Dallas {_}] Newark (_]j Seattle Cj Tel Aviv Denver {_} New Haven {_] Springfield (J Tokyo {_} Detroit {_j New Orleans {_} Tampa . {_] El Paso (_] New York City [7] Washington Field [—} Hovolulu rm; Norfolk {_j Quantico Dete 1/5/76 RE: DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DECEMBER 10, BEPORE fyi For information 7} optional {—? Enclosed are corrected pnges from report h dated Remarks: “By: routing slip da 1975 {7} action {7} The enclosed is for your information, If sources, [7] peraphrase contents. ted 12/30/75 and captioned as above, all SACs and Legats were furnished a copy of the transcript of Mr. Kelley's 12/10/75 appearance-before the Sanate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Although the data contained in the transcript may be made available to news media representatives, used in answering guestions received from citizens, and other- wise treated as being of a public-source nature, the transcript itself should not be reproduced FOr, or given to, anyone outside the FBI. on Ce Butile Urfile HW 54955) Docld: 32999494 Page 236
0-9 Rev. 2-48-74) h FBI Transmitin w= —‘“‘CSCSC«SWVtgs Airtel ~ owe [Type in plaintext orcode), . (Precedence) o: SAC, Albany — 1/14/76 . . oe (Date) From: Director, FBI PERSON ATTENTION COST OF RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES FROM OTHER AGENCIES, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND REQUESTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS (FOIPA) As you are aware, the FBI is currently responding to inquiries from various Congressional committees and agencies such as the General Accounting Office. In addition, we are having to devote ever larger amounts of resources to the handling of requests under provisions of the FOIPA. While much of the effort required to process these matters is expended at FBIHQ, the field offices are increas- ingly being called on to give responses. From time to time in the past, the cost of responding to the inquiry of a particular committee or agency has been monitored when this was deemed appropriate. Since it appears the high volume of inquiries will continue for the foreseeable future, it is necessary to provide for an efficient, standardized mechanism of collecting cost data and reporting the time spent servicing requests from all oversight groups which will be instituted immediately. The time spent on FOIPA matters will also be reported through this centralized system. As major inquiries from new groups are received, the time spent servicing these requests should also be reported. (This line for LEFT MARGIN.) Under this system, each field office will submit an appropriate communication monthly reporting the time spent 2 - Each Field Office Do not type below this Tine.) | Fa vn wn 62-2268 ~/7 yw es ee | | —L Re a x =~ So” = or a Od z S) < = ww = i Q S BS i 9 Ly 8 9 ind [=] Q
6 o Airtel to Albany Re: Cost of Responding to Inquiries From . responding to the requests of various groups and handling | FOIPA matters. This information must be-received by the fifteenth of the month following the month being reported on and should be directed to the attention of the Budget and Accounting Section. For uniformity, the information should be reported in the following sample format: Pee Ris Office: Albany A pd Month: January, 1976 ———— Cyvie Sorts General Accounting Office ——————————— Agent Hours: 21 Clerical Hours: 11 AlGcr7- Cheick Freedom of Information Act Agent Hours: 61 Clerical Hours: 13 Privacy Act Agent Hours: 17 Clerical Hours: 7 Field offices are not expected to keep detailed time records. Reliable estimates are acceptable and time should be reported to the nearest whole hour. The groups and activities which are being monitored at the present time are as follows: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities General Accounting Office Freedom of Information Act Privacy Act Statistics should be reported on any oversight afforded to the FBI and should not be restricted to the committees and agencies described above. For accountability purposes a report should be submitted by each field office each month, even if there is little or no time to be reported. The first report is to be submitted by February 15, 1976 for the month of January. HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 236