13-00000 TOP SECRET Foreword This is the third volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the problems of establishing a policy for the United States Government as Fidel Castro and his cohorts came to power in-Cuba.* The policy decided on by the US Government in March 1960 called for the displace- ment of Fidel Castro, and it was by no means a uni- lateral decision promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency _— although it is demonstrable that the Agency was far more perceptive. than the policy making bodies in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere posed by Castro's communist affiliation. Because the policy makers feared censure by the United Nations and/or. the Organization of American ‘States, the. myth of “plausible deniability" was the caveat that deter- mined the CIA would be the principal implementing arm for the anti-Castro effort. From inception to termination, * The preceding volumes were: I - Air Operations II - Participation ‘in. the Conduct of Foreign Policy. -~ iii - Ko ; TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET "deniability” would be the albatross around the necks — of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, mCH 15 April 1961). it became the strangling cord insuring the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs. This: volume describes the Agency's organization designed to accomplish the assigned task; and it records the interaction between the Agency and other government components (State and the military in particular), between the Agency and the White House, and among various CIA components as the program evolved. The relationships were sometimes less than harmonious. Particular attention is focused on the roles played by both. President Eisenhower who author- ized the anti-Castro program and Vice President Nixon -who has been chargedtime and again -- unjustifiably as the record reveals ~- with being the mastermind behind the operation. Emphasis also is focused on the drastic change in the concept of the operation between the spring "and fall of 1960. From April's plans for the infil- tration into Cuba of small teams of Agency trained specialists in communications, sabotage, and para~ military operations to provide training and guidance -~iv- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET to anti-Castro dissidents, November's plans called for an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a provisional government (approved/and apdkseted by CIA) could issue its clarion calls for US, UN, or OAS inter- vention. Encompassed in this volume are the records of the policy level. meetings which considered such items as funding the operation, possible use of US personnel in combat roles, the use of US bases for training or for operations, types of direct action programs (e.g., propaganda. drops vs sabotage), and the host of other - problems related to Castro's overthrow. It also makes . Clear that various US corporate interests played an’ active (sometimes overactive) role in support of the anti~Castro efforts of the Government. — This volume also examines official records in light of the allegations of the Senate Select Commit- tee's investigations that the assassination plans being developed by the Mafia were a fundamental part of the official US Government program to overthrow Fidel “Nat ae in ead Castro. There is no basis in fact for this chabae. * - Y= TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Finally, the reader of this volume should gain. some insights to the character of various of the principal actors -- Agency and non-Agency -- who were involved most closely with the Government's anti-Castro - policy during the period from its inception through the close of the Eisenhower administration. Not all of these impressions are flattering; but the author, who was in no way associated with the operation or . the Directorate of Plans (now Operations) , hopes that the presentation of. the evidence has been as free from - bias as possible. | Again the author wishes to acknowledge the valu-. able contributions of the other two members of the CIA History Staff, Mrs. Eulalie Hammond and Mrs. Sharon Bond, ° to the completion of this volume. Without their unfailing willingness to perform either the ‘substantive research or the grimly mechanical tasks required in preparing a volume such as this, the task. could have been interminable. For any errors of fact or questionable interpreta- tions, the author alone is responsible. -vi- ° TOP SECRET .
13-00000 TOP SECRET Volume III Contents Foreword . . - - 2 - 6 2 6 6 se ee ew ee Part I. Background . . . .. . 56 © «© « « A. Watching from the Sidelines B. Castro Takes Over ..... Part II Castro Must Go... . .. 2. « « A. Organizing for Covert Action B. Forging the Tool ...... C. Cooperation and Challenge . D. Personnel and Training... Part III Changing Concepts ....... Part IV Presidential Resurgence .... Part V Direct Action Programs ..... A. Propaganda ......... B. Sabotage and other Exercises Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role . . ... . 6.6.0 Part VII The Question of Assassinations . Part VIII Conclusions ........4.. Appendixes A. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59 ~ vii - TOP SECRET 126 143 165 204 204 233 241 277 290 296
13-00000 TOP SECRET iN B. A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 ......: Cc. CNO Correspondence with Department of State and NSC: 1) Letter for Allen Dulles from 'Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60 TS (DD/P 0-1436) ......-.-- 2) Letter for Gordon Gray from Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60 ...... 3) Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60, sub: US Policy toward Cuba .... .D.. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60, sub: - Liaison with US Agencies on JMARC Activities ....... E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at. Santiago de Cuba, 13~1L4 March 1961... . F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959 ..... G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing Vice President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba ......-..- Source References Part I | Background ee ee ee ee Part II "Castro Must Go .-. ... 1... 2 ee Part III ‘Changing Concepts .: ......6 - Part IV .Presidential Resurgence ..... . - viii - TOP SECRET Page - 300 311 313 318 332 335 337 344 347 352 366 369
13-00000 Part V Part VI | Part. Vit Part VIII TOP SECRET Direct Action Programs Mr. Nixon's Role. woe Assassination Cok ee Conclusions ..... TOP SECRET Page 374 382 386. 388
13-00000 TOP SECRET THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION | Volume III Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, [950 - January 1961 Part I Background A. Watching from the Sidelines Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the earliest reports in Agency files as “one of the young, ‘student leaders' in Cuba, who manages to get himself involved in many things that do not concern him." 1/ Beginning in 1948, the activities of Fidel Castro came to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the United States Government (USG) . By early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action program designed to remove the Castro government from control. of the island of Cuba. The policy of the USG was to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency and would culminate in:the operations at the Bahia de Cochinos from 17-19 April 1962. “Beginning in 19§%8 and continuing even after the. United States had formulated its official policy of -~l- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET removing Castro from the leadership of the Cuban Government, the principal questions faced by CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, by the Department of State, and by other concerned principals in the United States were: What is Fidel Castro? By whom is he controlled? What does he represent? Is he, or is he not, a Communist? The nature of the Agency's interest in answers to these questions is reflected in various of the récords for the period beginning in the mid- 1950's when it appeared that the Agency depended in considerable part on ‘the reporting from the American Embassy offices in Havana. | ‘Commenting on a report-entitled "Antidemocratic ‘Antecedents and Activities. of Fidel Castro“ prepared by President Batista's Military Intelligence Service (SIM) -- apparently in response, to a request from the Bur6é de Represién a las Activadades Communistas (BRAC) * _. to the Counselor of the American Embassy (Amembassy) in Havana, Lincoln vinton Chapin, told the CIA repre- sentative among other things, that: * Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET The SIM report is nothing more than a summary of allegations and accusations made. against Fidel Castro during the period 1948-1950. This summary has apparently been slanted in an effort to Take Castro a “Rojo,“ but the result is a rather poor one. 2/ The Department of State reporter refuted, on a paragraph by paragraph basis, all of the allegations which indicated that Castro had been tied in with Communists, or Communist sympathizers, ever since his university days; and in forwarding the report to Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the COS Havana indicated ‘that he was furnishing the information be- cause of renewed interest: by the State Department in Fidel Castro. ry, | The tenor of State reporting continued in a. similar vein well into 1957. Charges that Castro was a Communist could not be Substantiated, but State did note that in his student days, he "was involved in gangster-type activities." 4a/ Havana Embassy reporting also reflected another of the problems of continuing concern to the US Intelligence Community -- would Castro have sufficient force to oust Batista, and were his basic feelings toward the US friendly. 5/ TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET In ‘the ‘mid- 1950° S, Havana Station ran seven approved 1 FI projects, most of which were aimed at the Cuban ‘Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista Popular). Agency funds also were used to support the efforts of an anti-Communist organization engaged principally in propaganda activities. 6/ Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA's Inspector General, apparently accompanied US Ambassador Gardner and his party to a meeting with President Fulgencio | . Batista in the summer of 1956, a meeting which prompted the Cuban President to write to the DCI, Allen Dulles, in praise of the meeting.* 7/ In fact, Agency support for the peaceful transfer of power from Batista to a democratically elected - ‘successor and amnesty for Castro and his followers, as well as other anti-Batista dis- sidents, was proposed in a memorandum from the Inspector General in November’ 1957. 8/ “* David R. McLean, a former member of the IG's In- spection Staff, attached a cryptic note to the copy. of Dulles' letter of response to Batista, which he, (McLean) included in the file of miscellaneous docu- ments on the Bay of Pigs, which were inherited by the present author. McLean suggested that Kirkpatrick helped organize BRAC, but the present author has not confirmed this story. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET In view of subsequent developments, one inter- esting suggestion made by the Inspector General in November 1957 was the following: On the island of Cuba, probably only a US citizen, in some way known to be connected with the US Government and "assumed" to be backed by Washington, _ would. have the ability to act as inter- mediary between the various opposition groups in the Batista Government and. work out a possible “cease fire." This would have to be done covertly, and any results achieved either not ever publicly announced or certainly not advertised until after the election. Any public attempt to bring peace would be fore- doomed to failure by each side probably indicating exorbitant demands and then being unable to withdraw from its announced position.* 9/ Although it may have’ had no relation to the ' Kirkpatrick memorandum, on 25 November 1957, less than a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum, William Wieland of the Department of State notified Adolf Rerle, one of the country's leading experts on Latin American Affairs and a former member of the * It is. interesting to speculate whether at this time Kirkpatrick was thinking of William D. Pawley, | former US. Ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an American businessman who operated significant enter- prises in Cuba,.to negotiate with Batista. Within a year's time, Pawley, who also stood. high in the > ranks of the Republic Party contributors, was desig- -nated to undertake such a mission to Cuba. TOP SECRET
1,3-00000 TOP SECRET State Department, that he was enroute to Cuba, ac- ‘cording to Berle, “to see whether anything can be done to bring the Cuban revolt to any kind of an orderly conclusion." 10/ . Berle, with remarkable prescience, noted: It is rough going, anti-intervention is all right up to a point... But we are re- sponsible for keeping order in the hemis- phere quite aside from the proprieties, and .a vather bolder policy in that regard seems indicated. il/- By early 1958, the Agency had become sufficiently concerned about the pro-Communist orientation of Castro's government, and particularly the pro-Castro proclivities of his two principal deputies, Ernesto Che Guevara and Raul Castro Ruz, Fidel’ 's brother, that penetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was a priority concern of the field. At least two agents were successfully placed in PSP ranks, and.in March 1958, one Agency officer managed to join the Castro forces in the mountains for a period of two weeks and to observe their tactics in combat. In June 1958, “Robert D. Wiecha, COB, Santiago de Cuba, got himself “captured” by Raul Castro's forces in order to be able to assist 29 US sailors and marines and 15 US TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET businessmen who had been kidnapped by Raul Castro. In both instances, the Agency representatives returned unharmed; and both reported ‘on the “radical" and anti-_ American nature of the Castro movement. According to one source, Wiecha found “definite communist over- tones" among’ the Raul Castro forces.* 12/ .. Additional documentation of the pro~communist nature of the Castro organization was reported with great frequency during 1958 from contacts the Santiago de Cuba Base had in Oriente Province. Whether Castro's contingent: was communist oriented or not, others such as Adolf Berle and his.friends (both in-and out of State. Department), continued to reflect their concern about the possible ways to combat ‘the growing strength of the Castro movement in Cuba. 13/ Berle was most hopeful that the Castro situation could be remedied by cooperation among Latin American liberals working in conjunction with some of the more enlightened Cubans who had broken with Castro (for example, Felipe Pazos and Pepin Bosch) with additional support from the OAS * The historian for WH Division provided the figures on US captives shown here, but Hugh Thomas indicates 19 US businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET -- and only minor participation from the US Department of State. 14/. At a time when the Agency's fears about the Castro movement were increasing, a rather different proposal was: put forward by the Chief of the Para- military Division, Political and Psychological Staff, of the Clandestine Service. Rather than trying to ‘whip Castro, Alfred Cox suggested that perhaps the wisest move for the Agency would be to join Castro. it was apparent, according to Cox, that since Batista was on the way out, we should now try to remedy Castro's hostile attitude toward the United States because of ‘our efforts to prop up Batista. To accomplish this, Cox suggested that: A practical way to protect United States interests in this matter would be to make secret contact with Castro, assure him of the United States sympa~ thy with some of his objectives, and to offer him support. The individual chosen to. make the contact should be of such background that it is clear ~ that he speaks with the authority of the United States Government. _ Obviously, the support must be given covertly so as not to ‘endanger United States relations with Batista. The most effective means of help to Castro would be arms and ammunition. Air dropping of — TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET _this equipment might be dangerous from the security aspect. Allowing a ship- load of equipment manned by a Cuban crew to evade our Coast Guard would probably be.a better method. The most secure means of help would be giving the money to Castro, who could then purchase his own arms. A combination of arms and money would probably be best.* 15/ By late fall of 1958, when it became apparent that the Batista regime in Cuba was about to go under, the Agency in conjunction with the Department of State supported a plan to have Batista bow out more or less gracefully and to have the government of the country taken over, not by the Presidential candidate who had been elected in the rigged election, but by a junta pending subsequent free, democratic elections. When .* Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban area was biased against.Castro. One report in the fall of 1958 indicated that Castro definitely was not a Communist, citing as a reason for this: "Ninety-five percent of his followers are good Catholics. Three Catholic -priests have ‘jjoined Fidel Castro and his forces in the Sierra Maestra, and one has joined Raul Castro and his troops in the Sierra Cristal. The rebel forces under the Castros, therefore, have four chaplains, while the entire Cuban Army does not have a single chaplain. {Source comment: The United States should not be taken in by. President Fulgencio Batista‘'s attempt “to label the revolutionary movement as Communist in- spired, dominated, or influenced.)" 16/ The source for this evaluation of Castro was, as one might surmise, a Catholic priest. — TOP SECRET |
13-00000 TOP SECRET traveling to Miami with William Snow, an Assistant Secretary of State, and Henry Holland, formerly a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, met with William D. Pawley on 18-19 November 1958 to discuss a plan which would have Pawley travel to Cuba to meet with Batista in an attempt to convince him to bow out gracefully. Pawley was a long-time acquaintance and friend of Batista from the days when Pawley had been running the Cubana Airline. ° In return for Batista's support for a friendly military junta -- nominally to be responsible for his ouster -- the representatives of the Department of State and the Agency agreed that Batista should be provided safety for himself, his friends, and his close cronies, particularly those whose lives would be endangered should there ever be a truly violent overthrow of the government. Batista also was to be provided protection for his personal assets in Cuba. Various individuals were identified as possible candi- dates, for the junta, and,’ according to King, the objective was. that various of these members would have -° TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET sufficient political strength to weaken Castro's sup- port. | Following the meeting in Miami, Pawley did undertake the mission to see Batista in Cuba. Arriv- ing on 8 December in Havana he had a series of pre- liminary meetings with the Cuban Foreign Minister, who strongly supported the proposals that Pawley indicated that he was going to make. Unfortunately, however, the Foreign Minister told Pawley that it was unlikely that: Batista would accept the proposals. The meeting between Pawley and Batista actually took place on 11 December 1958 when, according to the re- port from Havana station: | Pawley met with Batista for two hours this evening. Laid his plan before — Batista without pulling any punches. . B{atista] took it calmly. He agreed with much of Pawley's analysis of situation, but said he could not take the junta way out. 17/ —— a Batista made no promises, and went. through the. . reasons why he couldn't possibly give up the office -- for fear of being called a coward and traitor; that there would be a blood bath; and that he had both moral and constitutional obligations. COS Havana -~ ll - TOP. SECRET
13-00000: TOP SECRET noted Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as follows: Batista will not accept plan, and will make every effort turn government over to Rivera Aguero [the Batista candidate who had been named Presidential successor in a xvrigged election]. However, unfavorable developments may produce change of attitude on part of Bfatista]. 18/ Following Pawley's visit with Batista, the situ- ation in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies of the US Government regarding Cuba were ambivalent. A representative of the Archbishop of. Havana, Father Bez Chebebe, approached the American Consul in Santiago to float some proposals for resolving the differences be- tween the two countries. The priest emphasized that although a Castro take over was inevitable: Both Fidel Castro and US interests . had important stake in sugar crop and both undoubtedly wish résolve problems caused by present situation. Also said that there were matters now mostly minor on both sides which have been sources mutual irritation and misunderstanding and that these should be eliminated soonest, so that they would not grow to affect future relations, which Father considers inevitable. 19/ In addition, the representative of the Archbishop of Havana indicated to the Amconsul that: He though[t] US Government could profitably send person of confidence, - 12 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET > not necessarily an official, to discuss mutual problems as discreetly as possi- ble with Fidel. Implied that such would be well received. 20/ Despite the fact that the communist proclivities of Fidel Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated by Agency personnel in Cuba, on 18 December 1958, COS Havana cabled Headquarters strongly supporting the position that the Archbishop of Havana's representative had proposed to the American Consulate, ° saying: Havana Station feels proposal merits serious State/CIA consideration. Opera~ tion this nature could pay big ;future dividends if fully qualified person could be found for job and dispatched quickly. Regardless how.we may feel about Castro- and his movement, both will be important political forces for a long time to come. Perhaps candidate could be found through National Catholic Welfare Organization. 21/ At about the same time this ‘proposal was being put forward, WH Division had asked the Paramilitary Division (PMD) to establish a small contingency task force, capable of making air drops into Cuba. Two representatives of PMD, | were sent to Havana -| | “survey possible drop zones and[_—i| to get himself to locate and _ into position to see if he could locate dissidents who - 13 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET were both anti-Castro and anti-Batista. What WH hoped to accomplish, presumably, was that they could organize these anti-Batista and anti-Castro dissidents and get them armed in time So that they could prevent Castro from taking over the government if Batista should | suddenly resign or decide to flee the country. 22/ On 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington; a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe; and the Office of Logistics would have an arms load - ¥igged for a drop by 2 January 1959. 23/ It was not until the last week of December 1958 that President Eisenhower became actively involved in discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward Cuba. “His interest was precipitated by a 23 December 1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had been prepared by the Acting Secretary of State and sent to Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, who discussed the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 Decem- ber. The President apparently indicated that he had not been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA -~ 14.- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET regarding Castro, and he suggested that meetings of the Special Group under NSC 5412/2 should be held on a weekly basis, with Cuba to be a regular subject ‘for discussion. Gordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other individuals into the act. Gray suggested that the President's Board of Consultants (later the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) be made party to the discussions, but Dulles rather strongly suggested that there was a significant difference between the discussions which were intended for the Special Group 5412 on Covert Operations, and PFIAB responsibilities for general problems related to foreign intelligence. Dulles made ‘the specific point that if the Board of Consultants was going to get involved in the details © of planned covert operations, they were then ina position of reviewing US foreign policy. The discus- sion also seems to have verged on the right of Congress to attempt to oversee covert operations -- a point about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly, ‘noting that such action by Congress would be an in- fringement of his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief. 24/ -~ 15 — TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET ’ At 3:40 on the afternoon of 31 December 1958, there was another high level meeting attended by Messrs. Herter, Murphy, and Rubottom, Department of State; Irwin, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke, the CNO; General Cabell, DDCI; and Gordon Gray at which the Cuban situation was again discussed. Even. as the meeting was in progress, Batista was preparing to flee Cuba; and possible US action, including direct intervention by US Marines, was among the topics that were discussed. There also was some suggestion that ‘the US take the responsibility for naming members to _ a junta to succeed Batista, rather than permitting Fidel Castro and his followers to take over the Cuban Government. 25/ With some benefit of hindsight, Eisenhower re- called this period in the following manner: _ During the rush of these last. events in the final days of 1958, the Central Antelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might \ not be in the best interests of the United States. (Earlier reports which I had re- _ ceived of Castro's possible Communism were Suspect because they originated with people who favored Batista.) “Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have ‘penetrated the Castro move- ment,“ Allen Dulles said. “If Castro - 16 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 .. TOP SECRET takes over, they will probably participate in the government.“ When I heard this estimate, I was provoked that such a con- ‘clusion had not been given earlier. At another point, the ex~President. wrote: © Though our intelligence experts backed and filled for a number of months, events were gradually driving them to the conclu- sion that with the coming of Castro, Com- munism had penetrated this hemisphere. 26/ a B. Castro Takes Over During the first few weeks of 1959 following Castro's take over, there was a flurry of activity as Havana Station attempted to keep track of the . changes in government. The Station seemed assured that it was cognizant of all of Castro's movements ,. especially on the developing military capabilities. In fact, when the US Army suggested that the Station provide support for the Army's covert collection of ‘military intelligence under -commercial cover in Havana, COS took strong exception to the proposals, emphasizing : A the Station's own capabilities in this area. COS was overruled by Headquarters, however, and General Cabell assured the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence ‘of the Army that while. he was aware that Havana had -~ 17 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET objected to the Army's proposals, the COS nonetheless had been “instructed" to cooperate.* 27/ In these early weeks of 1959, US representatives in. Havana were predicting that Castro would have a difficult time holding his government together, and among other things, one report emphasized the proba- bility that Castro would soon find that he would have to get along with the United States. 29/ The most . likely threat to relations with the United States was the existence of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, but neither CIA nor State Department representa-~ tives saw any threat to this installation, and this belief.was supported in early March 1959 by a Special ‘National Intelligence Estimate that, at most, Castro “sooner or later [is] likely to ask for major increases. * An interesting side note to the discussions at this time was that the Army Attache apparently had planned to use a negro Lt. Col. who was on-TDY in Havana to do a study of -the new Castro Army. In a memorandum -to the Chief} Western Hemisphere Division, and to the Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff, Al Cox, Chief, Paramilitary Division reported -- without ever using the term “black" ~-- that General Erskine (Army Special Forces) believed that a “color bar“ did exist in the Caribbean area and that a better choice than Lt. Col. Reuben Horner, the black officer in question, could be made. 28/ -~ 18 + TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET * in the nominal rent now paid for the Guantanamo Base, revision of employment practices which appeared to discriminate against Cuban workers, and perhaps other changes." 30/ In the early spring of 1959, as Castro made known that he was planning to visit the United States, COS Havana revealed ambiguous feelings about the im- portance of the Castro trip. He noted for Headquarters information that: | Washington visit can make ox break Castro. Unless he gets a strong helping _hand from the United States, many serious observers feel his. regime will collapse within a matter of months. 31/— Pointing to the serious economic difficulties of the new Cuban Government, COS Havana indicated that _Castro's popularity was very low among the middle and upper classes, but at the same time he emphasized that Castro was “the idol of the masses.“ 32/ COS Havana’ did an excellent job of predicting how Castro would act when he arrived in the United States, suggesting that Castro would probably make his pitch, not to the heads of the State Department. and to the press, but ‘that he would appeal to the workers, the farmers, the - 19 + -TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET students, and the masses in America to support his revolution. .COS emphasized that Headquarters should make no mistake that the Castro Government, while not openly avowed Communist, was heavily infiltrated with Communists and had taken no stand in opposition to Communist positions, and, moreover, there was little question about who would eventually control the Cuban | Government. cos aia suggest that Headquarters give serious consideration to planting embarrassing ques- tions with reporters to stick to Castro while he was in the US. 33/° Both the Department of State and COS Havana were in general agreement about the results of the Castro visit. COS Havana summarized one of his dispatches as follows: | It would be unwise to assume from the minor indications to date that Fidel has undergone a serious change of heart as a result of his visit to the United States. 34/ In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, President Eisen- hower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State noted. that: . | Despite Castro's apparent simplicity, sincerity, and eagerness to reassure the United States public, there is little -~ 20 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET probability that Castro had altered the essentially radical course of his revolu- tion. -From his experience here, he has gained a valuable knowledge of American . public reaction which may make him a more difficult man to. deal.with on his return to Cuba. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate this’ man. -With all his appearance of naiveté, unsophistication, -and ignorance. on many matters, he is clearly a strong personality and a born leader of great personal courage and conviction. While we certainly know him better -than before, Castro remains an enigma; and we should await his decisions on specific Matters before assuming a more optimistic view than heretofore about the possibility of developing a constuctive relationship - with him and his government. 35/ With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in this period shortly following Castro's visit to the United States the COS Havana may have misjudged a significant development which surfaced almost imme- diately after Castro's return to Cuba. Remarking on ‘an apparent rash of anti-Communist statements appear- ing in the Cuban press, one dispatch speculated that: These demonstrations obviously welcome, but possibly most significant aspect is demonstration once again, enormous power Castro, who with few words. made anti- Communism popular position. By same token he could reverse trend at any time, and. skeptics speculating that current stand is sop intended to make it more difficult for U.S. interests to protest effectively against stringent agrarian reform law. 36/ - -~ 21 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET A follow-up dispatch within two days of that cited above provided a more accurate insight as to the depth of the struggle which was,in fact, being waged within Cuba between the pro- and the anti- Communist factions. Reporting on comments made by the Executive Secretary of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) with reference to. the confusion among party members regarding statements that Castro had made while he was in the United States, Anibal Escalante laid it on the line that there was a struggle between the left and the right; and he emphasized that the - conservative element was trying to take advantage of remarks which Castro had been forced to make while in the United States. According to the source reporting on Escalante's talk, Vice-President Nixon had told Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the Communists, the United States would cut off economic aid to Cuba; and this threat had struck Castro as so serious that he made some unwise statements. The source, however, noted that the liberal forces of the 26 July movement in the Directorio Revolucionario (the DR), were in control of the revolution, and that the ~ 22 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET duty of the PSP was to work toward unity and overcome the counterrevolutionaries. 37/ ‘In a Special NIE of 30 June 1959 on The Situation tn the Cartbbean through 1959, the intelligence com- munity again indicated that the internal situation in Cuba had not been decided. The SNIE commented: The Communists probably do not now. control Castro, but they are ina posi- tion to exert influence in his regime, and to carry on further organizational work. 38/ Through the summer and into the early fall of 1959, the degree of Castro's commitment to Communism continued to be a major subject of discussion within the intelligence community; and in the weekly reporting that was begun by COS Havana in early June, this topic continually occurred. ‘In August 1959, when the Deputy Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, Rudolph Gomez, assisted ‘Leo Churn in the preparation of an “Urgent ‘Report on Cuba" for distribution to members of the Research Institute of America, Castro's Communist association was prominently featured. At this time, -and reflecting the views of both Western Hemisphere Division and the Department of State with whom Gomez . had coordinated the paper, Fidel Castro was not ~ 23.- TOP SECRET
13-00000 . TOP SECRET ‘considered to bé a Communist. His brother Raul Castro, however, was clearly identified as a hard-core Com- munist.* 39/— | The internal problem to which Anibal Escalante had referred in mid-summer came to a head in mia- October 1959 when Hubert Matos, a military leader in Camaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter of Castro, broke with Fidel over the increasing number of leadership positions which were being turned over to members of the Communist oriented PSP rather than to members of the 26 July Movement. Matos resigned as military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 and was arrested on 20 October. During the months prior to his trial in December 1959, when he was found guilty o£ treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, a x * In view of the trend of recent years, it is inter- esting to note that the Chuxn report found reason to be somewhat critical of the Senate Internal Security Committee (Sen. Eastland's Committee) for getting in- volved in matters which were principally of concern to the intelligence community. In this case, the Senate Committee was criticized specifically for taking Diaz Lanz, the head of Castro's Air Force who ‘had defected, and questioning him before turning him over to the intelligence agencies for initial inter- rogation. -~ 24 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET ‘number of others who had been prominent anti-Batistianos also broke with Castro. Among these were Faustino Perez, Minister for Recovery of Illegally Acquired .Property; Rufo Lépez-Fresquet, Minister of Finance; Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works; and Felipe Pazos, head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro and replaced by Che Guevera, whose expertise was in revolution not in banking. As Theodore Draper has said, this was the second civil war for Castro. 40/ Coincidental to the internal squabble. that led to Matos's resignation, the Deputy Chief of WH Division, Rudy Gomez, was in Havana (15-18 October 1959) promot- - ing. an increase in Station efforts to penetrate the PSP. In the course of this tour, the qualifications of the best of the agents who might conduct this pene- tration were reviewed with COS Havana and Station personnel. Gomez also pointed out that the anti-Com- munist efforts in Havana should not be limited to those who wexé FI or PP designees, but everyone in the Station was urged to take advantage of opportunities to push into the Partido Socialista Popular. In re- porting on his visit with COS Havana, Gomez noted that — ~ 25 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET the Ambassador and other members of the American Embassy in Havana also were very much interested in the program being advanced; and, in fact, asked Gomez if CIA could “send a qualified Communist expert to Havana to indoctrinate appropriate Embassy officers on Communist doctrines, particularly on their modus operandi and how Communists working under cover: could be recognized." Upon his return Gomez received J. C. King's approval to comply with this request. * 41l/ Even as Gomez was promising State's representa- tives in Havana assistance in understanding Communist activities, J. Cc. King, Chief of Western Hemisphere Division;: was going forward to the Director of Central Intelligence with a memorandum complaining about the Department of State's failure to provide CIA with a policy action paper on: Cuba -- a paper which, accord- ing to King, had been promised as early as May 1959, yet had not been received by the end of October. Nor was there any indication when such paper might be * It would appear from this request that both the DDP and State were remiss in the training of their overseas . personnel. That the Station had to request Headquarters for support on such an issue is difficult to imagine. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET expected, despite numerous meetings with Department representatives. King also was particularly critical of the fact that Ambassador Bonsal had been called to Washington on two occasions, but in neither instance had he called on. the Agency for consultation -- this despite the fact that there had been: indications from the Department that such consultations were to be held. 42/ The ambivalence regarding Castre's relation to the Communist Party was illustrated by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on 5 November 1959 in testifying at the hearings of the Judiciary SubCom- mittee which was investigating the “Communist Threat | to the US through the Caribbean." In response to the question of whether Fidel was a Communist, General C. P. Cabell stated: Our information shows that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party member or even a pro-Communist. On ‘ the other hand, they are delighted with the nature of his government, which was. allowed the Communists opportunity -- free opportun- ity -~ to organize, to propagandize, and to infiltrate. We know the Communists consider Castro a representative of the bourgeoise ... Our conclusion, therefore, is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist, however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. 43/ In an attempt to resolve, at least part of the dilemma a Related Mission Directive was approved on - 27- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET 6 November 1959 and "would remain in effect until further notice." The RMD stated in part as follows: For the moment, CIA operations should be carried out on the assumption that the revolutionary government is basically non- Communist, with legitimate reform goals that. deserve US respect and support. Cov- ert operations should support overt efforts to arrive at a rapprochement with the pres-—. ent government and to eliminate the con- ditions described above without resorting to forceful means. 'I£ it should be established that the Cuban government is Communist-led or Com- munist-dominated, or if that government cannot be swayed from adopting measures which intentionally or unintentionally accomplish Communist objectives, the question of direct attacks against Castro will be re-examined. In planning for such a contingency, each existing or new asset should be evaluated in terms of possible future utility from a paramilitary point of view, nor will the development or re- cruitment of assets be precluded merely because they lack a paramilitary capa- bility. Under no circumstances would any ' asset be apprised of this -contingency field, planning. In fact. any disposition to undertake violent action should. be promptly and emphatically discouraged pending a change in policy at the policy-making level. .44/ Even as the RMD was being dispatched to the another and more significant program was being evolved in Headquarters. On 11 December 1959, J. C. King, Chief, WH Division prepared a memorandum for the - 28 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Director of Central Intelligence, through the Deputy Director of Plans, forwarding a program having as its > specific objective "The overthrow of Castro within one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to the United States which will call for elections 6 months after assumption of office." To achieve this objective, Chief, WH/D put forward a program, to in- clude among other items the following: | | 1. Clandestine radio attacks on Cuba, from liberal Caribbean countries. 2. Intrusion operations against Castro's TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba. 3. Formation of pro-US opposition groups to establish by force a controlled area within Cuba. Colonel King then went on to suggest that: Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion Che Guevarra [sic], have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly ac- celerate the fall of the present govern- | ~ment.* 45/ * The reader's attention is drawn to Appendix A (see page 296) which reproduces the original 11 December 1959 J. C. King memorandum to the DCI. In light of subsequent investigations, hearings, and publicity regarding the Agency's complicity in assassination (footnote continued on following page) -~ 29 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET As 1959 drew to a close, a final Special National Intelligence Estimate, "The Situation in the Caribbean through 1960," indicated that Castro was in to stay, despite internal difficulties. The SNIE saw no serious. threat to Castro's continued rule, and it pointed out) that if there was direct US intervention, “Most Cubans including the military, would react violently." 46/ | , As 1960 began, General Cabell, the Deputy Direc- tor of Central Intelligence, held a joint briefing plots aimed at Fidel Castro and others, pages 2 and 3 of Appendix A show two significant corrections in Allen Dulles's own handwriting to the text submitted by Col. King. In paragraph 3d, the phrase “thorough consider- ation. be given ‘to the elimination of Fidel Castro" carries Dulles's pencilled correction making the text read “removal from Cuba" rather than "elimination." At a later point in the same paragraph the original text said “many informed people believe that . the disappearance of Fidel would: greatly -accelerate the fall of the present government". Mr. Dulles has substituted the word “removal" for the word “disappear- ance." These significant changes in the text on the ‘Original copy of King's memorandum -- which the author has recovered ~~ support the contention that the author. has made in the Foreword to this Volume that the com- ponent (WH/4) officially charged with the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program was neither charged with nor responsible for programs designed to assas- sinate Castro in the course of the Bay of Pigs Opera- tion. Colonel King's memorandum of 11 December 1959, with the pencilled corrections noted above, was con- curred in by Richard M. Bissell and approved by Allen W. Dulles on 12 December 1959. - 30 + TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET (8 January 1960) on Cuba for. the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reviewed the in- creasing hold that the Communist idealogy and those affiliated with the Communist Party were exerting the Castro government. At this time, the DDCI also discussed the need for increased covert and semi- covert programs aimed at Castro -- psychological war- fare, political action, economic action, and para- ‘military action, all of which had been conducted in: some degree during the past year. 47/ This 8 January 1960 briefing can be used to denote the beginning of the serious anti-Castro programs by Central Intelli- gence Agency which would culminate at the Bay of Pigs. - 31 - TOP SECRET |
13-00000 TOP SECRET Part II Castro Must Go A. Organizing for Covert Action (January-March 1960) The first mention of a formal Agency structure to’ deal with the matter of Fidel Castro was noted by Colonel L. K. White, then Deputy Director for Support, in reporting on the DCI's morning meeting of 8 January 1960. White's diary noted: There was considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba, and. the Director requested Dick Bissell: to organize a special task force to insure that we were attacking this situation from all possible angles. 1/ . The instruction was taken to heart, for on 18 Jan- uary 1960 the WH Division:-organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as an expandable task force to run the ‘proposed Cuban Op- erations. The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station, and 2 at Santiago: Base. 2/ Named to head the new Branch in Western Hemisphere Division, was Jacob D. Esterline, recently returned COS, and formerly one of the principals ~ 32 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 ~ TOP SECRET in Project PBSUCCESS, the operation which had resulted in the overthrow of the Communist-dominated government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Esterline was - ; the choice of J. C. King, Chief, WH Division; and to the best of Esterline's recollection, toward the end of his two year tour in| ne had been queried _ by King about remaining in | or coming back ; to Headquarters to work on the Cuban problem. It was shortly after his return to the States in. January of 1960 that Esterline became Chief, WH/4. 3/ | In addition to his participation in the Guatemalan episode and his extensive guerrilla warfare experience _ in World War II with the oss, Esterline thinks that | he got the job because J. C. King “had pretty much confidence in my judgment. "* 4/ The relationship between Esterline and J. C. King, Chief, WH Division and the relationship between, King and Richard Bissell, A Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) during the course of * The author had heard that Esterline had been directly selected by the DDP, Richard Bissell, to be the head of ‘WH/4. Bissell made no mention of this, and it is con- trary to the story noted above, as told by Esterline. ~ 33 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP. SECRET the Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subject of considerable speculation ever since the close out of the invasion. It seems appropriate that some atten- _ tion should be devoted to this subject. before going further into detail about the evolution of the covert plans to oust Castro. One source close to the DDP at the time of the anti-Castro activity stated flatly: A task force was formed under Bissell, excluding J. C. King, Chief, WH/D, from having in fact any control whatsoever over the activity. 5/ ‘The WH/D. history states: There was an informal but understood short cut in the chain of command; basic decisions were made at the DDP; DCI, or Presidential level. Although some of the key petsonnel were detailed from WH. Division, the Cuban Headquarter's unit was in another building; and no one pre- tended that J. C. King was running the show. Jacob D. Esterline ... was the Chief of the Cuban Unit, during the build-up and invasion attempt and took his orders from the DDP. 6/ : Walter Elder, formerly Special Assistant to Allen Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep King on the outer edges of the anti-Castro activity; but according to Elder, Col. King always knew what was going on and was thoroughly involved in the Bay of - 34 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Pigs activity from its inception until its conclu- sion.* 7/. Esterline himself declined to comment for the record on this particular speculation, but indicated ‘that he was not sure what J.C. King was up to at all ' times. It is clear, however, that Esterline was in very close contact with Col. King throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.** Additional insights concerning J. C. King's role in Bay of Pigs Operation have been provided by Richard . D. Drain, who was Chief of ‘Operations for: WH/4, and by Richard Bissell, the DDP. Drain has stated: J. Cc. King never was told, I think for . understandable reasons, to what extent he +. Elder. suggested to the author that “they" wanted King out of the operation because of his strong Re- publican affiliations. "They" were never identified, but King was well acquainted with highly placed figures and. contributors to the Republican Party. ** This will become most apparent in the subsequent discussion of the relationships between WH/4 and William D. Pawley. During the author's initial conver- sation with Esterline about the Bay of Pigs, Esterline © did state, in a manner similar to Elder, that J. C. King was out of the mainstream of the anti-Castro effort, because he had known Republican Party affiliations. 8/ There was no elaboration indicating the impact of such affiliations on King's role, and there is nothing in the record to support this allega— tion. 7 35 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET was in it, to what extent he was not in it. Therefore, from time to time, he | would protrude ...- sometimes, saying that he was ‘sorry to protrude; and then he. would retract; and then he would be in; and then he would be out ... that's as a person. Then again; his Deputy, Ray Herbert, would call and say. "I just. don't : understand Cable 18963 IN from Guatemala _today. Would you come over and explain to me what that's all about;" and I would step out of the maelstrom of JMATE ... they were just working flat out ... and go over. There would be the old WH types doing their thing in the old WH way. - Maybe two cables a week from the stations, and quite leisurely ... I think what had happened.to J. C. King was that he had stayed overlong in.the same job; and he was "Mr. WH," by Gawd. With the excep- tion of: first Guatemala and then Cuba, there was very little that ever happened in Latin America which got to be, given our other worldwide responsibilities in the DDP, a very front: priority matter; and consequently, at Staff meetings, for example, they would go around and talk: about the Soviet Union and China and — Europe and even Africa. Then, if there was any time left, J. C. King would have his time at. bat and report some relatively minor thing. Except in the case of Guatemala there was, as everybody knows now, a very substantial paramilitary operation which was run by Richard M. Bissell in-his capacity as Special As- sistant to the Director for Planning and ‘Coordination. - think that one of the many reasons -«- and I never was able to get much in the way of history on Guatemala as an aid , to the study of the Cuban operation ... while the latter was in process ... was ~ 36 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET that this had never set very well with J. C. King. He was divested of the Guatemalan experience, and particularly when it turned out to be a success .... PBSUCCESS was a success, through dumb luck more than anything else. J.C. ... ‘couldn't take-any of the bows for it. All right, that rankled, I am sure. - Now this one comes along, and rather than ex- pand WH/4, or whatever the hell it was, and leave this JMATE Project within that _Branch, and build up that Branch -- oh, no. Once again the same man, Dick Bissell “--= now, however, DDP instead of SAPC -- becomes the case officer for the thing; and his assistant, Tracy Barnes, is all over him. One of J.C. King's few very good men, Jacob D. Esterline, is pulled aside and made Chief of the project ... The old man had a great deal of amour propre, J. C. King did. He was very vain. He had all of the area expertise that one “would like to see in a Division Chief, but he had been at it an awful long time. It was a very incestuous Division. In terms of the rotation, it was solely within WH. There were very few people in WH who had served outside of the “Western Hemisphere, except in Washington. They were a tight-knit little group, and here now, for the second time running, one of their big chances to shine -- there was a lot of money and all that kind of stuff -- again had been taken away ... and it was ... it was tough. 9/ Where Drain implied that J. C. King was cut com- pletely out of WH/4 activities and operations, Mr. Bissell had indicated that the situation was somewhat different. In the course of an oral interview, the - 37 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET former DDP responded to questions concerning J. C. King in the following manner: Question: I would like to clarify at this point J. C. King's relationship | to the Bay of Pigs project. I have heard it -on both sides -- that he was involved and that he. was deliberately. end-run. Mr. Bissell: There. is no doubt in my mind that that was the case. I was going to say that both of the things that you have heard have an element of truth in them. There was a deliberate decision fairly early in the game -- I doubt if it was as early as March ' (1960. In fact,] I am pretty sure that it wasn't, [but] I am reasonably sure that the decision I speak of was made by some such date as June [1960] -~ {that] Esterline would take charge of this Project and Esterline would have direct access to me. He would. not be under. the usual requirement of all the cases going through J. C. King. Now, as the scope of the scale of this operation increased, and with the passage "of time, Esterline's direct channel to me came to be more exercised; and there was frequent interchange between Ester- ‘line and myself that didn't go through J. C. King in the gense of a command channel. On the other hand, J. C. . ‘ was brought into all the consultations and was fully informed from the very beginning about this operation. His advice was sought and given, and I usually found it very good and followed it. I remember no specific case where either J. C. King's specific advice or general attitude toward the operation was inconsistent with, or in conflict with my own. -~ 38 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET mid-November 1959 were roughly $80,000 each for the operations in and plus an addi- tional $12,000 for intrusion broadcasts which would originate within Cuba. 2/ Before the end of November, the plans to utilize had been abandoned because it was feared that the would not. give his approval for such an activity;. and by the early part of December, [| |naa made it clear that he did not want the propa- ganda operation to be set up in| | Conse=— quently, there was considerable discussion about the possibility of getting permission Erom a ercseutntiie —sennnseentt —n | to agree to permit the broad- casts from his country. Some members of the Special Group also suggested the possibility that the anti- Castro broadcasts might be originated from other of the Latin American countries, a project which Mr. Dulles discouraged because of the lack of suitable ‘broadcast facilities that would be available in coun- tries outside of the immediate Caribbean area. Some- where along the line C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A and Mr. Bissell's right hand man, came up with the = 206 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 131. 132. 133. 134.) 5 TOP SECRET Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 19 Oct 60, sub: Use of. US Contract Personnel for JMARC Maritime Operations. Ss. Cable to JMASH from Director, 9 Nov 60, DIR 10738 (OUT 90611). S.- Cable to Director from MADD, 1 Nov'60, MADD 8452. (IN 36407). —=S. Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. ett., Tape l, p. 7. i , - 365 - TOP SECRET