183 CONFIDENTIAL Commission, it is conceivable that the Commission would have | nm wanted to examine that point further. Are you familiar with the allegations that were made | by a Mexican citizen named Gutierez? The real question that comes up in my mind there is whether this might not have been done more or less in = =| Mr. Rocca. You would have to tell me more about ' ! I a 3 | Gutierez, because I don't recognize it from that name, = | though it may again be one of the things that I took up. | S 8 Mr. Goldsmith. Gutierez was the Mexican citizen who } us 7 said that he saw an individual whom he later recognized to e H : = ia | be Oswald leaving the Cuban Consulate with another individual = iby and that the individuals were discussing something sinister. | ba it : > _ it . H ~ = Gutierez may have further alleged that he saw money change © ‘2 . S aan hands as well. = i = tat . . c } . ee Please read number 1979, which will adequately refresn = 1S your recollection, I think, on his statement. ; “ aan (Pause) ee | * M7 \ Mr. Rocca. Oh, this is the famous “observed in. z nan mid morning." = 1g \ - ii (Pause) | ce. | o 0 | Mr. Rocca. I would simply have to restudy the | 2 | . re . ‘ ee ‘ whole thing. It just doesn't register with me. I mean, wo ~~ y I would have to go over the report. I think this is another 3 , Matter that they did discuss, the Gutierez lead. z DEN TIAL i i) DoclId: 322763409 Pave 136 . ALCERSON a fo) Q aT) jn U Hi ORTING COMPANY, INC.
CONFIDENTIAL 184 the FBI line. It certainly doesn't ring any bell to me. Mr. Goldsmith. Essentially, to refresh your memory , ~> te Gutierez alleged. that he saw Oswald and someone else leaving | | ) the Cuban Consulate, that the individuals got off in acar, | ~ “i took off in acar. He overhead a conversation that was, at . 2 i | w Hy : o 3 | least to him, sinister in nature and made an allegation that , a if : = > | = a payoff was supposed to have occurred, possibly in that car. = 4 . i = Does that -- “ 4 | < | Mr. Rocca. This is something that, as I say, I have i i = i no recollection of, and my feeling is that the Bureau did ‘ a i Zoi! = i whatever was followed up. C - Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the Bureau have investigated = i —_ i2 Hi ; i @ = this matter as opposed to the CIA? a | Mr. Rocca. Their jurisdictional authorities, I mean, = ' : £ is 4 ! = » were de facto in Mexico and they ran over everything. es 13 4 . . . . ~ i Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Bureau investigate Alverado? . “ 7 ll 2 \ There, it seems, that the Agency was responsible : = i for resolving that issue. | ! : = 7 Mr. Rocca. That might have been some kind of local, j c ' . : . S 0 | . | i private treaty. But de Paz, for example, they did the i qo BS : initial work and discredited her as a source. It was we, ee. : @ a i that is, Win and the Embassy man, who continued the interest i in it, with the Bureau's knowledge. 24 But my feeling is that they would not have accepted our investigation in a matter of that kind. They would have | CONPIDENTIAT DoclId: 322763409 Page 137
CONFIDENTIAL 185 py nh and hundreds of hours just going around Mexico City checking | up on Oswald. de | | gone over it themselves, and they did. They spent hundreds | { Mr. Goldsmith. So, your impression, then, is that 2, | ~ “iy the Bureau, rather than the Agency, investigated this issue? | ' i if a 2 | n s | Mr. Rocca. Could have. I mean, I'm trying to explain a i Ss 7 : Ss | why I don't remember anything about it. That certainly : = | doesn't strike a bell. ~ | Now, it may strike a bell with Whitten or somebody é nan else.that actually was vested with this area. = roa . : ' = i Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever attempt to a wt iW ‘ i . | determine whether it had obtained a photograph of Gutierez @ = 3 i outside the Cuban Consulate or Embassy? = it i = ts i _ ; Mr. Rocca. I cannot respond to that. % y t < fs Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Gutierez was = i : - | ever polygraphed? - if Mr. Rocca. No, I do not. 3 i 6 73 | ts = You see, I draw a complete blank on this one. ” = 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. S 20} , : i If you don't remember, I'm not going to press you are on it, Mr. Rocca. We are certainly not here to attempt { 2) am : © Se Vio @impiy sereate testimony. So, if you don't remember, I am | just going to withdraw. 44 Mr. Rocca. Well, you will fint people who will nM an remember, I am sure. DENTIZIAL q co) = > | H ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. Docld:32263409 Page 188
186 CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this allegation, Hy ! ' Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2020, and | 2 | read that document. : (Pause) : @ : 7 4 Mr. Rocca. I know of no followup or anything of that = ~~ 4 kind,-as a matter of fact. 2 i , a il . ; . ! ” at Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify the document ~ > 4 , | cs > Wf i iS ‘| for the record. S ~ a Mr. Rocca. It is a cable to the intelligence, the “ { : \s | -! 5 . : . . an j < "i counter intelligence community -~ White House, Department = iF : 4 i - Gg i = ‘“; of State, and the FBI from the Agency on Oswald on the = aan 26th of November, stipulating or setting forth information ; w 4 > - i ~ nam from Mexico regarding an alleged relationship between Oswald @ al ~ ! and Arnesto Rodriguez, who lives in New Orleans -- Arnesto - * i Rodriguez -- and runs a Spanish language school, and is | S ‘7. anti-Castro. ; 7 ey Mr. Goldsmith. Does the cable also make reference . ‘| t0 a tape recording? o y ! = a Mr. Rocca. According to Maria Rodriguez de Lopez, aA cod ; H S 20} \ fre) ~~ either of Oswald's connection with Arnesto Rodriguez or “{ | | | her son-in-law has a taped conversation with Oswald. | | | Tee ID ; ; ; ; Y fos , the fact of a possible tape recording was ever investigated |. a3 | ““ | by the Agency? 24 i F Mr. Rocca. No -- and it would not have been. ! Mr. Goldsmith. The reason for that would have been CONFIDENTIALS ALIERSON REFSCRTING COMPANY, INC. i Docld: 322763409 Page 169
CONFIDENTIAL 187 what, sir? Mr. Rocca. This is strictly within the investigative | responsibilities of the Bureau. { de “Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Bureau | ta ever pursued this lead? Os Mr. Rocca. I do not. 2002% (202) S5N-~2945 ~~ ~ fy | ! . . H \ . : . , . ; . 1 t This is not a matter -- in other words, this cable, | i in its entirely, is not anything regarding which I have any | < 7 background information. I don't know, therefore, whether z '€ | this was investigated. Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. . VrACTAL LT Mr. Rocca. I assume, however, that it was. Mr. Goldsmith. Now earlier, Mr. Rocca, you made ane be reference to an allegation by a woman named Elena Garro de AUT L DING , oO REPOATERS €£ after the assassination. ro Paz. | . ie Mr. Rocca. That's correct. “ 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you state generally for the : 8 record what that allegation was. : = es Mr. Rocca. Well, again, I would prefer to answer | = 2 | the question having the benefit of a re-reading of the | aoe summary that I gave for Mr. Belin. But not having it at : @ awd #3 this moment, it was she who came in around Christmas Day, : “ not Alverado. a Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Alverado came in shortly : li 4 Docld:32263409 Page 190
CONFIDENTIAL 188 Mr. Rocca. So, I correct that part. It was she. > She had become involved -- she is a highly 2 controversial right wing personality, (a poet), and had @ 4 | become involved in a situation with the secretary or the : 5 7 receptionist at the Cuban Embassy. : ! 4 i 2 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Silvia Duran? a i | 5 7! Mr. Rocca. Silvia Duran -- was a relative. | S a. They were hostile to each other. There was a long, | c | apparently, background to that effect. = i rhe i But she came in.with a story which concerned essentially the passage of money by a red-headed Negro at VASHTHGTON , the Cuban Embassy. But I cannot recall what her evidential-- ; ; ‘ what the crux of her evidence was in this. i | | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether she was referring ' H RULLDING, oO request -- that Mr. Scott pursued it very thoroughly. = iS to having seen this red-headed Negro at the Cuban Embassy ; * I$ | or rather at a party that was being thrown by Horatio ~ i an i “ 7 Duran? = = “| Mr. Rocca. You're quite right. It was at a party. = 2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this allegation 4 a ; 5 “| was ever investigated by the CIA? iat are Mr. Rocca. My feeling is from just reading the | eS Py! an | ; Y ) YR A | record -- and this came after, when I was working on the aa thing, reading the file in connection with Mr. Belin's Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, you indicated that CONFIDENTIAL MN SEPORTING COMPANY. INC. 3 Tr I mm ay Us Q 4i DoclId: 322763409 Page 191
ta ws a go: ” ~ t Nn i ‘ i wi ‘ wa Q | ~~ ™ oc nd } ws / — a “ a fe} Cc “~ . a ra) 7 famed . a = (0d = SC e = ' it ‘ a = : oe ‘ sli - Pa ‘~ a ye = : f = a4 fond tw it = . ~ if - u = ii = ta ; ‘ “f ab a hi - a & soi zl x ut ~ : u = le 4 = i = i . 1 ~! “ To i ~ i — : H = 3 pa t z i * = 13 1 = i? i ~ i i = | a = 20 | i 1 t ay t Fr ay a ©) oy { an i ee las & > ’ ‘i i 1 t } : 2404 ] ' i ‘Y t B ti hy oI uf ay DoclId: 322763409 Page 192 CONFIDENTIAL 189 Mrs. de Paz went to the Embassy around Christmas Day. | Do you recall what year that was? Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes. *. It was the end of '63, early '64. And, if it wasn't | Christmas Day, it was New Year's Day or the weekend, because there was -- her story was that her life was in danger. She had reported her information to the Minister of Interior or to the Gobernacion. They had put her up in a hotel. I mean, there was an entire scenario which she read. There were very few probative and evidential details to sustain her story. According to the record, as I remember it, the FBI representative regarded it as simply not so. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether she was given a polygraph? Mr. Rocca. No, I don't think she ever -- I remember nothing in the record that shows that she was polygraphed. Dyn we Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why she was not polygraphe whereas Alverado was polygqraphed? * Mr. Rocca. Was she? Mr. Goldsmith. I'll rephrase the question. Do you know why she would not have been polygraphed when someone such as Alverado was polygrapnhed? Mr. Rocca. No, I can't answer that. I think that probably it was because of the -- I CONFIDENT I Af. ALIDERSOMN RESORTING COMPANY, INC.
certain i ant who were 2 can gues de | ! was suff wn. | « ~ # aimpositi i fH = 74 2 "Paz went = ~ 4 of 1964? ; S entirely Pet 4 = id x 4 ~ if a) C i td = ,, |i aq if 3 = f Ss 3 x “A S * now that > a = ts 7 _ | had alre - i  red-head ed Bou = | story, t = | ~ 4 e : S 20 | ; in the p ! : 1} eee BS i i its work DoclId: 322763409 number 1 fF Page 193 CONFIDENTIAL 190 couldn't -- I certainly can't answer for the people -making -the operational decisions on the spot. I s that her story was simply not believed or there icient disbelief not to warrant that extent of on on her personality. Mr. Goldsmith. Are you certain that Elena Garro de into the embassy in December of 1963 or January Mr. Rocca. No, I'm not. I mean, I'm guessing Could it have been a year later? Ah. Of course. It was the next year that she walked in. It was the end of '64 or the beginning of '65. I recall this gives the link, because the Warren Commission ady issued its report which had mentioned the ed Negro and the lead, and therefore in reading her here always occurred the virus that she had simply taken advantage of an evidential detail which was already ublic domain. This is now my recollection. This is after the Warren Commission had completed | Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, according to CIA 957, which is part of the lengthy memo that you SCONPIDENTIALL BLIERSON RESCRTING COMPANY, INC.
CoOonFPIDENTIAL 191 | prepared for Mr. Belin, you indicate that the first reference hey to Elena Garro de Paz, or the first time she formally made @ a an allegation on. the record, was on 12 October, 1964. | Mr. Rocca. And the Warren Commission came out on che w i = oy first: of October. | i | Mr. Goldsmith. Would you plecse read through CIA i ~ S 7 | number 1957 through 1959, those three pages. : : | (Pause) < . Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed. This was my writeup of : = an the case, retrospectively, as one of those elements : ny that had happened after the Warren Commission had looked : _ * re after this, that suggested the possibility of Cuban involvement @ E ‘3 or that something further could be and should be done about | : i the Cuban aspect, should be undertaken. | = oe Mr. Goldsmith. That document makes reference to an : = | individual named Carvillo, who allegedly detained Elena Garro ~ \ : 7 de Paz at the Vermont Hotel in Mexico. : a Do you know whether Carvillo ever had any connection “ i ! = aa with the CIA? ¢ : : . i 5 20 | Mr. Rocca. No, I do not. | cee Mr. Goldsmith. What about June Cobb? Do you know “A a> ) whether she ever had any connection with the CIA? Mr. Rocca. I do not. She is a -- I thought you were going to say DGI. “ Doesn't she come in in some kind of -- i . CONFIDENTEZIAL ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INS. Docld: 32263409 Page 194
192 CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Goldsmith. .Do you know whether she ever had any wo ona | connection with DGI? Ps 3 | Mr. Rocca. This is what has been alleged in the : ‘| record, but I can't accept that as evidence. | : a As far as I know, there is:.no investigative | 3 7 substratum for that. | ~ H = | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether anyone ever | = i : 4 approached Carvillo and asked him-- | © a Mr. Rocca. No, I do not. | = ia | Mr. Goldsmith. -- why he detained Elena Garro de Paz? : Ho Mr. Rocca. No, I do not. | on * a Certainly that part of it entered into the period | “ = i bs e 3 of '63, if she was telling the truth. Of course, we don't = il vl know whether she is telling the truth because she told her E I story for the first time, as far as the record is concerned, ' a i 7 aan in '64, at the end of the year. | For that reason I inserted this into the record of 13 episodes that struck me as being at least interesting from the standpoint of re-reviewing the file, from the Cuban 300 7TH STREET, S.W. a1 : oes | Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2055. ‘i oN i Mr. Rocca. Where would that be? Are we using this number (indicating) ? 24 | i Oh, I see. | | | i! 20 | . . point of view. | | | | Mr. Goldsmith. Would you review that item? '?) Q a FIDEN TAT SON REPORTING COMPANY. Inc. DoclId: 322763409 Page 195
193 CONFIDENTIAL (Pause) | Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify that document? e : Mr. Rocca. This is a response by Mr. Helms to -- | 5 a memorandum by Mr. Helms to Mr. Rankin, General Counsel of | 5 : the Warren Commission, regarding allegations pertaining to | t } : 2 7 an intelligence training school in Minsk, U.S.S.R. | =: | & 7 Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of the document? | S : Mr. Rocca. I'm trying to find it up here. Maybe ! so 5 “you can help me: | = 10 | Mr. Goldsmith. The document appears to be undated, | : ul ! so we'll just have to refer to it again as CIA number 2055. | — = | It is possibly 5 June, 1964? | ¢ = 3 Mr. Rocca. I would say that that's close enough, ! = i = 4 inasmuch as Tom Hall, again the analyst who worked on Soviet g one matters’ in R & A, prepared it. | —_ es _ The allegations -- what would you like me to say about = i z Mr. Goldsmith. According to that document, there : ; i = iB was no reliable information indicating that there was a ; 5 | training school, an intelligence training school in Minsk, | : a is that correct? | oN | Mr. Rocca. That's correct, yes. 7 ' Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether subsequent to the ; 3 time that this document was written any information was obtained indicating that, in fact, there was a training school ; , CON FPIODENTIAL DoclId: 322763409 Page 196 ALZERSON REPORTING COMEFANY, INC.
CONFIDENTIAL 194 of an intelligence nature in Minsk? 4 . ! Mr. Rocca. As far as -- to my knowledge, there was T no such. sj | Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I think that this might be x an appropriate time to break for the day. = i 1 wr 2 if ‘ w 2 . : _ i I have, I would say, no more than two hours of i “ foi . . os ~ } questions remaining. i = } | € i I would ask you to refrain from discussing or < | disclosing any of the testimony that you have given today = iG! : S ! to anyone else. = i] i . ; = i May I have your assurance on that point? 7 ., oo! i Mr. Rocca. You may count on it. @ al | = i Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you. | rs . i The reason I make that point is because the committee, = i & 155 = 4 when it takes a deposition, does not have the same effective es : « S| ; ; s authority as it does when it conducts a hearing in Executive | i i Session. = | . Mr. Rocca. I note that from your ground rules. = i But you may rest assured. e it ‘ S 30 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. ae ; I didn't want you to infer from the fact that I was CJ { ® ; asking that that I consider that a risk in this particular i a2 5 i | case. That is.a question or a statement that I routinely ! make. 25 4 i ; . ees In any. event, I think that we will resume questioning, CONFIDENTIAL i ; ALDERSOM REPORTING COMPAR’, INC. i Docld:32263409 Page 197
N TIA NFIDE co wn fon a cd) 16) ou S oO Ug & m S (@) “d 16) nd co) _—_ ico} My . E (@) * ) ae ce] G ae) ~ - ze) 4 . 0) 16) & Wv oq . Q 16) . Qy io) - oN ) (e) . ite) ™ yy se) ad Oo ° (e) 6) iit] OQ a 4 Oo oO 16) ; od 1d) oO (@) oO . ie) {e) qo ! a = . - a2 16) ‘dl v @) a) i - v G . fie} (e) .o)) coo) oY ' 4 ord 2Q ~ Q 3 4 oe se) foe) ran) O . ive) c ™~ ra) oq ue) & qi ie) fis) . aad M4 ‘ fea co © . G rd 3 18) 1@) U-f m O 16) Q, 16) Y S a] 16) 3 qd od [s) oO G a io} 4 [aa 4 @) Lp) M4 S co) ‘al E GS 4 = “J ~ sa a ~- © K o.UD Oo on w uM nt) <b) ui re 3 o & =| Oo - le) G oy V VW 6) - cl rae] “+ wy Te] ~ oo oa c = os oy ct e 30 !~ my O- 2 o a ShEZ-HSS (202) HZ0UZ “OCU SNOLONING YS TPH LUNIOU SYEUONUE CAS SaaS We ute } hy > @ a7 a “SS ct AL I MEANY, Ne ed ONFIDENT c iNC. Patan) 196 te -Doclda: 322763409 Page t
196 a Oo Z ry a] ee ry G | ri Mod Pz HOROWITZ:aph rm SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS . | Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy. row) Washington, D. C. 4+ Tuesday, July 18, 1978 For the Subcommittee: MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, COUNSEL AU EEL TING , ny & 4 i it Ht i w . ' : 5 $i * i Continuation of the Deposition of = i | wr s jf 4 ua Sou \ ~ ; RAYMOND G. ROCCA, ~ y called for examination by counsel for the Subcommittee, x 3 ff | a | pursuant to recess from the preceding day, in the offices wl 3! ; = : of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Room 3370, = id! , | = : House Annex Number 2, Second and D Streets, S. W., Washingtoni, 2 4, 4 : | 5 ? D. C., beginning at 10:20 o'clock, a.m., when were present: — = = | H i i e Before we get started on the actual substance of = CHARLES BERK, STAFF MEMBER. pe i (The witness, Raymond G. Rocca, having been : = | previously sworn, was called and testified as follows:) is Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I would like to thank you | = ie | ~ i for being here today. : | I would like to remind you that you are still under | cee | | 7! | the deposition, I would like to ask you whether you discussed’ qe |i ; the substance of yesterday's deposition with anyone? 23.3 Mr. Rocca. I did not. ; CONFIDENT? IA ! } t r it . SL, ASBA GM STBOCRTIS TOM eaAN YY, INC. Docld:32263409 Pdge 199 ALOGREON REPORT! r -
197 CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. bd | I believe yesterday we finished the session with a ., brief discussion of whether there was an intelligence training 4 4a school in the city of Minsk, and you indicated that in 1963 Mr. Rocca. I know nothing about what local schools | i 1 i 4 | a ~ | there was no reliable information indicating that, in fact, | : : : v © | there was such a school in Minsk. | Ss ai Do you have any other information that pertains . { to that point? ~ 7 Mr. Rocca. I think you have summarized exactly a H . = re what I said, that there was no confirmation available = H that there had been or was during the time that Oswald was 3 - ‘* 4 in Minsk a training school of the service in that city. fod it 1 = fi . © e074 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive any indication | Sora . a i subsequent to 1964 that, in fact, there was no such school 5 °~ + din Minsk? De i : an Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there has never been - + any confirmation or indication. Be : ; ' = Mr. Goldsmith. One way or another? CT | t i = iF 3 i = "| Mr. Rocca. One way or other. ¢ i ; S 20 ; , | Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. { ! AT Mr. Rocca. We're talking now about the KGB central @ NN headquarters, the people who would be actually responsible i | for the training. i 24 | 4 Mr. Goldsmith. Right. ; CONFIDENTIAL it SON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. | i ALS Docld:32263409 Page 200
or local provisions might be made by the White Russian -- nN this is the White Russian -- SSR -- republic. As far as ! ! . | I know, they have no school training there either. { . | de Mr. Goldsmith. So far as you know, the Warren Qrr ee | | | | | | | | : | | of operational significance? = =i Commission was given all of the information that was available i i | a “ S| on that point -- & fy Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed. | = a Mr. Goldsmith. -- and there has not been any additional o “| information since 1964 that touches upon it? cand : - Fal if i z nan Mr. Rocca. That's correct. = tro . . } ae Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area, now, would | ~S ; you indicate for the record what a 201 file is? & i , : : = +44 . . . . © e '- l Mr. Rocca.’ A 201 file is a jargon expression that iad it t = It “3 t4 . . i a ; grew up, I suppose, out of the old army system, 201 files in =x i i = IF World War II. It was applied when our files, CIA files, a i om si . ‘3 i were set up in 1947. I am speaking now out of hearsay. ~ i “a 7 7 > . : - ig The phrase applies to files created on personalities, for. a = a dossiers on personalities. They are referred to, in other = ! a t = OF . . = in words, broadly speaking, as 201 files. | e : oo . , t S 79} . ; ‘ - * Mr. Goldsmith. So, a 201 file essentially is a =~ Zhou . pe > , Dr f personality file? | ai 21 @ yy | Mr. Rocca. (Nods affirmatively.) aa | . . i Mr. Goldsmith. Does a 201 file contain information 26 | | { Mr. Rocca. Yes, it can. It dépends on how the } - CONFIDENTIAL LOERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. DoclId: 322763409 Page 201
199 CONFIDENTIALSB Material has been selected and put together. el Mr. Goldsmith. What is the criterion for the opening) of a 201 file? | ' | a3 H * Mr. Rocca. These are specified exactly in a handbook | i i} | 1 ij \ = - which-is written and to which I refer you. The criteria ‘ i, a . | . | “a é | have changed, or were changed, over the years, at the beginning o i | = Z to apply to individuals who were either agents or suspect = i | NN z q . . i = | agents of adversary services, all adversary services, s an intelligence, counter intelligence, sabotage interest, = i = a our own agents, collaborators, and others, at the determination, = tro . . . . . . . . | = ° j} 4=€@again in terms of criteria, who fell within the mission of | ~ ‘2 5 the Agency. ! rT Fe qe fs 4 These categories are specified and I refer you, then, ' >. 4 : = ra} : . : «  § to that publication. It's at the Records Integration Center.| = is Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to open a : . i 201 file? . i Mr. Rocca. Personally? 5 | # an Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. = 34 = i. Mr. Rocca. No. e ! . { ° ° | . o z0 | I always*would indicate this and have other people | pay , Go it. As far as I know, I have not ever done the process, © oN 4 except perhaps as a part at one point of my formal training | ” # or other. But I have no recollection of having opened a file. r Mr. Goldsmith. On those occasions when someone from the CI staff opened a 201 file on an individual, would the 4 te al 4 vot n : sl TON FPFPIODEN | ia ~ + sob 4 j LIOSREON REPORTING COMFANY, INC. Docld: 32763409 Pate 202 ; ALDGRSUre | RVING © rN
200 CONFIDENTIAL t i primary purpose of such an opening be to obtain information on > a person who was of potential counter intelligence significance? Mr. Rocca. It could be that. t It could be of purely passive interest. It is to wy = Q.: . | a serve aS a repository for the accession of additional informatior wr 2. 3 H “ o | of whatever kind, overt, covert, or whatever. a“ i fF | 2 So, it does not necessarily indicate any kind of - a s , . \ e aggressive interest at all. ™ i : | i a 3 | , . : It simply serves as the receptacle or repository i ic TON, for the retention of information, and recovery of information. ~ ‘ Mr. Goldsmith. If an individual is perceived as a WAS EET EM 3 . } counter intelligence threat, would a 201 file normally be opened? . BUTEDING, ao Mr. Rocca. Yes. At the time that the file was opened on Mr. Oswald, |; REPORTERS i which would be 1958 or 1959, my impression is that U.S. aWe wa .- | . | defectors were not in the list of individuals on whom files | by i = would be opened automatically by the Records Integration ~ i Division, which actually could do this and did it asa ” | matter of formal duty. noe 7 Mr. Goldsmith. So, there are categories, categories | S27 22 © —- \ of individuals, which automatically result in the opening { of a 201 file, whereas in some cases you are saying that a, i 26 | the opening of a file is discretionary. Is that accurate? \ 7 CONPFPIDENTTAL z a ALSENSON RE: Doclda:32263409 Page 203
, : CONFIDENTIAL 201 n> | { Mr. Rocca. It's an analyst's choice. | Mr. Goldsmith. But in some cases it might be | i 3 | : mandatory, and in some cases it would be discretionary? i Mr. Rocca. Well, according to the handbook it would ! = $j ; * 1 be mandatory. Whether it would be done or not would depend as H ~ upon the analyst's capacity to judge whether this fell within; N i : P= 7 it ~ | the mandate. = ~ 4 . . = | Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 796. a | (Pause) = : Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that : m ofl ok & | document? ‘ dle i} . . H t \! Mr. Rocca. This is a State Department document. = i ‘ = i es. ‘ = 4a x ; Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of that document? ea : Mr. Rocca. October 31, 1959. = | Mr. Goldsmith. That document indicates in = ; substance, does it not, that Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at S18 a | the American Embassy in Russia to renounce his American = ‘Ss = 1F f . . i ~ i citizenship? It indicates that he had applied for Soviet ec t : = 70 || | | i citizenship. It indicates, among other things, that his i 1 a : aS: ‘i attitude was arrogant, aggressive, he had recently been a 34 WR AA , @ _ i discharged from the Marine Corps, and it says he has offered . 234 : the Soviets any information he has acquired as an enlisted 44601 ; | vadar operator. Now, wouldthe information contained in this State CONFIODENTEZIATL ERSON REPORTING COMPahy, INC. z st acn Docld:322763409 Pate 204 : Aw ENS
202 CONFIDENTIAL ' t ! t Department telegram, which was routed to the CIA and wnich we have obtained from the Office of Security at the CIA -- | would the information contained in this telegram normally lead to the opening of a 201 file? ! ! ! i i he ' be passed to the appropriate office for action? | fy ‘4 { Act y we is ,Y > oe Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. There obviously should ‘ ce / 2 3 a so Mr. Rocca. It depends on where it went in the Agency a | If it went to the Office of Security, they would have opened | = a their own file on it. But if a copy did not go to the DDP | i | = i j S a at that time, the Deputy Director for Plans, there would be v3 no way of knowing about it. = So, I cannot respond. | = ; S But normally, that would have been actionable, i “te a I would say retrospectively. And I have no knowledge whether en u : z ., i © a " or not it ever did come into our hands at that time. - i : = ie Mr. Goldsmith. Right. % 2 2 lS We will get into that momentarily. “ is Mr. Rocca. As a matter of fact, I think the substance = i “ 1 | of this cable was reported in the newspapers. - i = a Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any formal communication | = 3 i . . ‘ e Fi channel between the Office of Security and DDP which would : ° 2 | serve the purpose of having communications of this kind i 7 4 if i be. But if the people in the Office of Security will receive this, inasmuch as it concerns an American, and it was presumably relevant to their interest in Americans, and possible ~- ON PIDENTEIAL i 4 i ‘| ALG SRSON FEPCARTING COMPANY, INC. Docld:32263409 Paye 205 Alek
cONFIDENTIA 203 ti security interests from the defensive security point of view ww normal liaison, which would be via a liaison officer or simply a routing slip from the chief of the Office of in i | } { . i | of CIA itself, they might not do it, in which case the . | i | { | } Security would not take place. é Mr. Goldsmith. More specifically, then, is there 7! any link between the Office of Security and the CI staff 3 which would serve the purpose of passing information of this 20696 C207) Sou. 2545 o kind to the CI staff, as it would seem that the information a = '© | contained in this memo is relevant to the CI staff in = oe particular, rather than any of the divisions within DDP? : wa it 4 = - ft . . . ~ “il Mr. Rocca. Well, you are again looking at it with = i  ) = '3 | 20-20 hindsight. There certainly were all the channels = HH { = i } = t¢ | that one could expect in an organization, as I indicated | = i = is ; on the chart yesterday, for the passages of such a piece = 13 | of material. In point of fact, State should have routed ~ Hi} : _ ‘f/f it to the DDP. com | . i a 4, ; = nan It is in that kind of routing and selection that you | = '? | could get slippage. | . : = 4 | Mr. Goldsmith. So, if I understand your testimony, | i ame *' | it is that, in fact, there was a communication channel Dose i ) yal os i between Office of Security and CI staff which would serve the, "~ i purpose of passing along this type of information. Whether | | or not the information in fact was passed along is another i question. But there was a channel. een cee eee Go my: - DM SESORTING COMPANY. INS. ALTERS Doclda: 32263409 Page 206 *
204 CONFIDENTIAL wa Mr. Rocca. Oh, indeed. Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to review a document: ces) | that is known as Warren Commission Exhibit 917. de I might note for the record that at the bottom of the Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that a ¥ ps = : i ~ “| exhibit there is an indication that the document was routed a . | | ° ‘| to the CIA, although there is no indication specifically | o 7 3 -4 ~ | which office at CIA received this document. | < | Warren Commission Exhibit 917, for the record, is a : | confidential message from the Navy to the Chief of Naval < i, Operations. = | (Pause) ; tS} i : | t | document? KUTLDIN rm x : Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed. | Mr. Goldsmith. We just might note for the record PPEGRPERS fue = is that this document is somewhat briefer than the earlier . a | one you just reviewed, the State Department cable dated : é 8 | 10-31-59. This one also states that Oswald was in the 2 : i. Marine Corps as a radar operator and has offered to furnish : . 9 | the Soviets information he possesses in U.S. radar. | i } ae Again, would the information contained in this type | r raw = | of communication normally lead to the opening of a 201 file? a Mr. Rocca. In the DDP. At that time, as I say, it was not automatic. Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. Your testimony is cow PF IDEN TIAL ‘ ALLRSRSON HERPORTING COMPANY, INC. Docld:32263409 Page 207 nme =
205 very clear on that. It-would have been something no a | { | | discretionary. i | Mr. Rocca. Yes. | | Defectors was added as a mandatory category as a x ~ | consequence of this whole case. ° ‘| Mr. Goldsmith. I might point out that -- N " ' { c 7 t ™ f ° . : : . : ~ | Mr. Rocca. So, if I were reviewing this thing and = “ {| it had come across my desk, I would certainly expect it to = : go to a 201 file. ~ id | : 5 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. S i ; = i Mr. Rocca. But there would be other 201 files, — ‘{ e | or other files, that ought to receive it, too, including @ é ~ the Office of Security. = i H x Mr. Goldsmith. What is CI7SIG? tai 4 ' = ti 4 . . ; ¢ i Mr. Rocca. CI/SIG is Counter Intelligence, Special i ~ | Investigations Group. oo . vl ; tt 17: ; , 2 - Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the purpose of that | = | group was in 1959 to 1960? | = it Mr. Rocca. Well, this group was set up originally | c 5 . cs 76 | ; | when the staff was set up and before I joined it. So, are you rosie | limiting your question only to that time or to its general @ “~~ |) functions? ; Mr. Goldsmith. My question was focusing on the period i 1959 to 1960. (Pause) Be fi tt dl 4 n Docld: 32263409 Page 208 ALSEPS
CONFIDENTIAL 206 { | i 1 Mr. Rocca. The point is that it was set up to handle > 4 * e G * e ! especially sensitive casas in the area of security of personnel : { ts and in particular, cases involving security of personnel | fe who were also of operational interest, as were operators. | 2 = * | In other words, it was an interface with the Office ' i 4 7 of Security. s | Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, when you say ! = | S an security of personnel, you are referring now to CIA -- . = | : : < 7 | Mr. Rocca. DDP personnel, and Agency personnel to | c i i = ey the extent that they might affect the DDP's interests. = ~ This was the channel to the Office of Security. , UAL Mr. Goldsmith. So, is it fair to say here that the purpose of the CI/SIG unit was to insure that DDP was not BUTEDTHG ry f= being penetrated by a foreign intelligence service? Mr. Rocca. That, I think, would probably be one of the LETHE REFONTERE sensitive kinds of cases that they would be interested in. : v4 Mr. Goldsmith. What other types of sensitive types ! : a of cases would they be interested in? ! | ! : BI Mr. Rocca. I think they would probably have been | = 2 | interested in any kind of case involving security of DDP | eee personnel, or operations like the LINGUAL operation, which : he ‘ nD mS was placed within its purview. That involved, in other e 2 a n> mn produce information, again bearing chiefly on the: security s jh | | | 4 words, sensitive work against the Soviets designed to | | | of personnel and of operations. : { CON PFPIODENTIAL, vb 2 U u vu oO ot] { QO COMPANY, INC. Docld:32263409 Page 209 ALG:
CONFIDENTIAL 207 Mr. Goldsmith. When would someone within the w oo CI/SIG unit have occasion to open a 201 file? Mr. Rocca. I would imagine that they would have had de that occasion whenever a question arose that concerned x a people that came within the purview of the mission that I “ S| have described, namely, the pemetration of our operations ~ i ~ | or the advancement of our particular interests with respect _ 4 { & 2 | = i to the security of those operations. These now become very “ il = | difficult questions to answer without some thought, because | ql S i I would have to think of, really, general trains of operations, = | and in that area I was not, of course, briefed. But I think - 2 i H = _ i eC ~ f in substance what I have said covers what I know about it. = f , @ = Mr. Goldsmith. Okay. = ! | Pa ° i You just made a reference to -- 7 | Mr. Rocca. I mean, there were many sensitive areas | a i - ~ i that involved aspects, that involved sources and access to a i7 3 , ; 2 materials that were of higher classification than what you i have shown me. = 5 | Pat iFyou . . : = i Mr. Goldsmith. You just made reference to having 1 been briefed. i ' SS a Would larify for the record what you mean by ESE | ou you clarify y having been briefed. e / v f at Saeed n t i Mr. Rocca. Did I say -- I did not say that. Mr. Goldsmith. I think that you did, and what I suspect you referred to was during your time in the Agency CONFIDENTIAL : ALEERSON =ZPORTING COMPANY. INC. Docld: 32263409 Page 210
CONFIDENTIAL 208 things that you may have been briefed upon. | wn) Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes. I mean, I was not briefed w on the entire range of their operations. de Mr. Goldsmith. You were not briefed by the Agency ~ i. for this deposition, were you? = _ i Mr. Rocca. I was not. = 7 i . | ~ Mr. Goldsmith. You weren't briefed by anyone of the | xg | = | Staff prior to taking the deposition? soot | | Mr. Rocca. Indeed not. I have had no contacts : 1 | whatsoever about this. | ft Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. WACITHCTON I just wanted to clarify that. (Pause) . HUTEDTNG, oO req ! person had a relationship with: the Agency? . f) Mr. Rocca. One of the categories for opening a file, s Mr. Rocca. The specific purpose that lay behind € ~ the creation of this office I think grew out of the penetrations ~ i of OSS by the Soviets. : a i7 | ! a | ' Mr. Goldsmith. Okay. = | Getting back to the concept of a 201 file, will a = 19 | | = } 201 file always indicate whether the individual involved » ce } i c 30 «| Oe) - | . . . . . ' had a relationship of some kind with the Agency, either as ata ar . aOS5r" i an agent, a source, a contract employee, whatever? By looking: wr 4s. | 0 i @ ™~ | at a 201 file, will you always know whether, in fact, the 23 si! | 1 > in for opening a 201 file, was the contractual or fiduciary : - CONFIDENTIAL a il 4 TERSCN REFORTING COMPANY, INC. Docld: 32263409 Page 211 ALDERSS