30, CTA. Complex Hoscaw ANATOLE said it would be necessary to research ane cellate all the information about CIA officers and operations in Moscow includ visitors, i.e., TDYers, to get a picture pes Nt age) of their activities, associates, KGS officers they met and operational activities which might have made them vulnerable. ANATOLE opines NOSENKO should know more specifics about this and ‘that later it will be necessary to question him with snecifics . 1 On ee during the confrontation stage after comparing late elicitat results with collateral details. 31. A Gode Clerk in American Fmbassy i ith Spanish Language or Spanish Rackground. _ ANATOLE noted the reference in the paper re Vladimir Lwovich ARTEMOV to NOSENKO's information that ARTEMOV knew Spanish . and said there might be a connection to something he vaguely | ‘recalled about an interest in or a case against an American code clerk of gpanish background ar who spoke Spanish. ANATOLE said the’ period was 1957-69, He could not recall details. He sald this ‘should be considered a special case for him to work on? now for later questioning of NOSENKO if research indicated this necessary. ANATOLE requested sfor review any information available re code clerks, civilian or military, in Moscow 57-69 with Spanish laneuage or backround, HY 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 23
32. Viad ANAT of NOS asked oe ~~ “curren imir SUSLOV and Vasiliy V. OLE agreed that the questi STENINS rtf paragra mien reviewing paper with e VARERES Fs qr V iY ons re VAKHRUSHEY should citation stares. ANATOLA (SM NOTE: Question — oh ll by SM on basis ANATOLE. Pe, of course, had high'US Government contacts including some early 1950 work on U.5. intell A sp or documentary Foreign Rel Of VAXHRUSREV's them. He would like te see them too. (S) 1964 interview). ANATOLE thinks there may be a NOSENKO's schooling and VAKIIRUSHEV's sch Institute af eid not knew if poAtngent at th HW 53216 ck. ANATOLE DocId: 32404746 igence community reviews.) * ecific question ANATOLE as information that VAXHRUSH ations. He also asked if wife(s) available and if Foreign Languages. T had t { there was any collateral es Institute of Fereien/In projects ti Page 24 1 q £2Q -was ahout any collateral EV attended the Institute there were photographs SENKO had identified SM NOTE: See 12 August sienificant asnect about . ocling which needs checking. fATOLE that I : STR . NOSES KO was Lornational Relations noint on the Lorical
nrogression of NOSENKO's schooling in the military and probability that higher education would have been under military unless some special family or other influence permitted change. He also notes MOSENKO's continuation in Naval Service and confirms he saw NOSENKO. in Navy uniform in March 1953 in KGB Hdqs. ANATOLE suggests this aspect be reexamined after elicitation in Light of NOSENKO's answers and information about YHRUSHEV and SUSLOV, who was in Institute of Foreign Relations. ANATOLE says CHURANOV was in Foreien Relations Institute. and that cae. ae , Cuk was in Military Institute. ANATOLE speculates this ya be rd area where NOSENKO is hiding his close relationship with Guk - that he might have first known Guk in the Military Institute although GUK a couple of years older than NOSENKO Guk worked in GRY but ANATGLE does not remember if Navy. ANATOLE says he/ considers futher elicitation later and also a surprise question on new polygraph about NOSENKO's attendance at the Military Institute. A. The paper. NOSENKQ ” 's Defection was read by ANATOLE owwith interest. Tr did not have 2 copies of this paper. ANATOLE was told. a copy would be furnished him at next meeting. Certain comments which follow are based on information from this paper but a specific comment by ANATOLE was (see para 2 page 2 of paper): It is true TSYMPAL was a former member of Department 4, fond ct is A ee illogical that TSYMBAL was transferred to the Illegal Nrrectorate and more illogical he would travel with: the delegation if he were head of the Illegals Dyrecto ute. As Head of the 4th HW 53216 DocId:32404748 Page 25
Pepartment he would go with the delegation hut nermaily and te logically there would be no mixing of Legal and illegal elements. r 2 he KGB would not permit any publicity or identification of -} TSYMBAL if he were head of the Illegals, ANATOLR can only conclude ‘this information is to create the impression of reorgant ation after his defection. B. ANATOLE also points ont the Lllegic aspect of a Tourist Department officer as security officer to such a delegation. He nlso notes that when senior officials such as GROMYKO travel there are specially assigned expert security officers with their dele ions if any are sent at all. He notes that for the most yart the ‘senior officials travel without security officers except protective experts ass igned such as would be the situation NOSENKO . describes. ANATOLE says a basic questicn for confrontation will be about the inclusion of a "snectal security officer” ina . delegation such as ono headed by the Foreign Minister. He says the inclusion of a person such as NOSENKC is very unusual. The Foreign Minister and his aldes, etc., are trusted men who go abroad regularly. These are always experienced RGR officers. on the operations in support of the delegations and the planning fe well in advance. These officers can handle anything. At a is ~~ ‘Later date ANATOLE says we can confront } NOSENKO with ti opposite pesition from ANATOLE, HW 53216 DocId: 32404748 Page 26
C. ANATOLE said the story about NOSENKO's role with - SHARHOV just pives a reason to us ahout why NOSENKO was in 7 Geneva There would he no reason for any special interest by NOSENKO. ‘The rosidentursa could and would handle any technical csvices and operations such as NOSENKS describes. D., VALE Dhorsxtry ANATOLE found this connection and fi nal drinking hont Interesting and said b Qo th Guk and KREPKOGORSKIY would know what NOSENEO's mission was in 1962. T ceculd provide ne information about KR :EPKOGORSX “TY and ANATOLE asked to see photo of KREPKOGORSKIY, ni re He} no g he could not recall name. ANATOLE asked for information aboute (SM NOTE: SM needs Be check si gnificance - where in "NOSENKXO - Defection™ y paper. | What HOSENKO say, etc.). F. ANATOLE says a later question NOSENKXO should be asked, why in 1962 he rejected ‘the dea of using his position in ene Tourist Department as the logical nosition from which he could keep in contact with AIS, i.e., a tourist sent to be rectuited hy NOSENKO, etc. 33. Personnel of Ist Section, 1st Pent. 1959 - 61 ANATOLE believes this will be important area for later elicitation and, nerhans, confrontation after we have onaortunity ta analyze overvything NOSENKO says vs the enllateral and ANATOLE’ « inforaation Te will he , to research this, HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 27
HW 53216 Docld:32404746 Page 28 sugeests we double check the debricfing of e SOSENKD's approach and reexanine RRM background becn doing to see if there is anything which anda what he has £ looks significant now, i.e., anything important given hindsight 34. The Maurice De Jean Case ANATOLE said it was important to line out in quotes by date everything that NOSENKO sald about De Jean and do the same for the information from Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV. These | so should then be lined out and chronologically compared with what ANATOLE said. On the basis of these conclusions and the time " sequence we shouldeetHer examine the problem of the leakage of lead information to try to get indications#nt® least of how, why and where ANATOLE's information leaked. ANATOLE said we should also consider the vossible problem of leakage in connection with the WATKIN's Case and the RCMP in this. He also notes that GRIBANOV's role and visit to Paris may be important so when MOSENKO responds to questions about GRIBANOV we should examine this aspect also. 2 Specifically, NOSENKO should comment ahout why GRIBANGV went to 35. BUSHEK and GRIBANOV In connection with discussions ahout GRIRANOV and his trin in 1964, we discus the BUSHES case ond ANATOLE was told tie following re chronolosy:
18 January NOSENKD) to Geneva from Paris. 4 Feb (SM believes) GRIBANOV arrives Paris from Vienna - REEL Da RE al NOSENKO defects. 7 Feb, GRIBANOV departs Paris for Vienna (GRIRANOV uses name CorRSuveV in Vienna and with BUSHEK.) 12 Feb Soviets in Switzerland strongly protest to Swiss about NOSENKO's defection. 14,Feh (maybe 13 Teh.) GRIBANOV, according to RUSHEK, relaxed about NOSENKO defection when RUSHEK raised question. «a £ JATOLE suggests questions re BUSHEK come later. 36. Recall Telegram SO It is apparent to ANATOLE there is significant in- formation about this aspect of the NOSENKO case from the FRI. This goes to the. basic question of cooperation with the FBI and his knowledge ne concedes is a basic FRI decision avout. what he -se ses of the recall telegram information. ANATOLE has seen only NCOSENKO's information (transcripts, etc.). The . ra ‘ significance of this may bear on the question ef rank discussed separately but even without being able to discuss all aspects — ~ _of the recall telegram with ANATOLE he suggests we should examine if we have not done this the details of NOSENKO's ‘admissions he lied about his rank and the recall telegram. ANATOLE says it is necessary te determine: the exact date NOSENKO hroke on -eacn stery; who was involved: who knew he was being pressured; was there coordination with the FRI about the pressure on the recall ‘telegran; HW 53216 Docld: 32404748 Page 29
: Ty > : sit. ~ -20- what and who led us to conclude the stories were false; what were the dates involved hetween NOSENKO's story of the telegram and the information from another source(s); was there time for NOSENKO to confirm his use of the recall telegram story: could patty the message from NOSENKO have gotten to another source or wonld aed “ jt appear the telegram story had to be nisnned in advance and gered by confirmation from NOSENKO, after NOSENKG broke ied Nt “not trig was the other source(s) confronted; was there any change in the velations with the other source(s); has there been any collateral information reflecting KGB knowledge he has broken on rank or the 3 telegram stories. ANATOLE «suggests this aspect of the question fst ot a of dona fides come later in confrontation and he assumes SM will be covering this fully even though he hopes there will be permission for him to be fully read into this. le was told, for the record since he obviously understood the implications, I could promise nothing- sin nce any discussion abont the recall telegram and: any other source would mean opening to him full information about any source since everyone, including the FRI,knew he would never he satisfied with partial limited information. He laughingly agreed he would press for full information but did concede he might . (temporarily?) settle for less than the full seurce information arte if the context of the information about NOSENKO was complete and he could understand the significance of the source's po osition, etc. HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 30
- 30- I said we would think about what could he done but that optimism was not in order. 37. NOSENKO Statement Condemning Soviet Regime ANATOLE outlined the steps to be taken to ohtain from NOSENKO a statement which in its ultimate written form may serve both as a control and a prop anda instrument. ANATOLE believes that leading NOSENKO to a final absolute written and documented statement against the Soviets will not only nermit us to judge NOSENKO more accurately by observing his reactions but also provide additional psycholopical pressure useful in the final stages of dealing with NOSENKO when we confront him with the evidence we know he was on a mission. ANATOLE believes the final denunciatory statement may help tip the balance in gaining NOS SENKO's cooperation/confession. ‘The steps to be taken are as follows: - "AL Elicit from NOSENKO statements as detailed and ° specific as possible condemaing the Soviet regime, the KGB, the party, individuals, etc.. This should be at a fast tempo, (Th can begin immediately.) . B. After reviewing these statements elicit from NOSENKO increasingly detailed condennatory statements ‘by having him add details about persons and activities. . C. Cencurrent with 47A above NOSENKS should be asked PY “7 7 to enumerate in detail each example of -those things he did, ‘saw . * ar heard about which brought him to the peint of defection. Tf a st r stage in the * he dees not mention the KGR then at Lat x elicitation precess he ig phat pressed far reasons he dislikes “ BaF Bae HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 31
-31- , ' the KOR. Ke should be led to make statements about repugnant £GR techniques such as blackmail, betero-sexual and homosexual entranments ainst diplomats, tourists. preminent Western 2 59 pwr oO sgust at wh ra oe scienti wa , etc. He should be led to express his ¢ every stage about the intimidation practiced and should include Russian youth and the spying on intellectuals. D, After NOSENKO has enumerated and elaborated his denunciation and condemnation of the Soviets, orally and at length he should be asked to write in his own words a statement which he will agree can be published. He should be asked at this point, although it may he necessary to ask him earlier, if he is prepared to make an official statement condemning the Soviet regime and specific people. We will he told that with his cooperation we want to expose the Soviet regime on the basis * of.real knowledge. This first statement will be revised by us “ to include specifics and which will incluse statements such as "T condemn SHELEPIN, GRIBANOV, etc. for - 8 - - -"3 "T condemn | CRIBANOV for forcing me to engage in reprehensible homosexual s entrapments - - “3; "I condemn a systen which deals in misinformation i and confusion such as that led by AGAYANTS - - ©. E. At a later stage after review of his other statements about personnel, the KGB organization, etc: as fFallow- up Re should in interview only detail. what steps were taken to counteract the damage from GOLITZYN's defection and the KCR Ne reorganization Ne should list ali personnel structural aid ’ ‘ >. a tet ELL § | 33216 DoclId: 32404746 Page 32
particularly the functional changes in the KGB. He should asked the specific questi ion of when was a conference held to consider the imnact of GOLITZYN's knowledge anout tourists and the loss of documents. te should relate this to the 1984 Tourist Conference he says was scheduled. FP. The final written condemateory statement will he considered for publication with or without NOSENKO's approval or key element in assessing é agreement. The statement should he a ft his reaction at the nolnt where his confession/cooperation is solicited and he is told it will be published. 38. -NOSENKO's "SASHA" Case eee ae ee NN ee ai nape ee tak cece oa fm are eh There was little discussion of this except to consid need to review more and consider this a topic for later questioning. ANATOLE considers this a topic worth more study and ‘review on the basis that something may have been overlooked ‘ which relates to misinformation ahout the American Embassy.or American personnel. We should not consider this case closed and “more research is needed. . (ANATOLE sees no relevancy to the questions re GOLITZYN. If we have some operat lonally significant angle he can approve ‘questions but he sees none - he finds this unnecessary and question ‘15 especially unnecessary. ANATOLE HW 53216 DocId:32404746 Page 33