13-00000 Sreemeae we nomen Sanne sks han abe d ARA REN RETO ia ieee a Cr Agel ep wees oe aoe . me ve ay - 8 ae There hag been a lack of useful intelligence on Cuba. This has caused the U. 8. oe a tostententiog inte ob aenbincia.on: _ pfittliigense sperations with a eaeeanpe ik of- emphasis on a wast amounte of ouerant operational tntelligente are ceeded. ‘ke phtovity for this operational type intelligence has been relegated ‘@ & velatively unimportant station in the epectvum of our iutelli« gence requirements for Guba, This is partieviariy true when there — ate limited assets and se much pressure to obtain réliatle informa- tlen.or confirmation on sophisticated ‘conventional weapons or Soviet i activities, Normally, different methods of operation are employed. | pee cae: Myslent exvircnment for hove soubiog eperesipon) "ye abn Se petsncd out that the tack of babdlllgunce hos bees uged as & crutch in net preseing for more clandestine operations - astiess. Thie view can be justified, but no commender commits forces on the battlefield ever knowa all he wants to knew: ‘hhe . enemy, Somewhere in between lies the anewar, Therd must be an acéeptance of cortaia, aps im operational intelligence and consequently fitlonal risks; otherwise, mo meaningful actions Os PARAMETERS OF FUTURE AGTION This portion of the paper ie designed to indicate in general terms the latitude of dandastine and covert actions based upon past experience and those pertinent factors which might serve to Limit ioe ea B., sctian in Chase areas. Tale shal ‘be interpreted : .  Clussdgetinn eid ehvart activities price ta tad dating thie Bay of Pigs operation ean be characterized as bold and far reaching. The futave orientation of U. &. activity in thie fleld ia conditioned largely by the follure of that eperation. Clendestine and gevert actions eince April 1961 ean be summarised ac being cautious, intermittent, end low level. The current aftention directed towards "things Guban'' places even more stringent requirements on U, &. activities in the clandestine and covert envivdnmaent.
13-00000 Following are examples of tha types of activities which could be undertaken. This ic mot an exhaustive lat, anh Raa eae ~Ailestenta tho typee of etiety which ight he eonslfoned. & . ence and Counte ence w Interrogation of refugees. (2) Counterintetligence tn 8. 5. (3) Legal travellers. ee O Shameciacumce | a oe (6) Communictitions survelilence. e (@} Eeternal sourees (whore , Gata be oe yepre- sented officially or quasi-officially or where refugees and : Qwavellers can be reached). (8) Intelligence provided by third countries. . (9) Bedectors (inside or cutside Guba}. [tie — ' important to mete that the eceurlty mechanism in Cuba renders auspected potential defectogs relatively insceessible. The development of a deleute wales requires vact emeunte of : re at ttnaal siete oh has nat heen available. “There . , whe might defect if there was any reasonte believe they could leave Cubs. Those-who have sought asylum in other embasaies in Havana have beew refused exit vicas for auch prdlonged periods that thelr information, when finally released, is practically aeelegs. (10) Penetrations Guside or outside Guba). Extreme caution must be used to prevent the compromise of any penetrations which can be made. Penetrations in the communist epparatus cute side of Cube may be af she etiity or Cuban remnements of auch, -
13-00000 to Latin Arnesies. Sekt To eee: acta oe be pact, white or grey divected at’ Printed meterial (all, alzdrop, or packed , @) _ with other material destined for Guba). AirGrop bs severcly " [ignited by Gubs's aly defense capability. = @ ‘Rammer, threat, | of other campaigns using all available communication asseta, to include:telephone, Pxepagands . should reach the proper target, éhduld be consiet ty Guba versus other parte of Latin America). Psychological @ould iacluda als dropping of foodetuffe and medicine, sesslaa longdene booad. cate, large scale military actione sear Cuba of  deceptian nature, Tumeorg and “plants of information, ote. s. Political Aations _ (i) Inaide Cuba to instigate demonstrations, establich a resistance net, or to teke a particular action, & _Pusnenal to inatigats demonetnetleds agutaat 3) Tours of Guban exiles to Latin Amezica ead “elsewhere (educators, ‘faricts, labor leaders, women, youth, — ‘ ‘entertainers, veligious and cultural groups, et¢.). NOTE: Many of the above-actions can be secompiiahed overtly. 4. Eeqnomie Actions 111) Sabotage:af. agvieublare, power, internal or extpeial transport, communiaations etnefrtlon or storage facilites.
13-00000 G2) Covert operations to provent sale of pur- gilda’ ot tals Aadijand tec Oube oF ecdog foes Cake: i tropicals, ete.) NOTE: Stace the Zind-Séviet commitment to Guba is preponderant, a large portion is not eusceptible to U. 5S. action; however, the remaining trade with the Free World, elthongh relatively miner, ie exitical to Gabe and provides the U. &, with « lucrative target. 2) Gounterfalting. Because Cue has easestially eS See. keprepent a asatal,. ty. bie pola een k ronshing a i Sehotage of leaders hemes, “chteas and wallitaxy inatalietions. (£éonemic sabotage tnctuded tn pera graph d above). * @) Actions designed te withdraw people from harveat or to overwork military elements. (Te include actions from tumors te mijor military exercises). (3) -Radlo or television intrusion ox jamming. - aman embarrassing, ‘Baghmailing, accass~ o Attach, ocisure, search or harrassment and sabotage of aly and naval traffic. (6) Attack, intlenidation and harrassment of Guban representatives abroad. ay 7 a (3)
13-00000 CEA deste other wees rue 7 So AML Dua ey ae peg 4 e eperations oct undertaken, howsver Hpaearepederble ae ve este A disousston éf fature aptions should be related apectfically . to the. overall chjective end: should consider the Sectors indicated in his antl to wing ’ actions sale alone in ender tie) denamttcate and pusdicioe continued Cuban resistance, (b) keep the reeistance potential alive, ich.acesde to demands for a spectacular action, (dj indicate a vep {or actions by the Cuben Regime, (e) test, probe, deceive of hatrass’the security mechaniem in Guba and (f) establish a psychological lisaste for other overt actions. so long as Castro remaine the "David" and the U. 8. semaine | the "Goliath," the U. 5. will have a major problem of image meking ‘in Cuba, Latin Ameri¢a and the workd. Since April 1962, theré are inéieations that the fascination for “Fideliame" hea waned siguificantly butte the Cubans, the Latin Americans and many other neweborn states, Castes te still the "David" and the only Latin why has suocenstelly - Ae the economic situation in Guba becomes more intolerable, the @. &, many expect greater 4 @iesendion and more manifestations of  wpveet, te include outhraake of violence. At some point, the U. 8. - eodid be called upon te suppert epenly euch an effort. Obvieudly, it would be extremely embarrassing te the U. §. to be ugahia to regpend before the resietanse is created ecmpletaly. In In any event, it would be extremely difficult for the U. S. te support such « gediatance in a dlan- destine or covert manner for more than a few days. Sach aupport could serve to alert Cubs to U. &. intentlena.
13-00000 nob alt - Theotetbentlye the most desizalie ov event which Soul take, a ined would covlonge’e ncajor aplit of Cuban velatively gvcpartinccte wilitory and tateraul eocarity faites. It: fe difficult under present clreumetances to viewalice a Cuban leader of such stature even considering such a move,. since he hag ne real gagugence of immediate U. 6. military, economic and political sup- port vo vital to lis tenure and so necessaty to peévent a counter coup rom those deriving etrength from the heavy Sineqfoviet eeunomte orlentation of the present regime. oe of possibility to howe Gabon dlzected attacks of Gdben rallltary ele- ment (dlegalced as exiles or U. S. personnel) on soft and emotional targete in Gaba. . Such on action could serve to help Caste consalidate internally and te aeriously embarrass the U. 5: interhatiqnally, 8. SUMMARY ' The U. 8. Ginda iteelf in an uncomfortable position of waiting _ foe the breaks in Cubs and not knowing precisely when or hew the breaks will eceur. As time goes on the changes for en internally - inspired revolt become ineressingly more remote. Barring a major ‘polistend schiem in. which major elements of the security forces are split, there ia ttle promise of an internally sparked revolt of suf- Se ee epee oe abel od Oe ent en tt epratansae . * peolittg (2 sathseitative sources, , thie. u. 8, ‘tt soctive litte: or aot advance netics of such en uprising and according to intelligence eatimates there ie little ikelihood of such an uprising surviving for more than a few days, Alsu, it has been indicated that there fe litte Ubeliheed of eaech a resistances could gain central of a radle station to request outelde ageistanté. (¢ le recognised, however, that this probally would be ane of the principle aime of any each detion group. }
13-00000 So long as the SinosSeviet Bloc contimes to cubsidiae Cuba, _ ies sie te cane eine pe Rupee ee thoed committed te the Castee Regime. sates re “in thels oupport of Guba, Castro line cautiously avoided provocative actions of sufficient magnitude to incur the wholesale weath of the U. S. or to provide a juridical basig for overt intervéiition. To Casteo's Uking, U.-8. options have been narrowed to-U. &. inatigated Petilaterih otananeh wetiieteg toa tim myaltilateriat: Srotensdinie 7 fewateeting ‘approach: " evoxt actions (ech dee nbrberesapet bey pee nen Torben wie ai j appestunitios upon wiles the U. &, can espttalise witi-tigneane at ite, ee een nt OS can canttelina: es: sat ite From the atendpoiat of the Cuban Regime, ‘there appears to be ‘tltele Likeliiood that any clandestine actions will be taken dixectly ageinet the 0. 8. However, the recent alveraft attacks or warnings against U. S. boats indicates the possthility of uncantrolled action on _ the part of individuala of the Castro Regime.
13-00000 7 Co, ie he! © SECRET, Bones! ve ie ee FOR & Tie NATIONAL JECURLTY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE _(@cupared for tha Meating of ___» February 1963, 4 P.M.) PROM: Coordinator of Cuba Affairs a &% UBJECT: Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba \ . Objectives . - ° The basic program adopted by the Executive Committee on January 25, 1963 sets forth major objectives for our policy toward Cuba, It als commits us to “be prepared to inérease the political, economic, psycho- logical and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present thenselves or ‘can be created," ‘ This memorandum outlines @ program that will meet the paychologica: a vequirements of our overall policy. - Role of Psychological Op erations A successful peychological campaign cannot be viewed solely as a - propaganda exercise or an informational program, It should cover actio: and statements~-all that is ‘said or done solely or primarily for psycho: logical effect. This definition sets off psychological activities from those actions undertaken primarily for their direct value--whether in ti fields of intelligence, military, political, or economic action. One of the tasks of psychological operations is to.exploi. other &-s-vitles to maximum advantage, or to seek to minimize any nc -ative as- pects of such activities. In designing and carrying out action program Girected at ees G it she} be the task of the Coordinator and his Group
13-00000 to balance possibly conflicting intarests and to determine which, in any given circumstance, shall have priority, Suxategy and’ Tactics wa gust keep in mind cons tantly tha relationship between what happens "in Cuba. and the overall struggle between ourselves and the Communists. We should seek to ingure that the Cuban situation will develop in a way that will: | a) lead to the collapse or overthrow of the Castro regime; ; by demonstrate to the Gyban people and to the world at large that communism ig not @ solution for the problems of a:developing . country; ; ce). diseredit ‘Castro ‘and his associates and their methods of opera- tion throughout the Americas; | d) insure that the burden imposed by Cuba on the Soviet Union and. the satellites adds substantially to the mounting evidence that efforts to export communis t revolution are unsuccessful and ex=- cessively costly. Our focus should always be on the first of these objectives--the end of the communist regime in Cuba. But pending achlevement of tats, wa‘ cca rove toward the other objectives, And they, after all, are of major importance to our overall strategic purposes. --
13-00000 ao -3e= Wa have the possibility of insuring that so long as Cuba remains ‘Communist it will serve as an open, bleeding wound that will weaken the Communist cause generally. This strategic concept is ona which the Comaunists have tried to use against us. . Our tactical approach should be designed to fit this overall concept. it calls for the utilization of every available weapon in our aresenal _. and engagement, day~in and day~out, in a multi-faceted struggle at ali levels. | Our initial ain should be to wéaken Steadily the capability, con~ fidence and will of the enemy (inside and outside Cuba) and, correspond= . ingly, to strengthen our side. We need not, indeed ought not, stake every- thing on one great effort, Nor should we concentrate on simply building» up our forces and husbanding them “until the right time comas" for a final showdown.. ~ | Instead, eur effort should be directed toward achieving an unbroken series of. small successes, encompassing gains on the part of anti-Castro elements and failures on~the part of the regime itself, Our aim should _ be that the end of each day'would see the position and prospects of the ‘Castro regime and little worse than they had been at sunrise. & factory breakdown because of a shortage of spare parts or sabotage, - an incvease in absenteeism, Leng thened queues at the food stores, failure to getia field planted~=whether because of neglect or lack of seed, a. PERE
13-00000 -4. resort to terrorist sathods against the populace, an unexplained fire, | exeetion of suspicion in a minor but key official, the sudden appearance of antiregime slogans on walls, a ' defection from the arned forcess-these and simllar things, whether major or minor, and over and over again on & mounting scale, will have a cumlative impact, In the long run, they can be equivelent to a major victory. The important thing is to keap-the pressure on, to never give the xegima a respite, to see that the series of ema defeats and setbacks is unbroken and unendiage "our purpose is to create a sifuation in which the regime and its supporters steadily lose hope and Heart, in which they coma to “accept the certainty of eventual defeat. Meanwhile, repercussions would be felt throughout the Communist world, Assistance to the regime would increasingly be regarded as a "rat hole" operation. Thea “example o£ Guba” would become the reverse of ' expectations; fidelismo would become a term of opprobrium, in short, the goal is to bring about the elimination ef the Castro regine without resort to direct and massive forced, We cannot rule our the possibility that some reliance on force may become necessary to. insu: finel victory for anti-Castro forces, But the greater and mora effec- tive Ls the effort herein outlined, the more we ere likely to insure tha! overt Zorce requirements will te minimal. —
13-00000 ET “3 Spacifie programs: to carry out this kind of approach to the Oiban problem are submitted in Annexes 4 and B. . | fudiences and Targets : | . The psychological program should be directed at the following primary audiences or target groups: . ° 1) the Cuba people. Our geal should be te encourage dissatisfaction with the present and hope for the future once Castroism is eli- It should be made clear that the next chapter of Cuba's inlominated. But they should know that ‘history must be written by the Cubans. they will have friendly support from others. - 2). the Castro regime, Our goal should be to create dissension, doubi and hopelessness inside the ruling clique. | 3) Latin America. In ‘programs ‘directed at the peoples and govern- ments of the hemisphere, our goal should be to weaken the influ- ence of the Cuban regima and its propaganda, to encourage solid- arity within the OAS family, ‘to counter Cuban influence in key groups (youth, labor, intellectuals), to encourage actions that counteract Cuban programs of subversion and insurrection, To picture Cuba si 4) the Soviet Union and other. Commmist states. as a steady drain on already limited resources, to insure that i is such a drain, to encourage the Soviets to limit and eventual] t i H 4 - eliminate their involvement in Cuba. 4
13-00000 5) Gther countries. To insure understanding of what is involved in the Cuban situation, to use Cuba to disprove that conmunism provides useful answers to the needs of developing countries, to expose . the continuing danger of communist efforts to export ‘ ‘revolution, | . . . 6} the Home Base. To provide the: American people and the Congress with the full facts of the Cuban situation within. the limits of legitimate security considerations. , fssets ’ ’ The psychological program toward Cuba should utilize the full range of che Gcvernment's capabilities for action and information, These in- _ cluds, emong ethers: a) public statements by the President and other . officials; . . oo b) “informational assets such as the public affairs an Congressional relations agencies of State, Defense and other agencies; . ‘e) the Government's research and analysis facilities; d) overseas information programs in all media, especially the facilities of the U.S. Information Agency; . e) the diplomatic mechanism for both formal and “4nformal contacts; £) capabilities for unattributed programs of action i end infompatton. Get SS }
13-00000 Coox “dination add Guidance tin carrying out the kind of meny~sided offensive described hereia, it will be necessary to provide for coordinating various programs. We i " gust de sure that what we do in one area reinforces what we do elsewhere, it will be necessary to” provide careful end regular policy guidance to those responsible for action, This task is assigned to the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. He should establish the necessary machinery on an inter-departmental basis. ’ . U.S. Posture toward Cuba : ? _ The picture we should seek to create is one of a confident and dee cisive United States moving forward in esoperation with its other fftends, Gealing with the Cuben situation but not exclusively preoccupied with Castro. We should not appear to be in doubt or confusion, We should take note of developments in Cuba promptly and react to them quickly, Our answer to claims, charges or attacks should be ewift. Our machinery must be geared’ to permit answers to Castro ‘and his henchmen immediately and etfectively. If he makes a speech tonight, our reply should ba on the airwaves tomorrow at the latest. Cur approach should not be defensive, We should not confine ourselve to cuswaring Castro but as much as possible force him onto the defensive. We should insure that he is required to do the answering, the explaining, the disagreeing es much as possible. | Attachments: Annex A - Guidelines for Attributable Programs . Annex B - Guidelines for Unattributable Programs;£8 i 2 1553 ae TIE Tae Smee St Bom
13-00000 MIM earn. Guidelines for Attributable’ Programs Q@srrent Reculremants 1. there should 33 a statement, preferebly by the President, exe cs oieining overall U.S. policy teward the Cuben question. It would provide clarification of where we stand on Cuba and how we hope to see the future cavelop. It would provide the basis for statements, private and public, for ali other officials concerned. ‘It would inform the Cubans how we re~ gard their future; ‘tall Latin Ansrieans how we see the problem and our view of their role; underline’ to the Soviet bloc our determination to a . Oppose communism in this hemisphere; further clarify for our own peop}e the seriougness of the problem and our determination to support the cause of freedom in Cuba with all feasible means. The Coordinator should arranges for preparation 0 o£ such @ statement and submit a draft. té the White House. - . 2. It is our policy to seek elimination, or at least material re- duction, of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. Efforts now underway . to achieve this end should be given a reasonable chance. If they fail to produce the desired result within a reasonable time, we should be pre- | pared ‘to nova forward along other lihes. The Coordinator should develop & progvan to mest this contingency. ‘Meanwhile, the continuing presence . of Soviet forces should be descrited as ‘an_exacerbating influence in East-West relations and a symbol of forsign domination and control in Cuba. |
13-00000 -2-= 3. Clarification oz our position on "non-invasion" would be desira- pha. This could be covered in 1 above. It should be. clear that wa do not | xegard invasion of Cuba by the United States as a desirable or useful | course. But the possibility of such action in given circumstances cennot be eliminated, The door should be left open for any action that we and our allies in the hemisphere may regard ag necessary in the future to counter aggressive moves by the Cuban regime. | | 4, We need to have clearly in mind our. position regarding a possi- _ ble internal revolt. This, too, could be covered in 1 above. We should evoid statements for the present which could reasonably be expected to . €heourare fa open revolt. We should avoid for the present anything that could be read as a fim pledge to come to the aid of anyona who moves | against Castro. We should maka clear, however, that we are prepared to Support and cooperate with any elemants. who succeed in ending ‘commnist dominance in Cuba and who are committed to establishing in Cuba a free Yj and democratic government responsive to.the deSires of its own people. | 5. We should exploit by available means all evidence of internal discontent and opposition. Defections from the Cuban regime should be . exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are “mate _ 6. The Coordinator. should azzange for up-to-date surveys of the followinz:
13-00000 ») gy @) f) progress now underway in the psychological field; U.S. capabilities in this field with a view to exposing any obvious remediable gaps in our resources for conducting a signi~ fieant psychological effort against Cuba; astro" S propaganda machine--how does it work? how much effort goes into it? how can wa woaken iv major lines of the Cuban propaganda offensive--favorite themes, techniques, principal targets, etc.; - current position of Gastro and his regime in Latin Americaq- i main areas of influence, by country and by groups. the past record on leaflet drops~~how effective, advantages of ._plane vs. balloon drops, comparison of delivery by other means, possibilities of auch a program being used to attack us in the UN or among the Cuban people. anemes for Information Programs information media should exploit the following thames to the max~ imum extent practicable. Hard data supporting these themes should be SEO + Sau tted on a day~to-day basis and used. Commentaries and discussions suid be tellored to take full advantage of these attitudes. « (20 Cuban sudlences) Le ‘Castroism is doomed; it is on the slippery slope to oblivion. 5 Pa ?
13-00000 36 De ~ he Cuba is an unvilling i:ustrumeat of Soviet ‘policy, subject to the waims and moads of a foreign power. Moscow wlll use Guba as it sees fit and for its own purposes, giving help and withdrawing it to suit’ the Kremlin's desires. Cestro has isolated his country from ite traditional friends, °- from the hemisphere in which its roots of history, culture, religion, and well-being are.sunk. . . Commmism has failed to solve the problems. of Cuba--has lowered 7 * rather than raised its standard of ‘Living. . r The Cuban revolution has been perverted and betz‘ayed, freedon, independence and diversity are the "wave of the future." . Latin American audiences) | Use the above as appropriate. Cestro and the Russians are using Cuba as a base for subversion, espionage and gabotage against neighboring states. .Castxolem promises bloodshed, terror and economic stagnation. The Hemisphere’'s most promising course is vigorous efforts to ? achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress. ° ‘ Soviet and Bloc audiences) — ; The above as appropriete.
13-00000 2. Cuba rovresents a steady deain on already limited Soviet and bloa resources; every shipment to Cuba means things do not appear on Seviet shelves, _ ‘ | | 3. Castro really supports the Chinese, not Moscow; he is using a | “Soviet help to promote Castroism not Moscow's policy. tke above lists do not pretend to. be exhaustive. They are but the. beginning of a catalog of themes we can exploit in our information and: -propasenda offensive,
13-00000 ABNSX_B it is the judgement of the Coordinator taat this annex covering 7 ; intelligence and covert actions should be submitted separately after the Executive Committee reaches a conclusion on the overall psychological ‘- program and the attributable activities set forth in Annex A. | Fy, ye qe | : ff at ‘ are
13-00000 DOCUMENT RECORD 2011-63 {AR BE0-5) . = LOCAL 78 CONTROL NUMBER M2 applicable) HO51 Mr, Califano [UNCLASSIPIED SUBJECT OF SHORT TAvR Psychotogical Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba NMVMBER AND OESCRIP TION OF INCLOSURES TO DOCUMENT Ondiaate addition and/or deletion of incloewres with dates) Annex A (5 pgs) and Annex 8 (1 pg) OISTRIBUTION DATA . GATE OF OWTRIBUTION . ! i COPY NO. AODRESLEE (Print or typa) ADDRESSEE (Print ar type) INTRA OFFICE ROUTING DATA e Be im ‘4 e ci) J > “4 ad POR: . [Jacrion (J inroruatrion Cote e > MES OF ALL PERSONS HANOLING ATTACHE. DOCUMENT OR WHO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF ITS CONTENT WILL BE LISTED BELOW MAME (Print or type) -- MAME (Print at type) D A FORM S69 EDITION GF 1 JAN BH IS GRSGLETE. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED PROM t MAY GO : CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES oO,
13-00000 PD mor, 146 > SUBIECT: ‘Future Cuban Leadership INTRODUCTION Following is a proposal for the creation of an imaginary Cuban leader. This proposal is presented primarily to fill gaps exiating in the present policy study. It will become obvious that this proposal can be utilized iri conjunction with current programs as well as many of those programs proposed for the future. It may be necessary to address this proposal or a similar proposal separately and in advance of the policy study; however, in ore event no pressing requirement exists, itis suggested that “ ; _proposal be considered in conjunction with the policy study end 3 handled on a closely held basis. REASON FOR PROPOSAL Following are listed a number of indications that the leader- ship question will be addressed in the near future: a. With the termination of U.S. support to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) a vacuum has been created. Various - exile groups in the U.S. and elsewhere will be vying for recognition and support in an attempt to fill this void. b. There has. been constant pressure on the U.S. and on other Latin American countries to recognize a government ' im exile. This proposal could serve to lessen or eliminate much of this political and psychological pressure. c. This proposal could serve to reduce the bickering among exile groups and may serve to resolve some of the problems’ of Cuban exile unification. EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REG , RADING ott Sensitive DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY —
13-00000 a. The proposal could emphasize the development of a native "David" in opposition to Castro, the Cuban "Goliath." This could serve the U.S. image by making Castro the "Goliath" rather than the "David" who opposes the "North American Giant. " e. This proposal could serve to prevent the U.S, from making premature commitments to a leader or a particular exile group and could be used as a device to test exile response. f. This proposal could retain for the U.S. the ability to control future selections of leaders or groups (timing and political ideologies). g. This proposal could permit the U.S. on a progres- sive ‘basis to influence the idealogies of the resistance and thus to influence the platform of a future Cuban Government. ’ bh. The publicity associated with the prolonged existence of a resistance in Cuba can serve to delay the furtherance of. ‘the de facto recognition of the present Cuban Regime. OBJECTIVE To create an imaginary leader or image of resistance in Cuba. This image would serve as a focal point for resistance directed | against Castro by Cubans or Latin Americans. DEVELOPMENT An imaginary name of a resistance leader could be developed utilizing a popular name from Cuban history, a name associated with resistance in Cuba or a newly devised name. The name selected ‘should typify a person who is friendly to the Cuban people, is anti- communist, ie willing to fight against the Regime, and is Little-but tough. There is no requirement for a detailed staff study in order Sasit ice
13-00000 . : ” ae GET sonsstive to determine this name. "The Little Bull," "The Little Worm," "The Friendly Worm," "The Fighting Friend," "The Tough Peasant, "' or any such name which is acceptable and meaningful in Spanish could suffice, Over a period of several months the name could be .o ; “dropped" or leaked through U. S. officialdom, in diplomatic channels, in intelligence channels or within the Cuban exile community. Specific acts against the Regime could be credited to this individual or mem- bers of his group. Communications could be arranged between this individual and his subordinates to be picked up either by Castro's censors or by. radio intercept in Cuba or in the U.S. After a period of time, all unexplained incidents and actions for which credit has not been seized by some other exile group would automatically be ascribed to our imaginary friend. At some point in time it could be leaked that the U.S, is, in fact, supporting this imaginary person. Similarly, other Latin American countries may, without inducement, publicly follow the U.S. pattern, — During the course of this operation it ia quite possible that the . Castro Regime could indicate that the activities of this individual were terminated, that the individual was captured, that he was being pur - sued, or that he was an imaginary faker or fraud. Such action would only serve to further publicize the actions of the individual and so long as resistance in géneral continued ‘the fame of our "Cuban Kilroy" ' would spread. Humorous antics could be credited te our imaginary friend and rumors of hie exploits of bravery (ala Zoro) could be circulated. , At some point in time it may be wise to indicate what this individual stands for. {It will become obvious that he is opposed to the Regime in Cuba.) It could be possible to indicate little-by -little his political platform im very general terms ~- realizing that the mistique and the "generalnees" connected with his operation is, in fact, the power behind the operation. Ultimately, Cubans and others may demand that he proclaim his complete political views or even that he present himself physically. Since this is not desirable, 3
13-00000 arrangements could be made to have selected individuals meet with his appointed representative. His instructions and words could be relayed to the public by many means. As his political platform becomes more apparent within the exile groups, it may be possible to determine those willing to follow his leadership (to gain Cuban independence under his terms) or those who are umwilling to accept his leadership. The lines of controversy among exiles can be drawn more clearly, Undesirable - leaders and exile groups can be eliminated from the competition through his disavowals. , Eventually, a member of the resistance in Cuba may gain sufficient stature to assume or to be given the title of this imaginary ‘leader. This, of course, will depend in large measure on individual leadership ability and the ability to "fill the boots" of this anti -Castro image. : While this scheme is replete with girmmmickery, ite imple- mentation could be undertaken in a relatively short period of time. Sensitivity of this scheme is such that the knowledge should be held on the tightest basis and if implemented, those proposing should not be informed. In the event the scheme is compromised, (unless knowledge is widespread) there is little need for plausible deniability; however, once used and compromised the scheme can hardly be . reinstated. A major advantage is that this image can be created over a long period of time or developed rapidly. without a political or economic commitment on the part of the U.S. There may be a point at which the U.S, could no longer disavow collaboration with this imaginary person, This point, however, is so distant that during any point in the intervening period it would be possible for the U.S. to disengage easily without suffering embarrassment or loss of prestige.
13-00000 CONCLUSION - Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it appears that the U.S. should immediately undertake to implement this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change the image during the subsequent 30 or 60 day period. eG ames K, Patchell Lt Colonel, -USA
13-00000 22 May 1962 | eh tee From: : a Colonel Patchell Subject: Psychological Operations Group Following ig a brief “run-down" of meeting on psychological operations at State, 21 May 1962. The mectings are normally held each Monday at 1430. Attendees include: Bob Smith or Kermit Brown (USIA); Seymour Bolton (CIA); Colonel Wade Robert (BOD); Harvey = * Summ (Caba’ ‘Desk Oificer State); Bob Hurwitch, - Dick: Phillips: (Public: Affaire Advisor of Martin's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs = State) and Leon Curtis (Bureau of Intelligence and Research - State). Subjects discussed included: 7 s é (i) Priorities of work « Cuba, Western Hemisphere, us. in that order. (2} Publication of document on conditions in Cuban Univer- sities received from Cuban exile group (DRE) - CIA te check authenticity and whether document is outdated. ; (3) Radio SWAN - CIA studying proposed changes. (4) USIA reported three commentarios pate out on a Cuban Independence Day. oo Ls mere day (5) On the Agmatrong Circle Theater, USIA. states this ‘hung up" for $15,000 cost of translation. It was decided in meeting to push on to get it translated - and in the meanwhile to get Miro Cardona's speech into wide circulation. _ (6) State suggested that speeches isa Cuba (Rodrigues, Castro, ‘and others) within past week indicated moves away from collectivization - to free enterprise and mentioned antipathy of people to idea and name of cooperatives. USIA to push on this and to prepare releases on it. _ REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
13-00000 (7) CIA to declaseify the Soviet nickel contract with Cuba _ which exposes Seviet colonialiam + for wide distribution in Latin America thriugh Exibassies and USIA and for use by CIA in Guba. . _. , (8). CLA wants more otuff in the vein of ridicule, satire, . eeimer © >.t0 get away from invective and hit the regimé and individuals - ‘low key stuff to develop ridicule. (9) GIA to find out from refugees what sppeale best, what they read, what they listen to, etc. (10) USIA and CIA to play up the March USIA survey which showe Castro's popularity in Latim America on the decline. (11) On 26th of July, State suggested cave be used to avoid discussing 26th of July movement as Commy - to clearly differentiate between original 26th of July movement and its priiciples - and the be- trayal. CIA vequested State's guidance on policy and State's help on providing material. State provided the attached and indicated that ite use 4s within policy {I have noted some particularly hard hicting. apatt « if used properly}. (12) A number of important events and dates in June and July were discussed to include Caribbean Games, Peace Festival, Khrushchev Rocket statement, and Castro's "Cordillera of the Andes" statement. USIA and CIA to prepare information on these. (13) State asked CIA to prepare a catalogue of admission of failures of the Castro Regime, a lst of production promises, and a report of bloc people in key positions, Ali were asked to bring idene inte next week's meeting ta. be used te exploit 26th of July to our advantage. (14) This office will be placed on distribution of minutes of the meetings.
13-00000 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON £3, B.C. te : a 1 June 1962 From: Lt. Col. Patchell _ Subject: Peychological Operations Group Meeting held a¢ 1436 hours on 28 May 62 with Mr. Hurwitch and Mr, Simm of State, Bolton of CIA, Smith of USIA, and myself — attending. ‘Following | is a Summary ¢ of eubjects. discug a _ Q CA asked State to provide’ a clarification St pies and groups to be supported - this came up in connection with a dis- cussion of CRC and newspaper stories on its change in leadership. (2) The Armstrong Circle Theater movie has ‘ieed okayed for Spanish lenguage publication and distribution. (3) On the "Eyewitness to History" program of 25 May 62 - because of the type of movie - USIA to look at carefully and deter- mine whether useful for replay (1 will be invited to attend). (4) GIA using theme for farmers not to produce « okayed, (5) On declassification of Cuba - Soviet trade agreement - GLA has ‘been unable to obtain, bat should produce soon. © 7. 6) > GIA: guidance dw being prepared. for. ‘paych: wait to ) list - priorities as followe: .(a) Cuba, (b}) Latin America;'(o} rest of world. Draft copies will be brought to next meeting for informal review. (7) On the DRE publication "White Book on University Probleme in Cuba" - 2,000 copies each are being printed in Chile in English, French, and Spanish. CIA to take action to make available in summary form for Latin newspapers and student publications. (8) On the CRC publication “Guba Nueva’? - presently going wes only to exile commiunity. CIA to look into getting it into Latin America Le and Cuba - money appears té be no Problem,
13-00000 (9) State euggested exploitation by USIA and CIA of iteme appearing in the FBIS daily summary. (Housing and labor -« made arrangements ‘to put us on distribution. } bate (40). GIA broiight.up the. app Bi inferring’ ‘that Cdba’whould be forgotten and ee EE the Alliance For Pregress. State indicated that o a ~ correction was being = made to show that Moscoso was misquoted. ( 11) State Suggested that Castro's 11 April speech (which was not released until May) had many exploitable points -- corruption » failure to suggest unity «- labor <« State gent to GIA for research people to work on. (2) es 3 ap aging in Cubsa paper concerning people wh "tvansgress the’ norm" Deke sent to training camps: « UBIA ta: take. action. (23) GIA after leoking at symbole etc. has about dedided ‘that the "worm" ia preferable to the “fieh" and that it has béed popularised by Castro and we should take advantage of it. Both CIA and USIA will develop further the worm idsa. Lt. Col. Patchell suggested relating it to such expressions as “the worm will tura" « if applicable in Cuba and associating it will biblical quotations such as “Their werm shall not die, and their fire shali not be quenched" -« Isa 6624 or “As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood, so the sadness of a man censumeth the heart" - Prov. 25.20. USIA to ‘take action. COMMENT: - In the two: ‘previous mestings I have developed sufficient rapport oe =. . se -that I can now-get‘actions taken without too much: question, This . next meeting I propose to introduce a system of suspense dates so that ' the “we are looking into" or “we are considering" are replaced by — ‘we will meet the suspense" «- this may be ditscult at first, but feel it can be managed,
13-00000 ee ee ae oo Bsa . OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 28, 2. c. & June 1962 ‘MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE: _ From: Le. Colonel Patchell . Subject: Peychological Operations Group _ Meeting held 1430-1450 on 4 June 1962. Attended by Mr. Hurwitch, Mr. Phillips, Mer. Summ, and Mr. Curtis (State), Myr. Bolten (CIA), Me. Smith (USLA), and myself. Following is & Gummary of discussion items: | : . q) “USIA will provide advance notice of oY programe scheduled re Cuba. F . ___:  @ Free Cuban Group (DRE) has arranged for strong representation at African international Student Meeting in Canada te U.S. preea. (3) GIA has looked at CRC's mailing liste for various types of info, te include the publication "Cuba Nueva, * They find lists most elaborate, complete and well organised for each purpose. _(@:.UBIA reports they are on top of stories pointing out leas of rights by workers in Guba. USIA provided sample copies of their daily wire output and of weekly mail output for me to look at in . greater detail, (I will repost separately an this.) ; (5) Much exploitable info in Castro's speech on housing «- corruption, unavailability etc. USIA and CIA to exploit. (6) GIA reported that the Latin American edition of Time Magasine wae in English -- that Time Magazine in spanish was a ' Latin publication (Bogota) using same format, but not useful for purpose of exploiting Blas Roca story.
13-00000 6b aa Paes AFLP 0.2 A gM eee age os . a : (7) Reporte of hunger strikes etc. at Isle of Pines prison to be played up by USIA. (Berne's cable 527). cette 148), Caples of cartoon pooks and other publleations wore, ekg (9) USIA requested to provide info on the public opinion poll conducted and schedules for future polls. Seymour Bolton privately asked me to inform you that subject to any comment from you, he was using the approach on psy war that the means of delivery would not be tied to attribution. Although it might be more convenient to work completely through the CRC, he . believed that we‘should reserve flexibility by organising the "pipelices™ . and then putting atdff {n Irom CRC, or other ‘Cuban organisations, as <.* -.- well as stuff created by the U.S., with or without signatures or attri- bution. He feela that euch control would best insure that we sent in . just what wae aseded and no more or no leas. ; e:
13-00000 RSI OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 28, D.C. . 12 June 1962 © MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE “7. } : From: Lt. Col. Patchell ". \ Subject: Psychological Operations Group Meeting held 1430-1600 on 11 June 1962. Attended by Mr. ; Hurwitch, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Wells (substituting for Mr. Curtis from R&l-State); Mr. Bolton (CIA); Mr. Smith (USIA); and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following Is a summary of discussion items. (1) CIA has translated and declassified Soviet-Cuban _ Trade Agreement and passed to Mr. Hurwitch for publication and use. © . . ‘ . 4 (2) Lt. Col. Patchell pointed out that the Cuban increase | of delegates to 330 to Helsinki Eighth World Youth and Student Festival "for reasons of an imperative nature" should be acted upon and full use made of report on student conditions which will be surfaced at the Canadian regional meeting. Bolton assured me that action was being taken, NOTE: After the meeting Bolton said the same group of people were working on both and that "extensive" work was being done on Helsinki, I asked him to be sure it was on Gubans in Helsinki -- not just Helsinki. (3) USIA agreed to look at clippings on Cuba with view to broader distribution in Latin America -- as requested by Lt. Col, Patchell. : ; (4 CIA will present a document next week on guidance. “with respect to Cuba. ward wrhsw, Slo We 428 (5) State (Mr. Summ) indicated a Cuban report indicated that Havana was going back to horse-drawn trolleys because of motor transport shortages. Mr. Wells added that previously horse-drawn transport was not permitted in Havana. All to look into this for possible exploitation, . , [= EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC \ BEGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY =
13-00000 (6) Lt. Col. Patchell brought up comparison between . Hitler's speech after the wisuccessful Beer Hall Pustch and Castro's “History Will Absolve Me Speech" following his abortive attempt. CIA will look into this -- both for research and whether suitable for propaganda purposes. (7 Since the title "Doctor" adds some respect to Castro's name ~~ all agencies will push toward referring to him primarily as ; the Prime Minister or secondarily as Fidel Castro. <— Web asurbins, a T.4. ry Uy Hy Seek f (8) A USIA report indicated that Cuba had increased its radio propaganda output by 60% over the past few months. USIA | stated that FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) has added Cuba to the list of Bloc Countries, which -- subjects Cuba to periodic research and analysis reports and broadcast trends. (See FBIS Report, “Operational Developments in Foreign Broadcasting" Number 355, dated 6 June 1962.) (9) CIA reported additional people had been placed in their research department to make content analyses on Cuba. (10) State has received two articles from New Delhi written. by an Indian reporter who visited Cuba in the early months of 1959 and recently revisited Cuba. These reports are good for the "before" and "after" content and will be publicized. State asked USIA to look for others who visited in the early days of the Castro Regime -- who might be encouraged on a selective basis to return and make a comparison. lo Cron AUTO (11) State indicated that Cuba had presented a series of complaints against U.S. actions at Guantanamo and it looked as though | ‘per Cuba was building up a case against the U.S. for future use inthe U.N. _ poe" or world opinion medias. State has asked Navy to provide similar , (” ul ginformation for use by State and will present information to the group at a * *for possible exploitation. . vtayh (12) USIA unable to report on Miro Cardona's spéech in 3 Costa Rica. CIA reported that it iad been carried in papers in Costa acca | Rica and had been broadcast by the Voice of America and several Miami Spanish language stations. Mal ir, of- abine by s pitere ’ 22g ® (13) State suggested the next meeting be held‘at USIA for M4ev@ ; the purpose of briefing the group on the functioning of USIA -- in ¢ at handling a select number of items. , ~ yard ee 8
13-00000 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 23, 0.6. 18 June 1962 che US Scouser eenhs Laious te ive Me wei o From: Lt. Gel. Patzhell Subject: ‘Poyahetogtoal Operations Groep, The meting held 1430-1600 on 18 June was. attended by Mr. Hurwitch, Meg, ‘Bast. Wells, Bae. Garam, and lée. bel ee tate). - io (1) CLA diutrtbuted coptes of a stadeut booklet (Ragiieh and Ly French versiong attached). Thirty-thousand copies were printed <a in Spanish, French, English. and Pertuguese in Chile -« epinsored sens by a Latin American student organisation, and primérily Sor. Latin audiences. The hodkiets will be eed on tour of Latin fm dMfetiin - —— youth and student meetings in Quebec and Heleinkt.. geome eopite will he maiied inte Guba. ate - 2.) CIA presented draft guidelines for overseas posts re " Cuba. The group mads some minor changes. The guidelines are Paimanicy on pre July. Por USE '@.) State will gut out a similar olrculaé to tts posts, and USIA will consider doing:the same, (4.3 Rowsdup reports of overseas statione on actions are ‘Que within 7 days after 26 July. They are to cable significant: ‘actions immeédiately. | . ia (3.) Hurwiteh distributed copies of a dratt cable intended to 3 , exploit Cardenas incident (copy attached). . a (6.) Lt. Col. Patchell asked full exploitation of Mexican 4 defector ~- suggesting appearance before OAS Committes, . trip eh through LatinAmeries, ete. 0400000 pm - song EXCLUDED FROM ALTOMATIC a REGRADING; DOD DIR: 5200,10 DOES HOT APPLY." td ty ‘ BPECTAL-HAHBLING - ‘This document contains _ ch pages. Gopy No... % of _ _@___copies. Boxee ce ii
13-00000 (7.) The Group was informed that Mr. Grant (St. Louie ch Post-Dispatch), Tad Suule, and a number of other sewamen . ‘were attempting to get into Havana far the 26 July celebration. ~_ (6.) State will obtain copies of reports from the Britich, italian, Weat.German and other Allied Embassies in Havana for detribution to members of this group. A: ae ay (6) CIA asked to have Cuban Embassy representatives in _ Other Latin American states confsentad, with. Gastro. promises and agked fer comment for publidation: »= refusals sad "no Come ments" to be publicized. . - - 1610.) SISTA voported that Cardeuiis tnetdent i “c_ , {ts) USIK: reported that 'Cardexitd fneident played two times = Saturday evening and four times Sunday ever VOA. - (IL. ). WarA, provided film on Carpenter flight for use on TV ° a o . at Fe oA MIP, oy
13-00000 WASHINGTON 28, D.C. 26 June 1962 . MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE ‘Ficm é: Gal: ‘Pitehell Subject: " Psychological Operations Group Meeting held at 1430 on 25 June 1962 was attended by Mr. Hurwitch (State), Mr. Robert Follestad (eubatituting for Harvey Summ-State), Bob Smith (USIA), John Tilten (eubstituting fer Seymour Bolten-CIA), and Lt. Gol. FPatohell.. Following | iteons discussed: | v- a. State to seek ‘anf Castro j press clippings ‘from other Latin - American countries fer replay. b. USIA is distributing confidential memorandum, vine impact of Castro on Mexican Public Opinion and Some Indications of Attitudes Toward the U.S. and the USSR" (LA-3, Feb 62). This report, although dated Feb 62, ie just now coming out - it reportedly shows a significant decrease of Castro popularity in Mexico. ce. CIA was asked whether the reports of Cuban communist interference with other Latin communist parties could be exploited. d. Decided to direct propaganda into Cuba which is designed to destroy the image of Cuban success throughout the hemiephere. Also te direct propaganda designed te stress that Cuba is belng “used” by the USSR. @. State pointed out. the value of President's:trip to Mexico this week end to point up US-Mezice selidarity. (Neted that Hurwitch withdrew: considerably from hie initial pesition - ~ Gubs not mentioned asa point of solidarity). . &. CIA is translating Theodore Draper's book inte Spanish for diesemination aga paper -bask in Latin America. g- Decided to play back into Cuba adminietrative “goofe" by Cubans on transportation arrangements for youths of gther Latin countries _ te celebrations. (Some left penniless and stranddd in ‘Garibbean). ea een Ge. . EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC — HEGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 , DOES HOT APPLY
13-00000 kh. The Cultural people in State are seized with preblem of Jamaican Games. I suggested other athletes for free Cuba or other personalities. «+ That we Ghould at least make an inventory to gee what we have available. 3¢{a-moted that Cubans aré “out. to win't .. - What is now being Secomplished: ie net good enough. reo CIA working with Navy en \ doclacotfication of USSR-Guba Trade Agreement.
13-00000 O  wrs— . OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 23, 0.6. ‘3 July 1962" - oe) MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SDALE (boner From: Lt. Col. Patchell Subject: Psychological Operations Group . Meeting held from.1100.to. 1300.ca 3 July 1962 with the following in attendance: Bob Smith (USIA), Seymour Bolten {CIA), Bob-Hurwitch, Bob Fallestad, Al Garter, and Bart Wells (State) and Lt. Gol. Patchell. Following are. highlights. of discussion. oO ae State is. providing copies of report from: ‘Britiah Ambassador.to Cuba MARCHAND. Report.made after absence f . 9 3.months from his postin Cuba. Compe tetas 4) — ASL We. , -b, State has received letters explaining dethils of Cardenas incident.- passed to CIA and USIA for action, c. GIA to obtain ‘more information on outbreak in ALGANO which is being suppressed by Cuba. . ad. CIA provided copies. of study on. promises and failures of Castro regime.- it has been.distributed to CIA stations overseas. State and .USIA to look at-with view te providing copies to international organizations and State and USIA representatives overseas; Coy: « ath 6 astudle e. In-ylew of uncertainty expressed. in messages from ‘Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and JAR about stability of Cuban. economy and attempts to collect. funds to assist Guba - CIA to play on theme of Cuba as poor investment .etc.. behind iron curtain. ; f. Defector who was formerly, Cuban economic attache in Moscow being debriefed - he was held for 16. months in Argentine Embassy, in Havana and for:this reagon much. of hia ‘information is dated, CIA to expedite his assessment. g. On Cuban economic defector from Mexico ~ still being _ interrogated and assessed with view to looking at: his. ability to stand Te? SECRER- - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY —
13-00000 netet tone 7 MSE up to cross-examination under OAS. State stressed need to : expedite in order. to gain impact. CIA can provide. no estimate of time when assessment will.be completed, In Miami, his press conference indicated Castro control.cf the Mexican provincial police. -h.. On question -of interyention - Mexican papers stating this is Mexican victory on Cuban issue ~ this is being replayed: by U.&. papers - leaves a-poor-impression, State said this is-being discussed with President and. will.be covered by. Lincoln White at ‘Press .conference.today. CIA and-USIA agreed that more should be -done. . State could not anéwer. on Guban talks - unknown, how deeply — ‘Guba was covered and whether the ‘question of diversion of U. 8. good or movement of people were discussed, “Any hint of Mexican - victory will be ‘demoralizing to people in Cuba.- exile community and Latin America in general. i. Following the meeting Mr. Hurwitch indicated that State and CIA representatives would meet with CAS officials con- cerning PAA flighte to Havana. . i eo:
13-00000 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 2% B.C: “it July: 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE “From: Lt. Col. Patchell Subject: Psychological Operations Group . Following ie brief of meeting held from 1430-1530 on.9 July 62 with the following in attendance: Rebert Hurwitch, Harvey Summ, _ Juan Gurrell, and Al Cartér (State), ‘Bob Smith (USIA), Jolin Tilton " (CIA), and Lt. Col. Patchell. - Swiss article. A Swies. publication has a wery fine article. in detail on Guba - by Swiss reporter who bpent several months in Guba - USIA to replay. | fo ° Clipping service. Good immediate reaction to clippiiy service being provided. . 26th of July. Group. ‘agreed t to "Jack up" machinery for informa- tion. on activities. and L. A. reaction to 26th of July. - . CRC Political Platform. State provided membera with copies of a GRC political platform (attached) Little publicity has been ‘attached to document. CIA will check to see if itis a document for internal or external distribution. (Note: Following the meeting, I asked Mr. Hurwitch: to. consider this in connection with his ‘guide - lines paper, depending: upon ite validity and usefuliess. He stated he believed the two were in. consonance, but would check: ) Cuban Protests. ‘Discussion of Cuban protests. Believed that the publication of protests may be leading up to justification for receipt of defensive weapons. (Note: This fite. Inwith Mr. Bill Harvey's earlier remarks on the same general subject. ) State. is responding to ‘protests and queries in lew key. : EXCLUDED. FROM AUTOMATIC — BECRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES HOT APPLY This document containg _pegen. Copy Ko. ; copies. Series_...—.
13-00000 othe, oak . Mr. Donovan. acl British Newsman. 1430 on il July. _ @ Communist. Will meet with State representatives. at Others invited; Thig individual was formerly Chinese Opium Techniciazis, On report of Chinese techni - cians to assist Cubans in oplum growing. Lt. Col. Patchellieug- gested CIA get declassified and publicized as. quickly as possible. Overall Evaluation. AL to take a look at orientation of group - its purpose, missions, methods of carrying out tasks te see what changes are required for period starting 1 August 1962, or after new NIE is published, Note: From the time that I joined the group on 21 May,. the group's orientation has changed from a general Latin American psychological operations group. to one focused on Cuba, My own personal objective ig now to get the output extended beyond Latin America - into NATO, the uicommitted areas, eastern Europe, Japan, etc. fo Visit of James B: Donovan” Following the meeting, Mr. Hurwitch gave me the attached memorandum of conver gation with