HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM _ been based on single-member districts. In Leopoldville and Elisabethville, a- cohesive and disciplined group of the population pro- voked great discontent by winning. repre- sentation far exceeding its numerical strength, Parties or individuals. were permitted to enter lists. The party had the responsibility of listing its candidates in order,. perhaps the most difficult task performed by the parties, However, an unusual provision of the law permitted the voter to cast his’ ballot either for.a list or merely for one candidate on the list. There was extensive solicitatonof these "preferential votes! by individual candi- dates on the party lists, a factor which under- mined the effectiveness of party leadership. Another feature of the law permitted the com- bination of two or more districts in a prov- ince into a single electoral constituency. If retained in a new electoral. law, this clause theoretically would permit a winner-take -all election, from which a single dominant party could ernerge in control of a province.. The 1960 elections were organized under the supervision of the Congolese Executive Colleges, which had been designated at the Brussels Round Table. Control of electoral operations was exercised by special com- missions, named by the King and headed by. magistrates from Belgium, One commission was created for each administrative district. Under no circumstances could new elec- tions be organized on the basis of the 1960 law; its wording presumed the pre-inde- pendence situation. The Loi Fondamentale stipulates that a new electoral law is neces- sary for the organization of national elec- tions to replace the initial Parliament, unless it is dissolved before the expiration of its term--which will almost certainly not be the case, . ; A number of. serious difficulties will be encountered in the preparation of a new law. The creation of new provinces and the changes some -have made in their admin- istrative subdivisions invalidate the 1960 elec- toral ‘districts. There have been substantial population movements, especially in Kasaiand Katanga. Thus, the pre-1960 census figures can no longer be utilized for establishing the number of seats to which each province will be entitled. The census machinery rests upon the local authorities. Accordingly, the prov- inces- will control the collection of infor- mation. The temptation to pad census results will be almost irresistible; one need only cite the inflated population figures claimed by the new provinces recognition in 1962, All urban centers also have experienced a tremendous influx of popu- lation. There voting status will pose vexing dilemmas. In addition, with the removal of administrative controls on population move- ments, cities like Leopoldville will experience in their petitions for. 36 agonizing problems if contending parties bring in battalions of. voters from the countryside, In the. final analysis, control of the elections probably. will lie with provincial and local authorities. The stake which the political elite of the country has in the elections cannot be over-emphasized. Because of its impact on the outcome of elections, the electoral law certainly will be a major’ concern for all po- litical leaders. Conclusions A new electoral campaign would run the risk of creating a serious security problem in many areas of the country at a time when tranquility is at last returning to almost the whole nation, Disorder is not likely where effective provincial administrations are op- erating. However, there is sufficient political confusion or latent local hostility to create areal threat to security in the following provinces: Lac Leopold II, Moyen Congo, Hant Congo, Maniema, Kivu Central, Katanga Oriental, Nord-Katanga, Sud-Congo (Lualaba), Sankuru, Sud-Kasai, Luluabourg (Kasai Cen- tral), and Unité Kasaienne, In addition, nearly all the disputed territories: would be powder _ kegs during an electoral campaign. It is not likely that there would be eruptions at all these points... However, disorders in even a few of them would severely strain the ANC, Especially dangerous, in our view, is the threat to the key productive area of southern Katanga. The threat there is a latent problem stemming from the complete political vacuum in both Katanga Oriental (East Katanga) ‘and Sud-Congo (Lualaba), It isnotatallcertain that this danger will have been removed by 19.64, The organizers of a national party will be wheedlers, not commanders, of the support of provincial leaders. The advantages which the latter enjoy sitting athwart the lines of com- munication to the electorate would not be compensated for in an electoral campaign by any corresponding weapon of. intimidation in the hands of the present leaders of the central government. Thus, if.it comes into existence, the national party will be a loose coalition between Leopoldville leaders and leaders of provincial governments, A moderate national party would probably labor under the onus of identification with the American Embassy—even if there were no active US encouragement and support for. such a party. Conceivably a united opposition group might be built around an anti-Ameri- can theme, offering the Soviets opportunities for electoral involvement, If, however, a loosely organized,. radical, national opposition party emerged in re- action to the national moderate movement, it would be hampered by a).pressures which SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM . Docld: 3276276338 Page 45 B)
a SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM provincial leaders aligned with the nation- al moderate party could apply, and b) the likely use of the ANC in many areas to suppress disorderly radical political activity. Sections’ of a radically oriented party are most likely ‘- to emerge in provinces where effective gove : ernment does not yet exist. In those areas such a party could pose a serious threat to candidates. of the moderate national party who are likely to be exposed.to physical dangers, . Because it’ would be, in fact, a loose coali- tion between central and provincial govern- ment leaders, a moderate national party would likely dissolve into its component units shortly after the elections: and would: thus lack the power to promote national integra- tion or the capacity to link the central gov- ernment and the population at large, Manage- ment of Parliament would continue’ to be an exasperating process; the new party would not give Adoula (or a successor) the dis- ciplined majority in Parliament necessary for dynamic executive leadership under a- parliamentary regime. However, a moderate national party under present. Leopoldville leaders and with the backing of a core group of provincial lead- ers from stable areas who enjoy relatively firm control over their local electorate prob- ably would emerge with a narrow majority of seats in Parliament, obviating the danger, at least for the time being, of a moré extreme replacement for Adoula. In the accompanying table, we propose a very rough approximation - of the votes a moderate national party might - obtain in 1964 elections on the basis of present trends, There are a number of areas; like Kongo Central, where the results are pre- ordained. There are others, like South Ka- tanga, where prediction is virtually impos- sible. The disputed territories and the failure of the new provinces to coincide. with the old districts make it’ impossible to know exactly how many representatives each prov- ince will have. Thus, no mathematical pre- cision is claimed for this table; we are adrift on a sea of approximation: Rough Estimate of Possible Popular Vote Favoring Moderate National Political Party in 1964 Elections (as of June 1963) ~ Former District New Province Population of | Number of - Former District Deputies Kwilu Kwilu 1,148 9¢ . Kwango Kwango 466 4 (4) ; Bas Congo K ; Cc tral 412 4 Cataractes ongo Centra 439 4(4) Ubangi Ubangi 4 . A Mongala ~ Equater h Moyen Congo { 312 3 Tshuopa Cuvette Centrale 4397 4- Ituri . Kibali-lturi 652 6 (4) Bas-Uélés { 468 44) Haut-Ueles 582 6 Tanganika North Katanga 397 © 4 Kabinda Lomami and Sud-Kasai 480 gd 66 (4 4)=70e “a. HW 49061 Docld:326263356 Page 46 Based on population figures for former districts of the ex-Belgian Congo, tables 1 and 2, pp..133, 134, Tableau Général de la Démo- graphie Congolaise, Ministry of Plan and Economic Coordination, Statistical Services, Leopoldville, July 1961. . ., - The number of deputies is computed on the basis of one deputy per 100,000 population, as provided under the Loi Fondamentale. The UN draft constitution now under consideration by Parliament, how- ever, provides one seat for each 50,000 population, which would double the size of the lower house. . Because PSA/Gizenga continues to have popular support among a segment of the Kwilu Province population, the estimated number of deputies has been reduced by 2. . . Migration since 1960 of Baluba populations from Katanga, Unité Kasaienne and Kasai Central (Luluabourg) to Sud=Kasai has re- sulted in an important increase in the population of that area. The - estimated number of deputies accordingly has been increased by 3. - There are nominally 137 seats in the lower house; hence 70 seats would provide a narrow majority for the national party. 37 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM |
HW 49061 DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM “Vil. THE POLITICS OF FORCE: CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC), POLICE, AND sRETE The role of force necessarily looms large in a political community like the Congo, which — lacks a consensus, a sense of national identity, and adequate legitimation for its political © structures, Indeed, the military throughout the underdeveloped world until recently had been greatly underestimated. As Lucien Pye ob- serves: Only a few years ago it was generally assumed that the future of the newly emerged states would be determined -largely by the activities of their West- ernized intellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist rul- ing parties, and possibly their menacing Communist parties, It occurred to few students of the underdeveloped regions that the military might become the critical group in the course of national- -building.! , In the stages of political development, there are certain characteristics of the military which are of positive value. ‘Edward Shils indicates that the army is ubiquitous, recruits from all parts of the country, and, most im- portant of all, is national inits symbolism, Pye adds that armies as rationalized structures are capable of relating means to ends.21 The experience of military service provides a mechanism for an intensive acculturative experience for the recruit, and a shift from traditional to rational behavior. The good soldier, in short, becomes a modernized man, The structure of discipline in the army pro- vides a relatively high degree of psychological security. Acculturation in the army proceeds in a very differeht environment from that of the urban center. with its anxieties and ten- sions, The ANC and Its Antecedent The nature of the Force Publique, the pred- ecessor of the ANC, was sharply different from that of other armies in tropical Africa. Unlike Britain, France, and Portugal, Belgium sent no metropolitan troops for the colonial con- 19. “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization,” in John Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Coun- trie s, 1962. 20. “The Military in the Political Development of the New States,” ibid, p. 32. 21. Ibid, p. 74. ; was somewhat over 20,000. quest. Nor could the Congo Free State long bear the cost of recruiting ''auxiliaries'' along .- the West Coast of Africa or in Zanzibar. The Congo had to be quickly organized "to con- quer itself." Although the Force Publique was formally founded in 1888, by 1897 it numbered 14,000 men of whom 12,000 were Congolese, Throughout most of its existence, its strength The European complement of officers andnon-commissioned officers was small, During the most difficult part of the conquest, the Arab Wars. of 1892- 1894, there were only 120 Europeans with the army in all of the Congo. In 1960, about 1,100 European officers and non-coms were in charge of 24,000 African non-coms and soldiers, . , , Ethnic scrambling. The Belgians endured a searing experience when in 1895 the ''Bate- téla" tribesmen of the Luluabourg garrison mutinied and killed their commanding of- ficer. The ''Batetela' in the Dhanis column marching ‘toward the Nile revolted in 1897. A third mutiny near Boma in 1900 was again attributed to ''Batetela'', The lesson drawn from these experiences was that. the army had to be ethnically integrated very carefully to prevent domination by any single ethnic group at any unit level, even the squad. The army with its very. small corps of expatriate officers could be a secure instrument only if it were so scrambled that no group resistance could emerge. Discipline could then operate on the individual, who by himself posed little’ threat. The Belgians could bank upon the postulate that being Congolese or even Afri- can would be an insufficient factor of solidarity for the Negro troop to unite against the white officer, The impetus for ethnic integration received renewed life when the Luluabourg garrison -again mutinied in 1944, The inquiries on this disaster showed there had been dereliction in the application of the scrambling principle. Instructions were reiterated that at least four tribes had to be represented in each platoon. In the early days, the Free State tended to concentrate its recruiting of soldiers among the so-called ‘martial races," the "Bangala," Batetela- Bakusu, and Azande tribes, The great -mutinies showed the dangers of this policy to the colonial system, and later levies were distributed throughout the Congo. Thus in 1960, the composition of the army, probably more than any other institution, including the civil service, reflected the ethnic composi- SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 47
HW 49061 DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM tion of the population asa whole. Loyalty to the nation. There was consid- erable effort to instill in the Force Publique loyalty to itself and to the symbols of the colony, such as -the Belgian crown. ''Congo uni, pays fort'’ was the slogan of the army “in 1959-1960. The indoctrination was carried out through an active troop information pro- gram, newspapers, and veterans' associations. Much .of this: esprit was assimilated. by the troops, and it.is very visible in the attitudes of the officer corps. today. The army is not partial to the pan-African brand of national- ism, but it has a loyalty to the whole Con- golese political community exceeding that of most other sectors of Congolese society. The French had an entirely different ap- proach in the military field. Africa was re- garded as a vast manpower reservoir for the French Army. In War War I France mobilized 181,000 tropical African troops. Even during peacetime, 100, 000 black Africans. served in the military. However, the military organi- zation was not related to the. territorial units which later became separately .inde- pendent, The bulk of the soldiers came from the interior, rather than the coastal regions. In areas formerly. under British rule, only Sudan -had an army of its own. However, re- cruitment. in West and East Africa provided at least the embryos of national armies. In West Africa, enlisted ranks were recruited mainly in the northern regions, especially of Ghana and Nigeria. The small African ele- ment in the officer corps came mostly from the coastal regions, where education was more accessible. ‘Thus the Congo army was ‘much more a national - army than other tropical African military forces. The careful ethnic integra- tion and sense of national mission enhanced its potential role in the nation-building pro- cess. The failure of political parties or representative institutions to develop in the Congo set the stage for a de facto abdication to the civil service and the army. In the rest of independent tropical Africa, the scales have thus far tipped in the other direction. The political sector’ has been substantially better organized, and the armies much less 5.0. The Shock of Independence ‘The events of independence shook the Congo- lese National Army (ANC) to its very founda- tions, Overnight the Belgian exodus removed the whole of its. officer corps. Soon thereafter, the emergence of four separate armies re-. flected the political fragmentation of the Congo. In 1960-1961 leaderless bands of mutineers committed: atrocities without number. The new Congolese officers had a daily battle to 39 ‘ candidates, restore discipline. Nothing is more destructive to an army than a successful mutiny; . the mutiny of the entire Congolese army against its officer corps is a virtually unique phe- nomenon, - The immediate cause for the breakdown in the army was the obstinacy of its last Eu- ropean commander, General Janssens, who refused any real acceleration in the Afri- canization program he had devised. At the end of 1958, when Belgian policy-makers were counting on independence in five years, a- scheme was announced that would have pro- duced 14 second lieutenants intenyears. Prep- aration was literally from the cradle up. The in the initial plan, were to be chosen in primary school. Some meager ad- ditional concessions were made in the months before independence, in the face of a growing malaise in the army. However, these were hopelessly out of touch with the psychological requirements of power transfer. The new of- ficers were to be newly recruited, not selected from the non-coms. Under this plan there would have been no Congolese officers before 1962, Against this background the troops ‘grimly observed the. spectacular promotions which were available in civilian sectors and which the army did not share, The disintegration of the colonial: order had kept the troops in almost constant action for 18 months. The army also had been the object of intensive solicitation by political leaders, who feared that in the hands of European officers it would be a neo-colonial instrument. On July 5 the ANC mutiny began. On July 8 General Janssens was relieved of his com- anand, Two days later. the Congo government decided to -Africanize the entire command structure, Victor Lundula was named Com- mander-in-Chief, with the rank of general, and Joseph- Désiré Mobutu was named a colonel and. Chief-of-Staff. This. formula reversed the Belgian. plan through a massive promotion of the non-commissioned grades, Apparently the central authorities, hoped only to exercise some control over the nomination of field grade officers, Company grade officers were chosen by the garrisons themselves, ap- parently by elections where there was more than one non-com who was a logical candi- date. On July 9 government delegations were sent to different parts of the Congo to superin- tend the installation of the new officers. During the following months the ANC was for the most part a "disorderly rabble." The new officers had little authority over their troops. Political figures tried to make use of bands of soldiers from’ their regional or ethnic .groups..A result of this disintegration was. Mobutu's coup d'état of September, which was made possible by his firm-control over a very small number of men. The bulk of the SECRET/NO. FOREIGN DISSEM Page 45