104-10210-40015 oy we eo te tee tees oe ee FREE STN NT RE, PTET SATE, LATA AES NN SY UNE cer PRA NMREEEN t Nh fae MEO ee ene RAE PF eee tenant annette sale cee ree on tan nere wee ¢ 25 October 1965 MFMORANMDP! FOR? Director of Central Intelligence SUBIECT: Yuriv I, SOSENKO 1. The attached merorandum describes the technicues ged and the results obtained in the first rha.e of the eiesent isterrocation of MOETMNEN, The rwost sienificant item to ereree freer tris auesticnine and related volverach testing nertained to Tubfect's story on Lee llarvey OS¥ALr, Su>fact's reactions to the polveranh indicate that he never iearc of OSWALT antil after Presieent Nennedy'’s assassination in “Noverhner 19637 f.at he was not an active narticirant in the case as claired and that his whole Story on CS>PALD was nrenared by the KO3 and piven to us at their cirection. 2. Other areas of strens reacticn refer to Subject's suspected contact with the KCB while in Geneva in 1962 and 2964 and to Abidian and the Fushkin Street drop (key factor in the PFENROVSKIY corprorise)., Subject became very unset at questicning on this subject and refused to discuss his own alleged involverent in the cas2. re also touched uman “OSENKG's nareutal -achground, reriods of irvrisonrent end homosexuality. His reactions here all pointed to clear- cut contradictions in the story he has told us. 3. There still remain several areas of interest and importance to be covered with the techniques used to date, We expect to complete this line of auestioning by 28 Octoder. 4, This first phase has ensbled us to confir: our analyses of kev easrocts of this case. “ere irnortant is the fact that NOSFNEO kno-s he is reacting in sensitive areas and this is worrving hin because he is net sure hew Buch we Know or Sow we learned it. NGSENKO's reactions have given us hone that we rav by this nrocedure have hegun to strike heme. We do not know what it is that keens this nan sitting month after month in his present situation. We speculate that one factor rav be confidence that the KGB will get hir out. Related te this rav be the thoucht that the EGR hes CIA so deenlv nenetrated that it would be unhealthy for hin to confess. ‘ur current line of interro- gation, exsanded and used even rore forcefully, might EVES GuLY tthe trent ete ebb kaa hee wc ete eth e ates we bce hatale ieancct antl Koics waees he Sle Vas
eomtectgetnseninetctrettertir steers Wim th + ite tne te ATA an tN nett Ht when a ‘ fe vette oo ae pose c ’ bate a ee « . . » fry kiie wile d - « 2 « break down sone of his’ obstacles to confession by showing us in a different and stroncer posture. Therefore, we now plen to go beyond the limited sims originully set for this phase of the interrogation. We plan to continue the inter- rogation in the hope of getting a confession; written vlans wili be submitted when they are more definitely formulated. Navid FE. Murnhy Chief, Soviet Bloc Division Attachment ec: Acting DBP (w/fattach) Chicf, CI (w/attach) Director of Security (w/attach) TOP Stent] 2 oye ee ees score, ce ete eet siner meres ae gen ae nee se ARE OET an s eamee att nabs atten caine aa babatt 5 bee hes chillin 6 ocala 4 UO
14-00000 SSS STRATES A ELSE PEEP OO CPLA ORES 2 SY ECD SONS OO SEDER SEEN SE” {EE EA EE NAINA tee He * =A as EVES G:3y 24 Oetober 1966 i. This ig an interim report on progress to date in the new phase in the interrogation of NCSENKO, which began on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21 October. After a break, it will resume on 25 October. 2. Our aims in this phase of the interrocation have been limiteds in view of the possibility of losing access to NOSENKO, wa have sought (a) to strengthen our basic report, now in preparation, by testing his story further, clarifying © points of confuaion and revealing new contradictions, and by polycraph exaninationa cf key areas, and (b) to lead toward his eventual confession by directly exploiting our hypetheses about the true background of NOSENKO and this KG3 operation, to convey to NOSENKC the impression that we know more than before, that we possess irrefutable proof of his guilt and that he has no prospects for release. We refrained from doing this in earlier phases of the interro- gation, but at this point thera seens little to lose. 3, The first four days have shown that the method is useful, NOSENKO again proved a cood reactor on polyoraph, he seemed disturbed by our kno#ledce and the special areas Of laterest we revealed, and we were able to develop im- portant new information, contradictions and indications concerning the background of this operation. Method 4. Our basic epproach has Leen to queation EKOSENKO in specifie.termgs cn selected end detailed aspects-of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our renedal of the interrogation, nor has he asked for any. Our questions have been pointed and detailed and neither require nor permit long-winded answers; they do not seek new infor- mation but are clearly desiqned to check information he pro- vided earlier; our questions are slanted to build up the impression that they are based on data we hava learned in- dependently. The subject matter ig teken up in a preceter- mined order designed for maxinum impact on NOSENKO, Inter- rogation sessions are followed by polygraph examinations on the matters covered in the iaterrogation and/or other topics, Somewhat more time is spent on direct polygraph examination than on interrogation. TO? SERET EVES G31 oie rate a yen men omnes! AeA a 5 dh + mentee ta ne B00 6 vSadtatnd oo
14-00000 Highlights to Date §. OSWALD Cases The opening session was a polygraph examination conducted by Nicholas Stoilaken, wher NOSENKO recognized as his earlier polycraph operator. The question- ing was deveted entirely to Lee Harvey OSWALD and NOSENKO's role in the OSWALD case. we hit this point before any other in order (a), to permit clean pelyoraph testing on this key matter without having disturbed him with other questions, and (b), to get over to NOSENKO the cravity of our concern on thia matter of highest state interest. The operator's conclusions were: Be Subject was not personally or actually in- volved in the OSWALD case from 1959 while OSAALD wag in the Soviet Union. be Subject received special instructions (from the KGB) abcut the OSWALD case and what to tell am- erican authorities about it. @. Subject’s allegec- association with the OSWALD ease both “before and after® the Kennedy assassination Was partly for the purpose cf supporting and sub- Stantiating Subject's cover story “leqend*, & Subject heard of OSWALD (as a case) only after Kennedy's assassination, however he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case ky a KGB officer. 6 Geneva Meetings: We devoted several hours of inter- rogation and polycraph testing to the Geneva periods, June 1962 and January-February 1964, We hit this point second in order because there are clear signs of important deception behind it and it offers us special opportunities to sugcest inside information which in fact derive from observation and deduction, Among the hich points were the followings @ Pavel SHAKHCVs NOSENKO's story of his "investi- gation" of SHAKHOV, a Soviet delegation member whom he said was suspected in 1962 to be an American agent, was covered again in detail. The new data we obtained tend to confirm that this is a serious part of NOSENKO's TOP 99337 EVES GY one noe mee ern epee we ee! eB oacan, Fae ew re eeey Degete eae of a wat he Std wae
14-00000 dee OED reteRE e 6 cS ee ce eae i SO mERTET TTS assert TESST cts eee AeA A eI 2 Spee on ee tee oh message. SHAKHOV's.background in fact suggests that he is actually a KGB officers his contact in Geneva with|Devid MARK, a former CIA cooptee in Moscow, is 06,08 at the center of NOSENKO'’s story. We slanted our questions to succest knowledge that S:IAKHOV is a KGB officer (not a KGB investigation suspect) and that #@ may know of some of hia important operational centacts. NOSENKO wags inconsistent in his story and reacted significantly under polygraph examina- tion, we are currently tracing new names and data evl are re-examining the aicnificance of this matter. atrongly and consistently to the question of whether er not he had been sent to Geneva by the KGB to con- tact CIA, whether he was receiving KGB direction ; there, and on related quastions, including some re- lated to his ostensible investigation of Pavol SYAKHOY, b. KGS Control in Genevas NOSEMKO reacted very G. U.S, Personnel and Installations in Geneyas HOSENKO was interrogated on his earlier story that he had seen in Geneva in 1964 the file on KGB activity against American installations in Geneva (KGB ecryptonym *SKONPION"),. His version this time conflicted with his 1964 version but contained the same message, that the weak and understaffed KGB in Geneva had little interest, limited facilities and no success in opera- tions against the Americans and had practically no idea of the identities of CIA personnel there. In addition, NOSENKO reacted to polygraph questions related to whether the KGB had told him the name of his CIA case officers, On the other hand, he did not react to the names of the then COS Switzerland and COB Geneva, which suggests that he was not told them (these names were buried in lists of namea). a. KGB Personnel in Genevat NOSENKO's answers to questions concerning Alexandr KISLOV conflicted with certain details earlier reported, including KIS§— LOV's role in the({ARCHITCHAT case. He seemed disturbed 02. by the questioning on KISLOV and finally said he saw no reason to answer any more of them. However, his polygraph reactions did not suggest that he was as sensitive to KISLOV as to other individuals and matters ecversd in the same series of questions, We also asked, with the polygraph, whether he was withholding anything TG? SECRET Eyed Gil Zl6R ere epee tat Sean
14-00000 46 a concerning his alleced agent Glieg GRINEVSATY, an official ef the Soviet delegation; his reactions u suggested that he may genuinely be ignorant of Vv GRINEVSKIY's KGB activities at the S18 « @ ned earlier | said that his daily access to the KGB Residency in Geneva in 13964 was due to his frequent contacts with Mikhail S. TSYMBAL; this cine he said that he only sad TSYMBAL twice in Geneva in 1964 end failed to mention a Sunday meeting with TSYMBAL which he hed reported to us at the time it occurred. This leaves open the whole question of how NOSEIKO can explain his daily access to the Residency, which he himself no@ says =~ evidently on the basis of what he has learned freea our previous interrogations -= is not normally permitted. This will be covered in further questioning. 7.Matters Related to the PEIKCVSKIY Compromises @e John ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street addrops SOSENKO reacted witn special sensitivity and intensity when asked in a polygraph test whether he had been instructed to tell CIA about ABIDIAI'’s wisit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop. In addition, he refused for the first time to discuss his o«n participation in the incident, adanantly claiming that he does not remember when or even whether he wisited the drop or whether he read- reports on surveillanes coverace of it after ABIDIAN's visit. (He had earlier said he visited the drop at least twice, immediately after ABIDIAN's visit; he des= eribed the location. and named the KGB efficers.he went with.) In sharp contrast to hia reluctence to discuss his personal role was hic unhesitating and confident response to other aspects of the Pushkin Street drop storys he reiterates that ABIDIAN was under full time, double-strength sure weillence throughout his tour in Moscow and that #BIDIAN was surveilled to the drop. He now adds, for the first time, that the KGB concluded that the G@rop had been initially found by a U.S. tourist or G@elegation member and that ABIDIAN was merely check- ing out its suitability for some eventual use. (In fact, PENKOVSKIY proposed the drop and ABLDIAN went there only in response to the agreed telephonic signal triggered by persons unknown, not by PENKOV. SKIY.) TO? S225 EVs C.°Y te me meee on rem ont + ae ate + cates Abentanetacatreanitee ot ote, VIRK ee eee eee an
14-00000 eee es cease ups oeemmmananed acs erent sere ambaneneenennne ERED! mn meen one oo reat nt fA AEE Ente EN ETOAC eee bied tial b HOSEMKO was again queried on ob [co el DULACKI'S bugged restaurant meeting with } | an _lofficer, whose neme he geve as oy 2? 7362 and in 19€4. He could not clarify why he had confused the names. Since we now know through Greville WYNNE that the Soviets were inter~ ested as late ag early 1363 in clarifying PENKOV- SKI¥'s allusion in a hucced conversation. in 1961 0b to we believe that NOSENKO's 1962 version Was @ KGE’ fishing expedition. However, NOJENKO , did not to a polycraph questicn concerning 0) the name and he may not himself know that he was civen a wrong nane for the[_ officer, nor «hy. \ ce, 2amiral VORONTSOVs It hed been speculated that when NOSENKO menticned in June 1962 meetings the name of his “big friend“ in the naval GRU, démirel VORONTSOV, he may have bsen fishine for coments from us concerning Marshal VAREUTSOV, PENKOVSKAIY'a protector. Cueried this time about Admiral VORONTSOV, NOSENKO said that he had never met him and had no personal or similar connections he seens to have completely forrotten ever having Claimed a personal relationgsnip. L ob ob 06 8. & REISFREUND] and (STORSBEEG} | NOSENKO was asked about {gohan PRETSFREUKD) whom he had earlier claimed to have handled 1960-61 in Mostow a3 an acent acainst the[mflitary code ODE Clerk Jim STORSBERG] NOSENKO again said he first met \PREZS-~ FREUSD jin 1960.. W@ tolda NOSENKO that |FREISFREU> told“us ol that had not met NOSEMKO until 19627 NOSENKO. denied this, We then added to his concern by telling him (untruth- _ fully, but with a reasonable estimate of the true situation) O bthat[PREISPAUZID also’ said that the KGB had told him to say he first met NOSE in 1960. when polycraphed NOSENKO re- acted stroncly and consistently to questions on the subiect. These reactions and our follow-up may well bear on the ques- ObLedon of dhethor [STORSBERG] was actually recruited by the KGB, an issue we nave reviewed with the FBI. NOSENKO must be concernad because he now says that the (STORSBERG|casze was Qe primarily GRYNAZOV's, not his own, although he, NOSENKO, *“supervised" it. Thus disappears the sole case that NOSENKO has claimel as his very own, 9. Identity and Personal Background: One of the basic questions underlying this cperation is NOSENKO's real identity. and personal background. There are many indications, reported TOP SEC?ET EVES G3i¥ “e 718 ene ene meet settee see
14-00000 exmprromrrnitetctnepesttesisteen SSF tSANDAD- Eten eenestiermsi—spssntesenenastnssienteagerIate hy SAARLAND heen reetrteisetter, Seems narttinan Qmemtewerettsget aa, eect * cade rT Ge ‘ earlier, that he has spent tine in prison and that he is not in fact a KGB officer; similarly, his stories of his early school and military service sore inconsistent and unbelievable. We are trying in this interrocation to clarify this important point. Among the points covered so far are the followings a. identity: NCSENKO was questioned extensively on the polygraph concerning his ide:tity. In one series of tests, for exeuple, he was asked whether. Minister of Shipbuilding Ivan NOSENKO was the father of Yuri Ivanovich NOSETKO and was then asked whether Minister NOSENKO was. his father; similarly with Tamara WOSLAKO, his ostensible mother. NCSENKO did not react to the question phrased “Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO", but reacted consistently when esked if these were his own parents. He wag sensitive to questions concerning h‘s marriage. (Tnere is reason to believe he is not, in fact, married.) He was also given a series of tests asking for the first letter of his given name. The whole alphabet was covered, and the polygraph charts show that he beceme increase ingly tense, culminating at the letter S (or perhaps T) on both runs. hile we recognize that testing of this sort. may not give valid results, it certainly gets over to NOSENKO the decree of our doubt and may even help us determine who he really is. we will purgue this further, covering his patronym and family name as well, b. Homosexuality: We tested polycraphically our observations that NOSZNKO has homosexual tendencies and experience. He showed himself extremely sensitive to this line of questioning.. The test results tend to show that he had homosexual experience in Soviet imprisonment (see below) and with the KGB homosexual agents whom he has told us he recruited and handled. Ce. Imprisonment: In view of the strong indica- tions that NOSENKO has spent considerable time in prison (as reported in the past), we questioned him on this. He reacted strongly and consistently to the question of whether he had been imprisoned in the USSR. We then ran a series of tests to determine his relative sensitivity to various types of imprisonment, various erimes for which he may have been imprisoned, various areas of the USSR where he may have been imprisoned, TOP Skensy EYES rly
14-00000 eerste tennant etter REEF eboNAS TSANG netehtetetn etheneneetensnetbenuateeshiedeeshetppeneeneeientesetvttrttntrttetttenin stk ietttwteteertistryeeeateeenSSRSRSRSSSSTITEAEAO See inet eens wis ea tots» te oRRERETERONEP SOARS ESTAS ORs ORG SAAS om 3 , " ~  Tgp or Ehe§ Ly and various yeara._of imprisonment. -He seemed con~ sistently sensitive to correctional labor camps as the type of prison, and to several possible causes of imprisonments particularly homosexuality, desertion and felony. Interestingly enough he was not sensitive to questions concerning imprisonment for self-inflicted wounds despite his story that he had shot himself in the hand during the war. He seemed more consistently sensitive to Siberia as the area of imprisonment but the results were not as clear as on other aspects of his story. He seems particularly sensitive to the years 1954-1956, which immediately preceed the period from 1956 onward, when he began to appear in KGB operations. TOP SEeRET Eyes Gta os PN tee Pe nate wee ee eee cee nen ama OR an