Ay “er . . * , (Vv) ‘ . . Date : 07/14/98 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION . Peleased under the John ; . Kennedy AGENCY : NSC Lssasgsination Records RECORD NUMBER : 145-10001-10271 ollection Act of 1992 RECORDS SERIES : (44 USC 2107 Note). AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 169 ase#iNW 54214 Date: 1O-O4-2017 . DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : NSC FROM : THOMAS A. PARROTT TO : TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD DATE : 04/05/62 PAGES : 2 SUBJECTS °: MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE SPEICAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON OPERATION MONGOOSE - DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/17/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS EXEMPT PER E.O, 13526 SEC 3.3(b)S@X 8 ft [ DATE EXEMPTED: JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 3!DzL 23” CIAY Te Tecliens: AS REDACTED 2016 HW 542714 DBocld: 32977091 Page 1
5 April 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, Thursday, 5 April 1962 PRESENT: General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone and General Parker 1. Mr. Johnson reported that the Italian representative at the UN has now been briefed on the proposal to approach the Cubans with an offen of food or medicine in exchange for the Playa Giron prisoners. He noted that no specifics had been agreed on, and the first contact would be for the purpose of establishing in principal the possibility of such an exchange. 2. Mr. McCone reiterated that all reports of Cuban inter- vention in the Hemisphere are proving to have no substance when they are actually run down. In answer to General Taylor's question as to what the U.S. might do if hard evidence of this kind is obtained, Mr. Johnson pointed out that a subcommittee of the OAS, on security, had been authorized at Punta del Este. This committee was given the authority to mobilize multi-national action against the Castro regime in the event that such hard information is obtained. It was agreed that whatever information becomes available should be given to. General White, who is the U.S. representative on this subcommittee. 3. Mr. McCone said that after studying the possibility of using Cuban air crews, CIA had concluded that they would not be suitable for supply drops at night. On the other hand, trained U.S. civilian crews could be provided by Civil Air Transport (CAT) in 30 days. Arrangements could be made to have these pilots ostensibly employed by Cuban exile groups in the U.S. and, therefore, they would be non-attributable to the U.S. Government. He said that available Cubans could then be used for less demanding missions such as leaflet drops. There appeared to be a general feeling on the part of the Group me that U.S. civilians of this type would not be essentially ilo different]than "sheep dipped" personrelfjin the event that any were shot d ver Cuba. GU)(c) 4. Mr. McCone referred tothe Weekly Progress Reports which are now being produced by CIA. He said these are required internally within the Agency, and that to consolidate them with reporting from other responsible departments and agencies would slow things up and HW 542714 DBocld:32977091 Page 2?
HW 54714 -2- and make the report less useable. It was, therefore, agreed that the CIA Progress Reports would continue to be produced every Tuesday, and that a highlighted summary would be prepared weekly by General Lansdale and forwarded to General Taylor's office for information of the Group. It was also agreed that General Lansdale should normally brief the Group every other week. 5. Mr. McCone expressed some impatience with progress being made on the project, and speculated as to whether it might not be desirable to consider the possibility of a different approach. In this connection, he noted that reconnaissance has revealed con- siderably less Cuban military strength than had been expected. General Taylor &sked that Mr. McCone give the Group, next Wednesday, a summary of the intelligence received from reconnaissance and from the debriefing of, exfiltrated agents. 6. The Group discussed at. length the question of whether the U.S. would actually welcome an excuse for overt intervention. One of the points raised in this connection was the possibility of massive death sentences for the PlayaGiron prisoners, and whether this would serve as a casus belli. The possibility of a quick operation to liberate the prisoners was also mentioned. It was felt that the time has now come when the basic philosophy of the project should be examined once more, with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early overt intervention. A meeting was set up for next Wednesday at 2:00 p.m., to include the Secretaries of State and Defense. sets Parrott No distribution, except for General Lansdale - ‘4 drefrenyed + [eles DoclIda: 32977091 Page 3