Pee Senireeane 2 eee os -_ “~ . “DERECTIVE oF Tue FREStDENT OF TI UNITED STATES DECEMBER 15, 1953 oe ‘ On September 6, “1939, dJanrary 8, 1943, and July 24 i950, “presidential Directives were issued requesting ali eanforca= ment officers, bot h Federal and State, to report promptly alk information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities hud sclated matters to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of investigation. . [ tyhe Federal Bureau of Investigation is charged with . investigating 211 violations of the Atomic Bbuergy Act, incsudang the ditegad expor® or import of fissionable material, the Jilegat possession or transportation of Tissionable material and the . Adderall production, transt¢ *, or possession of any eaquinment or Wevice Geil BANG fissionable muteries. or AcGnMIS Gierey as a mibitasy Weepon. ssionoble material’ means plutonium, uranium-Z35 os othex, ma erial which the Atomic Energy Comaitssion hes determined to be capable of releasing substantial guantities. of energy through aerapend Shain reaction, JI am requesting that ail enforcement , f¥icers: both Federal and State, weport all information relating to ‘violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest Licld LPEPY een Bentative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, ty suggest that ali patriotic org anizations and individual Lise wee report ai. cuch information to. the. Federal Bureau of 4 ; tie . trve ration in the Same manner. | Dats oo s . . . . . me _ i 55078 Docta:32989530, Page 33 .
THE WHITE HOUSE WAS SHIRGTON duly 2h, 1950 Roo renee G TO DOLESTIC ST iVitis 3 Al brad Kol oi rare G2, wl HW 55073 Docld:329895350 Page 34 On Septerber 6, 1939 and Jenwary 8, 1913 a Presi~ 2. gh | Roo Ee ee ae oo OMe =e P S . i “ a TONAGS dential Directive was issu ed providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Deparinent of Justice should take . , charge of investigative work in matters relating to esplonage : pabotage, ubvers sive ac tivities and related vatiers. It was ; poinied out that the’ invesbisations must be conducted in a an “ couprohensive manner on a National basis and 23]. tnformation ‘ carefully sifted cut and correlated in order tr avoid confusion. T ghantid Vika tn nerd In antl the attention of 21) Pafenaanont . - i 4 + = tae i Ofiiecrs, bow Foderal. and State, to the resuest that they re- - port ell inforration in the above cnumerated fields promptly to the nearest-Pield Reprosdntative of the Fedore] Duresn of - invastigetion, which is charged with tie responsibility of ~ ; Cumce di ta ng this material and res erring matters which are under the Jurd.s sciction of any other Federal agsnoy with res sponsibiii~ ties in this field to ths appr opi “228 BLENCY. 1 ; ; -° t . a . . an . £ suggest that all patriotie organizations an . jndivs Ovals Likewise report all such information relating to : 7 esplonscs sabotage and subversive activities to the Fodsral Burea UL of ‘Investigation in this sane manner. . : > 4 . . Z . i ° . ‘ . ° 7s . f i ~ i . “ . Py | - . i . . . Pa a le ° el. -
we Laie ram ort teherdee at Bate “ ay HW 55073 ”, wetness Teter ee eae amen Set te adhe Bato a taranmeg Rae * ee eres coraa 4 < oe a wee ewes WANE HARY pee mem tne VATE So ele teRanan eaateamer min tee SAY lees we fSMEP OT enbew CAI arate Sree catlnsmabasten te Some semnchend Nellis ine tabs wre ates sans mecant bebe te ae . a & ’ . igs . ~w * se ~ « wt REPORT SECURITY MATTERS TO FBI "On September 6, 1939, J issued a aie rective providing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice Should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage and ° violations of the. Meutrality regulations, pointing out that the investigations must be conducted in a comprehensive Manher, On a National basis, and all ipformation carefully. sifted out and correlated in order to avoid coniusion and irresSponsibility. J then requested all police officers, sheriffs, and other law enforcement officers in the United States, promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Iuvestigation any such information. "T am again calling. the attention of all enforcement officers to the request that they (report call such iafGcmativw promptly to vhe nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is charged with the responsibility of correlating this. material aad veferring matters which are uncer the jurisdiction of any other Federal agency with responsibilities ‘in this field -* ‘to the appropriate agency. "TI suggest that all patriotic organiza- tions and individuals likewise report all t such information relating to espionage and 7 related matters to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the same manner. . "J am confident that all law enforcement officers, who are now rendering such invalu- able assistance toward the success of the internal safety of. our country will cooperate in this matier.' ' Fs + gh Siiak Lo. hravcl, —— rd ae . °. SY oy . - , January 8, 1943 . , \b 5 : — ~ 3 ree ~ Qheshey es ye” Docld: 32989530 Page: 35 eet nnee naa mee A SEINE BO POLO HEE Star, Bison aunitite
r , ih, Cr a een en - - ‘ , poe a ss oe * . . ANGIE Ae AEA AN oe USEF eth Te Tite eat eile eM, co Lee abeteed ee bes tat SEE ems GE Laatste Leta cele cz tat BUTE REINA, SRI ds eat es SE, , : jar he Neem as ows ort haan “ Set Pe aN ew Hd Sm ate tbetee Chere When pane what tn a ate eee oe x | 20 OT bee Ae te RS Baba es te ee ee we . ‘ ss ‘ “ - *, 4 a 4 < 4 . . | ‘ ' ’ . oe . . /! . t ; ' . - € . cd tem memene vere leewiin ne eee reese a . . : ~€ + . . « é ERECTIVE OF THE PRES TPERL OF THE UNITED STATES SEPTEMBER: 6; 198 9 at tthe “Attorney General ‘has been requested by me to ins struct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espic ige sabotage, and violations of the neutrality r-gulations,. ter ot te ate Bam om nt Tee ne. £ 2 SLL LD VAAL wis ¢ WICH OL O PUTORUEOT rere, mee om somprohomsive and effective manners on a national basis, and ail information just be > . carefully sifted out and correlated in order to uvoid confusion and irresponsibility. : ; : ‘ ’ . ” rs "fo this end I request all police officers, sheriivs, and all other Law enforcement officers iu the Uxiited States promptly Lo tuxiy over to the nearest representative of the federal Sureeu cz Investigation any information obtained by them relating to esplonars, . counteres pionuge, sabotare, subversive sctivities and violstions of the neutrality laws," cS . HW 55073 DoclId: 32969530 ' Page 36
nde Seen 2o more ct ia eal fin wae ON -a4 3 Rack ¥. fon + ’ : seat Ra ee & abe! we cringe Seer eet ENP wnat ny wenteywir wee ca Be te ote AGTS : Fo Neches hada tnd at COACEINALG es errean de wee Be + the Sem pe ares eer suey Jeet most ang t } 4 -% fant nyt tn i Ste oO 4 ort fo QQ @ ae fi 4? DO o-ei er Syel oho O10 rl oa 4 of ples 4 9 reg et ra WwW NV > Mae) @ » a no oO bay to bas Oe 6) 42 > Ff ane G2) mW wt fa eh © Ww + Fe + fa 6 co) oom 42 3 cy ost gw 42 Pavi~ con ars and tee ee 42 o @) $4 oO nt yours, cea cern eee Very truly Page 37 32969530 DoctId ~—e HW 55073
The Attorney General i ’ \ ‘ Director, FBI " \ Q . UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVIT maa an kes all St A eee Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of ~, Investigation, \ Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes an initial response to the various requests set forth in referenced letter, A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your récords, Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming, ee nea Enclosures (10) £ cE — pwhsjvi-t , Lorie Ge) AF } eh 8. *, eae a owe ‘ 4 re, | ! Assoc. Dir, 2 Dep. AD Adm. — Jf Dep. AD Inv. 4 §. he 4 ‘ Asst. Dir: . ‘ if i Uy / I; ad Admin. __ . ° ‘ ¥ i I, ype Comp. Syst. —_., '-4 * ad iy Ext. Affairs 1* ° ” gate poss “ 2 Files & Com. i be i i 4 / ‘ i Gen. Inv. t é Ident. Inspection Intell. Laboratory Plon. & Evol, — i Sladen Legal soo Tele plop CRG 1 Directdf Se MArig TELETYPE UNIT Cj WW O55073 Docld:32969530 Page 36 \ Aprit 4, 1975 1 = Legal Counsel Division Fs { ‘he ‘gm apa 8 1978 een Sea Mane] RE , _gyicLose Ie ui o on j } GPO «8.
Assoc. Dir. Dep. AD Adm. _ Dep. AD Inv. __ Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. — Ext. Affairs Files & Com. __ Gen. Inv. Ident. Inspection Inteil. Laboratory —__ Plan. & Eval, — Spec. Inv. Training Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. _ ‘ a | : . Director Sec'y.. MAIL ROOM[__] TELETYPE UNIT ca ' HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 39 » 1 = Legal Counsel¥ Division l~ ite, W. 0, Cregar xb aa 2 UNyrED SpATES SENATE SELECT COMNETTER TOs ism TIONS WETH RESPSCE TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Reference ig. made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for decunents and other infornetion from the Federal Bureau of Investiga~ tion UFBI), Attached are various documents which constitute an initial ond partial vesponuse to the Committea’s request, These gocuwents are described as follows: A, A menerandun from Atternoy General Hansey Clark to FBI Director J, Edgar Hoover, dated September 14, 1967, 2, Two FRI memoranda recording instructions received from President Franklin DB. Roosevelt by FBI Director Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities and which indicate meetings hetween President Roosevelt and Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1936, o,. <A memorandum from Director Hoover to FRI Agsociate Director BE, A, Tanm, dated September 16, 1936. 4, Prosidential divectives dated September ‘6, 1938; January &, 19435; duly 24, 1956; and Becomber_i5, 1953 De The various other requests contained in the Conmittee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the carliest possible tine, Enciosures (8) < 1 - The Attorney General is tive poe } 5 ; if f ie Femme Ti , ic ae eect te “ * / SOURIS
Assoc. Dir. e aa March'31, 1975 The Attorney Gencral Mr. N.P. Callahan Mr, J.B...Adans Mr. J.A. Mintz Mr, WR. Wannall Mr. W.0O. Cregar REC-46 25.7 Uf Director, FBI L.4 fro. 2 fe WY -_ fest fel foot fond fost pitta SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ~~ Reference is made to a telephones convorsation betyveen Associate Doputy Attorney Gonoral Janes A. Wilderotter and Inspector John B. Hotis on March 25, 1975, This will confirm the authorization provided hy Me. Wildcerotter to Mr. Hotis with regard to permitting CIA to furnish a menorandum dated February 7, 1966, entiticd "CIA Qporations in the United States," to the staf2 of the Sonate Select Committee, it is ouv understanding that Mx. William G. Miller, Staf2l Director, Senate Select Connittec, telephonically contacted Mr. John Ciarke, Associute Deputy to the Director of Contral Intelligence, and requested a copy of the above-~ described memorandun, way i = The Doputy Attorney General arrePR ye WOC :bew pV ee px oan @)\ 5 “* qlsloo. - She nore: \° See memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated 3/24/75, captioned "Senstudy 75," prepared by WOC:ebc. Dep, AD Adm. _.. ID: i Dep. AD inv. | ™ \ 7 | Admin, = ‘ ae ‘ (x ‘ , Comp. Syst. oy q \y Ext. Affairs re : Files & Com. op : ON INU, Gen. Inv, a) f ve Ident. “ ‘ * H * in inspection sone ccrreeern ie Ve Intell. he Laboratory \ \\ Plan. & Eval. A \} Spec. Inv. = Training r Legal Coun, CT 7 Telephone Rm. _.. . ; Director See4) (fy MATA ROOMIZ/” TELETYPE UNIT (_} EO tees Le ae 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 40
OPTIONAL FORM:NO. 10” _-§010—-106 , MAY 1962 EDITION ., GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 _ . UNITED STATES GO! MENT Assoc. Dir. —__ s Dep. AD Adm. Dep. AD Inv. _. M emorandum | ree Comp. Syst. —_ Ext. Affairs —_. : Mr. W. R. Wannall DATE: 3/24/75 Files & Com. — Gen. Inv. \@tl 1 ad Mr. Adams Ione on FROM : We regar ‘l= Mr. Mintz Intell. . Ye 1 ~ Mr, Wannall / A 1 - Mr. Cregar ions suBjECT; SENSTUDY 75 stern! etree ahi beh en A Training Telephone Rm. — Director Sec’y __ This memorandum reports that on the morning of 3/24/75 Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, telephonically advised Section Chief William 0. Cregar, the Bureau's representative on this Group, that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) has requested a copy of the 2/7/66 FBI - CIA Understanding, encrled “ c/A Dferad leis way Whe Umetid S1adéas," tom re: We have previously received requests from the House <O8 Appropriations C ittee as well as the Rockefeller Commission eSisas for copies of te FBI - CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66, In a QD both instances f Deputy AG Laurence Silberman authorized the | f a release of theAFBI - CIA Understanding to the House Appropria- f : is ‘yi «tions Committéé-as-wéIT as the’ Rockéféller Commission. ATLA CO wy On the morning of 3/24/75 Mr. John Clarke telephonically | advised that CIA has received a request from the SSC to provide the SSC with a copy of the FBI - CIA Understanding. Inasmuch as we have previously provided a copy of this Understanding to another Congressional committee, it would appear that we have no choice but to furnish a copy of this Understanding to the SSC; however, clearance should be obtained from Deputy AG Silberman, he bo ea waar ae Dis P/26/G AGE, DTPA eo Inasmuch as a timely response to the SSC is desired, it would appear reasonable for the Legal Counsel Division to telephonically inquire from Mr. Silberman whether he interposes x any objection to CIA furnishing a copy of the Understanding to the SSC. If oral authority is obtained, the Intelligence Division will confirm such authority from the eC AG Bee / Hh ; Mat ACTION: RECAG Ure If approved, the Legal-Caiinsel pivision* Wik aveenp3 to obtain Mr, Silberman's authority for FBI to_advise.CiA that this Bureau interposes no objection to CIA furnishing a copy of the FBI - CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66 to the SSC staff. This authority will be confirmed in writing if granted. or On V25f 2S, pssa Vepoud? (he as ay, @ LY Orne _OilldereEE UM td. ifn. weed? Ww BL, hin weniaten of Fel-wih S aK i3 Fer Thor 4 1 cconllcan AY Lb des egs -f ta cl€el 2/ 2fiaé de, § SG « une t at pene eee, HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 41 LES
1 cy & ~ he Sd ae CODE TELETYPE L ANOe| aid FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION _ 1 TO ALL SACS ine Joo gp wclec ey : wn J G[aSieP—"e MAR 244975 | FROM DIRECTOR FBI crap Maven ich () SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE actrvifins! YPE a Le ar deen ee - ean me Namen ee SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ‘TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMA- TION FROM THE FBI, AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, | ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLI- A GENCE MATTERS, PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT . Be ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPRO- PRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES, THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL Assoc. Dir. 5 7 ; i “4 j Dep ao Aa 1 - Each Assistant Director | 8 ny ly 4; ] / ae wl er ois NOTE: By letter dated 3/19/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman‘of the ‘Senate Comp. Syst Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Rsspect To Intelli- Et Affsiss — gence Activities, made an initial request for data con¢erning the FBI's legal Gen. Inv. authority, jurisdictional agreements, ‘organization anid staffing,.policies and procedures and studies and reports concerning internal security and countér=— intelligence activities. It is necessary to contact the field offigesy apiain. LsboraterY — specific information concerning the current agent a assigned to thésé Ident. Inspection Intell. Spec. Inv. matters, \ arn Weampeenesey ‘ Leelee RR a YA\ / iN Ow = Telephone Rm. my” q 7 ( Director Sec i Pe SA ~ , : 5 MAIBAOO ara TELETYPE UNIT / HW 55073 rtp sont ssl TELET ER y
FROM nde l6., ALL TNPORMSTED ConA IES BERGE 1S USCLAGSTREER Sou Lf f- FeO). | AW 55073 SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 8 OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27 UNITED STATES e021 © 7 5010-106 + Assoc. Dir. - Dep. A — Dep. AD } ——. 1 - Mr. Callahan Asst. Dird Memorandum 1 - Mr. Calla me ) Eee Affonso Mr. W. R. Wannalye” pate: 3/18/75 Files & Com — 1 - Mr. Mintz Ident. 1 ~- Mr. Wannall Inspection Ww. - of) teen 1 - Mr. Farrington a eer 1 - Mr. Cregar Loot goan. Eval. _ Pigs —_— Training one Telephone Rm. —_ Director Sec’y ___ This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of nel Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Int lligence Community, (hereafter_referred_to as the feroup) » held on 3/14/75. Shey The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees. At a meeting of the Group on 3/14/75 the following items were discussed: Freedom of Information: Mr. Clarke asked all agencies to report on the volume of requests that are received under the Freedom of Information Act. The CIA representative pointed out that as of 3/10/75 CIA had received 93 requests. Since 3/10/75 the requests are averaging approximately 50. per day. The National Security Agency has received approximately 35 requests. None of the other agencies reported any high volume of requests and those requests that had Ne received did not impact on the Intelligence Communit REC-38 bie) af fia: Lf - Ys CIA's Director of Security, Mr. Charles. Kane, and the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee, > Donald E.,. Moore, ,have met with Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Office er for the Senate {Select Committee (SSC), and are encouraged by fhe’ ‘physical, and document security arrangements the SSC intends to employ. Attached is a letter from Senator Church to Mr. Colby expressing -Sena tor \Church's appreciation for the help provided by Mr. Colby's staff in developing security precautions. 4 3 we Security Arrangements: * f Enclosures : a WOCzebe A i \h (7) ENCLOsuar CONTINUED - OVER> ~ Ds. i Pay Docld: 327989530 Page 45
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 The FBI — CIA 1966 Understanding: Mr. Clarke advised that the Rockefeller Commission requested a copy of the FBI -— CIA Understanding of 1966 and inquired whether one could be made available to the Commission. I advised Mr. Clarke that we had made the 1966 Understanding available to Congressional committees and I saw no reason why a copy of the Understanding could not be furnished to the Rockefeller Commission but I would have to defer to Deputy AG Silberman (also in attendance). Mr. Silberman said by all means we would have to respond to the Rockefeller Commission and he authorized Clarke to furnish a copy of the Understanding to the Rockefeller Commission, Clearances for Staff Members of the SSC: Attached hereto is a copy of a letter to the Staff Director of the SSC from Mr. Clarke outlining procedures for the certification of clearances granted to SSC staff members. As an enclosure to this attachment is a suggested format which the SSC could use in certifying that staff members who have received a security investigation by the FBI meet the require- ments of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified informa- tion up to and including "Top Secret.” A second enclosure to Clarke's letter to Miller contains a copy of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14 which sets up the Uniform Personnel Security Standards and Practices Governing Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, Clearances for access to compartmented information are the responsibility of CIA and such clearances will be issued to select members of the SSC on a ‘*need-to-know" basis. Staff Members on Whom Substantial Derogatory Information is Developed: Mr. Clarke asked if I could describe for the Group what procedures had been worked out with Senator Church when information was developed of a significant derogatory nature regarding potential staff employees. I advised the Group that upon such a determination a Bureau official would bring the CONTINUED - OVER HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 46
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 written results of the investigation personally to the attention of Senator Church or his Staff Director. Follow- ing that a copy of this investigation would be made available to Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence and that Senator Church or the Staff Director would welcome any comments from Mr. Colby as to the security ramifications attendant to the employment of this person. Mr. Clarke agreed this was a very desirable procedure and the Group fully endorsed this arrangement, Organization of the SSC: Attached is Mr. Clarke's understanding of how the SSC will be organized, It is noted it will be broken down into fow Task Forces, each with a Task Force Director, a lawyer or lawyers assigned, each with several researchers. As noted from this enclosure, Task Force three concerns domestic activities including the FBI and those parts of the CIA that relate to domestic matters. Army counterintelligence activities may also come under the cognizance of this Task Force. Staffing for Task Force number three is still in. process and no Task Force Director has yet been appointed. CIA Secrecy Agreement and Employee Bulletin: Attached hereto is a letter to Senator Church from Mr. Colby designed to relieve current CIA employees from any obligation of secrecy, It is noted all CIA employees sign a Secrecy Agreement as a prerequisite to employment. Also attached is a copy of an Employee Bulletin, dated 3/12/75, advising CIA employees as to the procedures he should follow if he is selected to be interviewed by a member of the SSC or its staff. It is to be noted that both the Employee Bulletin and Colby's letter to Senator Church were reviewed by the White House and the Department of Justice. CONTINUED ~ OVER HW 55073 Docld:329899530 Page 47
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 CIA Requirements Received from the SSC: Attached herewith is a letter from Senator Church to Mr. Colby enclosing the initial request for CIA documents for transmittal to the SSC. According to Mr. Clarke, it is his understanding that similar requests if not already received are being prepared by the SSC for other members of the Group. Executive Session: At the conclusion of the formal meeting, Mr. Clarke asked for an executive meeting to include the following persons: Deputy AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Mr. Chamberlain, Inspector General, CIA; Mr. Thomas Latimer, Department of Defense and myself, According to Mr. Clarke the purpose of this meeting was to develop strategy as to how the Group would respond to the anticipated requests from the SSC. Both Mr. Buchen of the White House and Mr. Silberman,acting in his capacity as the President's Counsel for Congressional Inquiries, insisted that all requests as well as the responses to all such requests be coordinated through the above Group. Much discussion was had as to how this could be accomplished. No definitive decision was arrived at. However, it was agreed that the CIA would prepare a paper outlining how they would respond to the questions that they had already received, defining the level of response, the area of coordination and identification of sensitive problems. It was not quite clear to the Group as to exactly what form CIA's paper would take. It was proposed by Mr. Buchen and agreed that the same Executive Group would meet at CIA Headquarters on 3/19/75 to review the paper developed by CIA. In view of the various legal questions involved and jbecause of the direct involvement of Congressional committees, the question of the Bureau's representation was discussed with Mr. Adams. It was agreed that in addition to Mr. Cregar, the Bureau would be represented by Assistant Director Mintz. This proposal was discussed with Mr. Clarke and he readily agreed that certainly Mr. Mintz' presence would be a valuable asset to the Group. CONTINUED - OVER HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 46
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 As a result, Mr. Mintz and Mr. Cregar will attend the meeting of the Group on Wednesday, 3/19/75, at CIA Headquarters, at 10:30 a.m. Senator Towers had requested the Bureau to conduct a counteraudio sweep of his personal office inasmuch as he anticipated having sensitive conversations in his office: con- cerning the business of the SSC. Mr. Cregar was asked to raise the question of a counteraudio sweep during the executive session to get an expression from the Group as to whether counteraudio sweeps should be done. Both Mr. Silberman and Mr. Buchen felt it was desirable to conduct such sweeps and strongly recommended that they be done. No commitment was made as to who would do the sweeps at the time. However, after consultation with Assistant Directors Wannall and White, Mr. Adams and Mr. Callahan, it was agreed that the Bureau should do the sweeps inasmuch as it was a domestic matter. Mr. White indicated that he did have the personnel and the equipment to conduct such sweeps. As a result of that decision Mr. Clarke was telephonically advised that the Bureau would conduct counteraudio sweeps of the personal offices of both the Senate and House Select Committees providing such was in accord with the desires of both Committees. Our Legisla- tive Liaison is currently contacting both Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi to confirm that both Committees desire this |tnetude the check, It is to be noted that these sweeps will not include the outer offices of the Senators or Congressmen and will not include the offices of the employees of both staffs. ACTION: For information and record purposes, » HW 55073 DBocld:329399530 Page 49
| HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 50 FRANK CHUY2:H, IDAHO, CHAIRMA:, 5 ‘ JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICK CHAI PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAK’ 24, TENN. WALTER F. MONDAL®. MINE BARRY GOLDWATEN, ARIZ. WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC, MATHIAS, JR., -MD. ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S, SCHWEIKER, PA. SA A san eieromunea Mmuiter States DSenafe e Z r SELECT COMMITTEE TQ STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (PURSUANT Yo 8, RES. 21, 4TH CONGRESS) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 March 12, 1975 Mr. William E. Colby Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.G. 20505 Dear Mr. Colby: On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governhental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, I want to thank your for your letter of March 11, and the copy of the Employee Bulletin you have issued to all CIA employees. AS we jointly recognize, in order for the Committee to carry out a thorough inguiry, in accordance with the mandate contained in S. Res. 21, the Agency's full cooperation will be necessary. Your recognition that our mandate authorizes all, past and present, agency employees to cooperate fully, and without impediment due to secrecy agreements, will serve to facilitate our expeditious collection of material relative to that mandate. I particularly appreciate your statement recognizing our security precautions. As you know, your staff was very helpful to the Committee's staff in designing those precautions. The Staff Director and the Chief Counsel will; under the direction of the Committee, notify Mr. John Clarke of the members of the Committee who have been designated to carry out studies, inquiries and investigations required to meet the tasks specified in 8S. Res. el. Tt is the Committee's understanding that the members of the Committee and designated staff will have access to any and all information which the Committee determines is necessary for its inquiry. We recognize, however, that the Committee inquiry may touch on sensitive areas, such as the identity of CIA personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the event that the Committee inguiry touches on such sensitive areas, which matters we have already discussed in our meeting of February 27, we should discuss jointly, and as you suggest quickly, what procedures might be followed should the Committee decide it requires more information in these specific areas. \
Mr. William Colby Page Two March 12, 1975 I welcome these first steps in close cooperation and hope that it forecasts an expeditious and thorough inquiry that will result in the strengthening of our nation's intelligence activities under the law. Sincerely, VA i, Frank Church Chairman BDocld: 327989530 Page 51
HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 52 Ro 7 7 Pupp. § RTE eM, aa edt { f \ ' : 1 . ' THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 13 March 1975 Mr. William G. Miller Staff Director Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510 Dear Bill: Following up on otir brief discussion Tuesday on the clearances of Committee Staff, I thought it might be helpful to outline a procedure which you may consider reasonable to use. As I understand your current ground rules, you are submitting your staff applicants to the FBI for full field security investigation and on report from the Bureau, under the authority of Senate Resolution 21, the Chairman . and/or the Committee will take action to grant or deny clearance. The next step requires a notification to the Director of Central Intelligence of the Chairman's decision and certification of the clearances granted. I've attached a suggested format for this which you could use. On receipt of the certification we will advise the USIB security elements of the people so certified. I also promised to go over with you the range of compartmented clearances that exist and I] am prepared to do that when we next get together. You will recall these are the clearances for which you will want to determine the 'need-to-know" for selected members of your staff. We need to establish agreed procedures here as well. Access to this information requires that an individual meet security standards set forth in DCID 1/14, a copy of which is attached. Classified by 0068 05 - Exempt from General Declassificaticn Schedule of £.0. 11652, Exenrption Category: 58 (1), (2), (3) or (4) Deaclassified only on approval of the Director of Central intelligence This douumcnt may be bun DHZIS Se? Sb ce to es (a. Th ee fuori. sen» cn mAs es ee etter: fee eens ben net .~’sa 1) Unclassified
I would like to suggest that you appoint a member of your staff - say, Ben Marshall - as a focal point for handling compartmented information _access approvals and assign him the responsibility of insuring that these security standards are met by persons selected to participate in this aes “sensitive area... . The CIA operates a Compartmented Information Branch as a service of cormmon concern to the intelligence community which records the names of all individuals in the Government with access to compartmented information. Your personnel would be similarly recorded which would considerably ease the access certifications to all organizations for the duration of your inquiry. As indicated, I am prepared to discuss this with. you at any time. wo? - . a 1 Sincerely, LO ohn M. Clarke ~" Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community Attachments: 1 - DCID 1/14 2- Suggested Format HW 55073 Docld:329895350 Page 53 '
. ook sultants; and employees-of-Government contractors..whe- require: access se DCID No. 1/14 —St«s (New Series} — nee Nog wt eben we en tee owe ir a oe ? DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. J fa! oe oaths - * te Das aoe ae res Fee cere eee se asic, ae ai way we toe ae amen nkt heat we “ts UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY ‘STANDARDS “AND: PRACTICES" _GOVERNING ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION? 1 ern Pursuant to the provisions: “Of NSCID No. T ay Series: revised 4 ‘Mara: .. 1964), paragraph 2,. subparagraph a. (5)-and in order.to ensure.uniform . ‘protection of sensitive ‘comparitmented | information, the following’ pere | _ sonnel’ security. Standards’ ‘and “practices are established ‘for all United States. Governmiént: civilian “and military peérsormel; Governmerit Gon-- to sensitive comparimented information or to information which: reveals - the -manner,. methods and operational details by which sensitive com- : - parimented informats on is collected. . The standards and ‘practices estab. _ lished herein are to be considered minimal and the departments. and agencies may | establish internally such additional security steps as may | . be considered necessary and appropriate to ensure that effective security " is maintained: “Access to sensitive compartmented information shall be « - under ‘the strictest’ application of the “rieed-to-know’”” principle ‘and in . full accordance with the existing authorities and eguiatons. which | govern access: thereto. »- eke SS ‘ a . “Aan wee enh “eek Berens ae ne ie CEOS 2f 38, 227 lee Purpose 2. an ‘The coated’ piSection ‘of sensitive doinpartmaeited ‘information ° 4 wn within any one participating: agency or among Government contractors “ . <p affects and is 4 matter of ‘serious sectirity concern to all ‘patticipating’ . = “agencies. The provisions ‘ ‘of ‘this Directive*shall apply-to-allé persons = under the jurisdiction ‘or cognizance of the Executive. Branch, ‘without. « . regard to civilian or military status, form*:of employment, official. rank’ or position, or length of service. “The establishment of uniform person:- ~~” a nel security standards-and practices as well‘as continuing security-proe- ~~ ° = -- 7: grams should enhance the security protection of such information. and” The at the same time. facilitate the security - certification "process: among were ee popnert ee ahi *The term “Sensitive compartmented information” as used in this Directive “is . intended to include all information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end.products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section il, Public Law 585," '! Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. . ae . . ; ‘* This directive supersedes DCID 1/14, approved 23 June ‘1967. 7: arreceeeee . x : i : me “GROUP I Exduded from automatic 73 st at downgrading ond ah - a. at ee _ ENOLOS ue ws CORY Ng. or a = =
The following Staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and’ social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified inforrnation up to and including Top Secret. ppt ay MERE SNE TES, 4 APART eta) ic MURR ee iotyem es: NW 55073 DocId:32989530 Page 55
Lo HW 55073 . “ Personnel: Security Approval criteria we basis for, access to. Sensitive compartmented information, are as follows: © ihncbasnan since ‘sponse; parents; brothers, s Sisters” 3.2 OS ( a and children, "| oa ae Tre TA Docld:329895350 Page. 56 S. C Government departments and agencies when access to sensitive com- - a partmented information is required. ‘ . oe 2. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria con- - tained herein and who are, therefore, denied access to sensitive compart- mented information shall not, solely for this reason, be considered in- eligible for. aceess-to other classified information.’ However,-individuals --'*-- - . Whose access to sensitive compartmented information has been author- . ized as an exception granted in accordarice with’ ‘paragraph 5, shall not. ©: wee ‘ ‘solely for that reason. be considered eligible for access to-other classified #7". mir" 0D ~ information. ° . oe. Criteria for security” ‘approval of an “individual ‘on a 1 tieed-to-know: eased Be "The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discre- . ton and of ungiiéstioned ‘Toyalty to the United States. - he “Except where’ there is a compelling need and a’ determination PR ne eR eS has been made by competent authority as described in paragraph 5 -".. *- = - below that every’reasonable assurance has been obtained that under: ° ** _ the circumstances’ the- “security risk is negligible. cored Taek (i) Both the ‘individual and the members of his immediate family . "shall be U.S. citizens. For these purposes, “immediate family” is. (2) The members of the individual's family and ‘those persons to whom he is bound by affection or obligation should neither be sub- ject to physical, mental and other forms of duress by a foreign .. power nor advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow the’ _ Government of the United States nor the alteration of the form of ° ; ‘Government of ‘the’ United States by unconstitutional means. 4, “When there is dompéiting need to grant ‘aecess to sensitive ¢ com-» partmented information: prior to completion of the full prescribed in- = vestigation, such investigative checks as are immediately possible shall _ - be made at once, and shall include a personal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel whenever feasible. . Access in such cases shall be strictly controlled, and the full prescribed investiga- tion and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practicable moment. — ; . a Lawane, . wu wees an Exceptions cl ‘atone OF ete 5. The exceptions to paragraph 3.b. rh (2) above may be granted only by the Senior Intelligence Officer of the parent organization represented on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), including military de- partments, or his designee, unless such authority has been specifically 2” CONPEDEREEAL,
a and: 3. judicious. review of the information therein must be roade before - .. am exception. j is considered. 7 « ; Investigative: Requizements..j B ie ’ = for decess to-sensitive corspartmerited infortoation shall be thorough. and +. shall Be desighed to’ develop- Information: as-to whether the individual : Glearly:-theets the above Personnel, Security, Approval. Criterian’s oe SRS or st wet Pop pete aaa’ ast deen, £ “ & . oan 7° a 4s Lathe ‘investigation shall be accomplished tbroligh personal interviews | no by trained investigative personnel and shal. establish. affirmatively’ to the . ' adjudicating agency complete continuity. of identity. ‘to. include. birth, a residences, .education,. emloyments. and: military service. “ Where’ the _ Greumstances-of a.case indicate, the investigation. shall exceed the basic | _>» kequirements-set out below to.ensure. that: those responsible for. adjue - De dicating: access.eligibility have-in their Possession aul the. televant facts - . “8. During the Gdiirse “of ‘the investigation: the individual shall “furnish : - . Federal Bureau: of: ‘Investigation. shall be obtained. Photographs of the ue individual-'Shall” also; -be- obtained where: ‘additional. corroboration ° “of. " ey is required. | ia ’ pb. Check of the subversive and criminal files of thie. Federal ‘Bureau. = pa HW 55073 Docld:32989530 ‘Page 57° . co oo a re delegated to. the head of an office or organization. as set forth. i in. . inter=: . departmental agreements. All exceptions granted will. be a common sense determination based .on all available. information, and shall be recorded by the agency making the éxception. In those cases in which - ee the individual ‘has lived outside of the United. States for.a substantial . ws period of his life; a thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investigas::. es tion in terms of-fulfillment of the minimum investigative requirements, © . Segisy *F STEELE ry begeeekee <2 art is ot &.. “The: investigation conducted on an: individeet-wider “consideration. assigned. personal’ history statement and a ‘certificate of non-afiiliation ° With -those organizations designated by the Attorney General pursuant - to Executive Order « Fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the -; ay * a (oo-Verification of date: and. ‘place of birth, and  itizeny ‘of the aN os “dividual. oot nsILe. ALES. 2s. of Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, ‘and other . ; national agencies as appropriate. An additional check of Immigra- ~~~ tion and Naturalization Service records shall be made if members-of.- -_ y the individual's immediate family are other than United States citizens ‘ ee * by. birth. - oy wad lr, at Pemeescreneceten fro. -e. Local checks in alll areas of the United States where the individual *. "has resided.for at least six (6) months during the past fifteen years - 3 . oa GROUP I Excluded from avtomatie}- - downgrading and * ; . . + mo -CONFEPEN TEAL daclassification . . _ CORY Ne) 301.
: . " a . ~ : . oe aa : . 22 ‘ ‘ 6 , . } “Or since.age eighteen, whichever is the shorter Period. Such. Periog ; _ of coverage shall include the following: . z - z < (1) Check of police and credit’ records,’ S silent Senclole ? {2) Interviews with neighbors at préesent residerice: “regardless of duration and, to the extent considered to be productive and Practical, any other address at which the individual has resided. mE ost: Ce a er eo alee mde oe. a Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen’ years’0 or ; ae -- since-age eighteen, whichever is the shorter. period... Personal inter-.-.....-. ° "views with supervisors and co-workers who had personal contact with ~ ae . the individual shall be accomplished. to the extent possible and prace peak ag lefties oF shite ISB aytberf eet ” een Tape or eee: hs egret wr a0 Bs “ Panes se —_ "+ @ Attendance at institutes of ‘higher learning of atthe mostrecently, ~~ ale _ atiended secondary school shall. be verified in all instances: During co these inquiries collateral verification of prior educational records shall __ be made and personal interviews with faculty members who had per- — 7 a “sonal.contact withthe individual shall be, accomplished to the. extent Lebattee teal Cece te wpe ” possible and practical" "~~ 1 SSE 0" oe se WM UIE tne es -.f. Review of appropriate. ‘military, "records. a i - ~ g. Interviews with.a sufficient number of personal ‘Teferences given - aby the individual and with a minimum of two other persons -who can ; ; ‘furnish information on the basis of personal. mnomiedge concerning 7 oped RS _the individual’s character, discretion and loyalty. |. "i543 eee ; __,. h. When employment, education or residence, except U.S..Govern- * r ment service, has occurred overseas during the past fifteen -years, or - _ Since age eighteen, a check of the records will be- made at the Passport - Office/Department of- State, Central Intelligence Agency and other . . appropriate agencies. ‘Efforts shall be made to develop. informants who knew the individual overseas in order to cover employment, edu- cation or residence during this period. . terpert ng stipcris -. i The spouse of the individual and members of the immediate family shall be investigated to the extent necessary and appropriate to permit affirmative.determination by the adjudicating agency that the provi- sions of paragraph 3, Personnel Security Approval Criteria, above, are met. In all cases, the spouse shall be checked through the subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other national agencies, - as appropriate. ; act 4 ~ = gels at otee ee ee ce eee Previous Investigation 1i. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past five years which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it may serve as a basis for granting access approval provided 2 review of the personnel and security files does does not reveal substantive changes in the individual’s security eligibility. ‘Tf at previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards or if it is more than five years nw 55073 Docld:32969530 Page 56
« old, a current investigation shall _he required_but may be limited to that necessary y to bring the individual's fle up-to date in accordance with the ~ investigativé requirements set forth in paragraph 4, above. Should new information be developed during the current investigation which bears . unfavorably upon the individual’s activities. covered by the previous -- _investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded 8S necessary to - develop, Tall details. of this new information... eoepaes Up w i “~~. ‘The ‘evaluation of the information developed by investigation on °°” an individual’s loyalty and suitability shall be performed by analysts of <~ broad knowledge, good judgment and wide experiente in security and - - eounterintelligence. - When all other information developed on an in- ~ - dividual is favorable, a minor investigative requixement which has not been-met. will not preclude favorable adjudication. In-all evaluations - the protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt con- | a - . ten gerning: ‘personnel having access-to sensitive:compartmented information: <0... + _ shall be resolved in favor of the national security.. ‘The ultimate deter- ae mination of whether the granting of access is.clearly cousistent with the interests of national security shall be an over-all common sense deter- Se ‘ mination based on all available information. Ob un een CET ~ wet ‘Secutity Programs ” Oe ee . 7 ' C “TIT TE order to facilitate the attainment ¢ of the ‘lghest standard of. of wo ~ ; personnel security and to augment both the access approval criteria and. . the inyestigative requirements established by this Directive,. member . : departments and agencies shall institute continuing Security Programs for all individuals having access to compartmented information.. In ~ addition to security indoctrinations, these programs ‘shall be tailored to -_ create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape _ - notice or be left unresolved which brings into question an individual’s aan “ Joyalty and integrity or suggests the possibility of his being subject to va undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable - personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive - “compartmented work requiring access to sensitive compartmented infor- mation and operations, the department, agency or Government program - to which he is assigned shall assume a continuing security and counter- - intelligence responsibility for that individual throughout the pertod of : his assignment. moa tate To 14. The Security Programs shall include the following: . oe a. Security Education Programs to ensure that individuals who are granted access to sensitive compartmented information are initially and periodically thereafter indoctrinated as to its unique sensitivity and that they understand their personal responsibility for its protec- ° tion. ‘These indoctrinations should be conducted by individuals having . ic ie Excluded from autamatic downgrading on CONPEPENTES declassification toe copy f° 301 ( ; . 5 GROUP I HW 55073 DBocld: 32939530 ‘Page 59