104-10312-10192 sy 74 “ay NOTE: Pg. 6 excerpt (pertaining to Warren Commission/Oswald) is taken from a 7 November 1966 memorandum written by David Murphy to the General Counsel, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich MDP) routed through Chief, CI Staff (w/carbon copy to DDP The original document, and its attachments (Tabs A thru N) is located in file entitled "General Counsel "==" SB Discussions on Legal Aspects of Case." only A Xerox copy/of the covering memo is contained in the Pertinent Documents (to the Study "The Monster Plot") file drawer.
13-00000 7 November 1966 MEMORANDUM POR: General Counsel SUBJECT -: Yuriy Ivanovich iWOSENKO Summary 1. The Director has requested that there be con- ducted immediately an exnaustive examination regarding the possibility of damaging publicity and embarrassment to the Agency should it become public knowledge that we have held Subject incommunicado for over two years. This memorandum seeks an acvisory cninion from the General Coun~ sel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Sub-~ ject to Gate, on the position that could beast be asswned = the Agency were calied upon to defend its uandling of Subject, and on legal aspects of Subject's eventual dis- posal. . . Background 2. Subject voluntarily established contact with CIA representatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's Internal Security Direc- torate and offered to sell counterintellicgence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in vlace and debriefed on counterintelligence matters dur- ing five meetings in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with nis CIA handlers ne de- fected on 4 FPebruary 1964 and was secretly taken to Frank~ furt, Cermany, crossing the Swiss-German border on the night. of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity cocu- mants. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt, Subject wrote out an asylum request, requesting political asylum from the U.S. Government (see Tab A). 3. Because serious doubts about Subject's bona fides had arisen on the basis of the information he had pro- vided both in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was originally planned to do a detailed bona fices de- briefing and assessment in Germany before making any ‘ t
13-00000 “3 ae iecision about moving Subject to the United States. How- ever, unprecedsated action by the Soviet Government dn resvect to the cefection of one of its citizens forced a change of plans: On 3 February, unidentificd Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the press that Sub- act, described as an “expert attached to the Soviet Dale- gation to the Disarmament Conference" had ais sappeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected. Because of mounting pressure from the press, wnich included much speculation that Subject was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Depart- ment would make a brief announcement acknowledging Subject's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying nim as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February (see Tab B). On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Subject left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his releasa. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassa- dor to the Disarmament Conference. TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Govern- ment of failure to cooperate in locating Subject. Although the Swiss categorically rajected these chargas the Ameri- can Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that “swiss authorities be allowed to interview Subject to convince themselves that Subject had left Switzerland of his own free will. : . cea ea - de Senahe 4. On 12 Fekruary,, on the instructions of the Direc~ tor, Subject was brought to the United States. Ne travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Amay identifica- ‘tion, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under tne provisions of Section 212 (ad) (8) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (see Tab c). 5. On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet Embassies in Washington advised the State Depart- meant that they desired interviews with Subject. On 14 Febru- ary, in Noscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassedor KOHLER and protested ‘impermissable activities” on the part of the U.S. in Subject's case. Soviet press spokesmen took an even harder line to Western. correspond- ents, and accused. the U.S. of kidnapping Subject. On tne afternoon of 14 February, at two separate interviews Subject spoke first to Swiss Embassy and then to Soviet mmbassy representatives (see Tab D). At these interviews, which were also attended by State Department and IN
13-00000 ~ 3. ect confirmed that he left Switzeric 2 Li to sesk asylum in the U.S. In addition, t replied to questions of tne soviet Enbassy. ative to tne effect taat iG was enouncing his Sc eensmin. Gn tne avening cf 14 February, the U.S. a Department made a brie formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a brief statement to ne press noting that the interviews had been held and tnat Subject ha confirmed his desire to remain in this country, 6. rom the time cf his arrival to 4 April 1964, Subject was housed in an Agency safehouse in the Washing- ton area. During this period, regular systematic debrief~ ing was commenced, and Subject was made available to. representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affect- ng their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Subject was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In acéition, Suuject took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, agai in accompanied by case fficers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that Subject was a KGB plant. and at the same time it be- came obvious that it would be impossible to proceed fur- ther to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which Subject was being held. Subject was growing increasingly uncocperative, specially wnen sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the Legaliz aticn of his Status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registra- tien car€é. At the same time, Subject's heavy drinking and ether unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keep- ing him under control and out of trouble at all times, ang it was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More important, ne was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute. 7. On 4 April 1954 Subject voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated daception on a number of critical points indi- cating that he was sent out by the KGB to perform one or more missions. which also involved his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was decided, therefore, t the physical circumstances of Subject's stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if the Agency were to carry out is counterintelligence responsibilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As a result, Subject was moved to quarters where his movements
13-00000 * re ould more gasily contrclled., and his outing privileges vers guapended pending resoluticn of bona fides. He ias he t “. 2. ery ° S. It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action but accepted Subject at face value, it is quite pos- sible that we would have proceecai with a saries cf opera- tional actions on the basis of Subject's information. The results of some of these actions could have been very em- barrassing to the U.S. Government politically and camaging to U.S. national security. For axample, Subject's chief operational proposal at tne time, one that he was most. insistent we should proceed. with immediately, involved the sexual compromises of Vladimir Paviovica SUSLOV, the most senicr Soviet official in the United Nations Secretariat, holding the position of Undersecretary in Charge of Poli- tical and Security Council Affairs. Bona Fides 9. Since April 1364, hundreds of hours nave been devoted to interrogations of Subject (in which he has willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time has been spent on exhaustive collateral investigations. We con-~ . clude that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that Subject is a KGB agent who establisned contact with CIA and subsequently defected on KGB instructions, ane that he came to tha United States on a deception mission. . The implications of tnis mission have a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings are supported by the results of two polygraph éxaminations (ausacond one has just been administered), we must note that the nature of the evidence is inadmissable in a court of law. In any case, it is clear tnat Subject has not been in a position te perform any overt act of trans- gression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable meats of communication with the KGB. 30. Subject does not admit that ne defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. de has admitted, however, that ne made numerous lies about his personal aistory and about tne details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States. (A translation of a handwritter statement by Subject about these lies is attached as tab E.} Coordination_ with Other U.S. Government Agancies ll. USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has bean a member of
13-00000 n Pe * a hostile intelligence service, Subject's status and nandling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an ad hec basis, SOSENKO defected on A Bobruary, and the secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Nacional Security Affairs, NeGeorge Buncy, General Carroll, Direc- tor of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 Pabruary, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB men bers on 11 and 19 February (sea Tab F), which stated that Subject's bona fides had not yet bean establisned. It was agreed that no DS number would be issued to Subject, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Subject as a defactor dropped off drastically as it kecame quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community. 12. The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions about Subject's bona fides by the then Director, Mr. McCone, on 11 February 19647 Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PETAB, was given a simi- lar briefing by Mr. Halms on 19 February 1954. 13. Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also sub- sequently informed of the problems about Subject! 8 bona fides (see Tab G). 14. ‘fhe Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Subject's bona fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGa” agent. In discussions about the possibility of Subject's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors (sce Tab 4) - 15. The Director of Security, State Devartment, was informed of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this Office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Subject’s in- formation as it affects the security interests of the State Department. 16. The problem of Subject's bona fides took on particular significance and urgency in respect to the &
13-00000 work of the Warren Commission. Acce ording to Subjec ct's Stery, he Aad been in the HGS line of responsibility for Loe Narvey Oswaleé wohile Oswald was in the Soviet Unies, and aftar the assassination of President Kannedy, Susject particinated in an investigation of Oswald's activities in the USSR. In the course of his cfficial auties, ne 4 4 Alleges that he nad read Oswalia's dossier. Subject was therefore in a position to vouch for the fact that the KGB had never had any interest in Oswald, considered ain to be “abnormal” and were delighted to get rid of him. .- {Por good measure, Subject threw in a story avout Oswald's being a poor shot.) As Mr. Rankin, the Chisf Counsel of the Warren Commission commented, Lf Subject’s story could be accepted at face value the Commission could easily terminate its werk sooner than it had expected. Rankin was informed therefore that there were aspects of Subject's information that caused us grave concern and that we were not able to say that his information on Oswald should ie accepted uncritically (see Tab I). 17. Because go much of Subject's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the PBI bears primary responsibility, and because of the possibliity that Subject was a KCB plant has a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI has been kept fully informed on our views about Subject's bona fides. ang our progress in interrogating and investigating hi Rim from the moment of his defection to the present tin Thus, C/Cil informed the FB Lai officer about o reservations on Subject's bona fides as early as 5 Febru- ary 1504; the Director of the FEI and ais deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, have been kept com- pietely up to date ever since, and we have coordinated all major aspects Gf our handling of Subject with then. After a long meeting with Sullivan and pener FBI repre- sentatives to review Subject's case on 1 April 1964, the FGI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Subject's movements and commence hostile interrogation (sea Tab J). Subsequently, the FBI has formally agreed with cur findings on Subject, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interroga- tions of Yuri KNOSENKO and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possi- ble that NOSENKO could be a Soviet plant or agent provoca- teur.”. (See Tab K.)
13-00000 | 7. 18, The then Acting Attorney General Br. Nicholas Ratzanbach (ana Several members of nis staff) were apprised of our reservations about Subject on 2 April 1954 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parcle agreement, and as to now we snoul: proceed in the event that it proved | my POS8ErY to Geport cr He a is) al hy +] {, o i HI & f ct ct iy c. ty iM i. bject from this country. Pertine as Tab L. Queries from Congressmen, the Press, and the Public 19. There have been several queries. from congress men about Subject's status and whereabouts, and from the press about the possibility of interviewing Subject. The general formula that was worked out to answer such requests, acapted as necessary to £it the specific request, runs as follows "Yuriy Nosenko requested asylum in the United States in February 1964. His request was granted. The information Mr. Nosenko is providing is regularly made avallable to appropriate agencies of the Government. However, publicizing. this information and its source could only increase the possibility of Soviet reprisal against Mr. Nosenko and ethers who may seek. asylum in the Free World.” Several specific examples are attacned as Tab NM. Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Onur Awareness of Subject's True Status 20. From the time we learned that Subject had heen sent to this country on a KGB missicn it.was obvious that if we were to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt to keap the KGB from learning of our awareness of subject's true status. Con- sequently, detailed knowledge of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Subject, and the implications tnereof, has been restricted to a vary few people in the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, as can be seen from paragraphs 11 to 18 above, we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intelligence com- munity, even though this carried the inevitable risk of leakage. As you can see from Tab H, we have not disclosed eur suspicions about Subject in our responses to press and congressmen. Even in our formal correspondence to the PFIAB, for example, the most we have said is that "Sub- ject’s bona fides has not been established” (see Tab F).
13-00000 oviet _ ivies 24 bbe Nave Lee: what has happened to Subject ane face. The most blatant and unusu Appro by a Goviet journalist, ¥ Fs 3 ), to the Trench macazina x provide photographs and Ory of Subject and his famil KORSLEV, Subject's wife is consicertag . an approach to ar internaticnal ju cieical organization in an effort ta ob- tain compensation from Subject for damages used by his avandonment of her and her colldre: to this approach throug an official’ hava quoted a statement, purporting £9 co uimself to the effect that Subject considers this approach to represent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by tne KGB and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way. Subject's Status sucject entered the United 22. To recapitulate, 8s States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the AGency under tne provisions of Section 212 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Na tionality Act. As wea understand it, parcle re- sponsibility is dele gated to the Agency by the Attorney General and the DCI om 10 February 1955, which statas: “After parcle of such aliens. the Central tntei- ligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and contrel of a kine and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status.” In accordance with our uncerstanding of this agreement, and because we have reason to be slieve that Subject is a conscious amd willing agent of a hostile ix ttelligence gervice, we have seen to it that Subject was under our dirsact observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United States. From 12 Pebru- ary to 4 April — it was possible to keep Subject at a location where he uld enjey a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. Since 4 April 1964, for reasons explained in paragra ph o@ of this memorancun,
13-00000 9. it nas been necessary to heep him incosmmunicado at a loca- tion which isa known to no one outside of the agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Subject to “yermain in this country under the Special Agreement Pro- cedures has been periccically extended by the inmigration and Naturalization Service. The current extension is good until 17 Februar xy 1567 (see fab XN). 23. Although his freedom of movement has been severely restricted, Subject has not been maltreated and ne has not made any formal complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we have several written statements from him in the past year in which he states that our handling of nin was justified and even beneficial (sea Tab §&). Disposal 24. Prom the time that Subject was brought to this country we have thought about tne possibllity of his avent— ual deportation as a contingency measure. You will recall talxs on this in which you participated in the spring of 1964: at that time we thought that it might Le possible to mitigate the political | ang propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Subject has con- fessed his true KGB role. With the passag@ of time. how- ever, and in view ef cur much firmer conclusions about Subject 's real role and mission and our clearer understand- ing of what this implies, it is apparent that great practi- cal problems stand in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country. a. USSR: Subject has categorically stated on numerous occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When tne possiblity of expulsion was discussed with De- partment of State officials in 1964, both tha Secre~- tary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse viclent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States and the congressmen representing them. Undzs these circumstances (and wa can be sure that the KGS will dc whatever they can to promote the furor), an
13-00000 . . 16. alleged “confession” sy Suoject would come under very close scrutiny. and nicht backfire very badly. Another point that has to be considered is the possibility that the Soviets. again playing their part, mignt refuse t raot Suyject on the grounds x c S that he has renounced his Soviet citizenshio. The only leocation cnonsiderad so far for turnover to the Soviets has been Berlin, which was used for the exchange of Abel-Powers and Lonsdale-Wynne. and for the transfer of saveral Soviet defectors who re- - quested return. Subject does not appear to fit either category. On the other hand, if Subject were to agree to turnback, there is a real question as to whether the Soviets would accept him in Berlin as they did tne others in the past. Their current practice is to handle repatristion of Soviet citizens through the Soviet Embassy in Bonn. Finally, if Subject were accepted by tne Soviets on the basis of forceé repatriation, the Soviets might carry through the charade, try Subject as a traitor, and give wide publicity to statements by him about his “maltreat- ment by CIA,” ete, Seer os b. Third Country: Altnough we believe it likely that Subject would accede to deportation to. a third country, there is certainly no country in . the free world on which we could conceivably try to > unload Subject without first informing them of nis true status. Even if we considered this a desir- able objective (and we do not), it seems certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece ef inter-governmental duplicity::on the basis of the political risks involved. Sy the same token, it appears very unlikely that any country would agree to accept this dangerous and troublesome Soviet agent if they knew what thay were getting. Finally, -@avan if we were somehow able to induce another coun- try to take Subject off our Aands, it is obvious that at best we would have succeeded in exchanging a short term, latent problem fer actual and persistent ones. Once legalised in the West, with his movements uncontrolled and with free communication with his KGB superiors, Subject would have tremendous opportuni- ties for creating adverse publicity to the Agency and creating other serious trouble without ever con- travening the laws of the country in which he re- sided.. We cannot even exclude the possibility that
13-00000 L. fwe Subject might be abie to convince a liaison security or inte Lligence S2rvice that ne is genuine: in such a case, tne possibilities of trouble and smbarrass- ment are almost limitless. 25. Regardless of where Subject is deported to, several factors must be consicered. Would it be necessary to serve Subject with a formal warrant of deportation? Tf so, would he have the right to demand ana receive coun-~- sel? . Alternative Course of Action 26. Given sufficient time we Lelieve that we could persuade Subject to confass. Although there have been certain recent gigns of erosion in his ability to stick to his story, and perhaps even in his will to resist, we cannot estimate how long a period of time might ke re- quired, but we do not believe that he is prepared to hold cut forever. Once Subject confessed, we astimate that we would require approximately a year in which to debrief him, because it would be primarily from minute examination ef the details of how ang when he was trained and briefe by the KGB that we would expect to obtain a better veacing the true nature and extant of KGB penetration of U.S. intelligence agencies and activities. bBuring that period we would still wish to maintain the present circumstances of handling Subject, and would continue to respond to out~ side inquiries to the effect that Subject fears for his life, doesn't wish to be interviewed, etc. Upen conclu- sion of this debriefing period--and depending on our esti- mate of the sincerity and completeness of Subject’ confession--we would then be prepared to provide Subject a new identity and an opportunity to settle in the U.S. or elsewhere. 27. Finally as can be seen from the summary in para~ qraphs 10-17 above, and from the material attacnec in the tabs, we have coordinated every significant aspect of Subject's handling with the other U.S. Government agen- cies who have a direct stake in one or another aspect of Subject’s case. Spacifically, we would not contemplate proceeding with any specific plan to dispose of Subject without coordinating this with the Department of State, the Department of Justice and the FBI. 28. We would like the General Counsel's comments with particular respect to any gaps he may detect in any asvects of the Agency's. legal position on Subject's case, ue
13-00000 Vee tre cate ene een tien end L: a saggestions for improving this cosition, and, specifically, his views on waether the autnor itv for carole granted to the Oiractor in 1955 has been validated or updated by succeeding Administrations or by legislation. We suggest that the General Counsel's review specifically include ddentification of possible legal actions which tne wife bp g ox anyone else could initiate in feceral or state courts, probable legal and publicity consequences of any such action, and determination of legal defenses and ways of handling - publicity. In reviewing this case and preparing an opinion it is requested that the case not be discussed with anyone outside the Agency. | : [sj Dovid E. Murphy David E. Murphy Chief, SB Division Attachments fab A thru N