TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE | -5- Americans have had to travel to and from Cuba via Prague. , Free World ined in 1963 is running at roughly 40% of 1962 levels, Prospects . fa for further reduction are good since we now seem to be making good progress with the three principal shipping countries -- Greece, Lebanon; . and the UK. . In this regard, the Greeks have recently issued stiffer laws to prevent their ships from going to or from Cuba, while the Lebanese have drafted (but have not yet enacted) legislation to the same end; and some important British shipping companies have finally decided that they should play ball with us. . But there is plenty of room for improvement. There are still roughly 30 Free World ships per month in the Cuban trade. Free World countries still send many commodities to Cuba, which Cuba needs desperately. And there are still air routes between Cuba and Spain and Mexico. . The effectiveness of our isolation policy in hitting the target is impossible to gauge accurately. .While Hurricane Flora, in a few days, probably hit the target more squarely than our isolation measures did in a. year, it is generally agreed that the. economic chaos ‘which now in fact exists in Guba and the enormity of the Soviet aid bill is, in part at least, due to our efforts. Castro's. repeated and loud public protestations about our ' isolation policy and his serious and energetic efforts to break at of Free Worla isolation substantiate the view that the isolation measures probably - hurt him, economically and ‘politically.
-TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE -6- _(2) Covert Measures -- Our ‘covert program over the past year has covered essentially six areas. First,’ through a variety of techniques, we have collected intelligence for both U.S. strategic requirements and for operational requirements; the quantity and quality is good but there is: always’ ‘room for improvement. Second, ClA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media, directed at Cuba, have been used to encourage low ‘tiek; simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance,. and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. . Third, CIA has “worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba com- modities which it urgently needs, Fourth, we have been trying to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist _ i elements in the power centers of the regime, with a view to stimulating an internal coup which would dislodge Castro; we currently are in direct contact with several people in Cuba who may be of significance. Fifth, we have directed four small-scale externally-mounted sabotage operations for the Auating Cute. teen emicctly | purpose of stimulating resistance and a6-an-econemic-weapon. Sixth, in order to expand sabotage and resistance activities we have been involved in aiding autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals, who will probably be . ready to begin infiltration and sabotage in mid-J anuary, and who will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance. (A financial breakdown of CIA's covert Cuban operations since 1960 is attached at Tab 1) ' The most outstanding characteristic of our covert action program so _ far is that its potential for bringing about a basic change in Cuba is still
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE stitutes a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. a a largely unknown. The program, which makes use of Cuban exiles and which is-not yet fully underway has already achieved a degree of success -- e.g, in demonstrating to Cubans that Castro is not invulnerable, in forcing Castro to divert valuable resources for defense against covert activities, in inflicting small, but cumulatively significant economic damage, and . perhaps in stimulating to some degree the insurgency which is evident in Cuba. As yet our covert program has not been directed in such a way as to inflict serious economic damage on Cuba. ‘There are those who believe that much can be done in this regard, as well as in stimulating further resistance. polemic laymen But our covert program presently operates under present policy prevents,air attacks on Cuban targets and prevents free-lance exile raids on Cuba from U.S. territory. Ill. Where are We Going? In theory, at least, our present offensive measures, vigorously . pursued and,. to a degree, complemented by our defensive measures, could lead d finally to one of the following three eventualities, each of which con- A. “Overthrow of the Castro Regime Most Cuban experts in the U.S. Government regard this as the most likely of the three eventualities. Hopefully, by exerting maximum pressure by all the means available tq the U.S. Governments, short of military force, "we will be able to bring about a degree of disorganization, uncertainty, and “ ‘discontent in Cuba which will predispose elements in the power centers of the
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and ° the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; at some stage of the revolt, it is likely that direct, or indirect U.S. support will be needed to ensure Sa ‘its success. Theoretically, the ‘Cuban people, tired of economic hardship, lack of freedom, and isolation from their Latin American brethern, will embrace the revolt. B. Accommodation with Castro on U.S. Terms Under this eventuality, Castro would agree to break his tie-line with the USSR, stop his subversion efforts, and perhaps renounce the Com- munist ideology. While highly unlikely, it is not inconceivable that such factors as (1) U. S. isolation and covert measures, (2) further Cuban . economic deterioration, in spite of Soviet aid, and (3) distrust of the Soviet intentions will lead Castro to believe he has no choice but accommodation. | Indeed, there is evidence that Castro may already be thinking along these lines. In the past few months he has made a number of accommodation noises _and since he undoubtedly has a pretty good reading of our minimum terms,. these noises could conceivably indicate that he is willing to go a long way towards meeting them. - Che Guevera's reported nervousness at Castro's - ae that. . -accommodation tendencies substantiates the view ./ Castro's desire to © negotiate is genuine and not a ploy to reduce U.S. heat on Cuba. But there are obvious major probiems with this alternative. Not the least of these is whether the American people would tolerate accommodation Te SS ere PR TS TPR PRCT IE, EO Pe PI OS TER TS I TRI YT  T I EY LT FE PPE EO I vi Seed MAT PRE ORDERS ort ore eee
/ TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE ; 6. with even a reformed Castro and whether or not we could prove to the American people that we've gotten from Castro what we say we've gotten. .Nevertheless, there is rebuttal for such arguments and accommodation remains a distinct possibility, if not for now then for later. C. A Soviet Decision to Quit Cuba This ray be the most unlikely of the three eventualities, yet such a Soviet decision cannot be dismissed categorically in ‘view of such factors as (1) the lact' of real Soviet progress in making Cuba a "showpiece", (2) the obvious U.S. determination to make Cuba a Soviet ''dead end" in the Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will be permitted), (3) the magnitude of Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of the USSR's own present economic problems. At the least, these factors would appear to have a bearing on how tha the Russians would view the eviction from Cuba, either by the overthrow of Castro's regime or by a Castro decision to accommodate with the U. S..on U.S. terms. Relief would conceivably mix generously with Russian grief, especially if the Rus sians ‘could find a vaguely credible fig-leaf. | - -IV Current Estimate of Possible Success | The $64 question -- Will our present offensive measures, even if implemented vigorously and flawlessly, ever lead, by one way or another, to the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere? -- is impossible . to answer. Castro's position within Cuba appears to be erroding gradually, . while the situation in Cuba is characterized by economic stagnation, depressed living conditions, the loss of revolutionary impetus, and.the disillusionment . othe eR REE OFT EERE Le EE ENTE POLE ID, SPE NET A BEES BSE TET PG LO RIT NE LPS DN NTE MEM Ee Este re ane
5 Aber Menten oe nesters ete ee te ew wee * fete et i pea wes feat io k, ( am le easel Rael ee abe ent ements ont OLA Of abecnee ae seen Wee me te se bm ee a | -TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE -10- of an increasing large majority of the population; moreover, Castro's stature in Latin Ame rica is generally very low. Nevertheless, the general consensus seems to be that Castro still retains control; without stepping up our pressures considerably, the chances are practically nil that we will get to Castro in the near future and only fairly good that we will get to him: eventually. Probably the most we can say for certain is that we appear to be moving in the. right general direction; and this, of course, is important. A vigorous, tough, and nasty policy probably lays the best groundwork for bringing about any of the three eventualities which are noted above and | which constitute the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. From a domestic political viewpoint, this is probably fortuitous; a tough but no invasion policy is one policy which the American people appear prepared to support at this time. v. Further Possible Measures Against Cuba | The general consensus in the Government is that we should try to find ways of stepping up our pressures against the Castro regime. One of the most important reasons for this is that the Castro regime continues to ‘constitute a threat to Latin America. While Castro's efforts in Latin Ame rica may not be substantial in absolute terms, he is operating in an ‘area which is politically especially fragile. it is also generally agreed that we are now in a good time-frame to © step up our pressures, The recent discovery of the Cuban arms cache in i 1 t
° _ TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE | | -il- Venezuela should permit us to raise the general noise level in and around _ Cuba. Actions which we may have been reluctant to take several months ago, may now be feasible. ‘The following is a list of further actions, short of invasion and blockade, which we may want to take in the near future. They can con- . veniently be divided into unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures. The brief description following each measure is meant to give you a flavor for some of the more important implications. At the HERS meeting, State, Defense, and CLA will be prepared to discuss each of the measures with you in depth and in detail. | A. Unilateral Measures (1) Air Attacks -- We can authorize CIA to conduct or to equip autonomous exile groups to conduct air attacks against. selected major - economic targets such as power plants and oil refineries. Asa starter, we ih have & targets,in mind. These wewkd-be considerably more difficult to attack . . from the ground but planning for a ground attack on one of these targets is already underway. Planning for an attack on the Santiago oil refinery will aha , _ be completed ia-Meveh, 1964. While the concrete and psychological advantages of selected air strikes ' have always been recognized, and while unauthorized air strikes have in fact ‘already taken place over Cuba, up to now it has been our policy to steer clear of U.S. involvement in this sort of activity. Primarily it has been considered
Sac ENING Constant Wa cee ant GT amen Plena ap EL a ane tear vt hat AaB eareee ae ceome emare mte tee Ae ote eee SH ee Sidhe sone TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - | -12- a relatively high risk, high noise-level type of operation which would not have a major impact on Castro, which would be hard to control (e. . innocents might be killed), and which could conceivably lead to a sharp Soviet reaction in Cuba (e.g. shoot down a U-2) or elsewhere. . (2) Unleashing of Exiles ~- We can relax our present policy of not permitting independent Cuban exile groups to base sea and air attacks on Cuba from U.S. territory; we can urge thq to do the same for | _ territory. While such attacks might inflict only small concrete ' damage on Cuban targets, they have some. distinct advantages. For example, they would tend to high-light the regime's weakness, cause ~ ' Castro to divert more resources to defense, lift the morale of the exiles and of the anti-Castro elements within Cuba, and provide cover for CIA- controlled raids. This also is not a new subject, and, in the past, the disadvantages were believed to be over-riding. Such autonomous raids, “which would in- volve the U.S. directly and which would raise the noise-level in the Caribbean, | would be hard to control; it is possible that raiders would attack Soviet ‘vessels and installations and precipitate strong Russian reaction, including, possibly the transfer of more Soviet troops to Cuba. Moreover,. encourage - ment of autonomous raids on Cuba from U.S. territory would be in sharp variance with our publicly and privately stated position. Since March 30, 19 63 we have taken'the public position that we will not tolerate the ‘violation of U.S, neutrality laws, even by anti-Castro raiders. Privately, we have
ate bee este PEE ae ee ne earns wereassirthi aut ST St Oe a ban hath tan Se oer tah, oe Sin Ge. Me elena wicca s ad uh oo wilee bee + f TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - 13 = said the same thing to the Soviets while maintaining the position that we have no control over raiding activities which originate outside of U.S. territory. | Vn L LA of all povot wobel. Optimumly, | we would prefer that these completely autonomous, amateur exile raiders operate from non-U. S. territory. However, we may not have :this option. Generally speaking, such amateurs have their homes in Florida and don't want to move. Moreover, the fact that U.S. | territory is physically very close to Cuba makes a difference to the rela- ‘tively poorly-equipped amateurs who would be involved in this sort of raid: | (3) Military Feints -- We can move U. S. air and surface units over and in international waters near Cuba in a manner designed to keep Cuban military forces in a state of alert and unce rtainty. | This isa measure which has not been explored to the extent of the first two. On thé positive side,. it would harass Castro, cost him resources, and, if desired, offer opportunities for. escalation, On the negative side, there is the ever-present problem of possible escalation which ‘we may not want as well as the investment of U.S, forces, over time, in an essentially psychological exercise, Implicit in this measure is the assumption that we would be able to conduct military feints on a level at which the Cubansubuld “get jumpy but the Russians would not. (4) Low-Level Flights -- We can reintroduce low-level reconnaissance flights over Cuba in such a way as to minimize the chance of Cuban counter- action. Publicly, we can rationalize the resumption of theflights on the ©
Pe mane Hate ade EID Gada St tell teats ele Ris SRE aa Ranta to want ot St Bla me ee ae Tt Rare ot cin htt omit hE Won mor oF Pet elec cee ne a ee eee ( TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE -14-- grounds that they will give us more intelligence on Castro's capabilities co to ship arms to Latin America. In fact, the primary advantages to low- level flights are psychological; they would indicate a tougher U.S. line and would be extremely irritating to Castro - a biatant disregard for. Cuban sovereignty. | Much discuséed, the reintroduction of low-level flights has been turned down in the past primarily because of the noise-level problem, and because it might lead to Soviet reaction against our U-Z flights and in other areas. Also there is a real possibility that low-level flights might lead to escalation we would not want; the Cubans are on record that they might try to shoot one down. {5) Free World Shipping to Cuba -- We can take further unilateral measures to reduce Free World shipping to Cuba. For example, we can ‘close U.S. ports and deny U.S. Government sponsored shipments to lines | of some or all countries which have ships .in the Cuban trade. This is a subject which has probably received as much attention as any in the whole realm of Cuban affairs. | Briefly put, we have thus far re- jected further unilateral measures mainly because the nature of the Cuban trade is such (small shipping lines with a greater involvement in Cuban trade than in U.S. trade) that our unilateral measures would simply not ¢ provide the leverage needed to produce a substantial reduction in Free World shipping to Cuba; .the slight reduction we would get would not be enough to
me TO anette onan | oP ad ae a cad ORANG A A ells nd eee ea TE aS hae lal at pert Feed. tale eet cle, sedis» Tata eitt TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE = 15 - compensate for a number of foreign policy losses we would suffer. | Generally speaking, we have instead concentrated on applying in- tense. bilateral pressures on the governments of Free World countries to control their shipping to Cuba; and have had considerable, but not total, success (see also Section V B (2) below). At the same time, we have not entirely ruled out further unilateral sanctions. Some shipping experts seem to feel that if we apply certain unilateral ‘sanctions in March, 1964, . the Soviets and Cubans will have to scramble seriously in order to adjust charters and shipping schedules in time to be prepared for the heavy Cuban shipping season which begins in May. | | (6) Public Presidential Statement -~ You can issue an early policy declaration on Cuba, making clear that the U.S. regards the current situa- tion in Cuba as intolerable. Such a statement would be designed to stimulate - anti-Castro/Communist dissident clements {vb Arte ete to carry out a coup. It would also have a salutory effect on those Latin American leader s who have indicated a willingne ss to follow a positive U.S. lead in taking more forceful action against Cuba. ° Your statement might also include the point that the U.S, is natogaingstorpszmitstooaschiginshcestabdiskmenscnssenathirxaGiabact “not going to permit the establishment of "another Cuba" in the Hemisphere. This point would be designed to make it clear to the Soviets and Castro that they have reached a "dead end" in the Hemisphere. On November 18 in Miami, President Kennedy included both of the
tet Se te ella RS Pte Bells ord te dowd tt Fo fektaaieaeel 5 sah Peels Be EA te PLE GOT gion ale Rea iat ee b= odaaien wl etna et eee haem Et ee weatctl clteals retmaire wd det L TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE» | | - 16 - above points in his speech tothe Inter-American Press Association {excerpts are attached at Tab 2). Whether er not you would want to take a more vigorous line in your own statement would have to depend on many factors - e.g. upon U.S. willingness to pursue a more active anti-Cuba: policy over the riext months, upon possible adverse ‘Latin American re- action to a statement which hints of UL S, interventionism and upon domestic political considerations, . (7) Talks with the Soviets and Cubans -- We can, through normal diplomatic and private channels attempt to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the Cubans and possibly, to encourage some Russian thinking in favor of withdrawal and some Castro thinking in favor of accommodation with the i4§. ow U.S. terms. To the Soviets, we can emphasize (a) that we are never going to let things stand as they are in Cuba, (b) that the Soviets, despite con- siderable expense, are making and can expect to make, no further real progress in Cuba @r elsewhere in the Hemisphere, (c) that the existence of the Soviet tie-line in Cuba is a serious impediment to a U.S. /USSR detente, and (d) that the U. S. is prepared to assist the USSR in finding a fig-leaf to cover Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. | | te Castro, very well aware that the Russians pulled the rug out | ‘from him in October, 1962 and aware that he is making no progress despite massive Soviet aid, the following type of message might have some appeal, It could be confident in tone to mitigate the possibility of relieving Castro
ony Tce cette ae tay PAE Eee teed St See eh Oren ine Fe te ge acinalany Chieti, See Dart AE cae cena Daanart Sb tel aie ed E 909 fonbceatth wde, tea a SA ae ede Fa er Fe i : _ TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE . 17 _ 7 of any anxieties he may have which work in our favor. - "Fidel, we are content to let events continue on their present course. We intend to maintain, and whenever possible, to increase our pressures against you until you fall; we are pretty certain that we will be successful. Moredéver, you can forget about getting tanother Cuba!’ in the Hemisphere. -We have learned our lesson and ‘another Cuba! is simply not going to happen. However, we are reasonable;men. We are not intent on having .your head per se; neither do we relish the suffering of the Cuban people. You know our central concerns -- the Soviet connection and the subversion. If you feel you are ina position to allay these concerns, we can probably work out a way to live amicably together and to build a prosperous Cuba. If you don't feel you can meet our concerns, then just forget the whole thing; we are quite content to continue on our present basis." B. Bilateral Measures Further efforts in this field essentially would represent a . continuation, sharpening, and intensification of programs already in effect. A basic limiting factor is the degree to which we are willing to expend credit with our allies to obtain 422 cooperation in making life diffi- : cult for Cuba. : | . — a | | (I) Free World Trade with Cuba -- We can, through overt and covert, legal and extra-legal, diplomatic and private means, make a greater effort to deny Cuba access to Free World.-markets and sources of supply; extra- ‘special attention can be directed to those Free World commodities which Fo.4:4
tw + Slates aeatee eco mmmhctiteii ete a sae fable oe cen cee eel PL rai tment ntact nt oe fer tl DLN ahaone il ee dn sweeten PE Ree te. i TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE. = 18 - are critical or important to the Cuban economy. “ There are some real obstacles to further progress in this field -- a world-wide shortage of sugar which increases Cuba's leverage over Free World sugar consumers, and a reluctance among many Free World countries to interfere. in non-strategic trade. Nevertheless, there appears to be general agreement that more can be done in this area. Among other things, we can interpret more restrictively various legislative provisions which bear on Free World trade with Cuba; we would have to be prepared, however, to accept political losses in the offending countries as wellas the dornestic political losses inherent in tacitly admitting that our former interpretations were wrong. (2) Free World Shippirig to Cuba =- We can increase our bilateral pressures to eliminate the slowly dwindling number of Free World ships which remain in the Cuba trade. We can try to ensure that the Greeks en-_ force their new shipping legislation against ships in the Cuba trade. We can press the Lebanese to enact the necessary shipping legislation which has already passed through a number of constitutional processes;:a letter from you to the Lebanese Prime Minister might Help. Although we appear to have recently found away to reduce British shipping to Cuba without HMG help (through direct dealings with the shippers), we can continue to press for HMG cooperation, which, if obtained, would be most helpful. ; Since our prospects seem to be good with respect to the three major shipping countries, it is axiormatic that we should keep pressure on other oT ip | a -
execution of the program. | TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE . 4 1 Ure Free World countries to ensure that they don't pick up the slack which the Greeks, Lebanese, and selective British shippers will soon be leaving. . . In this regard, the selective refusal to exercise the Presidential waiver of the Cuban transportation provisions of the new Foreign Aid Authorization Act (cessation of aid to any country which has not taken steps to prevent the transport of commodities, by plane or ship, to or from Cuba), could : increase our diplomatic pressures on the maritime nations, assuming of. course, we are ready to incur the foreign policy costs involved in this step. (3) Air Service to and from Cuba -- We can increase pressure to reduce, restrict and harass Free World and Communist air services to and from Cuba. Strict application of the new Foreign Aid Authorization Act. ' could help in this regard if we are prepared to accept the costs involved ' in offending certain countries (e.g. Spain), On the other hand, the con- clusion of a U. S. /USSR civil air agreement could erode our strong position against Free World air service to Cuba. (4) Anti-Subversion Program -- We can continue, to press in the direction of strengthening both the will and the capability in Latin America ‘to take the political and technical measures which have been recommended both bilaterally and multilaterally. The basic lines of the anti-subversion program have been laid out and they are being followed, with varying . degrees of success, in the different countries. Constant follow-up, technical ‘advice, and assistance, and training are essential to the improvement and i 5 i : aoa eT
of STATE ST MOSER ET | TOP SECRET & SENSITIVE |. -20- : | ee We can also make a tough approach to the Russians with evidence of the Venezuelan arms cache. . Gromyko in the past, has expressed doubt that we could show evidence of Cuban subversion. We can show it touhim now. | 7 °: : 7. ° : C. Multilateral Measures . . (1) Rio Treaty Action Against Cuba - At present, we are in the process of deciding what Rio Treaty action we can get the OAS to taleagainst Cuba as a result of the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela. What we push for will depend, in large part on the hardness of the evidence presented in an OAS investigating team's report and on the attitude of other ; OAS countries towards energetic anti- Cuban action. Best estimates are that we will push for and get 4 or 5 of the following 7 measures: | - (a) Stop and search, on the high seas, of selected Cuban an OAS- registery vessels. This measure implies a willingness to use force and involves the concommitant risk of unwanted escalation. The ostensible purpose of this measure is to stop arms shipments but because the quarantine ; ‘could be easily by-passed and because the chances are good that arms shipments to Latin ‘Ame rica from Cuba are minimal, no arms are likely to be found. The real purpose of this measure is to infuriate, humiliate, ‘and . provoke Castro. (b) Stop and search, in territorial waters, of all suspect vessels. This is a variation of the above, which is probably almost as effective in controlling arms shipments and which does not involve the possible use of -force.. At the
‘desirable action, It would dramatically demonstrate Castro's isolation f. te. ain : ty im ‘ .TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE. -21- : game time, it will be easier for Castro to swallow than the "force" option.’ ‘(c) The breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba by the 5 OAS ‘countries’ which maintain them. On the whole, this would be a highly and deny to Castro the subversive bases which his missions in Latin America provide. : (4) The breaking of remaining economic relations between Latin "America and Cuba. This would be helpful as a means of demonstrating Cuba's isolation and perhaps as a lever to get other Free World countries to — i . break trade relations with Cuba. Of itself, it's not much. Latin Ame rican “trade with Cuba is already at minuscule levels. (e) The breaking of air and surface communications between Latin “America.and Cuba. On balance, this would be quite helpful primarily A because!it would shut off the Cuba/Mexico air route and would constitute an ; . “4 important step in reducing Cuba's ability to move subversives to and from _ 2 Latin America. The primary obstacles are that such a step will involve : *a small-(but acceptable) loss of intelligence facilities and may involve legal “ difficulties with respect to bilateral and multilateral civil aviation agreements. @ Condemnation of Cuba by the OAS. The OAS certainly will agree to . this as one of its actions. But it doesn't mean much. : (g) A renewed call for alert against subversion and an endorsement - of previous OAS recommendations outlining specific measures for combatting - the threat. OAS approval for this one should be easy so long as the wording does not obligate states to implement the recommendations. In this form, SOE gL OTS Bee I TON TT ae TT EN Pa ORE ED Pe Ne Tee
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE yo, -22+, however, such action will be fairly meaningle ss. (2) Other Surveillance Measures == Outside the context of Rio Treaty Action we can try to conclude OAS-wide or bilateral agreements with Latin American governments to take joint measures to detect and prevent arms smuggling by land, sea, or air into Latin-America. Because of the urgency of the threat, Venezuela and Colombia skewid be given first priority. i} : i i 1 i ’ ‘ ER POTN BRETT