ore) 3 ct fi] ee ef be O Loo an ee { Oi i iQ ral he JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM sy ers nase vio “nase ave EBRD YL sD Seth Fhe MER GORE EOI GE STEPS CEO AINE MOKA EUR CREA TORR ORE AE CeTeT EID itah tt tie ARLE AHN nD ne HoENE HHNN Geren HA Om furOW hw Rts UMD SE LOK SEO) GNA GUT Soe fen cotta Gey and GED stem Gams GE AEE EER ROW INKY Cute mm Ore MINER On Him SN Gem corm Fett eer, rhs ctY Ea ST canie AGENCY 1: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014~10045 RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-H-G23 levee wna tem ite ag Uicih Tarte Aten SO EER EHR TY EAH FPWR OT SHEN OPO NE ~NIENSOMEE LET AR. CSTD Grd NTD TL ESS SSR ENON FVD ANAD SOR OTE PED nt vet sur) Ene Ht atte ch NIEHS a enh Hen) Sea HH PHY AMD Hh rl cre GEAEY TR MIE ASH MMe uN WDD WHA tO tom oem amen cub mami mut cures Guin aumn stim aie Here GAC GES soe cite Oem DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATGR : SSCIA 1 FROM : GRAY, GORDON TO 3 ; TITLE ¢ DATE : 07/09/75 PAGES : 91 SUBJECTS : GRAY, GORDON ASSASSINATION, CASTRO, FPIDEL EISENHOWER, DWIGHT DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED . RESTRICTIONS : ib é CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/98 OPENING CRITERIA . COMMENTS : Box 2 ace erm eine ove Cam Sia CAEN TREE HeED ute ADE CHE EN be enh erm eke HED ER CAR SO OE MRD ARLE GL MOE GIA ERD Gd ED ORE ATT GREY STIG) Gar CORE SGP MERE SEEN CEE tae ER ORD EY eR GED FANT CTL TET GEN cee IE Omer HR FORM EUR Gime) IO eeENE FON TID AEE SO are WRC iE URE en ON Crme AEN AE DR eR ore eh MN AE TH HY 50955 DBoctd: 324293433 Page i
HW 50955 Doctld: 32423433 ‘oamubher ged Bil soll The United States Sruate NVA Mee R t of P di eport o roceedings BH Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Wednesday, July 9, 1975 Washington, D.C (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD &. PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, 5S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 OP SECRET Page 2? jer se et tH i Vetar bs : meee ject
i “A P’ oh iy TESTIMONY OF Gordon Gray OOOF-w rs (£02 Ferg) avrg EXHIBITS FOR IDENTIFICATION ata cated 1 sES SSCA CIOS a aah ittattin VAwa © Cwm LWOUS VU “valburusena * PG berty thy OEE — Lad Qe W fad wr O. O — 3242735433 Page 3 Bocld: HW 50955
Y WARD :GSH\ Prone (Ares 207) $44-6000 AAD & FRUL ny L Wanker, SE 31GB aest Sereet, COMMITTEE BUSINESS Wednesday, July 9, 1975 United States Senate, Select Committee to study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:25 o'clock Pom, in Room $-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Mathias, and Schweiker. Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; F.A.O. Schwarz, III, Chief Counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel, Prederick Baron, Michael J. Madigan, Charles Lombard, Charles Kirbow, and Robert Kelly, Professional Staff Members. TOP SECRET
PROCEEDING The Chairman. Mr. Gray, would you like to take the Prone (Aree 2027) 5444600 efore you're seated would you please take the oath. ‘| h proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing Do you swear that all the testimony that you give in this ut the truth, so help you God? Me. Gray. I do. The Chairman. Thank you. Mx. Gray, I want to apologize t . for the delay. You've been waiting several hours and I am #orry that it's taken us 80 long in our interrogation of the previous Witness. I appreciate your being here and I understand you have some opening remarks that you would like to read into the record. ! Mr. Gray. I will, sir, and that may save a:little time for i WARD B PRUE ‘the Committee. The Chairman. Very well. sl i Mr. Gray. Let me say, Mr. Chairman and members of the i i i committee , i've been around this town a long time. You don't have to apologize to me for being behind. I know how de dis. ‘So I am happy to wait. POOF oO. ALO Fest Street, S.£., Wasmimaton, TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBoctd: 327423433 Page 5
TESTIMONY OF GORDON GRAY Mr, Gray. I have always considered it a privilege to appear before a Senate Committees. As perhaps you know, I had 4 session Prone [Ares 202) $44-4000 on July 5 with four members of the Committee staff, I should ike to say, Mr. Chairman, that I found them courteous, intelligent, inble and well informed. I hope that our meeting was a construc~ ive one. | I trust that I need not assure you that I wish to be as helpful as I can, but I must remind you that we shall probably be talking about situations which existed something like 15 to i ‘97 years ago and I fear that my recollections are not aa sharp fe “as I would like them to be. The staff mambors did give me a some refreshment by showing me memoranda which I believe will WhO & PAUL i ‘form the basis for your questions. I might say that these were Inenoranda which I had not seen before, and I believe that the reason that they were not distributed to principals of what is ‘how called the Forty Committee was that President Eisenhower wanted only one copy of notes of these meetings in existence it and that was to be kept in the files of the Director of the oant + “Central Intelligence Agency. An exception was made in the case -of Cuba. . Wasmegran, OC. My own experience with the National Security Council and intelligence matters in general was as follows: ; As Secretary of the Army from 1949 to 1950, I at one time 310 Fert Sireet, SE was a statutory member of the NSC. However, as you will recall u t TOP SECRET HW 50955 DBDocld:327423433 Page 6
1 SG he 1949 amendments to tha Act removed the Service Secretaries. 2.|% might parenthetically say that Senator Symington and I have Prone (Aree P07) $44-6000 standing joke that we are the only living two people who have ever been kicked off the National Security Council. He was at the time Secretary of the Air Force, In 1951 I established and served as the first Director of t i ithe Psychological Strategy Board at the request, and by appoint- | ent of, Prasident Truman. In 1953 I was a member of the ‘President's Committee on International Information Activities, Lopularly known as the Jackson Committee. In 1955 I became Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs ‘ ‘and in that capacity served as back up for the Secretary of ‘Defense for National Security Council matters. I attended all WARD & PAUL NSC meetings with him. In 1956 I became Director of the Office ‘of Defense Mobilization in which capacity [| was again a statutory, 4 ‘member of the National Security Council. In July 1958 I became. ‘Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs and the National Security Council and its subsidiary bodies were among my responsibilities. In this capacity I also ‘perved as the President's representative to what was first known as the 5412 Committee -- I believe it was 5412-2 Committee -- ul and later "Special Group," 1 having changed the name because . Washington, O.€. 20003 5412 had attained some visibility. My understanding is that 210 Faest Stemet SF Bubsequentiy it underwent at least two more hame changes, the vast being the Forty Committee. I consider this Committee -- TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBoctd: 327423433 Page 7
TOP SECRET @ CJ ref 5] | ; . i the Porty Committee -- a vital one in the interest of the 2 lunitea States and of the President. Indeed, when following ! : Jinstructiona from President Eisenhower to leave everything Prors (Aree 207) $44-4000 in the best possible shape for his successor, and when I was 5 : briefing McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's to be Special 6 J Assistant for National Security Affairs, it became apparent 9 "to me that it had probably already been decided that virtually “ald of. the so-called machinery developed during Eisenhower's Administration would be disbanded. JI sought, and succeeded in obtaining, one commitment from McGeorge Bundy and that was that “it he wanted to protect the interests of his President the one . thing that should be retained would be what is now known as the Forty Committee. This commitment waa kept. WARD ® PAUL Since May 1961 I have bean a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. I took no documents out of Government with me and have not had occasion to read anything other than those shown me by the Committee staff. As I have already observed, I never even saw notes of the Forty Committee meetings and such memoranda in this field as I made I think entirely related to Cuba. They were produced in original form only and these are all at the - Eisenhower Library at Abilene. That concludes my opening statement, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Gray. 410 Fast Strwet, $F. Washington, O.C. 2a0n) We have a vote on. In the interest of time I think we TOP SECRET HWY 350955 DBocld:327423433 Page 6
: TOP SECRET | should wtrip down and keep the hearing going, as long as there twill be one or two Senators here at all times. Prone (sae 207) 344-4000 All right, Mr. Schwarz, will you commence? Mr. Schwarz. All right, Mr. Gray, this is a procedural imatter. You know you have the right to counsel and all other | Constitutional rights. / Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. Mr. Schwarz. Now when President Elaenhower spoke to you about the 5412 Committee did he tell you that he thought it i was important that all actions that impinge upon the soveriegnty: 'of another country be deliberated by the 5412 Committea? Mc. Gray. He made the statement to me that the 5412 Committee -- we of course had many conversations about it but WARD &® FAUL that was the one thing he said about the 5412 Committee. Mr. Schwarz. And it was your understanding from the time you became National Security Advisor to the President that all important covert operations were to be considered by the 5412 Committee? 20003 Mr. Gray. That was my understanding. Mr. Schwarz. Did the 5412 Committee ever approve an action to assassinate Fidel Castro or any other person? . Warshengron, OC. Mr. Gray. No, not while I was the President's representative. Mr. Schwarz. Well, do you know that it did at any other time? SLO Forst Steeet, SE Mr. Gray. I can only speak out of experience, sir. - TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423433 Page 9
“TOP SECRET | jNo, I don't know entirely that it never did. Mx. Schwarz. Now was your relationship with Mr. Eisenhower Peper {bos ae 202} $44-6000 such that you would believe that he would discuss with you tt any important matter that came to hde attention that related ‘to the field of, covert operations? al | Mr. Gray. I believe that ~-- yes, the short answer to that i question is yes, that he would discuss with me anything that ‘i “came to hia attention independently of me, yes. ; Mr. Schwarz. Now if an officer of the Central Intelligence te 1 “Agency or if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency : had told President Eisenhower that the Agency had made a ‘contract with the Mafia in order to assassinate Fidel Castro, ‘do you believe that President Eisenhower would have discussed WARTD & PAUL that with you? Mr. Gray. I believe that he would but I don't know that to be the case. Mr. Schwarz. Did he, President Eisenhower, ever have such discussion with you? Snoa4 Mr. Gray. About -~ Mr. Schwarz. Assassination of Fidel Castro? Mr. Gray. No. | Wasmegten, OC Mr. Schwarz. About the use of the Mafia in connection with Cubans? Mr. Gray. No, I have heard about this use of the Mafia S10 F seat Street, SE only in recent times when it appeared in the press. I never TOP SECRET VSM ENere Fae TUR NTN TY MET hier Rw Al gt EM Tht WW 50955 Docla:32423433 Page 10
ithat situation. knew anything about. pur be fore 4 and Would you turn, Mr. Kelly, Schwarz. Mr the Special Group minutes of November 3rd, the Witness, ge 8 3 | be ® & af ee [°] = a CJ ia) o ba « 8 Se o $3 6 ce Q wn a 16) ord & z oo ' ‘ (The document referred to was marked Gray Exhibit No. 1 for identification.) ANwa @ Quy PQOO! “AG “Hause AR 2G sdensy stag Oe TOP SECRET Docld: 32423433 Page 11 50955 HF
Pade SAA. Mr. Schwarz, Mr. Gray, this is what purports to be the ti minutes of a Special Group meeting which you attended? Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. imone [Aree 202) 344-4000 OC; Mr. Schwarz. Would you look at the third page, please? The document says that "Mr. Merchant asked whether any i I || real planning has been done for taking direct positive action J jagainst Pidel, Raul, and Che Guevara." | Mr. Merchant was a State Department representative on the I “1 Special Group? Gray. He was. Yes, indeed, Schwarz. Now would you agree that the words “direct . positive action” appear to question whether there's been any ab ' planning in connection with assassinating those people? WAHD & PAUL Mr. Gray. I think the phrase "positive action" could include assassination, but I should say it is all the intent of the user. of the phrase and his meaning of it, and I'm not Sure what was in Mr. Merchant's mind. I agree that assassination could be included in that phrase, but I think, having had my Poon recollection refreshed by seeing this paper, which I had not De seen before, Mr. Merchant includes, or General Cabell pointed cut that this was not a practical option and he said it would « Wastington, have to be concluded that Mr, Merchant's suggestion was bayond our capabilities. BLO Fst Steeet SF Mr. Schwarz, General Cabell was the Deputy Director of the CIA? TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423433 Page i2
TOP SECRET Mr. Gray. He was the Deputy Director of the CIA at the time. Mr. Schwarz. Did he diselogea at that meeting or any other Emene (Arts 202) 544-6500 time that the CIA had engaged the Mafia in order to assagsinate Pidel Castro prior to this meeting? Mr. Gray. No, not to my knowledge. Mr. Schwarz. Turning back to Tab B,-- Senators, I now going to refer to two earlier documents at which the subject of dealing with these three persons ~-- Castro, Che Guevera, and Raul Castro -- is discussad, although not decided upon, and I think the earlier meetings should be read in light of the November meating when the CIA representative said it was not practical. WARD ® PAUL Tab £, if you would mark it as Exhibit 2, Mr. Kelly, is -: » that what it purports to be, minutes of the National Security Council meeting in March of 1960? Mr. Gray. Well, it is a report of the discussion of the — Council., I wouldn't consider it as such minutes, Mr. Schwarz, Onn but it purports to be a discussion, nc. (The document referred to waa marked Gray Exhibit No. 2 for identification.) S10 Fest Street, § £ | Wasturgran, TOP SECRET HW 50955 Doold:324293433 Page 13
Mr. Schwarz. The Special Assistant to the President for ‘National Security Affairs is reported as being present, and | I take it that is you. Crone (Ares 2027} 544-6000 Mr. Gray. That is right, sir. Mr. Schwarz. Now there's a lengthy discussion of the subject of Cuba and Mr. Castro, which runs, starts on page 2, ‘and I would like to call your attention to some pieces of it “and see if it fits your recollection of attitudes in that period of time. Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Dillion -- that'a Mr. Douglas Dillon. Gray. That's right. Mr. Schwarz. He takes the position on page 7, which is WARD A PAUL the second page of the copy we have: “The result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist take-over." Was that attitude expressed by people in connection with Mr. Castro? Mr. Gray. I am sure that there was. I don't remember Mr. Dillon saying this but I have no doubt that it was a o00t tc. concern of people at the time if Castro should not be in power that there was a vacuum which might be taken over. Mr. Schwarz. I'm just going to put in some exerptsa from the document which set the flavor and then read up to the particular thing I want to question the Witness about. S10 Facet Street, S.6.. Wasmington, On page 8, which is the third page, the President is TOP SECRET BW 50955 — Docld: 32423433 Page 14
to have said that °a certain amount of pro-Castro sentiment 2 lhad been expressed by small groups in the countries he had recently visited." Pmane (Aree 207) 544. Skipping down: “Latin American Presidents had counselled jfurther forebearance by the United States." Skipping down further: The President is quoted as having said he did not wish to endanger the lives of Americans living in Cuba. On the top of the next page the statement is made that "we might finally have to use force if U.S. citizens were exposed to mob violence.” Then Admiral Burke is quoted as ‘ saying we need a Cuban leader around whom anti-Castro elements could rally. WANE & PAUL a Was that a problem, the lack of a replacement for Castro, i: |who would be preferable to the United States than Castro? -Me. Gray. Yes, it was a problem. I think it was recognized by many people who thought about it as a very serious problem and I remember very well, Mr. Schwarz, toward the, I guess the end of the Eisenhower Administration that he used to press POOLE the DCI, Mr. Dulles, Allen Dulles, very hard about the possibility of a government in exile because he didn't want a  Waastrcergtaves, OE. “yacuum left if something should happen to Castro to take him out of power. As I recall it, and I have not looked at my notes on Cuba ALO F crst Ntroet, % F i since I left the government-- ‘since the. Bay og.Piga, I~ | TOP SECRET HW 50955 Bocld:32425433 Page 15
HW 50955 WARD & PAUL Prone (Ares 207} $44-6000 aad Pooas ALO Frege Street, SE. Wasmengtan, O.C. Docld: 32423433 f SECRET TOP ; hada a chance to see them then, The Cubans couldn't agree i iamong themselves, The Central Intelligence Agency had not, y think, by the time President Eigenhower went out of office, been able to set up any kind of government in exile. I'm not sure that one was ever set up. Mr. “Schwarz. Would the assassination of Mr. Castro prior to there being a preferred raplacement be consistent with United States policy as you understood it during the time that you were in office? And I understand you're saying that ‘assassination wasn't approved, but I'm asking you a hypothetical question.. Would the assassination of Castro prior to the identification of the preferable leader of Cuba have been consistent with the United States policy? Mr. Gray. Well, I can't answer that yes or no because I must repeat that to my knowledge assassination was not considered a sensible course of action at the highest levels of government. But I think that the other part of the question is that actions should probably not have been taken to relieve Castro of power until there was some way to assure some sort of a viable government ready to move in. I'm not sure I'm reaponding to your question. Mr. Schwarz. No, I think you did. Now I want to pick up near the bottom of page 9 and read two sentences to you. "Mr. Dulles reported that-a plan to affect the situation TOP SECRET
i jan Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke suggested that any “plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, u p h Prone (Area 202} 5444000 ‘since many of the leaders around Castro were even woréé than Castro." Now does the plan for the removal of Cuban leaders contem-~- iplate the assassination of Cuban leaders? Mr. Gray. The plan that Mr. Dulles reported on that was being worked on on March 14 was a four-point program, and 1 am not sure, Mr. Schwarz, whether this meeting took place "before the President approved of the four-point program oF immediately afterwards, but Mr. Dulles was certainly referring to what I. call the four-point program which was approved by the President and which formed the basis of various WARD R PAUL activities which ultimately resulted in what we know as the Bay of Pigs. I have not had a chance to see that four-point paper, I guess since T went out of office in the Eisenhower Admini- stration. As I recall it, however, it included sabotage, increased or enhanced economic sanctions, propoganda activities, raooy .Oc. and the training of Cuban exiles. Now this program was approved by the President. Subsequently, , Waster gtar in about March -- I don't know the date of it -- there were many. meetings with the President about Cuba and this four-point program and i recorded these meetings, 1 must say in violation 210 Borat Steeet, SE of his instructions because he had told me, as I think I gaid TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32423433 Page i?
earlier, that he wanted only one copy of the reports or notes lof covert action approvals kept in the files, I felt it was Prone (Aras 207) $44-4000 {important to have Prosidential memoranda prepared and kept, ‘as I said earlier, in original form, and they are all at Abilene. Ishave not seen them since the spring of 1961. | Mr. Schwarz. WHhatrwetreieryingitoidecidethere t--what we're trying to deal with in your testimony about these documents ‘igs whather the words that we just saw, “plan for tha removal of Cuban leaders," turning to Exhibit 2 -- Mr. Gray. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. Exhibit 2 ia taken March 14 and reflects the National Security Council meeting on March 10th. Exhibit 3, which is at your Tab F, is taken March I5th, 1960, and reflects wand & PAUL the Special Group meeting on March 15, 1960. (The document réferred to was marked Gray Exhibit No. for identification.) Wastungton, O.0. 20001 SE ATO Fest Steoet TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32423433 Page 134
HW 50955 Prone (Ares 2027} WARD &® PAUL aalets ae SF Warshenaran, wet Street ain ke Docld: 32423433 TOP SECRET Mr. Schwarz. Now some related language is used in il " jParagraph 6 on page 2, which says: H . "There was. a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che ‘Guevera should disappear simultaneously. Admiral Burke said ‘that the only organized group in Cuba today ware the Communists sand there was therefore the danger that they might move into control, Mr. Bulles felt that this might not be disadvantageous ' because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. * Colonel King" -- and he's with the CIA ~- "said there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified.” Now the November 3 memo, which we marked as Exhibit 1, which suggested no such authority to assassinate the three men was ever granted, and indeed, that the CIA said it was not a practical solution. But do you not agrea, Mr. Gray, that the language used in here suggests that the subject of assassination was being discussed? Mr. Gray. At the lavel of the Forty Committee or the National Security Council? Mr. Schwarz. Yes. These words should disappear simul- taneously or any plan for removal should be a package deal, which is the. Security Council. Mr. Gray. I do not, no, sir. I again repeat that, “shoulé disappear"is like removal or eliminate. It is the intent of the TOP SECRET
Raa ar user of the expression or the phrase that is controlling and there may well have been in the Central Intelligence Agency Baomne {Aree 207) 444-6000 [plans and/or discussions of assassinations, but I am repeating iH | enat at the level of the Porty Committee or A: higher level . “than that, the National Security Council, there was no active discussion in any way planning assassination. Mr. Schwarz. Well, we agreed, ramember, that there had | been one where it was turned down but it was discussed. That ,is the :November 3, 1960 meeting. Mr. Gray. That's true. Mr. Schwarz. And there the words used were “direct action.* Mr. Gray. That's right. WARD A FAUL Mr. Schwarz. And we agreed that that included assassinations ‘and there from the context you thought it probably meant ‘assassination. Mr. Gray. Mr. Schwarz, f will say I agree that assassination could have been on the minds of some people when they used eoal these words eliminate or get rid of. I cannot say that Admiral Burke, for example, wasn't i himself thinking of assassination. I am just trying to it was not serious considered as a program of! action by president or even the Porty group. 40 Fest Street, $.6.. Wosnington, OWL. Mr. Schwarz. Do you think it is possible that persons at the level of the Porty Group or the 5412 or such high ‘TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423433 Page 20
WARD & PAUL « Wasturgtes, 0.0. 20005 410 Ferst Street, $.€ authority might use worda like “get rid of" or "eliminate" to im@an overthrow the government, as opposed to murder the leader and other pérsons, perhaps in the Central Intelligence Agency, "| ‘would interpret or misunderstand those words to mean murder ithe leader, kill the leader? Mr. Gray. I think this is possible, However, the people jhe might have given it that interpretation in the Cantral | Intodtigence Agency had no authority to carry out such a plan. 7 Mr. Schwarz. Your testimony is that it would be beyond | their authority to act to assassinate unless they had been given a specific order. Mr. Gray. Or unless it had been included in a Specific program, Mr. Schwarz. In other words, it would be beyond the : authority of the Agency, as you understood the Agency, to ' rely upon general instructions such as we should take action in order to overthrow the Castro government to constitute authority for taking specific action to assassinate Mr. Castro personally? Mr. Gray. I agree with what you Say and if I may just speak further to the point. The fact that there ware Many, many meetings about Cuba with the President with sort ‘of a shifting group of top government leaders throughout three quarters, at least, of 1960, and that is into January of '61 _when the word “assassination” or that kind of activity within TOP SECRET
Crone {Area 202) $44-6008 WARO & PAUL o 6 is ¥ c : é ° £ < 4 A 3 w a t a > « © a his approved program wags never mentioned,’ ia an indication ae to me that it was never in the President's mind or anybody who were these important people in government that assassination - vas considered a wise, sensible or practical thing to undertake. i 4 Me. Schwarz. Would you mark as Exhibit 4 the April 14th, " ui | 1960, dtecussion of the National Security Council on April 14th, : | 960, which is Tab H, and the part that I’m going to call your attention to is on the fourth page, which is numbered page Se (The document referred to was marked Gray Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)
Prone (Aree 202) $44-¢, WARD & FauE 310 Fest Street, 4 e, Wasrington, D.C. 29003 Schwarz, Actually, I'm going to start at tha bottom ‘the different language that is used, With respect to Trujillo the following is stated: "Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspact to the j ettwazion in the Caribbean. If Trujillo could be removed from “prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-Castro ‘ " campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost, The Vice Prasident agreed that getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development for us." Do you understand the words "getting rid of Trujillo" “to mean assassinating Trujillo? Mr. Gray. I did not understand that to mean that, I did not understand then and understand now it to mean assassina- tion. Mr. Schwarz. All right. Would you look at the next paragraph where it demonstrates that if people wish to talk about assassination, they were quite willing to use the precise word assassination, and what I would like to ask you after you have read that, well, I may read it into the record: "Turning to Cuba Mr. Dulles reported that a Senor Betancourt (no relation to Venezuela's Bentancourt} had recently defected in Cuba and had told U.s, officials that he sees threa possible TOP SECRET
‘TOP SECRET outcomes of the Cuban aituation: (1) the assassination of ; Castro, which would make him a martyr (2) Castro's suicide, Prone (Area 202) 344-4000 which ids a possibility in the event of failure and (3) a continuation of the present trend, resulting ultimately in a soclalist dictatorship and a Batista-typa terror in Cuba.” i I guess the only question I had coming out of that is was the point that the assassination of Castro would make him a martyr one which you heard discussed on more than one occasion, | or was that the only time you heard about it? : Mr, Gray. I think that this is the only time I heard it, i, "Mr. Schwarz. Here, of course, Mr. Dulles is quoting a Sanor Betancourt, who is talking about the assassination of Castro. Actually, I would now have to say that it's not unlikely that WARD & PALE it would have made him a martyr had he been assassinated. Mr. Schwarz. Now has your recollection been refrashed sufficiently for you to remember without my showing you a document that during your service the special group authorized the passage of weapons to dissidents in the Dominican Republic? Mr. Gray. Yes, I think they were referred to as small 2 O84 arms. That was in lata December of ‘60 or early January of ‘61. Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's put in the record as Exhibit 5 SO 0 Wasninaten, O16 the January 12, 1961 minutes of the Special Group, Tab X. (The document referred to was marked Gray Exhibit ASO Fasst Steeet, No. 5 for identification.) TOP SECRET
Br enre (meen FOP} 444-4009 d 2 < & ry 3 = a $ oan + _ Wastungran, (2 ¢ APO Fst Street NE ET Mr. Schwarz. In which it is stated that the Special Group approved the project then limited supplies of small arms and | . materials would be made available to dissidents inside the : Dominican Republic so long as -- that den't there. Was there any condition put on that, ag you recall? Mr. Gray. I do not recall. Ags a matter of fact, Mr. Schwarz, I have difficulty remembering these two meetings or this meeting, which was in January and the next earlier meeting iwas in December. I was asked by a council of the Rockefeller Commission | spout arms for the Dominican Republic, and to be perfectly honest I had forgotten any discussion of arms for the Dominican Republic and it is only because your able staff has shown me ‘been discussed because I can't deny that it appears in these minutes. : if if a if i : Mr, Schwarz. Now prior to that meeting, didn't Mr. Bissell “gay on December 29th, 1960 and let us put before us Exhibit 6 of the minutes of that meeting which is Tab W. (The document referred to was marked Gray Exhibit No. 6 for identification.} TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 707) 944-4000 WAKE & PALE o? RB. End Tape 6A: Begin Tape 6B veya ae om’ ten Ow ALM Breer Steet, Se f Me. Schwarz. That ¢hot planj.current ascofs Devemberca}; not bring about the desired result “Lacking some decisive "lptroke against Trujillo himself." Wouldn't you read that to mean the stroke against Trujillo himself is killing him? Mr. Gray. I wouldn't so construe it. Me. Schwarz. How do you construe it? Mr. Gray. Well, other memoranda here I think reflect other notes, reflect that various courses of action which ‘might take place in Cuba or Trujillo resigning, and I think there was some negotiation to that effect. Now you haven't mentioned in some of these minutes -- these memoranda have refreshed my recollection that somehow there was much more concern about Trujillo in many quarters than there was about Caatro, and it seemed important to some, I now recall, that something should be done about Trujillo and before anything was done about Castro. Senator Mondale. Could I ask you about why are we 50 concerned about Trujillo? He was presumably friendly ‘to‘us, anti- Castro, anti-Communist. What was the concern? Mr. Gray. I believe the concern was more in Latin America than in the United States of America. I think they were, concerned about perhaps the way he governed his country, for example. But I think it is reflected that the President or high officials of our government were receiving some Latin TOP SECRET
‘TOP SECRET 1 llamerican pressure to do something about Trujillo. . Prene [Asaa 207} 444-6500 the fact that he had previously arrested a large number of 2 | Senator Morgan. Wasn't part of it, Mr. Gray, at that time i ‘prominent people in hia country and while doing so maybe he chad alleviated some of this opposition but he lost general | support and the country was in bad financial condition and it was thought that he was going to either fall or abandon the country and that Castro people would take over? That seems to be reflected as I read the minutes of the + Security Council. Mr. Gray. Senator, I just don't recall the situation in _those terms, I'm sorry. Sanator Morgan. Fritz, if I remember, is that not Py 2 « & e z < g reflected in the minutes? Mr. Schwarz. Yes, it is and there's also the thesis that we needed to demonstrate that we wanted to move against both right wing and left wing to astablish credibility in Latin America for the movement against Castro. Senator Mondale. That proves that nobody is safe. PaO Ane Senator Morgan. I really think it might be well somewhere for you to put that in the record because when we come to . Weaateees “writing the report on Trujillo that we will want to know why. The Chairman. My memory of the period and the concern about Trujillo was the fear that Castro, 4 Communist take-over would ALO bees! Atreee te “occur in the Dominican Republic by virtue of the repressive TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-4000 WARD &® Paue 20008 AEG Foret Stemet Se | Wisheagtosn, O.¢ eRe ed CRET action that Trujillo had taken and the Shakey condition of 2 jhts government and the belief at the time that Castro was , z Jagressively engaged in efforts to extend his revolution to other ‘Latin American countries, Isn't that the case, or do you recall, Mr. Gray? Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I just don't recall. I said to iMr. Schwarz earlier, if I may repeat something I said earlier, that it's a strange thing to me that my recollection about the Dominican Republic is much dimmer than about many..other things, and he told me this is true of some of the other witnesses. I .. -@on't know why this is so. But my recollection is-very dim about the Dominican Rapublic, Mr. Schwarz. Senator Morgan, some of the exhibits we put in do put forward both the reasons that have been put forward here. Senator Morgan. I haven't been here all the time, Mr. Schwarz, All right. Now I want to talk about - Patrice Lumumba. Do you remember who Lumumba was? Mr. Gray. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. Now we didn't like Lumumba very much, did “Gray. No, Schwarz. Why was that? Gray. It's my recollection we thought Lumumba would TOP SECRET
“ye yet tee TOP SECRET be amenable to Soviet influence and control. But your jassociates refreshed my recollection. Most of what I remembered | ‘about Lumumba was tha’terrible.jokes'we used to-tell about, mone [Asean 2702) 544-6 “you 'va-got thet wrong. telephone Lumamba’s? The situation in the Congo was fluid, it was chaotic, and é “now I remember it was the subject of vary much discussion in .this government and in the National Security Council. But I & . do remember the name Lumumba and I of course have seen some of the papers which contain references to him. | Mr. Schwarz. All right, now were these minutes referred to your associates or your associate, we have shown you papers that convince you that that is the ‘name used for President Eisenhower. rs < a e & « $ Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. Mr. Schwarz. Mark: as Exhibit 7, Tab P of the Senators' books Special Group Meeting, 25 August, 1960. {The document referred to wag marked Gray Exhibit oon 8 No. 1 for identification.) O.c. 210 Fat Street, SE. Washimetan, TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 WAIT A PAE HOON A | Mr asrenatere D3 & BIG OC acat Ntroet, Sf a Mr. Schwarz. Now you'fre talking about Lumumba in | \eeons paragraph, aren't you? | Mr. Gray. Yes. - ' ( ub Mr. Schwarz. At first Mr. Parrott and Mr. Dulles described | i some operational lines involving the use of unions, the i Cc and the labor groups. The group agreed that [that kind of action againat Lumumba was very much in order. Now you want on then ‘to'call.on behalf of your associate, Le * Hand that 4s President Eisenhower. Is that right? Mr. Gray. It. must have been, yes, Mr. Schwarz. Saying that he had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action, i and then there is discussion about that. And it is “agreed ‘that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out ‘consideration’ of any particular kind of activity that might | contribute to getting rid of Lumumba." Now do you agree that you contemplated and approved, at ‘least, the planning of the assassination of Lumumba in that ~ meeting? Mr. Gray. No, sir. Mr. Schwarz. Didn't you agree that no activity would be ruled out? Mr. Gray. Well, again, I repeat, Mr. Schwarz, that when you talk about an activity like some of these other phrases or TOP SECRET
Preprg (roa POP} $4-4- Py 3 < & « 3 2 < & . Grgas t fre | We astrenates, ALO beest Steoet WE geval TOP SEC words we have used. I would call your attention to something lwe have not discussed, ig I may, though, in this precise language .~- “of any particular activity which might, contribute a “to getting rid of Lumumba." I would suggest if you meant assassination, that would Ive itself getting rid of Lumumba . | Do you know a Mr. Robert Johnson? Mr. Gray. I think there was one on the nsc staff. Mr. Schwarz. He has testified before us that he understood l president Eisenhower, at a meeting that he had attended himself, >to call for the killing of Lumumba. | Now, first, did you éver hear President Eisenhower himself say anything which called for the killing of Lumumba? Mr. Gray. I do not recall him ever saying anything that contemplated killing Lumumba. Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any comment one way or the other which can help the Committee in understanding the credibility of Mr. Johnson as a witness? Mr. Gray. Yes, sir. _ This is the first thing that has taken me by gurprise, Mr. Schwarz. Your associates have been very courteous, you have been very courteous. In all of the discussions we have had Robert Johnson's name has not been mentioned. Mr. Schwarz. That's true. That's not from.any intention that is true 46 far as I know. TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 207) 44-4000 wand & PAUL So0048 oe 1 Wastiont ALO Furst Seemed, GE Mr. Gray. Are you asking me if I can establish his credibility. I impune his credibility. Mr. Schwarz. Or make any comment, if you can, If you ‘Mr. Gray. All right, gir. Well, Robert Johnson, as I recall, was an able member of ,the very small NSC staff which we had in those days. It was a lean staff and I recall, I think, that I regarded him highly -as an individual and as a staff man. The thing that puzzles me ia where he ever would have heard Eisenhower make that kind of a statement because I don't think, I can't swear to this, that he ever attended a National Security Council meeting, and I would wager that he never saw Eisenhower in any other kind of capacity. May I ask a question? .Well, is this a sworn testimony? Mr. Schwarz. Yes, it was and. he describes it as being in the summer at a meeting with a number of people with the normal s@eretary away and that he was present at the meeting to take notes. Mr. Gray. ‘This is possible. I said that I would have gathered that he attended a National Security Council meeting, but of course the notes of the meeting would indicate that. Mr. Schwarz. We have not found notes of the meeting taken by him. Mr. Gray. I question the credibility of this statement. TOP SECRET bmereane -P 5 nerd « aeabdhee seta
TOP SECRET ! Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be proper afl ito fill in the full circumstances. { | In hia testimony this Mr. Johnson, he said it was not ‘his normal course to be at the Full meetings of the National ‘Security Council. What he did was to fill in because it was ‘the summer and people were away on vacations. He took the “place of the regular note-taker and he was startled by a ' «remark made by the President following a briefing on the situation "in the Congo with particular regard to Lumumba when the i "President said something to the effect of -= he was not clear in his mind about the exact words but the meaning remained in his memory, mainly get rid of Lumumba. Then he said that the question that arose, he wrote this Pi > < &. é : < g up in notes and he referred it to, I've forgotten who the normal note-taker was, what to do with the notes. He said he could not recall the exact words of the President and that it was a long time ago and that what stuck in his memory was the startling remark by the President and the stunned silence of PATA) the people in the room. Senator Tower. Why don't we have the minutes of that NSC meeting? 2 Matter agten, (a € Mr. Schwarz. Well, we have not found the minutes of the meeting, unless it is this meeting, and this meeting is not shown as having been transeribed by Mr. Johnson but rather S10 Fest Steno NE by Mr. Parrott. TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 207} ¢ 2 « a @ co z < 4 Lrasminatos, O © 20008 seet SE BUD EF aeat St TOP SECRET Mr. Gray. Well, excuse me. You see I don't know which meating we're talking about now. The anti-Lumumba campaign llenat we're talking about is a Special Group meeting. Mr. Schwarz. And it doesn't show President Eigenhower lattending it. Mr. Gray. He never attended a Special Group meeting “except the meetings in his office on Cuba, which weren't » technically Special Graup meetings themselves, But the President -never attended a Special Group meeting. So the President couldn't have made it in this meeting ‘and I would feel more comfortable having challenged the ~ credibility of Mr. Johnson for whom I stated I have 4 high regard. Lf you can't find the minutes of the meeting that he said he took notes on ~~ now to me it seems the Committee would be interested if you would take his testimony seriously in trying to find out. Mr. Schwarz. And that, Mr. Gray, is why we are looking, we have not succeeded. Mr. Gray. And my second point again, and forgive me for being repetitive, that he apparantly said that, he didn't remember the exact word,but here again, get rid of or get rid of Lumumba. Well, it's no secret now. Live testified here that my associate wanted to get rid of Lumumba. TOP SECRET
4 Prune (Aves 20?) $44-4000 rs 2 € a € « 3 aga coat Stewed te | Weastrecuteens, Th SONG f Mr. Schwarz. In his testimony he said that whatever the i p words were he construed them as meaning killing. He, Johnson, ' construed them as meaning killing and the meeting was stunned. Mr. Gray. Well, I would like to say I disagree. The Chairman. What did you understand the Elsanhower : policy toward Lumumba to be -- take such action, such covert action as might be necessary to depose Lumumba? Mr. Gray. That's right. This meeting moved to spend, the last exhibit Speaks of various types of covert action that * might be taken and this minute reflects the fact that I said “that certainly the Prasident had vary strong feelings on the necessity for straightforward action. . I do not consider that to include any thought in his mind of assassination. Now this was a Special Group meeting in August. I don't know when the National Security Council meeting at which Mr. Johnson said he was present. Mr. Schwarz. All we have is the summer. Mr. Gray. All you have is what?. Mr. Schwarz. He said that it was in the summer. Senator Schweiker. The summer of when, Fritz? Mr. Schwarz. The summer of 1960. I think we'll wait until the Senators come back up. (A brief recess was taken.) TOP SECRET
gsh 33 a « & ¢. fo} @ £ 2 aster DUM 6 eet Stewed, 9. F f “TOP SECRET Ff Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Gray, we had a chat over the recess and The Chairman. All right, Mr. Schwarz, it ‘you gaid you wanted to maka some further comment. about the ‘questions we asked you concerning Mr. Robert Johnson. Me. Gray. Yes, thank you. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I am troubled by this. Earlier ii expressed my high regard for him as an individual and as if te «a member of my staff. I find myself now challenging his i} eredibility. This troubles me quite deeply. I just wanted i | hat on the record. Also, I guess it is reasonable to point out that in any event if’ he were to take notes of the meeting and if the President did use the word “get rid of," it ia the same kind of language we've been talking about ever since I have been sitting before the Committee. Thank you, sir. The Chairman. Given your close connection to President Eisenhower on all covert action matters, do you believe that it is possible that you might not have understood exactly what President Eisenhower had in mind when such terms were used? Are you confident that it was not the Prasident's intention and it was not the policy of his Administration to pursue any means, including assassination for ‘the purpose ef getting rid of Lumumba? Me. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I would say that any administration TOP SECRET
Prone [Aves 207) $44-4006 4 3 « ry € i] & « 3 ATO Fooat Street, $.0.. Washington, O.c. anor ~ TOP SECRET’ should probably give consideration to any means, but in anawer ? leo the question about my relationships with General Eisenhower, Hes would be convinced, if I May use that word, that I understood “him very clearly in any conversations we had about anything. “And in further answar to your question I would think and believe I enat it was not his policy for the United States to pursue a | policy of assassinations. Mr. Schwarz, Why not, Mr. Gray? ' Mr. Gray. I don't think that this is the kind of thing i ic the would have believed in. Proving a negative is very difficult, i “but I will repeat-one iilustration that I ‘gave, i i i i ! In many months of meetings about Cuba if there were any thought of assassinating in Cuba, certainly there would have been some conversation about it in these meetings. There was to my recollection no mention of assassination at all. This is just not tha way he would ‘go about things. Mr. Schwarz. All right. I want to ask you a broad question about Cuba that will start with your testimony and then ask ask you to assume certain facts as true and then ask you to explain those facts to the best you can acting as an expert. Pirst, you have testified that the assassination of Castro was not, as far as you know, authorized by the Eisenhower Administration. : Mr. Gray. ‘Not 0 far as I know. Mr. Schwarz. And second, you have testified that you TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 207) 2 > « & e 6 x « z HOOF * ALG Foeat Seeeet, SF. Warrengtan, D.C | benteve that President Eisenhower would have communicated to t . : yxou personally if a CIA official, Mr. Dulles, had come to see | Ht ‘him to say that the CIA was seeking to assassinate Mr. Castro. Mr. Gray. Yes, gir. I believe that the President would have communicated any 7 i guch action or agreement or order or approval to me, although it must point out that I was not with President Eisenhower “24 hours a day. It was 4 few minutes every day, practically _evary day. I find it very difficult to believe, and I do not believe, that Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to him with such a proposal without, for that matter, my knowing about it from Mr. Dulles. Mr. Schwarz. Ail right, now third. You have testified when we have examined Exhibit 1, which is the November 3, 1960 Special Group. minutes, the Senators' Tab V, that you did recall that meeting at which the subject of assassination was -prought up and it was rejected by the Special Group after hear inc from Mr. Cabell of the CIA ag being impractical. All right? | Mr. Gray. All right. Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, assume, if you will, that in fact prior to November 3, 1960, and at or about the end of September, 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency made 4 contract with the Mafia to offer $150,000 if Mr. Castro were killed. TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET Assume that to be a fact, as the record indicates. It is I Is fact. How, as a person with experience in the field of 1 | national security matters, can you explain that fact in light Prune [Aree 207) $44-6000 of your testimony? | Mr. Gray. I find it very difficult to explain, Mr. ! Schwarz. May I just speak about procedures for a moment, which ‘will help me answer your question, I think? In the case of covert action, at least at that period of time, although it may have bean approved by the Agency itself <r my am now speaking about the Central Intelligence Agency ~~ the normal procedure then would have been for it to be staffed in the State Department, I have already, I think, testified that I complained that I was not given a chance to staff out some 4 > < a @ “ae g -of theae matters, but that is perhaps aside from the point -- at which time both the State Department and the Agency. had agreed it would have gone to the Forty Committee and if the Forty Committee approved it, it would be approved, considered - approved by the government, unless, as in some cases, the President's representative to the Forty Committee had a Oe § me question about the action and he wished to have a Presidential grea, decision, and that happened on a few occasions. Casta So now getting back to your specific question, how could this thing have happened, one way it could have happened would have been that it was well known in the Agency that there was Bie oat Stemet, VE a program directed against Castro and that the people in the TOP SECRET
inune (Aree 207) $44-4000 Py < a @ fol z < z oon, LWosater gon, 0 & FIO Cast Street AF TOP SECRET Agency assumed that that meant anything goas against Castro, This could hava been a possibility. | Iorather guess that that is the Probable answer to the iquestion, A possibility of course is that the responsible jpeople in the Agency simply felt they had the power to act on { thetr own, which x would have denied had it coma to my attention. ih am unable to, really to explain it. But if it happened, it ‘is BY judgment that it shouldn't have happened without the ,4ppropriate procedures being followed. Mr. Schwarz. And your testimony ia that those procedures “were not followed. Mr. Gray. I believe this to be the case. If I ever heard of this Mafia thing before it recently appeared in the press, I certainly have completely forgotten about it. Mr.. Schwarz. It is the kind of thing you would remember if you had ever heard it. Mr. Gray. I would think so. I would think 80, yas. Mr. Schwarz. So just to pin down what you said, well, you are obviously not sure... Your Opinion is that the most likely explanation is that the Agency personnel assumed erroneously and mistakenly that the program with respect to Cuba included the assassination of Castro, even though the program in fact did not include the “assassination of Castro. Mr. Gray. I have to make that kind of assumption. Ap a further observation about this we were referring to TOP SECRET
Prene [Area 207) $44-6000 a « ry € fy x < g Sa Loon wet ena, 5 Weastes BIO Carat Steet Se ‘TOP SECRET [a November 3 meeting of the Special Group ‘in which it was agreed whan General Cabell said assassination ia not a Ipractical alternative. I just can't understand how -- what date did you say, Mr. Schwarz? Mr. Schwarz. The record indicates the contract with the Mafia was made the end of September, 1960. Mr. Gray. Now here is General Cabell on the 3rd of November saying that this is not a viable alternative. I find it difficult because ha's the Deputy Director of the Agency, and I don't think myself that he might have approved an assassination attempt and would hava come to the Special Group saying that this is not the way to-go about things. General Cabell was an honorable man, I think an able Deputy Director. He would not, I think, Khave approved such an action and then a few days later say this is not the kind of thing that we should do.- Mr. Schwarz. So from your knowledge of his character you would assume he, in fact, did not know of the contract with the Mafia. Mr. Gray. This would be my assumption. The Chairman. Have you completed? ; Mr. Schwarz. I do have one thing, I forget. Did you and I discuss whether or not Vice President Nixon had a major ‘ role in the Bay of Pigs? Mr. Gray. Yes, we didn't finish our discussion. TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET re] @! rd tad wa | Me. Schwarz. I think you have something that might add i to tha record on that. I ‘| Phone (Area 207} 344-4000 Mr. Gray. If was saying to Mr. Schwarz that I am reasonably sure -~ this is not by way of suggesting you shouldn't call former President Nixon for any purpose you want to talk to ihim, but I am not talking aboutrthe Bay of Pigs. I am reasonably Sure he never attended those meetings of the Special Group. It wasn't really the Special Group. How can I refer to it. ~-- ‘the Ad Hoc Committee that sort of was set up by the President. to deal with the Cuba program. It is my strong recollection'he never attended any of those meetings. I think that what he would have known about the Bay of Pigs would have been known to him --. wall, I say ¢ > < a € « the Bay of Pigs. What ultimately culminated in the Bay of | Pigs, the program against Castro, would have been known by him only as it was discussed in the National Security Council, and I cannot remember with what detail that program was discussed in the National Security Council. I would have to see the notes to refresh my recollection. So that if he had an active role in what led to the Bay a of Pigs, I have forgotten what it was... I'm just saying that Meant I don't think he's gdéing to be too helpful on that particular point. Now let me say, please, if I may volunteer one other thing, ATO © eat Stewet, SE at the time that President Eisenhower went out of office on I 5 TOP SECRET
trina [area 207) 9444000 2 > « & € “ z < $ Fone 4 Lowasninge, Be BLO dee Sereet St i i "TOP SECRET January 21, 1 think it is faix to say that there was no plan or no action committed, there was no military planning. As a matter of fact, I never heard -- I'm geographically ignorant perhaps, but 1 don't think I ever heard of the Bay of pigs until this thing came out. So certainly there was no military planning to land at the Bay of Pigs. In fact, General Eisenhower objected very strongly to the fact that there was any military planning whatsoever when he left office. And I expressed to Mc. Schwarz the personal opinion this morning that this was a bad three-months period in American history when, after President Kennedy was elected, he apparently felt he was not in 4 position to trust many of the people around him. And my own judgment is had this thing come A year tater, either the Bay of Pigs operation would not have been started OF it would have been a successful operation. and I think it is unfortunate for him and it was unfortunate for him and for the country that this thing sort of came to a head so guickly in his Administration. That is gratuitous, I know. The Chairman. Senator Schweiker -~ Senator Tower had H a question. Senator Tower. Referring to Tab E, page number 9, which is Exhibit 2, toward the end of the page there. These are: the minutes of the Security Council meeting of 10 March, 1960: "mr. Dulles reported that 4 plan to affect the situation TOP SECRET
TOP | fin Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke suggested that any ‘plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal mene {A108 207) 544-6009 ‘since many of the leaders around Castro were evan worse than Castro." Now did Mr. Dulles -- now the minutes are not detailed in ‘this inatance, but can you recall whether or not Mr. Dulles “went into any detail on the plan to affect the Cuba aituation was being worked on? Mr. Gray. May I take a minute to anawer that question, Mc. Chairman? The Chairman. Surely. Mr. Gray. I am not so sure how much I told you, Mr. é 3. < s @ «< z Schwarz and members of the staff and members of the Committee. It's hard to remember. I have been shown the minutes of the Special Group which are dated, I think, February 27 -- anyway, in February of 1960, which dealt with the sabotage of sugar refineries, and I remember the meeting. It was in the President's office in tha Oval SO0n4 Room and I remember it very clearly because there were schematic ‘ ve drawings of sugar mills and Mr. Dulles and his technical Breer, associates were demonstrating how this kind of sabotage could a eater take place, etcetera. SF And I remember the President, and it is my recollection that the President said, well, perhaps it's time to make a move AEC F seat Stewet, against Castro, but don't just fool around with sabotaging TOP SECRET
a: a Ss Prone (Area 207) 944-6000 4 > < a ¢ & a « 4 SOT LMWoaameeaten, 0 ¢ aoe Sta beat Steves ‘TOP SECRET “sugar milla. If you want to move against the Castro government, bring me a program which is going to be effective. They can always repair the sugar mills, atcetera. And as a result of that direction Allan Dulles came back to the president in my presence and in the presence of others, I have forgotten who now, with a four-point program which responded to the prosident's request to come up with something more than just sabotaging sugar refineries. I have not seen that four-point program since I left “government. It is in the library at Abilene and those four points ware sabotage, enhance the economic sanctions, propoganda, which resulted, among other things, in the establishment .of that Swann's Island radio, and the training of Cuban exiles. Now, Senator Tower, J would hava to know the date of that four-point program which was the beginning of all of this to know, for example, to answer your question as to how deeply he went into detail at this meeting because he was either preparing the four-point program or had just prepared it. It was my recollection it was sometime in March that he presented it to the President. The cecords would show this certainly at Abilene, and I remember very well that Mr. Dulles read from this word for word without any deviation whatsoever to make sure he was proposing a program that thé President understood. So that is sort of a convoluted answer to your questian. I don't know at this time whether the program was in preparation TOP SECRET
frre fAvee POP) $44. 2 2 a Ly € z « $ 410 Farst Steet, SF, Wane or had just been adopted. But he certainly, according to this note, didn't go into any real"detall about it. Senator Tower. Well, here again, I'll read this to you. "Admiral Burke suggeated® -- now this waa in response {to Mr. Dulles's report that the plan to effect the situation i ‘in Cuba was being worked on, Admiral Burke's follow-on comment ; i ywas “the suggestion that any plan for the removal of Cuban : leaders should be a package deal because many of the leaders * around Castro were even worse than Castro." I would assume that that refers to Raul and Che Guevera. Mr. Gray. Yes. Senator Tower. So it would appear to me from that that Mr. Dulles, if he went into any detail or at least it was understood by Admiral Burke that the kind of plan being worked on to effect the situation in Cuba had something to do with the removal of Castro, perhaps not necessarily by assassination but nerhaps by other means. Then again, over F in numbered page 2, Exhibit 3, in the Special. Group -. this is a memorandum for the record -- a Memorandum for the Record, numbered page 2, Item 6: “There was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevera should disappear simultaneously." So this says to me that at least there was an awareness and at least some contingency planning going on, I suppose TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET i junder pulles's direction to effect the removal of Castro i | BOMe means and those around hin. Mr. Gray. Well, in the first reference, which is the Onone (Area 202) $44-6000 National Security Council meeting, he actually said that there was a plan being developed and Admiral Burke apparently said well any plan should be a package deal. “Later on Admiral Burke again is expressing his opinion that the removal of Castro by whatever means might result in a Communist takeover. But let me remind you, please, Senator, that these meetings were either the same day or one day apart, and I have already said that I don't know whether that four-point program Was in existence under preparation or had been adopted. I just would have to see the date of it. But I don't think you'll d 2 « a € fe} & « g find it. Excuse me, sir. Senator Tower. Sure, go ahead. Mr. Gray. I don't think that Admiral Burke knew what was in any four-point program at that time and I think he was just expressing his own observation. Well, if you're 20004 making plans these are the considerations that I have in mind. Senator Tower. Well, a four-point plan, as ft remember J Wartangten, OC. you reconstructed it, included economic sanctions, propoganda aT broadcasts, the training of Cuban exiles as guerrillas, I suppose, and what was the fourth? 410 Faest SteWet, Mr. Gray. I think it was sabotage. TOP SECRET
borepne [Atee 207] 544-4000 = « a € z « z RE Waateratee DEM banat Gteeet, TOP SECRET Senator Tower. Sabotage. Me. Gray. J think these are the four points. Senator Tower. But none of those contemplate political activity of the type that would result in the actual surgical removal of Castro. Me. Gray. Tf understand that. Senator Tower. These are less precise instruments of adversely impacting on the Castro regime. Mr. Gray. I simply have to repeat that I am reasonably certain on March the 14th Admiral Burke was not privvy to the plan that Mr. Dulles was referring to and that he was sinply expressing hia’ opinion that if you have any plan at all, it ought to take these factors into consideration that you might end. up with 4 Communist government Lf you don't watch out. And I think, well, I know t've already said thereafter there was a lot of discussion about 4 government in exile to avoid this kind of situation. My guess -- I have to guess that Arleigh Burke was just expressing an opinion when he was told there: was a plan being formulated. 1 don't know whether that responds or not. Senator Tower. All right, thank you. | Sénator Schweiker? | Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Gray, in the Special Group records that we are referring to here ~~ TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET Mr. Gray. Yes, sir, Senator Schweiker. Mr. Merchant is whom? He represented ‘whom for this Special Group? Prane (Area 202) 344-4000 Mr. Gray. He was a State Department representativa, Senator Schweiker, And Mr. Irwin represented -- Mr. Gray. He was Defense Department. He waa Assistant Secretary of Defense and for Security Affairs. Senator Schweiker. Now in your structure set-up at the Administration here General Goodpasture played a role. What was his role? Mr. Gray. General Goodpasture's title was Staff Secretary, Senator Schweiker. For the National Security Council? ‘ix. Gray. No, for the President, for the Office of the rd 2 < a ¢ z € z President, and that is a role which he performed. -Now this wasn't a cover name, If you wanted a secretary yoy had to get Goodpasture to hire him, this sort of thing. He was secretary to the whole White House staff. He was also a trusted confidant. of the President, a distinguished military as then, and subsequently, he was an unusual sort of man and I think this is not irrelevant to your quastion, he for example, though it's not ganerally know, has a PhD. from Princeton, as well as being a four star general, and that is not a common: thing, The President used him, if I may over- simplify, for spot matters. If he wanted to get a message to the Pentagon or to the Joint Chiefs or perhaps even to Allen TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET -Dulles on some immediate issue or some immediate problem. My responsibility was more in the longer range planning. 1 had Ema {heres 207) 944 GOOD the National Security Council and its related machinery, which was a planning board in the OCB. Senator Schweiker. Was there a staff to direct over? & -Were you a staff director? Mc. Gray. My title was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and by statute there is an Executive Secretary, and his name was James Lay, James S. Lay. Now the cause of the potential difficulties in having two men dealing in somewhat the same field, it was the practice between General Goodpasture and me to keep each other fully informed when any of our activities impinged on the « ‘ € « $ activities and responsibilities of the other. I thought this was a good way to operate the White House myself, but it did require two men of goodwill and mutual respect or it wouldn't have worked too well, as you can guess. So if I can oversimplify -- he was the spot man and I was the long range planning man. Mr. Schwarz. So you must have had a good working relationship. ; Mr. Gray. Well, sir, I'll say publicly, because you might have him in as a witness, if somehow he could get nominated for President, I would vote for him. I don't know whether he'd say the same about me. TOP SECRET
bree (horea 207) 544-4009 « & 4 < ¢ TOP SECRET Sanator Schweiker. Well, f understand that John Ziaenhower, in the last couple of years of his father's administration, also worked either with, maybe with General Goodpasture in some context. Is that correct or not? Mr. Gray. Over in the White House? Oh, yes. He worked for General Goodpasture in the White House. Senator Schweiker. Would he coms into areas ~~ wall, would either General Goodpasture oF John Eisenhower come into that kind of Special Group situation? Mr. Gray. Thank you, because I should have explained this. Ficst, with respect co General Goodpasture, he was always invited to sit with the vational Security Council as an observer, . \ not as a participant, and genecally did. So he Knew what was going on in my field in that way. John Eisenhower, never. . When some, usually when some covert action was approved by the Forty Committee, I would inform General Goodpasture that if it was of sufficient importance for him to know about it. | Never John. What General Goodpasture informed John of I don't know, but Goodpasture was not a representative of the Special Group and neither was John. He never attended the Special Group meetings. Senator Schweiker. Goodpasture did not attend TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 384-6000 WARD & PAUL A10 Fast Street, $.£., Wastinatan, D.c. 20003 Tape j7 e ray 4 “TOP SECRET woe John: did .good iatalf .workwi it will have sboheayahe as ipot at. th il NSC or Special: Group level in terms of his activities«:.t. | | am not sure, Senator, precisely what he da. 4 He says in the letter he wrote to you, Senator, recently, it think, offering -~ Senator Schweiker. Yeah, he wrote a letter to me. Mr. Gray. Weil, it was in that letter I think he said hat Goodpasture and I were both -- well, I'm not sure about Senator Schweiker. I think he did. Mr. Gray. I've got the letter up here. I have it here + if it's important. But he wanted Goodpasture and me to offer ‘our services up to this Committee and before I had a chance “to do so, which I would have, I had a call from the Chief 2: Counsel of the Committee asking me if I would come. So lI was able to write John that I was asked. TI didn't have to offer. Senator Schweiker. That's all I have. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Gray. I was perfectly willing to come before the Committee, eager to come if I could be helpful, and you would need not have issued a subpoena to get me here. The Chairman, Senator Morgan. Senator Morgan. “Mr. Chairman, I have just one question. Mr. Gray, We were talking about Robert Johnson, and as 1 twas thumbing through the book I noticed that under Tab U there TOP SECRET
is a memorandum contained in the ‘discussion of the National jSecurtty Council and it lists as being present a Mr. Robert H. Prone (Area 202} $44-6000 [ gonnson. the Director, National Security Council, Secretary. | ana he signed the minutes. : So I just wonder if that does indicate that maybe at times he did take the minutes? Me. Gray. Well, it certainly does indicate that he was 8 j there at this meeting, Senator Morgan. But again, and I may be | G mistaken in how many meetings he attended, and I'm already 4 } ij i ‘ 4 19 | on record about my trouble with having challenged him, but 1 11 4 would remind you also that this meeting wag in October and not 19. in the summer. And as far as I can understand from what has  peen reported, he only referred to attending a meeting in the WATTD & PAUL summer of 1960. Senator Morgan. I just mentioned it to indicate that - he may have from time to time. Mr. Gray. I would have to agree with you. Senator Morgan. When you were the Director of the office oon8 of Defense Mobilization, did you resign the position when you > became Special Assistant? an, OC. Mr. Gray. Yes, gir. Senator Morgan. SO that position later was filled by- whom, do you know? mr. Gray. Well, at the time I left the Office of Defense TED Farst Street, S.A. Measbena Mobilization its responsibilities and those of the Civil TOP SECRET
Prone [Area Phy Sha sooo WAKER fe PALL . Weashionte oF 1G bast Street, 22 = Security Reso 58" TOP SECRET —. i | Defense Administration were moved imo ane argeniration, and 1 z l pelieve that my successor was Leo Hoig, a former governor of * lla western state, and I've forgotten which state. He had been : + ' pirector of the Civil Defense organization. Later civil : t fat e was transferred to the Defense Department, I believe, i |pefens : i 2 4 i + and that office became known as BRP. I believe it's still You gentlemen’ would know better than -I would. It's the Emergency ~~ well, anyway, it does emergency planning : { i ? || known as ERP. | ¢ ‘for relocation and so forth. : i 4 fea] ‘ | Lo So that started out by reason of being the old National il ureces Board which was created by the act that 2° ereated the Defense Department. te * The Chairman. ‘Are there any other questions? Mr. Schwarz. All right, the memo I told you that Senator Morgan referred to, that is a meeting of the National Security ~~ ' Council ana there's a lot of attendees listed. It doesn't c+. List the President. Does that mean the President wasn't there or was it a practice not to list the president? Mr. Gray. Actually, Mr. Schwarz, L take the position, and maybe I said this to you, really I am puzzled by this one to eo: which my attention has just been called because my view always l Security Council meeting without was that there is no Nationa the President. It is the President and Council. And I don't act it says here is the Secretary of State, of course. TOP SECRET g: “understand,
He would have been the ranking mamber of the Council presiding. lt'm sorry, you've got ma on this one. I cannot understand beacause I always have taken the position when I read in the Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 jipress today that the National Security Council says, or the i ; 1 iNational Security Council does I-take some umbrage because t il there isn't any such thing as the National Security Council a : This is why I don't think that we have the best organization 'possible to run our affairs today. But that is not the |“ subject of this discussion. The Chairman. Well, I'll tell you one thing about it, “Mr. Gray. It is no longer lean. 2 > « a € c & < z Mr. Gray. No, sir, I know. that and I know very well | | about that. But this is not the subject. May I go off the record? The Chairman. Certainly. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Gray, I have a couple of things that “came up in your meeting with the staff I neglected to ask you. Was there at some point during your government experience a . Veastongenn, B.C. 70002 2: i) discussion of killing Nasser, and if so did it lead to anything? I mean obviously he didn’t die from assassination. Mr. Gray. Yes, I'm glad to bring that up because I think S10 barat Street SE I got the impression I never heard the word “assassination" TOP SECRET (
Prone (Area 202) $44-6. a 2 < a € [s] « < z suton, D.C, 20003 SEL, Wat $10 Kaest Streee aor ee TOP SECRE used and that is not quite correct. I cannot remember which year this was but probably '58 or '59, at the time when Colonel | nasser was riding high. We were in the Planning Board of iwhich I was Chairman, reviewing an NSC paper’ which would go 1 i naturally to the President and members of his Council on the i Near and Middle East. . i And as we began discussions of this paper and views about what our relationships with and posture toward Colonel Nasser, “what should be this posture. And the original comments ranged ‘all the way from one side, let's bump him off, to the other “extreme, let's get in bed with him. And I mean there was a “whole gamut of expressions. Well, when we sat down to write the paper the word “assassination” or “bump off" or anything of that sort never - appeared, nor did “get in bed with him," although it's interesting that the CIA position at that time was that Nasser was tha ° wave of the future, that he would sweep across Africa and we ought to get rid of him. ‘The President's decision finally was somewhere between the extreme of getting in bed with him and of trying to limit his capabilities somehow. Having;left the impression perhaps t never heard “*assassination" mentioned, I'1l guarantee it never found its way into print in that paper and it was never offered to the President as an option in that Middle East paper. Mr. Schwarz. Well, is the point it didn't get into print, TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 207}. $44-6000 a < a € € z OOO Ss. ate by Wasterregtacre, tra. Straet Aya bast ‘TOP SECRET is that the only point you can say about Nasser? Mr. Gray. Well, nobody seriously after the first discussion, nobody was putting forth that as an alternative. f . i Io am not sure that answers your question. i | Mr. Schwarz. Well, itis better, i think, than saying it idn't get into print. Mr. Gray. All right, it was not pressed. Mr. Schwarz. pid you hear of any gather discussions of lassassinations? il | | Mr. Gray. Yes, there's one other I mentioned te the staff | and I have forgotten. Can you refresh my recollection? Mr. Schwarz. Yes. Was it a discussion when you were i . iwith the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board? Mr. Gray. Oh, yes. A former member of that Board, whom (ir would just as soon not identify because I don't think it's important to this Committee, when the DCI would appear before it ‘the Board and we would be brief on Vietnam, on various occasions iH : ‘this member of the Board would say, have you given any ‘consideration to trying to bump off the leadership in Hanoi? ‘And i was never sure whether he was being facetious or not’ But in any event this was his question and the DCI would il, ; gust shrug. So wa'd come back to another meeting a couple of months ‘later and he'd say, have you yet given any consideration to y bumping off the leadership in Hanoi? And the OCI would just shrug. \: | TOP SECRET
aq - a x Prone (Area 207) 944-6000 a 3 < eS a s z < z an OE ALO Ferst Street, SF TOP SECRET And I think the fact of the matter was the DCI didn't feel he had the capability. Certainly he never responded affirmatively to this question. And 1 believe those are the two times that I really have | heard somebody seriously advocate at some point assassination, and when I say ,how serious it was, Lidon't know w*.. nothing, I'm sure there was never any: planning to it. Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear of the term Executive Mr. Gray. Well, I had not heard of the term Executive | Action that I recall until one of the counsel of the Rockefeller Commission asked me this. No, tam sorry. I can't be more ? accurate. Mr. Belin, in my pre-appearance conference, asked me '¢¢ [ knew the phrase Executive Action. I told him, I said Ie never heard of it and I asked him what it was, and he said, well, it was some sort of, not a program but a procedure or ' something for bumping people off. I am not even sure that “that phrase was coined as early as the Eisenhower Administration. I don't know -~ do you know? Well, the answer is I don't ‘know. The Chairman. Senator Schweiker? Senator Schweiker. Maybe this was covered because we i went back and forth but ~ don't want to be too repetitive. the National Security Council minutes of September 21st, TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET under Tab G, Mr. Gray; lists the White House Staff Secretary 2 {as being present, and I gather that would be Mr. Goodpasture. Mr. Gray. General Goodpasture. Prane (Aree 202} 944-6000 Senator Schweiker. And then it says the Assistant White I: - || House Staff Secretary. Might that be General Eisenhower? i Mr. Gray. It might be. 1 Senator Schweiker. But going on to the minutes, on page 15 of that document,:-the last sentence of the first paragraph on that page: | | , i i "Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo | for the momant but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained i ° “a grave danger 4s jong as he was not disposed of." oak i Do you have any recollection at all of that conversation? wae) & PAUL Senator Schweiker. Senator, I remember now. As 1 said earlier there was a great amount of discussion in the i * National Security Council about the Congo. That is, we spent a great deal of time discussing it. 1 don't precisely remember this briefing, but certainly 1 have testified here today and the documentation shows that Tree t wa, OC. cwe were opposed to Lumumba and I remember the name Mobutu, -and I cannot remember Our relationship or concerns with him. a Senator Schweiker. I would like to ask the counsel if we nave a record of these minutes? . Mr. Schwarz. If was going to ask Mr. Kelly. Did this Aye saat Street, tek ' come from Abilene? TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202} $44-4000 WARD & PAUL 20004 . Wastenaton, OC. B10 Fest Street, Sf Mr. Kelly. Yes, all National Security Council meeting | | i minutes come from Ablléne, They give us only the portions relating to -- ii Mc. Schwarz. It is relevant. Mr. Kelly. Well, :- Ti told. them to give me the first jpage, whether relevant or not, and now we'll get the signature ‘page, whether relevant or not. | i ‘ Senator Schweiker. I was wondering whether General ‘Johnson kept the minutes of that meeting. in Mr. Schwarz. General Johnson was the one we had with : General. Taylor, and this. is'Mr.. Johnson. The Chairman. It is very difficult to read that sentence, the one that Senator Schweiker has pointed out: “Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave _ danger as long as he was not disposed of." It is hard to read that sentence without at least construing it to mean that Lumumba was still alive and until he was no longer alive, he was a danger. Senator Schweiker. What was the time sequence, if I might ask the counsel, of the meeting that Bissell had about -disposing of Lumumba? When did that occur? . Mr. Schwarz. The fall or the summer, Mr. Baron, October-November. Senator Schweiker. Of that year? TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 4 « a € c z «< 3 ALO Borat Steeet, S&F, Waste ‘TOP SECRET i ‘ Mr. Schwarz, Of that year. There's no doubt about that. Senator Tower. That might be reading too much into it. ' Tt doesn't nacessarily mean until we dispose of him. He could pe disposed of some other way. Mr. Schwarz. Senator Schweiker, I am told -- it The Chairman. Can you interpret that sentence for us? What in your judgment did that sentence mean knowing what you lesa about policy atithe time? | Mr. Gray. I would have to study it a little more, senator. Senator Schweiker, I think, has quoted the last sentence iin that paragraph, which says that Mobutu appeared to be the lotsective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was “not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long a8 whe was not disposed of. | ‘Mr, Grayl. I have already testified we were after Lumumba, and as I say I remembered the name Mobutu. I have also testified ‘tnat the situation was fluid and chaotic. And as it turned ‘out, I think, finally we didn't do anything. The United Nations ‘was put in charge of it. Mr. Schwarz. How do you construe the words “disposed of"? Mr. Gray. I put it in the same category as "get vid of, *“eliminate." You see, it says eaflier that "a recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed." That's up at the top of “ the page. There's no suggestion that we had attempted TOP SECRET
Q e Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 a o WAHOD & FAUL AL Forst Gteret, Gb, “TOP SECRET 1 tan assassination. Mr. Schwarz. No, it had never been suggested. But does that help you interpret the language about Lumumba, disposing ii} hoff Lumumba? ti it ‘i Mr. Gray. Would you ask the question again? 4 . Mr. Schwarz. You referred to the ceference to assasbinating + Lumumba athe failure .of that up abeve and-you! commented we. had 8 pothingito do, with it;.and::I-:said- there wae noiailagation we.did. g put I ask. you whether those words about Mobutu help you | | | interpret the “disposed of" language about Lumumba, or are * they irrelevant to the interpretation of "dispose of"? Mr. Gray. well, t will simply repeat that. Zt was not “my impression that we had in mind the assassination of Lumumba. The Chairman. If there are no further questions, Mr. » Gray. we appreciate your testimony. Mr. Gray. May I make some concluding remarks. They are rather brief. The Chairman. Yes, certainly. Mr. Gray. Pirst of all, let me say, sir, that I have . been treated with the utmost courtesy by counsel, staff, and .: by you and your Committee, and for this I am grateful. I co. ‘have appeared before a lot of committees and this has not always been the case. And 1 appreciate the opportunity to appear. And I hope you will permit me some personal, but not TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET | "unimportant observations. : I hope that you will complete your work as expeditiously Vas possible as I feel very strongly the need fora viable Prane [Aree 207) $44-6000 Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within its charter. I believe that the present furor about. CIA is _impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it ‘is able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the better our country will be served. I believe that we will continue to need effective, intelligent collection and analysis ‘ for our policy makers and I think there will be occasions when covert activities should be undertaken in the interests of our national security. Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that a > < a e 6 « < E 4 there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that it is improper -- with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, while at the same time people seem not to be equally concerned about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country, vespecially through its very many KGB agents who are here. I would hope that_a Congressional Committee would be interested enough to investigage this most serious matter. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Gray. Mr. Gray. Thank you for the courtesy. The Chairman. ‘Thank you. “ ‘The hearing will recess until 10:00 tomorrow morning. AUG Feest Street. SE, Wasty (Whereupon, at 5:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned, TOP SECRET
to reconvene on Thursday, July 10, 1975 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.). Phone {Aras 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL ¢ ° 6 a g fo} e & é s 3 w a c rf a z “ c @
wre. [ee re 3 November 1960 6-5 Grey by | | MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Minutes of Special Group Mecting, 3 November 1960 Messrs. Merchant, Nouglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell, nsdale 1, Guba tne . Mr. Gray inquired onc é e status of planning for problems which would arise Mo. Beorebant said he would check into the pro sent group which has becn charged wits g : s on this matter. From thi the entire conce supporied bY Me perhaps thin of the type Mr. Dougla d to the extensive pro cited the mat rms from the Soviet bloc, and hr. on the incrcesi effectiveness of Castro's measures to control population in ¥ hich the Communists have developed so wel latter said 3 hers in whe State Department had originaby thought would cevelos within Cul dt this cou exiles ence? more and raore t deprivations Be- ig actually work foresaw Unt shore inter venuas would not v expresse gituatiun with wy: M pparcery ~~ ; : . 4 tas nT,
intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that ehould Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war, Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed_on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this-very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completcly understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agrecd-on response. Mr. Merchant stated thar, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. iby this he meant that it is not logical to conclude that an incigenous uprising is impossiblé and yet that it is feasible for the U.S, to goin overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by 2 hostile populatien and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria. Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala ind the increase of the program, which has been brought about by the increase of the Castro regime, Atl snembers of the Group expressed doubts as to Whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Merchant said at one point, that although this docs not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best pessible case for overt intervention. Mr. Gray suggested that th ion | be put up to his associates at the same lime Tibet is discussed. erchant agreed that this is where it should vp, 1 ased Pun is not prepared fthe vossibilitics tt to move in that direction untila s ef keeping operations in th 5. In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refupec organisation - cither an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations. eee Oy
Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable. Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. / “te gaid that without these three the Cuban Government would be / leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly cangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultancous , action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion ia havand aur eanahiliries, fic enes eer tek ga d peneeriy ee THE WHITE BaULE GE ut
HW 50955 Docld: 324239433 NR dtie & > eed ek ed Deeg +4, Supply Drops - Cuba e Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication had been canceled decause still planned, anc assumed from the DZ, and the of weather. _that the Group had no objections. Escambray operation He said that these missions are The members so signified. Ws, U-2, Cuba Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 20%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a riority basis and tha time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to the missions required to extend the coverage. some make yecommendations for Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was 21 not be availiable to discuss Tre other is him since ke "would certainly this kind before the middle cf next to nave the same reaction. V6, to week, Policy Consideration Re Cuban F>» Feiss = Mr. Gray said that Assistant A to him afier his meeting with Col. & Holman. He had representatives, and the arran said that the infor necessary, were entirely satis that a problem remains with resp that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handlisg of Cu other than those uncer the direction of be to have tae discuss arrangements for Parrott gave lr. Merchant the ancy
ti yee ct, is subje on th on 20 October 19 ay st Led ne spy et & i fe) oe a < Re < Wy q S Ee fat fee eet TS etas PaEEETS bra
bd DECH: HS DOR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 3 November 1960 ey 6 e = // & Crew b, fF MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Nouglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell, Gen. Lansdale , . JS 1. Cuba nt og : . more as to the status of planning for Castro. Mr. Rorchant said he Mr. Gray inquired once roblems which would arise po 5 t- k into the progres f the State De par rument group which ~ developing = ecommen ncations on this matter. P forts ee .farchant, pernaps thin ; of the type © Mr. Douglas re extensive program ot the militia, cited the matter of arms from i e Soviet bloc, an dodir, Merenant awe on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in wa ys s which the Communists have developed so well. T latter said that ac and others in the State Department had originally thought that a sopular rebellion S would Gevelop within Cuba and that this could > 2g i the comparative: iy small- seale efforts © seules unde? ‘ jow the same poo: » are beginning to ieel more and more u tespite's! wrous Cefections and the deprivations Qe: : : is actually woreen: hant seid wnat he foresaw U.at there . ond which covert intervention would not do. the j -eupressed the © situatiun Withoes the use of PHOFLELY an THE WHITE files 508 \enerree
intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo thie would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive ata top-level decision on this very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response. Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that itis not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met bya hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria. Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N, investigation ‘in Guatemala and the increased scope se of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength sc of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to Whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent @ final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; thatis, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intery ntion, Mr. Gray suggested that the ‘associates at the same tirne Tibe i that this is where it should en¢ up, t ; pth : ; 1 to move in that direction until a s: s 4 of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed. In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibuity of using a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to ‘backstop the operations.
Mr. Douglas said that.in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable. Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. “He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultancously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultancous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion ia havand. aur canabilities. a fe PROPER YO THE WHITE mgule & Sed 4 ,
+4. Supply Drops - Cuba Gen, Cabell e: «plained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because ef the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather, He said that these migsions are still planned, and assumed .that the Group had no objections. The members so signified. | “5. U-2, Cuba Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He centizued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that come time after the middle of next week we should be ina a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage. Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all htiw with him since. he "would certainly not be available to discuss anyth ng of this kind before the middle of next weck." The other rr. embers ppea to have the same reaction. V5 255 hia . Policy Consideration Re Cuban Fixile Mr. Gray said that Ass sistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and He had said that the information gives to hirn by the CLA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problems remains with respect to action the FBI should take; - that is, the FBil needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups. others than those under the direction of CLA. The Group agreed that the beet way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeaugley attend next week's Ssecial Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrett was asked to make arrangements forathis. 7 J 47. Value of Cuba to the USSR a Cape Canaveral Mr. Parrott pave Mr, Merchant ist of the OSI memorandum THE Wrist coke ween HW 350955 DBocld:327423433 Page 73
which had been discussed with the rest of the Group on this subject, a on 20 October 1960, ; Crraratt THOMAS A. PARROTT
3 November 1960 oe gS Crew bn, fF | MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting: 3 November 1960 Messrs. Merchant, Mouglas, Gray, Gen, Cabell, PRESENT: Gen. Lans dale / 1. Cuba a2 Mr. Gray inguired onc é of planning + for roblems which would ari ba chant said he would check into tne pr : : sroup which ine i ig matter. From the entire conce supported py pe s from th effec stiveness of Castro’ Vays which the rumunists nav others deprivalon® © sing ¢ i : ig actually : ‘ side. MM remnant foresaw UW.at ther . yoint ia time S peyond which intervention would not do mc fy, Gray € express 3 everbe ab Nelean up the yite (overt military forsee He sug pester the pos sibil iy of} sine Tac bac Lexiles to moust 4 : 7 ot excuse for overt pimulat EG attack On CGeantanarno pom ere me tes eos a cose pROrLELY 0 ree rm : ane ; Sranvar) Pe ee ieee THE WHITE flue. te poe ee coo .
Age ae sy ys Wee z cass > » 4? intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the peneral conclusion © . of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo comm — this would almost certainly mean war, Mr. Gray said that he had had See" the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in . order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. - He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely — understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response, Mr. Merchant stated thar, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's mecting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant . that itis not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out thar if Castro's support were such that an. 77 uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would .~ be met by 2 hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria. sc a -Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen, Cabell - outlined the general proposal to establish tases in the U.S., with the pews a reasons for coming ta this conclusion. He cited specifically, the ®@- possibility of U.N, investigation in Guatemala ond the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength Nea! c of the Castro regime. All imembers of the Group expressed serious ¢ Cc. doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. a Merchant said at one point, that although this docs not represent a s c final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal : | embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; thatis, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or i ener creer eA MLAS FH TEN, Wen EVRY AILS A PEMY La SN ERD elds F preparing to make the best pessible case for overt intervention, Mr. Gray suggested tha associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Af that this is where it should eng up, but ageerted that he t the decision could be put up to his yr. Blerchant agreed § not prepared to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed. In this connection Gen, Cabell mentionce the possibility of using a refugee organisation - either an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations. © | ree eee PROPrety os ef) Lith) THE we Wt Maen ue.
Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locationg that would be suitable. Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. “tre said thar without these three the Cuban Government would be / leaderless and probably brainless. ‘Me conceded that it would be necessary to act apainst all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed _. out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly cangerous in conception and execution, becausc the instruments must be Cubans. Ee felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultancous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion ia havand aur eanahilitian, pea ERY OF THE WHE ,
4. Sup ply Props - Cuba Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of spe ecified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified. “5, U-2, Cuba Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results ona priority bawis and that gome time after the middle next week we sould be in a pos ition to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage. Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middie of next weck." Tre other members appe to nave the same reaction. V6, Policy Consideration Re Cuban F Policy Conshae rn nm Mr, Gray said that Assistant Attorney Gene ral Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King & and Massrs. sterling and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CLA representatives, ‘and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those uncer the direction of CLA. ‘The Group agreed that the best way to attack this pr roblem would be to have Bir. Yers ley attend next week's Ssecial Group mec discuss the matter ats trsthand. Mr. Parrort was shed to sakes arrangements for this. mo, J 7, Walue of Cuba tothe US SRasia Rage Vis ot as ris Cape Canave rral iin — Mr. Parrott gave Mr. ‘yerchant the gist of the OSI memorandum year
vad & O o ia < Re < WY < < ar Q a on this subject, on 20 October 1960 SRE suber shee
Sp rty: uf the Dwight » Eisenhower Library, diilgne, KS March 14, 1960 Greg Ex dt MESORAN DUT SUBJECT: Discussion at the 435th Meeting , of the: National Security Council, Thursday, Horch 10, 1960 Present at. the 436th HSC Menting were the President of the United States, - presiding; lr. C. Douglas Dillon for the Secretary. of State; Mr. James ii. Douglas for. the Sceretary or Defense; and tie’ Acting Director, Office of Chvil and Defense Mobilisation (John S, Patterson). Also-attending “the ‘siveting and. yarticipating in- the, Council actions below. - were ‘the. Secretary of the Treasury ‘and ‘the Director, Burcai: _ of the Buds sate also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Atomic’ Energy Consniss ion; Admiral Arleigh Burke for the Chair- san, Joint Chiets-of Stall; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, UlSs “Tatormation: Agency; the Dirceter, Inter- - national Cooperation Administration; the Special Acsistants to tae Fresident for Rational Security Affaire, for Security Oper- ations Coordination, and for Science and Technolosy; Aceistaat Seeretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Bbetense John i. Irwin, Il; the Assistant White Houcr Start: Secretary; Mr. Charles. Waskins, NSC; the Bxecutive Secretary, RSC; and the Deputy. Executive Secretary, NSC, woe There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.’ : Le. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPENTS AFFECTING U.s. SECURITY Mr. Dalles ‘said he’ vould cover certain situ ons which nad developed during the avsence of the Preside america. Growing stzpjins had appeared in relavi rean.and the USSR. renian ‘Ambassador in sioScow, e-establishnent: ‘of normal “re betueen Tren Soviet Union, was suggesting that wir ishchev end hould hold-a meeting somewhere in urone. “insist. that. Tran must“ban all military bases s willing. ‘to go-no further than giving assurance 3 that he. “hd t-long.cr mediuni range. missile bases..t9 ye established ranian. ‘territory. Re | “canpatga: of “Soviet-y ssure against “is being intensified, ‘with Russian iradio. eracanda bezng Piched to’ play: on the nerves: of. the. ‘Shah. “by. Oz, zing “pidte hig life. Mr. Dalles felt there migh Se come (rounds celieving plots against tre Shan did.in i : exist. Balitiar bar} o a tO tng ete re nebrtatumessiens NO OBJECTION - - selease or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assasandiisa'Hetords NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Collection Act of 1992 ru 526) wena: MAP SHH WW 50955 Donlad: 32429433 Page 60
STUMP AL eta “aight be a des The National Security Council: Hoted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Iran; Khrushchev's trip to Asia; Guinea's relations with the Soviet Bloc; the Italian political situntion; Jepanese-Korean relations; and the Cubun situation. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA . ; WSC Action no. 2l05-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Action No. 2177) Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on the Planning Board dis- cussion of U.S. Policy toward Cuba. (A copy cf Mr. Gray's Briefing liete in filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum) . ae Mr. Dillon remarked that any threat to the safety of U.S. eitizens in Cuba vould probably develop overnight. ‘Te Country Team report that there was no hope of satisfactory relations with Cbs, while new, vas merely a confirmation of our asic current policy towurd Cuba. Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba. This objestive is not being renlized at the presunt time because there is no apparent alternative to the present sovermagnt in the event Castro disappears. Indead, the result of Castro's disappearance mignt pe a Comminist take-over. If Castro were successful io his effort to provoke us into intervention, the result would help the USSR, since American Intervention in Cuba wouid be considered in many parts of the world as-a counterpert of Soviet intervention in Hungary. Iv was becoming more and more - likely that the lew we originally planned to recomnend to Congress on sugar would not be passed; and indeed we may not now want it passed. It had been planned to recommend an extension of the sugar subsidy without change except for the provision that the President would have authority to meke changes at his discretion. Congress will probably now want to go further than this recomnendatioa. Mr. Dillon reported that up to the present time he had relt we should te cerefnl not to take actions which would have a serious effect on the Cuban people, but now he welieved we need not be $5 careful: about auctions of this kind, since the Cuban people were responsible | for the regime. If Castro continued his present activities, the results would be catastrophic throughout the hemisphere, whereas” & set-back to. Cutan economy as a result of Castro's actions ble development, gince it would show that Comsaunist- im of e a oes not pay. Our legal position with respect to %h Gsantanamo, Naval fase was firn. fre only basis for attack on cur’ position would ve the argument that the treaty was. impoged, on ‘Cuba: and that it was a very old treaty. However, if the mutter were . ‘ he i type activity ¢ a ° TOP SECRED
broucht to the UN, we would be in a difficult pouition because our posture is that we do net wich to keep a militury tase if the indicsenous coun vy does not want our base. There WeaG a certain sfinllarity between Guantanamo and Bizerte, where the French case is based on ie; ealities and our position is. that the yroblem is a political one. Hovever, we are Standing on legal grounds with re spect to Guantanamo, even though our position is a-diffier’s ore, uO Admiral Burke believed we had o legal right to stey in Guantanamo, which was a very userul training base. Cuontanamo differed from Bizerte in thet ve had been established in Guantanamo for a long time and there were no Cubans living inside the base ‘Orea., Cutting off the water supply would-be the only means of Cuban attuck against the Guantanamo Base. If “the water supply Were cut off, we could continue to Euipport the base by means of havy tankers, yerkaps even by installing plants which manulac ture fresh water from sea water. Admiral Burke reported ine cidentally that we had atrvempted to obtain water by drilling on the base, but had been unsuccessful. In Tract, we had feared for a time we might strike ofl. The 230 marines on the bese Vould be. able to hold it agaioss a Cuban armed attack. In Admiral ‘Burke's view, Castro may want ta provoke our intervention in order to lower U.S. prestige in ae America so that other latin American revolutions could be created. The Imtin Ane rican military men to whom he nad eaaied Tavored a strony U5, stand, Felt that the U.S, had exereised a vreat deul of reg traint bo for, are insisted thet we should not. ellow ourselves to- he ‘pushed Purthes. _ yoo Tne President said a certain amount. of pro- -Castro sentiment had been expressed by avall groups in the countries he had recently visited, His host Presidents hed labelled this Sentiment as Communist-inspired. On the trip he saw displayed some signs Tavo rable to Castro, but was aware of no demonstrations, “The Latin American Presidents nad counselled further, Corebesrance uy the U.S. in the hope nt azmhers of the -Orpvanization of American States woulu 5¢ potential. dancer in Cice and take concerted act re Jatin Amor ican Pres sidents, heow~ ever, had no fdea as to “how she situation in Cuba should. ne handled. he President had fugeested to then that now 1 not condone a situation which might result in frightening: U.S. rom Latin America. To, some extent vach country From action eseinst Castro ty a vociferous Centunist asked whether ii chould keep the ‘situation. constant survéill A ows * i ’ e cone e Council thas, in a icy tow ‘erd Cuca should ‘con isn to cntaneey the Liver or Ywnericeans forced to texke “action other than dip- ens were in dang ger, and we ought: ‘to BENSUS OF present po President living in matic ac Com ct a a ; et '.2OP SECRET rn
se VOperby™ or thio Dud ydit Ei genhowor Library, Mdleno,* Ky know what action we would take in such & continueney. Ye mivht finally have to use foree ir U.S. citizens were exposed to mob Violence. Admtrad Burke thought we necdea a Cuban leader Cound whom anti-Castro elements could rally. ite. Dalles calid Some anthi-Castro Leaders existed, Lut they are not in Cuba at The President said we might have another Black Hole cutta in Cubas and he wondernd what we do abenatt such a eatumtaon. kr. Dilion felt it would be neccasary to face that Situation when it arrived. Admiral Burke noted that ve had Ekans for insediate evacuation of the 10,000 Americons in Cuba, &5 well as military forces to put these plans into execution, Secretary Douglas WOs somewhat pessimistic about the possibility or evacuation, saying that someone was bound to get hurt during 3 The President remarked that,we could blockade island and say it is quarantined. Hic, Gruy esred whether and Petense should be directed to review contingency plans ding Cuba, ii. Dillon Said plans were being reviewed cone antly, but the airficulty was that all the contingencies not be foreseen in advance. Admiral Burke believed Cuba te dlockaded within two to three hours after the order was tie. Patterson asked whether econcaie Measures as such hurt Castro. fr. Dillon believed that economic measures Castro would not have much effeet in a short time. More- Stro would probably te able to counteract economic sanc- receiving whet ne needed from the Soviets. The President could nos do this if we tiockeded the 2Sinnd. Admiral ggested thet we should intensify oar propacanda to per~ OAS Gnd the Cuban people to Support our policy. The iding that we could do almost anything if we ee support of tre GAS, Mr. Dillon pointed out that the State LParticint was constantly endeavoring to secure the Support of the C683. Tne President Agreed with the sugrestion of Secretary Andér- Son that the Inter-Amcrican Bank should be uGed as a method of gaining the support of OAS countries, He added thats we should endeavor to think of ell possible ways of influencing Latin émerican countries to favor our pOlicies in Cuba. ir. Dulles repcrted that a plan to affect the Situation in Cusa was being Worked on. Admiral Bourke Suggested that any plan for the removal Cuban Jeaders should be a package deal, since many of the : The President had been very bitter ebout Gicvara. Secre. following story wus 60ing the rounds: When ever the Cuban rank, he had asked at a meeting z weether there was an economist present. Guevara cd his hand and Castro had appointed him head of the Bank. way out of the meeting Castro hed said to Quevara "YT didn't “ere on economist", and Guevara had replied, "Oh, I thought Ny a@ oa Conmnist TOP SECRET
Sporty: Of the’ Dwight " No 7 “vobisenhower Library, “ddidne, KS Ce eo, mo, cy March 14, 1960 Greg Ex tt A SEMORAN TULA ion at the 83th Meeting 2 ational Security Council, Murch 10, 19c0 ont at the 435th RSC Meeting were the President of the vi States, pe acsiding; Mr. C. Douglas Dillon for the State; Mr. James ii. Douglas for the Secretary ore ense; and the Acting Direetor, Office of Civil and ense Mobilization (John S. putterson). Also attending meeting and part? cipating in the Council actions below sere the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Burcau ov the Padget. Also attending tne meeting were the Chairman, Atomic Enerry Conmsission; Admiral Arleigh Burke Tor the Chair- san; Joint Chiers of Stale; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, Inter- navicnal Cooperation Admini stration; the Special Assistants to tae President for National Security Affairs, for Security Oper- ations Coordination, and tor Science and Technology; Aceistent retary or State Gerard C. Smith; Acsistant Seeretury of ense John N. Irvin, ID; the Assi White Ecuer Stare ryj Mr. Charles Haskins, f y Reccutave eeeretary, ad the Deputy. Executive Se NSC. woe There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken. l. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPVENTS AFFECTING U.S, SECURITY Mr. Dalles said he vould cover certain tions which developed during the ausence of the President in South Growing strains had appear ared in relations between the USSR. Intercepted messages indicated that tre  pnbassaaor in Moscow, seeing no further nope of the gblishnent of normal relations between Tran and the vars let Union, was suggesting that niu maghehev end the Shan uid hold A nuéting somewhere in pe i jSER continues insist that Tran must ban all wiliteary bas hle the Shah willing to go no further than giving assurance that he will ae mee Rake pe oy ct 0 EM PE sO mt Lf 4 ce] 3b permit dons medium-range missile pases we established . Tne campaign of Soviet aa against ngified, with Russian radio canda being the nerves of the Shah by ; « his ire. we, Dalles felt there migh ideving plots against the Sran did in? sou vanian ter fre bt TOP SECRET
Tae National Security Council: Yoted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Iran; Khrushchev's trip to Asia; Guinea's relations with the Soviet Bioc; the Ttalian political situation; Japanese-Korean relations; and the Cubun situation. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA ore nee (HSC Action Ko. 2165-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Action Now 2177) Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on the Planning Board dis-— cussion of U.S. Policy toward Cuba. (A copy ef Mr. Gray's Briefing Hote is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another, is attached to this Memorandum ) Mr. Dillon remarked that any threat to the safety of U.S. citizens in Cuba would probably develop overnight. ‘Tre Country Team report that there was no hope of satisfactory Felations with Cuba, while new, was merely a confirmation of our Vasic current policy toward Cuba. Our objective is to bring another government to power in CQuta. This objective is not being -renlized at the resent time because there is 7115 apparent alternative Lo the present veruagnt in the event Castro digappears. Indeod, the result of tro's disappearance might be a Comminist take-over. If Castro egsful in his erfort to provoke us into intervention, the esult would help the USSR, since American intervention in Cubs would be considered in many parts of the world es a counterpert of Soviet intervention in liungary. It was becoming more and more Likely that the law we originally planned to recomnend to Congress on sugar would not be passed; and indeed we may not now want it passed. It had seen planned. to recommend en extension of the sugar’ subsidy without change except for the provision that the President would have authority to meke changes at his discretion. Congress will probably now want to go further than this recomiendatioa. Mr. Dillon reported that up to the present time he had felt we should te cereful not to take actions which would have a serious effect on the Cutan people, but now he believed we nced not be so careful avout actions of this kind, since the Cuban people were responsible © for the regime If Castro continued hls present activities, the results would be catastrophic tarouwhout the hemisphere, whereas a set-back to the Cuban economy es 4 result of Castro's actions might be a desirable development, cinee it would show that Comsunist- type activity does not pay. Gur legal position wita respect to wh Guantanamo Raval Base was firm. Tae only basis for atinck on our sosition would be the argument that the treaty was. imposed on Cube and that it wes a very old treaty. However, if the matter were TOP SECRET
—oee © iphe ary, brought to the UN, we would be ina difficult porition because ow posture is that we do not wish to keep a military tase if the indiconous country does not want our base. There wes o certain simllnrity between Guantanamo ond Bizerte, where the French case is based on legnlities and our position is that the rroblem is a politicai one. However, we are standing on legal grounds with respect to Guantanamo, even though oar position is oa diffier’t one. Admiral Burke believed we had a legal right to stay in stanamo, which was a very useful training base. Guantanamo differed from Bizerte in that we had been established in Guantanamo for a long time and there were no Cubans living inside the base area. Cutting of f the water supply would be the only means of Cuban attack against the Guantanamo Base. If the water supply Were cut off, we could continue to fupport the base py means of huvy tankers, perhaps even by Installing plants which manufac. cure fresh water from sea water: Admiral Burke reported in- cidentally that we had attenpted to obtain water by Q@rilling on the base, but had been unsuccessful. In ract, we had feared for a time we might strike oil. Tne 230 marines on the base would be able to hold it against a Cuban armed attack. In Admiral Burke's view, Castro may vant to provoke our intervention in order to lover U.S. prestige in Latin America so that other Tatin American revolutions could he created, The Imtin American military men to whom he nad talked favored a btrony U.S. stand, felt that the U.S. had exercised a Ureat deal of restraint 60 far, ard insisted that we should not allow ourselves to-be pushed furthers. on a 1a Tne President said a certain amount of pro-Castro. sentiment had been expressed by snall groups in the countries he nad recently visited. His host Presidents hed labelled this Sentiment as Communist-inspired. Cn the trip ne saw displayed some signs favorable to Castro, but was aware of no demonstrations, The Latin American Presidents nad counselled further Corebearance by the U.S. in the hope that the members of the Oruanization of American States woulda rinaliy see the votential, dancer in Cube and take concerted action. The Latin American Presidents, how- ever, had no idea as to how the situation in Cuba sh handled. Whe President had suggested to them that 4 Situation which might result in frightens vrom Latin fuserica. Tos eep the situation in Cuba under constant surveil) dow it was the con- Bensus oF the Council that, : bh i ny at least, ou present polley toward Cuba should i be pursued, President said he did not wish to endanger the lives of Ariericans Living in Cuba, We wou @ Yorcved to take action other than dip- iomatic action if U.S. citizens were in danger, and we cught to. TOP SECREP
> eT aga yror the Duiphie ‘s ae ed yenhower Library, ileno,' KS know what action we would take in such o continuency. We might Finally have to use force ir U.S. citizens were exposed to mob Wiedence. Adintrad Bare thought we needed a Cubsan leader eround whom anti-Castre elements could rally. ite. Dalles caid Some anti-Caugtro Leaders existed, but they are not In Cuba at Present. The Presideat said we might heave unother Block Hole of Calcutta in Cuba; und he wondered vhat we do abut such a eavuntaon. he. Dilion elt it would be necessary to lace that Situation when it arrived. Admiral Burke noted that we had vans Cor imuediate evacuation of the 10,000 Americuns in Cuba, SS well as military forces to put these plans into execution. Secretary Douglas was somewhat pessimistic about the possibility of evacuation, sayine that someone was bound to get hurt during “ AN operation. The President remarked that ve could blockade Siand ani say it is quarantined. hic, Gruy esned whether and Dafense should be directed to review contingency plans ing Cuba. it. Dillon Said plans vere being reviewed con- ly, but the Girficulty was that all the contingencies not be foreseen in advance. Admiral Burke welieved Cuba te blockaded within two to, three hourg after the order was tie. Patterson asked whether economic meacur2s as such wut Castro. fr. Dillon believed thet econunic m asures wouid not have much effect in a short time. More- astro would probably te able to counteract econtiale sanc- f receiving whet he needed from the Soviets, Tne President tT #t sa err a BOG a Cy bw oe re BG; 7 ¢ fT) be pee te feo gh bg 4 a] = could now do this if we bicckaded the -Siand. Admiral igested that we should intensify oar proparvanida to per- ie O45 ond the Cuban people to support our policy. Tne nt agreed, eddins that we could do almost anything if we Support of tie GAS, ir. Dillon pointed out that the State 2 ne support of the The President nerecd with the Gugzestion of Secretary Ander- Son toat the Inter-American Bank should be used as a method of caining the support of OAS countries. He added that we should endeavor toe think of all possible wavs of influencing Latin American countries to favor our policies in Cuba. lr. Dulles reperted that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being edion. Admiral Burke Susrested that any plan for the removal wsain-leaders shoulé te a package deal, since many of the around Castro were even w rse@ than Castro. The President 2@ Argentinians had been very oltter about Gicvara. Secre. 38 going tne rounds: When over’the Cuban Bank, he had asked at a meeting ; there was an economist present, Guevara astro had apgointed him heed of the Bank, ig Castro had said to Suevara "I didn't “were An econo and Guevara had replied, "Oh, I thought a. Conumunist." oo oe ; HONG WAS Constantly endeavoring, to secure th ey % .
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wl’ the beipns J. Eisenhower mebearyy fs: te wet fe f. nt) ae yo. April 14, 1960 VOLlene, ks so eee sae Cray Ex / SUDECT: Discussion at the whist Meeting. 4 or the National Security Council, Tourcday, April 14, 1960 ent at the bbist ysc Meeting were the Vice Precident of - United States, presiding; Mr. C. Douglas Dillon for the eretary of State; the Sceretary of [efence; and the Direc- tor, Office of Civil ana Defenie Mobilization. Alao present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau * of the Budget. Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Starr; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special acelstants to the President for National Security Affairs (Items 3 & 4), for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coor- dination; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Saith; Aesia« tant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Huntiogton-: “Sheldon, CIA; the Assistunt White’ House Statr Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary’, | “NSC | S nae 6 Tnere follows a Summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken. Sena Gammempenennnene eee LOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY TULIOY SONARD CUBA Te (ESC Acticn No; 2loo-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos, e2lTy, 2191, 2195, 2201, 2206 and 2213) U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAI REPUBLIC (iSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2175 and 2212) . hire. Dulles said that Chou en-Lai's forthconing visit to new Delhi-represented a Chinese Coummanist elfort to restore cordiality in the relations between India und Cossunist China, & cordiality which had been shattered by the events of the’ Last year, including the border dispute,and the Suppression of the revolt in Tibet. Chou en-lai would be accompanied by a bigh-pevered hegotiating team and his expectations cf arriving “at a-settlement were Spparently high. By contrast, Nehru wae Skeptical about the possibilities of Settlement. Nehru was also under parliamentary and public pressure to make no conces- Sicns in the border dispute aince he had committed himself not 0 THIS DOCUMENT. O OBJECTION Ti ICATION AND/OR aos Ya] 9q5-. Fi DECLASS! SELEASE 0. The Department of State has no objection to the a release or declassification of this document ond ve ' tinder the provisions of the JFK Assassination Reco Bp NO OBJECTION ~ “Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526) NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL a iagan 2p 78 wd ( Qarwsn
Mr. Dulles reported that tn position continued to weaken and wholesale arrests ordered by Tru almost every prominent family in these arrests had broken up the had at the same time, wernkened th thought that further attempts HO Trujillo. Relations between the rapidly detertorating. Mr. Dull the attitude of the chureh in th different frac attitude of t iturttion tn a Aaninican Repub nternational Cinun eevernment has resorted to verio improve its Frecarious financial whether it was true that Trujill the world,with sore money than t Said this statement was true; Tr the Dominican Republic of £h00 m Erobably exnecarated and thirds. Secretary Anderson said in gold had beea recently renove Doninicun Republic and had been Dulles said he ation of the Dominican Republi not ad. 8 Pr, it appeared held $15 milliocn in eold and tha cChligutions; for example, a $16, nova Scotia s ed by the sugar hed alse drawn million out of Tnternational [4 Fund. Se national Monetery Rund's cealing mignt present e rroblem to the y had drawn so cach from the Fund future #2 million every 90 days of the Fund. If the Bominicens $2 million every 90 days, the cu U.S. Director should vate when t the necessary consultation with ‘ Ss Stagnant and 8 tye eure boxed re OW EV i ontimaing nis b pos Mr. Dalles,e @pyearently not realizing his early fall fron power an 1@ Dominican military. forces le excesses in Cubs and may T: a : . ur A h be radi ‘egalnst Trujills before the Docld: 32429433 should be scal bad a detailed r €,all the details of whic without cons Q 48 appar the Wis now Jillo last winte Dominican Rejublic, Trujillo's quite precnrious.: The | rohad affected the Domi nicailRepiblic.ALthough plotting against Trujillo, they e dictator's position. Mr. Dulles uld be made to kfih or oust Bevernment and the church were eG potnted out fncidentally that e Dominican Republic wag quite he church in Cuts, The economic lic was worsening. Ihisiness is cial sources are drying up. The us 6ubterfuges.in an attempt to position. Secretary cates asked’ O was one of the richest men in: he Dominican government. Mr. Dalles ujillo was reported to have milked illion, an estimate which was ed down by one-half or two- he understood that Pil million ad from New York banks by the . pleced in the Bank of Nove Seotia. #port on the financial situ- h he would Deninican Keyaiblic now t it had incurred a variety of milljon loan from the Bank of - crop. The Dominican Republic - @ $11.5 mfllion credit with the Cretary Anderson said the Inter- 8 with the Dominican Republic S The Dominican Republic now that it could only draw in the ulting the Directors should want to draw more than . estion would arise es to how the n@ Dominican Republic undertakes the Fund. ; that the 2 riefing, reported that Trujillo, ition, is not anticipating an ently not planning Plight. @ apparently been repelled by ve they will be compelled to act elements,which de gal pro-Castro e e TOP SECKET
Bo sce orn rence “eopury wa the UV LiL Jo Eisenhover Library, A®dlene, KS are daily inereasing in strength, take over the bovernmment. If there is a gap between the departure of Trujillo anit the estab- Lllshment of the new regime, the rudical pro-Castre elcacnts Ihisht have an Opportunity to selee power. If the army does not hold ovr these redical Glenents, a period of chugs might ensue . Mg es belleved that Trujlllo's downfall Might not occur — for weeks or even months but,on the other hand, the situation might become critical et any moment. We Viee President wondered whether the worst outcome of the situatton in the Dominican Republic vould not te a tuke- aver by the pro-Castro elements. Ie also wondered whether we were doing everything possible to support other elements. Mr. Dalles said the difricult question was that of leadership of moderate elements in the Dominican Republic. The vice president or the Republic might be able to assume power or the principal military officers might govern through a military junta. Many PYaninent anth-Trujillo Dominicans were din exile. Mr. Dillon said this sovernment was following the e{tuation in the Dominican Republic closely and intended to try to prevent cselzure of power by any pro-Castro group. This would involve working closely with the CaS. The Vice President believed that we could not let Castro or a pro-Castro group take over the Dominican Republic even if we had to intervene in corvder’to prevent such a takeover. Mr. Dillon felt thut in order to intervene we would need en invitation. The Vice President feared thut the old StOry wOb Leing repeated in the Dominican Republic; that ie, the pro-Castroe clement was the cnly minority group with Gtrong leadership and definite ob- jJectives., Mr. Dalles said there vaa a ercup in Venezuela which would like to move into the Dominican Republic and take over the governnest. Mr. Billion belicved the Castro element in the Dominican Republic was not strong enough to assume control of the government without support from Cuba. It was, accordingly, very important that the U.S. be prepared for rapid action. ‘The Vice President agreed that it was very important that the U.S., if necessary, take rapid action to prevent any move by Castro to seize power in the Dominican Republic. Mo. Dulles said the situations in Haiti and Venezuela were being affected by the situations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Betancourt, it is reported, has wmade.a deal with the ermy «hereby he will ebvandon government by coalition, will rule Venezuela with his own party Supported by the army, and will take action against the Communist movement. However, it is possible that the communiste know of his plans and may take action to thwart them. ; we wr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect to tne situation in the Caribbean. if @rujillo could be removed fron power in the TOP SECRET
Jedpur ‘ eA ‘tue way 0. Biyenhouer Libpa ry, \bilene, KS Dominican Republic while pro-Castro clements were prevented Pron seising pover ¢: & country, our anti-Custro Cumpaigyn Uhreuchout batio Ameri would receive a great boost. _ 'Paue View Grosident @ereed that gctting rid of Trujillo would be a Puvorable developsent vor us. Turning to Cuba ir, Dalles reported that a Senor Petencourt (Ma relation to Venesucia's Betancourt) had recently defected in Quibs und had told U.S. officials that he sees thru: possible oukesnen of the Cubsn situation: (1) the assaseinatlon of Cestro,; wasch Would make him a martyr (2) Castro's sulcide,which is 4 sibility in the event of failure and (3) a continuation of present trend, resulting ultimately in a sociuliot dictator- and a Batista- ~type terror in Cuba. Senor Betuncourt had that Castro was a warped personality and he hed accordingly ested that the U.S. ayeolnt a committee of three’ tu deal with hie = & Committee consisting or a psychologis t, a diplomat | and aun actor of the Orson Welles type. . A&A recent invitation ‘by Cuba to Honduren students end legis- ‘6 tO uttend the Conference of Underdeveloped mations indi- that Cuba is atandoning the concept of making this con- ence an official governmental one. Cuba appears to be pre- 1B tO establish diplomatic relations. with Czechoslovakia. sureer dGipiomat in Latin American alfairs vro as mexico had arranged for the shipment of Czech arms aArbenz revime in Guatemala in 1954, would protably: be -the antassudor to Cubs. Tne Cuban communists were increasing efforts to control the Cubun Labor Federation. ‘The Presi- S fetter to the Chilean students had received wide notice ta and elicited a favorable reaction among many people who ecoming disillusis ned with Castro. Cc ~~ O be 3 sic rer BO 8 C2 et oe ‘Cc co + c th d i ES Dillon thougnt the President's letter to the Chilean was very erfective throughout Latin AmeFica, especially 2. ° We nad rece y aries the attention of Argentina, nd Colcinbia : y act that a Cuben radio Station had itries “lackeys and elaves ous." : nacaro Taecility : a "oad nickel. This will ve « test case ‘Lecauce the yO day moreatoriuna on application of the Cuban export tim to iiicuro expired april 1. t will be interesting to see ether Cuba will apply ‘the tax and compel Khicaro to shut down. wetlon Guid it’ was his impresaion that the Cuban censorship teconing more and more eri ‘active, 66. thut it was increasingly icult to get the trun to the Cuban people. He asked whether dign would like to comment on this point. ; : TOP SECRET
by wt the pede J. Eisyunhower Library, KS \bilono, Mr. Allen said USTA had been discussing means of presenting factual infarmcion to the Cuban people. Hie aeency hod been Unda some pressure Crom U.S. newspapers und fembers ot Congreas on this potnt. Ghe Senate had recently passed 6 resolution allo-~ cating PlCd,COO to ve used by USIA to buy time on Florida radio stations for progrems aimed at Cuba. However, a conference com- mitece had refused the allocation of additional money, suggesting that funds already appropriated be used for the purpese. Studles USLA had developed two possibilities for getting the factual ermation to tie Cubun people One project would be a 500 ewutt mobile standard-wave radio station in Florida traonomit- is programs beamed to Cuba. It would take at leust nine months d pessibly up to-twenty months to put this project into oper- ion. A second project vas the proposal’ to fly an aircraft over:! Koy West for the purpose of beaming television proyrans into Cuva, probably on Channel 8. Vhis project could be put into Ss S$ bm ge Fa 7 PM et et “operation in obout cight weeks if the Navy would provide USIA . with oe Super-Constellation alreraft now being used on weather yatrol duties However, this project was fraught with certain cirfticulties. Yn ne Federal Communications Commnicuton,although it would of course cooperate if directed to do nu by.the KSC or the President, was ‘strongly opposed to the operation because it fearcd that the result would be a radio war in the Western Ilemis- phere. In any cese, FCC would like to be heard Vefore being directed by the USC to proceed. Mr. Allen pointed cut that if Mexico or Canada beancd programs to one of our cities from an uwircrart, we would te furious. A similar reaction mignt be @x- sscted from Castro. Morcover, if it became known tinut we were cadcasting on oa particular channel, Castro could shift his leviston stations to this channcl and jam our progruns. In ct, jumming is 60 easy that Castro might retaliate vy jancaing Other U.S. stations. So much for the technical difficulties of this problem. Tnere were other difficulties also. Pcaming tele- vision programs to Cuba from an aircraft would give Castro a plat- form from which to denounce the U.S. for television aggression. He could pose as e mertyr, saying he was a victim of the power- Tul U.3.,and ask other Latin American countries to rally to his defense. In the light of all these difficulties, USTA was searching for alternate means of getting factual information to the Cuban people. Cur short-wave broadcasts to Cuba heve been augmented. The difficulty with short-wave broadcasts 25 that ad . i : there are only about 150,000 short-wave sets in Cubs, most of hich were imported by Castro during his days as a guerrilla. : nt be possitle Yor USIA to buy time on local stationu in <a ror broneces tng Cuben programs. The most useful station Li6 -—purpose 15 one owned by lar. Storer, who io most cooperative sose Station has broadcast to Cuba on an experimental basis. radio stations do not wish to rent. two or three hours of good sing time to the USIA for Spanish-language prograns because are feurful cf lost ng their regular listeners. Mr. Allen con- ad by saying he would welcome guidance.on the USTA’ problem.
J. Bisenhower Library, \bilena, Ks. Me. Dillon wos inclined to think that any contrived solution such os broudeacting television programs (rom on air- crate would be less than productive in cur relations with Latin American countrics unless the operation produced a very definite dividend. ba. Allen sald it had been buyyested that we broadeast Big League baseball games to Cute since the Cubans appeared to be baseball fans. Mr. Dillon doubted that broad- canting baseball games to Cuba would advance our pulley very Yar. MMe. Allen said of course we would mention other newG in the pause velbveen innings ar the basebull game. On balance, Mee Allon ogsreed that while baseball broadcasting to Cuba iad some Attractions, it was not sufficiently dignified for o U.S. progren., Tne Vice President agreed that broadcasting from an airplane would be counter-productive; it would not produce enough benefits to compensate for its disadvantages. The Vice President had no objection to taking action which would be bit- “terly protested by Castro provided such, section would really” dumage the Castro regime but he caw no point, in taking action whieh would merely irritete Castro without productuy tangible benefits for the U.S. No doubt Castro would chorg: the U.S. with ageression if a U.S. broadcast prevented Cubaunn from listen- ing to his specches. Overt action-of this kind shuuld not be undertaken by the U.S. unless we are sure that it will result in great benePits to us. fhe Vice President wondered about the possibility of buying time on iamL stutions. tr. Alien said moot of these stations were low-powered stations altheugh there wes a Gpanish-languege station in Miami. The Viee Preoident thouzht the power‘ol the low-nowered stations migak ve increased. wrscAlien felt we should exjand our short-wave broadcasts, in- Vustigate the possibility of cvuying more time on locul stations, ete. He also pointed out thet the Internationsl Teleconmnications Conventions contained the principle that naticns wishing to broad- cast internationally should do so by short-wave and that standard wuve or television broadcasts should use only enough power to cover the territory of tie preudeasting state. The Conventions also contain tne principle that nations should not broadcast on standard-wave or television fron the high seas. Secretary Anderson wondered whether it woule not be more useful to expend available funds for the purpose of introducing more short-save sets inte Cuca ‘rather than to buy time.on local radio stations. Mr. Allen felt the introduction of more short- wave radio sets would be reasible.. Mr. Dulles said distribution or these 3 might present o problem but he would look into the matter. .@ Viee President said he understoca the, number of people in Cuba, disenchanted. with Castro was constantly increasing. ile wondered whether twenty per cent of the’ poyulation was disillusioned ith Castro by now. Hr. Tulles said disillusionment with Castro TOP SECRET oe, Pe
Sropoerty cf tho Ded slit ). Eisenhower Library, \bileno, Ks, had occurred principally amen the educated clasnes of the popaiation; there woe not mich evidence .of any change in the feeling «cf other classes for Castro. & change tu the senti- ment of the lower classes would only occur over 4 Long period or time, probably as o result of economic dirficultics. Mr. Datdes FYeper bed Ghuy Sune Cuban inberiectu.le woe.w bedi. be Droudearting to Cuba from Boston at night. It wau hoped that a gecond rudio station over wich Cuban refugees might broad- cust wrald be installed in five or six weexs. Mr. ilies then read Grea a report of the Secretary Generai vf the Popular Socialists (communist) Party in Cuba. This report indicated that the Communist Party recognizes thet Castro,us the leader of the revolution, can do more to promote communist aims in Cuba than enyone else. ‘Tne report indicates thut the commnists are keeping in the background in order not to mike difficulties for Custro in his international relations. The report declores- that the major vimo of communism ure being accomphiched in Cuba. It declares that Castro knows that he has the strong support or the communists, that he has said that anti-comunists are imperialist agents, that he has given the communists credit for creating during the last thirty years the anti-imperialist sentiment which made the revolution possible and that he has edmitted that the revolution could not have succeeded without communism. ‘The report declares that Castro and the leaders of his government consult the communists regularly, that communists are in ney positions 4n the army and in tne government, and that Q conmmunist-controlled Cuban goveroment could not make a6 much progress towards the aims of communisin 46 the present government is making. Tne Vice President said this report appeared to indicate that the communists feel they have the Castro government well in hand. Mr. Cates asked to whom the report was made. Mr.Dulles said apparently it was circulated among Cuban communists. The Vice President wondered whether the report could not be publicized. Ke felt publicity would be very effective in thig case. .Mr.Dulles gaid he would investigate to determine now widely the report had been circulated already. He would not want to publicize it'in such & way es to.uncover nis sources of information. The Vice President agreed but thougnt that if the report had been widely - disseminated, it would be impossible for the Cubuns to tell which recipient had passed it on. “te, ALien wished.to turn to the cituation in India for a moment.  #e said he -nad just returned Prom New Delhi and it was his imprecsion that: one ef Hehru's great aifficulties was his _ promise to yarliament that he would not negotiate on the border dispute until, the Chinese Communists had evacuated the territory
know what action we would take in such a contingency. We might finally have to use foree if U.S, citizens were exposed to mob Viedence., Admtrai Burke thought we needed a Cuban leader bround whom antl-Castro elements could rally. itr. Dolles said antieCastro agaders existed, Lut they are not in Cuba at The President vatd we might heave another Black Hole Jeutta in Cuba; und he wondered what we do obhentt such a son. fie. Dilion relt it would be necessary to face that . uation when it arrived. Admiral Burke noted that we had wediate evacuation of the 10,000 Amaricans in Cuba, a5 well os military forces to put these plans into execution. Secretary Douglas. was somewhat pessimistic about the possibility or evacuation, saying that someone was bound to get hurt during Suen an operation. The President remarked that we could blockade the island and sey it is quarantined. Mr. Gray esked whether Stave and Defense should be directed to review contingency plans regarding Cuba. io. Dillon said plans were being reviewed con= btantly, but the difficulty was that all the contingencies not be foreseen in advance. Admiral Burke believed Cuba ce blockaded within two to three hours after the order was i. Patterson asked whether economic measures as such t Castro. Hr. Dillon believed thet economic measures astro wouid not Nave much effect in a short time. More- cy receiving wnat ne needed Prom the Soviets. The President could not ¢o this if we blockaded the isinnd. Admiral suggested that we should intensify our propavands. to ‘per- the OAS and the Cuban poople to support our policy, Tne agreed, adding that we could do almost anything if we support of the GAS, Ide. Dillon pointed out that the State mone was constantly endeavoring to secure the support of the Tre President agreed with the suggestion of Secretary Ander- son tnat the Inter-American Bank should be used as a method of waining the support of GiS countries. He added that we should endeavor to think of ell possible ways of influencing vin: American countries to favor our policies in Cuba. Mr. Dulles reperted that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being Admiral Burke suggested that any plan for the removal an leaders should te a package deal, since many of the round Castro vere even worse than Castro. The President sentinians had been very oitter about Cucvara. Secre- soid the Following story was going the rounds: When over the Cuban Bank, ne had asxed at a meeting porters wievner there was an economist present. Cuevara Castro had appointed him heed of the Rank, woeting Castro had satd to Guevara “I didn't were an economist", and Guevara hed replied, "Oh, I thought a Conmmunist.”. TOP SECRET
SEAT) LA Tae Ca VPOpOPLY “OL che Deripiiy Ue Eluyenhower Library, | Do ; . ! \bilene, Ks rn April 14, 1960 .  MEMORAN US 7 Dee wp Le eo _ RAN Gi . Cray Ex Jt uy SUBJECT: Discussion at the hist Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, April 14, 1960 Present at the hhist nsc Meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; Mr. C. Douglas Dillon for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Direc- tov, Offlee of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting end participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau or the Budget. Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Speciul Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs (Items 3 & 4), Yor Seience and Technology, and for Security Operations Coor- dination; Aseistant Secretary of State Gerard C. caith; Auule- lant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. ituntington Sheldon, CIA; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary NSC; and the Deputy Executive secretary, NSC. Tnere follows a summary of tne discussion at tne Meeting and the main points taken. arr reenee A egretted that Mr. Gray would te unable sng 0f the Meeting but might ve able to re it ended. WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SZCURITY SCNARD CULA (ESC Action No. 2160-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2177, “2191, 2195, 2201, 2206 and 2213) U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAI REPUBLIC (SC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2175 and 2212) Hr. Dulles said that Chou en-Lai's forthcoming visit to bew Delhi represented a Chinese Comsunist elfort to restore cordiality in the relations between India and Conmunist China, & cordiality which had been shattered vy the-evernts of the 1ast year,including the border dispute,and the surpression of the revolt in Tibet. Chou en-Lai would be acc mpanied by a hign-pewered negotiating team and his expectations cr arriving at a settlement were apparently high. By contrast, Nehru waa Stepiical about the possibllities of settlement. ienhru was also under parlianentary and public pressure to make no conces- Slons in the border dispute since he had committed simself not TOP SECRET
Mr. Dulles reported that tn the Dominican Reyublic, Trujillo's position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious, Tne Wholesale arrests ordered by Trujillo last winter had affected hlmost every Prominent family in the DomintealRepublte.Although these arrests had broken up the plotting against Trujillo, they had at the same time weekened the dictator's position. Mr. Dulles thought that further Attempts would be made to Kill or cust Trujillo. Relations between the government and the church were rapidly detertorating. Mr. Dulles pointed out {Incidentally that the attitude of the church in the Dominican Republic wag quite different from the ettitude of the church in Cube. ‘The economic situntion in the Dominican Republic WAS worsening. Thininess is stagnant .and international finuncial sources are drying up. The Eovernnent has .resorted to various subterfuges in an attempt to improve its precarious financial position, Secretury Gutes asked whether it was true that Trujillo was one of the richest men in the world,with Bere money than ‘the Dominican eovernmncnt. tr. Dilles said this statement was true; Trujillo was reported to have milked the Dominican Republic of ghoo million, an estimate which was Erobably exagcereted and should be scaled down by one-half or two- (thirds. Secretary ‘Anderson said he understood that fh million — tn gold had been recently removed from New York banks by the Boninican Republic end had been pleced in the Bank af Nove Scotia. tle. Dulles said he had a detailed report on the finuncial situ- ation of the Dorinican Republic,all the details of which he would not read. However, it Appeared that the Dominican Kuepublic now held $15 millien in gold and that Lt had incurred a variety of chligutions; for example, a $16.5 million loan from the Pank of nova Scotia secured by the suger crop. The Dominican Republic hed alse drawn 37. million out of eB $11.5 million credit with the international Monetary’ Pund. secretary Anderson said the Inter- national Monetary Fund's cealings with the Doninican Republic mignt present @ problem to the U.S. The LDoninican Republic: now had drawn so mich from the Fund that it could only draw in the future #2 million every 90 dgsys without consulting the Directors of the Fund. If the Dominicans should want to draw more than $2 million every 90 days, the cuestion would arise es to how the was oo3 U.S. Director should vate when the Dominican Republic undertakes the necessury consultation with the Fund. , bir. Dalles,continuing his briefing, reported that Trujillo, apparently net realizing his pesition, {6 not anticipating an early fell from power and 1S aprarently not planning flight. Tne Dominican military forces have apparently been repelled by 2th cesses in Cuba and may belicve they will be compelled to act st Trujillo tefore the radical pro-Castro elements, which
vpopore ¥ wa Lhe owleiut Js Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS) are daily inereasing in strength, take over the government. If there is a gap between the departure of Trujillo and the estab- listwicnt of the new regime, the radical pro-Castro elements might have an opportunity to seize power. If the army does not hold orr these radicel elements, a period of chuou might ensue . he. Dulles believed thet Trujillo's downfall might not ‘occur Yor weeks or even months but,on the other hand, the aituation might become critical et any moment. Tae Vieco Preci{dent wondered whether the worst outcome of the situation in the Dominican Republle would not te a tuke- over by the pro-Castro elements. Ile also wondered whether we vere doing everything possible to support other elements. Mr. Dalle 5 Sald the difficult question was that of lea adership of moderate. elements in the Dominican Republic. The: vice president or the Republic might be able to assume power . or the principal military officers might govern through a military junta. Many pVoninent anti-Trujillo Dominicans were in exile. Mr. Dillon said this sovernment was following. the 6ltuation inthe Dominican Republic closely and {nténded to try to prevent celzure of power by any pro-Castro group. This would invelve worki ng closely with the GAS. Tne Vice President believed that we could not let Castro or 8 pro-Castro group take over the Dominican Republic even if we nad to intervene in order to prevent such a takeover. Mr. Dillon felt thet in order to intervene we would need en invitation. Tie Vice President feared that the old story was Leing repeated in the Dominican Kepublicy that 16, the pro-Castro clement was the cnly minority group with ctrong leadership and definite ob- jJectives. Mr. Dalles said there was o ercup ino Venezuela which would like to move into the Dominican Republic and take over the eovernacnt. Mr. Dillicn believed the Castro element in the Dominican Republic was not strong enough to assume control of the government without support from Cuba. It was, accordingly, very important that the U.S. be prepared for rapid action. ‘he Vice President agreed thet it wos very important that the U.S., df neceseary, take rapid action to prevent any move by Castro to seize power. in the Dominican Republic. les Situations in Haiti and Venezuela were being aft td n@ situations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Betancourt, it is reported, has made a deal with the army whereby he will evandon government ‘by coalition, will rule Venezuela with his com party supported by the army, and will take action against tne, con 15% movement. However, it is possible that the commnista plas and may take action to thwurt them, : hr. L + we “ir, Dillon said there was one favored le aspect to the situation in the Caribbean. If Trujille could be reciove ed fron power in the TOP SECRET
Sage ahh igss . : COPUREY oh btw udp Je Risenhover Library, ° \bilene, KS ; Dominican Republic while pro-Castro elements were prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-Custro campaign threuchout Latin America would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that getting rid of Trujillo would be & Yavorable developrent ror us. Turning to Cuba bi. Dulles reported that a Senor Petancourt (mo relation to Vonesueia's Betancourt) had recently defected in Quiba and had told U.S. officials that he sees thre: possible | the Cuban situation: (1) the assassination of Cestro, make hin a martyr (2) Castro's suicide, which is a in the event of failure and (3) @ continuation of trend,resulting ultimately in uw sociulist dictator- @ Batista-type terror in Cuba. Senor BRetuncourt had hat Castro was a warped personality and he had accordingly that the U.S. sploint a committee of three to deal with committee consisting of a psychologist, a diplomat. and r of the Orson belles type. A&A recent invitation vy Cuba to Honduren students and legis- to attend the Conference of Underdeveloped uations indi- that Cuba is abandoning the concept of neki ng this con- an official ¢ governice ental one. Cuba appears to be pre- stablish diplomatic relations with Caschoslovakia. Lorat in Latin american alfuirs who as cureur di iv mexico nad arranged for the Shipment of Czech arms regime in Guatemala in 1954, would protably-be -the ambassudor' ta Cua. Tne Cuban communists were increasing heir efforts to control the Cuban Labor Federation. Tne Presi- dent's letter to the Chile in Cure end elicited a fav ne en students had received wide notice orable reaction among many people who are becoming disillusioned with Castro. Dillon thougnt the President's letter to the Chilean’ 3 Was very ¢e7i ive througnout Latin America, especially 2, We nad ree y called the attention of Argentina, sd Colcispia to the fact that a Cuban radio station had calling the presidents of these countries "lackeys and slaves 32 U.S." Ga ay we ere planning to send a snip to the o facility in Cuba to load nickel. This will be e test case the yO day msrectovium on application of tne Cuban export O Hicuro expired-om April 1. It will ve interesting to see here Cuba will aprly the tax and compel hicero to shut down. Guid it wes his impression that thu Cuban censorship ning more end more errective, be that it was inorcasingly ‘. to get.the truth to the Cuban people. He asked whether aun would like to comment on this point. Co TOP. SECRET
Property ef the Dedy lit 2. Eisunhower Library, Abilene, KS Mr. Allen said USIA had been discussing menns of presenting factual information to the Cuban people. His agency -had been under some pressure from U.S. newspapers und Members of Congress on this point. The Senate had recently passed a resolution allo- cating $100,000 to ve used by USIA to buy time on Florida radio Stations for progrems aimed at Cuba. However, a conierence com- had refused the allocation of additional muncy, suggesting funds already appropriated be used for the jarpese. Studies IA had developed two possibilities for getting the factual carnation to the Cuban people. One project would be a 500 iYowutt mobile standard-wave radio station in Florida tranomit- ing programs beamed to Cuba. It would tuke at leuct nine months possibly up to twenty months to put this project, into oper- . A second project was the proposal to fly an aircraft over” 2st for the purpose of beaming television programs into Cuba, probably on Channel 6. This project could be put into operation in avout eight weeks if the Navy would provide USIA with uw Super-Constellation aircraft now being used on weather atrol dutles. However, this project was fraught with certain cirfieulties. Tne Federal Commnications Comnitulon,although -£¢ would of course cooperate 1f directed to do no by the NSC or the President, wos strongly opposed to the operation because At feared that the result would be es radio war in the Western emia phere. In any case, FCC would like to be heard Uclore being directed by the USC to proceed. Mr. Allen pointec wut that if Mexico or Canada beamed programs to one of our citics from an gircrart, we would te furious. A similar reaction might be ex- weeted from Castro. lMorcover, if it became known tnut we were sadcosting on a particular channel, Castro could enift his evision stations to this channel and jum our progruns. In , jomming is 60 easy that Castro might retaliate vy janmning .S. stations. So much for the technical difficulties of this problem. There were other difficulties also. Beaming tele-- vision programs to Cuba from an aircraft would give Castro a plat- form from which to denounce the U.S. for television aggression. He could pose as a martyr, saying he was a victim of the power: ful U.S. ,and ask other Latin American countries to rally to his defense. In the light of all these difficulties, USiA was searching for elternate means of getting factual information to the Cuban people. ‘Cur short-wave broadcasts to Cuba have been eugnunted. The difficulty with short-wave broadcasts +s that there are only. about 150,000 short-wave sete in Cubs, siost of witach were imported by ne stro during his days us u guerrille. ane be possivle for USIA to buy time. on local storviona in Por ronceasting Cuban programs. The most usurul station Tnis ‘purpose 4s one owned by itr. Storer, who 1a most cooperative whose station has broadcast to Cuba on an esperar ntal basis radio stations do not wish to rent two or three hours or good tening time to the USIA for Spanish-language pro ogreans because they are feurful cf losing their regular listeners. sr. Allen con- cluded by saying he would welcome guidance.on the USIA problen. oe
‘ t Property of the Dwight 2. Bisenhower Library, \oilene, KS. Me. Dillon was inclined to think that any contrived solution such as broadcasting television programs trom an air- erart would be less than productive in cur relations with Latin American countries unlicss the operation produced a very definite dividend. “Mr. Allen said it had been suyycsted that We broadeast Big League baseball games to Cuba since the Cubans apyearcd to be pasebali fans. Mr. Dillon doubtcd that broad- canting baseball games to Cuba would advance our polsey very far. dar. Allen said of course we would mention other news in the pause between innings of the vasebull game. On balance, Me. Allen ogrecd that while paseball broadcasting vo Cuba had some attractions, it was not sufficiently dignified for a U.S. progrem. Yne Vice President agreed that broadcasting from an airplane would be counter-productive; it would not produce enough benefits to compensate for its disadvantages. The Vice president nad no objection to taking action which would be bite terly protested by Castro provided such “ection vould really ‘dumase the castro regime bat he eaw ‘no point. in taking action whieh would merely irritate Castro without producti tangible benefits ror the U.S. No doubt Castro would chords the U.S. with aggression if a oS. broadcast prevented Cubans from listen- ing to his speeches. Overt action of this kind should not be undertaken by the U.S. unless we are sure that it will result in preat benefits to us. The Vice President wonderrd about the possibility of buying time: on hiiamk etations. Mr. Alien said nost of these stations wer: low-powered stations although there was a Spanish-languese station in Miami. fhe Viee president thoutht the power of the lew-powered stations might ve increased. we. Alien felt we should exjand cur short-wave broadcasta, in- Hae 8 vustigate the possibility of cuying more time on local stations, etc. He also pointed out thet the Internationel Telecommnications Conventions contained the principle that nations wishing to broad- cast internationally should do so by short-wave and thet standard wuve or television broadcests should use only enough power to cover the territory of the proudeasting state. ‘The Conventions also contain tne principle that nations should not broadcast on standard-wave or television from the hign seas. Secretary Anderson wondered whether it would not be more useful to expend available funds for the purpose of introducing more short-wave sets {nto Cuta rather than to buy time on local radio stations Mr. Allen felt the introduction of more short- wave redio set would be teasible. Mr. Dalles said distribution of these sets might present o problem put he would look into the matter. » Viee President said he understood the number of people in Cuba da nr ate isenchanted with Castro was constantly increasing. He wondered whether twenty per ceat of the population was disillusioned with Castro by now. Mr. Dulles said: disillusionment with Castro 1 TOP SECRET me PEt
oe epoporty eto tha Dedsht ). Bisenhovwer Library, \bilene, AS, had occurred principally among the educated clannes of the population; there was not mich evidence of any change in ‘the fecling cf other classes for Castro. A change in the senti- ment of the lower classes would only occur over a long period of time, probably as a result of economic dirficulties. Mr. Puides Yueperbed Uiae bull’ Cuben inber.cctule eubd, bUGi be Droadeastiny to Cuba from Boston at nipht.- It wou hoped that a second radio station over which Cubar refugees might broad- éust would we installed in five or bix weens. [Ar. Dulles then road Pre. a report or the Secretary General of the Popular Socialists (communist) party in Cuba. This report indicated that the Communist Party recognizes that Castro,us the leader or the revolution, can do more to promote communist aims in Cuba than anyone else. Tne report indicates thut the communists are keeping in the background in order sot to make difficulties for Castro in his {international relations. The report decleres that the major alin of communism ore being accomplished in Cuba. “Lt declares that Cantro knows that he has the strong support of the communists, that he has said that anti-communists are imperialist agents, that he has given tne communists credit for creating during the last thirty years the anti-imperialiset sentiment which made the revolution possible and that he has admitted that the revolution could not have succecded without communism. ‘The report declares that Castro and the leaders of his government consult the communists regularly, that commnists are in key positions in the army and id tne government, and that B conmunist-controlled Cuban government could not make as much progress towards the aims of commmnism as the present government is making. ‘ é Tae Vice President gaid this report appeared to indicate that the communists feel they have the Castro government well in hand. Mr. Gates asked to whom the report was made. Mr. Dulles said apparently it was circulated among Cuban communists. The Vice President wondered whether the report, could not be publicized. Ee felt publicity would be very effective in this case. Mr.Dulles said he would investigate to determine hew widely the report had been circulated already. He would not want to publicize itcin such & way es to uncover nis sources of information. The Vice President agreed but thougnt that if the report had been widely disseminated, it would be impossible for the Cubuns to tell which recipient had passed it on. Mts, alien wished to turn to the cituation in India for oO moment. Hg said he had just returned from New Delhi and it wos ~his imprecsion that one ct Netura's great aiffieulties was hie promise to yarliament that he would not negotiate on the border dispute until the Chinese Communists had evacuated the territory TOP SECRET
12 January 1961 - Lf FOR THE RE MEMORA “DU? , SUBJECT: x4;. , 12 January 1961 PRESENT: : Lewin, Dulles ; Mr, Willauer Outlined c JM 4 proposal to CStablish a OnSisting of Pep resentatives of State, ‘CIA, Defen @ ys draw up COnUneency Plans Covering: the POSSible eventual use of Overt ULS, forces, ; All members Mr, Gray as for the mee a task force S¢ and the Joint Stary ‘ a bjection to the : epartment of State has noo othe isi orine under sled les of 1992 (PL102-526) “AD Reviewedon Of 2 > __ , ils of the Cuban “irdrops plus On? cache, In anewer (9 4 Guestion, Mr, Bar Covernineut's capture of Mealericl) fro; ’ u / nes fave deta n two oe a, és NO OBJECTION cIL Ty COUN NATIONAL SE # WW 50955
“Docld: 324? 4 9, Dominican Republic Mer. Merchant explained the fecling o i 5 i : wpa ay et ahy that invited s arms and ot vi » U-e@ Fliehts - Vietnam Mr. Dulles and Mfr. Parrott outlined peneraily the results cf three seceessfu) -2 fliphts.over Viein et Vv am, noting that Hanoi bad ne: been covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a missica to cover that arca as so9on ag the weather permis. The Group agreed that no such ght should take place after January 20th. They also requested a brief memo s for the mecting of the 19 . fo mi ian tent May as . eis . LL tad Rothe ae f a nan e PHUPEREY recent ’
H DUM For THE RECORD 12 January 196] MEMORAN j SUBJECT: “4 , 12 January 196) PRESENT: Xpeay Irwin, Dulles 3. Mr, Dulle Goodpa * reported th “Cr to the effect that ETOUp reportedly Will vigit \ Yash / v5, Mr, Willauer Outlined 4 proposal to Cstablish a {ask force consisting of POPresentatives of Siate, CIA, Defense and t Os draw up ConUnceney Plans Covering the POSSible eve Overt ULS, forces, he Joint Start Atual use of All member Mr. Gr for 5 “creed that such Planning is an esscntia) Step, y asked thar a prelimi Y Yeport of the task force be available the meeting of “nuary 19¢h, ‘ a in Cuba In answer to a Gestion, Mr, E Ceverninent's cant Barnes fure of Materiel fr Ls Gave details of the Cuban om two airdrops uty e445 One cache,
Mr. that Limited available for dissic paid that we believe this can be manages securely the plan would call for final transportation ina 1 provided 5 rhe S Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott cuilined generaily the result three sucecssfu) U-2 fliphts.over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi bad been covered because of clouds, and tha that itis planned to fly a missica to cover that areca as’ soon ag. the weath fight should take place after January 20th. Sur ser permits. : The Group agreed that no such fi They also requested a brief memo summarizing result: for the meeting of the 19th. Sf J a eee were may coos aeeeenwag + ant u . eames orto ea Poona Pete a veh Lines ee eee oe OPHUPERTY OF, THE WHITE HOUSE Ur riit PH LIRR
MM “MORANDUM PO] THE RECORD Minutes of Special Group Meeting 29 December 1960 erchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Dom intean Republie 22d outlines of ertain lirnited covert lig emphasj {her is no intentio singe this Would 5 Ne-alsg e “Gud ne: : ¢ impr ] lew of mphasized that the Proposed desired result in the ne ar future, ujillo himself, Ikeking S ‘NE about the “(Poke apaingt Tr PeNtioned Pawley re “Should be m Minican Republic i Opcration, The “=CONSensus of the Group WS that this w itwas “greed that ry Ailes wha: the ¢ Ould nor be However, © plan is w im NoOin ventual ¢ mierchan: reported a brief fOnVersation he had had with Mates “ning. - The latter h ade two Points: ble tg Obiain the Cooper “AeTican Cevernn Possibte, i and Support of & "ments, (b) ie Would be desirable, if U.S. it break relations with Cub; in Concert with January 26th, adm SGine tlre before . , ena “saa | clomtene oe Dapauuer i State has no opjectiome rk iad acsiation otis dure inf | underthe Pent the JEK Ass walalees ~ Oe . 7 NO OBECHONT - FSC pay y Collection Act i . PHeeses Reviewed on URITY COUNCIL NATIONAL SEC sRITY PANG
INC POR THe RECORD ° Minutes of Special Group Mecting, 29 December 1960 » oie rchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Proceeding broad outlines of ertain lirn Trujillo rep: ited covert Aereed with the proposal a felt that it i 28 noted that ion j Dominican Republic i the Cuban ope ee ; f Ould nor be ® plan is wy deci this w However, dt wae Tereed that thy N no matter what the ¢ reported a brief cony 8 associates this morning, le to Obiain the sAerican me ’ €rsation he h would ‘i. WOME Lye The latter h COOpe ration veraments, (b) it wou relations with Cub ore January 20th, ad had with Ade two Points; and support of ld be’ desir a, Gesinad vidual Lai: awe, adm . to brea} able, if tne tre bef in Concert with
HY under the provisions of the JFK The Department ol State nas no onjection tothe as ean toe 4) ssification of this documentt ieeese or Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102- 526) 25 August 1960 Reviewed on “Peps Once MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles 1, Congo . Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later’ deséribed them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in PRO THE WHITE 0955 Bocld: 324249433 mounting an anti- Lumumba campaign ‘in the Congo. These included: operations through <aguruat Aime OEY AEE RE ala ci Har ti Sar aren mares ner stern the pianned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact witn an alieged ieader of certain independent labor groups. Hie emphasized that te latter Had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual, The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order, Mr. Gray commented, however, ‘that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and’ he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that.he had taken the comments referred to seriously and’had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily’ put himself ina position of interpreting: instructions of this kind within the pounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that, planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out, “consideration of any particular kind of activity which might contribute, to getting: ‘yid of Lumumba. auSUSSINeG —)O HAT DLERioy— Page 115
a ° outsta in n bility-or dr but’ well motivated. : Mr; Irwin asked whether there might be individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature ho could be useful. Mr. Merchant commented that 2 Africa is not a very substantial force. Te : but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate. e pth rete wan : ak Oo ad 18 onus : “7 piss | CORRE LO Pyss oc] ¥ TRE WHITE #9 Retenr ale & hte ee dere fd HW 50955 Docld: 324273433 Page 116
V4, Cuba  ' The DCL summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfilment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups as a tes {after this action had been cleared with the Snccial Group). tof its capabilities + We also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase. ° Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr, Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had nvo reservations that he would like Gray to look into, “One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with ‘the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence uit any elfective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, ‘Mr, Dulles and Mar, Bissell had mentioned a number of such proups. ) ; The second point had to do with a fecling that-we might not & . oe ‘ne vepartmient ons ale ngs qgnection tothe is +, fal deci skein ct is document in full NO OBJECTION Oran Certo oe He JP Ss on Records NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL giohe Tce Collection Act of 1992 Pug se8 Kk PE “Jeviewed on to
HW 50955 Doct Jenove enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, deal about the _~and would take that opportunity ideas of Chene particularly.as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration , property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had > pointed ont thar ihe brente is composed of people who have broken with Castre, ai ieast-on the basic philosophies. ) , In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first Parrott told the Group about last Monday's mecting with Mr. Macy, at which Mr, Barnes had covered in considerable detail. Cuban project. ‘He said that he was ata loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr, Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that-our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the ' point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question \/ - to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the ‘ec numbers of disaffected individuals within the point, Mr. all aspects of the » for CLA to attemep participation of iar country. On the second point, Mr, Dulles said that we do know a good asic political sympathics of Frente members, and cited 4s an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups.. He said that the Frente had issued a’ statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as being to preserve the principles of the revolution, He said that as to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr, Stans! point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future’ to discuss these matters further, a5 appropriate. Bor. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political duals must be constantly assessed and must be clearly estallished before the operation actually comes off, He however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically- screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD. iis particular stage it would not be practical added, torether, and ihatat tl b ’ 4 v coe - e per _ Peer. e Page pte gt ghee toe Cee Tht tere tyres supett ae Net Do ke Mec 2 OTRPAWHELL Given he hee ce che § pel ee
HW 50955 Doct - necessity for making continge pelling out of individual or group to insist'on a more precise views. Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that» Macy that it would be given lanning group. This was a support - fiscal and otherwise - point which Afr. Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure adequate attention by the interagency p concern expressed as to planning for the of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn of the presentone, Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the ney plans of this sort, and had in fact directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up. A THOMAS A. PARROTT wah 0 ae ph eee e
25 August 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Mecting, 25 August 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles ‘1, Congo Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lincs that we are following in mounting an anti- Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of no comiiGence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact witn an alieged vader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing ides and capabilities of the individual. _ The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, ‘that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself ina position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability, It was finally agreed that, planning for the Conte would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kina of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. ~. lrwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have piven thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West, In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment whica had been made of the Nepro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the ausessment being that the individual in question is a man of not pROPLE EY oe : THE WHITE pues.
Palais ; S buethat he is obviously r there: might be other sser, stature in the church . “Sutatanding intelligencoyvability or drive well motivateds? Mri Irwin asked whethe sndividuals.of similar, although naturally le hierarchy who could be useful.” See meee does a e ey we Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, put added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate. e OR USDA } pers e : | Noy “ i . t i 4 . 1 ar i t 4 . . i Mf . . — o Lae . Probe it
V4, Cuba _ * The DCL summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups asa test of its capabilities (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group). 2 He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready te operate by November, In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase. = Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that he would like Gray to look into. *' One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his dincussion with CLA representatives in connection with the latest’ withdrawal frum the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had 5 answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr, Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups. } The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not PRUPLYAT ()t a THE WHITE nuusi UETICe reer ny e i Levvin f
HW 50955 Docld: -to assess their apparent leaders. Mr, know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, their attitude toward restoration particularly as to basic freedoms, of seized American property, ete. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had pointed Gut thay the trente is composed of people who have broken with Castro, ai least on the basic philosophics. ) attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with Mr. Macy, atwhich Mr, Barnes had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was ata loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had devcloped at considerable length - the thesis that our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify. such groups and Parrott said further that the point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out-of the question -\/ for CLA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the umbers of disaffected individuals within the - In an participation ef large n country. j r. Dulles said that we do know a good On the second point, ympathies of Frente members, and eal about the basic political s the position that h cited ag an example ad been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as being to preserve the principles of the revolution, He said that as_ L to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this it would give the Frente the appearance was thought to be unwise because of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans! point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future 60. hese matters further, as and would take that o yortunity to discuss ¢t PE appropriate. Parrott said that there was no disayreement that the political Sadividuals must be constantly assesued and must be before the operation actually comes off, He added, however, thatit should be borne in mind that once these politically-sereened individuals had issued their general statement vr primary operational task has been to hold the FRD it would not be practical hor, ideas of thene clearly established of objectives, on together, and tiatat this particular stage } foe me we af Oe pe! tae f TE WET L tec WEE : y a 3 rr ” Ral me we kde ithe)
HW 50955 Docld:3% to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group views. ; ; Mr. Parrott also said that Mr, Macy had raised a related point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that Mr. Barnés had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise - of anew Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn of the present onc. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up. A THOMAS A. PARROTT