SECRET CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOUN F.° KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. “INTRODUCTION. le Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter part of 1959, 1960 and early 19617 were almost. totally devoted to the | development of the paramilitary operation which culminated in the Bay of Pigs invasion on 17 April 1961. During this period, major efforts were | devoted to training a paramilitary force, formation of a Cuban exile organization in Miami to direct opposition activities and to provide future Cuban leadership and a propaganda campaign designed to rally op- position to Castro in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. . 2. Some of the actions initiated during 1960-61 continued following the defeat of the Agency supported Cuban brigade. For example, prior to the break in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the U.S. on 3 January ‘ 1961, CIA maintained a Station in Havana. This Station recruited and trained intelligence: agents and procured and cached communications equipment to form a staybehind net to provide intelligence on Cuba following the break in diplomatic relations. Following the Bay of. Pigs defeat, this net. continued to function providing information on Cuba - via radio communication and Latin American diplomatic pouches. Radio . . | £2, IMPDET SECRET. CL BY 055636
SECRET ‘ Swan is another example of an operation which continued after the Bay of Pigs. Tt was established in the Spring of 1960 as a component of the anti-Castro propaganda campaign. (Tt continued tn this rote until its termination in 1968. : ; . 3. Following the Bay of Pigs and in response to administration urgings to do something about Castro, CIA established a large Station in Miami in September 1961 to continue operations against Cuba. The operations described below. were developed and run by the Miami Station; many of them were still in the developmental stage at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. | 4. The Station initiated three major classes of activities: intelligence collection/espionage,. covert action/propaganda, and infiltration/exfiltration actions. It should be noted that there was” no clear delineation between these activities, e.g., an exile organi- zation. primarily engaged in propaganda on the Agency's behalf might. also provide positive intelligence information from interrogation of an exile or provide candidates for an infiltration team to perform sabotage. It should also be’noted that infiltration/exfiltration ac- tions were undertaken for a variety of purposes such as espionage, sabotage and to assist defectors. Aside from intelligence collection, al] of the remaining activities would constitute forms of covert action. ~2? = SECRET
SECRET & B. COVERT ACTION/PROPAGANDA . Tv, Agency Supported. Cuban Exile Organizations: CIA provided monetary support ‘and guidance td a number of Cuban exile organizations in the Miami area who disseminated anti-Castro propa- ganda. Some of these organizations: came into existence through Cuban’ exile initiative, but they became: > largely dependent on CIA to > carry on. their activities. a oe — a. Directorio Magisterial Revolucionario (DMR) : An exile teachers organization in which CIA became interested in early 1961. DMR produced a bulletin (Magisterto Cubano Libre) which was mailed to 18 Latin American countries, to DMR members and to press and radio organizations tn the U.S. Radto Programs directed at Cuba were pre- pared and broadcast over station WMIE in Miamt. Copies of these programs were sent. to various Latin American countries and were broadcast over 88 different stations. The DMR also produced seven TV programs which were broadcast over Channel 2 in Miami. The theme of DMR Propaganda Was the destruction of the Cuban educational system by Castro. The head of DMR attended the National Education Association meeting in 1962, gave a talk at the meeting and was instrumental] in having a resolution. approved con- demning the Castro regime. By the end-of 1962, the DMR was mailing out 350,000 booklets and pamphlets a year to various Latin countries and France. -3- SECRET
«7 SECRET & b. Union Deportiva de Cuba Libre (UDCL): A sports oriented organization established by CIA in October 1962. Led by a well known Cuban sports figure and a’ prominent Cubaii sports writer. Purpose of UDCL was to expose Cuban abuse of international sporting events. for political propaganda purposes. UDCL, leaders attended the IX Central American and Caribbean’ Games at Kingston, Jamaica in August 1962, disseminated anti~Castro propaganda and were in part responsible for - the defection of ten Cuban athletes. A simtlar operation was launched at the II Ibero-American Games at Madrid in October 1962 with less success. . Propaganda was distributed and two defections were induced. Pamphlets were also distributed at the IV Panamerican Games at Sao Paulo, Brazil in January 1963: No defections were induced. In 1963, ‘the UDCL is. credited with obtaining a temporary suspension of Cuba from Olympic competition and changing the site of the XVI Amateur Baseball? World ‘Championship from - Cuba to another country. c. Comite DeOrganizaceones Juveniles Cubanas_in el Exilio (COJCE): A youth organization headed by a former Cuban Boy Scout jeader. CIA began support to this organization in December. 1962. Starting in July 1963, COJCE published a monthly bulletin with a distribution of several thousand copies to Latin American and European youth contacts. Purpose of bulletin was to furnish information on the effect of Castro-Communist policies on Cuban youth. -~4- SECRET
: SECRET & d. Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil DRE): : Led by several former-Cuban-student—teaders— -€3A-support ta ae the DRE started prior to the Bay of Pigs. The DRE was primarily a para~ military organization and prior to April 1961, °21 DRE “members were trained and infiltrated into Cuba to create resistance and guerrilla units. This DRE apparatus was destroyed in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs. Subse- - quent paramilitary operations also ended in fatiure and CIA withdrew its _ paramilitary support in December 1961. In January 1962, the DRE turned to hemispheric propaganda operations. © DRE sponsored students. were placed in Latin American universities where they carried on anti-Castro activi- ties. This so-called student project also engaged in such activities as drumming up support for the U.S. position at the 1962 Punto del Este Con- ference and carrying out successful operations at the Helsinki Youth Festival in May 1962. Starting in 1962, the DRE began broadcasts over . *NY shortwave radio station WRUL six days a week and Miami radio station WMIE once a week. The DRE also published an international. bulletin which was mailed to contacts throughout the hemisphere and a- pony edition of 4,800 copies was mailed into Cuba. e. Frente Obero Revolucionario Denocratice Cubano (FORDC) : Established by cIA in October. 1960 as a rallying point. for middle and ‘upper echelon trade unionists in exile.. Led by former Cuban’ lg e SECRET.
SECRET & labor leaders, FORDC published a weekly circular letter which was mailed to labor organizations throughout Latin America, Prior to 1961, FORDC Sponsored a daily program over Radio Americas (Radio Swan). Starting in December 1961, FORDC broadcast a daily program over ‘Station WMIE. In addition to published and radio propaganda, . groups of FORDC leaders were Sent on trips throughout Latin America to maintain contact with hemi- sphere labor leaders and to sample attitudes toward Castro. -FORDC also maintained contact with international Tabor organizations. | f. Unidad Revolucionaria (UR): | = 7 ~ Originally established tn Cuba tn December 1960 as a clan- destine resistance movement. Its leadership was largely put to death or imprisoned as a result of the Bay of Pigs. The organization was re~ established in Miami in August 1962 with CIA support. A paramilitary ‘arm was established in April. 1963, ‘but no effective paramilitary action was ever carried out, Starting in March 1963, UR sponsored a daily radio program over WMIE targetted at Cuban farmers and another daily program exposing Cuban internal security service activities. In July 1963, UR initiated a shortwave broadcast from station WRUL , New York. The UR utilized nonobjective, Turid ‘propaganda themes. ‘The UR was also a prolific producer of propaganda pamphlets. During 1963-64, 1,442,500 items were mailed to Cuba and other Latin American countries. on a -6- SECRET
SECRET & weekly basis the UR published a list of free world ships visiting Cuba. This was consistently picked up by the Associated Press and Agence France Presse. Throughout its history, the UR was wracRed with internal bickerings and power grabs which detracted from its impact. 2. Agency Supported Individuals: . Aside from utilizing various extle organizations for propaganda purposes, CIA also supported several prominent exiles who prepared propa- . ganda materials. Zig Zag Libre was a successfu] satire magazine in Cuba prior to the Castro regime. The Agency supported its former editor who - published an edition for mailing into Cuba. In the 1963 period it was considered an effective weapon for ridiculing Castro. CIA also supported ‘a former prominent student leader, and one of the former directors. of Prensa Libre, a leading Havana newspaper. These individuals produced daily radio programs for Radio Swan and prepared propaganda materials for publication. These individual efforts tended to be more effective and to receive better audience Yesponse from Cuba than the organizational broadcasts described above. Agencia de_Informaciones Periodesticas. (AIP):.-_ AIP was a news information ‘Service financed by CIA. Agency sponsorship was. an open secret. It was designed to fill the gap in coverage by the regular news media. It was accepted in the hemisphere | -~7- SECRET
SECRET 2 2 fy & aS an accurate and objective reporter of events. It prepared four news bulletins a week which were distributed to 1200 Latin American news outlets and prepared radto tapes based on the bulletins which were dis~ - tributed to hemisphere radio Stations. oe oe 4. Radio Americas (Radio Swan): | | An Agency~financed radio station; the transmitter was located on Swan Island with broadcast studios in New York initially and later Miant. Started broadcasting in mid~1960, with entertainment programs purchased . from Pan. American Broadcasting interspersed with news programs and propa- ganda. CIA Sponsorship: was an open secret. Its image and credibility was smudged considerably as a ‘result of its use in the Bay of Pigs opera- tion. Most audience. response was recetved from Caribbean countries out- - Side of Cuba. | ; | | 5. Mailing Operation: | Most Propaganda nailing operations were. directed to Latin-American countries outside of Cuba. This project, initiated in 1963, was designed “as a mass mailing operation into Cuba to encourage subtle sabotage, re- Sistance and harassment. Utilizing names and addresses from Cuban tele- phone books, letters with. Fictitious return addresses were mailed to Cuba from various Latin American countrtes and by insertion into inter- oe national mail transiting the U. S. From refugee debriefings, it ts known SECRET
op SECRET ‘ that some of this mail] was delivered, but like most of the operations de- scribed in this section, it is unknown if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban’ refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration. and Naturalization Service (I&NS) - recorded basic biographic data on ‘all incoming refugees. Cards, containing : this data, were provided to the Miami Station to conduct a file check for counterintelligence purposes. In reviewing the cards, the Station identi- fied refugees who might be used for operational purposes and arranged interviews which, Frequently. also provided positive intelligence infor- mation. | | CIA's Domestic Contact Division (pen) had primary responsibility. for obtaining positive intelligence information from refugees. DCD inter- viewed refugees of positive intelligence interest at the Caribbean Admis- sions Center (CAC) in Opa-Locka. These interviews were documented in Preliminary Information Reports (PIRs) which were provided to the InteT- ligence Community and to the Miamt Station for review to obtain opera- tional leads. | | | | Prior to the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962, the flow of ~9- SECRET
rs & wr SECRET a refugees was large, and it was relatively easy to obtain information on __ current events in Cuba and Cuban exiles that could be utilized opera- tionally. Following the crisis, the Flow of refugees-decreased Signi fi- cantly. As a result, the Station established a section to exploit refugees more intensively, to centralize Files on refugees, and to pre- pare. Studies on extle groups ‘operating in the U. 5. 2. Anonymous Organization Group: During 1960-63, this Group conststed of between 50 to 100. Cuban exiles who constituted a structured intel ligence Support group for the ' Station. It performed a variety of functions for the Station, and it was the Station' S prime source of information on. Cuban exile activities. It is considered the Single mast valuable operational activity under~ taken by the Station. In summary , this Group: a. Infiltrated exile. groups and reported on their activities. | | b, ‘Maintained extensive files on Cuban exiles, exile groups and Cuban Government personalities. | | c. Monitored Cuban vadio broadcasts and summarized content. - d. Produced intelligence. reports and special studies. e. Debriefed refugees. . ff. Recruited infiltration agents. -10- | SECRET
“UPey / , SECRET & 3. “Intelligence Net: . In mid-1962, the Agency recruited a former Cuban politician to establish an agent net in Cuba. This individual recruited a member of the presidential entourage, a Cuban working in a foreign consul, and a third individual. These individuals recruited an extensive net of 150 subagents and informants which was very productive in reporting informa- tion of intelligence interest via the diplomatic pouch of the foreign consul. The high living and immoral behavior of one of the principles.) attracted the attention of the Cuban security service. This individual was arrested and interrogated prior to Christmas 1963 resulting in the arrest and conviction on espionage charges of all of the members of the net. . . 5 4, Juana Castro: 7 . Juana Castro, younger sister of Fidel Castro,’ was one of the more significant CIA agent recruitments. She was a strong supporter of ‘her brother until she realized he had led the revolution not on behalf of the oppressed Cuban people, -but on behalf of the Communist movement. _ 2h The wife| | who. was working asa CIA agent, (convinced Juana to cooperate with the Agency. " She! was recruited) in Mexico City. by a CIA officer in “September 1962, briefed extensively and trained in intelligence tradecraft. She worked as a resident foreign’ — os ae SECRET
A SECRET Vv iz intelligence agent until 1964: ‘when it was: determined that she wouTd be. more. valuable ina defector role. : _ _ D. INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION QPERATIONS . | 7 As noted earlier, infiltration/exfiltration operations, which started ~ in mid-1962, were undertaken for a vartety. of purposes, such as: | a. Enplace arms and comuntcations caches for use by agents and . resistance groups. b. Infiltrate agents to recruit agents for espionage purposes. c. Exfiltrate agents who had completed their missions. or for further training, or to obtain reporting. “* d. Exffltrate significant political defectors. .@. Commit acts of sabotage. Each of: these operations were approved by the Special Group or its succes- sor. the 303 Committee. ‘They were a major preoccupation of the. Miami Station and large amounts of money and manpower were devoted to them. They were executed with varying degrees of success and were frequently aborted because they encountered resistance from Cuban security Forces or rendezvous were missed. ‘These, operations were Supported by a small maritime force which, in 1963, consisted of three mother ships and six smaller vessels. During _ - 1963, 88 operations were planned of which 15 were cancelled. Of the - 12 - SECRET
en ee ee eg. SECRET & operations carried out, four tnvolved sabotage and ten others encountered contact with Cuban forces. Thus, during 1963, the Castro Government was aware of at least 14 operations involving inftitration’ of Cuban coasts and -harbors, and it would.be logically assumed that the U.S. had a hand in these actions. ; | oe, During 1963, a CIA trained exile paramilitary group committed two acts of sabotage which inflicted some damage, caused a great deal of commotion and attracted a lot of publicity. On 31 August 1963, this group attempted to destroy a POL dump in Casildo Harbor using an 8imm mortar and a 75mm recotl legs rifle. Unknown to the team, the. Harbor was under an air de-~ fense alert at the time. Shortly after opening fire, the team came under heavy enemy fire. The team inflicted some damage on the POL dump, and hastily departed in two small boats. This attack was reported in the Cuban press. On 30 September 1963, this group conducted a comiando raid against a large sawmill on the coast of Oriente Province. The sawnill was destroyed and no enemy opposition was encountered. ‘The mil was a main producer of railroad ties. -Tfs Toss. was felt, and noted in a Castro speech, when a_ hurricane. destroyed most of the ratlroad's lines in part of Cuba several . weeks later. _ = 13 - SECRET