104-10429-10091] 2 ae Ae NE i ea EN GD + N= at Seem oe ce awe cept ates =F Meee mon 7 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ June 1955-January 1960) erm ntee tem ant + ma _ Operational Activities (1958-1960) Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section Me a. According to NOSENKO, the Seventh Department was reorgan- ized.in June 1958, and NOSEHMKO's section, which theretofore . had. been concerned with operations against foreign tourists ‘from all countries, was split into two new sections, one concerned with tourists from the United States and the British Commonwealth and the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO claimed that at that time he was promoted to the position .of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, "the most important section of the Seventh Department". . In September 1958, he claimed.to have personally recruited . It was also in_1958, he said, that he super-,«! vised the sexual entrapment of ( | although Seventh "ss Department Chief DUBAS made the actual approach. Beginning ie, -in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV ~“*. and VOLKOV_in a series of successful entrapments-~DREW) (LUKIS), “Tr and] NOSENKO stated that he also — used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two and Finally, NOSENKO said, he xrecriited the Moscow représentative of the| NOSENKO claimed that his operational succéss during 1959 earned him a commendation from the KGB Chairman. [He has since retracted all claims to any awards earned during his KGR service.] It was because of his position as Deputy | Chief of the American~British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO said, that he first became involved with Lee Harvey OS'NALD. NOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among: . £oreign tourists was secondary to his department's principal . Mission, the detection of “Nestern intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union. In line with that counterintelligence mission, “on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENKO ee , . CLASS!FigATiON RE F : a eonoucren ow 9S ASTER, yoy 9 AQ - _ DERIVATIVE CL BY =a Document Number \S49- ino a Cj ECL © DAWnGER To’. | cap. 227, REWW ow Ze for FOIA Review on FEB 1378 : . “ rus - JS No. 7124 cjassiFieaTi0™ | vs . Y Secret / .. Copy ft ponDUcTeD OF ~ pen SOHN Rav OB DERIVED FROM — ee ee FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE
13-00000 Hated ae aed Gb ABy woes == US ale NK ay 4 . : - 2 oh dake -- — ee pasae in» om cemmeerendr was weenie dleestnfm we anh event? oun u-attntiteracmnrimersaemetimmntintnittets eterna tite: sAP Setnsnaarhynatl stale aN a ns nO Cerennele ey Oh + Het Sadhana Qnceune  wESme nee mn tome - 7 C Fj Secret — € eee cece cence or . (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960) claims that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions, -twice in Odessa, while visiting the USSR in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO insisted that he met but once in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period. Comment: NOSENKO volunteered his account of the | a case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. We freely a: related the details of the summer 1962 and February 1963 meetings with | lin the USSR. His account of | activities is consistent with| [version, except as noted above. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-1960) For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's: alleged involvement with OS"ALD in 1959-1960 and in 1963 are described elsewhere. (See p.303.) According to NOSENKO, the was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. In that capacity he participated in .the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union. 4 Comment: NOSENKO's information on his involvement with OS OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient. to serve as evidence confirming or refuting his claimed ' service as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department in 1959. WS ‘No. 197124 = Top Secret "Copy —t _
13-00000 (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) -waS promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief of the entire Seventh Department. A year later, he was made First Deputy Chief, a and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist operations. The Seventh Department, which had a strength of about 100 KGB officers, was responsible for all operations . against tourists in the Soviet Union. From this period NOSENKO claimed to have. learned, either by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief ‘of otherwise, of a number of KGB operations against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey _—OSWALD. NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB posi- tion “during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO re- -turned to Geneva for the second time, and defected. . Recruitment of | \. NOSENKO's Information, a — Doe __ Ptr Penny __ Fae «ae a so a In _ september 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate, - f- Seventh Department case officer Ye.N. NOSKOV, the management bs of KGB agent _) (exryptonym "ANOD"), was the president o fr ( | and the owner of a & mat | There was originally some suspicion _ that might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was also concerned over( contacts with AMTORG per- ? sonnel in New York City. NOSKOV, the case officer at the time, "felt" that |was not an FBI informant and recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for . BE blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union. | | . wae cooperation was secured against KGB promises that Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel agency - task was to screen visa applications of prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who - F: might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected . * such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick or | pencilled mark on the application form. “Be af ra | | TS No. 197124 Yao Secret Copy -_ ate d
13-00000 eet _.. (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) --NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case . | ¢ | ot Residence in the USSR -when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR the Seventh Department. All available materials on | etl ce mart oat, 6 The OSWALD CASE NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in. OSWALD stemmed from his claimed Tourist Department — assignments. He asserted that while Deputy Chief. of the American Section in 1959 he participated in the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational | interest. In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he was informed of OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to- apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB records of OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union including the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.. For continuity of presentation, both periods of (1959-69 and 1963) are discussed here, - ‘The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD case is significant if it substantiates. NOSENKO's claimed positions in the KGB and confirms the validity of his claim that he knew the extent of KGB involvement with OSWALD. NOSENKO's Information Prior’ to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, . he was completely unknown to the KGB. Moreover, upon receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief Directorate determined that he was not of sufficient impartance to_ justify any special interest by. the Seventh:Department. Not until about October 1959, did he come to the ‘attention of NOSENKO,. who was, at that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of © him were. thereupon collected and. examined - the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters’ reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. .NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his wish to stay in the USSR. | ae | ae 1S. No. 197124 e ; - 303. . ; , a Toh Sebret Copy 7 ~ a ee sae 5 omg = oF ee re ee ee ee er :
13-00000 (SEVENTH DEPAREMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) Although’ the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD’ might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility because "this would be done after the person 1s allowed to stay in the Soviet. .- Union." .Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after | his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB ' im an attempt to establish his intentions. KRUPNOV “sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary -- and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section. From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded - that. OSWALD was. of no interest to the. KGB,..and both’ agreed that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal." For this reason NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the Inturist . interpreter that he would not be permitted‘ to remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry. asa. permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders, and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Intuzist guide. This prompted a search, and after several hours, OSWALD. was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief of the Seventin Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's. original decision that. the KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and that OSWALD. should not be permitted to remain in the USSR. There was no ) attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn’t normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write ano auto- biography. . oe Dw ow TS No. 197124 lab Secret Copy —___ = + wee sete a
13-00000 Top Secret 9° tt (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO did not know who eventually’ granted OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR: or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit. The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live in the Moscow area. Either the Soviet Red Cross or the. Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decision .to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventh pepartment updated his file, and it was sent, along with a cover letter pre- pared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk. KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically in- structed local authorities there to take no action con- cerning OSWALD except to observe his activities "passively" to make sure’ that he was not an American Intelligence agent on temporary “sleeper” status. NOSENKO read this letter, . and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could ---be ‘taken in Minsk without’ KGB Headquarters approval. It was '. NOSENKO’s opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and associates, and coverage of his mail. After OSWALD's threatened second suicide. attempt, the KGB "washed its hands of him". and that éven though there was considered to be some possibility that he was a "sleeper agent, " KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk was "practically. nil." ee ee ed Shae al anak dams ot . 4 Baby aaa Request £0 Return to the USSR USSR The KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned with OSWALD's' return to the United States in June 1962, by which > ‘time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.. ‘No further word on him was received at KGB - ‘Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. City in September, 1963 and requested a visa to . return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Legal Residancy reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, re= questing information. The KGB First Chief Directorate had no record on OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Two (Countexr- intelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD, i The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department,. V.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the in- quiry to. Seventh Department Chief ‘CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO. genset gomenad quan wens esnacee | Se 305 fee po TS No, 197124 : nr Yop Secret . Copy -1_ : oe: : - ws . ee ee ot) ames ome we .
13-00000° ne C Op Secret ; on a (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was ° told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not. be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV . xelayed this information to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO did not know -to whom OSWALD had spoken-at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSWALD and. Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere. | Comment: Independent sources, however, reported on ' wisits by OSWALD to the Cuban as well as Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29 wesw cs se. .. September and. 3 October. 1963 and on his . _' (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew | nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 =. he revised this to say that OSNALD did not): o.o 0% CLS y ._ have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. . NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting.in ~ the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head- quarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had = ._.. wWisited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR . . . and that the cable specified that OSWALD had. _ dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only. Oo . . 306 . Ss | . TS. No. 197124 ~ | Te Secret - Copy a rr ed wee ene oe : - 7 = wet Sm mm ame eae
13-00000 : os oornnte Seared thamnttnena tenet © monn creer re ne Seen eA PASECAAEED = ae Pee: 4 -..—-+(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) i Bey eo 8 Post~Assassination Review of KGB File NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a result of President Kennedy's assassination. About two hours after President Kennedy was’ shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact in a telephone call to his home from KGB Headquarters. A short while later he was told, again by telephone, that the “ President had died. Aboyt two hours later, NOSENKO was told. that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers ‘of the American Tourist ‘Section were called in to determine whether the KGB had any information concerning him. After establishing OSWALD's identity from KGB files: and learning that his. file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB office in Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders. The local KGB ,dictated. .. .-over-the :telephone a summary of: its’ File “on OSWALD. “this 7 summary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk had attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction"... GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's efforts because it had been given specific instructions to .-... carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD there. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of the meaning of. the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flown immediately. to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally read the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSYALD's file when it arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to S.M. FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department..of the KGB Second Chief Directoraté, who prepared a two-page summary memorandum for GRIBANOV. This memorandum, which NOSENKO read, was forwarded to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, and Semichastnyy in turn reported. to the CPSU Central Committee and to Khrushchev. concerning it. eo iy a “OSWALD's: file: from Minsk. contained no information to indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from. KGB Head- quarters. From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner. ere] Yad : De a | a mo TS No. 197124 OO 6 Secret Copy. ws ee a. = we mms ' a. a a ce nape oe ome eT ee ray HD OI GP eT SI ane we oom ey ‘ae 2 ee. away ~ . - wee ee 8 ® ’ . - . a
13-00000 — APR ET | & ™ Bo : nes . , "7 (SEVENTH DEPARTHENT: ~ January 1962-January 1964) Fey OSNALD never _ received any KGB training. or KGB assign- ments. If. any other department of the KGB or the GRU had wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure permission from the Seventh Department, which originally ~ ‘opened his case file. .In view of OSNALD's apparent mental instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particu- . larly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotaqe) Department, would have*considered using him. KGB Head- quarters did not maintain a control file on him following his settlement in Minsk, as.it would have done had OSALD been of any ‘operational interest. The only KGB record on OSHALD maintained in Moscow was an indéx card giving his name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a file concerning him. The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSWALD;.. all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file. There was no -indication-in OSWALD's file that the KGB had had any interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she left for the United States. . wot ee : . ware ae Comment: NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he “only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSNALD personally. NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief © Direttorate first learned of OSWALD when he applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in September 1963 is probably incorrect. The .. consular file turned over to the U.S. Govern~- ‘ment by the Soviet Embassy in Washington after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier... ‘That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter. of / February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from : OS'IALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had © . j i Fre a4 . : | 308 . eS - TS No. 197124 | ee , JO Secret * Copy
13-00000 ee eer ee ete Rt ee ee - . . ose eee vere wms ecceve vee a oot oe Oo p Secret an © ¢ daha ag ‘~ «(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) | —_ Comment: (Continued) : earlier requested permission to “return to ‘the Soviet Union. In the last dated letter of the file, one of 9 November 1963, OSWALD advised: — the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his travel . , . _ -under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact - . - . with an official (whom CIA identifies as a ‘KGB officer) of the Soviet. Embassy in Mexico | a City, his contact. there with the Cuban Consulate _ , and his efforts to reach Havana in order to visit the Soviet Embassy there. “Without regard | to possible earlier correspondence, . OSWALD's | - request for a Soviet visa addressed to the - " .Embassy in-Washington in July 1963 would require .the Washington Residency to report the matter .to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico tae wy City Residency. later did. NOSENKO's apparent — “ss ce so." " -"“Fgnorance of OSWAED'’s “communications*with. the. -s-f8 3 .. -. Soviet Embassy’ in Washington discredits his - * \glaim to complete knowledge of all aspects of ao the KGB relationship with OSWALD. ON yacce, -_ ‘3 abe + ante mee capan este wees ry on me cow ans oem aes oe me tf ew oEe ob come The CHEREPANOV Papers. ‘Comment: -On 4.November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA os employee claiming: ‘to be one CHEREPANOV, passed “to an American:‘-book-buyer a package. which he -- yequested the American to deliver to a trust= .., worthy person at the American ‘Embassy. Embassy |. oO£ficials found the package to contain a. “bundle of typed or handwritten documents which . : appéared to have originated in classified KGB > files. Fearing a Soviet provocation which » oy could. lead to.a denunciation of the Embassy. -. £or. possessing classified Soviet Government documents, Embassy officials had the documents “«: photographed and on the next day, 5 November, | _ xveturned the originals to the Soviet Ministry . OF Foreign Affairs. pes a OO oe eS) 309 a ae | TS. Na. 197124 yop Secret | - Copy