ctticton ——— om —contro sas om A—contro gssuments en, ~65a-~ orally or in writing of the substance of the above-referenced conversation of November 22, 1963? If so, please indicate when and in what form this information was provided, and which CIA official provided it. (HSCA request letter of August 28, 1978) The. CIA responded ‘by. memorandum: “Although the (Mexico City) station considered the conversation Of Sufficient possible interest to send a copy to headquarters, the latter apparently did nothing with it, for there appears to be no record in the Oswald file of such action as may have been taken. A review of those Warren Commission documents containing information provided by the Agency and still bearing a Secret or Top Secret classification does not reveal whether the conversation was ‘4 given or shown to the Commission." (CIA Doc., Memorandum Regarding Luisa Calderon conversation, p. 1) a YW “2A SEA YER. afBAgs an The available evidence thus supports the @ 3 conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the information nor the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's oe " : ; Significance to the events surrounding President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expeditiously provided this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia ae Duran, and her comments following the assassination, : it may well have given more serious investigative Classification: secre og0nse | “asin ocr Ge
ote Classification: consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald (This form is to be used for material extracted am the cubge gaye SEBO d GoRMBARYLE involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Two difficult issues remain which are raised by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't ' the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the - Warren Commission; secondly, why didn't the Agency reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge - me oy of Calderon! Ss intelligence background, her possible ae hata _ knowledge- ‘Of Oswald and her ‘possible. connection to eee . the CIA or some other American intelligence appazatus.. The first question can be explained in benign terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the conversation was filed away and not " recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation and ‘See r o> ) faiccle’ portion AS foe trate hectic published its’ report.” (See above CIA explanation) As for the Agency's withholding of information concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was merely he » ¢ informed that Calderon may ANG ee of the DGI. (CIA Doc. 5/5/64; SwenrSOn] Hemorandum) The memoranda which provided more extensive examina- tion of her intelligence background were not made wf eseetoptonnben, Pe ae WL Classification: | o0s0gs Classified by derivation: / . A NOR “RLU, NGA, ; GIR, | NARA, h,
-67 = - Classification: CES (This form is to. be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) “SES. available for the Commission's review. Significantly, the May 8 memorandum written Py-Soseph Langosch following his debriefing of Ammuc- i Mindicated that m™ AMMUG= “1 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer ee CO “believed Calderon to be a CIA operative. (Cra Doc. iG s<- FOIA 687-295, attach 5, 5/8/64) It is possible lhe, , 1s a . “h that this information was not provided the Warren ©’ Commission either because there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because the allegation was of substantive concern to the Agency. If the ra allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious. It would have demonstrated posst e. that aSCIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy, | ‘. “SE. may have possessed information prior to the assassina- tion regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to the 3 Cuban Intelligence Service . and that Services possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate @ SHE, President Kennedy. — ss, a Regarding Calderon's possible association SE. ; with the CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal no x. “~~ostensible.connectién between Calderon and the CIA. NGGR Ry mes me NM QT, Classification: 900090 Classified by derivation:
. Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) However, there are indications that such contact ‘ between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staft to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City states in part: ---Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further identify the sister, our domestic exploitation section might be ina posi- tion to follow up on this lead...Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at 1 the next opportunity. (CIA Doc. HMMW- ia oi 41935, 9/1/63) “Oa, UA “UH. NG “An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief - of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that: [Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate,{ Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-- or her mother may make the trip--details not clear (CIA Doc. HMMA 21849, July 31, P | . 1965 by all 2} ; At the very least, the above dispatches PSB >. é e ? “HE, = “NURS NRE. evidenced an interest in the activities of Calderon and her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file. NS, SECRET Classification: DORGSS wt, Pit } vie’ Classified by derivation:
Classificatio on: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) 0 - . x. The Committee has queried David Ronis; the author of the above cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's “domestic exploitation section."  (HSCA Class... Staft Interview of David Ronis, 8/31/78) Ronis was a member of the CIA's Special affairs Stats at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was responsible for recruitment and handling of agents for collection of intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsi- bility \ was to scour the Western Hemisphere division “for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests co CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. Often he would receive no response to these requests, which normally indicated that no follow-up nad 8 eo either been attempted or successfully conducted. Tt was Ronis! recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division Classification: ~—=#2" 2! o Tens Classified by DORG92 Ss st WA, | TEE 1 GHG, es Ny, NEED. BRA. h.
ais | Piccolo, Interview of ehue'y ee Classification: 4 . (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) might have_been. requested to locate Luisa Calderon's . f . ; . Sister. Ronis told the. Committee that he had no i recollesticn : ‘of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He dia that he had recruited women to perform tasks the Agency. However, he did not recall ever any employees of the Cuban EMbassy/Consulate Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that recall for recruiting in he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated ‘with the CIA. (Ibid.) Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with ‘the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Heims, 8/2/78, ». 136; a .HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, spre 1928 p. 148; HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch,; 8/21/78, — PB oe. ae __-Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incompleteithe 9693 Classified: by derivation: “UHH, “eden, a a CE SNH, Nie) 2) Ms, Me ‘ ‘Yi NED
most glaring omissi f" Galdecan “4 . her 201 filefof * cryptic remarks ; een | following the assassination of President Classification: (This form is to be ysed for material extracted from ClA—controlled décuments. ) : vam on being the absence; from Kennedy. / AMMUG~ rv ad “Tn iarcne pute of Conds eee TPR MGS NL ey, TRA OK wee eh, Cred ON This committee’ s investigation of Luisa Calderon has revealed that a defector from the cuban Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi- ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts with the DGI in Mexico City- This defector was yar ate * a eee ~ wN assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 nereinafter) .* CIA files reveal that. A-l defected from the | canada.] DSI on Apxil 21, 1964[ in| When he defected, A-1 possessed a4 number of DGI documents which were subsequently turned aver to the CIA. (CIA poc.[orra Jrn 68894, 4/24/64) | Ne et ¥ & eo ¥ Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H. Langosch, went [to canada [to meet Aly debrief him, S travel into the United States. and arrange for A-1' (Ibid.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch' s own that A-l did provide sign) ESGARS herein) ng Luisa Calderon? ft 1S nt that little of this information was ur “tas ihg @flOMs yu che CTA to the. Warren Conmission. Therefore, the possibility exists that A-l had idea other information ta tRRsslfidd'by derivation: roe Wargen Commission's work wAlc *It is now kn Leads to the CIA regardi Se a a NOH. BRE ? os a Neath, NWA. ESP, Stn, bas h
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) GAURa. debriefing of A=l_were forwarded to[thefenies of eae, @ {£€ Station in Ottawa] ‘Candia. J (CIA Doc. Dispatch OcBA 7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May 1, A-l was under contract with the CIA for operational purposes. cote Dre (CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, #/6/64) ee eceneenrer anaes {By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-LN would be of great value to the Agency. He stated: There is no. question in my mind that AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning | Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, ' and agents. (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo to Director of Security, 6/23/64) “EG, SHR “GA, SEER Wee, As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of | 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's (.. Illegal Section B (CIA boc. [ovral in 68894 4/24/64) 2) a2, net ¢ G whicn was responsible for training agents for “Sth, RR, assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi- bility pertained to handling of agent operations | (cIA x Doc. Personal Record QuestP@n- 9» '---# @ of naire 6/4/64; CIA Doc. (Losed] in ‘68894 4/24/64) A-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli- “NEA gence officers assigned to Mexico City. Langosch . described A-1l's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows: Classification: ~ ED, “OHI. 000635 Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is~ Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. ( I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing of A-1, 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64) ? ; ee a Thus, A~l was able to provide the CIA soon NRE, after his defection with accurate information regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in Mexico City. we Tn sect fan pla € The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files P concerning A-l. This examination was undertaken. é to determine: 1) whether A-1 had provided any Fa valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining é to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2)f . + , 3 whether, if such leads were provided, these leads and/or other significant information were made RRs available to the Warren Commission. “sts Classification: RRR Classified by derivation: \ BOCE96
_ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) The Committee's initial review of the . Materials provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission did not disclose the existence of the AMMUG files. However; the Committee did during the course of its review examine a file containing material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That file made reference to A-l. Included in this file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-1 provided about the Oswald case. (CIA Doc. FOIA 68-290 Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within this file were the A-1 debriefing memorando of May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard to Luisa Calderon. (CIA Doc. FOIA 7687-295, attach's “fot 4 “Vo, 2 2 and §) Following review of the memoranda, the Committee requested access to all CIA files - - or , : concerning referring to A-l. From review of these materials the Committeé® « has determined that the Warren Commission did learn during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City. 009697 Classified by derivation: NRHA, i SA NUnit, «NUN, NAM. NERO, “Avs
+ 30% -~ 75 - ; Classification: __S222=57— (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) -+-Re, LLAcen Cammiss tory Prior to*learning of Oswald's probable contact with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter- intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that the Director consent to an interview before the Warren Commission on May 14, 1964, (J. Edgar Hoover also appeared before the Commission on that date prior to McConé's appearance. Warren Commission ‘Report Ape reee\(CTA Doc. FOIA 689-298, Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton. also wrote: i2 I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated With the an sensitivé Western 4 Hemisphere| source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appear- ance unless we have--first had some pre- Liminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implica- tions since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. ‘The DDP stated that he would review this care- fully amd made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Ibid.) ‘Classification: Richaite, “BEM, “Gill NA “ith, GERM , ‘ ¢, ea dy RA. t. 4 2 Nu NGI. \
(This form is to be. used for material. extracted fram, ClA-—controll documeots. Undowbté aly EHS WASPS ne Use source referred . panel xan to in Angleton's memo was A-1. this conclusion is based in part upon the date of this memo which was quite close in time to A-l's defection. In addition, Rocca's staff prepared prior to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren a"Brief a Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (CIA Doc. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/64) At Tab E of this brief it states: Within the past week, significant infor- mation has been developed by the CIA re- garding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff: is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban asspect. (Ibid., Tab E) On May 15, 1964, the day of McCone's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal ™® communication regarding A-1. (CIA Doc FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64) However, the Agencv did not at that time identify A-l by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the source of this information eo UN ioe 8 Classification: Classified by serivd) g Qugd. - ja ag ea ¢ SN NEED. NGA. NUS, IN ET, Se a i a “RHE. i
_ Classification: SECRET (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. (Ibid.) The May 15 communication did _ State that the Agency had established contact “with a well-placed invidivual who has been in close and prolonged contact: with ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de Intelligencia.“ (Ibid.) Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May or 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's pro- bable: ‘contact with ‘the DGI in Mexico City. The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI. (Ibid., attachment) As set forth in the section of this report. concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the informa- tion set forth in the memo was elicited. NeitherMthes ‘. questions nor the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a defector col- laborating with the CIA. (CIA Doc FOIA 739-319, 6/19/ 64). re oe eal é et ad Classification: 099192 Classified by derivation: a a iS CoO NG. a 4 Ne “OH.
$ ~ 79 - Creo mace 7¢): " Classification: --pat (This form is to be used tor CORED from ClA—controlled documents.) ‘Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant information regarding Luisa Calderon , specifically of Nov. 22 ‘details of her her conversation and“4ssociation with Cuban Intelligence a were withheld from the Warren Commission. This information as described above, was derived from However, debriefings of A-l. from the Committee! Ss review of the A-1 file provided by the CIA, the Committee has not found any credible evidence indicating that other information provided by A-l to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, in its review the Committee has determined that a | specific document referenced in the A-I1 file is. not present in that file. | The.missing itemis of considerable concern to the Committee. It is a debriefing report of A-l entitled "The Oswald Case." (CIA Doc Dispatch{ urcw- | ¢ 5035, 3/23/65) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch®® rs records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Ibid.) Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee who has worked extensively with the Agency files * fe « rtm Classification: __ ~S-gvee 7 Classified by derivation{ if 0 i i i Ai SS ALN NER, “SH, | NR. “RRR, nae “a, NS NR. | hh
A Elessifieation: ere $5 sere SECRET This form ig tg be ysed for motsriql sxtcasted om elA—centrelled documents.) ~BQ- system told a Committee staff member that this notation was the symbol for the CIA component known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a tetra, reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. IN a CIA memorandum dated September 27, 1978, the CIA has adopted the position that Wham debriefing Report No. 40 is a duplication of the original Langosch memorandum of May 5, 1964 concerning AMMUG's knowledge of Lee Harvey _ tert m Poss - HES, S possible contact. with the Decr.* 1 crarthe >, eg FANE ge fa ineded PEGS lip tottrincipnshetsr Beorretirs Ripert x e ble tA cad 4, iC =a 2 wer ¥ e’ Committee has questiondd A-h's Cage FR em oran devon. : to. officers regarding additional information that A-1 may ~< have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, when interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does fe» | > not know what information derived from A-L's de- briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph -Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also “Caer "+" es. ry — “SyR Interviews Of Hildago & piccolo) ie also stated that - & te i: v : - = he does not“recall that at A-l-provided any other information 7 Glessificatign: 009102: | Cee yy sees, eben