v9.1 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Docld: 322763410 Page 1 JFK Assassination System Date: 10/19/20 Identification Form Agency Information HSCA 180-10110-10005 SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY 014719 Document Information HSCA [Restricted] [Restricted] 08/09/1978 198 CIA, METHODOLOGY OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO RUSSIA [Restricted] [Restricted] wc TRANSCRIPT Unclassified 3 Redact 01/01/2003 Two duplicates follow in next two folders and Box 3.Box 2.
dUP OcuNnei WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Assassination of John F. Kennedy of the Select Committee on Assassina- tions, Washington, D.C. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m. in (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Preyer, Burke, Dodd, Devine and Sawyer. Also present: E. Berning; L. Svendsen; C. Berk; M. Gold- smith; B. Genzman; J. Blackmer; J. McDonald; G. R. Blakey; O. Wagner; B. Wolf; W. H. Cross. , Mrs Preyer. The Committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes the Clerk of the Committee to read - |. those who are officially designated to be on the Subcommittee today. The Clerk. You, Mrs. Burke, Mr. Sawyer and Mr. Thone are F regular members of the Kennedy Subcommittee. “Mr. Devine will - be substituting for Mr. Dodd. Page 2 TAS CCLOCT room 340, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer » H { 1 i j i i ! 7 4 | i | ' i { { H t i i \ 1 t t Mr. Preyer. The Chair at this time will entertain a motion | that today's hearings and one subsequent day of hearings be held i i | if ' ‘
| —1UP S2uKzi | 1-2 | ; : . . ; ; . i in Executive Session since, on the basis of information obtained by the Committee, the Committee believes that the evidence or testimony may tend to defame, degrade or incriminate people > 4 @ 4 and consequently Section 2(k) (5) of Rule 11 of the Committee | rules would apply. | | i | Mrs. Burke. I so move. You have heard the motion. All=those in favor will answer oo “S as the roll is called. | Mr. Preyer. Thank you. The Clerk. Mr. Preyer? ae Mr. Preyer. Aye. -- The Clerk. Mr. Devine? Mr. Devine. Aye. The Clerk. Mr. Thone? (No response) The Clerk. Mrs. Burke? Mrs. Burke. Aye. | ‘The Clerk. Mr. Sawyer? (No response) The Clerk. Three ayes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Preyer. Thank you. | - The Committee will go into Executive Sesison at this time and we will ask all those who are not members of the Committee, | witnesses to please leave the room at this time. (Pause) | | | | | { | | | | | | | | ‘ | | | | | | | | | | | | | 63410 Page 3 TAD CCforrT
iUPr QLuNne i 1-6 No. 94 is a letter from Acting Director Carlucci to the Chairman of this Committee which was written for the purpose a ef authorizing present and former agency employees to testify Ww a | oO. tn a da fully and truthfully before this Committee and to respond to questions that are within the scope of the Committee's mandate. At this time, I would like the Ambassador to be given a letter, or a copy of a letter, from Mr. Carlucci to the Ambassador dated July 27, 1978. I would request that this item be introduced into evidence as Exhibit No. 125, JFK Exhibit 125. - (The document referred —_ to was marked JFK Pxhibit - - No. 125 for identification.) Mr. Helms. I would identify this letter as one I received --4+ in the mail. n Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of this } ‘ letter and the previous letter that you were shown, JFK No. 94? o 19 Mr. Helms. I believe I do. iA Mr. Goldsmith. In addition, Mrs Ambassador, I would like y ND o 4 to examine JFK Exhibit 126, which is a letter dated 8 August. eo ee ee 1978 to Mr. G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director of this. aa | H aq | Committee. 24 | Part of that exhibit consists of a letter from Mr. Scott , oo, ac } Breckinridge of the CIA and another consists of a letter to / — | | Docld:32263410 Hage 7 TAB trary .
nN a) dae in G ~ ined i to ~~ {- Docld: 32263410 Mr. Blakey sent by Mrs Anthony Lampvan, General Counsel of es I request that-be introduced into evidence as JFK Exhibit the CIA. 126. Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered. _ | (The document referred to was marked JFK Exhibit No. 126 for identification.) Mr. Helms. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I read: this letter before the meeting started this morning. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand thé contents of that letter - | Mr. Helms. I do. Mr. Goldsmith. Finally, I have one more letter to intro- duce in the record, a letter from Mr. Blakey to Mrs Breckin- ridge dated 4 August 1978 which was sent to Mr. Breckinridge at the request. of Mr. Gregory Craig, counsel for the Ambassador At this time, I request that that letter be introduced : into the record as Exhibit 127. | Mr. Helms. Yes; I have seen this letter on another occasion. | Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, I request that this letter be introduced into ‘the record as JFK No. 127. | Mr. Preyer. without objection, so ordered. Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you. age 8) TAP CEeRET — !
nw) aq ; | 73 24 DoclId: 32263410 ate ate woe eee ere oer — aoe — — ee ee (The document referred to was marked IKE Exhibit | No. 127 for identification. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what was your position in, 1963 when you were with the CIA? Mr. Helms. In 1963, I had the title Deputy Director for Plans. | | Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what the organization function of the Deputy Director for Plans was in 1963? Mr. Helms. In 1963, the Deputy Director for Plans was the Deputy Director who was in charge of -- I guess the simples term is overseas operations. This entity of the CIA received its mandate from two documents, one known as MSC No. 5 and the other CID/2 or M-12. In any event, the responsibility of this unit was to conduct espionage and counter-espionage and covert action out side the continental limits‘of the United States. Mr. Goldsmith. Can you describe generally what your responsibilities were as head of that unit? | Mr. Helmsv:--- Iwas, in fact, in charge of the unit. In other words, I was under the aegis of the Director of Central Intelligence, to whom I reported. I was in charge of overseas: operations. | Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did the CIA have in the age 9 TAD SECOIT | | ) | | | |
investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy? — Mr. Helms. After this tragedy occurred and the Warren nD Commission was formed, there was every effort made in the Central Intelligence Agency to be as responsive as possible . da to request/ from the FBI who was conducting the investigation 6 or a major portion of it, and the staff and members of the Warren Commission. @ I would like to take this occasion to say we were all, I think, in this country equally struck with the tragic circum stances and we all felt, in the Agency, that we should do what we could to be as supportive as we possibly could of these other entities that had the lead in this investigation. Mr. Goldsmith. Am I correct in assuming that -- and under- standjgyour testimony to be -- that the basic role of the Agency in at that time was to lend support to the FBI and to the Warren Commission? u Mr. Helms. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Functioning in that capacity, how was the 19 | CIA's investigation organized? 20 | Mr. Helms. This is a long time ago that these events took. 2 | place. I guess it is all of 15 years. @ / 99 I do not recall. that, at the outset, that there was any - 7 | tomas organizational change made to accommodate this investi- 44 | setion My recoliection is that we figured that most of our a¢ contribution would focus on what had occurred in Mexico City -- DoclId: 322763410 bage 10 THe Crepry
da DoclId: 322763410 Ur ghuaZ i 1-10 in other words, Oswald's activity prior to the assassination in Mexico City. It is my recollection that the individual who was sort of designated to help out from the Headquarters standpoint was the man who had the desk there in Mexico City. My recollection, his name was Whitten. Mr. Goldsmith. Jack Whitten? Mr. Helms. I think so. That is my recollection. Mr. Goldsmith. What were your responsibilities with regard to the investigation that was undertaken by the Agency? Mr. Helms. My recollection is that I felt my responsibility to be as responsive to whatever requests came from the FBI or the Warren Commission as we could. I, therefore, tried to see to it that these requests were fulfilled and that we made the requisite inquiry or whatever else would be required under the circumstances. Mr. Goldsmith. Who, if anyone, was primarily responsible for coordinating the flow of information within the CIA to you and then from you to the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I do not.recall, at this late date, anyway, any particular flow of information. An inquiry would come over. We would attempt to satisfy it and we would attempt to. respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as individual items, and my recollection would be that it would be hard to describe this flow of. age 11 | TAP CEPCRET | | | | | | | | | t i | i i i i | | i
aa to Dy rm oT 24 DoclId: 322763410 93 | 1-11 material. Each individual item that came along we took care of as best as we could. As the weeks turned into months, we found that we were looking into matters overseas in Europe and various places, trying to. run down individuals, identify bits and pieces that the Warren commission was. trying to clarify, and as a result of this, it was necessary to deal through all the area divisions of the so-called Operations Director, or Plans Director, at that time. Mr Goldsmith. Which staff or unit, if any, within the CIA was given primary responsibility for coordinating the. investigation? ee | Mr, Helms. My recollection is that after the Warren commission was established and it got its work underway that this was put into the counter-intelligence staff. tir Goldsmith.. Would you explain to the Committee what the organizational function or purpose of the counter-intelli- gence staff was? 7 - Mr. Helms. Under the National Security Council intelli- gence directive, NSCID No. 5, there was a provision, a special provision in that document which dealt with counter-intelligence I say a special provision, because in the area of positive intelligence the Agency's charter was to collect raw informa- tion and then pass it to the various other interested agencies of government. age 12 TAD CERT | { | | 4 t | | | | | \
nN da wn 3 - ? a 9 5 | ! tay if | . i a | s 1 \ { ' i : \ | . : | seer ee DoclId: 322763410 bage 15 THD CrfrartT . was told more or less that he would be given free rein as to | | | | i: 2 | | rather sensible thing. to have done under the circumstances. | | | | iF oLundd i Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Whitten has testified before the Committee in a deposition, and at that time he indicated that he was intially given responsibility for the investigation and coordinating the information, and, I guess, sending it to the Warren Commission. He indicated to us that Mr. Angleton was in some way inter- fering with his function as coordinator of the investigation and that at some time the investigation was turned over from Whitten to Angleton. Does that refresh your memory at all? Mr. Helms. It does not,. and may I ‘Say, I do not mean to add to the questions I have not been asked, ‘but I cannot imagine giving anybody the kinds of assurances which Mr. Whit- ten claims that he was given. We did not operate that way. Nobody had those assurances for anything, including me. Mr. Goldsmith. Your. position would be that the primary reason, as you recall it, for the investigation! s being taken from Whitten, ina sense, and given to the cr staff 1 was because the investigation began to undertake ‘proader tones than was initially anticipated? Mr. Helms. Yes. That is not only my recollection, but alsovit would seem to be in the year (1978, to have been a Mr .. Goldsmith. Mr. Whitten also testified before the Committee that Mr. Angleton was talking to the FBI without
nN? in a6 fa as as Docld: 322763410 fOr wha i 1-15 receiving authorization from anyone. ‘Do you recall whether or not that was a problem at any time? Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. Angleton was responsibile for the liaison of the Plans Director for the FBI and consequently he talked to the FBI liaison man and other FBI people every day of the week and probably several times a day. Mr. Goldsmith. He was never, after the assassination, instructed not to talk to the FBI while Mr. Whitten was coordi- nating the investigation? Mr. Helms. Certainly not. We were doing our best to be as supportive and helpful as we could to the FBI. Mr. Goldsmith.. Did you serve as a point of contact between the Commission and the Agency, or was that responsibility given to someone else? Mr. Helms. I do not know that anyone in the Agency was ever designated as point of contact. I had dealings with the Commission because I had the part of the Agency that was doing - most of the work for the Commission. This was a situation indicated by the display of forces and activity rather than by anything else. I do not recall having been designated as a particular point of contact. I do not recall anyone else's. having been designated as a point of contact. | Mr. Goldsmith. | Do you recall what responsibilities, if. any, were given to Mr. Raymond Rocca? | Mr. Helms. I think in the counter-intelligence staff when set TOP SECRET .
nd co) da ta eo 22 33 24 DoclId: 32263410 bage 17 TAD CEPRET 4 Ur Seuaci 1-16 they took over this responsibility, if.you want to call it that, I believe he was the man in the counter-intelligence staff that was ‘Tesponsible for pulling things tcgether there. In other words, these Warren Commission queries would go to his desk, and the replies would come back from his desk. Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did Mr. McCone have in the investigation? Mr. Helms. As the Director of the Agency, he had a very important role. Everything we did was on his say-so and there was a constant traffic between him and me.about what we were doing with the Warren Commission, how we were handling these various matters. I believe Mr. McCone testified at the Warren Commission at one time. We would have had to brief him in preparation for his testimony and prepare the papers and so forth. He had a very real role. Mr. Goldsmith. He was actually apprised of the develop- ments and what was being given to the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms. Literally not on a day to day basis, but he was kept informed in general terms and specific terms if necessary. | | | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you. recall how many times a week you would meet with: Mr. "McCone and discuss with on the develop- ments with regard to the investigation of the assassination? Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I do not. In the Agency procedure, there was a morning meeting with the Director every day, five .
Ur otbdcl 1-17 days. a week, and I was at those meetings. What transpired at those meetings plus what transpired in his office in private meetings, I could not conceivably give you any idea. _Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you would say that Mr. McCone in was actively apprised and was not on the periphery of the Mr. Helm. Certainly not. He was actively apprised. He 8 | was very much interested, and we were all very much interested. 9 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to the ‘aivision ‘of 19 { : developments? { | responsibility in essence between the FBI and the CIA with | regard to the investigation. Would you go into somewhat more i _ - | - | detail as to the relationship between the CIA and FBI at that time? - oe , - | Mr. Helms. This crime was committed on United States. soil. ! Therefore, as far as the Federal government was concerned, the ' f into the continental limits of the United States. For It DoclId: 322763410 lpage 13 The Grra¢ry 16 | primary investigating agency would have been the Federal | 17 | Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of | | 13 |. the CIA would have been entirely supportive and it would have 2 «| nensupporeive ik <the. sense of what material we are able | ie _ Lo ; Lg 20 | to acquire outside the continental’ limits of the United States ! v| with reference to the investigation. | | e 22 1 This was the division of labor: between the FBI and the CIA. | “1 | The CIA's-mandate started at the ocean front. Ox, to put it : ou another way, the FBI+s mandate started as soon as you crossed | \ | | | |
in ~~ ay im rie in Docld: 322763410 ur SLAC! | 1-18 investigative purposes, the Agency had no investigative role inside the United States at all. So when I used here the word "supportive," I meant that in’ the literal sense of the term. We are trying to support the FBI and support the Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we were not initiating any investigations of our own or, to my recollection, were we ever asked to. Mr. Goldsmith. In your opinion, was that division of responsibility satisfactory? Mr. Helms. It was law. It was not a question of whether it. was satisfactory or not; it was law. Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. one of the purposes of this investigation is to examine the state of the law at that time and the manner in which the Agency has gone about investigating the death of the president. So, at this time, I am asking you whether in your opinion that statement of facts was satisfactory towards conducting the investigation that was involved? Mr. Helms. I do not ‘know, Mr. Goldsmith, whether on such short notice I would want to make such a~serious judgment as that. It does seem to me in any investigation that one organization has to have the primary role, otherwise you have a great. deal of confusion. I think it was proper that the FBI should have the primary role in this case. I do not recall ever having felt disadvantaged in any way in the CIA bage 19 THD SECRET : '
ia “N oo i bo doa 3 24 DoclId: 322763410 (UP SEUREI I-13 by the position we had of supporting these efforts, and that is the best answer I can give you on such short notice. : Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there were any problems between the Agency and the Bureau in conducting the | investigation? | | Mr. Helms. The only matter that comes readily to mind was the difference in the evaluation of the material of the Soviet defector named Nosenko gave. My recollection is that what this man had to say when he arrived in the United States around the time of the assassination was passed by the FBI to the Warren Commission exactly. as he said it. The CIA was responsible for handling defectors after they camé to the United States and did not feel that the bona fides or the good faith and credibility of this defector had been established at this stage of the game, and the Central Intelligence Agency felt it necessary to make that known to the Warren Commission. | There, indeed, there was a difference between the two agencies. | | Mr. Goldsmith. aside from that substantive disagreement | in the day-to-day relationship of the Bureau, can you recall whether there were problems in terms of coordinating the | investigation? | Mr. Helms. I do not recall any other problems. Mr. Goldsmith. Was information freely passed between the bage 20 TAD @CCfotT ' '
fur BeLudli 1-20 CIA and the FBI? By that, I mean the way the scenario is | | right now, the CIA is acting in a support..function to the FBI. qa Was the FBI giving information to the CIA? ‘ oS Mr. Helms. My best recollection is that there were not 5 | difficulties between the two agencies over this. As I said 6 7 | were passing along, I believe, everything that was relative. 8 I do recall when we got into certain sensitive areas a 2 couple of times during the investigation, if we felt we could not pass a piece of paper to the Warren Commission, for a) —~ at the outset, we were doing our best to be supportive. We | ee ae | example, we would go down and talk to the staff man to try ro) ed to apprise them orally of what our predicament was. ; wy) \ \ | thrust of the Agency was to be as helpful as we possibly could ae to go over the edge, if necessary. ib Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. In this case, my question wl was whether the FBI was also sending information to the Agency? ia In other words, was the FBI sharing information for your pur- . poses? 20 | Mr. Helms. I do not recall any complaints on those grounds. | Maybe they were and maybe they were not. It is a little bit a | | difficult, sometimes, to know whether you are getting something the existence of which you have never heard. Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency's investigation reflect any DoclId: 322763410 hage 21 Thp SECRET _ ss i working hypotheses? By that, did the Agency give any particular In other words, I assure you, Mr. Goldsmith, that the whole | i I \ t t
“a emphasis to thd particular areas, geographic areas? nN Mr. Helms. I think that the entire United States govern- q@ ment, not only the CIA, was very concerned as to whether there oy e@ | 4 | would be evidence of some foreign conspiracy to assassinate $ President Kennedy. They were concerned whether the Soviets 6 were involved in this. They were concerned whether the Cubans 7 | were involved in this. They were concerned that somebody may 8 | have been involved in it. 9 | I think we were all preoccupied with this. There is hardly any question there was more discussed during those days as to who was behind Lee Harvey, Oswald, if indeed he was the man who was responsible, what had affected his life, why had he done —_— —" the things he had done, and so forth. So there was a great deal of conjecturing going on. T= think if the Chair would indulge me a minute, I would like to make a comment about the various investigations into the 16 7 assassination of President Kennedy based on the tong years I 12 have spent in. the intelligence business, and that is, until the 19 day that the KGB. in Moscow or the Cuban intelligence in Havanna is prepared £o turn: over their files to the U.S. as to what | their relationships to these various people were, it is going - to be extraordinarily difficult to tidy up this case, finally, nN oO ’ t | . a4 and conclusively. 24 A. great deal of investigation aan be done, and has been ae | done. It has been. done conscientiously. I think people have = Docld: 32263410 age 22 THE SECRET
nm ae tn Qo. a 14 ’ ‘ DoclId: 322763410 @. 22 | 33 iUP OfURz! 1-22 tried over the years their very best to resolve a host of differences. I recognize also that allegations have been made that certain areas have not been as aggressively investigated as they might have been. That all may be true. But it really does not make any difference what is done in this connection until you can get those governments to lay before you their records of how they dealt with Lee Harvey Oswald, or anybody else who is relevant in this case. And, based on past experience, I doubt very mich whether youare going to get the compliarice of the Soviets or the Cuban government. But I want to make this comment, because it is extremely important and very relevant, that these cases are untidy. It 4 is only in books that they end up with all the little things worked out at the end and tied oft neatly. This aura of suspicion and all the rest of it hangs in the air. Undoubtedly that is why this Committee was formed, so undoubtedly this could be put to rest. I promise you, there is this one last step and until it can be taken, this is never going to be laid to rest. | | Mr. Devine. Do you agree, Mr. Helms, that the Likelihood of that happening is _remote? Mr. Helms. Remote. Yes, sir, I agree with that. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I believe. my question was --" Mr. Helms. Excuse me, Mr. Goldsmith. I did not mean to. age 23 FAD CEPorrT
nN aa %3 24 | iUP Scuaci digress. I thought that I would like to get this off my chest. Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. My question was, what areas received primary emphasis. I think your::answer, in part, was the area of foreign conspiracy. Are you able to give any more detail on what aspects of the foreign mnspiracy question were investigated? aspects of this, primarily. Why? Because Lee Harvey Oswald had spent time in the Soviet Union, time which never had been satisfactorily explained as far as we knew. “Nosenko arrives as a defector. There were a lot of very suspicious circumstances surrounding the whole way and timing of his defection. So that there were several areas there that seemed to require not only investigation but thought and analysis and evetything else that could be given to it. tude of President Kennedy's assassination occurs in this we have to suddenly become very careful, because accusing a foreign government of having been responsible for this act is tearing the veil. about as nastily as one can, and this can lead to a whole series of counter-actions which might be very unpleasant. | | I think all of us were keenly aware of this. It was not only true of the Soviet Union, but also true of Cuba, that. Docld: 32263410 Page 24 TRAD @EeAocT 1-23 Mr. Helms. I think we were very concerned about the Soviet I would like to say here that when a tragedy of the magni- country, it is at. this point that in our international relations | | | | | | | | | [ ! i i { |
UP otvall 1-24 President Kennedy's. whole approach to the Cuban government 2 of Fidel Castro. 3 | So that we were treading very lightly, but I am sure that “@ : 4 | we were very concerned at the time as to what we might end up E | with. And this was not improved or our mood about this was 4 | not improved when Khruschev runs to Drew Pearson in Egypt when 7 they were visiting there and tells Pearson that the Soviets, 3 | that this was a conspiracy of the right to assassinate Presi- 3 | dent Kennedy. Why does he make this remark to Drew Pearson? cd What is his purpose?» What was behind this? | | Is it a smoke screen to cover: up his own complicity? | “The air was full of these things. Therefore, we were | very conscious of it and we were doing what we could to make | sense out of it. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, was all information pertinent | to the Warren Commission's work promptly given to the Warren t | | | 17 || Commission? 13 | Mr. Helms. As far as I know... If there are indications ; .| ox evidence that. it was not, I do not recall having been aware 0 | of any sins of omission at the time. 2] Mr. Goldsmith. On the average, would you be able to tell @. - 37 || us how much time passed from the moment that information was 7 23 | receives by the\Agency until it went to the Commission? | 24 | Mr. Helms. My recollection is that as soon as we were a6 able to satisfy an inquiry, we sent the reply back. And some Docld:32263410 . Page 25 THD CIPotT .
in 73 24 DoclId: 32263410 of these inquiries obviously took longer than others. For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country. Obviously; one takes longer to perform, one act takes longex to perform than the other. Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, did you wait to receive an inguiry from the Commission prior to giving the Commission information? ' Mr. Helms. ves, I did, as I recall it. Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, did you wait to receive an. inquiry from the FBI prior to giving the. FBI information? Mr. Helms. That is my recollection. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, was any member of the Warren Commission or staff informed by the CIA of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots? Mr. Helms. I do not know. Let's clear this up right now. There is no sense in your going on asking a whole series of questions on this. I am glad to tell you what I know about it. In the first place, Mr. Allen Dulles who had about -- maybe a few months before, anyway -- ceased being Director of Central Intelligence and was replaced by Mr. McCone, was a member of the Warren Commission. Id not know what he said to the members of the Warren Commission. age 26 TAD CLPOCT - | | | | | j i { | | | | | | | |
Ur oluaci | : 1-26 Mr. McCone testified before the Warren Commission. I do not even have a clear recollection of that anymore, and I have not refreshed my memory from the Warren Commission Report. These so-called assassination plots I believe if I may put it this way -- a sloppy term which has come to cover some | | believe I was with Mr. McCone the day he testified, although I Agency had on its drawing board, if you want to put it that way -- the only assassination plot that had any even semblance or substance to it was one involving a couple of Mafia chief- tains and which were supposed to have taken place before the Bay of Pigs invasion. I guess you could call that an assassination plot. As far as the AMLASH business was concerned, I had a great stated before and I will publicly state it again, that was not i | devices which the Church Committee found evidence that the | | | | i | } | \ | ! | | | ! 1s | deal to do with the AMLASH operation and, as has been publicly | | | | | | | 17 | an assassination plot. The effort of working with AMLASH was |. 13 to see if we could find a political alternative to Castro and i9 | a-man who was prepared to lead a revolt against Castro in 20 political and military terms, inside Havanna. The assassination aspects of this which have been so highly publicized was an issue that Mr. Cubella himself kept raising, which was the simplest way to perform his mission was | | | | | | | | | to try to get rid of Castro physically. But he never attempted i - . | se § it, as far as I know, and President Kennedy had been assassinated | | | | DoclId: 322763410 age 27 TAD Crrory
‘ fe in “Mt 33 24 DoclId: 322763410 r 22 iUPr OLUvALI 1-27 before there was any possibility of his having attempted it, at least with the connivance of the Agency. -I think if one reads the record carefully of these various facts, you will find what I say is supported by the record. Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Cubella given any support by the Agency with regard to his desire to assassinate Fidel castro? Mr. Helms. In the end he was not, as far as I know. Mr. Goldsmith. Before the end, was he at any time given any support? | Mr. Helms. No. There is the famous story of the poison pen but he did not take the poisen pen. “He simply returned it to the case officer who offered it to him. There was no other device given to him, as far as I am aware. Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Mr. Dulles' knew about the so-called anti-Castro assassination plots? _ - ‘Mc. Helms. He certainly knew about the Mafia one that I mentioned. I think there is abundant evidence that he did know it. I do not have that firsthand, because that particular | operation was being handled by Mr. Bissell and Colonel Edwards with Mr. Dulles and General Cabell and I was not brought in on it. | At the time I was not a party to it. This is. all secondhand information I am giving you, based age 20 THD SECRET | | | | | | | | | | i | | | | being on the Commission. Do you know whether Mrz Dulles actualy
iUPr Sebati 1-26 on what came out of the Church Committee hearings. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. McCone knew of the plots against Castro? Mr. Helms. Yes, I think he did. Well, eventually he did. I do not know exaatly at what juncture he was informed about them. | Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, did you at any time inform the Warren Commission about these plots? Mr. Helms. I did not talk to the Warren Commission about Mr. Goldsmith. Would your position be that the anti- Castro plots were not relevant to the Warren Commission's investigation? | Mr. Helms. I would not put it that way, Mr. Goldsmith. I would not like to agree with that statement. Perhaps they were relevant. I think that is a matter of opinion. | What I would Like to say, however, is I have noted in the last two or three years that various witnesses have come forward to various Congressional Committees saying 1£ they had - known this or known'that or known something else their investigation, their attitude, their handling of the matter : “ag | would have been entirely different. But how it would have : been different is not really explained anyplace that I can find. a | | | | | f | | ' DoclId: 322763410 Hage 29 Tho @LPDLT
ined DoclId: 322763410 bur Siuarl I would like, Mr. Chairman, to make another comment, if I may, please. In 1962, in October, we had the Cuban missile crisis and to recall and refresh your memory, this was the occasion on which Fidel Castro and Khruschev connived to put intermediate range ballistic missiles on Cuban soil which had a range which could fire into the United States at least to the middle of the country, if not all the way through to California. If Khruschev had been able to pull off this trick, it | would have been the military coup of the century. The Russians| | would, in the military sense, achieve what, up to that time, they had not been able to achieve otherwise -- to hold the - | United States hostage. | At that time, the Soviets did not have intercontinental | ballistic missiles with the range or the accuracy to fire from Soviet soil to the United States. They have since | | achieved this capability but they did not have it in 1963,- | ‘I believe the military evidence will show. | obviously, President Kennedy through some good intelligence, | was provided, and by handling the situation with great skill | apie to. get those missiles withdrawn and also the bombers, | the TL-28' s which came with them. But I do not think that this operation endeared Fidel Castro to John: F. Kennedy. That was in October. In December the brigade which had i gone assure at the Bay of Pigs; the brigade of Cuban exiles dage 30 «FHP SECRET
» 45 x Z 6 x x 7 q S 8 N is) a 9 z is) & 10 z 4 11 E g 12 = © 5 13 ~ io} Nn 3 14 z £ 15 a 3 16 nN a 17 3 na 18 5 («19 2 20 21 g 22 23 24 25 | Docld: 322763410 Page 31 ft -30 referred to as No. 2506, was finally gotten out of Cuban jails as a result of an exchange organized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy of payments of medical supplies and pharmaceu- ticals and so forth. And this group came back and they were brought together in the Orange Bowl in Miami and President Kennedy addressed him. On that ocassion, he said words to the effedt that I will return this flag to this brigade in a free Hananna. I think those words are unambiguous. So in this period of the months prior to his assassination, there certainly was bad blood between President Kennedy and Fidel Castro. This was known to everybody. Whether this blood was made worse, or not made worse, by so-called assassination plots which maybe Castro knew about, or maybe he did not know about, I am unable to say. But I think there has been @ gross exaggeration which has taken place about the role that the so-called assassination plots might have played in the Warren Commission investigation. Ladies and gentlemen, what different conclusion would you suggest that the Warren Commission should have come to? Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I take it from ycur testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. rT A Bo ef fF fF FH FS
fo - ga se fi aw you about it. about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How ‘without the Director's permission. IP oebadsl assassination plots. Mr. Helms. I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations. Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask Is that not true? Mr. Helms. Yes, but how do you know they did not know was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else Mr. Goldsmith.. Did you ever discuss with the Director Castro assassination plots? Mr. Helms. I did not, as far as I recall. if any the Warren Commission was giving to the theory that the Kennedy assassination was part of a Cuban conspiracy, a ‘Castro conspiracy? Mr. Helms. I’ do not know what consideration was given to it. Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to the issuance of the Warren Doclda: 32263410 plage 3200—CO TAD RECRIT whether the Warren. Commission should be informed of the anti-» Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know, in 1963, what consideration .
ur SLoHLI 1-32 | | | Commission's report, did the CIA at any time have any documents | = or other information which indicated that Castro may have known about the CIA anti-Castro's assassination plots? sa vat Mr. Helms. I do not recall any, Mr. Goldstein. Maybe tn . : 9 | tion into this issue? there were, maybe there were newspaper articles. I do not have 6 any recollection of that anymore... I believe this allegation | 7 | has been made. I do not have any firsthand recollection. | . . . . eet { 8 Mr. Goldsmith. .Did the. Agency ever..conduct:anvinvestiga- |; | i 19 Mr. Helms. I do not know. | a | Mrv Goldsmith. During the time that you were DCI, ao you | i2 know whether the Agency ever conducted an investigation into . @ i3 this issue?) . 7 . : Td | Mr. Helms. Te it did -- | | Mr. Craig. Could I clarify what issue you are talking | 1s | about here? | both th ; | I7 | Mr. Heims. The issue I am concerned out now is whether a | the Agency had any information that Castro may have known about | 1g |] the assassination plots against him. | | | 20 | Mr. Craig. Whether the Agency conducted an investigation of 21 | that issue? | | @: 39 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. | . | Mr. ‘eine. I would have. thought, Mr. Goldsmith, that since — t | the Agency was operating against Cuba not only in 1962, '63, | t | | | | { | ace. i'64, probably '65, that if those allegations were made by | t eEPRET le DoclId: 322763410 Plage 33 TAD
Ur OLbaci | 1-33 | 1 | agents of the FBI or the Secret Service or the Coast Guard 2} or the Agency itself that the Agency would have, in the 3 | interests of protecting its operations, would have done its y tn were not able to find out. I would have thought that there 4 || would have been an ongoing series of operations in this regard | | @ 4 best to find out if this were true. It is just maybe they | | | | 7 Mr. Goldsmith. You do not recall specifically one way or 3 another? 5 Mr. Helms. No. 9 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the fact that the Warren Commission was | 12 | by you, did that reflect: a desire on your part to avoid Mr. Helms. I do not recall ever having any thoughts of | oe! 1 not told about the anti-Castro assassination plots, at least | { | | | { | thet kind in regard the investigation of the Warren Commis- | sion. One of the difficulties I had with this question is. | having the Agency? | i | i} | | | i | | 7 | ever Since Senator Schweiker's report was made, which made a ay Lat i 13 great deal out of this, I have never had an opportunity to } jtalk to the people who were associated with me at the time to | ifind out just exactly who knew what about what in those days. a |: . > Muarterbacks and it seems to me this is one of the outstanding | az | examples of Monday morning quarterbacking. - ! . The United States, after all, is a nation of Monday morning x | Mr. Goldsmith. Mrz Ambassador, was there any desire on your | 1 part to avoid an international crisis by not telling the Warren ‘| | | | | | | | | = n Y t 1 | DocId:32263410 Page 34 . THR CrrOory
ir ofbic! 1-34 | vere Commission about the anti-Castro assassination plots? wD Mr. Helms. The thought never occurred to me, Mr. Goldsmith As far as our volunteering infezmation is concerned, I have | no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not. | | ; 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. | In summary then, is it your position that | o ©} 4 the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in - 5 | response to specific requests by the Warren Commission? 8 | Mr. Helms. That is correct. | 7 ‘ I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallible. 8 | There may have been times or circumstances under which something 9 different might have occurred, but my recollection of those : 10 | days is that we were attempting to be responsive and rnin MY | of the. FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for | 32 | something, we gave it to them. | i . | | Mr. Goldsmith. In retrospect, do you think that was a H ‘ 16 i workable. arrangement? | qi. Mr. Helms. Yes, I thought so. ; | | ; 13 | Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, other than the anti-Castro 19 assassination plots, was there any other information pertaining 20 | to a possible mede o£ means or opportunity to kill the 3) || President that the Warren Commission was not told about? @:. 22 i Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. Sy “3 | Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever inform President Johnson about | ra | the anti-Castro assassination plots? . as Mr. Helms. I do not like the term. You use it over and : Docld: 32263410 dae 35 TRS QePeryT
Nw de 73 24 ' i ee ee er nn | a term, I will make an effort to accommodate you. would like to say is that %. was President Johnson informed —————————————————— SS ew ee wee ee ee ee + Gur Sfuus! over again. I do not like it. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, if you would give me Mc. Helms. That would be kind of you. I think what I of our efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro. Mr. Goldsmith. will you answer that question? Mr. Helms. Yes, he was informed. Mr. Goldsmith. At what time? Mr. Helms. At various times after he became President. Mr Goldsmith. Was he told specifically about your efforts to get rid of Castro prior to the assassination of President . Kennedy? ; Mr Helms. Yes, he was. Me. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether he was specifically told about the AMLASH plot? | Mr. Helms. I do not recall whether I ever discussed the AMLASH plot, or the AMLASH operation, as such. I do not have. any recollection of it. | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether President Johnson was apprised of the involvement of some of the Mafia figures in this operation? Mr. Helms. He was. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when he was so apprised? - Mr. Helms... I do. veorasaeaezate phage 36 THPp ereary
dur Olde! Mr. Goldsmith. Would you so inform the Committee? Mr. Helms. Yes. I have not testified to this before because I have no written doctmentation to “support this, but -s reported these warious matters to President Johnson on May loth, I believe, 1967. Mr. Goldsmith. How are you able to remember the date so well at this time, Mr. Ambassador? Mr. Helms. I do not like the implication of the question, at this time. Mr. Goldsmith. ‘Mr. Ambassador, I am not in a position to quarrel with you over the way my questions are phrased. I would like to know -- Mr. Helms. The implication is that I declined to identify it: on some previous occasion. | Mr. Goldsmith. ‘I am sorry. That is not the inference I | was: intending to suggest. My question is a very simple one: a7 are you able to remember today the specific date? Mr. Helms. After I returned from Tehran and had some time available to me, I had an opportunity to dig back and get ahold of some colleagues’ and talk to various people toctry to range in on what time period it was that these matters came up ll and how they were dealt with, the so-called IG. Report that I i] he +3 | asked to have done at the Agency. i) tf Therefore I wanted to try to specify the date on which I a=. 2 § reported to President Johnson about this IG Report. I was. able | | | | | | i | | | | | | | | | | DocId: 322763410 Phge a7 oo THD SeCgry
aa se acl aw | i he UP webiicd 1-37 to relate it to another matter I discussed with him on that occasion, and therefore I was able to specify.the date. Mr. Goldsmith.. Mr. Ambassador, what effect; if any, did the CIA's concern with protecting sources and methods as provided by law have @n the information that was provided to the Warren Commission? Mr. Preyer. This is the second bell on the vote. Before we go into that answer, the Committee will stand in recess for about ten minutes. (A brief recess was taken.) Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its hearing. I understand that it is agreeable with you to proceed at this time, even in the absence of a quorum. Mr. Helms. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I repeat the question that I asked you prior to the brief recess. What effect, if any, did the agency's concern for protecting sensitive sources and methods have gn the information that it provided to the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I cannot recall any specific ‘oircumstances if there were any where this question of protec- ting sensitive sources and methods caused. us difficulty. As I said earlier this morning, somewhere in the back of my mind there may have been an instance or two where we did not particularly want to put something in writing to the Warren! Docld: 322763410 dlage 33 ; TAP SrPory -
UP DLyALi 1-38 Commission so that it would come to reside in our files, become a part of the permanent record. someone went down and talked to a member, a couple of members of the Warren Commission staff so that they would be privy to. the information without necessarily having it in writing. I do want to repeat what I said earlier, that we were oo “~ Oo Nn w& tw ote doing’ our level best to be responsive and we were bending over backward or frontward, any way you like, to be as responsive as we could, even when sensitive sources and methods were I think that you will find, if I just might add this, that | But in a couple of those cases -- and I believe there were | | | free 7 | | we turned over to the FBI, for example, material from a mail- { . : | ordering operation which the Agency was conducting in those days which was considered about as sensitive as anything that we were doing. tive agency method or information that came from a sensitive 1 { 1 an were informed about. information that either reflected a sensi- | | | | agency source, was the source of that. information actually )given to the Warren Commission? > 4 “Mr. Helms. I do. not know. I am sorry, I do not know. . i) Ww We very seldom gave the names of sources to anybody, under —_ 731 ve | any circumstances. We usually tried to describe the source in . ; ss i some fashion which would be helpful in evaluating the material. ‘ Docld: 32263410 Hlage 39 | TAD CtPory | Mr. Goldsmith. When the Warren Commission staff or =} | | ! | | | | | | | | | t
ivr ofuaci be ! LoS) \9O But we practically never gave the names of individuals who nN | Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, Mr. Ambassador, I would like you to refer to what has been marked as CIA Document No. 1907. were informants or agents or anything of that kind. 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling the Committee, then, while - © 4 | the Warren Commission might be told about the substance of 5 | the information generated from a sensitive source or method 6 | of operation that the specific source and method would not ? | necessarily be disclosed? | 9 | in every instance. I am really trying to give you what was 10 : the normal operating procedure. | | | | | For your reference purposes, I would like to indicate that you L : - om been given a series of volumes of materials, materials | | Mr. Helms. Not necessarily, but I do not know what happened | | | | containing CIA documents. | i , : } ‘ | | The Agency has numbered those documents for the Committee. | You will note if you open up, in this case, volume number : two, on the lower right-hand corner of each page, it states 19 | page 1 of -- in this case, 212. 20 +1 ||} document number I am referring to. Immediately above that on @ . 3 | each page there is another number of four digits -- for example, 7 4 lier appears on. page 1 | | | | There are 212 pages in this volume. That is not the | | | | | When I say CIA Document. No. 1907, that would refer to , t Ww tor = what appears on page 1034 of 212. For the future, I will be DocId: 32263410 oye 40 TRD RECUCT -
1UP S2bAci ' referring only to the CIA identification number. | : 2 Mr. Helms. All right. 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. That is the practice we have been utilizing in and . c Y 4 | throughout the hearing im depositions. 5 | CIA 1907 «is a brief for presentation to the President's 6 | Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy and I woul 7 | ask you to look at CIA No. 1910 and read to yourself paragraph 8 E. | ] | Mr. Helms. Paragraph E. 10 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. "| (Pause) 7 32 Mr. Helms. All right. | | | | | : Mr. Goldsmith. Mrz Ambassador, does this paragraph | | accurately reflect the Agency's attitude towards sensitive | | | | 1s | sources and methods and the way in which information touching 1s | apon sensitive sources and methods was handled with the Warren 47 || commission? | ~ 4s | | Mr. Helms. I believe so. I do not believe any reason to ig | quarrel with what is in that paragraph. | 20 | er. Goldsmith. In the last sentence of this paragraph, they is a reference to channels and procedures that have functioned very well between the Commission and the Agency. Would you apprise the Committee as to specifically which channels and ed . —" =o oe procedures were established in communicating this information to the Warren Commission? > n sasst Docld: 322763410 Phage 41 TAD CQSPOLT
DoctId: in oo 10 | be authorized to go down and explain it and sit. down with them i3 | its staff express its concern to you that sources and methods { Mr. Helms. I would assume, Mr. Goldsmith, that what they are attempting to say here is certain individuals who are familiar with the question at issue were authorized to sit down and talk with the Warren Commission staff members about the operation or about the information. I do not recall there was any structured way that this was taken care of. I think it was. | If you were the individual most conversant with the problem you might be authorized to go down, or maybe your Chief would and go over it. Mr. Goldsmith. Did anyone from the Warren Commission or 14 | by virtue of not being provided to the Warren Commission = | session were causing a problem to the Commission. or its 16 | staff? | | Mr. Helms. I do not recall this, Mr. Goldsmith. — - 13 | . Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area now, are you able 19 | to state whether Me. Dulles played any special role in the 20 | Warren Commission in so “far as the Agency was concerned. 2 Mr. Helms. I am not able to make any comment about it 2y | at all. | “| Mr. Goldsmith: Are you able to state, for example, whether. ve Mr. Dulles represented the interests of the CIA while on the 322763410 B %.Warren Commission? i bee a2 TAR ereReT
iUr Siudel | 1-42 1 | Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not know what interests he represented. Having known Mr. Duiles for ®) many, Many years; I would have thought that he would have -s, @ 4 || acted very responsively as a member of the Commission and gs | tried to represent the United States' interests. P Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Dulles ever pass on to you Warren - Mr. Helms. Not that I recall. In fact, I do not remember 9 having seen Mr. Dulles at all during this period. If I did, it must have been on very rare occasions. Mr. Goldsmith. For example, Mr; Dulles, never briefed you er any Agency personnel on Warren Commission matters? | Mr. Helms. I did not say that he did not talk to anyone be | else in the Agency. I do not recall his ever briefing me. oe $e | | | ‘ Commission-related information? | | | | | t i | |e was a very responsible individual, Mr. Dulles. I cannot | imagine his doing anything that he would have felt was — | ' | | t peo 17 ; - 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I am going 9 to move. on to another line of-inquiry unless you or any other 0 | members have any questions. 3 Mr. Preyer. ~Mrs. Burke? Mrs: Burke. No. | Mr. Preyer, I have no questions at this time, Mr. Gold- SSS ee SS smith. You may proceed. 7% Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what role, if any, did the i |
iUP S2bu 1-44 1 | Mr. Helms. I think that is a fair statement. ™, 2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall who the Chief of Station was 3 ! in Mexico City? To refresh your memory, was it Mr. Winn Scott? ot Y ) 4 | Mr. Helms. Yes, that is correct. | 7 Mr. Goldsmith, ‘Are you able to give the Committee an ‘| assessment of Mr. Scott's competence as the Chief of Station? | Mr. Helms! Well, in. the first place, Mr. Scott came to 8 9 || He was a man of experience. He served a long time in Mexico 10 City, or =a comparative long time if you look at these overseas | assignments in terms of a tour of duty of two or three years. He spoke Spanish, and he was regarded as one of our more —— competent station chiefs. Mr. Goldsmith... Do you know whether or not Mr. Scott we oe nee ee ee | | the CIA after having been an agent for some years of the FBI. | | | | | | | | | id ve] maintained an adequate system of records and files in the ia! : 6 Mexico City station? i s : 7 Mr. Helms. I do not have any recollection of this. In As | oe ; a - | 13 ll fact, I do not recollect this having been an issue. 1s | - Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Scott had a .|personal safe? 20 - | Mr. Helms. No. 2] r | Mr. Goldsmith. Is it customary for agency chiefs of station, at 22 | Co ; ae nyt? maintain a personal safe? Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that that 24 | lwassentirely up to them, “if they wanted a personal safe or if to iH : ; ! : Docld: 32263410 Hage 45 TAD CrpotyT
| Ur ive i 1-45 | | they did not want a personal safe. I see nothing about it . | ~ ; 2 | one way or the other. ; ; an _ Mr. Goldsmith. After Mr. Scott's death in '70 or '71, do | y r 4 | you know why Mr. James Angleton went to Mexico City and removed | 5 | documents from Mr. Scott's personal safe? Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Angleton ever get materials from rex) Mr. Scott's safe to you? 6 Mr. Helms. No, I do not. Mr. Helms. I do not recall ever having seen them. This was.in 1971, you say? | | t Ho | -..Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. | Mr. Helms. I do not recall having seen them, Mr. Goldsmith In fact, I do not recall the trip. I am not for a moment | ‘ i implying it did ’not take place, I just do not recall it at all... I just knew that Mr. Scott died suddenly, I believe of P heart attack. But he had left the Agency at that time, I oe oe en ee A I RL re ‘ | | 16 | 17 | believe. Is that correct? _ 7 a 13 | Mr. Goldsmith. He had retired. i9 Ht Mr. Helms. Retired and living in Mexico City? : | So 20 | Mr. Goldsmith. That is also correct. Mr. Helms. Right. I do not know what Mr. Angleton tock. Mr. Goldsmith. You never seht Mrs Angleton to Mexico City _33|to remove materials from his safe? i} . , . a4 Mr. Helms. I may have authorized the trip on the basis of what I was told at the time. In 1978, I do not remember the Docld:.322763410 Blage 46 TRS Qrrgry
1-46 trip. Let me just say here that this is not solid information _I am giving you, but there may have been some concern that | Agency's work and the Agency just wanted to double check and be sure there was not anything:of that kind there. I think that would be a normal practice, particularly if a’ fellow maybe Scott had something in his safe that might affect the died so suddenly and there we were. | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Ann Goodpasture? | Mr. Helms. Ann Goodpasture, yes. Mr. Goldsmith. In what capacity did you know her? es Mr. Helms. She was a staffer of the Agency and I believe | | she served in Mexico City for=a time. : Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know nether during her stay in Mexico City she was commonly known as Winn Scott's righthand | person? : | Mr. Helms. I do not recall in that connection, but I | believe she was there | quite some time. | | | Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination, Mr. anbassador, did you review the cable and dispatch traffic that flowed | between the Mexico City station and headquarters? ‘Mr. Helms. After the assassination? Mr> Goldsmith. Yes, sir. Mr. Helms. I certainly saw some of the cables. I am simply | incapable of saying today of. what I saw, how many of them I saw,; » n a Docld: 32263410 vhye a7 TAS CERRET
tur OLvHL! because I think, in some circumstances, I would have been briefed, I would have been told here are the circumstances, . what. should we do? But I do not know whether I reviewed individual cables or whether I did not. Mr. Goldsmith. Who was primarily responsible for reviewing the cable traffic and dispatch traffic between the Mexico City station and headquarters, specifically with regard to the assassination? > Mr. Helms. -I think in regard to the assassination the branch that ran or had the control or support of the Mexico> City station, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere division, the staff chiefs who are responsible for various aspects of the operation like positive intelligence and counter-intelli- i gence, I undoubtedly read a number of them myself. I just i do not know which ones anymore. Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier we made reference to Mr. Whitten || being responsible for reviewing cable traffic pertaining to the assassination. After the responsibility for the investiga- tion was given to the CI staff, do you know whether anyone on the CI staff was given the responsibility for reviewing i the cable traffic that flowed from the Mexico City station and - ‘~headquarters? Mr. Helms. No, I do: not: know-that this responsibility was given specifically, but.I would have thought that if Mr. Rocca, DoclId: 322763410 hye 43 THO CECRryT
er wiv d 1-48 City matters, he would have wanted to review the traffic. Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against the Cuban whom you:.mentioned earlier this morning, were handling Mexico and Soviet embassy and consulates? Mr. Helms. My recollection was during that period they not only had photographic surveillance of both of the embassies, | but they also had telephonic or wiretaps on both of the | embassies. | Mr. Goldsmith. Was information related to Oswald obtained | as a result of these operations? | | Mr. Helms. ves, it was. | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information was mse Mr. Helms. My impression is that when he called one or the other of the embassies that this was picked up and trans- ‘was a fellow named Oswald who had called. | i cribed and it was. in that way that they found out that there. Mr. Goldsmith. ‘Do you recall whether there was any other information obtained regarding Oswald as a result of these | surveillance operations? Mr. Helms. I do not recall anymore. It seems to me that there was a great controversy back at that time over the | photograph. of an individual. (Pause) Mr. Goldsmith. I will repeat my question. poora:32263410 tage a9 . THP SECRET ., |
ivr oLvaci Other than the information that was obtained concerning Oswald as a result of the telephonic surveillance operation, was any other information obtained about him as a result of the surveillance operations that you had in Mexico City? da 5 , Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not remember. I remember, 6 | obviously, the telephone thing because that became such a key 7? issue later on. I do not remember whether they had other 8 information on them or not. | 9 | Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission given information 10 on Oswald's contact with the embassies? VW | Mr. Helms. As far’as I know, it was. 12 4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall at that time whether the i . Commission was specifically told about the:source of the information? i Mr. Helms. I believe this is what this must refer to here. When you are asking me to read paragraph HE, that I would have assumed that the technical questions involved here was those — a | ied nD —~ —~ oe ———— <—_ SS -gsurveillance devices. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the Warren Commission was told about the specific surveillance operations? Mr. Helms. No. | Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would ask you to refer ‘to CIA document number 2144 which also appears in Volume 2. Mr. Helms. My volume 2 only goes up to 2071.-— > n = f Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. I stand corrected. It is in DoclId: 32263410 vlage 50 TR SE CeeT .