»efore was one of pretty much i , words, we wanted ‘his cooperation aad oe reasonable manner, but his preference was ng, to. want to go out socially all the tim . ° continue to work. And the most importa: 2 decision to confront him with inconsist mt ia and passing it on. rene ay iving conditions, were rmitted to leave. He was not penny to ’-to-day treatment, not the actual i Ay | al int - recreation, was that changed at that tines: ? that early. I don’t remember that......-0 = is it correct interrog ‘sions that Nosenko was interrogated ular subareas on which he was interrogated know. Subject areas? This is 2 a guess, this i by - was made based: on what the CIA pooh | get an.admission.and to break on.that. * on points that.they had collateral on. By aid what this man is saying is not the truth and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this. vere tactical considerations relating to pos.’ : interrogato i Y sd the ot the wee 4 t Ts which then offered the’ normally the case, gives you oth } , , . er bi -. ts to be interrogated was essentially a tae. : that after April 4 the subj d ’ ubject areas 7 nim, aa him, as opposed to a desire ; in you i i the operation your role as an intelligence \mpression. The answer is yes beca vee man was not telling the truth, they * Aig be untrue and that, therefore, made « r his behavior and his statements were i not appear to make sense to accept as 5, you could be sure that that data was in coubts about this, leaving aside the moti- ow which he presented it, that the * * * * tbstance of what Nosenko had to say about — ‘ean, when he first said it back in February ‘ stance of it? iing I said would be polluted b i So m ist of the message’ was that Oswald was ‘nce Services, that he was never debriefed ecause I was personally i \ eally pin it down. y involved in the tent by Nosenko? ; delieve that it would be possibl mained indifferent to the arrival in bee >perator who had served at what was an ' ‘O be strange. It was only later, I think 2r ramifications began to emerge that it me even more unusual. eems to me almost to have been tack : cked o. ‘ dn’t seem to be part of the real body. of 5 ee eee Pn ee ee the’ other things. that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand that Nosenko was—much of what he said was true. Mr. Kem. You are talking about other areas? ot ; Mr. Murpxx. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn’t have much relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one coincidence - but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there.and all that sort of thing. That is what I mean: s = ® * * : .. * Mr. Kiern. Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept in Nosenko’s statements about Oswald? Mr. Murgpuy. Yes, that they just—this is part. of the first one—no contact was . ever made, that he went up to. Minsk and lived happily and well with no contact. The ‘Soviet Union with foreigners don't do that.-I mean, :he is the only. person. Read the accounts of what happened to this poor. gentleman, what happened to Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of him on the layout of the American Embassy. It didn’t seem to be possible. Fa ; ’ Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn’t constitute any breakthrough. It seemed to me to be strange. | ; : . Mr. KLEIn.: Would you distinguish between first. the fact: that nobody debriefed Oswald when he first .came to the Soviet Union, nobody tried to find out what he knew..aS a marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they - dedided to allow him to stay, nobody -debriefed him to find’ out if he was some kind of a Western security agent or working for CIA? " “ Mr. Murpuy. Yes, they would be two different points. ‘The first. point clearly involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this background and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence technical point of view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet what did the blips look like. I don’t think they had many American radar operators handling: operational traffic involving U-2's. . . Mr. Kie1n. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although the KGB knew Oswald was a marine, they did not bother to question him, and because of that, never knew that he was a radar operator or that he worked at the base from which the U-2’s took off and landed? Mr. MurpxHy. I think it would be strange. : My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector, there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be.properly the out- fit that would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a marine about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn’t require that he be known to have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a—they would talk to him about bis military affiliation just as we would. ; I realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think the Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don’t believe they are. J think they are very, very, very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Ameri- cans is that they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental competence that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a private in the East German Border Guards, period. The GRU would be interested in talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals and what have you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell all. I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or many other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere - of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally important to the. Soviet Union and we can’t understand it. ~ . ‘Yuri may be right, be may be right, but at the time it was very hard to believe. _ . * * * * * . * * Mr. Kern. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko’s statements about Oswald? Mr. Murpuy. And other things. — Mr. Ktetn. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn’t questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald was?
ass 3404522. 534 Mr. Murpnry. I honestly couldn’t find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone that the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this . case, were handling it directly. I don’t know of any former Soviet intelligence | officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter . who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it. Mr. Kier. During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would it be fair to say tliat the questions relating to Oswald and the problems whieh you have just been discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area for questioning and in interrogating Nosenko? Mr. MurpxHy. Probaby not. Mr. Kien. Why would that have been? Mr. Murpxy. Because there were many other areas which posed. equally inter- ‘esting aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred ° abroad and involved collateral knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in the Soviet Union. Mr. Kiern. Who in the Soviet ‘Russia. division made the decision ¢ as to. who. ‘would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4? ’ Mr. Mourpxry. [CIA employee], chief of the group. Mr. Kiemn. And do you know of any criteria that he used ‘to pick his inter- rogators? ‘Mr. Mureuy. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko’s English was not good, _the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the first. place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is liable to go back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don’t want to expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in depth, know it in depth and therefore,'so they use the officers that they had available and there. were a variety of criteria. Mr. Kiein. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is ‘our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn’t know anything about Oswald’s background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason that such a person would be used that you can tell us? Mr. MurpHy. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had, he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations. I wasn’t sure of the point he didn’t know about Oswald. I am not sure very many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time. Mr. Kxe1n. Two points—— Mr. Murpuy. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was level- headed, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer. Mr. Kien. But wouldn’t—— Mr. Morpuy. I don’t know that he didn’t, that he wasn’t what you are saying, he knew nothing at all about Oswald’s case. I find that difficult to believe. But I don’t know. Mr. Kern. ‘Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I told you the officer who interrogated. Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that they would not, if they didn’t have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn't do that? Mr. Murpry. I would certainly think-so. Mr. Kuen. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, let me be frank, we-spoke to the particular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from that, it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that . he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would that be—— Mr. Murpxry. That wouldn’t surprise me because there were very few people, relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of interrogation experience. We hadn’t done a lot of very many hostile CIA debrief- ings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad,
one, or I am- not aware of ine those ‘officérs concerned with Te ‘of any former Soviet intelli :om they spoke about this matter omeone did, I never heard of it. _ od, -beginning: in April 1964, would ‘0 Oswald and the problems which Oswald constituted’ a major area er areas which posed equally in ich more and which had oneurea hich obviously is not easy for us sion made the decision as to who. 42. ° oup. . cia that he used to pick his inter- ts Nosenko’s English was n. N : : ot tis one of the aspects of the ork sople because you..then lose. I 7 > th - In th ly hostile guy: who,.is liable. to: go." her side, and ‘so you don’t want to_ t a good idea to simply bri: ; a npl ng a died the case and became in depthe he officers that they had available nversations about 4. week ago, it is ygated Nosenko about the Oawala sewald, ‘he didn’t know anything swald at all. Is there ran tell us? ne any reason thought the point was that h L e had ie CI debriefings or interrogations. bout Oswald. I am not sure very 1an was available at the time. s chosen was because he wa ; b 8 level- ding to be with the case for the Chat is why he was used. And his »f many, he is a very good officer. iat he wasn't what you are sayi \ ing, find that difficult to believe. Butt : a hypothetical situation, wher knew nothing about Oswald Stier you think that was unusual that: ready who knew about Oswald, at a A to Z, everything that the CIA unusual, that they didn’t do that? was the other point I made t :, let me be frank, we spoke to the r knowledge is gained from that ‘ped up deposition that what I gay s, but my recollection of it is that derience, and my question is would cause there were very few peo le, leed elsewhere who had a lot of of very many hostile CIA debrief- probably otherwise, either abroad, ocTd:32404522 Page 56 a, ~~ H.- me eee a ar ee seen, oO might have had experience, squads and squads. of highl _-eould be used to interrogate him? . ‘except. what I men °. we thought we were going -. whether to give him drugs in or . putas far as.I. know and in) - those years, it is your statement that if but I know it might sound strange. There just wasn’t y trained fluent Russian speaking CI experienced’ _ interrogators. “ Be _ ee uld point out to you is that I have listened to a Mr. Kien. One thing I wo number of tapes,"and all of the ones I have listened:to were totally in English, there was no Russian. - Mr. Mugpqy. Yes. . a Mr. KLEIN. My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major operation in the Bureau in 1964? Lob . Mr. MurrpHy: It was an important operation, an important case. Mr. Krein.’ And yet there was nobody with interrogation experience who ; himself had a lot of background in this field. I can’t’explain “why. the officer who debriefed him on Oswald did not have prior:briefing on Oswald tioned to you the ‘other day, because it was not a thing’ that to get- through on,: because we were weak in that area at that time. — Mr. Kixin,, Was Nosenko ever given any drugs? iE 7 . Mr: Murpxy..Not to my knowledge... .. . a & . so Mr. Kien; Were there ever any conversations in which you took: part about - der to get him to tell the truth? - : i: : Mr. MureHy: There were many, many conversations all the time about various things that could be done, all the techniques that are known,:to get him to talk, discussions with the m the case, there was never any decision made.or any attemp because none of them appeared to be likely to produce result: be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results. Z oe lost control over the’ ease, ‘in: Mr. Kiern; Between 1964 and 1967 when you any drugs were given to him, to get him and no such thing happened? t ‘made to use these, : sand they all would to tell the truth, you would have known about it, Mr. MurpxHy. That is correct. * * * * * * * a . Mr. Kien. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in 1964, in April? : : Mr. Mourpxy. Yes, sir. Mr. Kren. Do you know the result of that test? Mr. Murry. It indicated he was lying on several key points. Mr. Kie1n. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid? Mr. MurpxHy. No. : . ; Mr. Kier. Are you aware that he was given a second lie detector ‘test in 1966? ; Mr. Morpxy. Yes. Mr. Kizr1n. Do you know the result of that test? Mr. Murrxy. Same thing. . ; Mr. Kuer1n. And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid? Mr. Murpxy. No; I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the same operator who gave him the test in 1964. . Mr. Kier. That is correct. ~ : . "vy, EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS ‘AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINA- TIONS . ee oo INTRODUCTION Ina further effort to clear up the facts surrounding Nosenko’s claims that his statements to the CIA should not be used to impeach his pres- ent testimony, the committee took depositions from FBI and CIA agents who were present during the 1964 interviews. These agents were "Me MuppHy. I am ‘sure some of the: people had interrogation experience, I MG _ mean, [CIA:employee] Pe, edical officer’ who handled « ~ s
Ze. INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION é OF: PRESIDENT JOHN F , KENNEDY 42.9 ‘SECOND SESSION _ SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21;°1978 “VOLUME IIL. Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations U8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 41-372 O WASHINGTON : 1978 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government ‘Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 :
On September. 25,1978, Mr. Katzenbach the Sollowing letter supplementing his testi 3 es! questions therein ‘réecordad “4s subject. to: corrections On my return to my ‘office this morning I checked on the notes | of meetings which were: kept by.my‘secretary, and ‘they confirm Mr. Helms' recollection... am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the wt —_ calendar. Although it is clear from this page that there was such a - , _ meeting, I continue to hav; absolutely no recollection of it, and there- . . fore cannot tell you what/was discussed beyond what is stated in the 4 calendar itself, Hew York. It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley madé such notes.. I believe Mr .. Foley is now.deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have. some recollection of the meeting.’ ge, “s es _~ “Yhad} prior ‘to'my testimony; checked my. calendar diary for the “period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investi- gation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While.
this calendar does not: refresh my récollection and therefore w change my testimony, it did seem to me that jaiatie to. b Committee and Mr. Helms I should make at ave lable “Hon. Richard C. Helms | mas
20° have a say in what happens with respect 2rtainly was involved with decisions on ; to end, but I-was_ not. the controlling re were three major agency reports that » the Nosenko case; specifically there was by the Soviet Russia Division, another | the Office of Security report, and then.a red to as the Hart report. ther you are familiar with all three of ll any‘longer whether I read the first two _ riefed.on their.contents. The Hart report the agency. in early February 1973 and I - onnections with it since. | [ missed: the question. 7 ; asking precisely during his defection in in the. United States, was Yuri Nosenko,| : . That was an accepted ‘procedure under - 4 2ragency Defector Committee that defec- intry were handled by the CIA, through ; = 2settling period, whatever had to be done iat the legal authority under which he k that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you like to answer that question a little bit dulge me. nly. go, un September 20, 1978, I received a ‘before this committee in executive ses- reviewing that transcript I noted that, er, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko’s between 1964 and 1969 in a number of is an area of obvious interest to the » take this opportunity to. describe my { greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen- entral Intelligence Agency was. a lawyer ‘nor a judge, so I was not conclusions about Mr: Nosenko’s tenure ce Agency..I’m sorry, I am not prepared. Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko re- 2d to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko’s npanied by a claim that he could give a ee Harvey Oswald’s. contacts in connec- Oswald’s stay in the Soviet Union be- 2 the significance that Yuri Nosenko’s ivestigation of President Kennedy’s as- turned out to be a bona fide defector, if ing his defection in 1964 and upon his _ tes was Yuri Nosénko in the-custody of: Docld:32404599 Page 62° 21 scinformation were to be believed, then we could conclude that KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do ‘with Lee Harvey gwald in 1963 and ‘therefore had ‘nothing to do with President ‘Kennedy’s murder. eo, oo, — f; on the. other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programed in ance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if Mr. Nosenko was giving us’ false information.about Oswald’s con- tacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was: fair for us to surmise that:there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November 1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent hen he shot President Kennedy. | re Tf it were shown: that.Oswald was in fact acting as.a Soviet agent: ‘when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United: States.of America and, indeed, to the world, ‘would have been.. staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to. .. of March it was clear. to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosen-:: . -.\: ko’s credibility would not.beeasy. = : “Qn April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of -Plans,-I, along with: ~ David Murphy; Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr. Lawrence’: | R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA; met with: Mr. -Nicho-': as Katzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General: of: the United: _Btates; Mr.-J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Divi-. sion, of. the Justice. Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who. was: . “-then Mr. Yeagley’s First Assistant in the Internal Security Divi-! sion; and Mr. Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in: the Justice Department. ; The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach’s office in the Justice. ‘Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosen- .ko’s legal ‘status in the United States and to anticipate what kind '.of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency’s ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko. ‘8 The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the _ record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting ‘on: April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the ‘substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day, ‘April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the ‘Agency on September 18, 1978,.and I would like to. make them part he record of these proceedings. , uring the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice ‘was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko’s status with the Agency and the Department’s opinion was ‘requested as to the scope of the gency’s ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko. ake Ag Mr. Houston’s memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko’s technical .. Status in the United States was one of “exclusion and parole,” f Which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had “technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had also temporarily “paroled him” to the custody of the Central Intel- . ligence Agency, /< It is my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that Mr. Nosenko would remain in the-custody. of the Agency unless it ~ Was determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or _ whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States. this:Government to determine the bona fides of Mr..Yuri Nosenko.,; Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end:
24 statement of some employee or something. He was designated by. the present Direc- tor to come here and present the story because’ he was “supposed to be the most familiar with.it since he had reviewed it for the CIA. — Pee OR TED tag Sie SB : He ‘stated: in-substance, Mr. Nosenko. was ‘taken .into:custody: in’ this country by the CIA after defection or after.alleged defection, held in.a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice’a day, was allowed .no reading material. The were instructed neither to talk to him or smile to him. He was subjected to 48 hours *. at a crack interrogation. This being while they: built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as ‘a bank‘vault, and. then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there under. the ‘equivalent of some ‘3 years’ with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be " specific, at which point they finally gave up and. gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll and let him go. . “oe : ..And.then, they gave as their—I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that:.Did they have any kind of process, and they. said other. than the fact that.Mr. = And I just found it awfully. difficult to believe that. And that is why—and I don’t -- “jmagine.it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK ‘enough that __ you would ‘not rather clearly.remember the incident if it had occurred.” ~ ar . ‘Mr. KArzensacu. If the facts‘that you have just'set forth to me, Congressman, "ad ever. been made known to me, I-would recollect it; I am certain;.and I would hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that'is claimed. . :.- Mr. Saywer..It makes me feel better about it. Thank you. ; a -:: ‘That is all have, Mr. Chairman. ae ae ; ..... Having -heard Mr. Katzenbach’s testimony of yesterday, can you “reconcile his testimony to, this committee with your. statement just .. read to:this committee? ". a ee “Mr, Hes. I can only say, Mr: Stokes, that it is very hard to ~* reconcile. I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the “meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the meeting is something he was. not responsible‘ for as. far as I.am aware. _- Let me read to you the memorandum ‘for the record which Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel of CIA, wrote on April 3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case. It reads: a Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opin- ion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I pointed out. that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole—or more technically, deferment arid parole. Paragraph 2: ’. After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representa- tives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position by telephone. ; . . 1 in turn, after the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided .an interpretation thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto. Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. . The.attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memoran- dum for the director of security. That would be the officer. who was the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors: On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by INS— alms’ had" conferred with you and gotten’ your OK, -that- this would: be. legal. .
. , , | PAGE LEVEL 1 - 20 OF 80 STORIES Copyright 1993 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. All rights reserved ABC NEWS SHOW: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET) August 27, 1993 Transcript # 1337 TYPE: Show; Show SECTION: News; Domestic LENGTH: 8240 words HEADLINE: Case Closed GUESTS: MARK LANE, Author/Attarney; GERALD POSNER, Author, “Case Closed"; Dr. PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas; URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent; ROBERT OSWALD, Brother HIGHLIGHT: Lynn Sherr reports an a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove LeeHarvey Oswald acted alone, ang was not a Mafia or KGB agent. BODY: BARBARA WALTERS, ABC News: Good Evening. I' m Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is on vacation. This is 20/20. ANNOUNCER: From ABC News, around the world and into your home, the staries that touch your life, with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters - this is 20/20. Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, will a powerful new book end the controversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he has the answers about Oswald, the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to come along. Lynn Sherr's explosive report - ‘Case Closed.' And- SELMA SCHIMMEL, Breast Cancer Survivor: (sp?] Who is equipped to think of dying in your 20's or 30's? . ANNOUNCER: -if you think it-only happens to older women, you're wrong. KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to have breast cancer, and I thought they were right. ANNOUNCER: It's happening more and more, and doctors admit the younger you are, the harder it is to detect. Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography can have an error rate of up to 40 percent in young women versus.a rate af less than 15 percent in Older women. LEXIS:‘NEXIS@# _LEXIS‘NEXIS@$LEXISNEXIS@* jevvisss DY Mead Data feewab inc. Page
PAGE 7 20/20 (ABC), August 27, 1993 ANNOUNCER: For women in their 20's and 30's, Dr. Timothy Johnson has some shocking news - 'It Could Happen to You.' ‘Plus, can gay men be made straight? This therapist says he transforms _ homosexuals. This man once preferred men. Today, he's happy with his wife. JOHN STOSSEL, ABC News: And now is sexuality an important part af your marriage. RICHARD COHEN , Nicolosi Patient: Oh, yes. We have good sex, if that's what you're asking. ANNOUNCER: Others claim treatment is helping them- 'ALEX,' Nicolesi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30 years of my life, I feel alive. . ANNOUNCER: -but in the gay community, backlash. GAY MAN: This is not a disease. There's no such thing as a cure. ANNOUNCER: John Stossel brings you the hot debate over gay men. Are they ‘Born or Bred?' Those stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message. {Commercial break] Case Closed BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this week when more than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were finally opened after nearly 30 years. And while close to half the current population wasn't even alive at the time, the controversy surrounding that event continues to haunt us all. The fact is a majority of Americans don't believe the Warren Commission, and do believe some form of conspiracy was involved. But now, a powerful new book claims to have the last word. Its conclusion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act alone. The book is titled Case Closed, but is it? | Cvoice-overl] Whatever side you're on in this still-raging controversy, you! 11 want to see Lynn Sherr's report now. LYNN SHERR, ABC News: Cvoice-aver] No period in an American presidency has been as controversial, as thoroughly analyzed or as frequently written and speculated about as the Final six seconds in John F. Kennedy's life. 1st NEWSCASTER: [£7] Three shots were fired at the President's motorcade as it passed out of the downtown area of Dallas. SHERR: [voice-over] No detail about the final moments of the President's life has. been spared scrutiny. Every eyewitness account, ballistics test, photograph, medical conclusion and investigative finding has been challenged, reinterpreted or dismissed, then woven into countless theories. For three decades, an already - skeptical American public has been left wondering if we would ever learn the truth about what happened in Dealey (sp?] Plaza on Navember 22, 1963. — EXIS: “NEXIS LEXIS: ‘NEXISG= LEXIS*NEXISS= FEViGSS. OF Madber Dat CAA? Inc. Page