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13-00000* ~» SECRET 30 Octoher 1962 URGENT MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President directed as follows: 1, CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made. This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee group ‘ 2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down operations during the next several days. 3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be reconsidered after current negotiations are completed. NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26) and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these operations should be suspended for the next several days. NOTE: ‘General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M. 4, The President requested that all the principals who are attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and . decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days. Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan. (This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.) , joven Cc “ cry aaa
13-00000 SECRET. 30 Getober 1962 CROENT MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall 8. Carter At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President dizected as follows: . . 1. CIA do everything possibile to inoure no refugee or emigre provocative actions againat Cuba are undertaken with or withoet our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami station and the MONGOOSE Task Ferce should be alerted to exercize every preceution te see that no unauthorised attempts are made. This should be done without disensston or disclosare to the refugee groups. Ze GIA ehould attempt to eatep Alpha 66 actions during the naxt several days. The President wae informed by DCI we have no contact with or control ever Alpha 66. BCI was instructed to attempt through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down eperations during the next several days. (3, The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped - daring the next several days and therefore all prier approvals for sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilia activities, caching of arms are to be temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOGE will be» reconsidered after carrent negotiations are completed. NOTE: After the meeting MeCone, Bundy and the AG diseussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships or shipping (item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26) and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these operations should be suspended for the next several days. MOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey phone ef 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/36 af 11:00 A.M. 4. ‘The President requested that ell the principals whe are attending Executive Committee meetings and these in the Departments whe were in intlanate contact with the Committee's procedures and decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days. Presa contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a representative of State. Any necessary Presa contacts by CIA, and these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan. (This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.) _
SECRET The above has been communicated te you by telephone. This . - memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa- JOHN A. MeCONE Director JAM/mfb Orig & 3ee to addressee lee ~ DCI chrono -—C_leé)- DCI #5 file
13-00000 ; a“ foe a i oe SECRET + The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa-~- tion by you. CVE CO JOGHN A. McCONE Director
1 3-00090 . November 14, 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCI policy decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction. In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Messrs. Helms, Heuston, Miskoveky and McManus, and upon receiving final approval from higher authority at 1:45, Mr. Houston was instructed by me to initiate appropriate actions. i ie exceedingly important that great care be exercised . ' to minimize the publicity and to emphasize humanitarian interest on the part of the United States Government in securing the release of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are - anxious that the explanations giventhe Cuban Families Committee be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme Attached is a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining caution be taken to avoid attribution or CIA implication in this matter. John A. McCone Director Attachment JAM:at l ec - DCI Chrono ice - DCI Memoranda 1 cc - Memo for the Record _. es abs do a Ode
13-00000 » Of; Credit en issued. by ‘the Badk, one in the amount 14 November 1962 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS. The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney General at 10:30 a.m., on h Thureday, Movember 14, at the DCI's request. _ McGone explained that he had had dinner the evening before with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association). Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations . for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some $0 millicn | dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with members of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked out promptly, and the aubject would undoubtedly be discussed at length at the Industry's Beard of Trustees meeting in New York on November 16th. Mr. Foley etated that the Industry had no clear understanding of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban developmonta of the bast three weeks. Alter explaining to Foley the background of the transaction LT told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a topic of current discussion ameng members of the Industry. In the meeting with the Attorney General I. expressed grave concern over the situation, votes out , GIA hac. illion : dollars on covert deposit in the [Bank t t two 1 Letters sony, dollars ‘t and one for. _seVenimillion dollars long as this money was on deposit. and ‘the letters outs » there - was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug industry, Or both. Despite the fact that'no official government
13-00000 SECRET-EVES Gali connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the - Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles). identifying Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of ‘17 million! dollars as representing the Government.cost of the drugs. . I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members of the drug industry | made it almost a certainty that “leaks would come.from industry sources as long as. the letter of credit were — outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials. Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if an article appeared indicating we were etill pursuing this transaction, the American public and a great many others would be confused and disenchanted, For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange for the bank to withdraw the. Letters of Credit,. and for the withdrawal : of-a- substantial part of ‘the. money from the (Ban Also advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that action be commenced today. The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of action. “We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families | Gommittee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the negotiation aside pending further developments on other important problems involving « our Guban relationship. . MeCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher authority. The latter was communicated to the DGI by telephone at 145 p.m ‘Copy to General Carter w/ covering memo - . JOHN A. McCONE . Director
13-00000 November 6, 1962 i MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cline, DD (I) SUBIECT: Castro as a Threat to the Americas, I think that in analyzing Castro's potential in the Western Hemisphere as covered by paragraphs 9 through and including 21, we should consider his posture and potential under various alternatives of possible United States decisions and probable Soviet policies, Let us assume for the moment that the United States meets the exact letter of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange and no more. - me oO This would mean the withdrawal of IL 28s, the halting of. the establish- ‘ment of a submarine base, and some acceptable form of inspection verifying the removal and assuring against the reintroduction of offensive devices, U.S. commits not to invade. At this point U.S, ~ - ; commitment on propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla activities and other actions designed to overthrow Castro is not very clear, but I think that we can assume that such activities if attempted would be no a | more successful in the future than they have been in the past, which is about zero.
eR SEGRET Having reached this point, the Soviets have at least three alternatives: One, they can abandon Castro, reduce military and economic aid, cut their losses, and in such event Castro would soon collapse. Current intelligence does not support such a probable Soviet course of action, otherwise they would not be disposed to leave such quantities of extremely valuable modern military hardware, including the SAM Sites, communications equipment, and extensive Naval and ground equipment and a large number of technicians. | Second, they could maintain about the same level of economic and military support as inthe past, although I would feel this could not be a very reasonable assumption from the standpoint of military support as the presence of large amounts of additional military equipment, in- cluding those mentioned above, would necessitate a higher level of military support than before in order to provide operational readiness, training, maintenance, spare parts, replacements, etc. This does not mean more economic supporthlthough I think Castro could insist upon it-on the grounds that Soviet equipment is a burden to him and of course Dorticos alluded to this in statements in New York.
13-00000 1 Ca) ? SECRET Third, the Sdéviets having accomplished one of their objectives, it that of securing a U.S. guarantee against invasion, will increase their a military and economic aid so that all military materiel will be work- able at all times and the Castro economy will be reasonably well off. Under each of these alternatives, Castro's posture and his effect on the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries will differ vastly and I would suggest that your paper be oriented so. that it will project for the benefit of policy makers the consequences, 7 favorable or unfavorable, under these several alternatives. It is my personal opinion that Mikoyan will return to New York te in a few days and will announce an agreement for some perfunctory Red Cross ground inspection of the missile sites and nothing else, will deny any intention of a submarine base, will dismiss the IL 28 ‘issue as wholly beyond the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, will te Os indicate that all Soviets are leaving Cuba except economic and agricultural advisers, and will state most persuasively that the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement has been fulfilled to the letter and demand our non-invasion commitment, He will then build Castro up and indicate Soviet intention for supporting in every way and to go right down the line with him,
13-00000 Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing ~ Western Hemisphere countries. | This is the situation I fear, and I think our policy makers whose negotiations are trending toward the establidhment of a set of conditions and commitments which will make the third case mentioned above a probability, should have the benefit of our thinking as to the consequences, In doing this, equal attention should be given to the first two alternatives, In further reference to the paper, the historical background igs excellent, the country by country annex useful, although if time permitted we might get the chiefs of station to give the current view of their contacts as Win Scott did, The inventory of equipment is useful but I propose that it be broken down into three columns, a pre-July lst, 1962, added since July 1962, and the total as of now. John A, McCone
26 September 1963 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: CIA activities in Seuth Viet Nam 1. Prior to January 1962 the CIA maintained a modest etation in South Viet Nam, the purpose of which was to support the Ambaseader and Headquarters with reports on the internal situation in South Viet aavavity grabklems. Ameng ether things we trained cud equigped Special Forces whoge mission was to conduct a variety of unconventional activities euch as the infiltration of V.C. centero, interdiction of oupply routes, interfering with V. C, communications, sabotaging | V¥.G, efferts, harrasament, etc. | The CIA station crested about 6 dozen training centers throughout South Viet Ram ia which eclected nearby villagers would be trained in community defense and civie action, B issued orme and thus provided the actual defense of the strategic hamlets created the U.S, Special Ferees. As the activities expanded, 0 determination wae made to shift prime responsibility to the military, with CLA im support, and the switch has been accomplished successfully. About 75,000 South Viet Namese have been trained.
13-0000 ClA created a South Viet Namege intelligence organisation, In adflitiva the Agency assisted in the development of intelligence In addition @ variety af activities were aupported designed to aseiat the basic objective of winning the war. Without exception all CIA programs in South Viet Nam were courdinated with the Ambassador and slso in Washington. CIA tock no unilateral sections nor involved itself in designing policy. CIA has been represented at all policy meetings in Washingtan, including NSC and Executive Committee meetings and ail of the McNamara-Poar!: Harbor mpetinga heid to review progress. The activities of the _ Wheeler's miasien, General Krulak's several missions, Me. Ferrestal's missions, etc, At no time prier te recent surge ef erisical publicity have CIA's activities ia Saigon been reported other than cooperstive and an integral part of on accepted and agreed - *poltey. In June 1962 I traveled extensively in South Viet Nam. I reported upon my return that repressive measures of the Diem/Nhu regime were causing considerable criticism and that there was -Z-
13-00000 danger of a coup. This situation was watched carefully by our CIA station and at frequent intervals we reported that the image ef the fegime was tarnishing and hence its effectivenses was questionable. A number of estimates and e great number of reports and appraisals were lesued, each ene warning that the deterioration of the regime's popularity gave tree to serious question concerning the future trend of the war and CIA warned that unless corrective measures were taken by the regime to improve its image, it was quite possible the war would be lost or that a popular uprising would cause the removal of the regime. For 18 monthe at frequent intervals ramors of coups were received by our station and were reported to the Ambassador and to Waghington. Throughout thie peried our Chief of Station at the direction of the Ambasesdor mat once every two weeks with Ngo Dinh Nhe, explored all problems relating to the ‘situations in which we had a common interest, and reported to the Ambeaesador, Contacte were algo maintained with many groupe in South Viet Nam, with military leaders end with knowledgeable citizens. . A review of the reperting over 18 monthe and resulting estimates bear out that the Agency consistently warned of the | deteriorating situation and the peasible consequences,
13-00000 During this period we also analysed the progress of the war and the thrust of eur reporting was to the effect that as the American advisere wore able to exercise their influance oa the South Viet Namsss military, and our Embassy and General Harkins were able to persuade Diem to reevient and redeploy his ferces, gradual but consistent favereble progress wae made, 3. Ateitade of the Station and Others in ony difficalt situation involving guerrilia warfare where casualties and prisoners, diflerences of opinion among observers arise, Likewise Americans required to work with a stubborn difficeltics inveived. Furthermore Americamaccustomed to our civil berties, freedoms, and the rights of the individual are _ shoched by the conduct of @ government which daprives the individaal of thase privileges. Finally an American community Mving ameng this is the case in Saigon and Has}, are bound to be influenced . by, aad te a degree espouse, these criticisms. For these reasens there have been serious differences within the American community.
Within the CLA ctation there are differences of opinion. Some feel the cause is hopeless with the Diem regime in power. Others feel it beet te go aleng with the regime until a better one appears. The reporting has been, hewever, consistent and has coincided with the views of Ambassador Nolting. Within ALD and USIA there have been strong differences of opinios and the came is true of the Embassy ataff, On the other haad, the military which is devoted to the single task of defeating the Viet Cong, had turned ite back on political problems and concentrated on military problems and have bean steadfast in refusing to be deterred by internal political issues. Many peaple have become highly emotional, have talked too much and have given the impreasion af very deep splits. o & «
13-00000 4,  Sitaatien in the last several weeks. The Hue incident on May 8th was a serious setback for the Diem Government. The agreement with the Buddhists on June léth wae deaigned te impreve the situation. The agreement wae never carried | out. Increasing agitation by the Buddhists culminated in the raids on the pagodas on August 21. This was carried out apparently at the direction ef Nhu by the Special Forces, seme of whom axe in che Saigon - Hye ' area aad by the millaary. In this cemnection (¢ le to be meted that neither MACV ner CLA maiutatoed absolute eoutral ever the deployment of the Special Forces and it is to be noted that substantial unite of them were deployed to the morth and engaged in theis regular assignments. The sction on August 21 broke the camel's back as far as those the Diem regime remained. Therefore, a cable was sent te the Ambagsador inetructing him. to inaist on effective reforme including reducing the influence and authority of the Nhus end if this could uot be accemplished by persuatibn te take such action as would accomplish thie ebjective even though it meant The fault in this instruction was that there existed at the time no firm estimate ae to the possibility ef successfully reforming the regime. and ne plan for a successor regime. | At this point CIA was asked by the Ambassader and General ‘Harkins to query certain military leaders and te determine whether the CEO wl ~6-
wo * ad Nee ee ~ resentment had created a body of opinion among the military, the Security FPerces and the public that would carry off a coup and establish a new | government. CIA reported this condition did not exist. During the week of Auguet 26 and without taking a position as to whether the regime should or should uct be removed, the Agency urged care and deliberation. It pointed out that to act precipitously and without assurance of svecoss a civil war - would inevitably result, the war against the Viet Cong would be lost and This pocition was highly exasperating to those who wished to move precipitously. It is fer this reason that the advocates of action to move precipitously without coordination and without intelligence support | are now carrying on a campaign agatust the Central Intelligence Agency andthe Station. we S ramen ro, ao Fw ie
13-00000 HS tity 2 September 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: General Garter You will note from the very brief memorandum of my. discussion with Secretary Rusk that he made two requests -- the first, a study of the reasons for lack of action of the Communists in Southeast Asia. This is a matter I discussed at this morning's meeting and I hope that we can have an OCI memorandum on my return. The second question was concerning clandestine channels to Castro, the Chinese Communists and Hanoi. This should be given serious thought by DDP. Each situation differs. Iam sure _we could, if we desired, open up a channel to Castro. The Peiping and Hanoi situations are more difficult. In one respect there is a channel open to Peipine through Warsaw, but it is not effective, Perhaps the would have some thoughts on this. Also, there is a channel to Hanoi through the representative on the ICC; however this obviously is an "official" channel and is not very productive, I think it would be well to. go over this matter with Dick Helms when he returns. Secretary Rusk expects comments on both these points next week, . rs 4 Director Attached: Copy of MR on Discussion with Secretary Ruck >