WARD &@ PAUL 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 iy HEL je ieibe cote es senstor Towers. “Any other. membera? / Senator Morgan. I have one. other question. . Reading from this report, Mr. Colby, dated August 28, the CIA cable from Saigon, ‘it says Richardson reports that "The situation here has reached’ the point of no return unless the generals are neutralized before able to launch their operation, We believe they will like and ‘have a good chance of winning. We all understand that the efforts must succeed and that whatever needs to be done on our part must be done." Apparently at that point whatever action we had set in motion Richardson felt was irrevocable. Mr. Colby. You will recall that followed the August 24 telegram which essentially told us to go out and see what you can get down. Richardson's feeling there was that we had launched something and that it was going to take place. The generals then came back thereafter and said no, we are not going to do it. That is the sequence that occurred. Senator Morgan. One other question. Who is Marquarite Higgins, the gal who -- Mr. Colby: - She is a reporter. Senator Morgan. She apparently had all of the facts, aian't she?: Mr. Colby. Yes. And a lot. of this has been published in -all the hooks that- have been written.
Mr. colby. That is right. Senator Morgan.. These comments. here are almost verbatim. Mr. colby. Yes, sir. ; Senator ‘Morgan. pia you ‘ever ascertain where she got the ?: Mr. Colby.” There have been lots of books written by Mr. HIilsman, Chester. Cooper. various other~ participants: in it have all written books about this period. Senator MOrgan. She surely had her facts. Mr. Colby. And Mr. Halberstam and Marguerite Higgins and Mal Brown. A variety of people have written this. _& - . BS Senator Morgan. Thank you. WARD & PAUL . Senator Tower. Wchave got a vote at 12:30 cand if we could I would ike to wind this up by that time. ; 16 |. Do any of the Senators have questions? If not, I will. ; 17 turn it over to counsel. 18 “Mr. Schwarz. I. just have one question following up on 0 | your first exchange with Senator Morgan earlier in the morning. 20 || In focuss sing on the. Trujitio matter and on this matter, both 2) || were instances whatever was done was done by dissident g2 || nationalists. ‘In the Trujillo case there was some effort. 24 ||. after the Bay of Pigs to slow down or.pull back. In this case 24 || there was some effort to disassociate;although I think not an 410 Fisst Street, S.E., Wasnengton, O.C. 20003 ‘effort to slow down or pull back.
4 > < e e a « < 8 410 Forst Street, $.E., Wasmington, 0.C. 20003 ae PR Is it a fair. generalization. to make that where the United ‘States seeks ‘ko accomplish objectives through foreign “nationalists, it de aisticutt for the ‘United States to . control ‘the actions . of those foreign nationallets?: Mr. ‘Colby. Certainly the. foreigner makes his own decisions at various times the degree to which he ig going to do one thing or the other. The U.S. cannot control it. The U.S. can assist him, the U.S. can counsel him and “advise hin, perhaps influence him, -but the control, that is where. I got, Senator MOorgon, when you are dealing with essentially -another sovereign, why there are Limits to your degree of authority over them. Mr. Schwarz. So when you start them down or we start them down the path of overthrowing a government, it ‘follows from the comments you have just made and indeed from the record as we have seen it, that even if we change our mind as to whether that is a desirable result, we may not be able to stop it from happening, we may not be able to stop the consequences of the events we have set in motion?. Mr. Colby. Yes, except for the point of starting them | down. I don't think you can say that the United States has the total decision there, either. Because the decision to move in a certain direction is a decision that they basically make on their own. We may be able in a supporting, we may be suggesting, simulating, indicating support for, but we do not
J > «< ry é ) & « z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 have the capability of att A “giving z ing Cree a start. ‘That has to be something that develops asa consensus that it is the right thing to ‘do because. of the situation. Mr. Schwarz. Both in the. Diem-case and trujillo case motivations initially ‘¢oming: from: the-foreign:pationalists so.I. think: from the testimony that at some point it was essential in their minds that this be given a word or action. in support by the v.s." Mr. Colby. Yes, sir. Mr. Schwarz. Once. Colby. It is one of their total factors. Mr. Schwarz. once that is down, it follows, doesn't it, from what we have gone through, that even if the govern- ment changes its mind about the result, it-is no longer able ‘to .be sure it ‘can control the result? Mr. Colby. » “Not entirely. It. depends on the situation. I ean envisage a situation where. we do reach a consensus that we ought to do a certain course of action. We then have reservations about it. We consult with them and we then indicate that we will no longer support it and they then at that point they have the decision to decide whether they have themselves enough force to go ahead with it, or. -they are so limited that they can no “longer go ahead with it. This does occur in various ways of influencing people.
/ 2 < a a o « < z 410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, O.C. 20003 he ah Bee | Pe y-relationship. If you~ develop an-agency'r fonship;: not just to be an agent you, and. we are having this a little to report intelligence to bit-with some of our agents now, that we indicated that we woulc work together, that they would give us information, we would support them, give them some funds and 80 forth. If part of the arrangement on our side becomes non-existent any more and our current problem is they are concerned whether we can - keep their identity secret, there is an inclination on their part to cool down the activity, and this is happening in this sense today. It also can happen by decision on our part to no longer do that particular activity, and we have a ‘number of relationships with foreign intelligence services, for example, by saying; well, here is a certain program but then we cut it off. One example in this context was the program of American support of the special forces in Vietnam. The Agency was giving support to the special forces. We helped to get it started and formed it up, the Vietnamese special forces. As part of the pressure on the government in the August period ahd in response to. the fact that the special forces with Vietnamese military and with Vietnamese police had conducted the raid on pagotas, CIA was directed. to suspend its assistance to the special forces. ‘We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to
2 > < e a () & < z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 thing to turn on “and off. ‘the other programs ‘are much more difficult to. “turn on and off. tn a simple way I think that has had a. certain influence in what they did. I know it re- “sulted | Ain the transfer of. ‘several units outside of Saigon where we said we would continue. to support | them. Senator Tower. Mr. Colby, I think that Goncludes our questioning on this matter. Let me ask you a question that I think is pertinent in the light of the event that occurred last evening, that I will no doubt be quizzed about. ‘Does the CIA maintain any current and continuing contact with any members of the underworld? Mr. Colby. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have penetrations for intelligence purposes of various criminal elements abroad. Senator Tower. I mean domestic underworld. Mr. Colby. The answer, domestically in the United States not to my knowledge, and I believe we do not. Senator. Tower. You have no.contacts that would provide you with any information on -the demise of Mr. Giancana? Mr. Colby. I know nothing of that demise. I have-no | connection with it and I can say with, I believe, full assurance, that CIA had no connection with it whatsoever. Senator Tower. It would be inconsistent with your. charter to get involved after the fact. Mr. Colby. It would not he only inconsistent, it would \
Prone (Area 202) Py > < a 4 to] @ < 2 410 First Street, S.E.. Wastington, 0.C. 20003 CAS ky Peace ESF NNEC be madness. Senator Tower. All right. Mr. Colby.. As I believe Tallyrand once said, it is ‘only wrong, it is stupid. | Senator Tower. ‘mailyrand lived to be 105. All right. | | Senator -Iluddleston. Might we inquire whether or not - Mr. Colby had made any inquiry within the Agency? | Mr. Colby. © 1 just heard about it on the way in this morning. I certainly will inquire whether we know anything at all about this and -- Senator Schweiker. It seems the FRI would be the one to fine out. Senator Tower. Thank you. ' (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m.,. the committee recessed,. to reconvene at 2:00 p.m., the same day.)