a wath mmc canch emanate Rit dat Laake RL ite tannhannilt We ESE LL pw b teh) BASS pebble nb i aA I VRE ok Lad eel om § pect AOA RO RR cc TT Nt A NEAL ANE LATA ILL I CS OOD ASS ER NEN SORE ET ETN RE ORES AS os AOE RD MASE TE OC ORE SANE RSET: 8 MEERA EET OHA AREY SA Seen & fia Ft nmin ee NW 35072 mrss eam es wy) ° SECTION 1 SECURITY TNPORMANYS AND —, ae SOURCES 107C -— D [ 8. [Persons being considered for useJin espionage and foreign nationality cases many times present special problems which Limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation. (See ‘ustructions re contact cases and @eseco program, section 1O5K, 6b and Gh, volume IV, of this manual. ) However, where practical the above items should be covered. 9. Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. 10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to [ guide, direct,[or designatelan individual as a potontial[security linforma ant. {D. [APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONTROL OF POTENTIAL SHCURITY f TNPORUANTS J 1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same ramerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to designate individual as a Bureau- approved potential security informe... and[tol]proceed with his development. . [Do not submit on a UACB basis. Ine*.ie a physical description. ] 2. [Deleted] {After designation as 2 Bureau-approved poter'ial security informant, the -following matters should be made clear to ht-.] [a.] His assistance is strictly voluntary an ‘“e is to understand that there’ is no coercion or intimidation involved. [ [b.] He is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI. In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonaticn statutes must be impressed upon him. { [c.] His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he «tolates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bure. s investiga— tive activity may be jeopardized. If he has a special pro.» m which would require revealing hislassistanceJto his wife[or other perti:ent individual, ] this should belascertained and an appropriate recommendation made to she Bureau.] The special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureaufand you will be advised accordingly. ] {a.] If the potential informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer-—employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on the infiltration of labor unions by subversive elements. [ fe.] If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in the initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions con=- cerning investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities. 4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the-superior in the field mre office responsible for developme-:* of ir ormants. This instruction is not applicable where active inv’ -s.igation has established that the potential informant is of good « »racter, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau. 5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters whore contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent ‘on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants. . 6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months.. Letters concerning ‘potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a "JACB basis, should contai - informative summary of information furnished during past four m As, and must include certifications regarding potential informant's sta: ity and relaibility and his indoctrination against disclosure. Thes letters should follow the form indicated under section 107N, 3b, but shoulda omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation. 10-13-65 Doold: 32589525 Page 1594
[ f NW 55072 107D - E SECTION 107. SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIA OURCES Bocld: 32989529 Page 1595 7. 8. 9. ic. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent. During{[contactslwith potential informants, if it develops individual . f does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts. an [Deleted] [Deleted] {11L.] During initi:” stages of development and on occasion active informants -- [12.] {13.] may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization. In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the PBI and if some question arises concerning his Lloyaity we will consider making the Pacts of his cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this-action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBY and the service which he is performing for his co» try may be terminated. Before taking steps t. udvise anyone of « notential informant'’s or informant’ s cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. Prom the first interriew with a potential informant through iis develop+ ment and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant. When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau. This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to. Bureau. BUREAU POLICY 1. 2. Development of military pexsonnel Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reserva~ ._ tions, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau. Contacts by designated Agents , Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him. Divulging information to informant . No information should be divulged to a potential informant or an informant concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation.. ; . 10-13-65
4, Hood » te, NW 55072 SECTTON 107. Qin THRORMANTS AID conte @.., SCURCES 107A — B DEFINITIONS i. Security informant Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor-— mation on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected, Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such 2 position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the Us. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current infor mation of value. Potential security informent Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau, Double agent A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance. Confidential source ; An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes i: .ormation available to him through his present position. Examples would ““: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make . concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish. ‘uformation readily available to them. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that pote ¢ial informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal i .esti- gative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon . initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: oF i. SOU BR WD ee Evaluation of a. Complainants in security matters b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaf— fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard- ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty ad. Bureau applicants as possible informants e. Personal friends and contacts of Special'Agents and other Bureau employees f. Sourees of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con~ tinuous basis Review of closed security files on individuals Review of reserve index Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, Deleted Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA, Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members, They, of course, should not de informed as to the purpose of the inquiry. . Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front, Such individuals frequently are innonens ot communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members, - A—_ 13-65 BDocld: 32989529 Page 1596
i $ 107B — C SECTION 107 Qc INFORMAN™S AND conriT gus SOURCES ae Q Sar ars ee see Nw 55072 9, Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries 10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed ‘ personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employ~ ees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization, In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making avail~ able the services of an employee who already is an informant of the manage~ att ment. 11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions. 12. With regar@é to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should ; suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact. ™ 13. <Atver the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an indus— trial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dis missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the pevson advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advan’-.te of such cooperation when offered. 14. Revier of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individ-— uals merely registered but never became active 15, Use of 2 reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact. 16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. 8S. 17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat 18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. 8. : 19, Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status ars in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau, (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.) [INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BRING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES] When a decision is made to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. [Extensive background investigation should not be conducted, hewever, until the individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume IIIT, and section 105K, item 6b, (LO), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation shouldlconsist of, the following: 1. Check of field office files for derogatory information 2. Discreet canvass of Logical informants to ascertain if thefindividual j is known to[{them]- . 3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individ~ ual's personal history (date and place of birth, ete.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must definitely establish that the[individual lean be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to iustability or unreliability. Securing background information from thelindividual Jigs not sufficient; {his]background must be established br the investigation, [including discreet inguiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.] 4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi-— - fication Division to obtainfanyjrecord [he may have.]. . ° 5 Armed services record should he reviewed if the individual is a veteran. 6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve. 7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties a11 details should be obtained. BDooeld: 32989529 Page 1597