| Phone (Area 202) 544-6900 10 11 (12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 wy 18 “19 20 eal 23 an 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 29 HW $4963.., Paekd<32089490-—Page 6 . » @ ‘ ‘ ' ‘PES TIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, “1902 INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS,. ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR~DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) ; . JOHN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT hL. SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, SR., ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT CHIEF;, AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF, CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting Office, | Senator Tower. That is GAO. Mr. Wannall. Based ona sampling of about 93 cases. Senator Tower. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate figure. | Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that we do get the principal portion of our information from live sources, Senator Tower. It would be a relatively. high percent. then? | Mr. Wannall. I would say yes. And your quest’ - criteria?
e smn 18 WARD & PAUL ‘e 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 MW 34961 — Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 10 11 12 13 14 15 16, 17 18 19 20 al 22 24 20 BoolId: _intelligence. collection? 2389499 Page 7 1903 Senator Tower. What criteria do you use in the selection of informants? Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. in | our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged in a criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do require that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field office indices, checks with other informants who are operating in the same area, and in various established sources such as local police departments. | Following this, if it appears that the person is the type who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we would interview the individual in order to make a determination as to whether or not he will be willing to assist the FBI in discharging its responsibilities in that. field. Following that, assuming that the. answer is positive, we would conduct a rather in depth investigation for. the purpose of. further attempting to establish credibility and. reliability. Senator. Tower. .How. does the. Bureau. distinguish between the. use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to Is the guidance different, or is it the same, or what? ara eR Sn ee rene ee RR re te eR RETR le Re SPO era Wt
‘smn 19 3 ca ~) Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Li 12 ‘13 [WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 . 24 * 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 29 ed 54961 Docld: 32989499 Page & 21 ‘avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can @ | eo | | "1904 Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over the operational division on that. Mr. Adams. you do have somewhat of a difference in the fac that a criminal. informant in a law enforcement function, you are trying to develop evidencé which will be admissible in court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be sust for purposes of pure intelligence. The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to, through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be used independently of the testimony of the informant so that he can continue operating as a criminal informant. Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to function as provocateurs? > Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regula- tions against using informants as provocateurs. This gets into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addressed by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage | in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the | ere eer eae A He i RY opportunity. This does not mean, of course, that mistakes don' occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to ee ere HH NR A
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 ne) li ‘Le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 20 - 24 25 .-@ an © | 1905 engage in criminal activity, and ‘the courts have held that, especially the Supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that: the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but because there is lacking this criminal intent to violate a law, we stay away from that. Our regulations fall short of that. If we have a situation where we felt that an informant has to become involved in some activity in order to protect or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United - States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our informants. a Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that © they are informing on, do you not? Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs, which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probab 4 one of the best’ examples of a situation where’ the'law was: in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights used much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the troops only as a last resort. And then you have a situation like this where you do try HW 34961 Docld: 329689499 Page 3 st
“Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ake) 11 13 WARD & PAUL 14 , | 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 12. 1906. to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement. You have historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We-had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence. The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those, he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance. We also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, ina | position where we had no authority in the absence of instructio from. the Department of Justice, to make an arrest. Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in United States Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials. So, historically, in those days, we were just as frus- - trated as anyone else was, and when we got information. from someone like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information, and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to I | NW 34961 Docld|32909495 Page i0 It
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 MW 34961 NI Oo 10 a le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 25 } | @ - 1907 do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he indicated. — ; . Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence.of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act? | | Mr. Adams. The Departmental rules at that. time, and still require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. . You ~ can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have}. no violation. Congress recognized this, and-it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights statute, which added punitive measures against an individual that didn't have to be a conspiracy. But this was a problem that the whole country was grappling with: the President of the United States, Attorney General. We were ina situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General. The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence, and in neutralizing the Klan ~- and that was one. of the reasons. . ~ senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in con- tinuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam Boold: 32989499 Page il
“a smn 23 fn > 1 t '8 é $ 3 4 5 6 ” 8 9 10 11 a D> < 12 3 t 13 3 14 15 16 17 18 8 19 3 2 20 é 21 = a 22 B g3 e ° 24 t 25 HW 54961 investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation e @ 1908 Veterans Against the War? Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the intent to halter political expression? Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans Against the War that indicated that there were subversive groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting. with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the International Communist Party. We feel that we-had a very valid basis to direct our attention to the VVAW. It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made, and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and: they closed. those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow the national organization. But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we and subservience to the national office. Senator Tower. Mr. Hart? Senator Hart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of informatio that clearly has no relationship to any Federal -:criminal Boold's2989499 Page i2
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL’ 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 ‘smn. 24 a) rau) Gl cs fox) ies) 10 uu 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 20 ‘an 22 25 24 29) Boold: 32989499 Page 15 ‘we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because eo a ® oe a “1909 statute. Mr, Adams. I agree, Senator. ‘Senator Hart of Michigan. Why. don't you try to shut that stuff off by siiply telling ‘the agent, ox your inforiiant? Me. Adams. Here is the. problem that ‘you have with that. When you're looking’ at an organization, do you report only the violent statements made by the group or do you also show that you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others, that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the statutes, You have to report the, good, the favorable along with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the real purpose of an organization, do you only report the violent statements made and the fact that it is bya small minority, or do you also-show the broad base of the organizatio and what it really is? And within that is where we have to have the guidelines we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in our files. | Senator Hart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process, you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment
« % smn 25° © e Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 “19 20 al “) 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 29 @ 7 e 1910 exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up. Mr. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, eithe asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter- viewed concerning some friend'who is applying for a job. | Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the FBI? | Now,. someone can Say, as reported at our dast session, tha this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our files has an.onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree. It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because of considering: a man for the Supreme Court of the United States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't ‘see. where any harm is served by having that in our files. “Senator Hart. of Michigan. But if.I am. Reverend. Smith and. the. vacuum. cleaner. picked up the fact.that.I.was.helping the veterans,. Vietnam Veterans Against. the War, and two years later a name check. is. asked. on Reverend Smith and. all. your file shows. is that he was. associated. two. years ago. with a group that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful. patriotism to justify turning loose a lot of your energy in pursuit on them -- Mx. Adams. This is a problem, MW 54961 DoclTd:32989499 Page i4 _
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 NW 34961 a 3 ” ie N on ~ Lo Li 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 ee) 24 25 = Senator Hart of Michigan. this is what should require us to rethink this whole business, | | Mr. Adams. Absolutely. And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well as the Congressional input axe going to address themselves to. Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range of groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetratio and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition of when an extremist or security investigation -may be under- taken refers to groups whose activity either involves ¥iolation of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then informants may be used. Another guideline says that domestic intelligence investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations. The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation relevant to a potential violation. Even now,-with an improved, ' upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back again in a world of possible violations or activities which may result in illegal acts. Now, any constitutionally protected exercise’ of the right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition, conceivably may result in viclonce or disruption of a lecal town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holdin Doold! 32989499 Page 15 -
n Ss Fes w te ~] Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 | cond 10 11 12 WARD & PAUL 13 15 16 17 20 al 22 23 2 24 "410 First Street, $.., Washington, D.C. 20003 “théy may result in-violence, disruption?.-. 19. 25 the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because Mr. Adams. No, sir. Senator Hart of Michigan. Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement? Mr. Adams. No, Sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we <']. monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored -by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where there is a ‘potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration. But this is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the. past than we do at the present time, But we have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the courts have said that the FBI has ‘a right, and indeed a duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention. And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut / MW 54961 Doocld: 32989499 Page 16
oF 3 5 = nN co a 1 case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have gz to make a Judgment | call as to whether it is one that clearly ° fits the criteria of. “enabling | us ‘to. monitor the activities, and a Ol Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 end 4, |) that's: where’ I think iiost, ‘Of jour "ad sageéinionts fall- 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 16 17 18 19 20 al Re a 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 29 _ NW 54961 Docld:325999499 Page 17
+ X HARRIS :GSH | Sen, Sel, CIA 12/2875 Tape 6 Oe * g z oO + 5 6 vi 8 9 10 , 11 a 2 < 12 | e 13 . 3 14 15 16 17 18 8 19 cS] : fa) é 20 § 21 a a 22 i 23 o | 24 vt 25 remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential Senator Hart of Michigan. Let's assume that the rule for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. ‘The Bureau manual states that ‘informants investigating a subversive organization should not only report on what that group is doing but should Look at and report on activities in which + the group is participating. There is- a Section $7B3 dealing with reporting. on connections with other groups, That section says -that the field office shall -"determine and report on any significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." ‘Any significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups. Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of 1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us sources reported on the plan's participants and activities of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM, particularly in open public debate in’a high school auditoriun, | which included speakers from the Defense Department for the ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM, The informants reported on the planning for the meeting, the distribution of materials to churches and schools, participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on i: | ABM from nearby town councils. There was also informat’:. on HW 34961 Docld: 3253894953 Page 18
Co 1 g £ ; o 4. 5 6 7. 8 9 10 ll ol 2 < 12 J ; E 13 3S 14 15 16 “17 18 8 19 g 20 5 21 5 ke 5 23 ot . 8 24 g 25 @ é 1915 a i . pians for a subsequent towh meeting in Washington with the names of local political Leaders who would attend. Now the information, the informant information came as- patt of an investigation of an allegedly subversive. “group - . participating in that coalition. Yet the information dealt with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated.” to the State Department, to military intelligence, and to. the White House. How do we get into all of. that? Mr. Adams. Well ~~ Senator Hart of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it, ‘would you do it again? Mr. Adams. Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969 was, The problem we had at the time was where we had an informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was going to take place and it was going to bethe Daily World, ’ which was the east coast communist newspaper that made comments _ about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May .28, 1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this organization. Now the problem we get into is if we take’a quick lceok and get out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security *¢ a8 Jikp WW 54961 Doold: 32989499 Page iS
. ‘ @ * e } -gsh 3. - . : a "1936 Soviet espionage where they: can put one’ person in this country Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ‘ad a and they supported him with total resources. of the Soviet 3. Union, false identification, ali the ‘noney he needs, communi: 4 cations networks, satellite assistance, and everything, and’ 5 you're working with a paucity of information. 6 The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic 7 security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations. | ded | 8 _So someone reports something to you which you feel; you take 9 a quick look at and there's nothing to it, and I think that's 10 || what they aid. ; . : ; 7 11 Senator Mart of Michigan. You said that was '69, Let { 12 me bring you up to date, closer.to current, a current place WARD & PAUL 13 1 on the calendar. 14 This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President 15 |) Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as 16 he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there . 1? || were several national conferences involving all the groups 18 |) and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty. 19 Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is 20 || not against -~ while unconditional amnésty is not yet the law, el || we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 22 | Mr. Adams. That's right. 23 Senator Wart of Michigan. Some of the sponsors wore | ‘2 24 umbrella organizations involving about 50° diverse eronps Sound! 25 || the country. FBI informants provided .advance piece atic cil : o : ! MW 34961 Docld: 32959499 Page 20 ,
e «6 gsh 4 r plans for the meeting and apparently atténded and reported on the conference. The Bureau's own reports described the Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 || participants as having. represented diverse’ perspectives -on the issue of amnesty, including civil Liberties and human rights groups, G.I. cights spokesmen, parents of-men killed in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues, delegates from student organizations, and aides of [louse and Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty. .The informant apparently was attending in his role as a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive and it described the topics of the workshop. WARD & PAUL Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted that in view of the location of the conference at a theological seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its coverage _ to informant reports. | Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last fall.- And this is ‘a conference of people who have the point of view that I share, that the soaner. we have unconditional amnesty, the better for the soul of the country. Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on ‘a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad informant intelligence really is, that would cause these groups in that setting having contact with other groups, all and 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O0.C. 20003 everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the MW 34961 DocldyS29o9499 Page 21 . : : —_J
13] gsh Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 Ww 2 3 4 5 6 Y 8 "9 10 11 J 2 < 12 { é 7 . . Q & 13 = 14 15 ! 16 1? 18 8 19 g i fa) | ¢ . 20 FA 21 a a 22 5 23 25 Bureau files. Is this what we want? - Mr. Adams. I'11 let Mr. Wannall address himself to this. ‘He is particular knowledgeable as to this operation. Mr. Wannall. Senator Hart, that was a case that was opened on November 14.and closed November 20, and the informati n which caused us to be interested in it were really.two particular items. One was that a member of the steering committee there was a three man steering committee, and one of those members of the national conference was in fact a national officer of the VVAW in whom we ‘had suggested before we did. have a legitimate investigative interest, Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I would almost say so whpt at that point. Mr. Wannall. The second report we had was that the VVAW would actively participate in an attempt to pack the conference to take it over. And the third report we had -~ Senator Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the information that your Buffalo informant had given you with ; respect to the goals and aims of the VVAW gave you a list of goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected ohjectives. There wasn't a single item out of that VVAW that jeopardizes the .security of this country at all. Mr. Wannall. Well, of-course, we did not rély entirely on the Buffalo informant, but even ‘there we did reces*:. _ Bo 232989499 Page 22
gsh 6 Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 ae) LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.c. 20003 25 from that informant information which I considered to be- significant. The Buffalo chapter’ of the VVAW was the regional office . covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the five most active VVAW chapters in the country and ata national conference, or at the regional conference, this informant reported information back to us that an attendee at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There was also discussion at the conferénce of subjugating the VVAW to the revolutionary union. ‘There were some individuals in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in agreement with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the _interest of the revolutionary union. So all of the information that we had on the VVAW did not come from that source but even that particular source did give us information which we considered to be of some significance in our appraisal’ of the need for continuing the investigation of that particular chapter of the VVAW, Senator Hart of Michigan. But does it give you the - right or does it create the need to go to a conference, even if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VVAW when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we seek to achieve unconditional’ amnesty? What threat? MW 54961 Doocld: 32939499 Page 23 wee se RT IN TEENIE ENS PLETE EOE NUY SUR RAED IS SE OTN TATE NEY AOR MTN IE MIS Hy
gsh 7 “| Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 MW 34961 “10 11 12. 1A. 15 16 17 18 19 20. 21 22 23 24 "R25 Bool @ oe oo 6 oe 1926 Mr. Wannall., Our interest, of course, was the VVAW influence on a particular mesting, if you ever happened to be holding a meeting, ox whatever subject it was. Senator Hart of Michigan, What if it was a meeting to -Seek to make :moré effective the food stamp system in this country? ..*, Mr.) Wanrall. Well, -of course there’ had been some organizations. Senator liaxt. of Michigan. Would the same logic follow? Mr. Wannall. I think that if we found that iff the Communist Party USA was going to take over the: meeting and use it as a front for its own purposes, there would. be a logic . in doing that. You have a whole’ scope heré and it's a matter . of where you.do and where you don't, and hopefully, as we've said before, we will have some guidance, not only from this committee but from the guidelines that are being developed. But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and not gathering everything there was about ite | In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us, and that was the person who had, who was not developed for this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other matters for some period of time. And as soon as we got the report of the outers) qi the meeting and the fact that in the period of some <i: Gown. 7 S2596394959 Page 24
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 er © et ee eres NN TT WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 @ Led discontinued any further interest. | Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, my time has expired but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we really want to control the dangers to our society of using informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations, And. that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants, obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before’a full-fledged informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or individuals. I know you have objections to that and I would like. to review that: with you. Senator Mondale, pursue that question. Senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn oose a full- fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources the Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the Committee. The Bureau argues that such a warrant requirement . might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their ' government, Now that's a concern for First Amendmént rights that ought to - hearten all the civil libertarians. DocTd: 329894995 Page 25
gsh 9° e . @ . 1922 °o bd oO¢ 3 . oO pe 1 But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement °° . , : X38 2 || raise a serious constitutional question? : 5 Mr. Adams, Well, -for one thing it's the practicability 4. of it or “thé dipacticability | “of s getting a warrant which: 5 ordinarily involves probable’ cause “to: ‘show that a crime has 6 || been or is about to be committed. ? In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily 8 with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activitie 9 such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have 10 || discussed before, where they say publicly we're not. to engage li ‘in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still 12 subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time "13 |} is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United WARD & PAUL 14 || States, 15 Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about 16 || to do it because they're telling you they 're not going to do it 17 || and you know they're not going to do it at this particular 18 |] moment. 19 It's just: the mixture somewhat of trying to mix ina 20 criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and 217 we can't find any practical way of doing it. We have a particulat 22 || Organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs 95 to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organizatioh: 24 ||}and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 || Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations. NW 34961 Docld: 32909495 Page 26 Lo
» a) ° 3 4 3° w 8 ‘ o f a 0 a i . - & = ar.) Log 6 E no f | Ok! [o> Oo LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 44 15 16 19 20 21 22 23 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 25 os . We don't have probable cause for him’.to target against that organization, ‘but’ yet we should be able to receive informa tion from him that he as @ Communist Party member, even though in an informant status, is going to that organization’ and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it. It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants, the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have recognized the necessity ‘that the government has to have individuals who will assist them in carrying out their | governmental duties. Senator Hart of Michigan. I'm not sure I've heard anything yet in response to the constitutional question, the very practical question that you addressed. Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutiona rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress can prescribe some safeguards, some rules and some standards, just as we have with respect to your use of electronic ‘surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants. That's quite different from saying that the warrant procedure itself would be unconstitutional. But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show probable cause, and therefore; you couldn't get a’ warrant, therefore you oppose the proposal to require you. to get a NW 3496) Doold: 325959499 Page. 27
hence ns nt nlinneti ta Boas anthesis ib bees: wd ee ee re ree ee en err ee rete ee cae ey mene inet atonement palerinet sheen ene Sensi tbat’ gsh ll % o 1 - .& 2 $ | 4 5 - 6 v4 8 9 10 li J pe] a 12 8 a ; es & 13 3 End Tape 614 Begin Tape “P 16 17 18 19 20 al £2 23 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 6 . : > . 1924 warrant. tt seems to beg ‘the question. . Assuming that you say that since we use informants and investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities but which might engage. in activities that can result in violence or illegal acts, and you can't use the warrant, but Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity, including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss the anti-ballistic missilé system, and we don't want you to use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or unless you present your request to a magistrate. in the same. fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most cases, to wiretap. oe This is an option available to Congress. Senator Tower, Senator Schweiker. Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much , Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential security informant and a security informant? | Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker, ‘that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth background check. A potential security informant is someone who is under consideration before he is approved by headquarters for use as’ an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration. NW 34961 Doold:32989499 Page 26
gsh 12 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O0.C. 20003 25 ® oo » ; | 1925 On some occasions that person will have been developed to a point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are engaged in “checking. upon. 1 his veliability. In some instances he may be paid for information furnishe but it has not gotten to‘the point yet where we have satisfied ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does, the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an approved FBI informant. Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step of - being an informant, I guess. Mr. Wannall. It is a preliminary step, one of .the | preliminary steps. Senator Schweiker. In thé Rowe case, in:the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known? I know we asked you several times but I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was _in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was known. | Mr. Wannall. Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to answer that. Senator Schweiker. A1I, right. Mr. Adams. The problem we had at the time, and it's the NW 34961 Docild:|§2989499 Page 25
problem today, we, are an investigative agency. We do not Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 have police powers like the United States marshalls do, “About 1795, Z guess, or, soe period Like that, marshalls have had-the authority. that almost: borders on-what.a- sheriff,has ; We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice and auring these times the Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency. We were to report’ on ‘ activities to furnish the information to the ‘local police, | who had an obligation to. act. We furnished it to the Departrien of Justice. | In those areas where the local police did not act, it. resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who WARD & PAUL were trying to march in protest of their civil rights. i | } i | t This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was _a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country. | “This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies _in itself at the time either because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that there was a.conspiracy available. We can do absolutely nothing in that regard. In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and —iw_ iat po259894999 Page 30
4 ‘ gsh 14 . . So o [=] wo ¢ 2. i i's] ( 3a °o N od 2 < Qo e ° & WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 MW 54961 ‘10 11 12 13 14 15 16 “17 18 i9 20 21 22 23 24 25 Doold: & next to the Army; “the’ United States marshalls should make then, not the FBI, even though. we developed the violations. | And over the years, as’ “you know, at {he time there were mary quéstions Yaised, "Why doesn! t the FBI, stop this? ony ‘don! t you do something about it?. Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and of course we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area. Senator Schweiker. “What would be wrong, just following up your point there, Mr.-Adams, with setting up a program . since it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to: have pre-knowledge of .violence of using U.S. marshalls on some kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence? | Mr. Adams, We do. We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the ‘Civil: Rights Act, But the arshalls are in Boston, they are in , Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this is the approach, that the Federal government finally recognized was the solution to the problem where you had to have added Federal import. Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced confrontation, shouldn't we have some vere a coordinated progran that when you go up the ladder of covs'and in the FBI, that on an immediate'and fairly contempor2ry basis, that kind of 989499 Page 31 , ’ i
gsh 15 m:.? s - 2 gq . 7A 5 6 ") 8 9 10 11 . ol 2 | ¢ 12 cf * . a t 13 Ed 14 15 > 16 1? 18 8 19 2 20 é 21 a i (22 i 23 ° 24 bod 25 1928 help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it gets toa Boston state? I realize it's a departture £rom the past. I'm not . Saying it isn’¢.. But, it seams. to me.we nead-a better remedy _ than. we have. Mr. Adams. Well, fortunately, we "ke. ata time where conditions have subsided in the country, evén from the '60s and the '70s and periods -- or '50s and 1608. We .report to the |. Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the | country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance with ctate officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting, down together saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston? I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the early '60s. But the government had no mechanics which protecte people at that time. Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the Robert Hardy case. I know he is not a witness but he was a witness before the Ilouse. But since this affects my state, I'd like to ask “Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized a raid on the Camden draft board. An‘! according to Mr. Hardy's et . , testimony before our Committee, he sz.i that in advance of the raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged the fact MW 54961 Doold: 32989499 Page 32 : : _¢@ eee
. gsh 16 3 8 3 1 , Oo 8 that they had all the information they needed to clamp down N . « § 2 : KS on the conspiracy and could arrest people at that point in time, & and yet no arrests were made. 4 i Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true? Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based only on the 6 material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It: was not v] 7 . ; . a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your, 3 | . question. a There was, in fact, a representative of the Department 10 . : . te os of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously : 11 . ; ° . a as that case progressed as to what point the. arrest should be . 2 i < 5) . . ian : 1 made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the fa] lV 5 1s ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort.. 4 . 1 So I. think that Mr. UWardy's statement to the effect that 18 there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true. 16 Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with who “™ jlunder your procedures? . 18 Mr. Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests, io] . . 3° . x 19 when they should be made, and decisions with regard to ¢ 20 | 5 prosecutions are made either by the United States attorneys g al or by Federals in the Department, ui 22 ; . ; . oe ; * Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have ax o 25 a departmental attorney on the scene ‘@ :ause there are questions rg " os 2 24 We conspiracy. Conspiracy'is a tough violation to prove and 25 sometimes a question of do you-have the added value of catching MW 54961 Doocld: 3¢939499 Page 33
WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 NW 34961 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 oO om FP oF wm HE “I 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el Re 23 24 25 someone in the commission of the crime as further proof, rather than relying on. one informant and_some circumstantial evidence to prove the violation. Senator Schweiker. Well,.in this case, though, they even had a dry run. - They could have arrested them on the dry run. | That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to me. “They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on the dry run. I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry run. Who was this Departinent of Justice official who made that decision? | Mr. Adams. “Guy Goodwin was the Department official. Senator Schweiker, Next I'd like to ask back in 1965, during the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the’ Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated membership. I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the government. And I believe the figure goes on =o indicate that 70 (4 percent of the new members of the Kla:. that year were FBI informants. i DoclTd: 32989499 Page 34 ‘
: . S a Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people | . ° . . : 7 Ot . . . 7 - { a . : 2 Il-to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that 5 5 | you shouldn't. have infoxitants in ‘the Klam and know what's “4 going on. for, viclence, put: it, sets to me ‘that hig is the. taLl- wagging “the “dog. (or) Fox example, today | we , supposediy have. OnLy, 1934. total ~ - informants, for. both: domestic” Snformanté and, 1 potential informants... 8. and “chat here’ we had 2, 000" justin ‘the Kian alone. 9 ' Mr, Adams. Well, this number 2,000 aid include all 10 || racial matters, informants at that. particular time, and I oN SAAT De he ICO EES SRI SORT on -1iL think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual. r : é 12 number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was aroun i ia : 13 6 percent, I think, after we had read some of the. testimony. | - 14 Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a 15 group called the Action Group. ‘This was the group that you 3 ' 16 remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left af- 17 || ter the meeting. He attended the open meetings and heard 18 |} all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information, 19 } but he never knew what was going on because each one had an 20 action group that went out and considered themselves in the 21 || missionary field. 22 . Theirs was the violence. 23 In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24} aS many informants as you poSsibly can against it, Bear in 25 l|-mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress an Doold: 32969495 NW 34961 Page 35
gsh 19: ‘o o oO ; . 8 : i ‘ gz ‘anes aon § ‘¢< oe c é ie) WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 NW 34961 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 38 couldn't control the conspiracy any longer. everyone’ is concerned about the murder of the civil rights workers, the Linio- Kent sase, the Viola Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church ‘in Bixiningham.. We were faced with one tremendous problem at that time. Senator Schweiker. I acknowledge that. Mr. Adams, Our only approach was through informants and through-the use of informants we solved these cases, the ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have never solved. They are extremely difficult. - These informants, as. we told the Attorney General, and as we told the President, that we had moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he could forewarn us of violence, could help us on casés that had transpired, and yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever unless we can create enough disruption that these members will realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers, even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure - and just like you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately wéte Klan members and they didn't dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they 989499 Page 36
gsh 20 “800 ‘ Phone (Area 202) 544- wo 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 al 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 20: | e ® 1933 Senator Schweiker. My time is expired. I just have ‘one quick question,. Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500 informers for black ghetto situations? Mr. Adams, I'm not sure if that's the year. We did ‘have one year where we had a number like that which probably had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities, were being burned, betroit, Washington, areas like this... We. were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is” violence going to break out, what next? They weren't informants like an individual penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have a group here that's gettin ready to start another fire-fight-or something. Senator Tower. At this point, there are three more Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get everything in-'in the first round, we will not have a second round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can. go on and terminate the proceedings. However, If anyone feels that they have another question —- that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00. ee Senator Mondale? : | ; | Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the | record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the = ; poet x a field.of crime investigating, it may be the best professional NW 34961 Doold: 32959499 Page 37
Q n « os Ns re Phone (Area 202) 544-600 LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el ‘22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 34961 Dootld: : organization of its kind-in the world. And when the FBI acts ‘last month ox two, through its public disclosures, heaped can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the S89499 Page 36 ‘in the field of political ideas, it has: bungled its. job, it has interfered. with the civil liberties, and finally, in the shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of the erucial public confidence in an essential: law enforcement agency of this country. In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the? FBI in 1924, In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and protector of political ideas. “And through the interference of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and- Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department get involved in political ideas. And yet here we are again looking at a record where with Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with -- we even had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of Churches. Secretly we: are investigating this vague, ill-define impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas. It seems to be the basis of the .strategy that people
* gsh 22 ; . 1935, 1 tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive e “or dangerous: ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 5 at odds with the philosophy of American government. A .. I started in politics years ago and the first thing we 5 had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out. Oo of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and 7 || I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help co from the FBI or the CIA. We just ramned them out of the meetinds 9 on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't | 10 || good union leaders when we didn't want anything to go with them Li And yet, we see time and time again that we're going .to 12 || protect the blacks From Martin Luther King because he's 13 || dangerous, that we've going to protect veterans from whatever WARD & PAUL 14) it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches 15) from the vetetans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy ‘and 16 || confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree 17 with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that 18 |} precisely what is expected of the PBI is known by you, by the 19 || public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask 20 || you? 21 Mr. Adams. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like , 22 || to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement 23 Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we follsed that policy for about : ee 24 | ten years until the President of the ited States said that- 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 || we should investigate the Wazi Party. Nw
gsh 23 1 lL o@ 8 8 2 < 4 5 6 ” 8 9 “10 11 J 2 < 12: rel a . e 13 r4 14 15 16 17 18 3 19 d o é 20 5 21 s vi ‘22° ‘one 2 24 + 25. HW 54961 DoclId: I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party. : feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in. the fact that _in World War II, as contrasted with World War I, ‘there wasn't jone Single, incident of! foreign directed sabotage which took place in the United States. Senator Mondale. And under the criminal’ law you could ‘have investigated these issues of sabotage. Isn't sabotage a crime? - } Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime, Senator Mondale. could you have investigated that? Mr. Adams. After it happened. Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get involved in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of’ crimes that could have been committed. It's very interesting. 'In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to continue what you're now doing and as. I understand it, you still insist that you aia the right thing with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of Churches, and this can still go on: This can still-go on under your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activitics in terms of criminal matters. Mr. Adams. fhe law does :not say we have to wait, until we have been murdared before we can -- | Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of” 2569499 Page 40
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 ) WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C, 20003 25 | MW 54961. Dold: { 2959499 Page 41 law again.  You'ze: trying’ to defend apples with oranges. That's the law. You can do that. Mr. “Adams. That! s right, but how do you. find out which of the 20, 000 ‘Bund members might have. been a saboteur You don't have probable cause to investigate “anyone, but you can direct an intelligence operation against the German-American Bund, the same thing we did after Congress said =~... “ Sehator Mondale, “Couldn't you get a warrant for that? . Why did you object to ‘going to court for authority for ‘that? Mr. Adams. Because we don't have probable cause to . go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for probable cause to investigate an organization. There were activities which did take place, like one time they outlined the Communist Party -- | Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under court authority you can investigate where there is probable cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest. Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than, just making these decisions on your own? Mr. Adams. We have expressed cemplete concurrence in that. We feel that we're going to govbeat to death in the next 100 years, you're damned if you ‘9, and damned if you , don't if wa don't have a delineation of our responsibility i
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ae arta ch etn Tin Pee me mr ete, WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18° 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Ww 54961 Doold: Y ] | . ® . 1938 in this area. But I won't agree with you, Senator, that we vhave bungled the intelligence operations in the United States, | I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr. Kelley has set a pattern of being as forthright as any Girector of the FBI in acknowledging mistakes that. had been made, but I think that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and Senator church, that we have to watch these hearings because of the necessity that we’ mist concentrate on these areas of abuse. We must not lose sight of the overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I still feel that this is the freest country in the world, 7 I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the United States and they can't walk out of their houses at night and feel safe. | oe ‘Senator Mondale, That's correct, and isn't that an argument then, Mr, .Adams, for’ strengthening our powers to go after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or continuing a policy which we now see undermines ‘the public. confidence you need to do your ‘job. Mr. Adams. Absolutely. The mistakes we have made are “what have brought on this embarrassment to us, I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some So9499 Page 42
« Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 6 7 End Tape 7 8 9 10 11 12 WARD & PAUL 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the PBI. But at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes out, as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity ~ of zercing in on. abuses. I think that we have donee one tremendous job. I think the accomplishments in the Klan was the finest hour of the FBI and yet, I'm.sure in dealing with the Klan that we made some mistakes. But I just don't agree with bungling. NW 34961 Doocld: 52959499 Page 43
SHARRIS/smnl © ® 1940 " t.°8 ; Le] $ ao 3 1 Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but 3 . = 2 I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble < . . ‘ . 8 3 over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we E 4 need to have new legal standards. 5 Mr. Adams. Yes, I agree with that. 6 Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston. 7 Senator Huddleston, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 8 Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at: some 9 length seems to have been an “inclination. on the part of 10 || the, Bureau to establish.a notion about an individual or a group 11 which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge. In -! . . < 12 the case of Dr. King, where the supposition was that he was om 2 & 13 being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investi-~- ¢< 3 14 gation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating tha 15 this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out 16 to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a 7 willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts. 18 Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar 8 19 to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, tha are} ‘ q 20 every piece of information that she. supplied to the Bureau ¢ 2 21 seemed to indicate that the Bureau was. not correct in its = wh 20 assumption that this organization planned to commit violence, Vv” ; E 23 or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist 5 24 that this investigation go on, and t:..s information was used bey * ; . 95 || against the individuals. Nw 34961 Doolt:32909499 Page 44 ‘
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARO & PAUL 410 First Street, S.€., Washington, 0-C. 20003 ® = ® 1941 Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted tha its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their _ course? Mr.. Adams ,We have admitted that. We have also shown from one of the cases that Sénator Hart brought up, that after five days we closed the case, We were told something by-an individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence AY . . in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This wasn’t the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point. What I testified to was that we were improper in discreditir Dr. King, but it's just like -- Senator Huddleston. The Committee has before it memorand written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the information they were receiving from the field, from these surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition was. Mr. Adams. That memorandum was rot on Dr. King. That . a was on another individual that I thi. somehow got mixed up: in the discussion,one.where the issues was can we make people
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 HW 34961 Dool 19° ) . . a “bw ter ‘prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to investigate them. But the young lady.appearing this morning making the comment that she never knew of anything she told us that she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch “as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regard- ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals from associating themselves with the VVAW-WSO. She is most concerned about efforts.by the Revolutionary Union to take over the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this.. I think that we have a basis for investigating the VVAW- WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped the investigation. They don't agree with these principles laid down by the -- Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that information against members who certainly had not been involved in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job or whatever? | Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to prevent crime, and you can't wait unt:l something happens. . The ae . Attorney General has clearly spoken ie that area, and even our statutory jurisdiction. provides that we don't -- 132989495 Page 46 e
_ Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 MW 54961 BDoclds62989499 Page 47 Senator Huddleston. Well, of course we've had considerabl evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent _ crime’, when you had information that it was going to occur. But I'm, sure there are instances: where you -have.- Mr. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he reported to us. Senator Huddleston. To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime. | Mr. Adams. Not necessarily. Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that, hadn't he? Mr. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have other informants, and we have other information. Senator Huddleston. Yes, but you were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in order ‘to -- Mr. adams. Yes. He furnished many other instances also. Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already part of it. Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so tha when the Department, aqreeing that we had no further. juris- diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform: certain law enforcement functions. ,
1? ~. 1944 5) ye to) wn Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committeé has received al documents which indicated that in one situation the. FBI assiste an informant who had been established in a white hate group Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 to establish a Yival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid his expenses in setting up this rival organization. Now, does this not put the Bureau ina position of being responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might have undertaken? a Mr. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a specific group. This is Joe Deegan. Mr. Deegan. Senatcr, it's my understanding that the WARD & PAUL informant we're talking about decided to break off from the group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of — the United Klans of America, and he decided. to break off. This was in compliance with our regulations. His breaking off, we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it on his own. _We paid him for the information he furnished us concerning the operation. We did not sponsor the organiza- tion. Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that ee organization? ° 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Deegan... He continued to advi:: us of that organizatio NW 34961 Doold: 32989499 Page 46
“ 4 ral Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL > 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 NW 34961 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 235 24 25 DooclId: @ @ : 1945 and other organizations. He would advise us of planned activities.” | Senator Huddleston. The new organization, that hé forméd, did it operate in a very Similar manner to the previous one? Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, ‘and it did not last that long.. . . Senator Huddleston. ‘There's also evidence of an FBI informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his ‘FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing them in how to use those weapons. Presumably this was in the knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became “~~ came in contact with the group that was contracting for murder, and he partici- pated in-this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably: all in the knowledge of the FBI. ‘ How does this square with your enforcement and crime prevention responsibilities. Mr. Deegan. . Senator, I'm not familiar with that particula pase. It-does not square with our policy in all respects, and I would have to look at that particular case you're talking about to give you an answer. ~ Senator Huddleston. I don't nave the documentation on tha particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of 2939495 Page 45
| . ~e Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL Pec cn eey neem ine ot ere ee ore ee ee en . 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 NW 34961 LO il 12 15 16 “17 “18 19 20 al 22 23 R4 Ro Dool 1946 control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind | of an. organization and to, what ‘extent an.effort is “made to | prevent these. inférmants. from engaging in the kind of thing ‘that ‘you are supposedly trying to prevent. : Mr. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who becam active in an action group, and we told him to get-out or ' we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the information he had furnished in the past. We have had cases, Senator, where we have had -- Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participate in violent activities. Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent ' activities. Senator Huddleston. That's what he said. Mr, Adams. I know that's what he said. But.that's what lawsuits are.all about, is that there. are. two sides to the issue, and our agents. handling. this have. advised.us, and I believe have advised, your. stafé, that at no time did they advise him to engage.in violence. Senator. Huddleston. Just to do what was. necessary to get the information, I believe maybe might have been his instructions. Mr. Adams. I don't think they. made any such statement to him ‘along that line, and we have informants, we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law 232989495 Page 50