104-10336-10034) « re oo Of / Bo a [7 17 September 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk Executive Director, ARRB FROM: J. Barry Harrelson JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM SUBJECT: CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number 104-10151-1-206 1. The following is in response to subject request. 2. Searches were made for information responsive to subject request and materials were provided for examination by the ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members selected a number of documents. Those documents have now been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be processed and released to NARA. 3. This concludes the Agency’s action on this request. If you have any questions, please advise. Ge
13-00000_, MEMORANDUM September 12, 1998 To: Laura Denk Executive Director cc: Bob Skwirot CIA Team Leader From: Michelle Combs Melle LL Associate Director for Research and Review | Subject: CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206 In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the Review Board requested additional information on a source identified-in RIF number 104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA provided the source’s 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald’s 201 file. All of these materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK Collection at the National Archives. Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review Board agreed to protect the source’s true name and cryptonym.. Documents from this source are identified as the product of “a yalued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts.” e:\combs \cia-ir35.wpd File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4
13-00000 SECRET OIM-98-0084 06 August 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board FROM: {(U) Lee S. Strickland Chief, Information Review Group Central Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: (S) Protection of |IUDECANTER /Cryptonym 1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I respond to the Assassination Records Review Board (“ARRB” or “Board”) regarding their current deliberations as to postponement. of certain very limited information in one document TT specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (j/[JDECANTER) . It is our considered judgment that the release of this’ cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US intelligence interests. 2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., “TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym . TJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and “would otherwise be releasable. 3. {(U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations. 4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided CL BY:.0619849 C/RG/OIM ~ " CL Reason: 1.5(c)} Dec! On: X1 Drv From: HUM 4-82 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET . SUBJECT: (S) Protection of {IJDECANTER YCryptonym information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment. is supported by reporting from another source [identity redacted but, in fact, TJDECANTER)s. It concludes by ‘Stating that this source (TIDECANTERY has had his "... bona fides fully established [by CIA]." It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information ~- "bona fides established" -- and by otherwise having (IJDECANTER/ known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the ‘key intelligence Judgment of CIA is not _compromised. ee ek ae 5. (C) The practice of counterintélligenéé (CT) -- and yo || hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from | four basic questions: e what information was compromised? yo e what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information? what understanding of the information did the | service(s) have? what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the | detriment of the United States? The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three are the most difficult and the most important 6. (C) interviews, and four, however, for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target | | | intelligence service. I | 7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a (i.e., the foreign government fully understands the substance \\ import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and pO the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect \' example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information {| compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a a oe f SECRET
13-00000 SECRET ° SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (TJDECANTER/Cryptonym 8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment of the United States; if they do not, the United States may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-a-vis defectors in our fold. 10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion, we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period 3 SECRET
13-00000 SUBJECT: 11 The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. protect his cryptonym here, are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their of _course, “12. is the most critical and legally compelling issue, SECRET Protection of | 'LJDECANTER ‘Cryptonym (S) question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key. (S) In sum, But we must 1 in this particular document, if we i previous knowledge and acquired information, including, information on the public. record via the media. oo ) While. the foregoing. showing of “intelligence damage there are (S) three additional points of relevance vis-a-vis harm: f Hy i! ml . “= tensions. ® Second, First, is foreign relations. .In our judgment, the GN ' Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the ~ > “United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This | specific release might well be viewed as a public move a to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate. ‘is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. TL i ; But T would ~~ minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons. SECRET
13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (TIDECANTER /cryptonym 13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release. Strickland 5 SECRET
13-00000 Office of : | i Oivi > mation manate™ SECRET CIA TALKING POINTS re Protection of [ “IJDECANTER” Cryptonym Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) 26 Avucust 1998 e The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA. e We request the postponement of certain very limited. information -in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (TJDECANTER) . e It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would: * provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter- intelligence effort, e result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence interests, and, e have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence. ¢ Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however: ® a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., “TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym |IJDECANTER /in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or, CL BY: (0619849 CARG/OIM  : ~ CL Reason: 1.5{c} ; Dect On: X71 Drv From: HUM 4-82 SECRET
13-00000 Ms Re TaN TD C3 Ba: oO dur i Lee my SECRET Do Not Rerraduce e if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source (e.g.,: “a Evie valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-~intelligence efforts.” As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. , ® The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. ® It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. ® It continues by stating that this CIA assessmentis—_ supported by reporting from another source (identity | ( redacted but, in fact, TJDECANTER) . e It concludes by stating that this source (FIDECANTER} has had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]. e It is this final fact which is critical. ® By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -~ AND by otherwise having 7 IJDECANTER ‘known to the public in true name and crypt, “THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised. I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this - particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment. SECRET
13-00000 , SECRET ’ « The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the 5 issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four . ‘basic questions: what information was compromised? e what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information? e what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have? ® what information did the receiving intelligence . service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party? e The first two questions are largely factual and can be | acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. e Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service. SP EEE Fie Wee CM? a ia pp eee = @ Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented. r Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation. S ae e If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the winter nes of the other service. SECRET
13-00000 SECRET a e If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully cs or to some degree. pean This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-a-vis defectors in our fold. ae In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article. TSS Ea ETI @ SST) Fata Py p, © In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key. b ® The CIA to date has released all of the substantive F information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular I, document. 7 7. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this pe particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their Fi previous knowledge and acquired information, including, | a 7 ? SECRET
13-00000 ° SECRET 4 of course, information on the public record via the J / media. a e There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of | IUDECANTER? e Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence . organization. / “ @ It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets ~~ current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA a will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time. e Their fear could be sufficient toe force them to take ‘ self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current : assets or public statements by inactive ones). e Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism). NN ee Se eee ee ® There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board’s time. They are not insignificant, however. e ONE, .is foreign relations. _ In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of iy reprisal. \\ A ® This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to \\ embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions. bs) SECRET
13-00000 ° SECRET e TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. | Cueerragn swig “oePAgerath gifE OB IA gut tepheectynsthB te Toe an at Ne # THIRD, is an equitable issue. ‘2 *, tal fo id: i aw ay fs * Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. e But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons. SECRET
13-00000 ° SECRET g:\irg frontoffice\general\lss\arrbijtp.doc (last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998) SECRET