LO SIC INIn b BREE eB eae a matter of our own security, undertaking some economic proscription, and isolating the Castro/Communist gang from contarninating the Hemis- phere. Along with recognition of our humanitarian sympathies, this seems to be the fear among Cuban refugees, although they are still hopeful. lf Cubans become convinced that the U.S. is not going to do more than watch and talk, I believe they will make other plans for the future. The bulk of Cuban refugees in the U.S. are most likely to start getting serious about settling down for life'in the U.S., dulling their desire to return home with personal risk involved, The bulk of disaffected people — ° inside Cuba will lose hope and incentive for futile protests against the regime and start accepting their status as captives of the Communists. Some Cuban activists will not accept the loss of their horneland so easily and may seek release from frustration by liberation operations outside U.S. territory and control. The recent wildcat Cuban scheme to bomb Habana from Central America is an example. ca 3, Sake * HERS eae Our probes of the guerrilla potential inside Cuba have been hampered by '‘@tmilar morale factors. Cubans sent to risk their lives on missions inside Cuba feel very much alone, except for their communications link back to the U.S. They are unable to recruit freedom fighters aggressively by the time-proven method of starting an active resistance and thus attractin; recruits; U.S. guidelines to keep this short of a revolt have made the inten- tion behind the operation suspect to local Cubans. The evidence of some intent is seen in the recent maritime re-supply of the team in Pinar del Rio. We brought in extra weapons, for which there were immediate recruits; if we were to exploit the evident guerrilla potential in this province, it appears likely that we would have to furnish supplie* by air and probably open the | to strong charges of furnishing such support to Cuban resistance elements sage Therefore, we have been unable to surface the Cuban resistance pote to & point where we can measure it realistically. The only way this can be done, accurately, is when resistance actually has a rallying point of freedom fighters who appear to the Cuban people to have some chance of winning, and that means at least an implication that the U.S. is in support. Word-of-mbouth information that such a freedom movement is afoot could cause the majority of the Cuban people to choose sides. It would be the first real opportunity for them to do so since Castro and the Communists came to power. There was little opportunity for the Cuban people to join an active resistance in April 1961; there is less opportunity today. If the Cuban people are to feel they have a real opportunity, th must have something which they can join with some belief in its success. ar hala tete TOP SECRET BW 50955 Docld:324274932 Page 6 in eee
TOP SECRET Ba ihc a tad PROJECTION (PHASE I). As a help towards the making of a U.S. decision ona future course | of action, the Operational Representatives developed working statements — | of four possibilities; at my request they have commented on the positive and negative factors worth considering for each possible course, and it is suggested that these thoughtful statements are worth reading in full. The working statements of the choices open to the U.S. are as follows: a, Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it, or b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Cormmunist regime without overt employment of U.S. military, or it ati rirut td c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or ' sverthrow the Castro-Communist regime by Us military for dthot.thie vayview of Phage Lhe considered by es the Special Group as providing the operational basis for guidelines and objectives for Phase II, It is a matter of urgency that these be arrived at by the Special Group, to permit developing specific plans and schedules for Phase I, & Attachments "Eyes Only" copies to: Special Group (Augmented) Mr, John McCone Mr. Robert Kennedy General Lemnitzer l. General Taylor 2. Mr. Alexis Johnson 3. Mr. Roswell Gilpatric o ut be Ope rational Rep resgentatives - 7. Mr. William Harvey (CIA) 9. General Harris (Defense) 8. Mr. Robert Hurwitch (State) 10, Mr. Don Wilson (USIA) ll. Chief of Ope rations 8 7 TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 3274274932 Page 9 |