HW 50955 Bocld: 3) a) 5) 6) - 7) 8) 324273463 SECRET Ory i - ll - , a \ Restore university autonomy and the free exchange of - ideas'and scholars. [Espousal of all political ideas permitted, but Communist and Fascist politi- eal parties forbidden for a period of five years. Children will be taught the true Cuban ideals of Marti. No labor without pay. Workers can form their ‘own trade unions and elect their own leaders without govern- ment interference. Sick leave and other benefits © to be restored. Peasants will be given the choice of: a) owning their own land; b) finding employ- ment on cooperatives; c) obtaining training and work in urban areas. Elimination of capital punishment, exclusion of re- prisals against cadres. of the present regime; those guilty of atrocities to be judged by an impartial jury under OAS supervision; preven- tion of unnecessary killing of Cubans by Cubans; transformation of the Isles of Pines into a national park, and the prison into a technical school for the young. Reconmend a mixed type of economy: state, local, cooperative and private enterprise. Decisions will be made on the basis of experiment with ul- timate decisions determined by referendum of the Cuban people. Property will not be restored to Batistianos and Communists. Foreign owned properties will be com- - pensated on the basis of 1958 tax assessed evalua- tion over a period of fifteen years. Foreign owned companies have the choice of this com- pensation or restoration of 49% ownership plus 51% compensated provided they are willing to assist modernization and ahare management on all levels with Cuban nationals. Foreign investment will be carefully regulated along the lines of the Mexican Revolution, with 51% ’ gownerships rule applicable to all enterprises. For a period of at least two years Cuba will not_ accept unilateral economic assistance from the West or from the Communist bloc, but will seek SECRET vy tg a Sy hid bie dh, Page 12k.
secrEr vo (hg le | - 12+ — aid and technical assistance from the inter- Mae al national organizations such as the UN or the CAS and from such countries as Sweden and Israel. (This might not be practical, but should have public appeal.) (An outcry against revolutionary exile proposals for the handling ‘of foreign property and investment by short- sighted American business interests with assets in Cuba will have the beneficial effect of increasing ‘ the appeal and legitimacy of the exiles putting forth this program.) Anything less than a program of this kind will confirm Castro's frequent and effective warning to the Cubans: “They will take it away from you." This program should be acceptable to the 26th of July leaders who refused to accept Castro's dictatorship and a Communist society. It should also appeal to ranking Cuban nationalists who re- - mained in Cuba. ‘The importance of this leadership. element was confirmed - recently by the British Ambassador to Cuba: "He (Castro) desperately needs his new friends, the ‘old Commmists'. He needs thier political theory as a basis for his society...But_he cannot afford to lose his old strongly nationalistic 26th of July Movement comrades." i D. Exile Radio Activities Exile broadcasts from Latin American countries or from international waters should attempt to transmit occasionally from the Cuban mainland or five the appearance of so doing, since it may be difficult to convey _ revolutionary inspiration from abroad. Exile broadcasts can be justified by recalling the totalitarian logic by which Castro demands non-intervention in his affairs while he intervenes in the internal affairs of other nations. Operational difficulties should be admitted to the Cuban people with the explanation that mainland broadcasts will become more regular and frequent when the Soviets leave with all their weapons. Exile radio activity is essential for the following reasons and purposes: co a 1) It can harass and ridicule Castro directly by interrupting the transmission of his speeches: "Fidel has no chin"; ‘"Why did you kill Cienfuegos?" SECRET HW 50955 DBocld:324273483 Page 122. ) ue Semmes ett eek a re
HW 50955 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 71) 8) Docld: 32423483 -.13 - Keep alive hope and the original aims of the 26th of ' July Movement , play its anthem (now forbidden), and remind Cubans that they and the revolution have been betrayed. Therefore, it can portray Castro 4s the Counter-revolutionary. Incite and teach no revolt but riskless sabotage and passive resistance as the first stage of rebel planning. "Cuban food yes, Soviet sugar cane noi" Guevara's guerrilla handbook can be used against Guevara. If Castro retaliates in a brutal manner against in- surgents who have attacked Soviet installations, it can help direct Cuban nationalism against the "Soviet occupation force." “a After engaging democratic Latin American students in a "Pree Matos!" campaign, it can raise this cry within» Cuba and create a rallying symbol in the person of an authentic revolutionary hero, lodged in a prison . once occupied by Castro. The Revolutionary Program should be announced from the Sierra Maestra (from the source of the struggle) partly to infuriate Castro and in sentimental appeal to the non-Communist revolutionaries still in Cuba; "Unions for the workers, land for the peasants, Cuba for the Cubans:" The main appeal would ‘be directed at the. urban classes. It can repeat Castro's broken promises regarding civil liberties, free press, elections, land reform: “Marti si, Comnunismo no.! By broadcasting accurate information about the out- side world, it can remind Cubans of their isolation ‘and help cope with a problem described by Jaime Benitez: "...for want.of adequate informetion from the outside, divergences of opinion within the “country grow undernourished and eventually stifled. ~ SECRET Page 123-: eee pe my
HW 30955 SECRET ~ wu - aarp 9) Radio Free Havana University can keep alive the ideals - Of freedom and democracy through political education programs: "The autonomous university is the cradle , of liberty." "this is the democratic creed that Marti preached," etc. 10) it can emphasize that the Revolution is purely Cuban and not exportable to other countries such as ‘Brazil, Chile or Mexico (for an interesting reaction). _ SECRET Docld: 32423483 Page 12¢.° a
SECRET =, - 15 ~ Discrediting Castro in Latin Amcrica ee Fidel Castro regards himself as a transformer of history--a Bolshevik Bolivar--and he sustains himself psychologically by the exaggerated role he has been able to play in the Cola War and with- in the communist bloc. His ability to manipulate mass emotions and to maintain political momentum stems in large measure from the | We propose that the president of a small Central American 4 republic be induced to assume a David role in which he employs . | ridicule and invective to make of Castro an enraged and impotent Goliath, thereby substantially reducing Castro's prestige and con- Spiratorial effectiveness throughout Latin America. For the sake of illustration it will be assumed that the republic is Costa Rica, a country dedicated to freedon and democracy, Costa Rica is half the | iol Size of Cuba, has a population of only 1.2 million, and a per capita annual GNP of over $400, (comparable to pre-Castro Cuba), Moreover, Costa Rica possesses the unique advantage 6f a population which is 88% literate, and no army save a civil Security force of some 2,700 men, , Costa Rican president Francisco Orlich is an educated and forceful man who actively participated in fighting during the 1948 Costa Rican revolution and later helped repel an insurrectionary raid from Nicaragua, He belongs to the Figueres-led political group ‘ in Costa Ricd which has promoted democracy with such fervor abroad ; that it has been Sccused internally of ‘international adventurism, " As a Consequence, if Orlich were to accept this proposed role, he might be obliged to strengthen his political position with- in Costa Rica, | By placing his own house in the best possible order, he would increase his effectiveness in this proposed role, If. criticism of other authoritarisn states, US effectiveness might be equal to its ability to remain publicly aloof, Orlich's opening maneuver would follow along these lines, He would present Costa Rica as a functioning democracy which is achieving its social revolution in freedom--in contrast to Cuba, That its aims are peaceful is attested by the fact that it has no army, It is justifiably proud of having more teachers than police- men. These dnd other real achievements should be made known to the Wa u-\ OM te ee cet ne ar te eg ee eo ae SECRET aor ro HW 50955 Docld: 32423483 Page 124.
SECRET ft, -~ 16 - Cuban people by radio broadcast. It should be easy to find other excuses to provoke Castro and outside radio penetration, according to the Canadian Ambassador to Cuba, provokes Castro's total rage. - Once Castro is provoked into responding to these measures, Orlich would step up the power of his transmitter so that all Cubans will come into range for clear reception, Although Orlich would probably need little or no coaching in this role, the following are examples of lines he might adopt: 1) Politely request that '"brother’ Fidel refrain from interfering in the affairs of democratic sovereign states. Invite the Cuban people to visit a land of freedom and social justice--wnen they are again free to travel. 2) Deny vehemently that he believes that Fidel is med--as is alleged by some medical authorities, admit the possibility that he might, however, be a little sick mentally and for this reason deserving of kindness and understanding. 3) Express frequent praise for the Cuban people and its noble traditions, make clear that disdain is only directed at Castro and his fellow-puppet entourege. 4) Take advantage of Castro's vanity, accuse him of sporting a beard simply because he has no chin. His proprietor Khrushchev needs no beard, dare his vassal -to be man enough to shave. 5) Describe the free and happy’people of Costa Rica, a land without concentration camps, without political prisoners, where citizens are not required to spy on each other, where the dignity of privacy is respected. Explain that he has come to office via a free election, other . political parties are allowed and dissenting views are, in fact, encouraged. 6) Invite unarmed Cuban observers to learn about democracy. Remind Castro of his dealings with Trujillo. 7) Make no mention of the US or the Alliance for Frogress. If Castro responds to this baiting, Orlich can defy him, emphasize the absence of a military establishment and declare that a free | people--even without any armements--has nothing to fear from a deranged and silly dictator. This should be sufficient to rally other Latin American countries to Costa Rica's defence, and the SECRET REG ot u ‘ HW 50955 DocId:32423483 Page 126- © -
HW 50955 Docld: 32493483 Page 12% SECRET - -17 - anticipated excesses of Castro's fury would do much to discredit him in-Latin America. It is imperative that the "Colossus of the North" remove itself from direct confrontation with a "small, defenseless country.' Castro needs to be pitted against a competitor on his own level, one not vulnerable to charges of "imperialism, " 'dollar-diplomacy" and other shibboleths to which Latin Americans instinctively respond. Costa Rica or a similar country is invulnerable to these charges. When the American public observes Castro responding to the hounding of little Costa Rica, it will come to view the Cuban problem with perspective and without hysteria or obsession. In turn, when Castro finds himself cut to size, his new perspective might impel him into obsessive and hysterical behavior. Assuming — a sympathetic attitude for a sick man on the part of the Cuban people, they might decide to dispense with his services, withdut violence, This proposal is a further effort to discredit Castro, which in conjunction with other efforts, might create internal stresses leading to Castro's removal by Cubans, At the lcast, it should help to discredit him in Latin America, it might provoke him into surfacing his aggressive intentions, and it might provide an excuse for additional OAS measures against him. Destroying Castro's Image by Ridicule The Cuban sense of humor is ideally suited to poking fun at even the Maximum Leader, With a population of only six and a half million, Cuba has 1,300,000 radio and 370,000 television receivers. The media of television and radio are therefore essential in ‘connecting Castro's psychological needs, his charismatic popu~ larity, and revolutionary control over the Cuban population with his defiance of the US. This arrangement is vulnerable to broadcast interference from outside Cuba, and it offers opportunities to subject Castro to ridicule, Castro! s extreme sense of dignidad,. however, will not permit him to find this amusing and the Cuban reaction might have considerable impact on the less stable elements of his personality. As Latin America's most accomplished orator, Castro's broad- cast exhibitions of sympathy for and identification with the under- dog and the masses are so accomplished that they may be partly genuine. They are the source of his strength and appeal. Paranoia, however, is his most salient personality trait and to him this affliction is a boon. SECRET ae mene ry *
- 18 - it fits ideally the role he seeks to play. He would create enemies if they did not already exist and his defiance of these enemies, which is frequently headlined.in the press ("Castro Still Defiant," 'Castro Shouts Defiance of OAS") impelled him to an . effort to defy Khrushchev, This stance of apparent heroism has been linked with Cuban nationalism, Javier Pazos offers this analysis: "Fidel Castro... knows very well that the regime he has established can only maintain itself in power by confronting the Cuban people with an external menace, Both the Communists and Castro need to be in constant strife with the US jn order to Survive." The Canadian Ambassador to Cuba recently observed; Castro keeps his revolution going, however, by playing on and building up anti-US sentiment and ‘the Messianic cause of Latin American revolution. These themes are essential to his program. He always seens to have to attack something....What he really enjoys is playing the role ofa world figure...Invasion scares...seem to strengthen rather than weaken him, oy (Cn the other hand, when it is tactically to Castro's advantage, he » could stress his role as a world leader by emphasizing coexistence, . — Castro may decide that he has achieved cminence on a par with Khrushchev and Mao, and he might temporarily confine his activities to maintaining his position). ; Cubans and other Latin Americans enjoy observing Castro pluck the American Eagle's tail feathers, In turn, his audiences I satisfy his need for adulation, Reporter Donald Grant states that, — "In Castro's complex personality, vanity looms so large that some . —. who have known him intimately think it verges on pathological narcissism, In reality, Castro rules by television and public appearance, simultaneously feeding his ego and retaining his popu- larity. His own description of this therapy is: ‘My medicine is the people...I thrive on Seeing and talking to the people, i TET ee eee Radio and television transmission could be carried out by exiles using a well-known Cuban broadcaster, or someone with a quick and acid wit, either by adding to Castro's dialogue by mimicking his voice (as the “Minimum Leader") or by speaking to “and commenting on his dialogue during a live transmission, were ge ee Radio interference will pose no problems. Line of Sight ‘sound transmission to television receivers would be complicated | Since it would involve some risks to those operating nearby but — an outside the three mile limit. 4A transmitting balloon antenna, for hoo example, would permit greater range but also be easier to locate — nnn ° oe ; me ve . er HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page L2& ~~
SECRET ; iy 4 hag. MED, and subject to weather conditions, The US would not, of course, ‘be directly involved in this operation. ; The minimal arrangement requires that the anti-Castro wit be able to receive at least the sound of Castro's voice while trans- mitting his own voice to Castro's radio listeners with some ‘clarity and range, An example of how this might sound is con- tained in an imaginary interference with a real speech delivered by Castro at the Rene Fraga Moreno sports field in Mantanzas, broadcast over Havana National Radio and Television Network 0224 GMT, 31 March 1963 (FBIS text). . ; /mimicking Castro/ . ..-This is something fundamental and of special importance to the revolution, /wbich I have betrayed/ Human intelligence and human‘work is what creates and produces. /not beards and cigars/ For that reason, in the. Oriente mountains, in the pre-vocational school, /in Siberia/ there are at present nearly 4,000 students, in the schools /and prisons/ of Las Minas del Frio (applause) who will be meeting gradually our /¥hrushchev's/ future needs, the plans for improving our present teachers, who year by year are bettering themselves to fulfill their sacred duty/ to Russia/ For that reason we should glance to the future, because the future belongs completely to us. /Blas Roca/ (at this point a monitoring technician hands Castro a note explaining this interference. Castro shakes his fist in defiance as a voice says) / I am the Gusano Maximo and I hate all Cubanst/ 7 —_— perce /dialogue with and comments on Castro/ my ayn oem e The imperialists have tried to copy these tactics of revolutionaries, /Fidel, you are lying!/ but the mentality of a counterrevolutionary/ like brother Raul/ will never be the mentality of a revolutionary/ come on, Fidel, shave/ the mentality of the counterrevolutionary will be crime, terror, and one of awaiting for the foreigner to come and invade. /what nonsense/ . _ And here in this province, /where is your chin, Fidel?/ at the end of January, and at the beginning of February/ March too?/ two workers of La Co were murdered./ you did it, Fidel, you butcherl/ A family, ‘ with two children, was shot to death;/ you communist _murderer/ and thus several crimes were committed/ you're lying again, you ape.... SECRET =f, 4 HW 50955 Docld: 32423483 Page. 12%.
THE WHITE HOUSE * ; SECRET WASHINGTON September 20, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY SUBJECT: Cuba: Possible Courses of Action As you requested, here is a summary of Paul Sakwa's "Cuba:.Pos sible Courses” of Action". (attached). Essentially, the paper purports to show how we can achieve a solution to the Cuban problem without resorting to invasion or attributable acts of violence or violation of international law. To this end the paper offers specific guidelines for (1) discrediting Castro and his regime in Latin America, (2) de- stroying Castro's image in Cuba, and (3) creating the necessary pre-conditions for a Cuban upheaval within two years. nO At the outset, the author gives the "rationale of proposals" which he describes later in the paper. First, the proposals will dovetail with present policies, put the Cuban problem in a properly. subordinate perspective and involve no U.S. mil- itary or financial cost. U.S, public posture should be that Castro is not a threat to us and that we are concerned not with him but with the Communist presence in Cuba. Second, the present importance of Castro asa nationalist symbol makes him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's martyrdom, Third, there is little chance of negotiating the Sovict presence out of Cuba. Fourth, a purely Cuban solution is most desitable. It avoids a US-USSR -confrontation, Also, it is important for our hemispheric policy that the Cuban/ ' Communist experiment appear to fail on its own merits; thus, we should disguise -any U.S. intervention, Fifth, our targets diould be the military, urban labor, students, and bureaucracy; the masses are nota good target. We should leave Cuban and Soviet shipping alone since such attacks will obscure Cuban reverses by confusing Cuban and world opinion. Sixth, the Alliance for Progress must show forward motion and should be dissociated from our anti-Castro/Communist policies. Seventh, we should. encourage OAS members to accept more responsibility for the Cuban problem. The author then goes on to describe his proposals under four main headings, 1, Revolutionary Nationalism vs. Communism -- Reputable exile groups (e.g. Manolo Ray) can be instrumental in establishing pre-conditions for a successful revolt, which must come from within. _ The U.S. should help only indirectly. Ap- parent U.S. involvement will sap internal Cuban initiative, tend to discredit the in- tegrity and appeal (to Cubans) of the revolution and allow Castro to convincingly blame the U.S. Help should be channelled through such countries as Venezuela and Costa Rica; the exiles, who should strenuously appeal to the powerful sources of Cuban: nationalism, should operate from Latin American bases, SECRET ahs HW 50955 Bocla: 32425483 Page 140 wee te a ee ae re
SECRET . OK oe t. ' Some specific exile objectives are (L) to convince Cuban pcople that they are against any foreign interference, and that, indifferent to the Cold War, they are engaged in an internal struggle; (2) to convey certainty of victory and demonstrate . a willingness to sacrifice; (3) to attack and provoke attacks on Soviet installations in the hope that reprisals will create Soviet/Cuban antagonisms. (The U.S. should be dissociated from this but should be prepared to risk possible escalation. ); (4) to separate patriots from ambitious politicos and to encourage internal leadership for uprising; (5) to establish a Free University of Havana in Latin America which will offer a better program (to be beamed at Cuba) and which will draw defecting students. , Hy, The exiles, under the banner of ''The Authentic 26 of July Movement", with Major Huber Matos as provisional leader (the mystic of the imprisoned leader}, ‘should 7 announce its program to Cuba. The program's principles would include (f) polit- ical freedom, the rule of law, a return to the original aims of the revolution; (2) free elections after 12 months, with exile leaders excluding selves from accepting - political office (a Castro tactic); (3) restoration of university autonomy; (4) trade unions, no labor without pay and a better deal for the peasants; (5) no reprisals and an end to capital punishment; (6) a mixed economy; (7) compensation for, but - regulation of foreign companies; (8) aid from UN or OAS but not from U.S. or . Soviets for two years; (9) no property or political office for Communists or Fascists. | The exiles should broadcast to Cuba from Latin American countries, inte rnational , [ waters, and occasionally from the Cuban mainland. Such broadcasts are essential | for the following reasons and purposes: (1) harass and ridicule Castro; (2) keep hope alive and emphasize the original aims of the revolution; (3) play the July 26 anthem (now forbidden); (4) incite and teach no revolution, but riskless sabotage a ed and passive resistence; (5) direct the broadcasts against "Soviet occupation forces" : (6) stress ''Free Matos" campaigns; (7) announce a revolutionary program from Sierra Maestra; (8) repeat Castro's broken promises; (9) bring information from F the outside to remind Cubans of their isolation. ‘2. Discrediting Castro in Latin America -- The author notes that in his role of David against Goliath, Castro.prospers in the cyes of Cubans and many Latin Americans who enjoy seeing Goliath's tail twisted. We should encourage a small Central American country -- e.g. Costa Rica -- to take up the cudgels with Castro ' and shower him with invective and ridicule. Hopefully, Castro will respond to the > bait. This will (1) provoke Castro into surfacing his aggressive intentions and make an ordinary bully out of the heroically-posturing ''Maximum Leader"; (2) in- . crease Latin American concern over Cuban subversion and promote OAS cooperation: , in defense of a small nation; (3) provide the U.S. with an excuse to take further HW 50955 Docld: 32423483 _ Page 131i ---
SECRET action against Cuba public opinion witha new Costa Rica deserve should e g serious ‘outlook on a Castr scalation be desirable; and consideration for the purpose described above. (4) pre sent American o cut down to size. it is much smaller than Cuba (lL. 2 milli on people), has the same Pp er capita income as pre-C astro Cuba, is 88% literate, has no army bu ta small security force of 2700 (‘'more in freedom. teachers than police Orlich might be ver ") and is y willing to play a democracy achievin the role. g social revolution stroying Castro's Image by Rid 3. Destroying Castro § Nee faci vantage of Cuba's g Castro's paranoia broadcasts -~ ©: ge ood radio and T.V. facilities, and sense of dignity. mimicry, OF biting comments (a little. covering weak chin) while he is speaking. scule -- The author suggests that we take ad- the Cuban sense of humor and We should arrange interferences in his sick mentally, beard Such tactics might amuse the Cuban He should be people, cnra ge Castro an d help destroy his charismatic ima ge- suceptible tot his sort of thing. 4. Psychological tA 3.§$, policy is often impede '; should not appear 4; peo ignore Guidcline Castro taunts; 5 -- The author notes d by Yankee-phobia to be opposed to economic and social revolution; (3) we should erase the Bay of Pigs image: that Latin American support of and offers these guidelines -- (1) (2) we should a loser; (4) ¢ maintain flexibility we should keep U.S. policy statements to a minimum; *(5) we should encourage OA S initia tive; (6) we should avoid direct attributable in- volvement in Cuban gituation. z=, Comme u.S. / Cuban a that there are § will do this at the -- Th e author has been hampe airs that he doesn't ext P sychological 3 know about. However, e interesting ideas in the paper which 2 red by the fact that a lot is going on in Bromley We Lagree with re worth exploring. ubcommittee meeting on Wednesday. Cl Gordon Chase aa Aste ee meee HY 5095 __DoclId: 32423483" Page 132 - wewor et
SECRET bie. s [ann cn Shree ! Pog ; | 20 - oo OUT [ eee yy SS eee Without speculating on the long and short term repercussions of such tactics, this affront to Castro's personal dignity might, as a start, amuse the Cuban people, enrage Castro and help to destroy his charismatic image, Personal dignity is the touchstone of the Latin American personality. Affronts to Castro's personal vanity might make him wilder and more open to terror than existing economic and political pressures, Psychological Guidelines. Latin. American support of US policy towards Cuba is impeded by Yankeephobia, historically justified or imagined fears of the Colossus of the North, and the spectacle of direct US confrontation with a small Caribbean country. To many Latin Americans, the | Cuban regime is linked with a social and economic revolution. Therefore, the US seems to oppose a social revolutionary trend and. is portrayed as a "reactionary" country by the left. Within the US, there is a grave danger that public, press, and partisan obsession with the Cuban problem will tend to force counter- productive policy actions such as immediate responses to Castro's charges or the issuance of overly precise and unnecessary policy © statements. Such public attention only serves to nourish Castro's ego, arouse Cuban nationalism to his support, and enhance his stature elsewhere. a {There is no reason for US officials and media to reply to charges and taunts emanating from Castro's verbosity, and it does not become a great nation to hasten to honor such provocation with a reply. Propaganda cannot be refuted immediately by truth, nor can one debate with someone uninterested in facts. The only remedy is the steady flow of the truth, which in time builds up the credibility of the medium employed and allows truth to be. ‘identified as such. . We must erase the Bay of Pigs image by not playing up the Brigade or the individuals connected with it, If nothing succeds like success, nothing fails like failure itself. Except for special circumstances, additional statements of US policy towards Cuba will tend to inhibit US freedom of action by limiting alternatives, confining policy rigidly to a single course, srousing more questions than are answered, or alerting Castro to a possible policy change. Moreover, Castro will use the opportunity to claim‘that the US is again threatening the Cuban people. Both in the matter of pronouncements and with. respect to overt policies it is usually preferable to have the initiative taken by one. or more members of the OAS. To do other- ~~ wise confirms the Latin American conviction that the US is overly . Oba yA? SECRET HW 50955 Docld:324293483 Page 133°
SECRET - oon On ren - 21 - (ao obsessed with Cuba, to the detriment of the Alliance for Progress. Direct US involvement in anti-Castro information propaganda > campaigns creates,rather than destroys»sympathy for Castro in Latin America.. Therefore, as much as possible, unattributable material and sources should be used.- For the US publicly to ignore Castro would be to deprive him of his largest audience, and it might provoke him into attention-seeking behavior, which in turn might have a sobering effect on Latin American oligarchs who are resisting reforms, It is really by his own actions (shooting of political prisoners, admission of Marxist ideological motivation, and allowing the Soviet missile buildup) that Castro” has lost face in Cuba and elsewhere, Rather than engage ina - continuing public polemic with Castro, thereby elevating him to our level, the US and its media should Keep public. commentary on Cuba to a minimum, ; Should it become desirable or necessary for the US to comment on the proposed Fxile Revolutionary Program, if it is announced, the following guidelines are recommended: 1) The US is pleased to note that the formulators defer to the Cuban people for ultimate approval of their program, The future of Cuba can only be decided by the Cubans, We applaud this democratic procedure. 2) Every free man awaits the day when Cuba is no longer a Soviet satellite. The Cuban Revolution, although betrayed by a "puppet," still lives. Our sympathies lie with the brave men who risk and give their lives ‘to free their homeland. 3) It is understood that the Free World would come to the assistance of a free Cuba. It is for the Cuban people to make a determination on economic assistance after they have reviewed the economic mess left by the Comnunists. Since it is known that the US is always prepared to assist noncommunist countries in difficulty, it might appear patronizing and seem like bribery for the US to over-emphasize its capacity to grant economic aid to a free Cuba. Mention of the Alliance for Progress in this context will only exalt its negative (anti-Castro) aspects, SECRET WW 50993 <Deretd: 32423483 Page 134 —
THE WHITE HOUSE . WASHINGTON , oa : i aa : er, September 23, 1963 pf fi y ; ~ * ame fe SECRET EYES ONLY oo G Pee ee ONLY . “MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP SUBJECT: Covert Operations Against Cuba - Security Within the Government > As you know, in August the U. S. Government directed two Nexile™ raids against targets in Cuba, From the evidence now available, it appears that our security, with respect to U. Se participation in these operations, was excellent. While there will always be public speculation as to the extent of U. S, involvement in raids of this type, I think we would all agree readily that it is important that there be only speculation, and no direct knowledge. Unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the Government who have to know a little or much about a U.S. -directed raid against Cuba, For example, without counting CIA personnel and secretarial and staff personnel of other agencies, there were probably over 20 people in the Executive Branch who knew details of the August raids while many other people were. generally acquainted with the U. S, involvement, Among others, the Navy knew where the attack boats were going; the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS knew about the "comings and goings" of the raiders; a few DOD people, who had to procure special equipment for the raids, coula presumably surmise that something was going on somewhere; and a few intelligence watch officers and press officers were told, for their background, that the U.S, Government was aware of the raids, Ithink there are twoimportant, if obvious, security lessons we have learned from the August raids -- one, that it is in the ; . » :mature:ofthe problem that many people probably have to know © i = somethinglabout such raids; and two, that these people apparently uh 4) Als Caehs A A pd. j SECRET - EYES ONLY (page 1 of 2 pages) WW 50955 Doold: 324235483 Page 135
SECRET - EYES ONLY -2- September 23, 1963 can maintain adequate security. At the same time, in view of the truth that security leaks are more likely to occur when substantial numbers of persons are involved, it seems essential to me that we constantly convey the high importance of security to others who are privy to information about our covert activities against Cuba, May I ask that members of the Special Group take such steps within their areas of authority as they think appropriate, and may Tin particular ‘urge that the Central Intelligence Agency, as executive agent for these enterprises, emphasize the importance of security to all those with whom it has necessary business on these matters, so that we can maintain the high level of security set in these recent operations, . McGeorge Bundy SECRET - EYES ONLY . {page 2 of 2 pages) i. raGy JUL 0 1915
Q) \) HW 50955 October 29, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT. SUBJECT: Item for your 4 o'clock meeting this afternoon a wwe I think it would be a wise precaution at the end of this meeting to ask that one copy of all important separate instructions _and reports made on any channel -- State, CIA, DOD, USIA, * and ICS -- be sent over here during this next period for your personal information, My object here is to provide a check on the tone of voice dn © policy-level messages in these tense periods. There is just no doubt at all that a good deal of our trouble in the last three months has come from differences of emphasis, at least, in what we have said to the field, Itis pointlessly cumbersome to inhibit the dispatch of business by requiring interdepartmental clearance on everything, but the. existence of a single information copy of everything important for you over here will allow Mike and me to call to your attention any serious divergencies. In requesting such a single information copy, you would be safe in saying that in no case would any such copy be given any additional circulation without direct notice from you to the agency concerned, ' I do not underestirra te the sensitivity of this order, JCS, DOD, and CIA particularly feel that they have a right to communication downward that is not monitored from above. But your interest is not served by the uncritical acceptance of that right. - McG, &, Docld: 32423483 Page 137
- a ai as any | CHECK LIST FOR 4 PM MEETING ' (Not intended to be exhaustive) 1. Intelligences os ULLAL nage te te A, Estimate of prospective balance of forceay~""' iB. Estimate of t quality and quantity of. military leadership committed: Gc. Summary of intelligence questions on which it would be profitable to ask further field assessment, e.g., cy . ..  d. Can we inaist on independent process of oe , confirmation or croas-check? © 2. Should we ask for a separate evaluation on these questions by Harkins? 2.: Lodge's Movements A. If we keep him in place, what are consequences for a " Plausible denial; 2. Possible indeiinite delay im retura while nothing happens; 3. Possible bad. signal to Nhu or to coup group. B. H he returna on schedule, who is in charge in Saigon, and under what Instructions. (There should be a draft instruction to Truehart and Harkins | on this } point for the 4 o'cloek meeting.) feo FAY FROM JUL 9 19S HW 50955 Docld:32493483 Page 138 —
Re an to "Coptingency Planning | A. CINCPAG - Presumably Defence will draft instructions for Felt which will preserve cover but move substantial forces: te within easy range of Saigon. 3B. Respones to coup. Presumably Harkins should be asked for detailed plans on use and withholding of U. S. forces 80 as not te choose up aides. C. There should be a political scenario of U. S. posture; l.. while in a possibly prolonged struggle; . 3. if coup fails.
. 4 1 t ‘ o i . - : sy + hae enmmmeeeirtne timate ieee Sg B+ 8 ttt oa se duh SPANO BT em Or BRNO lS. Wri cl af ia eset ah Ae Sted te oh ntiin 4° 9. Nth attest eee 8, tn ay wt os rg VIA CAS CHANNEL 10/ 30/63 TOP SECRET ee eee EYES ONLY FOR: AMBASSADOR LODGE Pal , - . FROM: , BUNDY, Wacie 1 sw 9 € l, . Your 2063 shows important difference in our views and we must repeat that we cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup. .In your paragraph 12 you gay that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to stop it. | We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not give a better-than-even prospect of quick success, — | We have never considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly rejected that course. © We recognize the danger of appeating hostile.to generals, but we do not share conclusion | implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure . justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated above. 2. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is nota better-than-even chance of quick success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in away calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are better, In such a communication | you should use the weight of U. S. best advice and explicitly reject TOP SECRET EYES ONLY AE AGES . . ee tn, ne somemmnnar mpm CRA i } i HW 50955 DocId:32423483 Page 140
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 2 “10/30/63 any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime, . We recognize need to bear in mind generals' interpretation of Ue 5. role in 1960 coup attempt, and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong | advice given as a friend and choice of sides by USG, -3, We continue to be deeply interested in up-tosthe -~minute assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to _.. our CAS 79126, We want continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic. | 4, To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is . . rescinded and we restate our desires as follows: . | a, While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country tearm in all circumstances and our only instruction is | that we are sure it will help.to have Harkins fully informed at all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing. guidance for coup contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination among generals. | b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart will be chief of the country team, and our only modification anry pot existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish “TOP SECRET . so FN fa wana fee e a ia. : cer NE NE Ee ECC ee A pet men ee i HW 50955 DBocld: 324273483 Page 143. , - _ . - mo
se ie “<2 em Bisons witness nF eina narrate tot Wa HW 30955 Docld: 32423493 Page 142 | ee ; 2 Schatten seate one bai antes Ben aT MPU A ot ty tntedernan ed eaten eee Dea et «tthe nm ett Ar he gs Heme meet, TOP SECRET EYES ONLY | -3- 10/30/63 all instruction and debriefing of Conein to be conducted in immediate consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know what is said to Conein and what he reports at all stages, c. If you have left anda coup occurs, we believe that emergency situation requires final local U. Se authority to be vested in most senior officer with experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view is Harkins, We do not repeat not intend that this internal switch in final re sponsibility should be publicized in any way, ‘and Harkins will of course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow in paragraph 5. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have the effect suggested in your paragraph 8. | | | 5. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions for U. S. posture in the event of a coup, » Be U.S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side, and U.S, -controlled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the battle lines or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington. b. In event of indecisive contest, U, S, authorities may . in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides, TOP SECRET EYES ONLY _ po —_
ey "POM . "TOP SECRET EYES ONLY ne B955 “D “ ocld:32493483 Page 14g” "1 rn were oes . ‘ . : i ‘ ee OD tele ap Sear ohiamR tell: prtate gattettthe fet AbD. Pe ttl ea laaeieeentmneteenmintatrnmitamenenes ten Cone PR a alm saat mete bmn Netty eo nwa TOP SECRET EYES ONLY | 4a . (10/30/63 such as removal of key personalities or relay of information, In such actions, however, Ue S. authorities will strenuously avoid “appearance of pressure on either side. Itis not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of coup. + '¢. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup, U. S. authorities may offer asylum in their discretion to those to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort. d. But once a coup has begun, and within these restrictions, it is not in the interest of the Ue S. Government that it should fail, | 6. We have your message about return to Washington and if announcement has not already been made, we suggest that it be. | kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible you keep open the exact time of your aeparture, We are strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this should turn out to be a week of decision, and ifit can be avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now. Hart REP E ah ee,
MEYORA SUBJECT NDUM FCR: ce WASHINGTON, D.C. 29503 ar oe mer ee e& 10 June 1964 Tae Director of Central intelligence Plans ct aes m =xiles to Assassinate Selects J n Government. Leaders iniformia- 1. The following report was compiled fron ; tion cbtained by “sency officers from versons who were O parties to tne ac tions cescribed. Agency officers mace clear to:each of the Sources that the United States Government would not er any circumstances, cendone the planned actions. Sumabiy the sources of tne report, in Submittin s information, were motivated in part oy the belie = by disclosing the information they woulé obtain immenity against legal action should they succeec in implementang whe plan. C) 2. A Cuban exile was avproacnhed on 2 March 1964 cy an acquaintance who wished to discuss 42 plan, which wos Still in the enbrvonic, state, to assassinate Fidel Casire. The acquaintance was cGescriped 2S 4a businessmen and a Shipowner who owns at least one ship which cails uncer the British flaz, and who aeiso has a legally Sanctions interest in distributing and placing slot machines in gambling houses. The involvement of tne acquaintance in the slot-machin2 business brings the man in convact with elements in the underworld, vrimarily through Ais paruner who is a former police officer from St. Louis aad througn whom there iS .a tie-in with elements of "Cosa Nostra.” Tae "Cosa Nostra" elements are slleged to have numerous contacts Still available to them in Cuba, .and they nave ‘ offered to assassinate Castzo for $150,005: no acvance ‘ fu nds were récuested. If. th isSion cannot be accom- LEn or 22 the pitn Lou CoO8GEal, an amas oss ° .COO0 would be paid for the travel and living expenses of five men involved in the mission. Tne C exile commenteé that he believec he had been approec: with this plan because of his family's wealtn; ne to o) _ NO FOREIGN _HW 50955 Docld:324293483 Page-14£-- DESSEM/CONTS a ” moore S5-C- hes 5-T LLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM A ied) BROAD/B BA CKGROU “COMY —y PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFIC!
C  <—— t HW 50955 his acquaincance that an approach money. Docld: 324235483 that he was not interested and sugrested might be made to Someone who. nas much more revorted “.3, Another Cuban exile that Byron Cameron, owner and overator: of the M/V CAYMAN EOPs,. WAOSe address — is Caribe Tracing Co., Ltd., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, met with sever es on 3. March 1964. 4mong che persons ati zt ceting were Teofilo Sadun Franco, co-owner of Antilicon Marine Snivoing Corpvoraticn, - Miami, and two of Eabun’s employees, Oscar sernancez Viegso and Eliseo Gon Fernandes. Babun ana Cameron are friendly Shinning-susiness concetlitors in the Caribbean area. During the course of conversation at this meeting, ; Cameron mentioned that ne was in contact with an unicenti- fied grceuv waich would se willing to assassinate selectec — Cuban officials for cisn; Szecitically, the Cameron group is interested in asscgsinating Fidel Castro, Raul Cascro, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 4, After a oreliminary discussion at the 3 arch meeting, it waS thought tnat the amount of $150;000 for the assassination of Fidel Castro, plus $5,000 expense money, payable in advance, wos tco high, and Baoun reit that this situaticn was just snother attempt to swindle a patriotic Cuban exiles. Another meeting was then neid on 5 March and « counter-offer of $100,000 “was mace for the essassination of Fidel Castro, tlus $2,500 for ex- menses, payadie in acvance. Cameron promised to cnéck with his convacts after returning from 2 trip to the Caribbean. 4 . ; 5, During a meeting on 15 March attends améeron and Babun anc his associates, the follewing t sere — agreed upon for the assassinaticn of tae Cuba (Cialis Fidel Castro, oe OCO; Raul Castro, $20,000; to - "Che" Guevara, 20 006; and $2,500 for ennens yable . in advanes, do . tarmit fav tra nronasead n vou ps 50 Gays From the care waen Babua could aiv, to the satisfcetion of Cameron, that ne nad $100,060 ct his disposal for the payment. The contract for payment AAS : to ‘ ~ Cr) cot S-E-C-R-5-T NO FOREIGN DISSEN/CONTROLLED DISSIMN/NO DISSEM. SBROS Oss: CNGROUMD) VSr aT 0 pec KEROL 2 . we eee eee eee coer: PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE fe Page 145- sO *
HY 50955 DPocld: 32473463 the nresentation would se honored only upon that the three Cuban officials died at asSessins connectec with Cameron's contacts. of evidence tne hands of the 6. In early Spril 1954 Zliseo Gomez Fernandez met. with Jose "¥Fepin’ Zosch., Sesch arreed to advance $100,000 and Babun anc AiS aSsecciates would acvance $2,500 for expenses. Julio So Clavarria, a wealthy. Cu tban exile in New York, Sussccucntly agreed to the terms, provided that his name was not involvec. Accordingly, Eabun gave Cameron $2,200 on 23 April, Cameron then advised his group, @nd on 25 LiL ae rerorted that his ¢groun had already callec itS mon-in Cuba and t 2 hin to precesd aS plannec ond that ‘their other man" fing for Cube Snortivy. Tne finel comment was e have some ccod news for you setween 20 2 Lovo plann? rd to Ziv wo Miami on 19 May to arrange for the transfer of $100,900 to a savety ceposit box, the eys to which are to be held jointly by Cameron and 2 confidant of Lobo. , ; 7. .Tne 2 ) whe persons in the Canercn ground and nov vy mle erecezd with this mission aré not known. Sabun's asscceiates are reluctant to make any unnecdssary auerias secause they nave invested Oa ecause Cameron mace it fairly clear at the at whe Mafia was involved, Camsron re- g tne neroviations that nis contact was 2 ficer in the St. Louis, Missouri, Vico Scuaed who was 2boutv to revire anc « nas mumerous conmtctions in the Matin, Cameron impliec thay "tae otner man" in question is in Soain. Cameron knows that ne could pe indicted for conspiracy and that if there is any treachery on fis wart, Easun ane nis associates would not nesitate to Sink nis Ship, the M/V CAYMAN HOPE. 8, I uben Exile who spoke with ‘taat Teofilo Bebunm and Wey bao assi3~ Sinate Ficsl $150,000. Sesen claimed the o furnish. © $50,000 an get the balance -3- ur? t “SLE-C-3-E-7 NO FOREIGN DISSEX/CONTROLLED DISSEL/NO DISSEN ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE CrLy xgze Soe | ; ~ “PROPERTY. OF THF WHITE HOUSE OFFICS - 7 ~ ern, at ~~ ~ . we Page 146
of the money from the Uni Government or from | cec States .other sources, Bosch indicated that he believes thet a quick change for the better in the Cuban Situation can ; be brougat about enly by the vhysical elimination of Ficel Castro and that nis elinination is well worta $150,000. In pursuing 2iS atulisots to raise an additional $100,000, Bosch is sianning to ask Julio Lobo to con-~ _— tribute at least $50,250. ‘ Uecceewere Cle Richard Helms Deputy Director for Plans y C) 7 $B C-R-E-7 | NO FORBIGN DISSZN/CONTROLLED DISSEM/iNO DISSEM ABROSD/BACKGROUND USE OT | ws PROPERTY OF ° “THE WHITE HOUSE OFFIC! MW 50955 DocId:32423483 Page 147. Oc on
HW 50955 = BART & NO FOR wk Bocld: . -CSDB-3/661, 653 Orig: Tho Director of Cantral Intelligence cc: istant to the President for Naticnal Security #ffairs Assistant Secretaryv--Iinter-American Affairs Department of tate The Director cl Intelligence and researcna Departmenc of Seate © Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Department oF State The Director, Dezense Intelligence Agency The Attorney General The Department of vustice The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation The Deputy Director of Central. intelligence Deputy Director for intelligence é t 5 Goo . -~ 5 - @ ; S~E-C-R-=£-T : “t DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEN ABA AD/BACKGROUND US O° : XERO, ixER) orn _ a ——. - - . PROPERTY OF FHE WHITE HOUSE-OF FIG) 32423483, Page 148 vor, “By, on :
- =e e *e. : ’ : e ~—- —o . : 7 oo - ° ect . ‘ ° mn ° . ~” oo —. = y : . : oo 7 “* ° 2 7 ¥ : . . 6 ‘ - . nee, ~~ ° as ° _ . f r } @ « * - “7 —=— eee we * - - . ® ~ 7 : ~ é ‘ - 4 . TT s,ote - 0 @ : a -_— ~ ® ~ * et . an 34 - 2 - — i . AON = so . = e* ‘ ° ’ ee kaw be ~- e noe ~ Mone - - eee remt bvto.e Tle 2 bte nee: po .-..A paper was discussed on alleged plans ‘which involve the underworld ' to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on . notice and should a ao ever yihing in its power to ascertain pron wipe tLy the veracit ty of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was 5 decided that ifr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney. General's attention as a matter of law enforcement, : Vay O .* . a ‘ oA " e é at . Peter Jessup: : | Distribution: — Mr. Johnson Mr. Vance Mr. McCone . fy oH ce aii . Ce ee AND ; e | rene — RR Ty THE WHITE PURSE a ee u— ta ed ay ene gi ore py 7 EEE So PELE petiietttin Se i aac. Yar etre eae FE EE sere REE eens ater omens HW 50955 DocId:32423483 Page 149-
) , : ‘ Leip V se 7 a | : 31 July 1964 7, | MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 30 July 1964 ~ PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone. Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was present for Item 1. Colonel Ralph D. Steakley was present for Item 3. le Cuba ‘The proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August 1964 weré approved. Mr. FitzGerald then addressed himself once more to the ever present problem of operations by autonomous groups. While under our cognizance, they are not controlled, he said. ~ | ” 4 It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would contact Mr. Sam Papich of the | FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia over-. ae tones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to | ono handle as a matter of law. enforcement. . . a @ , — an , PROPERTY OF . Lo. TRE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE : . bt, , “. oo. . . : ' aa Voovee twee MW .50955, Docld: 32423483 | Page 150.
Oa care oe meee Pe ee cae ee = am oD ES wo HW 50955 MEMORANDUM FOR: The tIonorable McGcorge Bundy 19 August 1964 Special Asaigtant to the President for — National Security Affairs 4 ° SUBJECT: ' Status of FBI Investigation re Plans by Cuban Exiles to Ascasginate Cuban te, Government Leaders oT: 1. This memorandum is for your information in response ‘to a 303 Committee quer y aL 30 July 1964 rezarding the status of the Federal Eurcau of Investigation's investigation of reported plans by g 3 +P P y Cuban exiles to assasein ate Cuban government leaders. 2, The following is a gummary of the investigation to date. 3, Subsequent to CIA's dissemination of information regarding "Plans of Cuban Exiles t o Asgassinate Selected Cuban Government : Leaders" {report disseminate by CIA to the 393 Committee and selected * key officials as CSDB-3/ 661, 653 dated 10 June 1964), the Federal Durcau, “of Investigation has interviewed all of the pcoole involved in the plot “Gxcept Byron Cameron. he may possibly return t -Cameron is now in Mexico on a business trip; 9 idiamion 7 August at which time the FDI plans m4 to interview him regarding the plan. Thee PI has not decided i£ it will -fntervicw CLA's other source OF if it will re-intexvicw all of the people jnvolved in the plan. 4 . Tho FBI, asa result of its investigation, has disogerninated a total of seven (7) repotts regarding this matter. A surmanary of these reports follow: a. Teofilo Dabun Selman spacifically denied to the FDI that he had any involvement in, or knowledye of, any plen to assassinate gelectcd Cuban government officials. Le adinitted contact with Julia Lobo OJavarria, but denied discusging the plan with hina and stated that . Eduardo Garcia Molina was present during the mecting with Lobo and that Garela could verify Docld: 32423483 Page 151 his statements. . HE WHITE HOUSE Gi rics eo ua . ie TEE PORE UESE RUD IEOUY” 67S RTA ARIES rua PPR! “nes Some ns inate?” tsa S
a b. JEduardo Garcia Molina advised the FEI that he knew of the plan and that he was present when Babun discussed it with Lobo. c. Julio Lobo Olavarria advised the BI that Eabun had told him of the plan and of Byron Cameron. Babun had asked him to con- tribute funds for the plan and he tentatively agreed to furnish funds, "put later declined. Lobo also told the FEI that he had discussed the _ plan with CLA. v_ - re three Lae utteietettenar: ee arneteltniine: + Bence, * ; d, Jose M. “Pepin” Bosch informed the FDI that he had heard of the plan in gencral terms and that he had rcvorted it to the CLA. He denicd that he had agreed to furnish funds for the plan. ’ “e, Elisco Gomez Fernandez informed the FLI that he had no oO kmowledge of the plan. : - - oS {, .Ceferino Oscar Fernandez Veiga infozmed the FBI that he : - had no knowledge of the plan. g. Major John Doherty of the St. Louis, Missouri, City Police Department advised the FEIthat he is now in charge of the Field Operations Division of the St. Louis Police Departinent and formerly { was connected with the Vice Squad of this department. Doherty stated _. that he had no idea aa to who would be involved with the Mafia and who a . would be in a position to participate in plans to carry out executions of Cuban government officials. h. All other people interviewed by the FEI denied knowledge _ of the plan. © 8 cre et ma Cun ms memo . : : . JOLIN A. McCONE ° 7 Dixector P : | oe | . — PROPERTY OF ; | THF WHITE HOUSE OFFICE Barina Os : WW 50455 Docld:32493483 Page 1477