AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER: RECORD SERIES : JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency Information MATHENY 178-10004-10264 SSC SERIES Date: 8/27/20] Released under the John F. ennedy Assassination Records OoOllecrion act oF 1992 (44 Sc 2107 Wore). Case: Nw Ptei4 Date: OF-11-201i7 AGENCY FILENUMBER: DRAFT REPORT--APPROVAL OF QUOTATIONS (2) Document Information ORIGINATOR: NSC FROM: TO: RECORD TITLE >: MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62 DATE: 09/06/1962 PAGES: 5 SUBJECTS : CUBAN EXILES OPERATION MONGOOSE CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICATION: — Unclassified RESTRICTIONS: IC CURRENT STATUS: —Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 08/11/1993 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET. v9.1 . . 17 HW 54214 DoclId:32105754 Page 1
yt TAP /mm co . . | MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD . - 7 ns peoemenen Dene Canes (| DBAFT MONGOOSE Minutes - 9/6/62 Ch ~—> ~ SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on ‘Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962 PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin; Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdaie and General Harris; General Carter; Mr. Murrow 178-10003-10090 178-10004-10264 1. Sabota e Operation General Carter reported that information should be available by Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation. Mr. . Bundy requested that the White House be informed as soon as the dnformation is obtained, BY 2. General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 3ist. “He noted that some of the:. operational representatives had . ‘questioned fey ‘3 Ahrset es . whether this was responsive to the changed situation ehgendered by the ‘desumee of NSAM 181, but said that ‘this plan had been prepared within the framework of the previously-approved guidelines (those of August 16). . Mr. Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to. NSAM 181 has ; ‘been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified -the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt thatthe approach - taken in the August 31st paper was satisfactory. “3. The following specific comments were then made on Activities Jasted in the paper: (It should be noted that final approval was not. -piven to the paper at this meeting.) a. Mr. Martin said that number 20 (balloons) was tricky and that the thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal cemen isiry UNMARKED _ Gerald R. Ford Library r NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION et "NATIONAL SECUR ‘ HW 54214 Docld:32105754 Page 2
-2- is prepared. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that details should be presented to the Group, to include the content of the leaflets which would be dropped, and specifics as to the method and place of launching, the technical details of the release of “leaflets, etc., etc. b. Mr. Martin felt that number 25 ("discovery" of caches of arms ) involves an important aspect of timing. He said, and the Group agreed, that any such action should be coordinated with U.S. objectives toward Cuba rather than confusing it with activities in connection with a third country. Mr. Bundy emphasized that any such undertaking should be done with: the-idea of providing a-pretext:-for further action. c. In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported by State, said that Radio Swan (number 23) should be continued even though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of ' the possibilities of intrusion into radio and TV channels in Cuba. Mr. Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount against U.S. radio stations, and sald that he felt on balance it would. " not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare. The Group asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared, . d. At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 (propaganda directed at Bloc personnel in Cuba) was assigned to USIA and CIA, rather than just to the latter, | e. On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose was changed from crippling to harrassing Cuban commerce, Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:32105754 Page 3
, General Carter pointed out that reference tto support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) ids -tmpractical., The word was changed to selected. Be Mr.. ‘Martin cautioned that results af number 50 (actions to be «undertaken ‘by ‘other Hemisphere governments) swould mot ‘be expected overnight. | a: -ih. General Canter wrged tthet, im connection weit mumber 22 (submarine tbroadcasts)., Generall Lansdale should ibe given ‘more latitude - dn working wp other deception possibilities. Mr.. Tunthy Felt, on the - other ihand,, that particularly iberanse of tthe possilbike Guban counter- | MeHSUTEB weibiisch thad ibeen outildared iby Mr. ‘Murrow, tthe Group should look ' at other possibilities im some detail. a. General Carter felt that a determination should “be made as tho thow &ar tthe W.S. is prepared tte go in ecunomic lhanrassing actions. He emphasized that scbotage operations such as those uniter number 27° wild mot im tthenselwes ibe especially effective im ee the Cuban a comm. festrutetT Dogan _ 4, The Group ithen thurned ito a discussion of mumber 32 (agricultural wabptage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and ‘the disastrous results ‘that would flow from some- ‘thing goimg wrong, particularly if there wene Gbvious attribution to the U.S. ‘He went-on tbo say,, ihowever,, that it would ibe possible to waxceomplish ttihis purpose ‘by methods imone :subtile than tthose indica ted in ithe paper. ie mentioned specifically ithe possibility af producing crop Sr ee ee Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library a-- eee ae ee ee HW 54214 DoclId:32105754 Page 4
He mentioned as examples what the’ U.S. response should be in the event of a revolt and whether or not a naval blockade should be mounted. . : The Group agreed that such planning, in addition to the military continger : , ’ plans already prepared, must be pursued. — ; Although recognizing that this type of activity is not within the Sein MONGOOSE framework, Mr. Bundy fdéit that General Lansdale's group, particularly the State representative, Me to the initial exploration _ of possibilities for later consideration by the Special Group, the Secretary of State and higher authority. On the other hand, General Carter felt strongly that if General Lansdale and his associates were given the responsibility for developing the spectrum of possible decisionsof this kind, it would inevitably detract from the time available for MONGOOSE operations. Thie metter was left open for further ‘consideration at a meeting next week. 00~ Go Panedde - QrafRoryd aleles . tom - Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:32105754 Page 6