(T6-10033-10085 AGENCY : : 176-10033-10145 RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : RECORD NUMBER ORIGINATOR : : Schlessinger, Jr. TO: _ TITLE : : 6/30/1964 FROM DATE PAGES : SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : : Declassified RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CLASSIFICATION JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM NARA Church Committee WH Kennedy, John F CIA Reorganization 15 Paper, Textual 2/14/2001 .
SANITILED Mut ts dolaA Sir © bs 4 June 30, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: GIA Reorganization f aubmit the fellowing viewa ag one whe worked in OSS during the war and served as a periadic CIA consultant in the years ince. On balance, CIA's record has probably been very goed. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphe of an intelligence agency are unknown®; all the public hears dbout (or should hear about) are ite errerva. But, sgain in the nature of the cage, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damasd few vigible errors. The important thing te recognize today, in my judgment, i¢ that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about uged up ite quote. Ite margin for future orrar ie practically non~exietent, Gane more CIA debacie will ehake faith considerably reorganized, ie wath | be widely blamed for Gevelopmente of which i€ ig wholly Inngcent. fhe argument of thie memorandum to that CIA's treuble can be traced to the autqnomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate; and that thid autonomy fe due te three main causes: (1) dn inadequate dactrine of clandestine operations; (2} an inadequate conception of the relationehtp between operations end potters (3} an inadequate  8OF ehould he «<2 gross aad repeated GEA foiling hag been ite eccaaional réadineds to succumb to the temptations of favogable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operationg were almost nullified by the fload of self-congratulatory publicity wiitch followed them fe. ¢g., the articles by Richard and Gladye Harkeese, “The 13, 1954). -_ : SECRED
SECRET conception of the relationship between operations aud intelligence. The memorandum algo suggests waye in which game of thage prab« leme can pethapa be sllevinted. & CIA Autonomy GIA conducts three main forma of eeexet works cloadestine intelite genee collections covert political operations; and para - activities. & earvies on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the oufcnomy are Materical. Whea CIA begen, the State Department, atitl thinfing too much ta tevmae of ite traditions! missions in foreign afiaied, leaked on this éugpicien dad eenpunced the: tn the macnatisna, GIA grow tn sise and power. SS oe aa lts a a lage suber of gle anit f dente ad ei aé8ed br Tiles patdetate to ite @kathe the auere mimaatum ita opevantoss Saveloped, and the grester cote it played in the tnttlution of paltay.. By the time thas Gtate had begun to be folly aware of the probleme cua change to eatatlich ke oun ultimate authority: While State re: é ait accompli: Ctute never bad title to contre! evest Clandeatine intelligences colicction ané te tad teat ground ta euch area ne overt pleat toporting sd oven tb atneanco overt diplomatic contactay co comme depres tet by Clas vandmocy oo protest prepased operation SECRET
SECRET: For its part, CIA had developed a whole aerics of functions paral- leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of — the Defense Depavtment a¢ well. Today it hag ite own political deske and military etaffa; it hae in effect its own foreign service) it has (or has had) ite own combat forces; it even hae ite ows air force. tg annual budget ié about times that of the State Depart ment. The contemporary CIA possesees many ef the characteristica ef a state within a efate. i, Doctrine Though CIA's autonomy developed for Materical reagons, it hae been abié to endure becauge there ie no doctrine governing cur donduct of clandestine operations, The prublem of dactrine fer CLA fe the extent te which {te various clandestine missions are compatibie with a frce and open society. it ig idle te argue that, becaguee the Communtete can do such-end-ouch, we ave free to do ittes. Gommuniom te a creed nurtured in cone epirecy; andthe whole point af Gommuntst social and politteal cegant- - gation is to make cenepizacy effective, I ‘fighting fire with fire’ means contracting the fraedome traditienally enjoyed by Americans in order te give more freedom to CIA, no ene seriously wiches to do that. Yet i do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the mits which the maintenance of an open ceciety places on secret activity. Until thie te done, CIA's rele will uct be clearly defined and under steed: The problem which muct bs faced igs what anet of secret @dtivity te congletent with the preservation ef a free gocial order? . We muet begin, I believe, ty accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will.ack questions asd make-speeches, reportere will dig out ctestes, newepapera will pub- Mab editeriale, individuaia, driven by promatinge of canscience, will biuret out things harmful to the state, and seam, We do ast aish to change these thinge and could net do eo without viclating the easence of our accigty,. Thege things make up the Grameworh to which CA must operate, In chert they constitute ths problem: aad, ae General Maeghall used to say, “Theve's ng polit fe fighting the ; problem.” SECRET
SECRET Each form of Gecret activity predente ite wn problem. Clandestine inteliigance collection hae been a traditions! function of the agtional etete. He relec and usages Gre feivly well cetablished. In the miunlas eapionage, if conducted with discretion. shoulé present no great problem, Howeveg, whea-cz & with an open checkbook ond a broad mandate, even eepionage can begin €o pach againet the ifesits of secret activity in.an open society, I consider later, fer . example, the question of the Gentrolied American Source {CAG} and whether the overdoing of CAS ta not beginning to haem other activities ' of the goverament: . Govert political eperations euedtont @ trickier probtem, MOE avice when (t io necesesry to eubsidics newepagert, politicians and organiaations in other countgies, But corruption of the political life of another nation fe not @ eegpencibility te he lightly assumed. ff wouder whether CIA hae eo? done ted much of tis for the joy of it. Pogemilitary activities ezeate en even mone diificult problem, if only because tho problems of concealment Gro eo much mere is genevel, 1 would auggeut that any secret operation whose encoces te Gependast on the suppregaton of news, on lying to Congeacamen and jouynsiiets and on the deception of the clectorate should be undertaken enly when the ertcte te co considerable that the gains eeally ecem to eutweigh the &® This auggeste thet the gic of the proe poued opeestion may be of eractal tmportsnce, 6 Sprariens cos the vieibility of the egesation, eats qucecue dependean . Giwerting the tmpuiees and denying the values of an-open society, the sickier (¢ Becomed,, and the more urgent (t te tet an overwhelming cage be made for ite seesaalty,. te ghost, chen confronted with & proposed eporuiton, @o must sot only ask whether the operation te technically fensitie ts tte own terms) wo tauat dak whether ite dueceds requines our open eoclety t be in Say cartons way feiee to {66 om principlogy SECRET
Pera ae) SECRET. — Clandestine activities Ghould te asaessed not only | in the centoxt of their relationship € an cpen society bot alge in the context of thelr eelationghip to United States foreign policy. GIA operations have act bean held effectively eubordinate to U.S. foreign pelicy. State Department cone "This face exposes Amévican fareign peliey 6 & vaultitude of embartassinante when Ci 1 ts digec reved recruiting — GIA hes said that, in such cases, neither the Embegey nor the Depart- ment in Waéhingtes ig acrmally informed ef this type of eporetion. fn chort, no one knows hew many potential peeblome for US forcign . policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are boing created at thie mement by CIA clandestine tatelMgence operations, Surely there is an argument fer permit 3 advantage to be gained by the operatioal weighs the righ (eog,. emaperating the local goverarment and shaking ite confidenes both in our purposes and in our senec}.. Clandestine intelligence operations ehould plainly be cleared both with the Depart« ment of State and (anve for exceptional inetances and on agreement of ' the Secretary of State} with the lecal U.3,. Ambassador, SECRET | | ie
SECRET 6. 2. Covert political opsvations techniesiiy require Etate . Bepartment clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often Been able to seiae the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almodt to that of a rubber Gtamp. This has been pertly the consequence of the Guperior drive and . Qctiviam of CIA pereonasl, especially se compareé with the didfidence of State Bepartment perscanel. Yer cxample, when man come to CEA with the sseigument ef devalaping covert political campaigne or organising coupe or prepezing for paramilitary wasiare, these mea naturally fall to work with ingenuity and ceal; thoy probably feel thet they ave agt earning theiy pay untege, eay, they organize as many coups se possible. The concept of ‘coatingency pignaing’ hae legitimatized the egncrete preparation of operations sill presumably ‘in @ hypothetical stage; people Gid act at Geet actice that ‘contingency planning, ' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often tranaferme contine genciae tate apperent necessities. Thue, if a group ia assembled and revved up on @ contingency baste, then the fatlave to carvy the project through [It 8¢ argued) will invite the dizag tment and allenstion of the gréig) aod the preagure ineweases an fellow through Gn whet had etasted ae a pute speculation. This wae o conteal facter, ‘ef eoures, inthe Cuban decigion «« the fact that distandment of the Guben feree in Guatemala just ecemed te create fag many probleme and embarrasomenate. Having entered inte relatiens with pevecaslities in fordcign lands, CIA has sometimes c¢eemed to feel thet wo must therge ropielhend dion Aapraaye teal Doieoeinari-oPepiehtanes Ayoninir nna of even go over to the Gommuntiate. This appreach hag made us on _ecésaign the pricgners of cur own agents. 9 8We become pricencre of qur agente in ancther cause toe. Tho Guban opicede leaves the gtreng impresatien that CIA fe nat able te cantral ite own tow-level cperativee, While the CIA people in Washingten are men ef exceptionally high quality, the msa attracted te field jgbe arc eeme- times tough aad even victoug peaple motivated hy Geives ef thelr own and net acconggarily in polities! or even moral cymmpathy with the purpecos SECRET
SECRET it hag meant too that the State Department, oftea apprised of an operation only in ite later etages, te under great pregsure fo endorse the operation a6 Gleeady mounted because of the alleged evil congéquénees of exercising avete. i well remember Tom Mann's remark the dey the decision wes made te go dhead an Guba: . “ would never have favored initiating thie epexations but, since it - bas gone ag far ae it hse, I do nat think we can risk calling it off. “ Moreover, at ¢ time when theve ie increaging pramium on activiem, State, when it queations CIA cperations or initiatives, caate iteclf in a prissy, clasy, segative role. The advocate of clandestine activities geome ‘tough’ and vealistic; the opponent has te invoke auch intangibies as the réputation of the United States, world public apinion, “What do we cay in the United Nations? ", ete., and geging hopelosely taralistie, legalistic end 'gefe. dhe eqvuls of GIA's tadtigtive in covert political operations has been to create eituations which have dovyeed policy on the State Depactment. Thig wag oot the original idea behing CIA. Ae Allen Bolles wrote _. is hie 1947 memorandum to the Geaate Armed Gervicss Gorumittes, ‘Phe Central iotelligance Agency shavid have abthing te.do with policy. “ Yet. in the yeore since, CLA hae, tn effect, ‘made’ golicy in many parte of the world. A number of governments still in power Rage thae they have ven bean targete of CIA attompte at overthsge «+ not @ state of mind calculated to stimulate fetendly feelings toward the aan are ieeeased Covert enevetion te inadequate to peatact Ue foterdete. There muct be sonw means by whieh tate can be informed . of such oparstigns at an early enough atage to effect the ¢ claus to confrost Guate with peal rsnene Gthorelse CIA hp SEORET 49061 Docld:32629331 Pane a
WT 42nnre ~ SECRET , Paramtl wy warisre. t gather, ig soganded (n fome quarters shnaet oo Cth funetin ore peeltary deeatert. on ths pale! ; confant than paramilitary wariar There age suverat rescens for this, Fas one thing, & paramilitary do euggeetod sbave, clashes withthe preswgposttione ef ear open teaining of, aey, the the South Vietaamede in gusgeitie teeties or to the support of steady existing guerrilla activities.) For gnother, the moral end and political price of dizect paramilitary llure i¢ acute for wi; Communists, when they otimulate pacerilitary eetivity, are dofag what the world expects from thomy when we do it, we appear i sand therefers cannst afford to ' 4 ants, soe fo pout deat ‘wo cannge lightly wriga them off and élose the The Commaniets, on the other hand, Rave no scruples about | qatdating @ losing ehowr, SECRET +E xMoyea,
SECRET 10. Moveover, guerrilla warfare te fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guorrilla _ succeeds when his program enlists gragsrocte gupport: and it is very difficult indeed to heat him whes the countryside t¢ with him. Van Mook told Geneval Marshall in 1946 net to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia; “we are sending 50, 000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three montha."” Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillag in the Philippines, ‘veplied, “Te won't be eG easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprue and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over« coming guerrille registance through sheer weight of militery force. Serious guercilie movements have been defeated only three times eince the end of the Second Werlé War: in Greees, because Tito’ defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cages tho guarrille resistance ended because of the combination of political ¢ litteal aad military countegmeagures. The 3 struggle | in Malays, ae Fe 4 Mayehel Torapler undepatecd (and eaid}, wae for the minds and heaste of the peoples ie therefore invelved not only paremilitery operations but 4 vaet educational program, organisation of trede unions, political reform ané an affor of national independence. 1 the guer#illa’s power lice in hie sovelutlenary program, the enewsr . lies in part ta meeting the ateds which enable the querrilia to rouse the countryside. “Without a political geal, wrote Mao Taa-tung, “guseriiia warfare must fl, os it must if ite goliciéel objectives da not coincids with the aégpieations of the people gad tf their eympatiy, esoperation and sgéietaace cannct be:gained.” He added, “De we want the cupgort of the mggses? EB we do, we mutt go emong the magseds arouse them to edlivity; tencera eareeives with their weal and woe." For theese reasons, paremfiitary wrefare cannot be considered a6 primarily a military weapon, ft te primarily a political weagon aud sauet therefare be gubfected to close and careful political oversight, & probably ehould be retained in o reconstituted CIA rather than teangforzed to Defense: ~ SECRET
. SECRET oo... orgs , le woud meas Vas te intel agency wad SECRET
SECRET &é. enforced by dinectives, by State Department chairmanship of wotking groups, and by the infiltration af State Depa: personel inte the intelligence agency. Obviously this det-up would nat gueceed, however, unless the State Department iteulf were prepared to overcome ite inbred habite of diffudion, négetividm and delay and to take 4 firm end parposefl grip oa the situation The selationchip betwoen aperations and intelligence calaes particu. lasly povplesing questions. &‘intelligence’ incledes two separable activities: clgamdsdtine collections end research, analyeis and evaluation, The firet desig with that omali portion of raw intelli+ gence procured by eeceet sasane (Me. Rulles datimated in 1947 that | "a peoper andlysia ef the intefiigence obtatnsiie by. . . avert, sormal, aad sbevebourd moans would cupply ue with aver 60 percent 1 ehould esticaate, of the information required fer the guidance of Guy national paltey"}: tho gecond iavelves the collation and interpretation of gli ferme of intelitgence, however.cbtained and the preduction of ‘aetimegtes, ” ‘Unter the Beitich aydtem, clandestine collection i¢ enteuated to the Secret Intelligence Services. The redaarch, analyste penchieiaaiti function ts lacated in the Fovelgn Office Ressaych og é Water the Amovrican gystenry CIA has resganathility for both Glandestine collection and researeh ang enalyeia,, The Mate Bepast+ mendes Bureau of Intelligence and Reecarch alge hee regegech and euslyéte seepenat eet but, ip practice, GIA hae eatablighed eontre! ever the maxhingry for praducing aationsl eatimetes fn euch 6 way 86 to reduce State's contribution to submitting {ta views to CEA fer beeeptancs or rejection, tn cther wordg, whee in Great Britain | the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that eqle hag been ageumed by CLA, i: et ty SECRET
TRAP | The argument against incorporating the rescarch aud estimate fuaction in State was mada by Dulles in 19¢7: “Par the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country i i@ important that infaymation should be protedded by an agency whage duty it ts to weigh facta, and te draw conclusions (vem those facte, without baving either the facta or the conclusions werped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the mon whoge duty it f¢ to determing policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too itkely ta be blind to any facte which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty. Ce ee nad ae ee ee ne wah canal effect against the incorporatinn of the research and estimate function in CEA a0 be if tatalligence te tan closely connected with operations, then sminitted to 6 particular operation will tend to aeciact out the ioflligence which validatas the operates. Obviously both erquneutyy conclude in @ case for eho extabliehment of @ fairly independent recesseb and estimate geaup. But, & the RGE group ig too independent, one runa inte the oppedite danger? thet ie, shea netthen policy soe oprétions will be Gubjecced te eaquate intelligence checks, The trouble withthe Gabsn eporation, tor example, ‘wae not that of the Cuban operation. ee ae Ce ee had veached the point in Cabs where o euccessetal landing « would provete upeisings lighind the Useo aad defcetions fram the wAMtlas. te Daceaber and Debrusny. the Cétce af Héstacel Roctmates produced general appratasia of the Cuban gitustion but thees were wholly independent of (he Coben operation, f gather that, tf ite opinion hed been fnvited, DRY would have given quite o diffaréat eatimate of the etata of opinion fe. Cubs from that on which the eperae tion was baced, There existed, in ghort, the etéiculous cituation SECRET
| Siete Departmen C : SECRET | 14, waé denied to even the top officiale af the intelligence branch. The Bureau of intelligence nd Research of the Department of State knew even leaa about the Cuban operation. The problem, then, ia te have an R&E group sufficiently independent ef both policy and operations te resist the pressure to make the cace for vested ideas and intereéta «- yet aufficiently close to be able to aubject projected operations or polictes ¢ to the moat intense and searching écrutiny. Where éould thie group be. tecated? if the GIA were to become qubordinate to State, 4¢ bif-6 is to the Poreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in @ ccordinate eubagensy, domewhat inde- pendent of both State aad CEA, yet closely connected with beth in day~ teeday operations. The R&E subsagency would receive intolligence fram CIA and from State, 46 well ae from the services and, of courde, fsem public sources. It would represént, in effect, a fusion ef CIA/DDI and State/intelligence and Research, it might alee take over cortain ef the gervice functiaag agw confided te CIA <« photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcadt moattoring, overt cellec~ tion, mépé, etc.. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives frora al} the intelligence agencice and with & Lor White House chairman: Ve. Congluston.. The argument of thig memorandum epites & fefely Creetic reserangée ment of our present intelliggnce seteup. It alae implies the capacity etrment 6 Sa¢ume command af the ditustion gnd to ég ao in an effective and purposeful ways, Ef the Stete Department ee at preadnt staffed ig net capable ef esauming effective commend, thie ie aot, in my judgment, an argument against 6 rational reorgeniaation of fateltigence.: & ig dn argument for a dragiic overhaul of the State: Department. SECRET
SECRET 15. ‘The etructure which would meet the criteria suggested in thig memorandum would be ee follows: ec: on To e DIRT TAT i} The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British mode! by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecrétery of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board. 2). The Joint Intelligence Board would include repre- sentatives from all clements in the intelligence community and also from the White House. ' 3) The operating branches of tho present CIA would be reconstituted under gome blameless title (the National Informa tion Service}. . This new agency would be charged with responsi-~ bility for clandestine callection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities, @ would submit projecte to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence far clearance. is general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relations Ghip to State ae the Digarmament Administration and ICA pregently do. 4} A accond eemi<indopendant ageacy would be ect uw, again bearing a blameleaé title (the Foreign Reecarch Agency}, coordic nate with the operations agency. This egeasy would be charged with responéibility fer collation and faferpretation. % would include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence ang Research in State, and the various dervice functions now egeried on by CIA (photegraphic interpretation, biographical files, for¢ign broadcast monitering, scientific intelligence, mapa, avert collection, ete. }. It might well be located in the CIA building in Mclean. . Avthue Gebleaingér, jy. The Attorney General Mr. Bundy Mr. Dungan SECRET