176-10036-10001 - JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10001 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE : Recommended Course of Action in the Congo DATE : 12/13/1962 PAGES : 4 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Congo Cables; restriction information innacurate/missing; box 1 eT ame on ee oe mm mm -
This document consists of &£ pages; Cepy # {_ of 34 copies; Series A, . ESE SECRET Ae cern ted (3, /96U) SNe St bE TS : | ‘ ks Chi te. Be 9 . / : . MEMORANDUM FOR TH™ PRESIDENT Subject: Recommended Course of Action on the Conge, 1, We are seeking tc reintesrate the Katenga, to strensthen and maintain a moderate government in Leopoldville that can, in fect, run the country, and to prevent an increase in Communist influence in the Congo, } 2. Efforts to reintegrate the Katanga have bogged down as a result of Tshombe's intransigence and Adowla’s rigidity. However. what could prove a major breakthrough occurred yesterday with Tshombe voluntarily agreeing that the UMAK should turn over its foreign exchange and revenues to the Monetary Council for division between the Gentrai Goverrment and the Katanga. (Some of Pshomte's conditions may be troublesome, but we are taking his reply as acceptance and are proceeding accordingly.) 3. In light of this development, the following course of action is recommended for the immediate futures (a) Adoula should ve persuaded that this is a sig#ificant development which he should seize upon as a besis for re-entering negotiations with Tshombe on the other major elements comtained in the UN Reconciliation Plan (division of powers between the Central Governrent and the Katanga, an amnesty, military standstill in North Katanga). In this connection, we should seek to re-establish discussions between Elisabethville and Leopoldville through an acceptable intermediary, presumably Gardiner. (To accomplish this, if necessary Ser SECRET
if necessary we should insist that Adoula prorogue the Parliament and govern with tacking of a pro-Western group headed by | Mobutu.) | (0) To restore GOC confidence in its position and exert additional ‘pressure on Tsnombe, we should seek UH agreement that if Katangan military planes cortinue te attack, not only will the UN interdict them in the air, but also destroy them on the ground, (c) We should also support advance staging of a "GOC air foree" through additional CIA efforts. lh. Given the UN's financial plight and the anticipated decrease in ite military strength with the seneduled withdrawal of Indian troops in January y very little time remains to achieve our objectives. Ve believe that a maximum of two weeks can be allowed for the working out of the payments scheme and substantial progress on other elements of the plan. If, in fact, the payments plan does not eucccdd; and if the other practical aspects of reintegration are not accomplished within this period, we should be prepared to move on to stronser measures than purely economic. The economic measures contemplated beyond the UMHK scheme are likely to be drawn out and ineffective and would require considerable and probably unproductive consultations with our allies, Se In these circumstances, we should decide now/a contingency plan for the adoption of stronger measures by the UN and the United States to be put into effect in two weeks if significant progress has not in fact (not just in Por SPCRET
3 2 = SECRET ti Feo (not just in words) been achieved. The major requirement of such a policy would be the creation of adequate UN military strength to make the possibility of 2 forceful solution of the Xatangan secession problem credible to Tsnombe and evidence of our determination to use it. The use of suecn @ strengthened UN position, both es a deterrent and as a force, should be adjusted to a graduated scale of pressures, For example, if negotiations failed, “the UN could stop all rail traffic in Tlisabethville,. If this did not achieve its desired result, the UN would announce that it planned to extend its perimeter to include Jadotville and Koliwezi in order to bring about control of Katangan exports so that payments required under Congolese law would be paid to the COC. | Mile the UN will have adequate ground forces during the next six weeks to carry out such missions, a substantial increase in the TN air ‘arm would be required. | os A number of additional planes from UN members are on the Way's However, it is doubtful that there would be enough to perform the task adequately and a contingency decision is required now that the United States would, | in the last analysis, use its own power in order to prevent chaos, large-scale massacres, and/or a major Soviet presence called in by radical successors to Adoula. This would mean in practice, thet the United States, once it has decided that practical progress is stalled, would make available to the UN a fighter unit for use in the Congo which should have both psycholog- ical and military value to the UN force, This squadron would be under UN Command. it is not
wo = +2 8 13 tn & fa ee | he It is not certain that the Secretery-General would accept such an offer, but making it would be @ concrete indication of our determination _to see the UN's policy succeed, ‘“e heve considered and discarded the possibility that such an offer would result in a counter-offer of the Soviet Union's being accepted. | The above course of action raises serious issues requiring at the . appropriate tine full consultations with Congressional leaders, the UN, end our allies, particularly the United Kingdom and Belgium. M:i3CMcChee/I0:HCleveland/1I0:UNP :JJSisco:¥RBuffum/ck December 13, 1962
Leste, Copy 0d deact fen |} 50 (not just in words) been achieved. The major requirement of such a policy would be the creation of adequate UN military strength to make the possibility of a forceful solution of the Katangan secession problem crediole to Tshombe and evidence of our determination to use it. The use of such a strengthened UN position, both as a deterrent and as a force, should be adjusted to a graduated scale of pressures, For example, if negotiations failed, “the UN could stop all rail traffic in Mlisabethville.. If this did not achieve its desired result, the UN would announce that it planned to extend its perimeter to include Jadotville and Kolwezi in order to bring about control of Katangan exports so that payments required under Congolese law would be paid to the G0C. | Mile the UN will have adequate ground forces during the next six weeks to carry out such missions, a substantial increase in the UW air arm would be required, | - oo | A number of additional planes from UN members are on the way’, However, it is doubtful that there would be enough to perform the task adequately and a contingency decision is required now that the United States would, in the last analysis, use its own power in order to prevent chaos, . large-scale massacres, and/or a major Soviet presence called in by radical successors to Adoula. This would mean in practice, ‘hiett the United States, once it has decided that practical progress is stalled, would make available to the UN a fighter unit for use in the Congo which should have both psycholog- ical and military value to the UN force. This squadron would te under UN Command. it is not