ew EX EMR TED NL 1 3O36 B14 l°/ oe SECRET srwgrve TAB C SOVIET VIEWS, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC | The recent discussions with Premier Khrushchev and ‘the Soviet response to Peiping charges following the test ban agreement provide insights into the balance that Soviet policy must strike between private views of Soviet national interests and public views which tend to emphasize Soviet leadership of the international Communist movement. | While there is a clear difference in emphasis, the public and private dialogue are not inconsistent. They are quite comparable to the position which the Administration has had to take in connection with the Soviet Union on the one hand and with the United States Senate on the other: Private Views In private, Premier Khrushchev has made Soviet views clear. on the following issues: | (1) Khrushchev is not interested in destroying rockets or strategic aircraft. "Harriman referred to further steps that could be taken.” Said some people were thinking of what was called in technical terms separable first stage. Such stage could include cut- . off of production of fissionable materials for weapons uses and perhaps dismantling certain percentage nuclear weapons on each side and making fissionable materials thus derived available for peaceful uses. Wondered whether Khrushehev had any interest in this and commented such steps might reduce Sov military expenditures. Khrushchev replied he had no interest whatsoever; moreover, he could say Sovs would never agree to this. U.S. position on this matter was well know and had been stated over ars. Sovs had also stated their position, and still held that position. No results could be derived from such an approach. After all, why should © Sovs destroy their bombs in which they put so mich money} “why should Sovs destroy some bombs and build others. Bombs could be destroyed only under a disarmament arrangement. Sovs “could not squander their money, particularly as their money Was people's money. Sovs were no capitalists, and to capital such an arrangement would of course mean no loss. U.S. ‘sh not waste its time developing such proposals; they were totally unrealistic." (Reference - Harriman's Ee cable from ‘Moscow, : (Me) SECRE™ erence | HW 49061 Docld:32626313 Page 2?
(2) Khrushchev is not interested in a separate agreement to stop production of fissionable material. "Harriman noted Khrushchev had neglected his reference to cut-off. Khrushchev said such arrangement would be of no use. Other people would say cut-off could yield no result in a situation where U.S. and USSR had accumulated enough bombs to blow up whole world. Others would say they did not possess such material and therefore mist produce it. Thus, this too was waste of time. As for USSR, it had stopped expanding its production fissionable materials ‘and now producing such materials at. same rate as before. Although he did not know when precisely this would happen, it very possible Sovs would stop production fissionable materials in near future; however, that would be without eny agreement and Sovs would not tell anybody about it. Sovs had enough such materials and U.S. was probably in same position. What Sovs were now engaged in was refabrication all bombs on basis results latest tests." (Reference - Harriman's July 27 cable from Moscow, No. 365.) oo (3) Khrushchev is interested in stopping the diffusion of nuclear weapons. "Harriman said.we believed world would be sefer if no more nuclear powers develop,:and certainly if China did not develop nuclear capability. Hoped Sovs could get Chinese adhere to treaty before they became nuclear power. Also, hoped by time China acquired the ability develop nuclear powers, more comprehensive control of armaments could be had. Khrushchev agreed and said Sovs making effort prevent increase in number nuclear powers. However, these efforts would of necessity be weak until agreement on disarmament had been reached." (Reference - Harriman's July 27 cable from Moscow, No. 365.) ~ . -(4) Khrushchev is interested in saving money. "Khrushchev wished to suggest that military budgets be frozen at levels of, say 1963. He believed this would be reasonable and would give to peoples hope that governments were at last showing common sense and doing something to arrest arms race and not add fuel to fire." (Reference - Harriman's July 16 cable from Moscow, No. 154.) . SECRETceNSITIVE - HW 49061 DBocld:326276313 Page 3.
Aas SEGRET SENSITIVE In contrast to the private discussions with Premier Khrushchev, Soviet Public Views ‘response to Chinese charges distributed by TASS on August 20 indicate the position Soviet leadership is taking within the world Communist movement. The Balance of Power 'Yes, the position of. the Soviet Union on the question of ending nuclear weapons tests did not become fossilized; it adapted itself to the changes in the balance of power in the international arena, to the successes in the strengthening of the defense potential of the USSR-and of all the countries of the socialist community, .and took into account everything that is generally known.as the realities of the nuclear age in their entirety. "ln the first years when nuclear weapons appeared in the arsenal of the United States, when the United States had a nuclear monopoly--and, in HW 49061 view of that, the security of the socialist countries was endangered-- the Soviet Government proceeded from the assumption that the main. task -was to deprive the United States of that advantage. This aim could be achieved either by completely banning nuclear weapons, which would have been tantamount to taking away these weapons from the only nuclear power of that time, the United States, or: through developing our own-nuclear weapons, which would help to insure the security of all the socialist countries. "The Soviet Government demanded the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons; and, when this demand was rejected by the Western powers, it started to develop its own nuclear weapons, which were called upon to become a good additional guarantor of the independence and.security of all the countries Bocld: 376276313 Page 4
of the socialist community, to make the imperialists lose the taste for HW 49061 aggression against the socialist states. Naturally, in those years, the banning of tests of nuclear weapons without simultaneous destruction of. those weapons possessed by the United States would not ‘have been in the interests of. the socialist.states. It would have brought to a halt the development of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and perpetuated the American nuclear monopoly. “'But the situation did not remain unchanged. As a result of intense efforts of the Soviet people, of Soviet scientists, in developing their own nuclear weapons, the American nuclear monopoly was smashed, the world socialist system received its own nuclear shield, the imperialist powers lost the material basis for conduct ing a policy of nuclear blackmail, a policy ''from a position of strength" vis-a-vis the socialist countries. This also put into new prospective the question of the nuclear weapons test ban. Now the continuation of nuclear testing could only. lead higher and higher the spiral of the nuclear arms race in which the socialist countries, and.all peace-loving states, to be sure, are not interested. At the same time, with the new balance of power the nuclear test ban would perpetuate not the American nuclear monopoly but the fact of its liquidation, not the unilateral advantage. of the imperialist. camp but the new balance of power in the area of nuclear weapons. "The Soviet Government has already called attention of the CPR Government to the simple truth that life does not stand still, that science and technology are developing rapidly, and that something which was unacceptable yesterday may turn out to be useful and even very useful today. Underlying this are definite material factors of great h — SECRET — SENSITIVE Docld: 3276276313 Page 5 Ney
ScGRET SENSITIVE significance, connected with important and major steps of the Soviet | Government to strengthen the defense capacity of the USSR, the security of all the socialist nations. These steps, which included also the tests of the latest types of nuclear arms, including the most powerful: ones existing in the world, have reliably insured the security of the socialist commonwealth. We now possess all the necessary requisities for further maintaining our defense potential at the proper level which is or may be required by the situation. © And when we speak .about’ that, we do ‘so knowing the facts of the .matter..... "Qf course now we cannot divulge such things, for instance, as the concrete results of the tests of nuclear weapons we carried out in 1961-62, the.data on the calibers of the nuclear warheads in our arsenal, the purpose of. specific nuclear combat devices of which the Soviet Union has plenty, where these means are deployed, and so forth. That would be against the security interests of the Soviet Union and of all the socialist states, including the security interests of the CPR. "And if the Chinese leaders, by saying that in recent years the -situation did not change but that the USSR policy on a test ban.allegedly did, and.in a way are thus goading the Soviet Union to demonstrate objectively the recent changes in the balance of nuclear strength and for the sake of that divulge the defense secrets of the USSR. ---- "But if. for some reason, the Chinese leaders really doubt that the Soviet Union does possess powerful nuclear weapons necessary for the defense of all socialist states and are not sat isfied with our explanations, they could at least study the statements highly placed U.S. military leaders made only several days ago in the American congress, as well as the statement | SECRET. SENGITIVE. HW 49061 Docld: 32626313 Page 6