(404-10179-10006 ceed 12 Mav 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT 2 Meeting with Ing. Manuel Ray PARTICIPANTS: Ing. Manuel Ray Ernesto Betancourt Rogelio Ciene a _ i. Ray did mot return to Washington until early morning on Friday, 12 May 1961. He called me at 0700 from the airport. He was unable to fix a definite hour for us to get together due to the {act that he was expecting an appointment with a person he did not name some time during the morning. He later called a number of timee from the Hotel Ambsssador to advise me that he still had had no word on hie appoint- ment. At 1145, Mr. Betancourt called to say that he wae with Ray and "Eugenio" (Rogelio Cisnergs) and could we get together, I suge gested they drive cut te°ae Clarendon Hotel Court on Wileon Boulevard where I had taken a room for holding cur meeting. They arrived in Mr. Betancourt's car at approximately 1230 noon time and we first went te the nearby Hogate Restaurant on Wilson Boulevard for lunch before we got down to the business of the prospectus, 2. During lunch we did not divcues the plan but I did take the op- portunity to stress in a most serious way the need for absolute secrecy concerning our discussions teday and any future discussione or devel- ‘opments which might take place in the future with respect to our relation- | ship. All agreed on the need for tight security: . 3. After lunch we drove to the Hote) Court and from approximately 1330 until 1730, we discussed the prnspectue, Using Mr. Barnan’ out- line as a general guide, I stressed the importance of being able to present en nee r 7 1 . ad 1 ee Ce eae
14-00000 UPA aL SEGMET o2= to the proper people at the earliest peasible time a carefully thought- out plan of action which would sat forib clearly the objectives -- what the project hoped to achieve; a statement of the problem; the strengths of the Castro regime following the ill-fated invasion; the statua of the underground and its morale and capabilities; the extent of internal support for and discontent with the regime, ete., etc. 4, also spoke of the need for describing the kind of activities which the Ray organization planned to engage in and the assete and capabilities which they have or can acquire to do the job, The need for explaining the relationship and coordination of the plan with the Revolu- tionary Council was discussed at some length. §, I suggested that ha include in the plan an itemization of the kinds of support which he would expect us to supply immediately as well as the kind and quantity of support which would be required of ue ae the project developed, : 6. lalso suggested that the plan include their views on how VU. &. Haleon and coordination could bast be worked out; how funds would be funneled inte the project; what commo and other training would be re- quired; whethar U. &, "real estate" would be nesded, ete. %, Ray outlined eome of hie thoughts regarding his proposed plan ef action. According to him it contemplatee action in three broad fields: {a) Underground activity -- principally sabotage -- {n the urban areas. \ {b) Gradual bufldup -- largely through clandestine infiltra~ t tione of ama}! bodies of men ~- of guerrilla forces in mountains ous and defensible areag, ane eee : (c) A psychological warfare campaign within Cuba and abroad aimed at discrediting Castro and at the same time providing the people of Cuba something to fight for, Oe ate emp ow \ &. It is Ray's intention to depend almoat entirely on maritime opera- ' ' tions for the infiltration of personne} and materie) into Cuba, He aleo rules out of hie plan the creation of another invavion army but does con- template the tralning of groupe of perhaps up te 150 man in other friendly \ 4
14-00000 countries of South America fhe mentioned Venesuela as a possibility) and said he would explore the possibility of basing maritime operationa in non-U. S. ports. 9. Ray said geome means, other than Swan Island, must be found for reaching the Cuban population by radie broadeasts. He epoke of the possibility of short wave broadcaste from Venexuela and utiliza- tien of a commercial station in Miami which he understands can be | Clearly heard.in Cuba. . ; 10, Ray epoke of the deaireability of stimulating the organisation of "Pro-True Cuban Revolutionary” student groups in many countries ' of Latin America (he said a successful organization has been formed . in Puerto Rico) and of sending qualified representatives to thoes Latin American countries where there ie Soviet diplomatic representation to contact otudent and labor groups aad leaders in an effort to present to ! them the true picture of the sorry state cf students, workers, and intellectuals in Castro's Cuba. 11. Ray ia also interested in the pessibility of putting out a "News | Letter" under MRP sponsorship which would discuse various aspects of the Cuban picture and set forth plans for Cuba after the fall of Castro. He thought such a pews letter could go s long way tuwards correcting mistaken impreseions among American university professors and in . other circles as to the true nature of the Castro regime. He pointed : to the recent letter from $3 Harvard professors which was recently published in the N. Y. Times as a "horrible example" ae to how mia- informed even university profeasore are on presont day Cuda. 12. When the discussions got around to the need for conducting operations at least “under the umbrella” of the Revolutionary Council, and the need for obtaining Dr. Miro's concurrence before the U. &, would be able to support any operation, it was obvious that neither . Ing. Ray nor Mr, Betancourt holde a high impreseion of the Counel). Beth fee) that there is a strong poesibility that the close public identification of the Council with the recent invasion may well have discredited the Council to such an extent that it commands no support — or r respect within Cuba. - ¥or the sake of argument they were willing to concede that the political advantages of maintaining the Cuuneil for the purpose -of forcing UTA ay are » oma ao
14-00000 GECaET al unity of the various exile groupe may well outweigh ite other obvious shortcomings. However, both fee], and Mr. Betancourt wee quite emphatic on thie point, that the Council as a body ie not capable of directing clandestine actions against Castro and ag a matter of fact ie opposed to any further efforts at overthrowing Castro by sabotage and other subversive actions since they are completely "sold" on the thesis that Castro can only be removed by direct U. S. military action and therefore a continuation of Cuban underground activities can only result in needless and futile lose of life. In the factof this attitude, Ray said he does not expect to receive much encouragement for his plan from the Council, although he je fairly confident that Dr. Miro's approval can eventually be obtained, Mr, Betancourt thought that a workable solution might be found to their problem if the Council would agree to concern itecif exclusively with (a) the current task of unifying the opposition, and (b) planning for ite future assumption of power as the provisional government. Under this arrangement, operations aired at the downfall of Castro could be entrusted to those leaders and groupe (auch as the MRP, MRR, and -posaibly the MDC) which have both the assets and the will to do the job, Mr. Ray thought that it might be feasible to create an operations planning board or command among the gtoupa with demonstrated agsets and thus avoid unnecessary duplication and confusion and make possible overall planning. I was obvious, however, that he would prefer to act autonomoualy in the execution of his program. Mr, Ray waa very critical of Artime and claimed he was in possession of sufficient "facts" to convince him that Artime, in collusion with ele- mente of the camps, were planning to eliminate the MRP and its leaders from the picture, when the invasion aucceeded. He eaid he ‘knowa" that Artime wae being financially supported by wealthy ex-Batistianos of the Miami area. 13, Ray hinted at various times that the MRP may at gome point find itself faced with the necessity of withdrawing from the Council and going it alons. He says that tht Council is composed of “good men” but they have no ageets or significant followings and “have nothing to offer the people of Cubs" and although the proclamation of the Council, aa finally drafted, wae a good one the "progressive" aspecte of the proclam- ation were forced on the Council by the Americans and do not repregent the true feelings of the majority of the Council members; He said the. ' TY oT