nN tad rv 2. 5 = 4 “~ ( i \ z= \ n~ ; ig = 7 | o a 2 | & ai = 1 a HI il . a 1 go F | Fo i = ig ‘3 u = Y = tod = iH “3 il = 4 = ’ , . jf 4 & | ra : a !3 | ~ A — + = i = at ~ | = = 1S 5 | n ly a = = o “os = co | = | ; = Cc S 720 | ! I i 1 1 ‘ ' i : { t H } | | | | 1 uy } Doclda:32263409 Page 217 | CONFIDENTIAL , 214 \ Mr. Rocca. Normally. Normally that would be the case, Mr. Goldsmith. Now you mentioned the PRQ's, the + personal record questionnaires. You indicated that they would not be in the 201 file. Where, to «your knowledge, would they be located? Mr. Rocca. They would be located in particular files held by the desk responsible for the agent. | Mr. Goldsmith. Would they be located in an operations or projects file? Mr. Rocca, I think that probably is the correct | term, yes. - . J Mr. Goldsmith. Please examine CIA number 788, which is the field personality file request form that was used in the case of Mr. Oswald. I think you had occasion to review that yesterday. (Pause) Mr. Rocca. I see nothing different here from what I saw yesterday. Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. _ I hope that you don't see anything different from what you saw yesterday since it's been in the safe all evening. | According to that document, when was a 201 file opened i for Lee Oswald? Mr. Rocca. Nine December, 1960, is the date for the request. , CONFIDENTIAZQ ALOSERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ce) S in 202% (202) SS5h-25945 ta AC, on ~ Wa {THGTON, #8 oO re REPGATERS BUTLDTNG, t aA, S a 200 7TH STREET, a om ta qs 2 diag “ / 215 CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Is there anything unusual about the Oswald 201 file . being opened over a year after:the Agency was initially informed of Oswald's defection and the fact that he was alleged to have offered information to the Soviets? Mr. Rocca. I find that not unusual in view of the flow of work and the pressure of work. I couldn't explain that gap in terms of anything, except just the normal flow of business, in view of what I know about the opening of it. Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think the normal flow of business might account for a delay of over a year? Mr. Rocca. Well, it depends on what was the date of the material that we got from State. | Mr. Goldsmith. Rather than reviewing all that now, I will just indicate that the material from State started to arrive in late October or early November of 1960. Mr. Rocca. So, the flow is correct, I would say, t t | i in terms of what was going on. There was an obvious interest: in this kind of material. Mrs. Edgerter exercised an analyst's choice in opening the file. I think there is nothing in the time lapse that would indicate anything, except the flow of work. Mr. Goldsmith. Now Mrs. Edgerter was a member of the CI/SIG unit, is that correct? CONFIODENTIAZ LOSRSON SSPCRTING COMPANY, INC. DocId:32263409 Paye 218 : ALZERS i { 4 t | | ’
216 CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed. i) Mr. Goldsmith. Is it unusual for the CI/SIG unit, ! | which was involved in very sensitive operations -- not | | ! : operations, investigations pertaining to possible penetrations = : | of DDP personnel -- was it unusual for this unit to open a 5 ‘| 201 file cn someone like Oswald? g 7 I guess the gist of my question is I don't see how & | Oswald is relevant to the primary purpose of CI/SIG. : 7 Mr. Rocca. Well, I would disagree with that. : ize Mr. Goldsmith. Please explain. : i Mr. Rocca. I would consider this to be fully within = 12 the competence of this unit, especially in view of the large @ : 13 number of defectors that had accumulated by this time. = ie There were others, Americans, in many instances, people : V3 that, it is my recollection, we regarded as more serious, = 1g potentially, losses. I can remember one who had the 4 7 | specifications of a nozzle that prepared plastic ina 2 18 particular fashion. There was press stuff in the interin, a = a two clippings that had come out. Patricia Blake had 5 7 written her articles. | ere In other words, there was an accumulation of material which concerned Americans, and a gathering interest at that time, 1959 and 1960, in the KGB, ultimately confirmed by American armed forces -- and that list that we had from i i ! Golitzin, as I reported yesterday, that no defector from the ' CONFIDENTIAL Docld: 32263409 Paye 919 ALDERSON ZEPORTING COMPANY, INC. i ! i i : i i t f 1 i { ! i t { r t ! 1 i
1 _ tw be a | aa Sey i a a q 30H 7TH STREET, SoU REPORTERS GUTLDTNG, CASHTHOTON, DLC, 20028 (202) S$5u-239n5 io oN Va ¢ 1 \ r + @ / > «3 3 nm ~ as) i i a dereliction not to have opened a 201 file. 217 State consisted of at least two or three other military defectors from West Germany, and I would have considered it Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I certainly agree that a 201 should have been opened at that time, and it would also seem that the appropriate unit within the Agency to open the file would have been the CI staff. My question is more narrowly focused in why would CI/SIG in particular have been opening the file. Mr. Rocca. Because of their concern, basically, with the problem of Americans and they were the recipient of the materials, probably from the Office of Security, if not the actual copy of that material, certainly the chit chat. Bruce Solie was -- B-R-U-C-E S-O-L-I-E -- constantly’ in touch with Mr. O'Nedll and with Mrs. Edgerter, I am sure. 2 Mr. Goldsmith. But from the face of it, it does not appear that Oswald posed any sort of a counter intelligence threat in terms of the penetration of DDP personnal. Mr. Rocca. Of the U.S. security interest. At a very: high level, though, he aia, involving other departments | and agencies of the government. | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand, and I am not suggesting that a file. should not have been opened by the CI staff. 3 I am just trying.to determine why CI/SIG in particular, which ' was concerned about DDP penetrations, would have been opening CONFIDENTIAL Docld: 32263409 Page 990 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
CONFIDENTIAL 218 the file. Mr. Rocca. Let me go back and open a little parenthesis i) sy about this. What I regard now, in the light of what you said, ae is prebably a too narrow view of what SIG was interested in. Mr. Rocca. I'm not saying that. You said it. ta a = i They were also concerned with Americans as a security ; ‘| threat in a community wide sense, and they dealt with FBI | 5 a cases, with the Office of Security cases, and with other case : | on the same level, as they dealt with our own, basically. | : 7 | Mr. Goldsmith, So, how would the function of Z is CI/SIG -- ! = J Mr. Rocca. At least, that's as I would represent « ; it. But again, Mr. O'Neill would be the person to judge @ : i exactly and I would defer to him. | : " Mr. Goldsmith. How would the function of CI/SIG 3 13 . in that case be different from in the Office of Security, : “ ‘8 | in general? : ‘ | Mr. Rocca. It would be with respect to where and . : 8 | what had happened to DDP materials with respect to a defection “ | = FY in any of these places. . | 5 = Mr. Goldsmith.. Again, though, Oswald had nothing : ee to do with DDP at this time, at least apparently. : Let me take the Dunlap case. Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not familiar with that case. Mr. Rocca. If we can get off of this, because I CONFIDENTIAL i) iH if 2 ul af a A Y if : LDOERSOM SEPORTING COMPANY. INC. Docld: 32263409 Paye 221 ALCERSOI Sf 4