* tat 2 y tes on a aes rod ie tra . PlLeb he Ps : : Tym TD teen 7 ‘ Bt te pene ad S| ‘ : “a, , ao ’ . : . ; . : =s 3 . ? » 4 1 * oa . %, - , Ms & ay D iv a ~ ¢ , * & “ . 7” ia 4 Td:32969546 Page 2 . -¥ ° at ag eta ge Maan a SE: et Meee Me we aed ote Pi? aed ye ee On rn ee kay Phe ey Pa. ha erie - ane ee - ~ woot ‘ae : * . . t o ‘ on « ’ , ” e Reed nem emenenete whee } t i ( i ~
. . = : ° @ Y Prior to the division, the Internal Security Section had a total of 130 employees, which included. 59 i ; | } i 4 i A : Special Agent: Supervisors. A total of 57 employees remained in the newly formed Internal Security Section, including 24 Special /zent Supervisors, a Section Chief, and Number One Man, The subversive Control Section was assigned 4 total of 73 employees including 31 Special Agent Supervisors, a Section Chief, and Number One Man. Subsequently, the finding by the Subversive Activities Control Board that the CPUSA was a communist-action organization, and, therefore, required to register with the Attorney General, was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court in June, 1961. As anticipated at the time of the reorganization of the Internal Security Section, the CPUSA and its officers and members refused to register. Failure to register was subject to criminal sanctions and prosecutions of the Party and its members were instituted. Subversive Investigative matters being handled by 4 : ij : | i i \ | | i - the FBI in 1955 numbered 36,975. ~3- HW 55093 Docld:32989545 Page 6
eo. @ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION * INTERNAL SECURITY - LIAISON BRANCH ‘Internal Security Section Section Chief Number One Man Special Agent Supervisors ~ 24 Clerical Employees - 31 Total Employees - 57 Subversive Control Section Section Chief Number One Man Special Agent Supervisors - 31 Clerical Employees -~ 40 Total Employees 73 *Following reorganization of Internal Security Section in August, 1955. (See chart attached) : ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN! NCLASEY DATE HW 55093 Docld:32989545 Page * =
*INTERNAL SECURITY ~ LIAISON BRANCH INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION (ISS) . | (SCS) @ PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT CLERICAL - AGENT = SECRETARIAL ISS 26 33 SCS 31 40 57: 73 sr %*Following Reorganization in August, 1955 HW 55093 pocldt320ab FFP Apa ger ity Section DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION LIAISON SECTION
HW 55093 Docld:32989545 Page 9 a a INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED . HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED : 1964 Reorganization dare Jolaa |e ev ga dun| The Intelligence Division (ID) was know as the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) in 1964, and the Internal Security Branch was composed of three sections: Subversive Gontrol Section, Internal Security Section, and the Liaison Section. Lffective June 30, 1964, 112 Special Agents were assigned te DID. Frior to June 30, 1964, 48 Special Agents were assigned to the Internal Security Branch. In 1964, there were 36,918 active subversive investigative matters and 5,622 active racial investigative matters throughout the United States. Racial unrest and related acts of violence increased significantly in 1964. Investigations and arrests arising out of incidents of racial violence in the South clearly implicated Cartain elements of the Ku Klux Klan which carriajout beatings, bombings, murders and other violent racial actions.
Reorganization of the Internal Security Branch of DID occurred in 1964, to afford improved supervision of the increased volume of information received and to chart new avenues of approach te effectively discharge our responsibilities in the potentially explosive racial field. In July, 1964, supervisory responsibility for investigation of racial matters, racial informants, Ku Klux Klan and related groups tosether with the development of informants concerning these matters were transferred from the General Investigative Division (GID) to DID. Five Special Agents and approximately 1,350 cases were involved in this transfer. Three Agents formed the Racial Intelligence Unit in the Subversive Control Section and two Agents formed the Racial Informant Unit in the Internal Security Section. In 1965, there were 37,818 active subversive investigative matters and 10,557 active racial investigative matters throughout the United States. In 1963 and 1964, a number of significant and fast- moving events occurred which directly or indirectly influenced the reorganization of the Internal Security Branch in 1964. A brief summary follows: (1) In June, 1964, three Civil Rights workers on their way from Philadelphia to Meridian, Mississippi, HW 55093 Docld:32999546 Page 10
. disappeared without a trace. Their abaruioned automobile was later discovered, completely burned out. A massive search involving FBI Agents and other law enforcement personnel was conducted, and 44 days later the three missing victins were found beneath an earthen dam near Meridian, Mississippi. All had been shot. at close range. The ensuing investigation determined that members of the Ku Ulux Klan of Mississippi, were involved in the disappearance of the three victims, and a Klan official was sub- sequently convicted on Civil Rights charges. (2) One of the most noterious and widely publicized murders involving Klansmen occurred on July 11, 1964, when Lemuel Penn, a Negro educator from Washington, BD. 6., was killed by a shotgun. blast near Athens, Georgia. Penn, an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel, was driving back from a training session at Fort Benning, Georgia, with two other Negro reservists. <A group of Klansmen from the Athens, Georgia, area, Were subsequently arrested and charged with the murder. (3) The Klan has been responsible for bombings, dynamitings, and other terrorist acts, and Klan history has been replete with acts of violence. At a Klan meeting Im South -3- | AW 35093 Docld: 32969546 Page 11
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Internal Security Branch Espionage Research Branch Internal Security Section, Racial Intelligence Section . Section Chief Section Chief No. 1 Man | No. 1 Man Security Informant and Bla ck Nationalist Unit Special Records Unit (5 Supervisors) (3 Supervisors) Racial Informant Unit Communist Infiltrated (3 Supervisors) Groups Unit (3 Supervisors) Riot and Racial Disturbance Unit (3 Supervisors) Subversive Splinter Groups Unit (2 Supervisors) Klan, White Hate, and Nationalist Unit (5 Supervisors) - { | i Communist Party, USA Unit ‘1(3 Supervisors) Special Cases Unit (2 Supervisors) Subversive Individuals - West Unit (3 Supervisors) Subversive Individuals - East Unit ‘ 1(3 Supervisors) . Total Agent Complement Total Agent Complement (Including Section Chief (Including Section Chief and No. 1 Man): 21 and No. 1 Man): 18 Total Clerical and Total Clerical and Stenographic Complement Stenographic Complement (Including Front Office (Including Front Office Secretary and Clerk): 24 Secretary and Clerk): 18 HW 45093 Docld: 32989548 Page 16 ° |: * ae ae - . _ * Ge pn
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH INFORMATION CONTAINED AEREIN su BBY de Reorganization, February, 1 DATE On 2/21/73, the Domestic Intelligerce Division was reorganized and the name changed to Intelligence Division. Under the new organizational structure, the Internal Security Branch, formerly the Internal Security and Research Branch, was broken down iurto three sections designated as IS-1 (Extremist Intelli- gence); IS-2 (Internal Security); and IS-3 (Research). In the restructuring, work formerly handled by the Revolutionary Activities Section and the Internal Security Section was combined into one section called the internal Security Section. In addition, the unit handling bombing matters under the former Internal Security Section was transferred to the newly reorganized Counterintelligence Branch of the Intelligence Division. Under the new organizational set~up, the Internal Security Branch was organized so that all domestic security work would come under that Branch. Organizational change was brought about because of the wind-down of the Vietnam War and in light of public clamor concerning domestic security investigations. Changes were made to provide coverage in the foreign field which had dropped to a dangerous level and to reassure the public of the FBI's restraint in domestic security programs. As a result of the organizational changes, the proposed agent complement'for the newly formed Internal sAaDESS4E Page 19: ; . a | « f a 4 ig
Security Branch was 61, a decrease of 10 agents of. the previous figure of 71. These individuals were included in the proposed agent complement of 63 for the newly organized Counterintelligence Branch for a total Intelligence Division complement of 124 agents. The case load in 1972 in subversive matters field wide was 45,956, and in 1973 it was 29,089; in extremist matters in 1972, 22,589, and in 1973, 22,122. (Reorganization ’ Chart Attached.) HW 55093 Docld:32999546 Page 20 os .y * vdeo T+"? a Ary
Total Present Agent Complement - 71}|Total Present Agent Complement - 53 -{fotal Proposed Agent Complement -61}/Total Proposed Agent Complement - 63 LL JIS-3 (Research) FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH FEBRUARY, 1973 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Counterintelligence Branch IS-1 (Extremist Intelligence) Present Agent Complement - 21 {Proposed Agent Complement - 23 CI-1 (Espionage) Present Agent Complement - 22 Proposed Agent Complement - 20 Is-2 (Internal Security) ‘ICI-2 (Sino-Satellite) Present -Agent’ Complement - 16 Proposed Agent Complement - 28 CI-3 (Nationalities Intelligence) Present Agent Complement - 21 Proposed Agent Complement - 1 Present Agent Complement - 11 |Proposed Agent Complement - 10 Present Agent Complement - 23 Present Agent Complement - 10 Proposed Agent Complement - Abolish |Proposed A ~-(Revolutionary Activities) CI-~4 (Liaison) ent Complement - 10 | Total Division Present Complement - 12 Total Division Proposed Complement - 124 HW 55093 Docld:329899546 Page ?1
oe a gee am IN NRE VA ORR TCR ON a VT RAL Acre ald Pact id 1 Ss Spey ene oe Sem nme renee nr ter el Canc Terese teen eee SEES Te aa INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED - SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS 95 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 _ 65 2. 60, 000 Pf Et | ft 55,000 a 50, 000 le?) for) o>) Q fey] [ee] for) i<o} x oO 45,000 +40, 000 P| LIN 30, 000 [Zi | a 25, 000 20,000 Lily - CeCe - 10, 000 a - ane | eo | ae oe — erent nenrnnatennesarres Fein Sent eaneestn ementnentren eran eetnen ee eereene 3 HW 55093 Docld:329899546 Page 22
—_ oad ~- - Intelligence Division: “pivistoa. Thie Intelligence Divieion' S inerensed wot lood: Interns] Security Brench aa oS an . Co Sa 1971. there were 37, 137 subversive atters. end 96. 36d extremist csttars being supervised by ‘the Intel tgence : wes efficiently administered with no ‘edétetenal. suporvinory - peteoanel hecoasery ‘as oO opule of this reorgenizatiion, . “Attached ic the 1970: rat Gaganis cational Chore: for Tatelligence Secusity-Raseazch Beench, Domestic Intelligence  taviten, feet _HW 55093 “pocld:32989548 Page 27 - 3.
be cos @ FBI ORGANIZATIONAL curt ® DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 1970 BRANCH _26 Agents NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION 16 Agents RACIAL SECTION - -_ 17 Agents HW 55093 Docld:32989548 Rage 26 DIRECTOR j ASSOCIATE | | DIRECTOR ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ESPIONAGE ~- RACIAL ESPIONAGE SECTION SECURITY - INTELLIGENCE BRANCH INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION 20 Agents RESEARCH SECTION 16 Agents NEW LEFT SECTION 2e Agents New Left Section created in Security-Intelligence Branch, 12/70 tl ’ NN EET PENAL RAO AT et POA RNAP HR WN PVA TERA MPSS A Veet nyereinenmnetn ares pommennet stat eee A aca ea NOMS ORES SETAC LAE EPPING TOS EPO er — L __ a
“4 i. a Se | @ 11/6/75 CRAFT OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS Domestic intelligence is a comprehensive product ~ resulting from the collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, and interpretation of all available information relating to threats and potential threats to the internal security of the United States posed by groups and/or individuals within this country. Pursuant to Presidential Directives, instructions of the Attorney General, statutes and Executive Orders, the FBI obtairs this product through investigations which are initiated to determine if violations of Federal laws relating ' to Rebellion or Insurrection, Advocating the Overthrow of the Government, Sedition, or other applicable Federal statutes are being committed, and to advise officials of the Executive i Branch of Government of such activities so that an informed assessment of the threat can be made. Intelligence collection is the gathering and possession of knowledge. The area to which the process is applied. supplies the characteristics of the process. Intelligence collection is { | done by investigation. The collection of intelligence for | internal security purposes can rightly be called internal security investigation. The comparison of an internal security } investigation to a criminal investigation will show no great : distinguishing features. Both utilize basically the same _ : ED ON CONTAIN ) ‘ pare 3 “AW 55093, Docld: 32969546 ,. Page 29 |
~ 2 techniques. What distinguishes the two areas is the goal of each. A criminal investigation seeks prosecution. An internal security investigation seeks to prevent the illegal overthrow or destruction of the established system of government. ‘ This is the primary goal. Prosecutions do occur but they are admittedly infrequent, and are not the ultimate accomplishment of an internal security investigation. Therefore, intelligence investigations are primarily concerned with the potential of illegal activity while criminal investigations are premised on the occurrence of a specific act. There are two basic kinds of internal domestic intel- ligence investigations: (1) the general assessment and (2) the assessment of a particular group, individual or incident. General assessments of potential for violence and civil disorders are collected to provide the Executive Branch with a knowledge regarding the potential problems with which it must deal. This information is gathered nationwide from sources whose reliability or good judgment has been displayed in the past. . Contrasted to general assessments in geographical areas are investigations which are directed at specific individuals and organizations. They are investigated because their activities include possible violation of Sedition, HW 55093 DBocld:32989545 Page 30
¥ . my ,_ . Treason and Overthrow of the Government statutes. Whether the statute has been violated or will be violated is unknown to begin with, for if the FBI waited for all the elements of the violaticns to occur, there would be no law to enforce or govern- 4 ment to enforce it. Some allegations or indications of subversion are ‘insignificant and require minimal information to refute or to place them. in their proper perspective. Because an allegation appears insignificant does not mean it can be handled quickly. While it may eventually be determined that a person poses no threat, an investigation is required to make that determination. Additionally, the experienced investigator knows that the full value of an item of information may not be immediately realized. Often,-an item of information triggers an investigation only after it has been reviewed in context with other facts. ; Other allegations of subversion are not insignificant and have proven to be of such stature and importance to require special marshalling of Bureau resources to more efficiently gather the information needed. Toward this end, special administrative devices are established to better catalog the knowledge possessed to allow for better investigative correlation, | | i comparison and assessment. | | AW 35093) DoclId: 32969548 . Page 31. , Coe
; . . . Pn a . The FBI's programs designed to marshal resources concerning specific groups or incidents will be discussed in some detail in this briefing. mal HW 55093 Docld:32999546 Page 32
INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS ~— SUBVERSIVE 1955 - 1975 te », @ . we \ In the domestic intelligence, or counter-subversive, field, the FBI's primary concern in the time period of about 1955 was the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and Socialist 4 Workers Party (SWP}). Both are disciplined and structured 4 subversive organizations whose sole reason for existence is to bring about the violent overthrow of our Government and institution of a dictatorship of the proletariate, Of the two, the CPUSA was, and continues to be, the most dominant and resourceful, ) ‘The CPUSA joined the Communist International (Comintern) “in 1921, accepting fully the 21 conditions for menbership, including unqualified allegiance to the Soviet Union, Passage .of the Yoorhis Act in 1940 (subject to foreign control) caused the CPUSA to disaffiliate from the Comintern in preference to registering with the Attorney General, During Worid War If, the CPUSA changed its name to Communist Political Association {CPA} in Line with Soviet efforts to solicit support of the United States. In 1945, with the war threat over, the Comsunist Party Soviet Union (CPSU) ordered the reconstitution of the CFUSA as a militant, Marxist-Leninist organization. Prosecutions against the CPUSA and its leaders occurred. Tho Snith Act-trials in 1948-1949 convicted 104. persons. In 1957 the Supreme Court ruled the Government must prove “incitement to action" to sustain prosecution and the convictions wore set TAINED Wt . ‘ LL INFORMATION CEES HEREIN S USGL EY HW 55093 Docld:32999546 Page 33
@: e aside. These prosecutions resulted in the“CPUSA operating in a largely uncerground level from 1951 to 1955, The xbove trinis, along with sinilar prosecutions of Janes P, Cannon and other SYP leaders, passage of the Labaz = Management Relations Act of 1947, the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Communist Control Act of 1954, and the Labor = Hennre~ in communist activity by the public, Congress and the Executive Branch, The FBI reneted to the extensive communist activity and related legisintion of that period by committing mannover ‘ang resources to these investigations, > HE 55093 Roecld:32989548 Page 340 wee > ens csirss vo ment and Disclosure Act of 1959 disclose a hith level ef interest
This situation remained somewhat’ stable until the “mid-1960s, The Vietnan conflict was becoming increasingly une popular and the old-line communist groups, CPUSA and SYP, became extremely active in organizing massive and -often violent protest against Government policy which in effect resuited in at least moral susnort for the communist North Vietnamese, In nddition, many young people, whose lives were directly affected ar by tho Selective Service System, reacted in both peaceful and vioicnt opposition to the var, Out of this turmoil a number of canpus-oriented, protest~type groups formed. Some of these “groups evolved frou protest to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organizations, whose primary ain and purpose was essentially the sane as the Oldelina CPUSA excent theirs was an avowed @llegiance to the Third World communist revolutionary forces, exemplified by Fidel Castro and his successiul revolution in Cuba, For cxemple, the 1968-65 school year witnessed a heavy wave of denonstratious and violence, During that year there were more than 850 demonstrations en college campuses, including nore than 200 instances of building seizures or siteins. More than 4,000 individuals were arrested for their disruptive behavior. Danmare to school facilities exceeded $3 nillicn an 61 instances of arsons or attenoted arsons were committed, This wave of destruction lozt one dead and over 125 injured, * An umnreccdonted number of disturbances and incidents . : { i d ‘ oe me Soca os mae spares pen AY ey een Pe Sa aah acho TO aren lege os pred whe ger eevee eetm AC CTA TLIO ERATE POOR Renan EE te rgeTT e tre Y Tere an we 8 , ST Pale Le oat wen ae Aes on emwreepenceremme lant of student=connected violence cruptcd during the 1065-70 school soar. | Lo) HW 55093 Docld:32999546 Page 35 meaner mer weiter
aw poos3 socld: 32989548 age 36 yer te Do gue eT Pree . ; omer In alnost every category measuring unrest and violence, the firures increased sharply over the previous academic year, In 1969-70 there were 1,755 Gcnonstrations on collese canpuses, including 313 building seizures by rampaging students. Two hundred and forty-six arsons or attempted arsons and 14 instances of bombing attacks were committed. Nearly 7,200 arrests were made in connection with these incidents, and damages exceeded $9,500,065. Eight deaths were reported and injuries totaled 462, nearly - two-thirds of which were sustained by police and college officials, Not oniy have the colleges themselves suffered. The _Burrounding communities have been severely affected, For instance, William Munstier, who directed the defense of the now famous Chicago Seven, who were tried for violations of Federal antiriot ‘gtatutes, spoke to a vally at the University of Californis at Santa Barbara on February 25, Ye told his audience that if tho President would not listen to the people, then it was each person's duty to be counted in the streets, Following the rally, demonstrators, including college students and other militants, gathered in a park in nearby Isla Vista, They burned the local branch of the Bank of Anerica, It has been estinated that Ganage to the bank veached $400,000 and that, in addition, $29,000 was inflicted in damages to cher property. Following the U. 5. troop movenent into Cambodia, studonts at the University of Wisconsin, Hadison, Wisconsin, left Bs ard
HW 55093 Docld:32999546 Page 37 the campus to demonstrate in Madison, They inflicted widespread property damage which has been estimated at $270,000. In addition, the payment of overtime to police departments and the National Guard to control the situation during these disruptions reportedly cost the taxpayers in excess of $300,000. Another gauge of violence during this period is the use of bombing as a political terrorist act. During 1972 there were 1507 bombings, 714 by explosives and 793 by incendiaries. Twenty-five deaths and 176 injuries were reported with a total property damage value of $7,991,815, In 1973 there were 1529 bombings, 742 by explosives and 787 by incendiaries. Twenty-two deaths and 187 injuries were reported and a total property damage of $7,261,832 was involved. Not all these bombings were by political terrorists, but the bomb has become an increasingly used weapon in the terrorists‘ arsenal. The pressures from the Executive Branch, Congress and public for evaluation of this activity and determination of extent of subversive presence, a8 opposed to legitimate dissent, was severe and required extensive reallocation of resources of the FRE until the end of the Vietnam War.
‘ HW 55093 DBocld:32989545 Page 36 -essential elements in their basic philoss ophy of class strucgie, . © @ ‘ , From the end of the Vietnam War until the present time the Fel has asain been faced with a changing pattern of tonestic subversion, Without the Vietnam Wer as a popular public issve which could be used to reach the public throuch front group operations (Communist Party, USA « Poonles Coalition for Peace and Justice} (Socialist Workers Party «- National Peace Action Coalition) and the resulting return of public interest to internal problens and issues, tactics of subversive groups underwent a change, Old+line crouns sara focused on racinl and labor issues consistent with their long-range efforts to roach the -worhers fo bkulid a revolution of the proletariacta, Racial minoritics have always been viewed as fertile recruiting grounds and are proparandixed as oppressed winorities,. } F ec ti fe 4 Q Fy vr a * Pp: 4. 7 , + a’ Furthorance and fomcntation of racial and lek Of more direct and immediate concern are the changes . which occurred in the icss Structured end discinplized ¢ Fk Consistently throucth the Victnan Yar yoars their tactics of « & Ae gee LARIAT Nein ~ ee 5 1, Re Bas protest were more yvielont, ¢.g., ROTO arsons and bonsings, ssaults on military and industrial recrulters, 9 t canpus buildings, industrial and public office bombinss, and the like, Pronerty damare was in the millions of Collars nud Le age 4 ~ 5 2 od 3 4 a) ah me, 2 depen e thousands of yarsons wore denied theiy basic frecioa to attend eet gre 3 4s nd Fae) rd 7 we ae st ~ classes, particinate in NCTC and meat and conversa with pergenn t 2 of theix choice ; _ 6 - 97 Pte ot oA "yo fy ea an re r sean eect eeenanee sorte ereammn eee we ot magen ene nan re came LONDEN DREN 1 meoenenaneey nae vi were prema oe = ey nee eee mene ete « en eer
» ¢ * F 2 ce © a) eb tr re 173] 9 ce | 0 u io) te cet) a @ Q a <3 pe Q Saad Q 3 Q .G 3 $e % 0) be o ro} Y fe ce - revolution cvolred what has been yardously deseribed ss counterculture oY Alternate liteestyle, The sdhorents to this innocuous sounding philosophy range from pacifistic, none competitive eropouts from society and the acid-drug culture victins to the MNarxisteLeninist revolutionaries operating Within this alternate life-style in en underground capacity, The latter, of course, are of serious concern to the FRI, The threat of the revoluticnary within the alternate lifa-style comunity in turn rauges from the unaifiliated individual who * ons ~ « eo ee ee £ Sta gnek Ya yr - ‘ONTLLCS 2H bombings, awxvSOonsS OY EB5SaSSA2uatilonws 2 2uUVcLGPancsS wer sonhisticated widersround revolutionarics such as Veatherrianu, There are currently 22 Weatherman in fucitive status, 14 others whe nre missing nonefugitive Weatherman believed in underground Ciperee reypeyeten el Tip aw bianca aOY Rie ROUTES OR sh SC aee ab g 4] LS. gm ot <¥5 Pee ~ w-4 $. ANY SULEUS, Stipperted by eprrenamately 240 a ) - od BF Aspen % 8 oan ps WHk Le QA Rew hs yore " Yoathermen hns claimed ercdit for 26 tombinsa an b believed resrontible for a total of between 35 and 40 bombings. These tactics are pisinly terroristic «- the use of terrericn by a suall group to force t Furthor compcuncinzg our prebloms in this area ig the rolific use of fLnise identities, frernently of deceased infants. “ Py. - 2. tn wee ny, Fe, Ong whe « ed Pris sonoct eF the rvshkien is cufficionrtly cevere to crura Bove mt re] : a de anes aw~watt -~ 7 oy ies eR TTY aye en ek ds wn on + mation of the Attorney Gorncral's Yoderal Advisory Commitccs on HW 55093  Docld:32989548 Page 39
ove ne @ @ False Identification. Tae intent of this Committee is to try to measure the scope of the problem to law enforcement, its impact ‘on business and derise measures to cope with it, It should be moted that the basic problem arisee from a local Isvel in that dn most areas births are recorded; hevever, seldom, if ever, are 5 ne oe + wet dey CP ae o birth resord and littie if any a ree . * ~ nate ot aft Savery st . re obituary colunn : En & nNGVBsaver morpuc Zor tho Gogiroad your of birth is the normal first step in obtaining a safe birth identity. Driver's license, Social Sccurity card, eredit carcs etc., unre then obtained to complete the idontity. fo meet its vesnonsibilitiecs in the domestic intelii-~ . gence field, the FBZ must coso with both the visible, structured and disciplined revolutionary groups such as the Cruch, SP and othors, along with their various front groups, 2S well as the more véiolence=prone rovolutionnaries in the underground. x certificate, which is the basis to establish a couplete Laise , t t5 It must bo borne in mind all of these greups share 2 eommon bond of Uarxist-Leninist revolutionary fervor, Their Qifferences are in tactics. The CPUSA would appear as a political who ving macees Who vould vocifercously fight alternative to the Intorine mnacses for their interests, while mashing the total conination and coalrsl ° of the Soviet Union, Tho CLUGA is merely on extension of the COmes tants TT at, ve ste 7 ft nas get Ce OY AO’ Ui bi in was UAC we le SS ond porew Low lu ay VOV Lae Le Ce nen) HW 55093 Docld:32999546 Page 40
. . . ry Ce ee vy a + - rn ots Soviet policy or interests, SWPP represents much the sane Lacade to intor, while enervetically eontinuing tc build party strength for the revolution and follow the international revolutionary concepts ef Leon Troishy. Other sxxailer groups continue in thse coma vein, with their own variations on the - HarxisteLensnast thoue of revalution, Novwer, less rigidly structured but more vielonce«-oriented subversive groups pose a Zane more difzicult probicu because their violence requires BcvYe covert actiung, often completely underrround in nature, ie) HW 55093 Docld: 32969548 Page 41
7  @ Noverge 10, 1975 INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS-EXTREMIST 1954-1975 Modern extremism as it effects law enforcement can be traced to the 1950s and the U. S. Supreme Court decision in 1954 outlawing segregation in public schools. The Ku Klux Klan, which had its origin in the post-Civil i War Reconstruction days, had long laid dormant, but forced - integration in the South pumped life back into it. Civil Rights (CR) workers championing the rights of Negroes, first on the issue of school desegregation, then equal facilities and finally voting rights, flooded the South in great numbers. Strong opposition by southern whites inflamed tempers and various Klen organizations inspired or directed actions against Negroes and the CR workers, which resulted in the Birmingham, Alabama, church bombing, murder of three CR workers in Mississippi, and the murders of Colonel Lemuel Penn in Georgia,and Viola Liuzzo in Selma, Alabama. The Klan and its symbol, the fiery cross, bacame synonymous with activities directed against Negroes, Jews, Catholics, and persons of foreign birth. A wave of floggings, murders, kidnappings ,and assaults began in 1950 and continued into the 1960s. Acts of intimidation became so prevalent that local grand juries met constantly and ‘hundreds of local arrests of members of the Klan took ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED . DATE BY ‘ - ™ =~ F WW 55093, DocId: 32969546 ,,.Page 42
« . Py ‘ 4 place. As civil rights protests increased, bombings became more frequent in many areas of the South. In March, 1965, then Senator Robert F. Kennedy predicted violence in the South and North after Congress ty Pa passed voting rights legislation. Kennedy said, "I don't . care what legislation is passed--we are going to have problems... violence." Violence reached such 4 stage that President Lyndon Johnson, appearing on national television, warned the Klan and instructed the FBI to intensify its investigations of the violence being perpetrated in the South. While Klan activi- ties abated, the 197Us have seen anotlier stirring of the Kian in antibusing activity as well as anti-Jewish and civil rights issues in the Nation. Other white hate groups such-as the National States' Rights Party, American Nazi Party and the Minutemen had their origin in the late 195Us and early 1¥6us, basing their philosophy primarily upon white supremacy. Arising almost simultaneously with Klan activity was black extremism. A dissident group of former National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) - members in Monroe, North Carolina, under the leadership of bo, tn mere eemen pene te petyspemerneemie bre wees se ~2- WW 5509% Docld: 32989546 viPage 43 ~ wee) ane!
®@ \ @ Robert Franklin Williams, fought back at the Klan. The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), backing Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's drive for Negro rights, under tre militant leadership of Stokely Carmichael and then H. Rap _ Brown struck out both at the Klan and southern police. Following close on the heels of racial violence in the South came urban riots throughout much of the United States. The 1965 ‘ Watts Riot in Los Angeles and the nationwide rioting following the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968, were examples of major disturbances experienced in U. S. cities. Black extremists provided the spark which inflamed many of our cities. Huge conflagrations consumed Harlem, Watts, Detroit, Newark, and our Nation's Capital. In a July, 1967, address to the Nation President Lyndon Johnson declared that "the looting and arson and plunder and pillage which have occurred are not- part of a civil rights protest." "It is no American right,"' said the President, to loot or burn or "fire rifles from the rooftops.'' Those in public responsibility have "an immediate" obligation "to end ' disorder," the President told the American people, by using -3- , A, 35093 ” Docld: 42969546 ,, Page 44... . poe “lo : — RUT PT TTNPA norte ReRremN Rte remrrenr er’ mt wey mpten RATTRAY OT POrerRPEITICYTIErNRAA IOV WR ADORE nemiNteTRTNI DYONR\RONtnEITHITTrN MeheraLeceren!Y Nt fff retned tressin\uitrmanea ate memreenenrenr{ Kanwarwmnimrenrasrranarcannineitna hy] MeranN Rime POUR KEV ETHRE HSE HOT OPRNIETE EA TPROTT IN eS
i “every means at our command...." The President warned public officials that "if your response to these tragic events is only business-as-usual, you invite not only disaster but dishonor." President Johnson declared that "violence must be stopped--quickly, finally and permanently" and he pledged "we will stop it." Racial tension in this country exploded into riots and racial disturbances over 2UU times between 1964 and 197U. Statistics reported across the country showed over 25U people were killed, over 1U,UUU were injured, and there was over a quarter billion dollars in property damage. Civil disturbances reached such proportions that a Presidential commission was established and the Attorney General of the United States instituted a data center so as to keep Federal officials aware of riot conditions. Beginning as early as 1963, mass demonstrations played a major role in this country. Student unrest became an important factor in demonstrations and With it came violence to the nation's campuses. Pronouncements like the following were commonplace: | "This is a revolution. Reformists work within ‘existing rules and regulations; revolutionists -4- L WW AS095 Doclda: 32989546 Page 45
HW 55093 ~ @ . make their own rules and regulations." “We will use any means necessary to uphold the principle that people of the third world have a right to determine what kind of human beings they want to be. Violence is the best means. It disrupts and terrorizes so that if people of the third world are not allowed to determine their own kind of education, then nobody else on that campus can get any kind of education." Jerry Wayne Varnado, Black Student Union Coordinator San Francisco State College, "Newsweek," 2/10/69 Statistics presented by The Senate Permanent Sub- committee on Investigations of The Committee on Government Operations in a publication entitled "Staff Study of Campus Riots and Disorders, October, 1967 - May, 1969*' indicate the extent of the problem: Docld: 3279895468 Page 46
AW 35095 : Total Colleges Involved in Disturbances 211 Total Disturbances | 471 Black Student Demands Leading to Disturbances 125 Total Estimated Persons Injured 598 (The February, 197U, issue of "Security World" stated that, during the period January 1 to August 31, 1969, losses sneci- fically traced to campus disorders amounted to $8,946,972) The widespread and increasingly violent nature of the problem prompted concern to be expressed by responsible spokes- men from all quarters. On ‘October 2, 1969, Senator Byrd said that "events in the news in the past few days concerning | activities by militant radical groups should alert us to the new trouble that is brewing on the Nation's college campuses and elsewhere.''- Senator Byrd said that "all of us would do well to pay heed now, and law enforcement authorities should plan a course of action before the situation gets completely ‘out of hand." Editorial comment in the September 28, 1970, issue of The Washington Post was also indicative of such concern: -6- Docld: 3279895468 Page 47
“ From its inception the BPP leaders called for members to arm themselves and learn how to use their weapons. The police were the first target in the BPP program for ''liberation" of the black community and the violent destruction of white America, Acts of violence traced to individuals affiliated with the Panthers from 1967 to 1971 resulted in the deaths of at least 12 police officers and the .wounding of 71 others. Separatist organizations such as the Republic of New Africa and the Nation of Islam also offered the extremists the opportunity to advocate violence and the overthrow of existing society. Another form of black separatism emerged in the late 60s and early 70s when large numbers of blacks turned to Pan-Africanism, which is generally defined as total liberation and unification of Africa under socialism, Black extremists, such as Stokely Carmichael, sought to achieve their goals through this movement. Groups such as the Congress of African Peoples, African Liberation Support Committee, and the All African Peoples Revolutionary Perty were formed by extremists who called for the destruction of capitalism. “The 1970s have produced extremism of a different nature. Militant Indians led by the American Indian Movement, ‘proclaiming long years of abuse by the white man, profess WW 55093 Docld: 32969546, Page 49. .
. @ T to champion the cause of American Indians. Their actions have resulted in numerous confrontations with authorities, including the takeover and destruction of both Government and private property. Two FBI Agents were murdered on the Pine Ridge Reservation in June, 1975. Bi-racial groups using the country's prison systems as its breeding ground have recently. adopted many of the tactics of guerrilla warfare. A prominent example in this regard is the Symbionese Liberation Army which has employed murder and political kidnapping to spread its message. Extremist groups such as the BPP, which from its inception promoted the stockpiling of weapons, have advocated urban guerrilla warfare. While basing political philosophy upon the teachings of MAO Tse-tung and other revolutionary theorists, activities have been based upon the urban guerrilla tactics used by Arab and South American revolutionaries. Robert Franklin Williams, as early as 1956, wrote that the ‘salvation of oppressed American blacks was ''a common household | match and a bottle of kerosine."' Stokely Cermichael, speaking over Radio Havana the day after the murder of Martin Luther King, jr., stated “more people are now beginning to plan ‘seriously a major urban guerrilla warfare where we can Move seriously to bring this country to its knees." ~ 9 - HY 55093 Docld:32989548 Page 50.
ea . ‘ Urban guerrilla warfare, as advocated by the Black Liberation Army, an off-shoot of the BPP, has been directed toward the overthrow of our present form of government. While extremists espouse causes directed against the evils of society, the first line of society's defense, the police, bear the brunt of such violence. In addition to the 12 police killed and 71 wounded between 19€7 and 1971 by individuals affiliated with the BPP, extremists have been responsible for the deaths of 44 policemen and 35 civilians, with 158 police and 129 civilians wounded between January 1, 1971, and June 30, 1975. Extremists and terrorists have since 1971 been responsi- ble for 127 firebombings, 17 arsons, 44 snipings, and numerous other extremist acts. - - 10 - | AW 55093 Docld: 32989548 Page 51
« P . ‘ . mo a 4 : SUMMARY OF DOMBST ES TUTELLIGEHCE BRIEFING ALL INF RIMATION CONTAINED . cs ; IFIED I. Scope and Purpose of Briefing bate ui2fe— Br veal ,This briefing will serve as‘an snerdduetion for the Committee to those activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division durina the past’ 20 vears which will be covered in public hearings. The hearings will pertain to programs (COINTELPROs) and allegations of abuse (the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King) undertaken by the Internal Security Branch of the FBI's Intelligence Division. ‘Therefore this briefing will be a short history of’ the Internal Security Branch and _the issues raised by its activities. The activities of the Internal Security Branch pertain to the FBI's efforts to counter internal security threats, that is, individuals and organizations perceived by ‘the Bureau as "extremist" or “subversive” and not necessarily haying any relationship to a foreign powe r. Tt does not cover the rai'ts counter- espionage mission -~- its effort to counte= the acti- vities of hostile foreign intelligence services -~ whicn will be covered in an earlier briefing and which will not he the subject of public hearings. 7 Aes © II. Internal Security Threats and the PBI Internal Security Program A. Internal Security Threats -- 1955 to the Pres ent Bureau officials will describe chose ‘threats as being at various times the-Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA)., the Socialist Workers Party (SIP) and other "old line" structured Marxist-Leninist groups, the Ku Elux Klan, “Black Nationalists" (black militants and some civil rights organizations, e.g., Southern Christian Leadership Conference “and Congress of Racial Equality) and the "Hew‘’Left." The Bureau officials will provide a statistical analysis reflec- ting changes in the threats as perceived by the Bureau for the period 1955-1975. B. The Craft of Taternal Security Intelligence Bureau officials will provide a ‘general introduction to the technicgues of Internal Security intelligence as practiced by the FBI. Fixrst, the distinction will be drawn between 7 3 intelligence collection and traditional criminal investigation. Second, the Bureau will explain the difference between Internal ‘| Security intelligenée gathering not necessarily directed at any particular group or individual and designed to assess a Eneaty -, general intelligence on civil disorders; and more aqqre sive intelligence prograns directed at particular—groups. and their leadership and involving COINTELPROs and criminal prosecu- tion. (See F. infra) re teins As Breet _ NW 55093 Docld:32989548 Page 52 a : \
' i oN Cc. FEI Internal Security Policy \ A description of the basic Policy materials on Internal ‘Seéurity intelligencef: \oesleqa ons : lauesbrin brag, o . ; i. asubversive matters” (FBI Manual, Section 87) -- pertaining to groups advocating violent overthrow . . of: the government, @.g., CPUS, SWP and the "New | . Left. . - fartekigoting . st “ ‘ . ss 2. ,"Extremist matters" (FBI Manual, Section 122) --— ’ ‘pertaining to groups the FBI perceives as racially “motivated or terrorist, e.g., Ku Klux Klan, "black hate groups" and modern - "urban guerillas ." ° 3. Major changes in investigative policy -- narrowing the scope of investigations in 1973. 7 canteen mets ee OU bebe bi seb Mapes BR At 8 Ae aD Oe D. Organization of the Internal Security Branch 1. Present Organization of the-Internal Security Branch. 2. Five Major Reorganizations in the Internal Security Branch as a Result of Changes in the Nature or the Threat 1955, 1964, 1967, and 1973. : E. Basic Intelligence Gathering Tools i. Overt Collection -- Interviews ‘and Public Source , Information. ; : . ; 2. Covert Collection Phrough Informants and Confi- dential Sources. 4 3. Covert Collection Througn’ Electronic Surveillance. . Pee Rk bot Ph dckaw arveneensannta rammensiduarsaeeenagaeniniaeeetoebcationh tent nthasenantagenanemiablan tet tthe crete 4, Covert Collection Through Sensitive Techniques Terminated in 1966 -- Surreptitious Entry, Mail Opening, and Trash Covers. Se 5. , Covert Collection Through Mail Cover, Photographic ‘ and Physical Surveillance F. Internal Security Investigative and Neutraliz zacion Programs 1. .Programs Involved - a. The Establishment of Special Indices for “ Intensifying Investigation on Leadership of "Extremist" and “Subversive” Crounps. fe sere ee met teen tel ook meet nts oe ot On mee Ser antes ptnenteme Retense wel re 4: b,. COINTELPPRO' Programs. ae oe tf * . wees nets et HW 55093 Docld: 329695468 Page 53° ts
| WW 55093 | .a. . Programs Relating to More Than One pType "Of Organization -~- Custodial Petention Program, Security Index, Reserve Index , and the Administrative index. be Programs Relating to the CPUSA and the SWP - i "Key Pigures/Top Functionaries" > 44. COMINFIL (iii. COINTEEPRO-CPUSA and COINTELPRO-SW! c. ‘Programs “Rolating to the Ku Klux Klan - a. Action Groups, Rabble Rouser/Agitator .. Index, Key Extremist Program ‘ we , ; . a, . . ii. COINTELPRO-White Hate. an - ” ad. ‘Programs Relating to "Black laticnalists" - ‘£. Rabble Rouser/Agitator Index and Key Black Extremist Program ii. COINTELPRO~ “Black Nationalist -@, Programs Relating to” the “New: Left" - i. Key Activist Program’ ii. “COINTELPRO-Now Left Other Consequences of Investigations Aside From COINTELPRO - a. Prosecution. bs bisseminating information to otner Federal agencies when FRI file subjects apply for Federal jobs or security clearances. Docld:32989548 Page 54 peed Pennattn ten AA SOE ET OCA eo nhd peat 1 Me Bags am tem ri ee orth Ae ce nate ents etn ten sev ean Oued 1894.00 eta teaed nnn Albina ener niin re Oe hOS HOF RA Be tbe Ree A eee oe oO tes = < = oe Ob 0 wear
von Me nn INTELLIGENCE BRIE] EPING November 17, 1975 | “ALINE mivATION CONTAINED Vv SSIFIED ° HEREIN sy BY efiaxdan| cy DATE This briefing will serve as an introduction for the Com- I. Scope.and Purpose of. Briefing mittee to those activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division ee, . by its activities. Branch pertain to the FBI's efforts to counter ‘internal security during the past twenty years which will be covered in public hearings. the hearings will pertain to programs. (Cons ITCLPROs) and allegations of abuse _(the- investigation of ‘Dr. Martin Luther King) undertaken by the Internal Security Branch of the ws FBI! s Intelligence Davisieny 4 This briefing will be a short history of the Internal Security Branch . and the issues raised OK ® The activitics of the Internal Security threats; that is, individuals and organizations serceived by the Bureau as Moxtremist" or “subversive” and not necessarily having any relationship to a foreign power. It does net cover _ the FBI's counter-espionage mission -~ its effort to counter the activities of hostile foreign intelligence. services -~ which will be covered in an earlier briefing and which will’ not be: the subject. ‘Of public hearings. The briefing will be divided into two parts, the first ° ef Srevts 4 Cay wank ev cy X Percent Cu ‘concerned with the PRI's, perceptien-et the major threats to HW 55093 the internal security For the period 1955 to the present, amt hew-tho—lurcau_has—attempted_to—counterthatthreat. This history of tne FBI's internal security function will be con- «4 Docld: 32939543 ‘Page 55 . ohn ta oe ner niente teh em meres Stee 6 11 Sprtechalant ain sohemeeti rs thes Lene ete ge chases tah | mie gt vatthe eects Uientre Wain ssbngpinre aatbined cbetontes 20 4 stim meant: Rint tn eevee wien tore wh nel nee ACen mig hd. wens petenn mee € ope emeterny oe meme soy am 4 oe emare a er we ae me : Ee ete mnavaan wtp stgrean tne prt haps ta akg an Pe ont pane weiter Si fen ge ee | tot et mers oe
‘ducted primarily by the leadurship.of the Internal, Security | ! Branca. fhe second part will bea presentati on of some of the general legal and policy : issues vaiéed by FBI intellig ence / activities and Tikely to be raised by public hearings. This’ “briefing will be conducted by Mari Gitens tein and other mem- e bers of the Cormittee staff. ‘+ + ITI.°* Internal Security Threats and the FRI Internal Security ’ Program A. Internal Security 1 Threats -- uz 1955 to Present (This. —— section will be wx Sitter by FSi officials. >, . Kawa GC aN Wr u ARN ‘Bureau officia s will des cribe those threats ,as -at various_times tie Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA A) J "old Line" struc— - - FB pesenc? a. \ tured Marxist- Leninist groups; the Ku “Klux Klan; “Steck ton- \ bah Got Meads Woe tal {i cvhilitants and_sonecivit right ‘the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), and other S-erganizattons, exg+;-Southernchristianteadersiip—conferénce-and ‘Congress-Sf Racial E-guaittey); and the "New Left." The Bureau officials will provide a statistical analysis reflecting changes in the ‘threats as perceived by the Bureau “for the period 1955-1975. B. The Graft of Internal Security intelligence (This: ‘. ‘section will be written by LBI officials, yo Bureau officials will provide a general introduction . to the ‘techniques of.Internal Security intelligence as prac- ticed by the FBI. First, the distinction will be drawn between intelligence collection and traditional criminal investigation. ‘AW 55093 -Docld:329895458 Page 56 | a es pevireen een atee tee PA APH PRP IES TIED RONNIE ITE nT Si dL Ce eases endo ew namie seen be Ate Mb Lente ate a i enya cua as me en methane eae pabtomsann§ darn yay trades Cedd cw paraie se: a enanery Vener mrrn Tre te whaweceales teas Sader bohennes taremtehinese wee ce athe yer? ob ore de nt strana me ean fot enn
. ; ae St Second, the Bureau will explain the difference between “Internal Security intelligence gathering not-necessarily dixectod_at_any_parkiculae group_ox-indivigu al- and aésigned to aSSess a threat, e.d., general intelligence on civil dis- orders; and more aggressive intelligence programs directed at particular groups and their headership and involving COIl- : . . Paes ~ - 8 TELPROs and criminal prosecution, (see,F. infra.) ‘C.. FRI Internal Security Policy ‘The articulated, poli icy ‘of the FRI with’ respect to internal ‘security threats is set out in the FBI Manual -of Instructions. Section 87 eapplies, to "Investigations of Sub- _versive Organizations and Individuals," and Section 122 applies to “Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest." (See Tab A for the present version of these sections.) , . , . \ * . . . _- * . Section 8&7 defines “subversive activities" as "activi- ; ties aimed, at overthrowing; destroying, or undexmining the ~ Government of the United States or any of its political sub- . divisions" by illegal means (Sec. 87.a.4.). Section 122 defines "extremist activities" in the same way, but also includes "denying the rights of individuals under the Constitution” _ (Sec. 122. a. l. e.). Thus the Section 122 definition | of extremist activities appears to include subversive activities. In practice, however, "oxtremist’ matters"*has meant matters concerning, violence prone groups composed of menbers of cone or. HW 435093 Docld: 32989548 Page 57 npe Wes wen ers cesses secgers memmuae aeeeteetes = esceste sookys sr bp cben twee hint ee em suhincns tomamrantins Pasian desmrvaneanceliananen weutubmut @Gmaencac: trees 1s
HW 45093- L _ . ; . t wh Communist party and other organiznai : . “| ; ‘|. another race. Section -122 is intended to cover what the “.. ‘Bureau calls “white hate" groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, and. "black hate" groups, such as the Black Panther Party and. , 5 , ‘the Nation’ ‘of Islam. . it also applies _toganerican Ind’ an ‘ groups such as the American Indian Movement, as well as. a _ variety o£ terrorist organizations engaged in "urban: ‘guerrilla warfare." Section 37 has been applied to-the activities of the’ mations which are ex-aye . ye Dae Yar f0Q- A eau—descrrye5—a: 7 ia ovolutionary Groups» ® paperecen bs Uns pr het LG Under_ this section the yureau has: investiqated grouns ranging from ‘Communist Party USA and the Socialist Workers Party ‘to the Wational Organization. for Women, During the Vietnam lords - Mee War period, Sect ion 387 provided authority for*intestigations of anti-war groups. ; Manual Sections 87°’ and 122 and the general policy of the Bureau with respect to internal security have changed over the years as the PBI's perception of internal security threats has ‘changed. In ‘the middle 1950's the only internal security concern of the Intelligence Division was the Section 87 "“sub-~ versive matters" area. Host groups investigated under ‘that section were perceived by the Bureau as threats to. the internal security of the nation because of .some formal or informal . relationship to the CPUSA or another "basic revolutionary group." Section 87 was not designed to cover the Ku Klux Klan = ewreaeneenes  rmecmemenmrs nia me Docld: 32969546 Page 56 | { ve emmpeey Sotes ee ERE TEE rm *
HW 55093 L _ as.-it reemerged during the late 1950's,’ nor groups which . aros e as part of. the, civil rights ‘or black wvower movements. Hee ror phec eid, of Until 1964 these matters were eeverct—by che General Inves- : . , : Priviani 7. : g tigative Division of the F3it,as “criminal investigations. . , : ‘Yhe Intelligence Division gained jurisdiction over groups with race orientations in the early 1960's, when it was charged with administration of the predecessor oF the "extremist ft “matters policy area (Section 122).- (At the; time Section 122 was captioned "Racial Matter") In effect these groups became, for the Bureau, ‘threats te the internal security. a . . . ° . . . ‘Furthermore, with the evolution of the "New Left" and as a result of the anti-Vietnam War movement, the Bureau revised Section 87 to place less emphasis on the old-line, highly disciplined Marxist organizations that had been known as: "basic revolutionary groups.." In 1973, the end of the Vietnam Nar and a decrease n goadh Can ceann wn lia Hy. Ruaren tres the leant anthik, fo a9 7 inbeveed secant, Civil rights activitiesyled tne Fur to de-emphasize and actu- are oe i . thats Hes ty ally. attempt to limit POT Seenetts activities, The FBI Manual received what. Bureau officials perceive as its most significant revision. Since 1973 the Manuial has required “each internal security case opened by the field to be’ related pled seamtrnes ' to some actual or potential violation of a federal gstatute. The statutory predication for an investigation must be. desig- “nated in the first report on the case made to Bureau head- ” quarters. he 1973 revision also ‘provides, however, that a & . Docld:32989548 Page 59. . a
@. Pg "preliminary investigation" may be carried on for 90 days for the purpose of establishing a statutory predication without notifying headquarters: the practical effect of _ Sanctioning these preliminary investigations will be dis- - - cussed in Section Tir. D. infra. ” - D. Organization of the. Interaal Security Branch - ” The organization of the FBI in the conduct of its internal \ , security function has, Like the various Manual sections, , a changed as the FBI's perception of the threat and the result- ant workload has- ‘changed. From 1955 to the present, the FBI 7 b has been “organized to provide maximum control by FBI head- quarters of the activities of the field agents who do the vast majority of the Bureau's investigative work. ; At present, internal security intelligence matters are supervised by the Internal Security Branch of the Domestic “Intelligence Division. (see Tab B for a chart of the: overall organization of the FBI.) The ~ . Special Agents’ of the Internal Security Branch are divided into three sections. Is-1l Section has jurisdiction over Manual Section 122 investi- gations, "Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest." . IS-2 Section ' een getatn: beaten ed se et Line! tadhatendatsieint Neate tn tateetaht shanties nls mantennninteRhinind Hep tess tenteanmenant © $88 covers Manual Section 87, "Investigations of Subversive Organi- zations and Individuals." IS-3 is the research arm of the Internal Security Branch. Thus, like the Manual, the Branch ead mace ener nes we Stem oh Gece om cena oe is organized around what the Bureau perceives to be the two 7 HW 55093 DocId:32989548 Page 60 .
basic threats to internal ‘security: extremist matters + . . (e.g., <KK and Black -Panther Party) and . "subversive matters" +. (e.ge, “New Left" groups, CPUSA and Sociali. | [ ' There have been five major reorganizations of the Intel-- st Workers Party) . Ligence’ Division since 1955, each resultina from significant ° changes in the role of "extremist" and "subversive" elements . a . . . . . H . . . -in American society, the FBI's perception of their threat to “" the government, and the change in the Division's workload «ot , ‘An the internal security sphere. . -. Pe sg 3.95 a In 1955 the Division yndertook a major reorganization as "a result o£ the burgeoning workload of the predecessor of the vo Interna} Security Branch. AE tha at time 4 nternal security matters were handled by the’ Internal Security Section, which "was concerned primarily with the CPUSA and its infiltration of domestic organizations. By 1996 the allegations of such in-  £iltration were so numerous that the Section had to be divided oan "and its manpower “increased significantly. The total number | Of internal- security matters handled by the Division had in- creased from to in the ‘period to 1955. The “PBI increased headquarters manpower from " to to cover these investigations. . “Whe effect’ of the reorganization was to create a.new section, the Subversives Control Section, which concentrated HW 55093 Docld: 32989548 “Page 61 .
on allegations that individuals were either methbers of the ‘ ¥ CPUSA or front organizations - “The Internal Security Section ’ retained responsibility for’ determining which organizations ; ; were subject to Communist infiltration. thus ‘the Subvers ive Control Section conducted investi ‘ations. of individuals, and’ tne Internal Security Section conducted investigations of liek “Brewky alse Confaved %o Cnveshiaak. - organizations, as-well-as, those individuals who were known a oo, . tn Su. byenstud— ' -subversives and considered.to be key ‘figures imnan, organiza~ : A tion? s-stracture. |. ot In [964, racial matters were transferrea/4 the Intelli- gence’ Division.. A special unit was created within the Division Hl and additional manpower was provided to meet the new workload. h . ' 1967 1 In 1967 another major reorganization was undertaken to | _ respond ko ‘the increase in workload resulting from the Bureau ‘ interest in. black militancy and the so- called "Mew Left" | . movement. All “investigations ‘of extremist matters (black and i . . a | white hate groups)’ were consolidated into one section, the 4 Racial Matters Section, and all investigations of subversive. | . ° } { oe a ¥ matters (new left and old Leet} were retained in the remaining sections. ee Oe ie Sena inteneenakiie i Mee we oe meee renner ets ._ 35093 Doclda:32969546 Page 62 .
"1970" Coe | / eee ee td a In 1970 the Division was again reorganized to place ‘ greater emphasis on internal security as opnesed to counter- ‘ ° k ntelligence matters. This reorganization was due primarily - to the increased workload in the "Now Left" area created by e the campus rebellion. ‘he reorganization had no significant impact on how the Division handled intérnal. security matters . . . \ oF other than to provide additicnal manpower. In 1973, the Division received its present structure. with the end of the Vietnap War and the decrease in black militancy, the ! Division was reor nized to de-emphasize in- a Kvecs wee — -ternal security matters and  resemprastee, ycountorintelligence. Manual changes of that year requiring a statutory predicate for each internal security investigation also reflected this change. So CO , LE. _ Basic Intelligence Gathering Tools The basic intelligence gathering tools used by the FBI have depended upon the seriousness of the threats -and the willingness of. the courts and Congress to permit their use. -The most overt intelligence gathering tool is an inter-~ view of the subject. There are no restrictions, other than internal FBI policy, on the use of this technique. Agents are limited, however, by the willingness of the subject to . WW 55095 DoclId: 32989545 Page 63
_ i soa st . yo 7 5, Odes: Uae FUE has ne Ur Among Jie bureau's mogk vedluabhu Fntet. “eDeY GOULCES are officlaL records and punlic souvredis. ose of public . ead cet : sae . HOMOY 2. SRS ie . be Course, 1s unrestricted. in’ recent years, how- 5 ever, Toure decisions. and federal and state JIecislation have : . - placed soe “Limits OW Access to otFictal records. Phe Bank Seeriey Ack, Che Foderal privacy Act, the Buc ekloy AmQn amet ‘to the idghes Kducation Act ‘of .1974 (2) ane a vari cey of “stake sand ofedaral cciminal yusiice lecislation Lave vestric- ted Pit access to a rich store of duformation.- here are $3 : still x,ecoriis as to which there ure no terri tut: cek . ' ‘ ‘ however; an important example is tax returus. .Vvhile baa is o ms « 0 0 Binds lecishation 1i imiting access Lo of Licivd records tod . so, lea. Ae riees such sorters ots Lnddequate. . 7 by Che Gureau is, live informants and cantidentlial, sources Use Gl these vasources is unrestricted by leqidAkalion er ease Law. A rournk, sbudy. conducted . one Of thee nudges ks thats Abmost halt oer bhne “suabeorageet aue “gabpomist" cases openad agqainat fidivicuebls age dvrcod. en s informant tipo. (See ‘Tab i) , | HW 55093 Docld:32989545 Page 64° oy oe?) KQstrvictive, civil libertarians argue that Lau protection: . vy The most useful covert antellicence vathering tool usad aedned pyc ihe Genes Accourki ns a peter amen AL nn DOSED En On TUIT TO NED MeTen Tee ene vel to SS eeniniemaeetad eameentinemateaiabetieeestektod 1 eee teenporn tintin ee tee
“ye . YS “An informant is an individual who ‘is -pai id by the FBI © a ar : : : ‘ , i for information on a continuing basis. He: is usually: a : at : * member of a target group, -and may have joined the group on-- i - Bureau instructions. , His activities as a reser of the. co ; i group are directed and controlled bv the PB | A confidential source is an individual who has provided __ . - information to the FRI on a confidential basis but who is not necessarily paid for the information. According to FBI ' officials the key distinction betvieen an. informant and ‘a diction cud! Caratisgy . confidential source is, Gere A confidential source provides pits ateereiits booms times atanenknahees ee anit «kinins Hs SIL ER edema 7 information that he has access ‘to because of his job or his a oF, position in “the community. He does not obtain such access at the direction of the Bureau; the information jis already available to him when, 1s contacted by the “FBI. Among im- portant confidential sources are school administrators, news~ and law enforcement officers. In many cases the information which these sources provide to the Bureau has been obtained: Mr PELERE YeAUS Se ° se . Tt 4 \ r from oF fiekal vecords | wea WweOarzay . . ry - Ra ns Gat AR, Mose” & wos. yf art oy } i i | i { . . . F paper reporters, bank’ presidents, telephone company officials, | t i As the’ Committes will see ‘in’its public: hearings on> the~ ew eer td COINTELPRO program and on the informant program, both infor- heen Ne ee rants and confidential sources: have been used from time to time for purposes other ‘than information gathering. Confiden- tial sources and informants played an important role in dis- crediting and neutralizing FRI targets as part of the COINTEL ~ Ce nD Ey Seen ne Ee ewe vane ete Tey * HW 55093 DBocld:32989545 Page 65 ' ‘ (ESSER SPATS ATL PIT KENTA NM SP TAAL LA ES ARES CANE Sy ila La Sle Be LI OTAL EAT ARTIC iek PRISER SSSR . eee eb 20 mee ee
AW 55093 , ‘ , @ ’ ee . . .f . . 13 Docld: 32989548 —Page66 t PRO sprograms. At present there are approximately ‘paid-for information by the FBI. There | informants being - are present ' y approxi- mately FBI confidential sources. Lach year the FRI expends approximately on its informant procram The LI has very detailed policies pertaining to the selection and supervision of informants and confidential sources and the treatment’ of th 1c information | they supply. These policies will be covered in ‘the Comuittec' s public hearings on P3 ‘informant Program on December -,. These nome f Gee. . on thics subject. Will be the first comprehensive: public hearings Until 1972, electronic surveillance was another very im- ‘ ‘portant ‘covert intelligence gathering - technigue used by the - Internal Security Branch and its predecessors. In 1972, ~ however, the Supreme Court held tha ‘t, unless ess the FBI had reason to believe that its. targets are agents of foreign governments, the Burcau cannot engage in wiretapping ox microphone sur ‘veillance of American citizen “without a court warrant. The FBI's use of this. technique, the Supreme Court s decision, ‘and a raft of Congressional: propos sals on the subject have been explored on several occasions by three subcommittees of the Senate Judiciary. Committee and-the House Judiciary Committee Electronic surveillance per se’ will not be the subject of public hearings by this Committee Hearings will touch on pagerreeaal of alleged abuse of this Eechnique , including bony eee ' " . . . a oe < ‘ 1 . “.¢ evbasage ive AL tne oe Woe ~ an L. ; sindvos dots it bhe . . . ~ ~ Ea} : “ t rv Sy ‘ Nay wey % asm é 4 [oe ed og hg : Fata ‘ '% To Af . j ~~ A vead aon ve 5 GS cee eC oa yoy mas CON ee a Can va OF coe pag +8 Ames eter ae meet pet moeneset a cae eucenttn nes coer eeprmertianty gag beaede| Ree iat eee # satan iene cI sha feast ET RIT
ri the “Kissinger 17" wiretap, for use in the Gonmittec's final”. i report. - 0: : . ot . -FBI policy on the. use of electronic surveillance for ! internal security purposes was never articulated in 1 its / Manual of Instructions. a ~ the use of electronic surveillances, gen-rarly, will be ‘covered ina separate bri iefing| immediately preceding the pres sentation of the public hearings on the PBI. Ss investigations of-Dr. King + tee mee and the’ Southern Christian Leadersnip Conference. Until’ 1966, the FBI used ‘a number of other sensitive’ “4 covert techniques against internal security targets. These OO _ included Su reptitious entry or "black bag jobs", mail sur- veillance, and trash covers. Director Hoover ordered ‘use of surreptitious entry terminated. in 1966. (See Tab for a - 7 recent PEL memorandum suggesting that not only were — such operations engaged in against donestic targets prior to 1966, but . have besn conducted since then: ) tap aee macht bent areata re Dhamrss te «ma att oehe wet Pelt Rtn RA Hota et ald a elee Physical and photographic surveillance are covert: techniques that cont tinue to be used by ‘the FRI. The King case is a ‘good ‘example ‘of the use of such technigues. In the Six years Dr. King was under investigation, he was subject to either physical or photographic. surveillance on at least occasions. as st Baten! Sit canoes come ouchinthe tuints wobes Move +4 paieks' Herel there are no-‘comprehensive Bureau policies on the use o these techniques against internal -security targets; neither are there federal statutes or court decisions which place any HW 55093 Docld:33989548 Page 67 _ ‘s ss