In 1977, the CIA issued a second Inspector General's Report concerning the subject of CIA sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in large part, was intended as a rebuttal o£ the ' Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states: The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns it (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have ‘during the period preceding the assassina- tion of JFK in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2) The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the -assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH | operation was not an assassination plot. Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state: It would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission) its efforts had it taken a broader. view of the matter (of normal avenue of investigation). The CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most then saw in general terms—- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination ‘because of the tensions of the time... It is’ not enough to be able to point
to erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities ‘about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (Ibid. p. 11) Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission on a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH operation was relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391, 392) In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this. Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26-27). | A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by Jéseph Langosch who in 1963 was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Specialy, Affai Special Affairs Staff was the. CIA component Staff responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch,
_(Ibid., p. de yer Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1). The Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald and was responsible “fox the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79) Langosch,as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit’ of Joseph Langosh, 9/14/78, p. 3) It was. Langosch's recollection that: that the AMLASH operation prior to ‘the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other senior CIA officers as an assassination - operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA (Ibid. p. 4) Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials including Desmond FitzGerald. However, the issue before this Committee is not simply whether the AMLASH operation was an
assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more significant issue, as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission: In the case of the AMLASH operation this determination is a most difficult matter to resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their ~ characterization of the Agency's operational objectives. Based upon the presently available evidence it is the Committee's position that ‘such informa- tion, if made available to the Warren Commission, might have stimulated the Commission! s investiga- tive concern for possible Cuba in involvement or | complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin commented before this Committee: _. «when t read... lthe Church Committee's report--it was an ideal situation for them to just pick out any way they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to be met and then either blame the rest of it on somebody else or not tell any more or polish it off. I don't think that
could have happened back in 1964. I think there would have been a much better chance of getting to the heart of it. It might have only revealed that we are involved in it and who approved it and all that. But I think that would have at least come out. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91) The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed om the Warren Commission, the Commission might have’ been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture | that has sourrounded the AMLASH operation during the past decade. As history now records, the AMLASH. operation remains a footnote to the turbulent - relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States. ere oe od