Sc-O2L64~-58 2, By 5 July 1956, the fourth fligat, the USSR was aware oo. of the purpose of the missions and were teking counter action. One positive action was the standaow of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and & second action which is helieved related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft inso East Gernany and Pelend on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved into Hungary at about this time. - 3. The performance of the Soviet system on tne 5 July missior, 2014, was jndeed curious. While the action evident fran (COMINT, ey is not clear an explanation which appears to fit the known Pacts is offered 25 follows: As 2 result of the previous missions, the Soviets had ecucluded the essential facts concerning the missions . j.e., thas they were for reconnaissance, that they flew above RU feet, and that a penebretion 4s deep as Moscow wes possible. ihey provably surmised that the 5 July mission ves heeded. for Moscow when the track appeared on & northeasterly heading. ‘Tne Loss of the target when it entered Soviet territory Was prosably deliberate and the "red herring" track returning to the west wes either a dodge or a convenience to avoid proadcasting & track for ell the system to see that @ “hostile or intruder" was coming OVE Moscow with no means aveilable 49 stop it. Tis idea is supported by the use of 2 reid mmber assigned in the region just beyond tne point qi) were the track hed been "Nost™. In addition, the treck wes not labeled “nostile or intruder" when it ves proadcast after it had pe gsed beyond Loscows The reporting of the treck when it did appear Wes only by Mostow and it has been suggested. the2% other \ stations had been instructed not to proadeast the track. Further, it may \ oe may not be @ coincidence that the heignt broadcast was alnost | exactly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but on the next missions, four days later, the altitude reporving wes consistently ehove| feet. . en / ; ° Lh. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recogaition of the great height of the mission flights, tracking was better and n general the performance of the warning system was much improved. closed a 3000 mile track with only two short periods or jon or track 1088- Altitude reporting Was over \feat ¥] which was only 100 feet off target. The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning * 6. The first eignt missions proved that the eir derense warning tem is deployed in depth. This wes myident froa pota the continuity *\ “treck and most forcefully from the ELIV? date collected. Some me/s band were 1 sjercepts of Soviet Bloc yadars operating in the obsained by project ETT as follows: cy Other 30. These numbers cannot be equated to in- divicusl radar sets since the same radar nay b intercepted more than | One . a jwere located, er aging! pew sites. Some i { | [| adaitiona signals were identified but aveileble information | i | does not permit determination of Location so that it must be con~ ! ; cluded that these signals include both know and new sites. Because i of the limite sion of ELINT to the band and the Soviet actice of collocating radars on aifferent freauencies the totel \ PIace = Fs \ number of radars may be expected to be at least double the number , . of sites. , — iin SIP .
14-00000 : sO . | : SC-02164.58° 7. Confusion and track loss seamed to be related to the 49 ~) presenze of large nudbers of fighters although the saturetion point has not been determined because of insufficient date. deme oat 8. The question of redars for height finding, the carat _| in this vole, the introduction of ROCK CAXEs and ls lopments are discussed in another section. ur ver, that these missions were a catalyst in OCK CAKEs. ee the introduction se = 25 ~ ] _ TOP SECRET — EIDER— CHESS