7 / Classification: _se 5 — = (This form is to be used for material. extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) oo so On May 8 Langosch further Gisclosed AMMUG's- knowledge of the Oswald case. (Ibid, attach. 5) Langosch paraphrased ANMUG's knowledge of Calderon: as follows: I thought that Luisa Calderon might have’ ; had contact with Oswald because’ I learned ; about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made ae a trip to Mexico, that she had been ©. ; . involved with an American in Mexico. The = se: information to which I refer was told to. me by a DGI case. officer... I -had commented Ea to (him) that it seemed Strange that Luisa’ °°. - (Calderon was. receiving a salary from the ~ a DGI although she apparently did not do : any work for the Service. (The case officer) . told me that hers was’ a peculiar case and > that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence - Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head® 2... of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, | (the case officer) had investigated Luisa. . “Calderon: «This was because, during the time’ ~~ she was in. Mexico, the DGI had intercepted  — .@ letter to her by an American who signed “his name OWER (phonetic) or something | similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is a@ifficult in © Spanish so I-am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. .. It could have been “Howard” Or something = i. _different.. As I understand the matter, _ a ae 5 the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a. Clandestine professional relationship ‘between the writer and Luisa Calderon.. I.also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen'in the a company of an American... I do not know. if this could have been Oswald... (Ibid.)_ SECRE main os Classification: | a Classified by derivation:
(This form is to be used for: material extracted | ‘from ClA——controlled- documents. ) On May ii, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to: Director Richard. ‘Helms. ‘regarding the information. oS I Swenson had elicited from. AMMUG (CIA Doc. “FOIA 687-295, | 5/11/64, Rocca Memorandum) - “Rocca proposed that "the "-  DDP in person Or via a designee, perferably the’ restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the agency or at the. Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is. not - desirable ta- put anything in weiting. (Ibid. p.. 2)- | ‘on “May 15, 1964, "Helms wrote Rankin regarding . former, discuss the AMMUG~1 situation on a very OF f “AMEUG" Ss information about the ‘DGL,. indicating its | sensitivity and operational significance. (CIA Doc. : - f FOIA 697- 294, 8/15/64, Helms Memorandum) Attached 7 ‘to Helms" communication was a ‘paraphrased accounting of Langosch' s ‘May 5 memorandum. (Ibid.) In that | f oe attachment the intelligence associations ‘of Manuel os | Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez > were set Eormgh. “However, ‘that attachment made no reference whatsoever ; to Luisa Calderon. 3 Howard Willens of the Warren Commission requested as a follow-up: to the May 15 memorandum, . CAET = os ¢ — 008034 - i ‘t Pel : Classification: _ a Classified by derivation:
ee 63 nes 7 pele “ aa Clestcation: —_SECRET an _ (This form is to be used for material extracted, from ClA—controlled documents. ) : / access” to the Tuestions used in. ‘angosch' Ss ae interrogation of anc. ,, (cra, ‘Doc. FOIA’ 739- -316, 6/19/64, aa Memorandum) — “On. June, 18; 1964 ‘Arthur Dooley of aa which she returned to ‘Cuba. early : in) 1964. " (Ibid. 7 "memoranda, of May 7. and May 8, 1964. which contained. - Rocca! s s @ounterintelligence Research and > Analysis a 4 | Group 4 took the questions. and AMMUG' s -Fesponses to | the. Warren Commission’ Ss office” s. for Willen! s. review: oS 7) Willens saw Langosch' S May 5 memorandum. _ The only "mention: Of: Calderon was: as follows: “The precise. s “relationship. of ‘Luisa Calderon to the DGI. is not clear. _She spent. about : ‘six months: in Mexico from 7 However, - Willens’ was not. shown | Langosch's much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, - including her. possible association with Lee Harvey "Oswald and/or American intelligence. (Ibid. \* The Warren Commission as: of June ‘r9, 1964, “had little if no reason to pursue ‘the Luisa Galderdg lead. It had stfectively been denied significant a a a ~ See .* It should be noted that these ‘memoranda. of May: 5, (7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not. ‘referenced in the Calderon 291 file. (See CIA ‘Computer printout of: Calderon 201. file) Their _ existence was determined by the Committee’ So. : Rieretaseitation other ae enc “files. eae pe | 000035 | (BH, SE f CR ne E ET) Classified by derivation:
| mo . Classification: a “(This form | isto be used for material extracted = from ClA—controlled documents. ) background information. ‘This denial may have . Le . impeded Or. prevented. the Commission’ s pursuit. of. Calderon’ 's pore ntial relationship to. Oswald sha the assassination Of President ‘Kennedy. | But oe - _ : f “even if the Warren Commission had " Leartied eo | “of Calderon' Ss background. and: possible, contact with Be! a 6 O, S Oswald it still had been denied the one significant, . ~ : piece of. information that might have raised. its: : i interest ‘in Calderon to. a more serious ‘level. “The - | f . Warren Commission was never: told about Calderon’ s- conversation of “November 22, 1964. SEE beep _.. Classification: SECRET ee 5
“Classification: — ‘s E C R E T, “(this form is to be used, for material ~~ from ClA—controlled documtepts. ) See , near rere Litre - me a vee SRS ‘Calderon 201 as reference to the conversation nor does it indicate’ 7 that it. was ever nade ‘known, to, or, provided the Warren Commission for its analysis. (cla Comput Si _Printrout of Calderon: 201 file) “In an effort to | | ‘determine the manner in which ‘the treated the Calderon conversation this Committee. "posed the following questions to the CIA 1. Was the Warren Commission or any. Warren -. Commission staff member ever given access . to the transcript of a telephone conversa-_ tion, dated November 22, 1963, between a female employee of the Cuban Embassy / Consulate in Mexico City, identified — . as Luisa, and an unidentified male. speak- -.ing from outside the Cuban Embassy/Con-. _ sulate? If so, please indicate when — 6 this. transcript was provided to the Warren. Commission or its staff, which CIA official provided it, and which Warren: Commission members — or staff reviewed it. e ee ae ae ee a a a arf 2.: Was the Warren’ Commission or any member - .of the Warren Commission or any Warren ‘Commission staff member ever informed. “SE. _SEGREL, | ~ Classification: : nn o00087 ; "Classified d by. derivation:
Classifications secret —____ is at is to e for arora extracte 1S mis io aterial extracte rom om A east ed ea, Suments. -65a- orally or in writing of the substance of the - above-referenced conversation of November 22,- 1963? If so, please indicate when and oe in what form this information was provided, | and which CIA official provided it. (HSCA request letter of August 28, 1978) - “Although the (Mexico. City). Station considered. - -.: the conversation of sufficient possible © ar interest to send a copy to headquarters, the latter apparently did nothing with it, for there appears to.be no record in the Oswald file of such action as may have been taken. A review of those Warren -. Commission documents containing: information ‘provided by. the Agency and still bearing a- Secret or. Top Secret classification. ‘does - not reveal’ whether the conversation.was _ given or shown to: the Commission... (CIA Doc., Memorandum Regan ying Luisa .. Calderon conversation, 1). 7 The CIA responded by memorandum: oo . ff The available evidence thus. ‘supports the conclusion that the Warren Commission was never — ; given: the information nor the’ opportunity by oo _ “which it could evaluate Luisa ‘Calderon’ s° | es oo d significance to the events surrounding President : wo Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been — q expeditiously provided this evidence of her ‘intelligence background, association. with Silvia —. ; é Duran, ‘and her comments following the assassination, 7 it may well have given more. serious | investigative ce » Classification: _ - 000688 |
o nake ace an sella, LM Ay — The first question can be explained. in. benign = 66-. Classification: _ SECRE =i wes consideration to her potential knowledge of. Oswald (This form is to be used for material extracted _- and the Cub Bn CIKELAARBIE LOERARRES involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. i Two difficult issues remain which are raised. “by the Committee" Ss finding. First, why ‘didn’ t =the Agency provide the calderon conversation to the — : Warren Commission; secondly, why didn' t the Agency . reveal. to the Warren Commission its full knowledge 1 roe Calderon" $s intelligence background, her possible ee Knowledge of Oswald and her possible. connection to. ‘a th the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus. ee v terms. — It is reasonably possible that by sheer. oversight the conversation was filed away and not: recovered. “Or recollected until after the Warren . Commission had completed its investigation and | See p oS) caecles pecrion asfoutnotenercia ‘published its report ce! (See above cra explanation) - ; As for the Agency' s withholding of information . concerning. Calderon' Ss _ intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was merely. informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI. (CIA Doc. 5/5/64, [Swenson }temorandum) The memoranda which provided more extensive examina- tion of her intelligence background were not made - 3: rr Pr ve oe oF - Classification: —___ 900989 | of i Classified by ¢ derivation:
Classificatignii secret “(This form is to be used for material ‘extracted | from ClA—controlled documents.) vee aot atten hlgatmert nnd 6 eh ate oh | might: have been requested to locate Luisa. calderon' s- | "sister. Ronis ‘told the. Committee that he had no | recollection of recruiting any person: associated - with the ‘Cuban Intelligence Service. He did. recall - that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. ‘However, he dia not recall ever recruiting any employees of the. Cuban Embassy/Consulate in .. Mexico: City. Finally, Mr. “Ronis. stated that he had, “no | recollection that Luisa Calderon. was associated ; . with the CIA. (Ibid. >. Various present and former cra representatives oe _. were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been “associated with ‘the CIA. ‘The uniform ‘answer was that no one ‘recalled such | an association.» (Cites: _ Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Heims, 8/2/78, p. 136; -HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/18, P- 148; -HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph hangosch 8/21/78, . Piccolo, “Interview of yo : = Se | oe * Thus, the Agency" s file on Calderon. and the - - testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no- connection between Calderon and the CIA. ‘Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete:the RAR. a Classification: See. 099083 . _ | Classified: by derivation: -
. most glaring omission ‘being the absence; SF erom oe ~ an GEE ey . eo yer 201 File.jof ryptic remarks aMMUG-1 Tn Gerrn e189 Erste | Intelligence Services pr i with the ‘DGL- in Mexico: City- oe assigned the CIA cryptonyn AMaUG-1 (A- Classification: _SECREL . (This form. is to be d for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) — Backyros®. ind ‘ A > <3 3 ‘ LUN Fs ing - Pwr bom Rete ude} O ON ; This committee’ s investigation Of. Luisa ae Calderon has revealed that a defector ‘from the cuban | ovided the CIA: with signi- . ‘icant information “about Lee. Harvey Oswald's contacts This defector was 1 hereinafter) - x CIA files. reveal that A-l defected from ‘the = DST on April 21, r964{L_ when he “defected, A-1. possessed a number of Dez. - documents which were subsequently turned. aver to “the CIA. (CIA. poe. [ks 68894, 4/24/64). a CIA. officer, seven a Following his defection, Langosch, went f ‘jee meet A-l, debrief him, ro A-L's> ‘travel. into the united ‘States. and arrange fo (Ibid.) On May 1, 1964,. 22 reels of Langosch' s _ *It.is now known that A-1 did provide sig t spat oe leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Caldere fur Sif ni. that little.of this information “was! ‘Ets GGF1GME oy che cIA to the Warren Commission. - @herefore, the possibility exists. that A=L had provided other ‘information tq teRffiddtby derivation: , n ‘commission’ s work wALc ad i: Wang a SRR.
_ 4 a a , ~ 7?" SECRET a Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) debriefing of A-l were forwarded tof i | (cra Doc. | pispaten[ocoa]) 7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May 1, AL was. under. (CIA Doc. Contract “Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64) | 2 od . oo By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-L XY would be of great value to the Agency. He stated: There is no. question’ in my mind: that. _AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector. (o) on that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning me Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, / contract with the CIA for’ operational purposes. " . : | a” ' and.agents.. (CIA Doc, Langosch Memo ‘to - Director of Security, 6/23/64) 20 As an. officer of the DGI, An1 from August of! _ 1963 until, his defection was assigned. to. the Der" Ss: “Tlegal | Section B (CIA poc. [x esso4 4/24/64) _ whicn was responsible for training agent -s for. assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi- ; bility pertained to handling of agent operations. | - in El salvador. (CIA Doc. Personal Record Question- : , naire 6/4/64; CIA Doc. (oh 68894 4/24/64) ae - ‘ A-l identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli- | § gence officers assigned to Mexico ‘City. | Langosch —_ 5 described A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in — Mexico as follows: a ae ws ud - Classification: - : | 000095 4 Classified d by derivation: :
i concerning A-1. This examination was undertaken Classification: _ (This form is to be used for.material’ extracted - from ClA—controlled documents.) In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence ‘people are. One.is the wo Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal.. He is. called the Chief of. the. Centre... That:. is his title but he is: actually > the _ intelligence chief; or at least he’ Was until: the 16th of April at which time a. replacement: was sent to Mexico. _to take over. . This fellow's name is © _ Manuel Vega. ‘The source ‘says that _. the Commercial attache whose name is. Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is: — “not. sure which is. an intelligence ' officer) and another one is Rogelio. _( I-might say that»some of these names... . are familiar to me.) (Langosch. arty of A-1, 4/30/64, Pe. 35. of reel 4, 4/23/64) Thus, A-1 was. able, to provide the CTA soon after ‘his defection with accurate information | regarding” DGI operations and DGI ‘employees in. no | Mexico city. a in sect. From prz. The Committee has ‘reviewed the CIA's files to determine: 1) whether Ael had provided any” valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining» to. the: assassination of. President Kennedy; and 2) | . whether, if such leads were provided, these leads - . and/or other significant information were made ‘available to the Warren Commission. | w tri Co aM yd | Classification: | pp296 Classified by derivation:
- 74 —. Classification: _ | SECRET. a (This form is to be used for material extracted a ‘from ClA—controlied documents.). . . The Committee’ s initial. review of ‘the a oa materials provided by ‘the CIA to. the Warren. Commission did not disclose the. existence of ‘the AMMUG files. - However ,. the Committee did. during the course of its. review examine a file containing material ‘passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That: file made reference to A-1. - Included in this 7 — file was a memorandum of May 5, “1964 written by” | Joseph Langosch which concerned. information ja provided about the Oswald case. (CIA Doc. FOIA 68- 290 Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within this. file were the. A-1 debriefing memorando. of: May. 7, and May 8, “1g64 previously, cited with regard - to Luisa Calderon. “(cra Doc. FOIA 4697- =295, “attach's s -3 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the 7 Committee requested access ‘to all CIA files. | concerning referring to Bele | . . From review. of these materials ‘the Committce. has determined that the Warren Commission dia learn "during mid-~ “May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably had come. in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City. sehy : : “SS. Classified by derivation:
"75 “7 | Classification: a this. form is “to be used for material. extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) _. the Waren Commission _ Prior t to “learning of : ‘Oswald's Probable contact with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief, of: ‘the’: “crats counter Intelligence stafé passed an “tstarmal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also. of the ‘Counter= - intelligence Staff, which | stated that he had been informed by the DDP,. Richard Helms, that: J. tee Rankin had contacted “John ‘MeCone to request that ee the Director consent to an interview before the - Warren ‘Commission on May 14, 1964, (. Edgar / Hoover also appeared, before the Commission on ce that date. prior to McCone' s appearance. “Warren - : . Commission Report YABeresee)(cra. Doc. ‘FOIA, 689= -298, — - Memorandum ‘of James Angleton, 5/12/64). Angleton oe Rn : f also wrote: | - oT discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are~ processing which originated with the ‘sensitive Western Hemisphere | source. I - informed -him that in your view this. would” _vaise a number. of. new. factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appear- — ance unless we have--first had some pre- © liminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implica- tions. since! it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. . The DDP stated that he would review this care-. fully amd made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Ibid.) soto ae 4 i - Classification:. Classified by derivfifh- G93 —
Classification: (his form is to be. used for. material_extracted . ¢ una di ae SAT ycerel doguments) = source referred | to in Angleton’ s memo WAS A-1. ‘This conclusion is | based in part ‘upon the date of this memo which was quite close in ‘time to. Al! s defection. In addition, Rocca’ Ss staff prepared | a prior. to Der McCone' s appearance before the Warren | . a“Brief: % Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission outlining various positions. adopted by. the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and. assistance to the Commission. (CIA Doc. FOIA 695- ~302-a, 5/14/64) | At Tab E of this brief it states: | Within the past week, significant infor- mation has been developed: by the CIA re- garding the relationship with Oswald of . certain Cuban intelligence personnel in. . Mexico City and the reaction in Havana _ within the Cuban Intelligence Service _to. the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the © Cuban asspect. (Ibid., Tab E) On May 15, 1964, the day of ‘McCone" Ss interview, ‘the. Warren Commission received its first formal 5 communication regarding A-1l. (CIA Doc. FOIA 697- 294, 5/15/64) However, the Agencv aia not at. that time identify A-1 by his real name or _cryptonym nor did ‘the Agency indicate that the source of this information. SEC! REL Bm : Classification: i "Classified by onl 90 og99 - 03 |
re le 7 Classification: __ SECRET (This form is: to be used for material extracted from CliA—controlled documents.) was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D. C. area. (Ibid. ) The May, 1s. communication did | state that the Agency had . @stablished contact | “with a well-placed invidivual who has been | in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the. Cuban. Direccion. General de Intelligencia." - (qbia, ) ; | ‘Attached to. ‘the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch' s above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 Tegarding knowledge of Oswald' s _Pro- bable contact with. ‘the DGI in Mexico City. The ~ attachment ‘made- no ‘xeference to the source's status. oe as a defector, from the. DGI. (Ibid., attachment) As ‘set. forth in the section of this report. concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard. oo Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo . and the questions upon: which. the informa-_ tion set. ‘forth in the memo was’ elicited. Neither the questions nor - the memo shown to Willens. made ; oe reference to the source’ s status. as a defector col-_ ‘Laborating with the CIA. (CIA Doc FOIA 739-319, 6/19/ 64). | Classified by derivation: EE WG Sra _ 5 4 ania B
~~ 3 2 ¥ ww eT a ay a a LY 2 ae Classification: —sexxt_SSCRET TAs form ig 9 be ysed for material sxteasted em ClA—centralled documents) -80- Fa system told a Committee staff member that this notation was the symbol for the CIA component known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. IN a CIA memorandum dated September 27, 1978, the CIA has adopted the position that debriefing Report No. 40 is a duplication of the original Langosch memorandum of May 5, 1964, J concerning AMMUG's knowledge of Lee Harvey ater? ao rer ) OnedS, s possible contact With the D@r.* | Nevertheless, + | Ae. Go fe ince a Lp lie Bote We ees reer Peorietirs Kuper 8 ‘ee e et @ ad hte ‘« Hele in awed a Loe has questioned aS SARAH Cremecandiven officers regarding additional information that A-l may have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, when interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does _ = not know what information derived from A-l's de- Bos a briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also Interviews of Hildago & Piccolo) He also stated that he does not. recall that A-1l provided any other information 20. GES) a) Cosa by. derivations. { DD wT Wn y EEF MF SE a ME ;
Glassification: Secret __ GR form is 19 be sss dor materia! extcacted Fem ClA—senirailed sosuments)) -80a- *The CIA memorandum states in part as follows: and considered the possibility that he might have some knowledge of the Oswald case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions to WH (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing AMMUG~1...WH desk records reflect that AMMUG-1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regarding this questionnaire.../B/ecause the debriefing on the Oswald case was handled as a sensitive matter, it was dictated directly to a CI (Counterintelligence) stenographer on 5 May 1964. /Note: A-1 was debriefed on | several subjects on 4 May 64. ‘The procedure was to assign each subject discussed a debriefing number and they were written up in contact report form by the WH case officer. The instructions from CI staff were to handle the Oswald case debriefing very closely and not to keep any copies in WH. Division/. The "Oswald Case" was logged in the WH notebook log as debriefing report number 40, but the report itself was dictated by the WH Case Officer directly to a CI staff stenographer. There would be no reason to include the number 40 on the report of this special debriefing for CI staff, since it was their only debriefing report. We are certain it is the debriefing report (#40) because the date is the same; it is the only debriefing report on Oswald a listed in AMMUG-1 records; and it it (sic) the only AMMUG-1 debriefing report in Oswald's 201 file. When CI Staff learned of AMMUG-1's ‘defection i _ & (CIA Doc., Memorandum for the Record, Regarding AMMUG-1 Debriefing Report on the Oswald Case, 27 September, 1978, p. 1) % eee, elssition ___ SECRET a po0i02 yf 20.083. | | eft Wy Servetion: ——— iN a LE LE LS | t
er , rn a % Sesto Secret & form is te be used for material exacted : roe Cae is Be decuments,) . -~8il- on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that | : set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 4 as discussed herein. (Ibid.) In a further effort to clarify the substance of information that A-1 provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted | to locate A-l. The CIA has also attempted to locate A-1, whose present relationship with the Agency is ambi uous, but has been unable aj to determine his present whereabouts.* The CIA's: inability to locate A-1 has been a source of "Sela. concern to this Committee, particularly in light of his long association with the Agency. ‘Pemmains incomplctt with 6 eyard te Thus, tesus.. merci recs rhot Gis.s* information A-1 may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. However, with the exception of the Calderon episode and on the @ 4, - 4 basis of the CIA's written reocrd, it appears that the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1 . information of investigative significance. A separate question remains, however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the ~ Warren Commission that A-1 was present in the ait 053° | Cesiica By dervaten, —esperk
Elassification: __secret_ This form is te be ysed for matesial satcested em GlA—centratled documents) -8la-. *An April 1978 CIA communication to the FBI regarding A-l states in pertinent part: ; f Since 1971 (A-1) has not been involved in any CIA operation.in Miami or elsewhere. Joseph Norris is the alias of a CIA representativef{who periodically debriefs (A-1) on personalities and methods of the ‘DGI. [There is no other CIA involvement with Rodriguez. (CIA Doc. 0807602, CIA 202417, Vol. 4, A-1l File 201-749651) However, a CIA handwritten index card concerning the Agency status of A-1 states: Informed "Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that (A~1) not receiving any salary, but could bé paid if and when used in an operation. No proeblems tA Doc., Handwritten Note, r° 15 April 1977, contained in Vol. 4 of A-1 file E 201- ~749651) a é @ Glassification: oog19s | | Clessiled &y, creixctien, —cw-Berk _ rN LT 5 LF Sa a a au a HOG2 LO
: -32-  - Classification: SECRET (This form is to be used for material extracted Washing torfronDCt—aantsollechdpcumentel controlled conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious concern | ; for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's status was not disclosed prevented the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-l as it ; ‘concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as: the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility ; ef exercising this option. In light of the establishment of A-l's kona fides, . | ve | -, his) proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, this option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission. ce Ge, wa. ,ackee sor dire The AMLASH Operation Cte be ince ego cone | cr ebicl ° j During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General S issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an. “hy! mri ECRET, Classification: _oosio6 ” Classified by derivation: LY LF
MT a aT MY SF SE SF LF Aa -83- - SECRET *° Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967 pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). Asa result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political. alternative to ‘the Castro. regime, the Agency subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid., pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated _ by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks. (Ibid. pp. 104-106) ‘puring 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against’ Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at castro!'s request the sentence was reduced to e ° twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid.. pp. 107-110). . - In its examination of the AMLASH operation the 1967 IGR concluded that the, CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p. el . = SEM ae Classification: Classified by derivation: 009107 “% a EA. Ga a aS as - oF ; b
— BP AT AP La Le St ke *< - 84 — Classification: S. ECREL (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) The most striking example of the CIA's-direct offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states “it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and ‘giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO. " (Ibid.) The 1967 IGR.offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The 1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMLASH was aS rea . , _ tried in*Havana;press reports. of Cuban knowledge of AMLASH's. association with the CIA were dated from Sh WA ~. “A “A wa, November 1964, approximately one year after President Kennedy' Ss assassination: (Ibid. p. 11l).- SE, NE The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. SR. (SSC, Book.V, pp. 2-7, 67-69) The Chutch Commitage , , concluded: | The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the ‘ean Warren Commision work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. “SE. Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH Classification: SSCs TL, SE. 9108 Classified by derivation: ae h 7 4
4 Classification: __ SECRET, (This form is to be used for material extracted - from ClA—controlled documents.) operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to the CIA; and - unlike. the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for 2 coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of the AMLASH operation. No one investi- gated a connection between the AMLASH operation and President Kennedy's assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro and anti- Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct a thorough investigation of questions of Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement.in the assassination. (Ibid. p. 5). > we! C3 v3 oo one | iw Classification: a ee a ee ee ee a a “GR. UR, 999199 Classified by derivation: _ LT AT LT LF LF LY LF a Le ~ SE. b.
General's Report concerning the subject of CIA sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in -— large part, wag“intendedas a rebuttal of the -~ 86 = Classification: ——SECREI - (This form is to be used: for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) In 1977, the CIA issued a second Inspector Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states: "assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH Operation was not an assassination plot. The Report (of the Church Committee) | | f assigns it (the. AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have ‘during the period preceding the assassina- tion of JFK in order to support the ssc view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2) The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state: It would have served to reinforce the credibility of [the Warren CommissionJ<@ its efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter Xof | norma] avenue of. = id ‘ investigation The r~too,_could. 4 . have. considéred in coeci fi erms- & what most then saw in Seneral terms S a the possibility of Soviet or Cuban ” involvement in the assassination because of the tensions of the time.. It is not enough to be able to point e > SE cael Classification: poo1i0 ; Classified by derivation:
- Classification: SECREL (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) to erroneous criticisms made ‘The Agency should have takehbroader initiatives\then as well. That et emptopess at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had ‘no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (Ibid. p. iy 70 Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA | oe employee in contact with the Warren Commission on oe ¢ a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH operation was relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, ; Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392) In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this : Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed ‘ to be an assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26-27). __ | ; A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. | ; Helms was Offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963 ; was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special-y The Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component Stagi responsible for CIA operations directed against. ¥ the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence a Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, y ERM. Classified by derivation’ D pili Bs
a Oe a a aT a a aT ae Ghassification:; secret (ais form ig tg be used for moveriol extracted fom ChA—centteligd ascuments.) -88- Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1) The Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond FitzGerald and was responsible for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp. 3,-8, 79) Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence f for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban j Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, p. 3). It was 4 -Langosch's recollection that: assassination of President Kennedy was _ characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the ‘ CIA. (Ibid., p. 4) --.the AMLASH operation prior to the { Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH | operation was insecure was available to feyeepivaiece) officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. (Ibid., p. 4) However, the issue before this Committee is GlessificatigA:——ceeree_____ ss: 000112 * ~ | Cassiiess by, teeixatis jon: work b a <P 4 2 <P ae ane a
Grassificatign: Secret __ | (Tis form ig to F: used for material extracted ram, CV—controlled documents.) 335 5 ~88a- *In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee has received from the CIA an affidavit executed by Kent L. Pollock (CIA pseudonym) who “served © as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff...and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed." (CIA Doc., Affidavit of Kent L. Pollock, executed Oct. 5, 1978, p. 1) Mr. Pollock specifically contested Langosch's assertion that the AMLASH operation was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond. FitzGerald, and other senior level CIA officials as an assasSination operation. In pertinent part, Pollock ‘drew the following conclusions: To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald - § considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action activity with the objective of organizing a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat. I heard . Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an “assassiahtion operation." Mr. FitzGerald f stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup d'etat often involves loss of life. (Ibid., par. 3, p. 2) ‘He also stated: Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an “assassiantion operation"; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other : branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially fitted with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH - for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain. /Ibid., par. 4, po. 2/), (Ibid., par. 6, p. 3) , MERU, 5 *, Classification; —seceoe —__ g991i2 4 | Classifeds by, deivetion. —c.—Bexk a A 29 LF LS MS a
, Classification: . Ps aE not simply" cies the, Se Eas" peel ion Was an assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more significant issue, as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether the AMLASH ‘operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission. In the case of the AMLASH Operation this determination is a most difficult matter to resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's operational objectives. - Based upon the presently available evidence it-is the Committee's position that such informa~ tion, if made available to the Warren Commission, might have’ stimulated the Commission" Ss investiga- tive corcern for possible Cuban involvement or complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin | commented before this Committee: ..-when I read...the Church committee's a report--it was an ideal situation for sd them to just pick out any way they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to be met and then either blame the rest of it. on somebody else or not tell any more Or. polish it off. I don't think that NBEO. os | a) po rid ET Classification: o00114 FF Classified by derivation: LaF
_ Classification: (This form is to be used for material: extracted: from ClA—controlled documents.) could have happened back in 1964. I think there would have been a much better chance of getting to ‘the heart of it. rt might have Only revealed that we are involved in it and who approved it and all that. But I think that would ‘have at least come out. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91) The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin that had the AMLASH Operation been disclosed to the Warren Commission, the Commission might have been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture that has s urrounded the AMLASH operation during the past decade. As history now records, the AMLASH Operation remains a footnote to the turbulent relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States. Classification: SECRET | Oo gondis y