1 : A. DEFINITIONS 1. Security informant ! Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor~ mation on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a sutversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in ‘ such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U, S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current infor- i mation of value, . 2. Potential security informant Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to . Bureau. . . "“ 3, Double agent’ ~~~ °° SR rege A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for voth a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance. 4, Confidential source An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position, Examples would be: bankers, telephone wee se oe " “company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations Secretariat,-:and individuals who furnish trash in connection with trash covers. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them, . B, SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS . TInformants should be developed on all organizations and individuals which are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential - informants may be obtained through elertness in the course of normal investi-~ gative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs, For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: 1. Evaluation of a, Complainants in security matters bd. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases C.. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaf- fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard— ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty a. Bureau applicants as possible informants e, Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees £,. Sources of informetion, confidential sources, and contacts on con tinuous basis Review of closed security files on individuals Review of[reservelindex Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, Survey possibilities of trash covers, Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA. . Gonsultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Pa rty members. They, of course, should not be ‘ informed as to the purpose of the inquiry. 8. Review of files on communist front, organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front, Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members, The Progressive Party file alno might prove a fertile field. ‘ SO OB wh MW 55072 Docld: 32969529 | Page 1373 . "\ SECTION 107. . ‘ary INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENT |b SOURCES 1074 ~ B
SECTION 10° SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFT  NTIAL SOURCES 1074 — B A, DEFINITIONS . 1. Security informant ° ‘ Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor- mation on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity . must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings - of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activitic or intelligence activities in the U, 5. on behalf of foreign principa! vhat he is able to obtain and does provide current infor- mation of value, . 2. Potential security informant . . individual in 2 position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S,. on tehal? of forcign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making ; affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be 7 -~ ~T vw 7. in a position actively to obt tain and furnish current information to tek, - Bureau, . . . eee 77"  3.4-- Double agent . Meet ns os . i A specialized t-pe of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receivin: rssignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence s/vice and the Bureau under the Bureauts guidance, 4, Confidential sou sgce An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position, Examples would be: bankers, telephone - company employees, American employees of foreign official establishmenis, --- employees of the United Nations Secretariat, and individuals who furnish trash in connesction with trash covers. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them, a B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals which . are inimical to the internal security, =Experience has shown that potential -dinformants may be obteined through alertness in the course of normal inresti- gative activity. Live informant ceverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs, For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: Z . 1. Evaluation of , , a. Complainants in security matters b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases : c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indicetions of diseaf. fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard- ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty ad, Bureau applicants as possible informants @, Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau . employees f. Sourees of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con. ‘tinuous basis Review of closed security files on individuals Review offreserve]inédex Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, Survey possibilities of trash covers. Review factionalism section of file on Comnunist Party, USA, Consultation with present informants zogane ing indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members They, of course, should not be : informed as to the purpese of the inquiry. . 8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with Only one ox two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members. The Progressive Party file 2iso might prove a fertile field, we SIO OFA aw 3 7-15-60 _NWE55072 Docld: 32989525 Page i374
SECTION 107. SECURITY INFORMANTS[AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES J LU7A — B n “YA, DEFINITIONS - oo Lo . es 1. Security informant Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor— mation on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected, Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U, 8. on behalf of foreign principal. that he is able to obdtain and does provide current infor mation.of value, 2. Potential security informant Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espicnage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be 7 in a position actively to obteia and furnish current information to sO Bureau, -- coos , . - [3. Double agent , i A specials zed type of security informant; a person who is cooperating § with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign t intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureauts guidance. 4, Confidential source [ An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position, Examples would be; bankers, telephone To. . company employees, American employees of forsign official establishments, [ employees of the United Nations Secretariat, and individuals who furnish C . trash in connection with trash covers, These individuals make no { concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish C information readily available to them, ] Informante should be developed on ail organizations and individuals which are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investi- gative activity. live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: 1. Rvaluation or + a, Complainants in security matters b, Persons interviewed in connection with security cases . c, Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaf-— fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard— ship, or other repudiation of party Loyalty d. Bureau applicants as possible informants . e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau - - employees f.° Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con tinuous basis ‘ ‘ 2. Review of closed security files on individuals. 3. Review of scomnaunist index . 4, .Ascertain possivilities of reactivating former confidential informants, 5, Survey possibilities of trash covers. , , 6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA, 7. Consultation with vresent informants regerding indications of disaffection - ‘con the part of Communist Party members, They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry. . , 8, Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuais whe have been associated with only.one or two fronts or who attended only 1a few meetings of a front, Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, vet they have a basas ror cultivating the acquaintance of party members. The Progressive Party file also might prove a fertile field. | i | SOURCES OF POTENTIAL [SECURITY] INFORMANTS Ww 55072 Docld: 32989529 “Page 2375 ¢ wl
107B — C SECTION 107. CURT 'yY INFORMANTS ARD CONFID# /4u SOURCES 9, Investigation of commonist petition signers who are acquainted with Communiss Party functionaries . ; 10. Be alert to reecive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed 7 , personne), who are reliable and friendly to the Bureav concerning members : of subversive orgenizations who might cooperate with the Burean or omploy- ees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making aveil-- able the services of an employee who already is an.informant of the mena ge— nent. A. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of . communist—-dominated wniens who retain their membership merely to hold their positions, 7 . 12. With regarva to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should sugpfest to the potential informant that he contact the Burean rather than have an Agent originate the contact, 13, After the Bureau has notified tke armed forces of a comaunist in an indus— trial plant having axmed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dise , missel or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers Iriondly to the Bureav somatimes suggest that the person advise the Burceau of his past activities. Be alert to tak advantage of such cooperation when offered, 14, Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individ- uals merely registered but never became active 15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform. ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Rurcau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact. 16, Officizis ani employees of foreign establishments in the U,. S. 17. kEmployces of the United Nations Secretariat . : 18, Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. 8, 19, Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interes % to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau, (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.) [C. [INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMEWT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONST DERED FOR INFORMANE PURPOSES] When a decision is mats. to consider a particular individual for informant purposes, backgrouné ‘ivestigation must be conducted. [Extensive background investigation shoulé -at be conducted, however, until the individual hes been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, ..! section 105K, ite.a 6b, (10), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. F- -tround investi-‘stion shouldloonsist ‘of the following: . 1. Check of field office files for derogatory init :zmation ; 2. Discreet canvass of Logical informants to ascertain if thefindividual ] is known tol[them] . 3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individ- uel's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, prescnt and past employments, and business connections. Background iuvestigation must [ definitely establish that thelindividuallean be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. [ Securing background information from thelindividuallis not sufficient if [his]background must be established by the investigation, [including disercet { inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.] 4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for _ F sess Boome Mes Kane Boe seen Bee Boone Be oe} the completion of an FD~9 form which should be transmitted t2 -t2 Identi- [ fication Divisic. to obtainfany]record [he may have.] - . 5. Armed services v-sord should be reviewed if the individual i, veteran, 6. Check draft stasus or status in the armed forces reserve. 7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained.. . . ‘ a 4 -10-13-65 Nw 55072 Docld: 325939529 Page i376 Aaa HAS Aa NNO cbed rae