SECRE® Security Information ¢ 3). The best cover is afforded by covert. penstration of friendly systems, {a Western European nation ‘talking back to » USSRe (@teo, a8 discussed in’ 2ode above): (4) Commercial broadeasting cover * presents some » poasie bilities | ‘in the free world but none for broadcasting to. the fovict Orbite De Bases re (1) - Becauge governments object to providing bases for aggressive psychological “warfare which they do not influence or controls it ig difficult to find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the Orbit. Furthermore y: ‘adequate breadeasting facilities take time to plan, Waild, and staff and long tenure is therefore important Howes: _ ever, the political Climate of a country can change: abruptly, with | . posulting. uncertainty as to length of tenure. . Munich, for. instance, | which once furnished-an exeellent base for a variety of broadcasts — . targeted t to the Orbit, appears: to be becoming less and less gatiafactory. . . Cover and control problems are ‘closely related to this. A base for a secure -and competently managed operation should be. less difficult. to obtain than for a loosely organized Once “ay Seaborne transmitters offer mech in mobility uty. ‘antenna ‘Limitations reatrict their effective powers As in the case of the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are required for maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problem becomes: the same as for land transmitter bases, and.costs in investment. and maintennance Bre. considerably higher. than land. based operations» Moreover, the- difficulties of providing credible cover for a covert seaborne operation . are ‘manifest. While this office will. contime to study VOA experience in this fields it. sees no prospect ‘of any agency use for ite — (3) The TOA, presently controls numerous broadcasting ‘bases and are: ‘developing additional baseas. in areas of the world ” _guitabdle for our purposes. The necessary agreements with host: sountries have. already been negotiateds MOWER, housing, transporta= tion and. other. Logistics. have been provided.. The present: manage=" : ment of VOA are sympathetic to sharing these bases with | CIAs In addition to the saving in costs. this. would furnish us secure. areas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems. HW 450955 If the difficult but not. insurmountable preblem of cover canbe resolved, § such, locations: would be | Adel ‘for: our: PUFPOBESe - so “Information Support, nn?) To supplement available normal news | sources, oo brosdeasting t to Orbit countries: is: dependent for: program. material — upon intelligence | -5- SECRET: Docld: 32424022 Page 9 ; - “
HW 450955 SECRET Security Information upon intelligence reports, interrogation of ‘efectors, escapees and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular fiow of intercepts from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to eredible, intere esting, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast potential resources and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is far from adequate, rarely timely, and umniecessarily costly. FBID, VoOA, and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the same or similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the same exiles for Pw information, whereas a single interrogator, trained in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only for all radio but all other Pu activities better and faster. A cleared consultant, on behalf of ene of our more successful operations, pro= duced on abundance of excellent support information and evaluation data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated, could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt Fi effort targeted to the same area, This complex problem needs a high level decision by State and CIA and the apnointment of a small team of officers — experienced in both PW and interrogation work with power to devise an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resources. do To Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard (1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts raises serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that can be heard above the jamming. Te be sure, some of our broadcasts get through because they are unable similtaneously to jam broadcasts in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast trang~ mission at all hours. For future planning purposes, however, these factors seen clear: {a) Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and on the increase. (b) The degree of their jamming seems to be re= lated to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on their interests. Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through. {c) We have no present capabilities to monitor their jamming if they use--as they probably do in congested areag=- low-powered local jammers. (2) Prudent planning would, therefore, require that any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming. (3) What techniques = & » Doclda: 32427402732 Page 10 SECRE Tt
HW 450955 SECRIT Security Information (3) What techniques are available to meet this require- ment? ; : (s) To deliver a signal of such power as to be neard above the jamming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a Low=powered and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering | unintelligible a signal of substantially higher power from a distant point. The greater the power of our transmitter the more complicated the installation and the more expensive the investment. And the more diffieult becowes the cover and security problems as well as the. political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the ensay is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would therefore be fighting a losing battle if we attempted te "slug it out! on & power basis only. (b) Jamming evasion through the device of vary= ing the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of lay~ ing down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jamming. This — method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient . to overcome the annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination with appropriate programming techniques and the use of two or more frequencies simultaneously this has so far proven | to be the most effective means of jamming avoidance a Such frequency ahiftings cannot be accomplished Within the legal. rules laid down for international broadcasting. These mist. therefore, be “black" broadeasts in the sense that they can be neredibly denied by our Government as well as the goverment of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies produces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This inter’erence, while fully justified in the case of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies, must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friends. : Cur broadeas ts using this technique have so far aveided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very low pover, This Limits us to 2 small part of the total Soviet Orbit ~arget and that only on the reriphery. The same vechniques can be used with higher power and at greater distances from the target. fe-aveid interference with friendly nations' broadcasts the base must be located in an area which, ‘with the proper antenna adjust= ments > permits our signal to "skip® over the territory of friendly countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting ‘bass in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts to the USSR, the facility would have to be engineered so that its signal would not interfere with lecal broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in between. . | {(c} The development of i unconventional broadeasting techniques for DocTd: 32424022 Page 14 SECRET
S-E-C-R-EP. Security Information techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting services might well enable us to overcome the handicaps imposed by — the jamming of our conventional broadcasts to the Soviet orbit and _ seize the cold war initiative in the radio sphere It is | a field which has. been neglected thus far. , , - > Sone possibilities in this area are described in the acd Troy” report of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology YoL I, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951. Among them is the "intrusion," or "gide-band injeetion,* ‘technique which was used successfully by the Russians “against Germeny during World War II. It would enable us to intrude our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on. “enemy home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the . ' Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences. over eneny facilities or compel. the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda broadcasts to Western Burope to the advantage of our friends. The: ‘troy report observes as to the technique itself: 4 ; This would be an effective and annoying technique which would be extremely difficult to counter." Utilization of. this technique appears to. be within our. “capabilities at the moment. It has been field tested - and is ready for use ag soon’as the necessary technical adaptations ean be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being 7 explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office. . Another unconventdonal technique being devel- oped by an agency_consultant and now almost ready for field testing ‘4s the so-called | | This operates on the theory that Other unconventional 1 means of carrying the | . cold war to the Orbit by means of clandestine radic might. be cap- able of invention and development, and the scientific and practical potentialities in this: Field should be explored to the utmost. This office is convinced that emphasis must be placed wore and more on umconventional radio broadcasting tech- . niques if the cold war of the air waves is not to become more one- HW 50955 sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly devel- eped and utilized, those. techniques already perfected or in the pro- cess of perfection and those which might be invented might even be : . the means of a: Docld:327474022 Page 12 SE-C-R-E-T