iS Sa ee A 8 Belitsky was an agent of the Department of Disinformation. Miss Brady. Within the KGB? ihe) Mr. Angleton. Within the KGB. | ' Miss Brady. Was that the first allegation you had of a | +e serious Soviet penetration by the KGB? | | P Mr. Angleton. From whom? I am afraid I don't understand wes ~ m a time, I don't know how many years, they were in fact running a | zg ‘y |) your question: : | r a | Miss Brady. Was that the first information you had had ' a | : 7 either through your own intelligence or through any other : : tg Soviet defector of a possible serious Soviet penetration? | S g 7 Mr. Angleton. We had had hundreds of them, allegations. | = yo $ 2 _ Miss Brady. How would you characterize this allegation - z 13 by Nosenko. Was it more serious? Was it more substantive? . @ ; ta Mr. Angleton. The facts were, ‘to explain this -- it is : : = a complex case, as you will find out all of these cases are, ; 1s | they cannot be simply explained in a few words -~ Belitsky | = 7 was a person connected with the media in the Soviet Union who | - 3 7 traveled extensively in the West and who had in fact attempted 2 a in our view to be recruited by another allied intelligence | g 20 | service. Eventually he fell into the hands of the CIA or the | —- 7: Soviet Division who believed that they had made a-firm recruit- SSS | ment of this individual and therefore, for a great period of 3 | | i c+ | him as an agent. z } He would travel to and from Moscow to the West. Therefore, HW 50955 Docld: 327763411 Page 14
from that point of view, to have it declared that their ho | case officers whose names were given accurately by Nosenko, wene in contact with a control agent of the KGB, particularly 3 the Department of Disinformation, they regarded that as an ta enormous discovery. But when we got that trace and began to ces analyze it we found the following: | _ Miss Brady, Excuse me. When you say we are you refer- a | ring to Counterintelligence? 3 Mr. Angleton. I am talking about Counterintelligence. to | i . . We found that the Foreign Service, whose favor Belitsky | | had curried at one time, had put him under surveillance and 4 i a number of other things while he was in their capitol. They . | : came to the conclusion that he was in fact what we would call coat dragging, he was trying to be recruited. Therefore, n they wouldn't have anything to do with him on the grounds qao Pet STRENT, SU, REPORTERS BUTLDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 2002% (202) 554-2345 17 Second, we had information -~ I will put it another way | . 14 ye when we had "X" in'a safe house there was some kind of | . | enees made into his personal papers and we found, not the | 20 | Counterintelligence but either the Office of Security or the . 31 | Soviet Division found, on some notes that he had made eee 37. apparently he was jotting down things to talk about -- and on /\ 22! not startling news becasue here was, number one, a Foreign A zs | that had any analyst gone to Belitsky and so on that this was | | | i i i l | | | | | | } i | | | | | | 14 that he was a suspected plant. -So that was found in the files. if i that he had the name Belitsky; in other words, the files showed '
10 i Service two or three years prior to that having given us a nw full report on Belitsky as a suspected provocateur. At the same time, we had in our possesion information | i | i | { from "X" that Blitsky was a plant. tan $a H ‘ i Miss Brady. Based on that information, what conclusions | | were you able to draw from Nosenko in terms of his giving this | information as a startling revelation? | : Mr. Angleton. We drew no conclusions. I gave you only us ij | | > | one piece of information that I can recall. It stands out | | because he also gave, I believe, the alias of Belitsky. | | Now, I would like to have seen the telegrams that came in at that period because when he had met our people there, Bagley j | | and whoever it was, he had made the statement that he would only give them three or four pieces of information in return i | | | | . | for about $200 or so, and that was. a one time affair. That | I i ' was his original approach; and he needed that money in order i i | | "| to make up for a deficit of what he had been using in drinking. So, he gave other pieces of information, which may come t ! | . : : 19 back to my memory, but at the moment, as I recall, they were | | ! \ i Fan peu STRERT, S.H, REPORTERS BUTEDING, WASHTHGTON, D.C, 20024 (202) 554-2445 39 | not the most startling in the world. Nevertheless, that is not 41 the basic point. The basic point was that the information £27 x i which I have just described on Belitsky would have made an ; enormous impact on someone in Bagley's position if he was wy 4 unaware of the file checks. © Miss Brady. .You have mentioned the testimony of John
3 il Hart. I take it therefore you are familiar with the transcript ab \ 4 | of that testimony? . . | | Mr. Angleton. I am indeed. Miss Brady. Are you also familiar with Mr. Hart's alle- ae gations or assertions that at the time of Nosenko's first : 7 interviews in Geneva, in an effort to sooth himself and calm | 3 5 ; himself he had been drinking heavily and admitted later to: | z a | case officers he was drunk in the earlier interrgation? ! ; | Mr. Angleton. I am familiar with it and I regard it = o as part and parcel of the Hart myth. a i : 1 Miss Brady. What other information do you have on that | = oo $ | bearing on what the condition of Hart was at the time of the | first interviews? Mr. Angleton. I happen to know that there was some drinking being done. My own feeling is that the CIA people REPORTERS BUELDING, were doing as much, if not more, drinking than Nosenko. i ir Miss Brady. — Were there ever any reports, telegrams or : . - | E 3 other type of information from those persons interviewing : 2 | him. that he was in fact drunk. : : oo Mr. Angleton. There may have been some description, : —_ — a oprational description, that he had been in some bars or | SS something of that sort. There may have been. You see, I have. to say to you that for many years, after I left the Agency, I have not left Counterintelligence. So, I see my friends and iwe still go over a lot of the same points and so on because we wey daa Oa ae ee AG oe cme ee am ~ Pataki ti tihd ALQESSON REFORTING COMPAS HW 50955 Doold:32263411 Page 17
12 gence and in the Agency. mw j have this unhappy choice of leadership in the Counterintelli- So that when I make some of these comments they are com-. | ments that may not have been known to me at the time of my ir gan TT STRERT, SoU. REPORTERS AUTLDING, WASHINGTON, D.C, 20024 (202) $54-2345 da activity but which I have learned subsequently. | Miss Brady. Is your lasting impression of Nosenko's first 7 | contact that he was unstable or in any way unable to give accurate information? ro) eo) H Mr. Angleton. If you have been 31 years in Counterintel-, i ‘ a ligence you don't draw any kind of inference at all. Conclu- -—~. sions are the last thing you make based on a one time walk-in who is only asking for $200. There is a certain unreal air, to begin with, that a man a | whose: father was a Minister of the Soviet Union, to whom they | bd | had erected a statue as a hero of the Soviet Union, would have) i | i | 14 degenerated to the point that he-woutd be willing to betray | his country for $200 in exchange for four pieces of informa- 1g | tion. t | In other words, there is an unreal aspeet to that which 41 for several thousands of dollars for one piece of information, : fe7 2 i if he liked to drink and have girlfriends and all that type i mS /* br a "| is illogical because he knows the trade, he could have asked i | of. thing, the thing simply doesn't jibe. | i Miss Brady. What other factors about the circumstancds WwW bse of his contact would you say had an air of unreality? ae as ey Lo, Se Ay fas “aa t bee wy es MIRSON REPORTING ComPany fA HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 168
13 Mr. Angleton. Because he alleged to be from the Second ey ' i | Chief Directorate and the primary concerns of the Second Chief | Directorate of the KGB are domestic, the same as the FBI. i i ; Therefore, if he was going to be in Geneva it was illogical be 7 : 2 : | up to a certain extent’ because there is what is called the 2 5 | "SK" or the security part of the First Chief Directorate, CIA , ” - S 5 | part, who would normally be occupying that position. ! z a Miss Brady. At that time was Nosenko challenged or = 74 ~ : | questioned about any of these circumstances about his contact? = / Mr. Angleton. I think in all honesty that Pete Bagley ! : r : was so taken up by the Belitsky and other leads, other | 2 1 | information imparted, that his basic concern was to break down, — 2 1 : this man or at least to induce this man to remain in contact : 8 E a | with a view to. future recruitment; therefore not to get three 7 = 5 | or four pieces of information but to get a lot of information | = 3 | z 1 and to offer him all kinds of inducements so that there would | = Gs be a permanent relationship. | z 7 But in this sense it stood to wason that if a man was ! : 1g | prepared to sell himself for $300 or $200 or whatnot, that you : | would have leverage over him in the ultimate if you desired ! a a | to use such leverage, that he would have no options but to work : Z=9 x | for you. : a 4 a 33 Miss Brady. Was Bagley the case officer assigned to | ai Nosenko at that time? | i a Mr. Angleton. He was stationed in Switzerland and he was: +h “2 4 “ae Fea if Wa le Sa hee a : “ om mite. F LLOEESON REPORTING COMPANY. . BW 50955 Bocld:322763411 Page i9
14 | a good Soviet expert. Miss Brady. Within the Soviet Division? re Mr. Angleton. I don't know whether he depended directly ’ ro | . . on them or whehher he dependhd on the Western European Divi+..| : 5 sion, but he knew several languages and had studied in Geneva 5 7 and was a part of our mission. S 7! - ‘Miss Brady. Was any of the information or lead provided F 2 | by Nosenko at that time given to another source to evaluate? “Oo ; | Mr. Angleton. Twill put it’ this way. When Pete came : ” back, I permitted him to read hundreds and hundreds of pages : . of transcript from "X", | 2 a | Miss Brady. | At this time could we identify "Xx" for the : 4 record? | | @ : a | Mr Angleton. Anatole Golitzen. I can't give you dates. 7 | or anything but he was absolutely shocked when he read this z 7 information.. = . Miss Brady. What was the basis for his surprise or shock? E sa | Mr. Angleton: Because he was unaware of it. Now, I = | . , a » | san add, we have one missing point here. Before he came < o back I had sent a long telegram, a questionnaire, to Geneva, a A | ; 7 for which I drew heavily upon "X's" information, because, to £29 77) use a word I sort of invented in the business and I don't like . & to have folks around know where it came from but I al-ays io) Les 4, believed in using "litmus paper", in other words, having a > rn fact not known, that the other side does not know we know. wa doa apres ALUSSSON RESORTING COM PARTY HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 20
BW 50955 3 : i 4 4 1 wt i F oS z 3 ™ i i i a ua oy a if a » | = oS 7 | — = i “ aii CS “wo = ™ ' it . * rs 7 ° i] = i | S i 2 s ty a | < => 34 | & z ; =z 14 _ Hy = | 2 ota} = = -) = 13k > u “ i ~ ; A V7 * i is 13 | = i “ i = 19 ~ ' H = 40°43 = 4 a1} SS oe ws. . Mas 22 u Pee i oN 4 43} aw 4 a, il ae | i i ae i ad i | i 4 4 4 Docld:322763411 Page 21 ‘thing. | the following names" There was no explanation. "Will you So that in the course of elicitation that thing is exposed to an individual and he is unaware of the fact that we do know the whole story, say, on that particular matter. Now, if he is in a position where he had had access and knows that and withholds it from you, it is an indicator, because, after all, a defection is-a.change of allegiance. Further than that, a person who defects has to transfer his sense of security and everyting to the other people. He has | 1 ' to tell you about penetrations in your organization and all of, . : | he could be assassinated by somebody within your own organiza- the troubles of your organization in his own defense because ' tion. Therefore, it is in his self interest to expose every- | | So that this was’a very long telegram, which I again have; not seen since practically that day, you might say, in which I spent many hours pulling together those questions for them to submit to Nosenko. To this day I don't know whether those | questions were submitted. I can't recall them. I mean, ee whether he left before they got the telegram or not, I don't | know. . But I did not tell them that ttecame from "X", as I recall. It only simply stated as a follow-up in his position, as Second Chief Directorate "will you please take up take this up. Have you ever heard of this? Have you ever BaP ths fw Ska LLOSZSON SSZORTING COMPANY
16-17 hard of that." And so on. | I can't recall,there may have been responses in all of 2 3 || that. In my time frame it is all telescoped down to Pete's ; return. So, to. go back to your question as to whether this | 4> 2 : | was taken up with any other source, hte logical thought that ~ ; : & 5 occurred to me was that since Golitzen was the first defector S 5 | who had ever given us in any department had the order of | F a battle of the Second Chief Directorate, that he would be the ! . | logical man to turn to for evaluation. ! . : | This was put up to Mr. Helms and Mr. Helms -~ the deci-~ ! So H t : nl Sion was that he would nev er wish to disclose the name or | = eo $ : circimstances or the fact that we had been approached at that | : 2 | given time and moment by this defector. So we resorted to : Oo 5 4 another device, and we took a page out of the chapter of the : 1g operation in which for some months, if not years, a member of wale | 16 the Eastern Bloc intelligence communicated. to:us: through: an> | t aot i Embassy anonymously, and therefore we took the information, - | bo Z 13 basic information, thhat was given by Nosenko and we disguised. = : it as though it was an anonymous letter sent. to us, and we “ . . q ¢ 29 showed that anonymous letter to Golitzin, who read the infor- | 4; | mation and who stated this is disinformation, this is a provo-! aI cation. Miss: Brady....What:was Golitzin's status with the Agency at that time? nO? bse Mr. Angleton. His status with the Agency was a defector AS AM P= QoPgad Tid Ges af it oe seanoy en ny ONE BLOEZASON SEBORTING COMPSMS HW 50955 BDocld:32263411 Page 22 2
Hv v fo & Ey a Vey, F who had supplied several thousands of pages of very hard core 4 information which had resulted in perhaps the most major 3 counterespionage cases in this country, I mean in the whole 4 | Western world. | 2 3 | Miss Brady. At the time of Golitzin's defection, did he , a] give any indication of what he expected the KGB reaction to S " be. to his defection? ~ al Mr. Angleton. “Exactly. He said that when he defected 3 | ~~ i mean at some given stage, and again I can't tell you the : 1d exact dates on this ~- let me put it this way: He defected 2 7 in Helsinki. We sent him on to Sweden and put him on an air- Z 12 | plane with his wife and child: with a view of a direct flight Z 13 | to the United States. Either through bad weather or for = i : 2 ta | reasons I do not know’his plane was diverted to Germany. He E 13 | had warned | ] that there was a penetration of, 5. U, s 1 | | the Agency. | Miss Brady. Was he able to identify it any more than 2 13 that? ia | — = I9. Mr. Angleton. No, he just said "you have to be very é 20 | careful how you treat my information because there is a pene-~ ve. 7! | tration." ~e/ ni Now,| in my view committed a terrible SOS545 error in giving a very brief, excitable summary of the infor- a4 | mation disclosed by Golitzin which he was able to derive in WD fe that short period of time. He included this allegation of nia! ‘eo asm a Wd 30M REBORTING COMPANY Docld:322763411 Page 23 18 t y
D.C. 20024 (202) S5N~23N5 oD = a ou ian rrr) nw a REPORTERS BUTLDING, WASIPTNCTON, Su, oa “Oo 390 Tu STRERT, a em) Ve ay EEGs fy : ‘But that was not done and it was paragraph 7 in the cable that, penetration wheras anyone more mature would know that you do not send that type of information through a cable where dozens of copies are going to be made and disseminated to various Gesks. It is the type of thing that you would have almost | traveled home with the agent and reported to the Director. | | had this statement that the source states we must be extremely} careful and he is fearful because there is a penetration in the Agency. So, that. was 11 that he told our man. He gave hima warning in order for him to be careful and how he handled * whatever he did send back about him. As I recall, Golitzin was supposed to have met a delega- tion coming in from Moscow at the airport at the time we were putting him on the plane and sending him on to Stockholm, so. we knew the alarm world be immediate. So, when the plane was diverted -~ and I. might also add that I don't think his wife and child had ever flown before or anything but they were terribly ill, and I don't think she knew anything about the defection until about the last minute, and she had relatives behind in the Soviet Union, so there were a lot of emotional problems -- so when the plane was diverted to Germany his. suspicions were immediately that something was up and therefore he began to fear for himself, because this was not in accordance with the understanding. It was supposed to | ied Me eae | Ths lem Ee] jon it ‘ WER SOM REZSORTING COMPSAY Boclda: 32763411 Page 24
© se nd msl wa ‘2 - 5 * “a is fls ¢ vay ws 6 - on . & 7 Sone a a = a oS ™ sooOF a - [¢ 3 = 1] “ es 4 ad 4 - Pad ba oy = = 13 = = tg. . an \7 g i8 a = 9 ~ e S 29 HW 50955 Docld: 2 toe be Wea 26 be a direct flight to the United States. Therefore, when he arrived in Germany he did what he i would not have done under other circumstance. He warned our t : . about the penetration had operated in G@rmany. Since the people in Germany that the agent to which he was referring person was a Russian speaker and of Russian origin, in fact him in contact or use as a handle: that very man who could | born in Russia, it would be logical that the Agency would put | assassinate him since he was one of the number one Russian | experts. Not knowing this at all, he had all the suspicions in the | world of that diversion. So, it entailed his disclosing to us or to the German station a great deal of information regarding | that agent. ath, B.. 7 ALOERSON 32263411 Page 25 i 1 1 I i i ‘ { 1 1 | ij i } { { { i t i | I st i i t i i
is fols msl thal Gra te Ga ee 9 21 i Miss Brady. Did he indentify the agent? [Te ) { | | i t Mr. Angleton. Only by cryptonym. uA FRANCE | 9 vey eeyprooym 3 | Miss Brady. What was the cryptonym. Jep. of } ne ‘ Mr. Angleton. Sasha, S~a-s-h-a. ng on ' = 5 | Miss Brady. Was the agency able through that cryptonym Jct 5 1784 | . . a | to actually identify that person? a. 4 , . & 7 Mr. Angleton. Eventually. I will go into that if you : He - = “| would like. ; os in] G7 | Miss Brady. All right. a H | | = 0 Mr. Angleton. First I want to get him back to the United = n | Statea. He is stranded here in Germany. | a | = T20 So, he arrived with his family and was put up in a safe- -« be | = i = 2 | House. In the meantime the very night that some of these . = 4 | cables came in, the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division was | S ea is Mr. Howard Osborn, later our Director of Security, and he came! ~ S| rushing to my home with the telegram that had arrived at night, an | as I recall, therefore he got in touch with me. We spent some, z 8 time discussing it with a view of implications and.all those = aa things you want to have in mind before the opening of business: Ss 2 next day. | i 7 pena Wo I will now digress on Sasha. Under the charter or under | ASE | weN “7 4 the regulations of the Agency all matters dealing with CIA : i : wl a7 | og ae ag | personnel are strictly jurisdictional matters of the Director | ~ | of Security. In other words, the security investigations of | ““ 4 personnel, their securitv files as distinguished from personnel aT PeeyT | Rp an Take | ALDESSON RESORTING COMPANY WW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 26
3.3 2 eo sg) Gh rors 207% (2072) Sh4-24nS wb B.C, VASUTNG TON , ia n aay REPORTERS BULLDENG, o. we —" ~ ta ana 7TH STRERT, S. a HW 50955 Bocld: Ls-2 . Set he Ae) Game 29 files, the polygraph, the investigations of applicants, the periodic reexamination of personnel, the periodic repoly- graphing of personnel, allegations regarding personnel, | employees, et cetera, axe strictly within the sole jurisdic- | tion of the Director of Security. That also includes physical installations and so on. a | . 7 So that they would be obviously the first party to whom| one would turn with an allegation regarding penetration and they would have under all circumstances the right of direct contact, with the source because they alone would ha ve the files from which they could analyze gathered information for interroga- tion and followup, et cetera, description or any small item of information that might lead to identification. Now Golitzen's story basically was this that he had been on the-Emigre Desk in the First Chief Directorate of Soviet Intelligence and the file of this agent; ~éasha, haa been transferred at a given time, I think it was 1951 or theres abouts, had been transferred to the American Department and | that he had a chance to look at that file and they knew that the individual's name ended in “insky" or something of that sort, and that agent had come back into Russia at one stage while in Germany to see his parents. , | Miss Brady. What do you mean by coming back? Mr. Angleton. That. means that unbeknownst to anybody, say, he might have walked down a street in Berlin, walked
in a house, out the back entrance, changed clothes, identity, | hed disguise or what not, been put ona plane, flown there, and then (we) | i | t that he spent a week in Moscow. In other words, he had a cover be 20028 (202) $5u-~2345 oe] aap | | | { ; ' redeposited in West Berlin, and no one would ever have known | story that he was on vacation or sick and so on. It means any kind of covered travel, covert travel. So that the Security Office interrogated him at tre- (Ra i mendous length. We were privy to much of this information. ae) Therefore, it was the duty of the Security Office to delve into all personnel files and all security files of all employees, puzzle because there were enough indicators. They came..up | | | | l past and present, to try to come up with somebody who fit the | with the name of an individual, and they were fairly certain cHat | : { they had made an identification because he had asked them | "Give me all the names of the personnel whose names end in REPORTERS BUTLDING, WASHTHGTON, Boe, JM, | | ~ | Vingky" and I will go through all those names and it may strike | me," because after all 10 years had passed since he had seen i 3 4 H one department to another. But this told us something. This = i that file. He had seen it illegally as it was transferred from i ~ | , = | ” told us that if we had been really sharp that while the man ! . : was on the Emigre Desk, his file was on the Emigre Desk, he was an agent in the emigration movement, but when his file 2 tb was transferred to the American Desk, then it means that his status must have changed, which in fact had happened. The. actual Sasha had worked as a penetration agent of Russian QEPes wie J cea] ALDESSON REPORTING COMPANY HW 50955 BDocld: 32263411 Page 26
a NE TER ee 4 24 emigre groups. During the course of that employment sought out the CIA and gave the CIA information betraying the emigre a. groups and built himself up with the CIA people in Germany to be | \ | | a point where they recruited him as an agent. { = 3 So he ceased to be a man working on emigres and he was ar) : transferred to the American Department. That coincides pre- § - = { | & 7 cisely with the career of Sash when he is finally identified. - I - 2  #%} But this terrible blunder was made that they omitted from this | ~ i | H : go F list real Sasha. = ns Miss Brady. How was that possible? | mid Mr. Angleton. You would have to ask the Office of g\ ., | | | | ~ ‘2 | Security. 2 4 5 ig | So.-they go down there, and of all the names he says, | = od "This is the closest that I can come to it," and it so navvenel®™ c = ; = 13 | that the person that he pointed out was a person who had been in - S| OSS and who did have relatives in Russia and who had changed | = i oo i= “ 2 his name but his original family name did end in "“insky." This = . = an was true because among the information that "xX" had given us, | = | he had taken actual documents out of the embassy in Helsinki, | ¢ | | | = * ll soviet documents, we had a very sophisticated research and ©» ! ; { a1 . i ‘ a: 1 ; 7 Hi Ss development program of an electronic device by which we could ! ae re wd “= | shoot a beam against a windowpane - and turn the windowpane. into a receiver so you: could listen to conversations within ith a room. There was a communication from Moscow to Helsinki i i and it appeared to be a general communication to all stations Ee i BW 30955 DBocld:32263411 Page 29
rs 5 25 a i and it stated "beware of this kind of CIA~FRBI gadget." | 2 Then it went on even to describe that so many had been Ge i ordered by the FBI and so man y by the CIA and so on and so on.! Now this was not the kind of thing that a desk officer -< 3 |7 mean this was not giving away anything other than it showed 2 6 | that they knew in fact about one of the most secret things | 5 7 ve had. So it did not lead you anywhere by having that docu- | S z | ment. But the man who was wrongly suspected was the secretary | a A i a 2 lof our technical production board of which I was the oldest | : 12 | menber, who therefore sat in as the secretary in all our | z 1) | meetings in which all the sophisticated research and develop- | = ‘| : i 3 2 | ment was discussed. If you looked at it with this mistaken | ee : 12 | "insky" business, he conformed to a "T" with an individual | 2 - 3. 12 | who could have supplied that basic information embodied in Pa . - is | that document taken out by "xX." | = te Miss Brady. How long from the time of the first "insky" ° "7 | information by Golitzen was it until you resolved which person z 1g you were actually talking about? : a = -| Mr. Angleton. ‘It took a very long time because finally | 5 2 | they cameup with the "insky." We had some very curious things | ae the "insky."” Number one, he has been described and : f a -~ | downplayed by everybody as only being "a contract agent." If | | 7 ithere is anything that has disgusted me throughout my career } : i | it has been from the time of the Colby period up to the present, with a brief respite during the time of Director Burke, who Bad ALDESSON REPORTING COMPAMY HW 30955 DBocld:32263411 Page 30
it think was really putting the Agency, after all the travails and so on, back on course. I mean he had gained the respect B | | 8 a of foreign intelligence chiefs. He had sensitivity to what 208% €202) S54-2945 intelligence was about, the personnel. He was making strikes a dss trying to bring back some luster to CIA after the Church Com- ~~ | | mittee. But nothing has disgusted me as it has from the Colby | period all the way on through in what I regard as destroying qs a profession. } | | { i | { { ; \ F . . ‘ we | This present director gives me no confidence whatsoever | t i | | { | I | t oe) t { rt i iG We. both in terms of his firing of employees, the falsity of the justification, putting out that they had to get rid of people because we had overrecruited during Vietnam was the official statement, things of this sort. There is no truth to these 2 matters. We did not recruit during Vietnam. Every component | of the Agency had to supply Xx percentage of their own personnel REPORTERS BUEEDING, GASHTMGTON, 0.C. > S.4,. my people for tours of duty. It was compulsory. So that ; i } i i to be directed to Vietnam. I had to give up X percentage of : | | : | | everyone went through this agony of taking people with families , and what not and deciding which man you were going to choose 300 7TH STREET, a Hi i i ' i i | 1 | | | to send to vietnam. | Ana we had troubles, the Agency had troubles because you had all kinds of hardship problems come up. You had all kinds of things and at one stage the jdea was that if a person did theagency, — and that was regarded as too harsh and:so on. ft _ yaad q ALDERSON REPORTING COMFAAY ) | not go when he was told, that then he would be separated from. i i HW 50955 Bocld:is2?263411 Page Fi
7 ter Sa by De & | was a very dre-dful period. So that these ‘so-called alle- gations on the firing and so on are just simply not true. n> | While I am on the firings, I might also state that any | ead 4 of us who regard ourselves as professionals knew many of the men 3 i Z 5 : who were fired. But Turner didn't know any of them then. song r . of the finest men were fired. This goes back because Colby 7 5 7 : had salted the place with his personnel os that they remained | o 3 on a long time after his departure in very prominent positions ; 3 | such as the head of the Clandestine Service, the Deputy Head : 2 19 | of the Clandestine Service, and so on and even into the Bush | : i period. po ¢ 2 Hart was one of Colby's men from the Far East Division. ! : | : 12 I was astonished to read the statement that he was supposed - | & s ha to be an expert because Hart's first job that I think he 7 af } | é 1g ever had in the Agency was under me as a very junior employee = “ 7 Miss Brady. I know you want to go into some detail --- | : | Mr.. Angleton. ZIuam saying my strong views on the kinds : 13 of distortions and self delusions that have gone on when it’. | S came to the identification in fact of the true Sasha, of | 41 | txying to brush him off as a minor contract employee when in fact in Germany he was in the most influential positions of recruiting agents that we would gent into the Soviet Union. In other words, we would sent 10 people from Berlin but all | of those people were identified by Sasha to the Soviets and : ALQESSON waits Bo aw HW 50955 DocId:32263411 Page 32
28 all of them were put under control. So that the rot set in. @ 2 | In other words, from a esponage point of view the moment | i | do that the opposition knows one of your agents who is in contact be with another, and then unbeknownst, it is not long in a police de state before identification of the entire net is ascertained. Being Russian, he worked in a very influential position in the ~~ | | actual operations that had to do with penetration, I mean ash with recruitment of Soviets for the.purpose of espionage in 5 a | io) Soviet Union. se) @ ae; a a pn ee pe Miss Brady. When roughly was Sasha identified as the son that Golitzen mentioned? te Mr. Angleton. I can't he precise on this but I would say around:'63, "64. [It became more and more -~ we found, gna ary STREME, SoH. REPORTERS BUTLDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) $5%-2545 l { i for example, that shortly after Golitzen's telegram that was | i ate given wide dissemination| to the effect that there was a penetration, we found a letter, which may have been pre= dated, of Sash writing a letter denouncing a member of the | Soviet Division as a Soviet agent, and this man's nickname | was Sasha.. ; | Miss Brady. The man being: denounced by Sashanhad:a- nickname Sasha? \ f | ) i wa 3 4 Mr. Angleton. His name was Alexander and the nickname eo “6 , of Alexander is Sasha. i u a ff eg oi an j j “| In all of his duties while he was in Germany Sasha's superior was the man he denounced. He stated that if the. j eu Ae Fceinad 2: a a ide j HW 30955 DBocld: 32263411 Page 33
eet Bos kb et 9 29 Agency did not do anything about Sasha that he would go to the | | | ‘> * | Attorney General. It was not too long after that he resigned | | from the Agency. oe Miss Brady. Which, the superior or the --- Mr, Angleton. The real Sasha. In other words, the man he was denounced, but in all of his dealings with him in Ger- C202) S$5%-~23N5 rs) au ‘ { 7 | many as subordinate never referred to him as Sasha. he refer- red to him as Alexander or by his last name. | 2002% he So that is a very important point in‘terms of either, one, the Soviets notifying him that in their damage report they | aa knew that Golitzen had seen the file on him, which was | | entitled "Sasha," and the question then is, which we don't know | | | REPORTERS BKHUEELRING, WASHINGTON, 2. C. 8 13 because he has never been broken, as to why it is that we have hoo , | him denouncing a man whose nickname is Sash, known to everybody | H f as Sasha? _e | : | ise Bray. Wws there ever any evidence that the superior * 74 named Sasha had in fact been an agent of theSoviet? | 2 | Mr. Angleton. No, but the sort of man that had been so ‘ a = 7 much dealing in this kind of affairs, knew so many Soviets and zou! was so exposed to to speak, and served in the field so long | i . in Germany and all that, that it was not beyond the realm of have been diverted to him, being tied up for months and months believing that he was the person to whom Golitzen | | =- imagination wren you had such an allegation, that one might ; i 1 i ' was referring. | i HW 50955 DBoclad: 32263411 Page 34
New Sina Set LE ow 10 30 Now let me explain to you that Golitzen stated what the Soviet reaction to his defection would be because this is very 3 important to us to have a member of that organization describe to us, what we had to watch out for, and therefore since he nh 202% (27027) S5u~23N5 in knew the inner workings of the organization because he had served at a time when other people had “defected," he had been ™) to the Briths and the British had a Soviet agent ~ penetration | axe i i ve) i | i ; . : on the Far East Desk when a Soviet officer was going to defect | | | | in their organization who informed the KGB and this was a man who was going to defect in Japan and from KGB or "GRU," it | i | / may have been the military intelligence, he was going to defect to the British. | | ae | The British officials in the field cabled London about | 1: ; | { i this would-be defector he was going to meet and all that and none co’ iiy | other than George Blake was the recipient of that telegram. He REPORTERS BHUPEDING, GASHTNGTON, D.C. fy went to his Soviet control and the Soviets kidnapped this indi+ | | | | | . aia East Desk handling that case, So we are dealing with an “ 7 vidual and brought him back to Russianand Golitzen was on the | : , ! a | = 9 expert therefore on what you do when you have defectors, | ec _ | ' bt | So, Golitzen told us that the first stage would be that | everything would be dropped to do a damage report, namely he was 16 years in KGB, he had many jobs, it would be laborious, they would have to go through all the materials that he could possibly have had access to. Now it is not as difficult for KGB to make a damage ALDERSCN REFORTING COMBGNY HW 50955 DBocld:32263411 Page 35
oc or 57 A - isl-1l 31 report as it would be in the United States Government. Miss Brady. Why is that? dad Mr. Angleton. Because the controls over information t ! de and the controls on access and all of that are so rigorous | | | | | | 3 : and time in, and so on and files do not float around and they z | that if a man saw a file there have to be signatures, and time i i ; a g 7 | don't use Xerox machines, and I can go on and on. | \ é 7 Compartmentation is the key to their security. Therefore, . : san making the damage report their first concern would be to exq- Z 9 | tect agents and to get at those matters where they knew that he 2 7 knew names of people where we could react immediately. They ! A ; : ! z 2 | woue anes know from the damage report there were things that | & Z 13 would take us a long time to arrive at. If you only have a | = ; = Is | czyptonym and one or two events how are you going to make any | 13 | Rdentigication? Do you see what I mean? = i = 7 Whereas if you have the name, address and telephone | a 7 | number of the agent, they can almost write him off as being : : | burned. So that would be number one. That would be the 7 “ E | en report, | = 20 | Then that damage report would go to two places. It would comet! | go to the 13th Department, which would be the Department of | | Execution or Wet Affairs, assassination, and it would go the & 2 3 : Department of Disinformation, the Department of Disinformation ® ' i H i 4 | | | being concerned with strategic deception --- 233 Miss Brady. Excuse me, before Golitzen's defection had SEORE bs fa aie Vex, | J : y = 7 N RESCRTING COMPaRY ' HY 50955 DBocld: 322763411 Page 36 . 3 G
12 32 i ‘ | the Agency independently decided or learned that there was a | . \ o> 2 | Department of Disinformation? Was there corroboration of the | bh } . 3 | existence of that? Mr. Angleton. We knew of Soviet deception for years but 3 | | = i we did not know the magnitude of its elevation to a Directorat = . | a 4 i in May of 1959. In other words, from the beginning we knew : HI Si | a | from the days of Dzerzhinsky and Lenin, Dzerzhinsky who was | He - * . S 7 the head of Cheka, we knew that deception played a. most prom- | a 74 inent role in Soviet covert activity. We knew that all through the war. And we knew it through our double agent handling other words, no one can run a double agent, you don't run 4 | | and we knew it through literally thousands of cases. In t | double agents unless you also resort to deception, and bb. deception is integral to that because you are not going to ada give away all your real stuff. You give away false stuff to REPORTERS ‘RUELDENG , MASHTHGTON, to ai achieve your objectives. . aU, & When I come in to describing the. background of Sasha, with the FBI on that since they were brought fully into it. . E i = '€ | then I think you will see more of what I mean by way of sophis-+ Ed 9 i tication by the Soviets and why this thing to try to shuffle | = #9 | him off as a contract agent is ridiculous. poe tht But going back to Sasha again, we held many meetings AOS ae | | Pe 34 i a | Since it was dealing with a Soviet agent in a sense they have concurrent jurisdiction. Miss Brady. Were they brought into it as soon as the
is-13 | | 33 Golitzen allegation had become well known? Mr. Angleton. Yes. i) | Miss Brady. What position did they take on the possible | | programs? * | penetration? ! 5 : | Mr. Angleton. For a long time they went into it. We | 7 | naa many meetings. We had meetings with the Bureau, FBI, nen g 7 pms of the Counterintelligence and Security Office on this | S | matter. We had to our satisfaction identified the real sasha. | oo i u 3 | they sent us a letter in which they said that we were wrong | . ik : : io | an our identification and therefore they proposed that we. | : 1 | send all our information to the Defense Department so that they = | eoue logk into it and see if the individual did not fit some- : © a iz: body in Defense. That is a matter of record. \ | , = rs | It shows exactly that the FBI at that time, for whatever | le was worth, that with all the same information, with all | 3 is | those facts, et cetera, et cetera, they perceived that this was = H “ 7 | not the right identification and the information should be z 13 | transferred to the Pentagon. ; a = 3 Miss Brady. Did Sasha touch any of their operations or | a 40 . Mr. Angleton. Off the. .top of my head I can't say because: “one would have to go over a damage report of the real Sasha, 10f all of the things that he would have had access to, of all lof his friends that. would talk about their cases which would “impinge on the intelligence community. Since he did not confess, ALQOSSON REPORTING COMPANY HW 50955 DocId:32263411 Page 38 :
HW 450955 20024 (202) 554-2345 D.C. WASHTHGTON , REPORFERS BUTEDING, AU, 5 390 77U STRELT, EE? = It first appeared in Time Magazine. The New York Times t . 22 brought up this entire matter, It is very important because a8 , Igor, to establish his bona fides told the FBI and the Office as o | of Security that Shadrin was their agent, that we must not do | ‘ ST tie i td Sine 7 : ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY Doclda: 32263411 Page 39 . i asd tan ~~ aha “oe 4 4.3 hee _ on LD woe ERS 14 34 the FBI in my view were not simply sophisticated enough to handle the Sasha case. They went over and interviewed him directly. Then he went and disappeared. He was seen emerging | from the Soviet Embassy and then they challenged him, "Why were you in the Soviet Embassy?" He said, "Well, you are asking me all these personal details about my mother and father and all this, so I went in there to find out about them." But later on, and this is very important, we had this agent Rgor, who has been referred to in the press, who was responsible for the Shadrin case, the kidnapping of the person in Vienna. The Counterintelligence Staff took the firm position, unequiv- ocally, that Igor was a plant. That was our 100 percent position. Both the FBI and the Office of Security took opposite positions. They are the | } ! ones who took Shadrin -- his real name was Artamanov, and took; him to » Vienna where he was kidnapped. This is where you have! all the stories ~~ I have newspaper clippings of the Nicholas Horrocks! article which is the most detailed leak that I know of in the government by way of accuracy and so forth. I only ask why anyone would leak that because if he had been a true agent of the Agency he was killed by that article.
15 °° anything to hurt him because he was anidealist, not a mercenary and he threatened us that if we did anything about + |; ~ ij Sasha, the Central -Committee had already approved a plan of i i | { | great retaliation, propagandawise and so on against the Agency | } | i z = | and the country. 2 é Miss Brady. Was that the reason for the inaction in the FS 7 Sasha case, that he was merely allowed to resign? S : Mr. Angleton. Oh, no. This is after he had already Cc, “Ob resigned. D, He went on to say that they had 29 volumes of Sasha's reports to them while working for us and all this material } . was the-ammunition that would bé used in the event that Sasha | i was hurt. n Now, the reason I explain this to you is that having ise represented for 31 years probably the most distinguished FTOU | —_———" of loyal people that I have ever known and the most hard working Ss. REPORTERS BUTLIING, WASHINGTON, aa oe | i x people, to have the Agency send as a representative of the Agency an individual of Hart's character and inexpertise befor that Committee to take up a case of this magnitude and to listen to the committee people talk about the Chamber of Horros of 300 7TH STRECT, , _ Poss a) i t i | ¢ i i Se ! i i i i | the Agency was redolent of the Church Committee, totally ' adversary, reviving the*past, and it raises very grave questions ge questions in a way that the American people have been horn- t i j | | about the integrity of your committee and it raises those i 4 ‘| i | swoggled. ‘| ea yon | Ma he ‘an ALDESSON REZSOCRTING COMPaNY HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 40
16 36 i> & In other words, you can't set the clock back. You a have unleashed something here that is going to go very far, one, in destroying the climate of defection from the Soviet Union of other defectors who will have access to that testimony, who | i i f ' | | t | a are on the American Desk. There was no pre-conference held in the Agency by anyone bringing in epople who worked for 31 years in the 202% (202) S5n-240§ ca “a counterintelligence field. Mr. Hart never interviewed <= he 1 interviewed me once and villated our agreement. I volunteered! to appear before him and I asked that there be a recording . —" br could be an accurate record and I could go over the transcript. i I had one interview with Mr. Hart and I was never called again, | | i machine and I asked that there be a transcript so that there | i . i { | | { Miss Brady. Mr. Angleton, I understand fully your position ‘ i i on it, REPORTERS BUTLDING, GASHTINCTON, ALC. in Mr. Angleton. But I want to be very clear on this becaude = i E would not be going into any of these details necessarily with Sia | = pe if it were not for the fact that Mr. Hart opened up a. = | great number of doors which you can't close. e I ! Miss Brady. I agree fully with that. Within the scope | a of the questions I want you to go into depth and explain it. | If we go off in this --- 3 a Mr. Angleton.. I don't want anyone to read the transcript and wonder why I am going into these details on Sasha, Colby, the FBI and all these others matters | with a committee investigating Patalts te ae cers 7 2 ae? 49h ag ALDERSON REFORTING COMPaAnyY HW 350955 Docld:32263411 Page 41
HY 4 3 et - - = EN oe] 7 N . t nm . wt fo] am a , = a 7 co a 2 fond Se ad fo] . 3 a 7 Ge . tA > a S ad So... Pa 7 % mT = “3 < . t fe ot = Raed af a tg — = vo 43 a Se fx 12 Pe lw 2 _ oe me —" _ Os 5.4, os BAG THU STRENT, Q Ponietad 0955 aa atl Bocld: 17 37 4 wo i ; the assassination of JFK, when it is only relevant in terms of | | the actions of your committee. | Miss Brady. I understand that. : Mr. Angleton. Therefore, we have to go in paralle. sinc : the door is opened I find it my responsibility in terms of the | integrity of the counterintelligence and in terms of the national interest that I close some of these doors and put it : into perspective one way or the other. | | Miss Brady. So that context stays clear, too, if I can continue to ask questions I think we will get out all the / information you want. . Mr. Angleton. I am trying to make it coherent though in! i | terms that these sidetracks and diversions are also influenced | al “| | by the Hart testimony. Miss Brady. That is fine. Bringing us back to the Nosenko case, was the Sasha i | ‘| allegation being investigated at the time of Nosenko's either i. | | first contact or at the time of his actual defection?. Mr. Angleton. Yes. — . ot a | Miss Brady, Did he give information on the allegation or possible penetration? Mr. Angleton.’ To my recollection his statement was that | Miss Brady. Was he interrogated specifically about the | they had never been successful in making recruitment. | Sasha allegation? | Mea ay
18 Snot Som Sf A en 38 ° i Mr. Angleton. Let me point out here again by way of ; © 4 explanation that the Counterintelligence Staff had no juris- diction whatsoever over Nosenko. Nobody in the Counter- fe | intelligence Staff ever interviewed him or saw him. The dos Counterintelligence Staff never signed up nor was every con- sulted on any of the administrative setups. We didn't know Ou projects and so on. So that when you are asking me this thing 20024 (202) 554-2345  o) : t 7 | anything about his salary and all that type of thing or the > { ° | it is all hearsay or things I can remember from reports that O., were submitted to us by people in other components, so to TON, ei a & speak, who were dealing with hi-m. I am not saying for the moment that we got all the reports and transcriptions and so on. I am just simply stating that they got into another gon 7ru STREET, So. REPORTERS BUELDING, GASETH Sasha which led to the identification of an army officer who | had been recruited in Germany, and he said that this was Sasha; ' | | That was an operation continued by the Office of security! | in the Bureau for a long period of time. I think it erenoraca \ . i 1g | in the end,. I can't remember any of the details. I can : remember that he stated how he was trying to recruit somebody | t 20 and how recruitment of Americans was impossible. I mean | 3 1 page after page after page of their lack of successes on recruit \ ! BSar way i ment of Americans. . & 3 3 Miss Brady. Was his information about a possible pene- t ‘ . ! © a2 3 a | x | tration just of no substantive value or aid it actually detract | | from the information that Golitzen had given about Sasha? : " st Vere i Of Wie | i ALGERSON SSPORTINS, comeany HW 50955 Docld:322963411 Page 43. °
19 39 Mr. Angleton. Totally detracted from what Golitzen had to say. In fact, the two pieces of information cited by Hart, one, about the foreign agent in the west, all of that had been | 4 i ' H | \ 4 Golitzen. The microphone business was all from Golitzen. I | | E 3 | sent a memorandum to the State Department in June 1962 allerting * 4 them to the microphone in the embassy. | = 7 Miss Brady. Was that based on information that Golitzen 3 | had provided? | | c | Mr. Angleton, That is right. Also, if I recall correctly, = | j = ae Nosenko said we were to look into one part of the embassy and : | not in the other part. They were found where he said we were | a = | aot supposed to look. | 1 2 13 | Miss Brady. Was there any contact with Nosenko from the | , : 7 time of his first contact in '62 --- : : is | Mr. Angleton. No. ! = 7 Miss Brady --- by the Agency? ! Mr. Angleton. No. Miss Brady. Was that normal? | Mr, Angleton, Yes, because he said that he would not | report from the Soviet Union because of the total police contral j and controls which they had in Russia. Therefore, he would i not risk his life in trying to communicate and we should not | try to communicate with him. Miss Brady. Whom did he contact finally when he made the — " actual defection in '64 and where did the contact take place? ee AR Er : nt. bet | 4 : The? tows ta) ER Se i ALOESSCN REPORTING CoMPasLY HW 50955 Bocld:32263411 Page 44 “
20 40 | Mr. Angleton. He had some kind of contact of notifying our i ' ij t ‘ H people. I don't know the details of it. Immediately a member | of the Soviet Division or a person who was taking over the | + | sovtes Division and others went there and got him and brought i g :| him to Germany. . ! 3 ‘| Miss Brady. What reason did he give in 1964 for being 7 5 ‘ willing to defect when earlier he had only wanted money? | & 7 Mr. Angleton. I think he gave ideological reaons. F $l Miss Brady. . Were they accepted as credible at that time? | | 10 | Mr. Angleton: I can't really say. I will put it this way. HI | I can't really answer you honestly without telling you that there was another case that occurred after he went and left j us. Two American tourists were walking down the street in Moscow. A man came up and handed to them a batch of documents | ' This batch of documents was documents of the.Second Chief REPORTERS BUTLDING, WASH NGTOH » 3 aU, 3 “0 ’ j « | Directorate, files from the “Second Chief Directorate, which | . | is there FBI, internal memoranda of their operations against |e It explained how we lost certain agents, Penkofsky, for example, brought them to the Embassy. The Ambassador was not there O1 } il Jan Tt STKERT, ES ga an} Set / But the Charge d'affaires feared that this was a Soviet prov- |! | | | The American Ambassador was not there. The tourists j i . : | acotion and insisted that the documents be returned to the : | Soviet Government, the Foreign Office. We photographed the e @€ i documents before they were returned. Obviously the very HW 50955 Docld: 32963411 Page 45
21 41 giving back of those: documents were permit the Soviet Govern- { ment to identify beyond a shadow of a doubt the individual } who gave those documents, whether he was genuine or not genuine. be rr The individual concerned was a man named Cherepanov and i wa - % , 2 | Cherepanov was a man known previously to us in Yugoslavia 1 i j) at the time when Philby was in the British intelligence and wh ~ | 4 og - : = 7 | had offered his services to the British and to ourselves and was = 4 z ~ i regarded as a provocateur. o "| He returned to the Soviet Union. Knowing Philby, and I- co i know him very well personally, Philby had also given away to grade defector named Volkov contacted the British authorities. and promised to give them the identities of X number of Ooviet : an) é. ' | { | the Soviets a very high grade defector in Turkey. A very high | | i | j { agents in the British Government in return for X number of British pounds. The _telegram-and communications of Volkov REPORTERS RUTEDING, WASHINGTON, aa came to Philby. He went to his Soviet control. Volkov was 2 | kidnapped immediately by the Soviets. That was the end of = 13 | . | = > || yolkov. . 7a) | , i = 7 ; = So, we had a similar situation that when Cherepanov made | 2 ; ' - jms overtures to the British, Philby was in the British i an . a= i Intelligence Service, he was a Soviet expert, and Cherepanov | ends up many, many, many years later being in the Second Chief Directorate with alleged access to the most sensitive infor- | ie matton which is the internal documents and how they picked up Penkovsky. CMPARY HW 350955 DBocld:322763411 Page 46 ;
22 42 Nosenko's story was that he personally engaged in the search and running down of Cherepanov at the Turkish frontier cas re er a nee et ne meee te a me OL A 3 and that he had been captured and executed, 4 We began to get this same plavback, through other sources 3 3 i of the Cherepanov story. An illegal, for example -- if you : 7 know what an illegal is ~~ an illegal agent of the Soviets who | S Z had been in touch with us for a long time made a trip back to | S 7 Moscow. He said that he went to the house of a General for | : ? | dinner and they vere discussing the Cherepanov case and how : 19 | Cherepanov was tracked down at the border and arrested and exes = : 2 nl cuted. Now it is inconceivable tht an illegal who is really at | the notton of the totem pole in terms of the hierarchial | | eS 2 12 matters, would be dining with a Soviet general who would | : | reveal to him the Cherepanov case, because the world of the | : 1s | t1legal is something so divorved from the internal parts of the z | Bureaucracy or headquarters, if you see what I mean, and yet | = i a i7 | Rere all of thise confirmations of Nosenko started popping out | 5 3 | of the walls from all kinds of sources who are not in the | a | , i : > | position to know. | e | This characterizes a great deal of things said by Nosenko | { : vee Oh | which were confirmed by Soviet agents of the FBI or CIA. The : sis i ag 3 s =~ , orchestration began immediately. Were were inundated with i . Lo . s . , confirmations, even of stories which he later denied, even of eo ! | stories which he later denied. In other words, where he said, i i ce oe | ("I was wrong, there was no recall telegram," et cetera, et ‘| ' 1 7 SEONE SZISON REPORTING cou 2 XR HY 50955 Docld:32763411 Page a7 }
23 43 cetera, but the others had already said that he had been sent A eI ee | | i a recall telegram. Miss Brady. 43 Were these confirmations of his story happening ge between the time of his contact and his defection or later? | 2 7 Mr. Angleton. Later after he defected. | 3 | Miss Brady. Were you able to get any other independent | S | information about Nosenko between 1962 and 1964 about who ne’ was z , | Where he had served, what his background was? ; 7 Mr. Angleton. Obviously we knew a great deal about his | : 1 | father. We have have: had one or two sources, I can't give : 1 |you the time spent, whether it was between defections or not 2 1 | of people who go to school with him. We had a case in Turkey | g 19 |ehat came up that some lady's husband had been in the same clas 5 1 lox things of that sort. .T can't recall whether it was before | : |p lor after the defection. | E 7 Miss Brady. I am going to need to take a-short break if : = it can for just a minute. : : a Mr. Angleton. Surety. | : : al (A Brief recess was taken. ) oo | : a Miss nrady. During the recess, Mr. Angleton, you referred | 1 ke an article you wanted to make part of the record. Will. | J a9 2 you do so at this time. Mr. Angleton. Yes. i I had a telephone call yesterday from | 34 a friend who subscribes to the London Economist and who read i a3 out the following statement from the foreign news section, which | : ALMSSSON RES SORTING COMBARY HY 50955 DBocld: 322763411 Page 46
as sae hp Ae id 24 44 | | i | is a special blue bulletin, dated 27 September 1978. The subtitle is "Nosenko footnote." bd Paragraph one. "Mr. James Angleton, the former Chief de 97) on 22 September to the House Subcommittee that is investigating S54 -2 aN § { | j { | of Counterintelligence, CIA, was due to testify for six hours | the Kennedy assassination. (See last weeks foreign report.) H - | i , | tali "| "He pulled out for the time being on the grounds that, (a)i,- i . | } aaa he needed time to review the testi-mony of John Hart, who had Cc. 20024 (202) a>. | made damaging allegations about the handling of the suspected | defector Yuri Nosenko, and, (b), he wanted his lawyer upon (sic) classified information." had time to try to analyze it in terms of dates and so on. But I had a telephone call frm the reporter from the wilmington " Delaware paper whose. name is Joe Trento, who has written a REPORTERS BUTLDING, VASHTNGTON, D o | - I simply don't know how this was acquired. I haven't t | | series of sensational réports about moles in the CIA, including JM, e 200 viru STRERT, 5 | ‘| mysets as a mole and others, and who purports to have agents ; “i4 }in the CIA and who purports that a former colleague of mine, : xara Cram, who I understand has been called back in service write the history of the counterintelligence, is actually |) working on this question of moles. Treto also wrote an articla in "Penthouse" together with a colleague named Roman for the : | August issue which deals with RGB penetration through the unitea | Nations, The article on the whole is totally apocryphal in | terms of allegations attributed to me, I mean statements aS ak Da en CSP ey 4 i ALSESSON REPORTING COMPANY HW 50955 Bocld:is22763411 Page 49 2
bd $. aa OB we Jon vr STREET, So REPORTERS RUTEDING, HASHTHGTOR , D.C. 20074 (202) 554-2905 9, \ é it ef bd $3 a4 $3 ay . ray HW 50955 BDocld: 322763411 Bage 450 tad bm i OS Mee Y . _is-25 45 ; attributed to me regarding that | I was shown a draft of this article by one William Cor- | \ | | es listed as the Washington representative of Penthouse maga- james He has also written a book, which is in the public | | domain, on the Office of Strategic Services, OSS. He is an | author of that book. I can't recall its title. ' I received this telephone call at the Army-Navy Club | iin which Trento stated that the Agency had put my head in a ‘ | basket by producing John Hart and whether I had any comments i i to make. Tt said no. Then he went on to make a statement that immediately. | I told him that my lunch was getting cold and that I had iguests, et cetera, and "no, thank you." Wow I don't know whether he said anything or not but it has been my experience his sole purpose, that he sayd, "I have great admiration for i ) that when he has called me to give me information, which is ' | i you and therefore I want to inform you of the following," and , the gives me a lot of things and whether I say "ho" or "hum) ‘j — _ gtanes i SR OHE: ALQERSON Me etoat NG COMPANY i | 1 son, a colonel, several weeks before its publication, William | I Corson is a former Marine colonel who purporst to have excellen Senators and including the Director of the CIA and others. Hej | | Nosenko was going to sue the CIA, that he mentioned names, whic |i did not catch at all, the operation I think he mentioned was | | Meadowlark and he insisted that he and Corson wanted to see me tc | i contacts with the Senate and House intelligence people, includin | creed 3 en ee an g
The con te Ae I : 26 . 46 He has a long quotation from me out of whole cloth, and I only heard a fragment on ghe radio last night about the ed ab Wilmington, Delaware newspaper, something of this sort and I | didn't hear it, I lost it. It must be on the Paisley case. But . : 5 he alleges to have informants in the committee. ! = ! , - ‘| I will say that I have a tape recording of 20 or 30 min- ' = | ® "| utes of Joe Trento, this man Roman, and the editor of Penthous¢, 3 there way up in New York, and myself down below, denouncing | J Z their going ahead with that article, since Corson had been | 3 | put on notice that this was all false, I mean that the whole | : i. thing was full of fabrications. I think they are unaware of : : ‘2 the fact that I made that tape recording, I know they are | & : 3 unware of it, in which they apologized to me and they offered | | : ‘4 me all the space I want in any forthcoming issue, et cetera, | s eo et cetera. 2 ' ; . I : Is When I threatned that I would take legal action they | “ 7 announced that three million copies had already gone through i E 7 | 5 a the printers, et cetera. When I pointed out to them that it 7 : he = "| creates a lie, in other words, that we must never lie regarding S . KGB because it.:destroys the climate of defection, it means that goss a the Soviet on the American Desk who reads all of that then | oR a says, "Well, they are just as bad as we are, so therefore i \ there is no inducement to come over," and it is a tremendous | disservice, because they had such allegations as the fact that: Department Five staffs the United Nations. Well, Department Five ALSSSSON REFORTING COMPaKY WW 50955 Bocla:327763411 Page 51
is=-27 47 is the new name that the Western Counterintelligence have learned to be the old Department 13 of Assassinations and g.2 Sabotage. $e In other words, the whole thing is a complete hysterical 6.8 . oem on eee ties es met | 5 a piece of spies in the United Nations. So you have the ; | editor of Penthouse pleading with me that he thought he was, | 5 7 | doing me a great favor, that their whole purpose had been to t S : | batance out all the adverse media business against CIA, by prin- ‘ ; | ting something against KGB and citing me as discovering agents : | Anside the Agency and all this kind of thing. | : I only put this out because of Trento's call to me | z 2 | regarding the Hart testimony and also the fact of what his | is iF 8 = ‘3 sources stated and so on. | : 7 There is much more than I can recall because I was standing = i e sup with waiters on both sides and a great deal of noise and I | : | was extremely irritated by the abruptness with which he stated | 2 | that Corson wanted to see me immediately, et cetera, et cetera. Pd H ' z 3 He does mention real names of people within the CIA. In other | : 7 |woras, what I. am saying is whether he had sources or not I : | ! 5S * [esmes Say or whet her he is an innocent being manipulated by a dissident elements'in the Agency and so on, or retirees, I : fae == ;do not know. : § I might add that Mr. Helms gets the brunt of this because | i i ‘keeps calling him every time these Trento articles come out i a | . abieel ‘ 5 pe 4 Aa tv hs Soa ALDSRSON ee NG COMPANY BY 50955 Bocld: 322763411 Page 52
ed is ae oO rye) C, 2N02% €202) $5%-2345 a ~ fant = oS Fad a a pe = wy * = ° aS mm rd a ee ad = may pe oy at fon - a 2 pn = = = ut x = a >= ~ Cc = ro) a a / 4 13 it u \ E i t i ‘ ' iF , think it was inthe first meeting with Nosenko that Bagley came | 28 . 48 in which he is mentioned as a mole and investigations by the Agency about that and so on. Miss Brady, Let us turn again to the Nosenko matter, if we can. Are you able to describe or characterize the Agency's attitude toward Nosenko when he actually defected in 1974? Mr. Angleton. Yes. I can't characterize it at that time. I think it was regarded generally as a great coup. Miss Brady. Did you share that view? Mr. Angleton. I regarded it as a very interesting development. Miss Brady. Referring again to Hart's testimony, he | ' : mentioned I believe that the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Branch | gave great weight and significance to the case whereas you just felt either that it was not that significant or that there | were great doubts. Is that accurate? | Mr. Angleton. He quotes me as stating that whenBagley_ | came over that he had "a great efficiency" or words. to that effect, Now my recollection is, and this is where I would have to go back to the files, that I don't recall whether Bagley came over after the first meeting with Nosenko -- I over. I would have to know which one it was, whether it was the first meeting or the second meeting in which I displayed to. him, exhibited to him, the transcript of Golitzen. But when he (NG COMPAS P 4 9 wi if u G 2 at) tg : O ves 0) 4 Z a a o HW 50955 Bocld:32263411 Page 53
iy) . | read those he was thunderstruck.-. In other words, what T am. ! y <> 2 | trying to say is that I did not influence him one way or the | bob $e other. I just simply pointed out these are the things to | read, He spent three days and nights in my office, outter aay office, reading and taking notes of the interviews with Golitzen that had taken place many, many months before. ~ Os carried the information that Nosenko had defected in Geneva “ee and that Tsarapsin, the head of the Soviet Delegation, had { { I | | I can tell you this, the moment that the news broadcast { | | i denounced the Swiss Government for being in collusion with terrorist powers and had kidnapped hin and what not, that we were, many of us, including foreigners, in conference with Golitzen in another building. 300 TR GYRERE, S.. REPORTERS BUTLDING, WASHINGTON, D.C, 202% C202) S5u-23N5 Immediately that Golitzen heard of the defection of t | | | : | Nosenko, he immediately said "that has to be the source of | 7 that letter you showed me." It so happened that McCone, as ‘7 | ~ recall, was in that building. It was not our normal building it . i ‘é | in McClean. It was a building that we had in. town. If I } an i qo = i 3 recall correctly, he want-d to see Mr. McCone immediately. 2 As.I recall I took him into see Mr. McCone. It was a building! | i -erme ‘| | where Mr. McCone would use those offices where he was going to ONS TF eT an “ 72 | t6 the White House back and forth, to the Secretary of State, | i i gs / v2 ioe) in town, and very few minutes from the White House, so that + | he would use it every so often, Golitzen made the definite statement that this was in fact the author of all of those . @fanct wall ALDERSON REPORTING COMPARY BW 30955 DBocld: 32263411 Page 34 ?
30 tia WEL 50 : i items that he had seen before and that this was obviously a prov- ocation. «2 | { Miss Brady. Was that the beginning of some of the charac ge terization of Golitzen as paranoid, to use Mr. Hart's term? dee Mr..Angleton. I find that kinf of accusation the kind $5 ~23965 that must have set off the greatest peals of glee in the XGB ne of the many statements of his defection. ahs 20024 (202) Miss Brady. To your knowledge had there been any Ciagnosi vay of Golitzen as paranoid prior to that time? Mr. Angleton. I imagine in the short time that you and I have known one another that you could. write a psychological i prfile of me and I could write one of you. I would say that ae a that is about the kind of imprecission or unprofessionalism of writing a profile on Golitzen by a trained psychiatrist or REPORTERS. BULLDING, YASHTHGTON, DLC. m psychologist. , While we are on it, at some stage I could have gone we, s 4 _& ~ through this thing page by page, which I would like to do, and just simply point out as one went along, but I will take ttup from there, Golitzen was a man who at ‘a very early age had had = =z ad i = 1s ~ o is -, the opportunity, because of a study which he did in training school together with his colleague, one named Kersheyev, had written to the Central Committee, which was permissible in | \ the Soviet system, a critique of Soviet espionage based on their studies, and that critique went to the Central «Committee and as a result of that, gorns through channels and it took. ALSERSON RESORT! NG COMPAAY HW 30955 Docld:32263411 Page 55
So te BTA 31 | «1 several months, it arrived at the highest level, including Stalin, Out of the blue, and he was way down in the south of | * | Russia, he and his colleague were flown to Moscow and met with Es | Stalin. Berea, and all the chiefs of intelligence, because | ' { . i : 7 it had gone through those channels to Stalin and it pointed : F 7 out what the glaring errors were in the modus operandi against | . 7 the United States. So, it wasn't once but it was twice that | ~ o | he saw those personalities... : o z a Second, his great quality was the analytical quality. rn n | other words, where two separate components within the KGB | 2 = 2 | naa different points of view he was brought in many times to aq ce : 6 5 i3 | the analytical side for the superiors in terms of the two points _ = . : is ho view. His mind without question is one of the finest | zg | analytical minds. He is not necessarily an operations officer, = | put he is an analytical type and he is a historian by background. “ 7 I dare anyone to dispute a historical date or tilme, wheter : eae deals with Mamelukes or Byzantine or whatever it may be. | wa : , i = 7 | He is a true. Therefore he is very precise in terms of what | 5 H [ne ota states and he separates the fact from speculation and so on. en So that I don't regard a man who comes from that system as being , paranoid who wishes to impart to ‘the President of the United & i) as States the strategic matters which he derived from documents of the Soviet Government. After all, he knew Stalin, he had access because the Cron: =] ed ibn oe 8k he ALOERSON RESORTING CoMeany HW 50955 BDocld:32263411 Page 56
Sh eel ee how eT ted bea indi SA Ese 32 KGB is the underpinning of the regime. Unlike what happens © 2 | in the Western World you could take many of the senior people ! 3 | in the CIA who do not have the slightest idea of what is going | 4 | on in the State Department or in the National Security Council ‘ i zZ : or in the President's mind. Uhey would not have access to the | 3 3 thinking or the policy in its formation, whereas the KGB .is ie : ’ the underpinning of the regime. who supplies all the <sguards | < 7 to the Krelmin, who have the only intimate knowledge of who is | on J ? | related to whom, which are the best kept secrets in the Soviet | : 0 | Union, have access to the Central kCommittee and have access td 3 He strategy and to plans, because they are an integral part of the policymaking. | In other words, Andropov, thecChairman of State Security, | AU ELPING , a REPORTERS t © is a member of the ruling class. He has been elevated as an equal ' | with Brezhnev and with others so that it is a terrible mistake, t re) | which I think runs through all of Hart and *,through all those | a : | people who have really never dealt in Soviet matters either ! : '@ || historically or casewise. JI can recall no achievement of : z | art's in his entire career that ever came to my. attention of | e = a value whatsoever as a contribution to counterintelligence. | j i ace Miss Brady. At the time Golitzen was assisting in the : | assessment of Nosenko was there any type of assessment in the ae = i i a] as Be tT want to clarify again and take exception to some of the | { | Agency about Golitzen's value to the Agency? | Mr. Angleton. Of course. When you say within the Agency | \ QEPSET ALDERSCN REPORTING COMPAALY HW 509455 BDocld: 322763411 Bage 457
a eo so te Th Se 8 _ is-33 53 niceties of Hart'd delusions that he foisted on your committee.) i He keeps talking about a small group in the CIA. He keeps | ho | talking about the fact that he didn't know about certain things + | the thousands of us that didn't know, if one quotes on. of ! : 7 his things, that were unaware of this or unaware of that or | ra ‘| unaware of the other. Therefore, he jputs it in a prejorative | 5 "| eese, that there were very few people who knew. 5 a | Now. let us give consideration to the people who knew. : | the Director knew. The Deputy Director knew. The head of ! S ; £2 the Clandestine Services knew. The Deputy Director of Clan- VION , destine Services knew. His deputy knew. The Chief of the | i { ] { ry { ~ 4 Soviet Division and all of his selected people, the Chief of tHe Counterintelligence and his selected people, the Chief of the ! Office of Security and his selected people, the FBI and their. | _ ¢) selected people. So that it is not "some kind of cabal that REPORTEENS BHULLDING, HASHTHE rm { | } H was. jealous reasons of its own denying Hart an others" | t t $ ” '7 | "knowledge," because an intelligence service has only one z 3 | defense against penetration and that is compartmentation.: .In = 9 | other words, it is because of compartmentation that we didn't < | 5 | know thousands of things about the Soviets. ee | But because Golitzen had made up his mind to defect many £27 2 years before he actually arrived, he was actually without our knowing an agent in place trying to bring down their compart- mentation, therefore he got himself into vositions which per- mitted him to break down their compartmentation into fields hg OE ORS a I ALEERSON  eESCRTING COMPAR HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 58. 8 ne) a —_ «2
34 54 7 A . i | where they weren't realizing that he was doing this for' the i purpose of acquiring vast knowledge in other fields which were t not his duties, and amongst. those-was attending the higher 4 eas [creates school where visiting KGB people would -_ in to speak and talk about their operations. | Reading all of the KGB training books, knowing how those | t i | | | i training books were -- for example, a case would be given there, | | I t ' 4 | | | | | they would change the name of the locus of the operation, but 2002% (202) Shm-2345 ren) aan 1 e) i he wouldknow and find out the secret that if it was signed by aTOH, B.C. ‘ i ' so and so, released by so and so, that that man was in the western European desk handling Scandinavian matters and there- fore the case as described in the training school did not I | occur in Turkey, as it was so stated in the training lectures, | | But was handled in Scandinavia or in West Berlin, by knowing who | the case officers, et cetera, were who approved that being a REPORTERS BUPLDENG, WASHINGTON ts We & pel .6 4 | | |: | submittea to the training school. : So that compartmentation was in the line of authority of : ia the Director. It was not. something which the CIA staff imposed. = | . : a” was not. something that people without authority imposed. rt é “yee the approved handling of the Directorship and the leader- | . 7 — 11 | ship of the Agency and it is based on the need to know prin- | ciple in which you do not bring people in who have nothing to contribute to the case. It is not a matter of cocktail talk or what not. It is compartmented and it is compartmented | ‘ hopefully in a way that if there is a leak at least you have a: i - gm wag ich et ? Xa, os ye oe i Se oe ee iF ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY HW 50955 Docld:322963411 Page 59 -
Ps ae 35 >5 Cr 1 i bigger list of people you know for your investigative leads. In other words, if Golitzen gave a highly sensitive piece | of information and there was evidence that that information sett : in the hands of the opposition, then we would be in a position = : | to know that these are the X number of people alone who had | “ a 5 | acess to that information as a basis for a leakage or whatever | S 7 ss may be. So that I simply state that when I mentioned earliar x : | aha Hart if a creature of the Colby regime I will go a step # : ) | further and state that in my dealings with Colby and the First | dealings when he took over as the Deputy Director of the Clan- | i i { ' | | destine Service from Mr. Karamessines, who unfortunately i | | ! | 2 passed away a coupde weeks ago and could have been very eloquenit i ! | jon this subject, his statement was that we are now in a new i || period in which you have to open the windows and let the fresh REPORTERS BHUELDTNG, UASHINGTONU a Now that may be all right for a lunatic assylum or sana- “OW | torium to have all that fresh air come in but in the.- iAtelli- = ié |gence business it just does not work. BF | So that throughout Mr. Hart seems to be a person who seems: ~ : , i © e 25 a 4 | | en aggrieved that he was unaware of all of these things; | t : Happening. But this was the real world. It is the real gi . Soviets. i itt was not a world which we created. In other words, we had ithe first major defector | in the West who was Gouzenko who HW 50955 Docld: 32263411 Page 60
36 56 lout with Kim when he’ defected, which lead to the huge atomic iH | espionage going on in Canada and the U.S. He was a code clerk ie | and he had that kind of access. That was the number one magic - opener to Western counterintelligence in the largest sense i of the word. cr. | The second major defector was Petrov who was Chief of the | | KGB in Australia, and his wife who was a code clerk in the cory 2024 C892) 658-2395 | KGB and who had been in many stations. He defected. to the hb | Australian security. He gave abundance of «information. So that, in other words, this is the world that spec- |ialists in counterintelligence live in which is the factual or} RS j|world of what they do. So we are not dealing with Nosenko as some abnormality in the thing. It was simply a part of the continuum which we had seen all the manifestations of during iWorld War II when we were in counterintelligence working REPORTORS BUTLDING, GASUTNCTOH, 2.7, ry WY a i ts | * |against the Germans. We began to bump into the Soviets right i and left working against us. In other words, we did not create a cold war or have a { i i i t |Paranoid attitude about the Soviets. “They taught us. In other: - oo x we = ws — ~ < <= jwords, they did it by kidnapping people, by murdering people, iby shooting down our aircraft as they did over Yugoslvaia and inot giving up the bodies until Truman gave them an ultimatum jand we had the LOth Mountain Division about ready to go in, which [probably would have been a good thing. . hat is when they gave ‘up the Kodies and the aircraft. 4 HW 50955 Bocld: 32263411 Page 61.
ta tian Sb Eck Tes S 37 c 37 | i | In other words, what I am trying to say is that there is an attitude in the Agency that there is no regime and there-. fore the past is the past and we will forget it and we will a | Start fresh again. But you can't undo all the cases of the con } 5 3 2 tinuum of penetration and of everything that has been going on | ! : 3 é from the days of Lenin. These cases keep going on. | & : I will give one example which I think is a very simply-_ | pS a minded one but one that is true and which is illustrative of the problem with Nosenko. Again it is illustrative of the Agency's p. t inability and the Directorship over there to understand what HASUTHCGTON , I intelligence and counterintelligence is all about. . ! i ' Now during the war there emerged a General Turkul. General | | i i ® ‘3 || Turkul had been a White Russian general who after the revolutign - . : | sted, “He worked in many Balkan countries as a mercenary mil~ | 2 S| Stary man. I think.among other things he helped restore King : : i=) 20g to the throne in Bulgaria. He established a residence in : “ 7 | totanbot and he became sort of a magnet for WhiteRussian or | 2 a anti-Soviets. He was I believe in the cavalry and he was very | a | = + mae and what not and he became quite a personality in hig 3 20 | own right. He made contact with the Fascists and with the : SS i regarding the Red Army that he was being paid fantastic sums | of money both by the Italians and the Germans for his intell- ag | conan general staff and gave such high grade information a: a th | | a | gence. Now his cover story or legend -- and keep in mind 3 in {I haven't been on this case for 25 years, so I am just reading ge ee 8G, : Rul im! 7 Bo: i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY “HW 50955 Docld: 32263411 Fage 62
Shas Bae oO She Bsa tye ish cae A 8 3 58 7 ; the highlights of it -- his cover story or his legend was that) i 1 BD he had a network of agents throughout the Red military, througl- ab $e | | out the Red Army, and that the Chieff of the Signal Corps of | the Red Army was his agent and that this network reported bre i | through well-handled cells, well compartmented cells, up to ! | the Chief of the Signal Corps. 7 i | | 7 | So that the head of the Signal Corps, who also ran the school fab for training young WT operators -=- that means wireless telegraph “ed operators in morse code and transmissions for the armed forces | ~~ would give them practice messages which they would transmit, say, from Archangel to the Crimea or what not, but that these were actually encoded messages for which he had the code, and | therefore he wouldn't go and explain anything further about alt ‘ 1 300 Pru STRERT, So. REPORTERS BUTLDOING, WASHINGTON, B.C. 20024 (202) S$54-2345 rs] dy} - rae) $3 Ra this but the fact that he could have the most recent infor- i | mation of troop movements, of internal things going on in the ‘S| Soviet Government and all the rest of it was because of this | | fantastic network that he had and the fact that alone he had | et cetera, and that here all of these hundreds of students, ! ! '8 | the code and that he could receive this information by wir-elegs, | i ! i which is typical, and you have in cryptographic work what : { are called practice messages. “ae { They can be the same groups this way and a thousand @ /A groups this way and a thousand backwards or they can be all ae) eft | kinds of things that are gibberish, in other words. They are \ " also used to confuse anyone who is listening to those messages,
39 7 | 59 But his statement was that these were actually the encoded 2 intelligence reports and the he therefore had the proper sig- to 3 nals and he could intercept all this and he could decode it 4a and this was the intelligence. | i Now he eventually ended up very highly favored by the = ‘| German intelligence and the German general staff during the | = | war. He went to Germany. His information proved extremely z 7 valuable to the Germans because Soviet divisions were destroyed 8 a based on his information on troop movements and all of that. ! E | Had the war gone on another three months or more, he would have : 7 replaced, because what he had been doing was undermining General a * a Blassov who had a tremendous army of Russians working with : ® ae Hitler. | ; : I am not going into speculation that if Hitler had + 3 | treated Blassov as an equal he could have been a major factor 2 a in the Soviet campaigns if he didn't have his whole attitude | “ 7 on race problems and so on. : E a] But Blassov erepresented to the Soviet Government the most a yo z 7 dangerous: single element since the revolution because Stalin : 5 a had made a decree that any captured Soviet officer or enlisted | | i man was a traitor. In other words, he put out that procla- mation that anyone who was captured, who did not fight to the | death, was a traitor. So here you found brave men being captured who were already traitors and Blassov who was an i anti-Bolshevik accumulated really the cream of the prisoners of Fe OePeaT 4 ae wing i i ALDERSON REZSCRTING COMPANY BY 50955 BDocld: 322763411 Page 64
Grae Saw ha , 40 . - =: 60 war and so on who wanted to fight against Russia and against : Bolshevism and they came from all over, the Georgians, from all ; i i 3 los the provinces. So that Western intelligence began to go int! 7 the General Turkul case as to bona fides because there were inter- Es 5 ceptions of messages which are known as the MX-MORUTZ which | ; ‘| were intercepted and they pertained to this whole overall oper g 7 ation. s 7 Now the quéstion on bona fides of General Turkul was split 7S 7 i right down the center. It:split:the Allied intelligence service ph, ne a in terms of whether he was bona fide or not bona fide. We had his German case officer in the Abwehr. We had him VASHTHGTON , in Vienna in a high security prison and on a given day NKVB re NGG, officers who were part of the repatriation commission -- that fEDIN a iy REPORTEIES itu was forceful repatriation of Russians back to Russia ~= came , over in American uniforms and raided that prison trying to it get the case officer and they were caught by a colleague of mine i. i “ee OSS in flagrante. mes Eee “3 i Now that only heightened the whole question of bona fides | ad ta} ’ . : i = fon Turkul.. It was not until 1967 or 1968 that my deputy Rocca | ¢ = | broke the case, the General Turkul case, through General { ; from the NKVD or the OGP™ or the XGB. | Miss Brady. When did Orlov come over? 1 | H ore i Orlov who was the most senior defector that there has ever been le yo i { i 4 i | 1 { 1 | Mr. Angleton, He came in 1934. He defected but he never - i imade his presence known until the death of Stalin in 1953. He | erpert thd CAN bow i F ALOSSSSON ee os oRTNG coueage HW 30955 DBocld:32263411 Page 65
snd fe 4S 2 41 61 | | wrote for nife Magazine a series of articles on the crimes of { i i o} Stalin. He-wrote a letter to Stalin on his defection outlining 3 all of Stalin's crimes and stating that "if you bother me: or | t ¢ ; my relatives or there is any sign of trying to touch me I will | | publish your crimes." He submitted in an attachment all of the Fs 5 | orines and the Soviets never made any effort whatsoever to take S + | setrimotion against him. a He was the head of the NKVD in Spain during the Civil war, When Stalin died the pact was over, the agreement was over, 1 : } i Dp | ‘ | | | and therefore Life magazine I believe paid him $40,000 for three | avd cy . i articles in which he spells out the crimes of Stalin which latdr WASHINGTON , s, is without question one of the most intelligent and most valued us an are incorporated in Khrushchev's secret speech. General Orlov | |men who had never been properly debriefed by the United States i Government. an i i | | REPORTERS BUTLDING, Miss Brady. What was his status in the United States? | t a 6 i gon peu STRELRT, 8.0, aos Mr. Angleton. He had relatives and he just emerged and | then. he was interviewed by the FBI without any human base being lereated which you need with a defector and he broke off with chen. They did not even tap the wealth of information which | ; las at his disposal. It happened in the Huntington case as ‘well, When you go in and try -- in other words, these men i t | , jee on't regard themselves as agents of the country. In other iwords, it is the same as Golitzen has stated on occasions that . | q i"T have left them but whether I have joined you is another 4 A ty t 5 1 ALDESSON REPORTING COMPANY HY 50955 DBocld:322763411 Page 66
§5u~2445 p.C, 20024 (202) WASHTHGTON , REPORTERS BUTEDENG, u. ann 7b STREDT, S. be as a | ve) Cc} a. beg i matter." It is a treatment that is accorded to them and what - 42 62 not. Miss Brady. Wes the Turkul case and the Nosenko case the two most obvious cases that were split “on the bona fides issues? Had other cases been significantly split within the Agency than those two? Mr. Angleton. In the Agency there were practically few people who were involv-d in Turkul unless they were in O8s:. although later on we had people in Germany working still on the Turkul case when we became CIA. The point I am trying to you have to keep in mind this is going back and recreating from the revolution all the way through NKVD, OGPU, all the rest of it, building up machine computerized records of every. single Soviet case from the day of Lenin so that you would have a data base where you understood comprehensively all of the 4 t activities,. organizations, changes in modus operandi and so on, i | i ! In the course of all of this he took up the Turkul matter and Orlov read the critical fact which was that a man by the name of Katz Nelson who was under Dzerzhinsky around 1934 came: i ! i { ! 1 | i H to Paris, I believe tt was Paris, and one of the purposes of | his trip was to meet with Turkul. Now Matz Nelson was the | Deputy Chief of the NKVD. for the Ukraine, a personal friend of Dzerzhinsky and Lenin, He was a cousin to Orlov and he was tHe one who warned Orlov of the forthcoming purges and that ‘
Boyan: oer ag ep Ae oem 43 | . ; | 63 he had better be careful of recall telegrams. There were many attempts by, I think it was Jassov, head of the Service, » bad de { | to try to invite Orlov to come to Belgium and. to go on to a | Soviet ship to have a conference on a very important matter, | | en ~ Cen 5 i et ceter, et cetera. He found in Spain a code clerk who was i 4 $ | loyal to him, told him there was another member in the mission E "ye the NKVD who was there unbeknownst to Orlov and probably fo : 2 | purposes of assassinating him because of the fact that he had -_ a put off any recall to Moscow. a i 3 a His cousin was one of those executed in the 1937 purges. = | s0 that the wealth of information is such that I can say, 4 i | = * ang I understand the agreement that you have, if I understand. ; g & - i | it correctly, with the Agency and the Chairman, that any | | = 1! | security oaths and what not are suspended for the; purpose | = | : S| of this. | Fat if | * | Miss Brady. Yes. | “ P| Mr. Angleton. I just want to repeat it because I am | : 1 | getting into fields that have never been ‘gone into and which in ia | = _ own view are more properly the field of the Senate Intelli- S 6 | gence Committee rather than the Assassination Committee. But | some. | haa anyone patiently worked with Orlov, and I might add in. : | ; | : a yo i this respect that the Agency once contacted him and the i . - a2 || . ‘ ~~ ; relationship fizzled out because of personalities, the Soviet | i | Division tried to have a contact with him and it fizzled out. : : HW 50955 DBocld:32263411 Page 66
an5 das §5u-2305 “a 20024 (202) ane oh Cc, p, UASETHGTON , REPORTERS BUTLDING, uv. ond 2 z= wn =o = o oC or HW 50955 Bocld: ee x ays Tal 4S i 44 64 craft of intelligence that I suggested to him. that he pay a { f tribute to General Orlov's book which is one of the really great books, and Mr. Dulles wrote and we helped him out a lot on the book in different ways -- and Mr. Dulles wrote a fine tribute to General Orlov's book and so on. One day Mr. Dulles called me to tell me that the Orlovs were-in town and that General Orlov had called him to thank hi Dulles was no longer Director or anything. He asked me whethe I would come to the dinner. I said, "No, I am not the man for that. I would like to send Rocca." $0 that is how Rocca met him and handled hilm up to his death. He recreated in one country alone 34 Soviet cases. bhat was a country that ha been overrun by the Germans, where the Germans had taken away | : | | | i 7 for the fine tribute, that he had invited him to dinner. Mr. | | z | | { H | F | all the Soviet files so they didn't have any archives. He recreated 37 cases in that country. ! i In other words, the most important cases to them and so on. j we nee ee te eg The most important thing was that when he was. in Spain he a knew that on Franco's staff -- he himself was chief of NEVD, with the Republicans fighting Franco, but he knew the senior agent they had was on Franco's staff, that he was a young Brit+ | ish reporter whose father was an Arabist and he knew his code | . | name, SINJAN, that was Philby, whose father was the famous Sir, John Philby, an Arabist. All of that was available in 1953. I am simply trying to stress what it means that when someone ; ALMEESOM S eoaT NS say 39963411 Page 69
Hv a. ade ut . « > 2 m™ 4 a ; wd 3 -~ nN . ‘= o 7? eat mM a a Lond fe ° * re $ _ teen « q - 10 3S ad ci = 12 fort ty a aca = 14 \ ge . ec = ‘ae ty = ba — = — = ; = * me & ts = .o = ~ na = P = 18 . ; _ berg a] 17 - oe = t, se ig 4 fy = 19 ~ eC « s 29 See ey ete, 1 - at Th 50955 Bocld: cy B oh Ay: a2 da} 45 | 65 as £ ae tries to take the Nosenko case and go and helieve that they are going to resolve it against a time factor, whether it be ! i t i | the Warren Commission or whether it be the fact that the Direc+ tor wants it resolved or whether it is any other kind of arti- NO, . ficial constraints, it is out of kilter and not in step with counterintelligence. is not to have his hostile interrogation because hostile interrogation gets one nowhere unless you have a superior piece of intelligence unbeknownst to that individual. Miss Brady. Who made the decision to go to the hostile interrogation of Nosenko? Mr. Angleton. The Soviet Division. Miss Brady. Were you consulted? Mr. Angleton. No. In fact I think I was in Israel but I am not certain. “Miss Brady. Which individual, the Chief of the Soviet Division? | Mr. Angleton. I never reconstructed exactly who made the decision. Miss Brady. Do you know when the decision was made? Mr. Angleton. I know it was after they thought they had enough ammunition to break him... Miss. Brady. At that point, the so-called thousand page report had already been issued, had it not? Prior to the STASrT en igaide & SON ae eee MG COMPASY 322763411 Page 70 ; . : 2 _ In other words, the philosophy of the counterintelligence
66 refers to documents or codes and all of these things, they are. part of my life. It is the only life I have known because T | i 3 started off as a corporal in our organizationl, in the Army, + | and I never went to an officers training school or anything | 5 | and I never asked for anything. | 3 é | So, my commendations or rewards by foreing governments 7 = i or by my own government can be seen there. They are on the & 2 record and I didn't write them. So, the men I chose were | G 7 of like caliber, Rocca, Scotty Miler, and I can go through - 2 a whole series of then, because experience taught me also how | é | to judge men. For example, when we come to Peter Bagley, | 3 = 2 who has been denigrated publicly through the auspices of your | Sod ‘ & 5 is committee with the help of Admiral Turner, Bagley was one | oO 7 7 of the finest officers in the organization. Bagley didn't know & z | it but it had always been on my mind in evaluating a man that = | he might well be one of my nominees for somebody who might | ‘ 7h Become the head of the Clandestine Service some day because he = 2 had certain qualities to him that’ I observed that were needed = a for that type of leadership. | = 2 First in intelligence, his schooling, his knowledge ‘of | oan languages, his total dedication. He didn't have a penny to , fa? me Ris name. iI mean he drove a car that I think was the oldest : car in the Agency. He had personal misfortunes, his son was blinded in one eye and a number of other things. But at the same time it was a part of his whole upbringing. Two % i d © if aed 4 a . iH i i 12g i ape eke ALDESSON REPORTING CO VIE ABLY HW 50955 Docld:32763411 Page 71
e23 ae AT i eb: Pe) . 2 = 2 Os i we A S oe =~ “ a 7 sad a < pane 3 Lond oe » a “3 7 oS s . sw Sf i ras = mi Sd ad ie) a = +A a cS za ow tA a ed 6 5 ~ A ote . wt 7 Saat & 1 re Li S Pas a ts ~- ine = woot i ae oe 1a it = os ~ a . = 29 ee CE ges On oe a 27 ad ‘ag “ecu x ie a Saw taf BD _ 46 . 67 i | decision to go to hostile interrogation had it*been written? Mr. Angleton, I don't know, Let me dwell on the ques- | tion of hostile interrogation so that we understand one another. Iwas many years in espionage and I think TI can say in al | modesty I rpobably recruited more agents than any person in the ‘CIA who would be’ known to you, by’ that I mean whose names have ever come out. I recruited very high level people in terms of access to codes and so on. I Simply say that because Iwas not just simply counterintelligence but I was also in the espionage game for a long time before I became Chief of | Counterintelligence. Iwas Chief of Special Operations among | other things. The ultimate in our business is that espionage, , the ultimate of an @spionage case is to get the codes of the jopposition. The ultimate in counterespionage is to protect lyour own codes. i lfrom recruiting a man all the way on uP. But the heart of | . jeverything is documentation, It is not just simply agent jreports. It is to be able to have the documents of the oppo= jsition or to read their telegrams so that you know at the same 4 time they know, so that you can make your own evaluation, not pased on what someone told vou but on the actual documents. ; So my statement to you is a world that I am very familiar with, I mean in terms of when I am Sealing with Golitzen he 4 “i 4 a u ALDESSON REPORTING COMPARY BY 50955 Bocld: 32263411 Page 72 i That.is the ultimate, There are all kinds of achievements’ 1
48 68 of his brothers were admirals of the fleet. One brother was the senior admiral in London which controlled all the - ge | | fleet in the Atlantic and what not. The other brother was an admiral, chief of the Bureau of Personnel of the Navy. His uncle was Admiral Leavy. I don't have to describe 5 ij } if a what that means when your uncle is Admiral Leahv. So does am . 4 y [anyone believe that a man of Pete RBagley's qualities is the ' same person described by Hart? Miss Brady. I believe you are referring to a memo or so- { | ‘ | | ame letter that Mr. Hart ascribed to Mr. Bagley? Mr. Angleton. Yes. J , | Miss Brady. Did you have any knowledgeof such a letter Lor memo? wt ot ow t wa wt 7m, ™ bard os ee eo ood oa od 5 oe) a a S aad g ya po any 6 << = e So = = —_ uae a oe) = Ln Som be = 2 oy te ay a = — rr « ~~ he le os rm an & ~ S a feel pear all x 4 | | i Mr. Angleton. Ofcourse not. I never heard of any such thing. But I know that a case officer who is working, I mean | is | who is really thinking through a problem, can go from the logical 7 [f° the reductio absurdum. In other words, if you follow me, if 1 i | | you are told to think of everything that was the color blue ey i you could start off with the blue of fintorreto and start getting }) down into the fact that I am going to sing the blues or some- ! ged “+ ray if You go from those things that you would communicate to | i : somebody to those things which would be I mean in reductio iu : d : iy absurdum. The memo never went anywhere, : It was a personal paper of the man himself. All I am a } ‘ a t Hh 3 ORTING Comes HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 73
49 | 7 69 trying. , to say is that Pete Pagley is the first man in the world that knows that the Agency would never tolerate liqui- | | dation. He would never dare come into Helms and say that "We have to liquidate the man." = 7 The thing is so absurd that the very thought of it shows : a 6 | the motivation of Hart to sensationalize and to put some | ms | = | kind of onus on the past, because Hart is married to a young : 8 lady, she is not so young but she is a senior supergrade in 3 3 the Soviet Division. . . | | | | | { ! Miss Brady. Was she there at the time of the Nosenko i e oy ri M assessment? ‘ | Mr. Angleton. Yes, but she was not in counterintelligence. She was in estimates with Len McCoy. When Colby destroyed the 4 Counterintelligence, as far as I am concerned, Len McCoy was . 1 { dee put into counterintelligence to take over from Rocca. He has REPORTERS BUTEDING, WASHINGTON, DOC ray i 1 \ H | 18 te: : oe . .i| no qualifications for that job. Len McCoy and Mr. Hart's wife ~U. - " were in the same group in the Soviet Division. : | Miss Brady. Were you ever party to conversations about what = ‘ | is termed the embarrassing consequences of Nosenko's detention = i . i s 8 | or possibly disposal even short of liquidation? H ; aie Mr. Angleton. I am personally aware of that because I go! ae an : : ad back to what I have always felt about any of these people. rT am not opposed to taking invanyone, all defectors are welcome. i t /¥ t a In other words, what I am trying to say is the more the merrier. But you don't ever tell them that you disbelieve them. In 5 HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 74
30 70 a other words, you elicit, you get their whole cover story from A to Z, You put up all kinds of hypothetical things to them. | | You feed them litmus and so on. | Miss Brady. What was your role in the counterintelligenc im after the decision had been made to go to hostile interro~ SSu-23u5 on gation and he was actually incarcerated? What was the CIA ~ daa Mr. Angleton. We were following up traces. Let me put 202% €202) it this way. Much was made of the fact that out of X numbers B.C, 7 a of days of incarceration he was only interrogated X number en 4 | doing at that time? | i | ; ' of days. I worked it out that every three and a quarter days | { WASHTUGTON , ie | he was seen. Now let us logically-look at it. The people | i who would do the interrogation are people who also have other | responsibilities. They have In boxes and other cases that are) i { Breaking. That is number one. REPORTERS BUTELDING, Be Number two, they have to take the product of that interro- gation back to headquarters from a distant location and do all the research and analysis and traces and dossiers on what has | 3 * 1 Been provided during that day's interrogation. —_ | 300 Pru STRELT, a 04 i = I can assure you, having don this many times, myself, with ; other defectors, having to travel to Mew York and spending ; until four o'clock in the morning and getting two hours sleep | and getting the first plane down and calling in people to get ; traces run and go back that same afternoon, it is a little i gruelling when you are also Chief of Gounterintelligence erpaey arias | ALDESSON REZSORTING COMEARIY HW 50955 Docld: 32263411 Page 75
71 | handling hundreds of telegrams and new cases that come in. i ‘ | Io am certain that when I fugured that they saw hilm once every | three and a half days, that, without knowing this as a fact, ge | | this would be the logical time factor of doing, one, your work i | a < 5 as Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division and whoever else he had S S| helping him, and doing the traces, preparing your questions 5 |e the next encounter, et cetera. : : : | So that I find nothing illogical in that. | ; 7 I personally believe that the trouble with hostile | 3 * | interrogation is that you can foresee that you are not going : : "| 0 be successfull unless you -have something so incriminating | * a that the man cannot deny it. In other words, if you photograph th : 3 him actually in the company of a known ‘Soviet agent passing a | : § | aocunent or if you had a cipher break of a telegram which says, 5 i "Go and see Nosenko and tell him that we enjoyed his report: | ps . © lon Bagley But try to find out about his brothers who are admirals," ‘ 7 c give a. fanciful thing, if you had such a thing of that sort | : 8 |where it is incontrovertible evidence, then you could go to. | 2 * Inostile interrogation. I don't mean by hostile you could tell : © eS i , i him that he is a liar. Hostile interrogation to me would be | eS i £0 show your card to the man, that you disbelieve him. Whereas: “eae 1 A geet fT i . es yo jthere is no reason to do that. In other words, you listen to 234 jhim. You thank him for his information but you have never let © ~ ham know that you disbelieve him until you have heard and pra in lexhausted his entire story and that can take several months ff i] HW 50955 DocId:392963411 Page 76
“how Sas 52. 72 i to get all the details out. It is only after you analyze all 4 1 a 21 that that you see that you still don't have anything on which you can break him. The fact that there was no telegram, the se fact that his rank might be wrong, or you can take all the dea dozens, which ft don'tt have at hand, dozens of contradictions, my attitude was that these were fundamental contradictions . reinforced by the fact that other people under suspicion were Gan fortifying his téstimony and that, most important, that Igor when he came out confirmed that Sasha, Alexander, had submitted | { { } we enough reports within the Agency, 29 volumes, to be used by the Central Committee against the United States, in a plan approved by the Central Committee, if any harm came to him, et cetera, et cetéra, that he went to the Soviet Embassy. At the same time he confirms the bona fides of Nosenko dt» and goes into a long thing about how important Nosenko is, is | he is more important than Golitzen and so on. Now we know i HH he is a fraud. | So then you take all the cases where that samé earmarked information of the lie is and you go through that to make the | gen FR SPRERT, SO. PEPORTERS CULLDING, UASULHGTON, B.C. 20008 (282) So4-2305 i i 23 idnetification of the other channels. When you begin to find \ , . { that an FBI source made the identical statement and so and . . : ! i | "y lied, I didn't receive the telegram," and you look at these 1 t @ Wa 4 } so made the identical statement and then you have Nosenko saying J i t | J . . ; | other sources who said he received the telegram, et cetera, if ‘ a . A | et cetera, what does it raise in your mind except the classical HW 50955 Docld:322963411 Page 77
HW 50955 73 i thing, when you become involved in a double agent case you ! are inviting for yourself a lot of trouble unless you have a tnd 4a | ! superior source. [In other words, to run a double agent or pene | ! exhaust a great deal of real information to build up his cred- St -239K§ | { | | i | | \ | | tration who is going to pass on information compells you to ibility with the other side. You find yourself at time not as achieving your objective and therefore you have to throw more | i 1 good information after good information and still not achieve 2. 22h (202) ~> your ‘objective. Tf the other side is astute enough, they ‘can force you to the wall in terms. of having to give up stuff finally that you can't give up and maintain the credibility of that agent. You are on a train going to fast to jump off. That is the reason I don't believe in hostile interro~ REPORTERS BUTEDTHG, UCASUTHGTOH , us. whether it is the Director who has to have an answer right ; i i ‘ a et cetera, | I gave the Turkul case as one of the most obvious kinds of: ana yr STREDT, S a i | ycases, showing how long all Western counterintelligence | lworked on Turkul. and how it eventually was resolved. | | So that I canunderstand the Nirector who wants an answer, 1 . if lwho has to resolve it, who can't go any further with it. I jdon't step away from Bagley and I don't step away from those ! at ‘people, Xhey had the Joris on In their judgment they had: " 4 it Docld:322763411 Page 78
ie ae OS at di acs : te Se ADS len § 54 74 i to make a decision, if you follow me. Therefore, when Helms was re confronted with that entire thing and the recommendations were fa. have known at the time or heard it or something but it was the | | | | mace and all that and he goes to Katzenbach and so on, I may ee se mn nee escapee ete rt a E 3 first time IT knew that Dave Murphy had gone to see Katzenbach ; 2 ‘| and they had had such a meeting. : r I did know Katzenbach very well before he became Attorney iS 2 General. So when I read or heard the testimony of Helsm I> : ai was quite surprised about that meeting. My point is that I : a can see that once they embarked on hostile interrogation it would be very hard to get off that train because once you VASHTNGTON , starting telling a man you don't believe him, then he can shif his story and you don't know what he would have told you ~- had you continued the elicitation. There were very many pieces of en 5 litmus, as I call it, things which if he was bona fides in REPORTERS NUELDING, | the ultimate sense, in the sense of wanting to, join our society ‘some. ee ’ i i , ; , vy and protect our society, there are priorities of information | | : 8 | which he would have volunteered immediately as benefit to a yo : ! = a the United States. | 5 “ Miss Brady. I think you mentioned you wanted to break | . , | a at 12:30, Is that correct? | 1 : 2 | Mr, Chabot. It might be a good time. | oo Miss Brady. Let us be back here at 2:00 o'clock. : @ | (Whereupon, at 12:45 a.em., the hearing was recessed, to | is ends a i reconvene at 2:00 p.m. the same day.) mhl fols 4 7 sm vamos tas RE | | ALOSEASON REZORTING COMBA HW 50955 Docld:32963411 Page 79
AFRANCE:msl 1 sc! 75 ‘ TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGCLETON RESUMED nm Mr. Goldsmith. Dib the CIA conduct an investigation ‘ i 1 ' into the assassination of President Kennedy? ! a 4 Mr. Angleton. There was never any formal investigation y 2 5 as such in the sense that there was never any thing like an | [ = 5 inspector general thing or task force. S 7 Mr. Goldsmith. How would you characterize the responsi~ : LN : i — { Z , | bility of the Agency vis-a-vis:the work of the Warren Commis- j . 5 | sion? M3 3 i . . ; - 19 i Mr. Angleton. I think when the assassination occurred Zo, | == I will state the obvious, that no one in the history of joo Poy Hy = Hoe Sarre the Agency had even been confronted with the assassination of a z 13 4 4 president. In other words, practically anything that ever oOo = 9 |: . ae | : Z 4, | happened in the Agency always had some precedent. In this = a area, there was complete chaos, so. to speak. So, the original. Ps | jurisdiction of course, devolved on the Bureau, the FBI. 134 J ~ i A 7 | When the Commission was set up I think it took it a long + = all time to get to focus:: as such. In other words, I don't think = | the community as a whole -~ I mean Johnson in forming the = 39 | | Commission, obviously there was advice from a lot.of people --: my view is that he just simply. hit on the Commission idea - i | as spreading the responsibility with some kind of blue ribbon panel. Mr. Goldsmith. I understand the purpose of the Commission a3 an in general terms. My question though is how would you ALURASON REPORTING COMPANY HW 50955 DocId:32263411 Page 80
4 wt x 5 Foe) od ™ i a wo 6 ~ a fond os 7 Sear -s 3. o ™ . nod a % a ° a ead ahd Ss g ee an < = 14 + be Lo - . = =e a = Be ota = is 2 = = 16 > a VW mo, e 18 iA = !'9 = _& . = 20 Caan a On ‘ AY. ery u nd Gir y 4 AS ¥) 3 HW 50955 Bacld: 76 characterize the role of the Agency vis-a-vis the work of the ! warren Commission? | Mr. Angleton. I think it went through a metamorphosis in the beginning. You had the Director, who was a very close ‘social and personal friend of the President and therefore in. | a sense he wasn't just the Director of Central Intelligence, he was also a very close personal friend. So that I think he had broad views on it htat went beyond the Agency and I think his Agency responsibilities. | I think that the metamorphosized into a thing where it | began to focus more on it as an agency would facing any | problem. In the beginning you had the Director, you had | the Deputy Director, you had case officers, you had division | chiefs, all seeing the Warren Commission independently. You | had FBI liaisoning at many different levels.. We had liaison offices. That would be the normal way of approaching any | kind of business. | There was some control of knowing what different elements in the Agency wre capable of doing or knew or whatnot. | Mr. Goldsmith. How long did it take to get focused so ing the Warren Commission on a regular basis with information? Mr. Angleton. I can't give you a time factor. I know, and this is only memory without having seen any papers, from In a sense, it took some time to get this thing to focus. E t q t 1 i 4 i 1 a4 there was an effective team of some kind at the Agency provid-, { j ‘ | i i i t
3 4 4 kd - z= 3 ™ t a wn 6 am, a . oS = 7 Sem ~ 2 S a ing ™ 3 9 a ~ 10 3 g ? = } A a arid tm => 42 - re) = = 13 = = 2B ts L = Poul it 2 = 4 ~ a a oo = *& 12 om ie] = 19 = band & 5 20 21 oo RE Ear a Ls He bs a of oN, 23 nm as me 77 my own memory I know I.was raising certain questions of dupli-| H } cation and of the fact together in one place. not be really sure that youwre giving { | i i . | the Director you could | a final answer. | It did not necessarily mean that was the Mr. Goldsmith. answer. Eventually was the responsibility for coordinating the Agency's work given to any particular unit 1 OX component? We had what I cxalled at that time, and ~- { } ‘ | Mr. Angleton. i Still refer to as the point of record. In other words, it didn' t have any command function but at least it was trying to get hold of all the telegrams, all of the memoranda of record, all the agency participation, et cetera. Mr. Goldsmith. By we are you referring to the CI Staff? Mr. Angleton. That is right. Mr. Goldsmith. Why did this responsibility devolve: upon the CI Staff? Mr. Angleton. i. lanalysis. ing to find someplace of common concern. We had research and Hi i A a] ;person of Rocca, the fact that he had some pretty good legmen u /] jaxround him that could be diverted from what they were doing | sto run errands and do work. i i 3 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference to Mr. Rocca. Who ed F QoAPEy " i Oo oe “HW 50955 Docld: 32263411 Page 32 : Basically because -you might say it was try~| We were very strong on research and analysis in the of trying to get all the papers pulled In other words, if you got a call from}
3 A 4 ww 2 - = 5 NN $ a “ § om m~ . food i 7 une Ss a covend : oe . « a) ¥ a = {a S Dad Sg mT A = = }2 ‘2 ; = — 4 . = 13 = . = ta bi = es 13 2 z 14 = an \7 - pane S18 ae) = 19 ~ = x = 29 HW 50955 Bocld: Commission to my knowledge, outside of Mr. Dulles and that i 78 within the CI Staff was primarily responsibile for coordinating the effort to assist the Warren Commission? Mr. Angleton. He was the principal point. Mr. Goldsmith. What responsibilities, if any, did you have at that time with regard to the work that was being performed to assist the Warren Commission? Mr. Angleton. I never saw anybody from the Warren Commi-j ssion. I am coming back to what you are saying. I preface | it by saying that I never did meet. anybody from the Warren was not in an official capacity. My basic thing was to read . . . - I. over everything htat came across my desk but basically shoving; . the responsibility on to Rocca to the point of the legwork | which meant that he didn't»have to go through me to deal with | other people in the Agency. : | The normal course of events, if he was going to go, if the Director called him or Deputy Director and so on, the channel. | would normally be that he would be on the phone to me about it and we would confer. He was given a Lot of latitude. But I ; have to explain something here. Mr. Goldsmith. Flease do. Mr. Angleton. Our main concern -- when r say concern, I don't mean it in the sense of importance or anything, but at that time we were in the middle of the day of the assassina- tion, I can recall it very distinctly, there was a high
79 : representative of a foreign government who had arrived the day: Gc | before and had presented a letter of complaint to Mr. McCone | regarding an allegation as to one of his service's number two | 1 i } | t | i ! 1 do the Chief of that service to register this complaint. das man, a Soviet suspect. So he had come with this letter from If I recall corectly, he had lunch with the Director | | | | and then he was to meet with me and my Deputy. Now, this was aka - one of those ball-ups of an individual from that country; our 4) representative, who had been back and had been privately | briefed as to the security problems relating to that station | arid to that country. Without authorization he disclosed to the i 7 | chief of that service the name of this individual who was in | fact this chief's deputy. So you can imagine the crisis that | - ta devolved from this unauthorized leakage. bo | | das So this snowballed into quite a package, I might add, and, ——— it went on for I think about a:.year, with many” Wisits from the. i | Inteznal Security of that country to us during which all kinds, Jon ru STRER’, SoU. REPORTERS BUCLDING, UASUTNGTON, B.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345 13 | of cooperation was given, depositions, and all that, and in the 19 i end they determined that -- I will put it this way, whatever | 39 they determined they gave us no final report but the head of | . 1 | that government appointed a special commission which got rid ) 1 Nvte of him, in short. So that the day of the assassination this was one of the 6 ! { 4 | ! i i primary concerns of Counterintelligence. So it was running in ' that office, I mean running in the conference room, running to, KA Rah 3 cn Se § wee q Bg kn ow A ee | ALOENSON REZSORTING COMPAR HY 50955 DocId: 32263411 Page 34
80 people, finally getting rid of the follow, staying on at night, . ir) | | | In the meantime, the Western Hemisphere Division was | | i involved, the Soviet Division was involved, the Deputy Director ! de . | seeing what happened, et cetera, et cetera. | was involved, et cetera. Z 5 3 5 | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that you were working in the) S 5 | context of a crisis situation by virtue of the facts that you | * a made reference to. In light of that understanding, however, S \ . : | my question is what responsibilities did you have with regard | : 2 to the work that the Agency was performing to assist the o- | 2 | Warren Commission? a | Shes 2 7 Mr. Angleton. I didn't have and specific responsibility. : | . . ce Z 13 Mr. Goldsmith. The CI Staff became a point of record? : ~ i! : ; ee 8 ‘ | Mr. Angleton. That is right. | 4 : eis] Mr. Goldsmith. You were head of the CI Staff? | : a Mr. Angleton. But that does not follow in that strict | . a 7 sense, The Director could call or anyone could call Rocca . « } , , zs '3 | without reference to me. In other words, it*was a very : z a special situation. He was doing a job of common concern. | g 20 | Mr. Goldsmith. To what extent did you get involved in : —_ 1 | the work of the Agency? | f; h ‘Mr. Angleton. I got very much involved in the immediate ES"4 ils IAS g.2 b3 | 23 | question, having been 31 years in the business and probably | as much knowledge as anybody about the Soviet assassinations, | . assassinations as.such by foreign services. My immediate STORET AME. SON REPORTING COoMPaaY HW 430955 Docld: 32263411 Page 845
au as hm ase 2002% (202) S54~-24"5 ou oO D.C. WASHINGTON , se - 4nd to lay o REPORTERS BUETLDING, a vo S$... ? t | i 1 t | 1 i 4 200 Vt STRENT, 20 | ! ar “I ) | Soares NE CN ‘ Lee 4 Xv ire} $2 Hi I | 24 i | HW 430955 Docld: 33263411 Page 36 ; | concern was the question of Soviet intelligence, Soviet -Bloc I } | il 1 i : J | | t | | t | 81 ' intelligence. Mr. Goldsmith. Did Rocca, as a matter of routine, pass on to you information that he considered to be important? | Mr. Angleton. Yes. It was not just passing it on. If he had: a matter that he regarded as a development or something, that I had to know because of its relationship to whatever I might be doing or anybody else in the Staff might be doing, then he wouldn't hesitate after hours to get on the phone and break in and so on, if there was such a type thing. fos \ Our relationship was such that it was only 20 feet away fromohis office to me. Mr. Goldsmith. Did he keep you apprised of the key developments in the Kennedy case so far as the Agency was concerned? . Mr. Angleton. There was an awful lot of activity going ; on which I wouldn't say that we knew at the moment that it would be in the WH Division that might not know about that. - happening. In other words, there were a lot of people who | Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the CI Staff was a point of record it does not necessarily follow that the CI Staff was | informed of all key developments that the Agency had become | aware of? Mr. Angleton. I can't say that as a fact. I am simply saying there were so many things going on that you couldn't Aras y to, he & Sha ase sate A GS commen
82 | be sure because, after all, unless. somebody sent you something, I how did you know that activity or that particular thing was i ‘ i 4 | going on? In other words, my memory is one that, unlike what 4 I said earlier where you have a task force or you have a | z= § | problem where there is no point of record but somebody who is | + | 3 7 charged and where no action is taken without the clearance of ! g "| that individual, there wasn't that kind of situation. ! x a | Mr. Goldsmith. Insofar.as information was made available ; | to Mr. Rocca, did he actively keep you apprised of those cacts : | that he considered to be important? | g 7 Mr. Angleton. I think so, yes. : 2 2 Mr. Goldsmith. From what you are saying I get the i a 2 4 | impression generally htat the situation was not all that well ' z af organized. Did Mr. Helms or anyone else issue an order indi- | n . : 7 cating that CI Staff was a point of record and that all perti- S it ; “| = 14 | nent information for the Warren’ Commission or information | = iT | relevant to the investigation was to pass through the CI : - : : 7 Mr. Angleton. I think it was to be at least deposited | 7 20 there. There was an order of some sort, some kind of instruc- a can 2! tion, that made it clear that everything ws to be pulled 1 OL sted dy together in the Counterintelligence Staff. That man was Rocca. Mr. Goldsmith. Was Jack Whitten responsibile for coor- est Se a.2 id “ii | dinating the aspects of the Agency work on the assassination? ’ ia sf ~ SS A BUEN SUN RESORTING COMPARES HW 50955 Docld:39263411 Page 87
83 : - Mr. Angleton. J. C. King was the head of the WH Division and Whitten was his right hand man handling all the Western | Henlisphere stuff, ‘| Mr. Goldsmith. My question was probably more specifically, E 3 | was Whitten given responsibility for coordinating the agency's ~ ; 5 , initial efforts to support the FBI in attempting to investi- | S 7 gate the Kennedy assassination? | ! 5 7 Mr. Angleton. I can't remember exactly the terms of : ; | reference of Whitten except that he was very prominent. | E 2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever having any conflict 7 a t g 7 with Whitten concerning areas of responsibility with regard ! 2 al to the Agency's effort to investigation the assassination? . | r z 1 : Mr. Angleton. Nothing that I can recall except that tT : : . = 7 always felt unesay when anyone met with the FBI or anybody _ : a | else that we didn't either have a participant or somebody ) 3 it | 5 13 | present. : i of Mr. Goldsmith. Why was that? : : a Mr. Angleton. I am talking about the regular counter- | : | intelligence lbaison. being centered in the counterintelligence a Mr. Goldsmith. If I understand you correct, what you | aay 4 are saying is that the CI Staff essentially was responsible cd y. ro 43 for liaison witht with the FBI. For that reason, you would have wanted to be kept informed? yee wry | | Staff. { | i } Mr. Angleton. That is right. Simply that my experience - HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 88
10 | with liaison | | t } oxganization i 3 | other words, 4 i i badd - | = an z= 3 “ \ : ) a , | wi io) -~ t = a | = a! Q wo = | m= iD? J 3 | trip? = 10 4 3 = im 4 a = ,, | = i3 i = i S i aT | . a Loon Sc 3 4 ; a hat “Dew “SF Ee Sew 84 is that when you speak with him voices to an. you are bound to have misunderstandings. In if you have people who have never dealt with the | FBI, there is a art of dealing with any interagency or investigative group, you know -- but Whitten was very promi- | nent because obviously the trip to Mexico and the telegrams | were coming in to SH Division as the action division. Mr. Goldsmith. By Mexico you are referring to Oswald's Mr. Angleton. Yes. The cable when it comes in has in the upper left hand corner a place where it says "action". f : | 12 ; Tt will designate the component. Then it will have another | i Line which shows dissemination. So that action would be WH Division unless it was the Deputy Director himself who. signed the cable in which case the action would be indicated on that cable at the designated point. Dissemination showed everybody else who had a collateral interest. of some sort. All of a sudden you might see somebody on there that you the question, why has the cable gone here, there and so on. 1g wondered why he was on it. Something like that might arounse | i Mr. Goldsmith. What individuals within the Agency to { 211 the Warren Commission, communicating information to the HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 69 oy “27 22 | your knowledge were responsibile for maintaining contact with @ 24.1 Warren Commission. Mr. Angleton. Just simply from my recollection, it would : ; ALDZSSON REPORTING COMBanY t
AL 35 Y have been the Director, Mr. Helms, J. C. King, Whitten, Dave ta Murphy, who.was the Chief of the Soviet Division, Rocca, and 4 | perhaps, but I am not certain, maybe one or two of his men. Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any formal procedure established zm = § | for communicating information to the Warren Commission? | 5 7 Mr. Angleton. r don't know that it was formal. It was | S 7 | more on what the subject matter was. : z 3 i Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, I take it that the CI Staff, = : 3 : per Helms order would have been informed of the information ! : 19 that would have been available to the Warren Commission? 3 ! 2 i | Mr. Angleton. We tried to keep on top of it. I think = i $ 2 | as time went on we got a little more of a grasp, I mean the | : | ‘ és = 7 people who were involved, and also they began to call us in the = i . i z al sense that we were passive, once we started getting all the : : al information and making sure that traces were run and all that, 2 i = 1s it was in their interest to call us and ask questions. : i. 17 | Mr. Goldsmith. - Now, you are referring to the Warren | a ai Commission? | = ip | - | Mr. Angleton. Both the Warren Commission and any of the | ¢ ‘a | other components in the Agency dealing with them. | 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state in general terms | Le & Se) 22 | what areas the Agency attempted to give emphasis to in attempt= t i : ing to support the Warren Commission? In otner words, were i i { } there investigative hypotheses that were pursued? > pe we bse Mr. Angleton. I think the fundamental one was the whole HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 90 MU EA SON REPORTING COMIN?
20024 €202) $5%-2345 B.C, WASHINGTON, So. REPORTERS BUTLDING, ana Fru STReVe, t= wy Fa) oO ree —" ab da oo “4 . LO 12 86 thing of trying to get some idea on Oswald and traces, hypo- theses, on the question of whether there was any foreign influence involved. | emphasis? : Mr. Angleton. The Soviet would be one, and of course | Cuban. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you feel that you were given by your : superiors at the Agency all relevant information concerning | the assassination which would have ensured that the Agency's | investigation and ultimately the Warren Commission's investi- . gation would be completely thorough? | Mr. Angleton. “At the time I did. | Mr. Goldsmith. What about today? Mr. Angleton. After I left my job as Chief, Counter- intelligence, but while they Kept me on ice for the Church Committee -- let me put it that way, I had been working very hard on that AP story that came out about Castro's warning about attempted assassinations against him. | Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first learn of the anti-  actve assassination plots sponsored by the Agency? | Mr. Angleton. I had wind of something from time to time but never one I didn't stick my nose into in the sense that I had been brought up in a world of compartmentation and I tried to live up to that. I regarded it as a twoway street, Mr. Goldsmith. Which area of foreign influence received. {
13 87 i i - | 7 But when someone has assigned things from the Directorate’ it is not your job to try to break down that compartmentation. | I learned by pure accident that there had been a Mafia be aap | contact. Mr. Goldsmith. When did you learn that? | | Mr. Angleton. I learned that, and I can't give you a | | ‘it because the FBI lisison fellow was at my house one evening | 2002% €202) $$4-2345 ou a date but it is obviously in the record someplace, I learned | when the Bureau was frantically trying to get hold of him. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember when that was? cee ean Mr. Angleton. I can't remembercthecdate. c) a = | gS : = | | 8 = 2 . Mr. Goldsmith. Was it before or after the Warren & = ia | Commission work was completed? | Zia | Mr. Angleton. I think it was after the Commission. aa th | & od Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the FBI liaison? = 6 Mr. Angleton. Sam Papich. According to the Bureau : a Ir procedures, he had left what his schedule would be and where |. z 1a he would be at every moment. The call came in from the field = i an | = 13 | office, as I recall, and they stated that from surveillance é 20 | of Rosselli from CAlifornia, I think it was CAlifornia, he had! | 4 31 { met an individual whose description was pricisely that of | ES | | eS Bill Harvey. They were a little upset. ut'4 ils Ts gna $3 I heard enough of it to tell Sam not to say anything and tell him he would call back or words to that effect. Then: i 23! he told me that they had said that Rosselli got off a plane
14 88 by such an individual. They were baffled. So I immediately called, I told sam, I said "Look, this thing, you have to keep in mind that the FBI had separate. -: liaison with the Cuban group because of the complications of | | | i i : Miami and all that." w | . ' j I called Harvey's wife and asked here "Where is Bill?" om i = 4 | Iosaid, "It is not my affair but don't start getting a S i lot of explosions happening until we get this thing clarified | ~ oe a 2 a a bit. " | ct wo | 3 vi Sam agreed. I think he told me he would be back at them | a , . . . 19 but not to get excited, or words to that effect. | ‘ i i | | - She said, “Duke Yeiberts." a "Will you get hold of him and tell him to call me . immediately, that there is a crisis?" REPORTERS BULELDING, WASHINGTON , i handed the phone, I said, "Bill, a Gernam somebody wants to Ju, ; | Bill called within a few seconds so to speak. I just | | AIF | talk to you." So I gave him the telephone. .I didn't listen | a in on-the conversation but I know that sam got the answers he , : 4 | wanted and he called back the Burau and apparently had the : surveillance called off. This was around 10 o'clock, between | ar: 9 and 10°o0'clock at night. Then he took it up with Bill the we SSF zn | next day. en —— 22 | I mean, from then on it left me and became a privileged e . 2, | Matter between him and the desk. i i . ze! Myr. Goldsmith. I realize that I have asked this question: rams ‘ ARENSON RESORTING COMPA HW 430955 Docld: 32263411 Page 93
89 one time. I would like to ask it again. i) Mr. Angleton. I seem to he avoiding your cuestion. Mr. Goldsmith. No, you have answereu my question. You have given me a lot of eatail about the circumstances surround oe 2 3 ing your first learning of the anti-Castro assassination. plot. : : 4 | The question I want to ask again is, do you recall approxi~- S 7 mately when you learned this information? : 2 | Mr. Angleton. No, I don't know the time. I was working ; 3 on a lot of that before I left the Agency. . | Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state whether it was 3 ! Z i before or after the Warren. Commission had completed its work? = fo: s | Mr. Angleton. I am certain it was well after the Warren ay : 13 Commission had compited its work but I have no feeling for = | dates. é is | Mr. Goldsmith. This is really the only relevant issue 5 | #0 far as we are concerned. = | Do you think that the work of the CI Staff in attempting . E a | fo fecuaieate the efforrs of the Warrent Conmission was : Wy affected in any way by the failure of other CIA officials to : 2 tn the CI Staff of the anti-Castro assassination plots? an Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way, whether it would cy mee | have facilitated the Warren Commission I don't know. I think | the problem, I just told Miss Brady I was very unhappy not | to have been informed either by your Committee or the Agency > a aE iain advance that Hart was going to testify, ne put me ata 4 i
ir) 4 3 w . z 5 Foe) wo ~ é 1 va , wa 9 i ond “~ ' oS @ 7 at os a es S a ~ . “4 ray ? oS - tA = aM S a So = tT oat Hi a a = ” Va : cS a = ra = : = ed 4 es a = ime te of ia 2 . Pe = te 4 is: > ol PvE] a5 fe ig wn = 19 ~ cg a S&S - 2 Cae : cia eters dell fe ins ca HY 50955 Doacld: 39963411 Page 95 answer in this fashion, that the counterintelligence concern 16 | ace 99 terrible disadvantage in the sense that I would have been glued to the radio to have heard hin, therefore, I lost three or : four or five days and nights to dredge up tnat testimony with | . i a lot of calls coming in from a lot of concerned people. | Then, forewarned, I heard a lot of Helms testimony except for interruptions. This question keeps comding up, whether it would have helped the Warren Commission. I would with the assassination could not keep pace with the life of i that Committee. In other words, the Committee's requirements ! or demands, or whatever it may be, they had a life of their - own and they had deadlines to meet. In other words, they were working at a faster pace than we were in terms of our activities and they couldn't coincide. In otherwords, for example, in private dicussions with Allen Amel Dulles I told him that personally I believed there should not be a finality to the report. In other words, the door ought to be left open. You don't have an assassin assassinate the assassin so to speak, without all these terrible things going , to come out of the closet. I didn't have in mind at that time! the Cubans, so to speak, so much as I did the whole question of ‘ the Soviets, the Nosenko business, and many other things. ; Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that Mr. Helms in his public i testimony indicated that in retrospect he would have taken the. information.on the anti-Castro assassination plots and put them ALQERSON REFORTING COMPANY
i7 91 : in a truck and driven to the steps of the Warren Commission and i { i simply delivered them there. | b~3 Mr. Angleton. I heard the statement. sharply because of the fact that we were more intensely 4 | Mr. Goldsmith. That is the statement in substance. Do | 2 5 | you think that the information should have been given to the ! z j | Warren Commission. : ° & : . Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I still haven't seen all : 6 a ! that information. Before leaving the Agency I can recall going ; 3 : through a file and I found that there seemed to be ats won't : 1g say disappreance but when I went to a certain individual and | : 7 : said "Where is ther eport on Pitzgerald, et cetera, et cetera, 2 2 ) "In Paris?", whatever it was, that I could feel the door shut- * { : , i }$ 2 1] i ting around me. | = if . 2 ta Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any good reason for not | n . : E 1s giving that information to the Warren Conmission? | 3 a , 5. 1s Mr. Angleton. What puzzles me is whether even if they had It | that, whether they would have seen its significance. In other. . ~ z a | woras, I even wonder whether people in the Agency understood : : 19 | the significance of what that assassination business meant. ss 2 I think we would have seen it. probably more sharply. ! : . i ae 41 Mr. Goldsmith. By "we" you are referring to the CI | rk ae ! om pal 2 » Staff? ! 23 Mr. Angleton. Yes. I think we woula nave seen it more | f | t 23} engaged in this whole Soviet Bloc assassination. We had more HW 50955 Docld:322963411 Page 96
20024 €202) S5u-23458 REPORTERS BUTELDING, WASHINGTON, B.C. uv, S. 200 Vr STREET, ro] te dey ou > 18 92 experience in terms of Department 13 and the whole history of 30 years of Soviet sabotage and assassinations. It was not || something to us that was a dream world. We knew of cases and we knew of the modus operandi and so on. ; i } H i Also, I never had much confidence in the Cuban operations, . i whether it was run by Bissell or anybody else so far as I security went. I just didn't feel that you can run operations) | . . j of that sort, imigre groups and all the rest of it, and main- | | | tain security. | Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive any positive indica-~ tions that there were in fact security problems with regard to! these anti-Castro plots? i i Mr. Angleton. I just happened to know a lot of the people involved and I couldn't see it. You would hear too many , | rumors. I don't like to make that. statement and leave it there. I went through the whole Bissell:period of the Bay of | 4 Pigs -~ not having been a part of it, in other words, I was in the TB sanitarium and I got back -- while I was in the TB i sanitarium I heard a great deal about the Cuban operations from people who were not even party to it. . i -s had lunch with Bisseil and he asked me, I mean he-. | raised the thing in some fashion, he invited me to lunch when 3 he got back. I asked him only one question. I said, "Do you | have any. escape hatch?" He took quite an officnse at that. He said, "What do you: omy, xr G COMPAAY
19 mean? "In case the thing falls flat on its face is there some- rey one who goes. to Castro and says ‘you have won the battle.. nb | | 4 What is your price?'" 25, bn E 3 In other words, have you planned for tne failure as much | : 2 as planned for the successs? We never met again until after : E 7 the Bay of Pigs. We never had one word excnanged. | Z a : So I say this only because I can't take an operation -- | ; 3 | fee then we had all this experience through the SS period, we | .. "9 had it with the Polish imigraion, we had it with the failure : S : r | of the Albanian operations. and everything else ~- when you | 2 1 start dealing with large masses of people and try to have | a : 12 these fictional covers they simply don't hold up. | = ta | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the Cuban aspect of the | : 7 assassination was thoroughly and adequately investigated by the E 7 Agency and by the Warren Commission? | = ah Mr. Angleton. No. I personally believe that the United | - oI . z ste intelligence services did not have tne capabilities to | : np ever come to an adjudication. I don't think the capabilities : ¢ “39 | Were there. | : ; | Mr. Goldsmith. This is regardless of whether or not the | . £27 x | anti-Castro plots would have been made available to the Warren | ® 2 Commission, you are saying regardless. of that, our intelligence pp ts agencies did not have the capability to investigate that WO in thoroughly. of at ORTING COMPANY ey ui HW 50955 Docld:332963411 Page 98 PN ean Se whe TL
20 94 Mr. Angleton. Unless they had a code break or a defector i ' } | 7 , = 7; OXF something. . | | Let me take a case by say of example to show you what T , i I oe | | am trying to say. I think it was in 1962 or thereabouts we had ? 3 | this young man from Hungary who was aviation internal security, 4 5 Hungarian Intelligence Security, Bela Lapusnyik, a very > o "| important defector to the Austrians.whi knew of the internal & 23 | activities of AVH against embassies, recruitment of personnel S 2 | in embassies and their whole modus operandi, et cetera. | The Austrians were very reluctant to give us the custody | we wanted and yet as a service they didn't have the leads and = . . +4 have the comprehensive knowledge of a VHO. It was only | indiirectly that we could pose questions to them and get (Ve { i answers but the answers we were getting were enough to show th mo tremendous importance of this individual .. LOT) REPORTERS BUTLDING, WASHTNCTON , a 1S Finally,- with a lot of pressure it came to an agreement, | \ a Ir that on a Sunday they would have exhausted all international Zot interest in the man and he would be transported to the United | = | a ot = 19 Stqtes. On the morning of his being transferred to us, even | ¢ 20 | though he was in a high security jail, with police and whatnot, ' | he was found dead. He was in his late 20's, in perfect health. Immediately it was declared that it was food poisoning. It just didn't stack up that it would be food poisoning. 25 | Now, we had had an allegation from reliable sources of q . & B HW 430955 Docld: 32263411 Page 99 PLUESSSON RESORTING COMPaRY
ad td. an w . ws a § m™ ! a . wt fo} . a ~ . aed oe 7 id . x = a S ™ . 4 g 3 a = id S G = 1 jens i a “ a = 14 1 & ‘s Z. ; = od = =. tS =] a lé = a ir w 18 a tf} = 'g < a 30 a Pe mae ; a“ 58 HW 50955 Boocld: ~ vues we we ence ee ee eee eee et weo> eevee wer eee ewes in terms of the way he would have been, in the way of the 21 95 penetration of the Austrian security service. It was a posi- tive type of allegation from a high grade source. So Stern Magsen sent all kinds of people down there. They printed and everybody reprinted the fact that the official finding was food poisoning. Even the Vienna Institute of Forensic Medicine, which is one of the most famous ones in the world, supported the statement. | Some years later, we had another Hungarian defector. The moment he got off the plane I got hold of hin. I met him out | in a safe house and one of the first things I hit him with was about Lapusnyik. He gave the story that he nad access to that file, that that file was in the custody of the Chief of « Ministry of the Interior and so on, and he explained in detail | t that he had access ot it and they did not nave the means of conducting an assassination but the Czechs had the agent and the @zechs were the ones-who: did the assassination. That was | d ' on the evé ‘ofthe “man: coming to the United states. I will say this... He had only been sxinmed on the surface | assets, and I mean recruitment, whe the agents were in: .° i embassies and so on. That showed capability, it showed : flexibility, but it also showed collaboration among Bloc services, the sharing:: of resources and cohesiveness of action, and that is supported by many other cases, Rumanians, Soviets and so on, all prove able cases, all cases which had ery.
4 * a 22:- gd ie. 96 prosecutions involved and evidence certified. Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area now, to what ihe 2 | extent did the Agency's concern for protecting sensitive | sources and methods have an effect on the nature and quality 2 7 of the information that was made available to the Warren | a | | 5 7 Commission? 3 7 Mr. Angleton. By quality what do you mean? Ou Mr. Goldsmith. Was the information given to the Warren ¢ | . 20024 MO | Commission in sanitized form, for example? | I.don't know. I know that my view is that no piece of infor- yo Mr. Angleton. All I can say to that is that I hope-:so.. mation should go out of the Agency where if that document is compromised it destroys: the source. i i | | | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if in fact that was the Agency's position that when information touching on sensitive i sources and methods was involved it would be sanitized at least REPORTERS BUTELDING, WASHINGTON, B.C Oo 1 t aot ! to those sensitive aspects and then given to the Warren‘ = . B : ’ = ta Commission? -. 7 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. What I am trying to say is | = i . : . i ~ | c | ; S20 | | that I can see the Chief of the Division or somebody if | he was. ‘talking to the counsel there and there wasn't any record being made and so on, that he might feel that he ought to tell him a little bit more to give him some sense of evaluatiing that this: is more important and this is important, something | 2: 4 of that sort. i HW 50955 Docld: 32263411 Page 101
23 97 Mr. Goldsmith. Overall, was there a concern’ about pro- tecting sourceces and methods when giving information to the | Warren Commission? | | Mr. Angleton. TI can't answer that question because I i 2) 5. really: don't know. I know that you had a lot of people dealing “ i OO z : with them. My personal view is that if we ever had information 2 7 that incontrovertibiy showed: that there had been a foreign 4 s , | power that had assassinated the President, then that would | cS ‘ ; | supersede'all sources and methods. | - : o | Mr. Goldsmith. Let us go off the record for a moment. : fon | (Of£ the record discussion) : 2 12 | Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Dulles play any special role on | 6 z 14 ‘the Warren Commission so far as the Agency was concerned? : = 4 ; _ | : 2 1a Mr. Angleton. Only by virtue of his having been the | ; Pa ts | Director. | oe z 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if he in any way represented | a : ‘ i the interest of the Agency to the Warren Commission? | oo Fd 13 Mr. Angleton. I don't think that he had any understand- | — 2 | an with Mr. McCone at all. In fact, T am quite confident he : wo s nl would not have had an understanding. They were not on the ! on best of terms. 0 GRRE | rf : © * ae Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge one ~ | ° | way or another about that? Mr. Angleton. I personally had a relationship with him? s 7 oo Wo Rea Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge re a8 Rise an ta A eat st wei cee s monte PMS uy ' ALSEASON RESORTING COMPANY HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 102
24 98 a | concerning whether he represented the interest of the Agency i i @G . >; On the Warren Commission? . | | Mr. Angleton. Explain that to me. to) Mr. Goldsmith. For example, there would have been areas oe | 2 5 that the Warren Commission and the Agency may have been some- | ~ ; | z A what at odds. One area that comes to minu is in the Nosenko | S 7m area where the Agency may have had a preference for having the| Z ; | Warren Commission not treat the Nosenko issue at all whereas ! a | : 3 the Warren Commission may have wanted to deal with that issue : : 1¢ in some way. That would be a case where the Agency's interest g 1 | would be at stake. 2 "9 | My question is, do you know whether in a case of that kind : & : 7 Mr. Dulles. would have made an effort to represent the Agency's | . = a position to the Warren Commission? ! : al Mr. Angleton. No, I don't think so. I think that you : z é 7 have to first keep in mind that Dulles was oretty much his own | & | man. He was an attorney with Sullivan and Cromwell. He was : - oH 4 | about as independent a man as I know when it came to questions 2 soe his personal integrity. He wasn't a person who tried to | : co | compromise a lot of things, if I can put it that way. | | €@ eZ 39 : Commission he did not give the President an answer right away. | ioe] CoS) i In other words, he raised with the President, according to what any | | | When it got down to something as serious as going on the | I | | i he told me, because he called me the very day he got back from i whereever he was up in New York and had received a call from wo daa ws ot ORTING COMBINY B 2 | ~ oe SLUBASON R HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 103
25 ~99 the President, and he recounted to me the fact that he had nm i | | raised all these conflicts, possible conflicts, in the public | eye if he took that job. | 4) _ We kicked that around as to the pros and cons. I. knew ass he wanted the job. Like anyone in retirement this was a | challenge to him and so on. But I think by way of character, . | there would be no loyalties to the Agency or anybody else | ree) superseding his mandate from the President. tT 2AN2% (202) $54-2945 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me who you a document that corre- a.€ ~~ sponds with JFK Exhibit F-529 at the Committee's final hearings _ of basis for the question that I just asked you. I would ask you VASHTNGTON, This document actually is one that we reviewed that was the to skim two paragraphs. Read the third one and the fourth a bit more carefully and then we will talk about it. | | | REPORTERS BUTELDING, be ! \ | | | Mr. Angleton. I don't think that necessarily changes | anything that I said. What I am trying to say is that I am | SU, and the doubts on Nosenko were expressed, whether it was the certain if he believed that this was a proper course on it». Bureau talking to him or anybody else talking to him, that he i would still be persuaded by the facts, not by the fact that 2ng 7TH STREET, a | § i { : { | 7 it was the Agency. | Mr. Goldsmith. The third paragraph there simply suggests. i : | 23 | the possibility that Mr. Dulles was attempting to represent the interest of the Agency and the Committee was. concerned zi i with (a), whether that. was more than just a possibility, SOMB ARTY HW 50955 DocId:39263411 Page 104 Bhar eS
100 , | whether it was a fact, and (b), to what extent that was preva-, 3 : lent? 7 Mr. Angleton. I will say this. If there was anything in a 4 ! that memorandum that he regarded as being detrimental to the : , | | = si Commission's work, my view is that there would have been an | : 7 explosion and he would have exploded. S : Mr. Goldsmith. By that you mean then that he would he : z a | giving priority to the work of the Commission rather than to ; | the Agency? | | | .. | Mr. Angleton. And I think in there he is giving priority| 3 | : 1 | to the Commission. Wheaver briefing he received -- I was 2 2 unaware of the meeting that is being referred to here but I : x : 12 | am ‘just saying that he was obviously persuaded, if there were | = ta these doubts on the Nosenko thing, that this thing, the contror = 1g | versy as to bonifides, that it would -- I mean, it was one of | a) it . { : 13 those kinds of things that would be detrimental to a finding ; = 7 | of the Commission. : « | . i : . Mr. Goldsmith. T would like to have tnat marked as _ - 9 | Angleton Exhibit Number 1. : : ” (the above referred to document was marked Angleton : 7 a Exhibit Number 1 and follows) | HY 50955 Docld: 32263411 Page 105
27 101 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Dulles had any re special arrangement with Mr. Helms? 3 | Mr. Angleton. No. I was never present with both of them together. I don't know the content of any of their meetings { : | ‘people. That was by force of his own personality. 2 3 | so far as I can recall. - ~ : / Mr. Goldsmith. What role did the Mexico City station g powers the Agency's investigative effort? ~ ) i & 3 | “Mr. Angleton. It had a very important role for two | . ; | reasons. One, Win Scott was the Chief of the Mission down : 1g there, was pwerhaps one of the more capable officers we had. | g 1 | He had been in the FBI. He was a very highly intelligent man .| 2 1 He had assets, to wit, the overage, sources. If you had to : r : 13 grade stations across the board in terms of different kinds of| : ta | coverage or assets or agents or whatnot, I would give him a ; 1 ! very high batting average. He was a real professional. | S i : ma Further, he had an. excellent relationship with the FBI . = 17 | which had a huge station down there, and I would say a lesser E 48 man would not have been on speaking terms with them because : = | ter hag once owned the Western Hemisphere in terms of juris- | - wy |ddetion and it was with some reluctance, so to speak, that they’ : — -1] transferred it to CIA. So he was highly regarded by the FBI o | ae : —_ - LS 8 ae | 23! Mr. Goldsmith. The Mexico City Station had a major role? a ss | Mr. Angleton. Yes... i ad 23 : Mr. Goldsmith. I take it one reason is because Oswald C
2 4 4 wt = § pa a) ia i a a 6 = ford 1 a 7 nl os a a = L&™ g 9 i} ° fal 2 [c S Pa g = = ou a <<. = +4 de . cS = E i : a be — = : =< tA i=. wt = a = z 13 2 = 14 Ss a \F = i = : 2) = 19 = ‘eo : = 20 qt Hv BS aan 50955 Bocld: 102 had visited Mexico City? Mr. Angleton. That is right. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you review the cable traffic that flowed when the Mexico City station and headquarters after the! assassination? Mr. Angleton. I saw a lot of jumbled messages. I saw an awful lot of meassages that always seemed to be contentious ‘and that is the only way I can describe them. Mr. Goldsmith. Contentious in what way? Mr. Angleton. In the sense of headquarters saying cer=- tain things to Mexico and coming back and overlapping. I never was able to sort out, I don't know that I saw all the Gables but there seemed to have been a lot of confusion. Mr. Goldsmith. Let me see if I can summarize that > accurately. You saw a lot of cables. You did not see all of them, is that correct? Mr. Angleton. I don't know if I saw all of them. There was no reason why I should see all of them because I think on some occasions Win would telephone directly or.the station would telephone him directly. Mr. Goldsmith. Would Mr. Rocca have reviewed all the headquarters? Mr. Angleton. If they sent it to him, yes, if we were on the dissemination. i i : | | i i ‘cable and dispatch traffic between the Mexico City station and!
103 ' , Mr. Goldsmith. I take it after Mr. Helms'corder that the: nw CI Staff would have been on the dissemination. 5 tay $e ore : Mr. Angleton. We probably would have been. You see, | every station chief had the privilege of what is called "eyes | = on cable" in different categories of dissemination that cable | : / people only follow what the code word’is. They don't know ! S ry eee Helms! order in that sense. | Z a | Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that the cables were | : 5 contentious. . Was there any conflict apparent in those cables | 3 - between Mexico City station and headquarters? | : 1 | Mr. Angleton. When I use the word contentious it may be | = | $ 4 | crerieiog it but I can remember somebody saying, "have you Q : +4 | done this or that?" Or demanding that you send it up here | E ra | or something. I can't give you details. All I meant is that | : 1g | Win was usually the tidiest of men. tn other words, he always: é 1 had a big fat In box but he never left, regardless of an | 4 | appointment or anybody else, until he finished his day's work. : al He was a prodigious worker. | : a | : 2 | | So, what I am trying to say is that having been down there : 20 | and seeing him function at one time when there was some pro- | a " blem with the Bureau and all that, i had the highest regard : for the way he ran-his outfit. ; Mr. Goldsmith. How common was it for Scott or anyone else in the Mexico City station during the aftermath of the assassi+ i z3 | nation to communicate with headquarters personnel ~~ a i A Hf 4 y 4 a
td A 4 wt = 3 Me i a P wt io} = ~ a 7 to z = a S ™ . rat a ¥ a * A 2 t0 S cand g = tw pany as a x cs = * ¢ . = 33 = =z t4 n a io. Fat - = 1s 2 = 8 > a“ VF & ia = oy = 19 ~ e Se 729 _ 21 ne ae yi e @ HW 50955 Docld: ; ye wens ewne o: i t i b I } i 1 | i | { t i at a 32963411 Page 109 _phonically relative to the assassination? 104 telephonically? Mr. Angleton. It was very rare. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever communicate with them tele- | Mr. Angleton. I don't think so, no. I mean, I wouldn't have the right to. | | Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against Soviet and Cuban Embassies and consuldtes? Mr. Angleton. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Was information regarding Oswald obtained as a result of these operations? Mr, Angleton. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what information was obtained | Mr. Angleton. Unless I saw the cables I could not tell | you precisely what was obtained. I know that there was infor-) mation about his going into the Soviet Embassy. In other ! words, there was both telephonic and other surveillance of some : sort. Mr. Goldsmith. Photographic? | Mr. Angleton. Photographic surveillance. | Mr. Goldsmith. -Do you know whether this information was : given to the Warren Commission? Mr. Angleton. I think the substance of everything was given to the Warren Commission.
31 105 . Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission’ i H was told about the specific surveillance operation? Mr. Angleton. I don't really know whether they were in | ae ase question about whether to. black: out the background behind the face or soemthing so that it could not-be identified in -terms of location. | | the end. The reason I Say that is because I can remember a | | Mr. Goldsmith. .Your answer is that you do not know ame 6) about the surveillance operation? : whether or not the Warren Commission was told specifically | | { | | been told in the sense -- I mean, it stands toreassn that they | | Mr. Angleton. No. My feeling is that they must have | : more and more about the coverage and all that. | | Mr. Goldsmith. We have made reference now to a photo- \ | . oe , . | would be pressuring, the attorneys would be pressuring, to know graph. Why don't we start examining some of the cable traffic: t H that is available to me. I am going to be making reference } : b. to the documents by the Agency. Essentially the Agency has Fo documents by their numbers, The numbers have been assigned: assigned the numbers for security purposes so that every docu-! ij t 31 _ Ment that. is given to the Committee can be accounted for. For. ‘ fl 300 7th SYREN’, S.4f, REPORTERS BULLDING, WASHINGTON, D.C, 29024 (202) 954-2345 ts i ey ) { ane ye convenience purposes I have taken those security numbers and i i ue'y rt j* Fy $3 ~ rouse the for reference purposes in this deposition. At this time we are going to refer to CIA document number. 4 At 33,177, which is a cable dated 9 October 1963.— The 177 appears HW 50955 Docld: 32263411 Page 110
32 106 Gable. m2 i a at the bottom right. I would ask you to read that particular | Now, the second paragraph of that cable makes reference ' | i ! : to photograph and it gives as description of someone. The E o description, however, does not correspond to Lee Harvey oswala, 5 5 Do you have any information concerning the descrepancy between! 3 "| Oswald and the description given of him in tnat second para~ | S 2 | graph? | | Mr, Angleton: No;,. it does=not mean anything to mes. ..: : : of Mee Goldsmiths Was the Agency. ever-ableito learn. the: : nt identity of the! individual. to whom reference is made in the | $ 9 second paragraph? i - Hh 2 14 “Mr. Angleton. I don't know. | ~ | . = td | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when the Warren Commission was n i oO a rs | told about these photographs to which reference is made in | 2 Ho . i z 1 the the second paragraph? - | . 7 | “Mr. Angleton. No. I mean, I don't know when. | : a -. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that they were told about | . the picture but you don't know when? | | ¢ 2 Mr. Angleton. I heard much about the picture but I still cae 2! don't have a coherent picture of the picture. | | oh gal 2 - Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA Number 2139. This | 23 | is a memo dated 5 March 1964 for the attention of Richard | 1 Y 24 | Helms. Raymond Rocca is the author of the memo. | 23 Mr. Angleton. Who gave it this title? | HW 430955 Docld: 32963411 Page 111
33 Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me? t ' mo | Mx. Angleton. Who gave it this title? | 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. I don't know who gave it the title. That 44 ds a xerox copy of the document in the form that we found it 2 | to be in the Oswald file. | ; 5 Mr. Angleton. “Where is the reference to -- | 3 ‘> | - Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. | : 7 | Mr. Angleton. Where is the reference? Where is Rankin's| ; 4 letter which has been referred to? | | : 1G Mr. Goldsmith. i will make that letter available to your : al Mr. Angleton. I can't get it in the context. | = I . : : H $ i Mr. Goldsmith. tet me as you this question which I do | : 1 not feel requires reference to that letter. ) = ta The second paragraph clearly makes reference to those ! : 18 photographs? | | a : ' = 1 Mr. Angleton. Let me finish this because I only got this) 7 | far. : . | 7. . . . Mr. Goldsmith. I am only going to ask you a question - =. - 9 about the second paragraph. 7 . | ¢ 20 | Mr. Angleton. it starts off here, paragraph two of the ! nO letter, this says "this is in response to paragraph three of | this letter." | if you feel you have a need to see it. Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will make the letter available d ts. | i } | i | Mr. Angleton. Yes sir. yaa tre 1 i AY i + HW 50955 Docld: 32263411 Page 112
HW 30935 rao] a3 : dap cory 2002% €202) 354-2345 ~ D.C, WW, REPORTELS BUTLDING, WASHINGTON, ie = s < — oN 390 Pr STREDT, oO wa ban Hi Docld: 38263411 Page 113 it means, wait out what? I have to see what Rankin -- ‘letter. Later on in the same paragraph it says "We have either | 34 108 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the second paragraph of that memo makes reference to the photographs that were the subject of : the controversy. According to the second paragraph there was | apparently an inclination on your part to "wait out the | Commission" with regard to its request for these photographs. | Mr. Angleton. Does it say that? : Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read the relevant sentence to you. | Mr. Angleton. I don't read it that way. I don't see what Mr. Goldsmith. Otherwise it refers to "Jim would prefer to wait out the matter covered in paragraph two of that letter — Mr. Angleton. Which I don't know anything about. Mr, Goldsmith. I understand that. I will show you the i passed in substance to the Commission in response earlier levies for the items referred to, reported leades. For example, the famous six photographs which were not of Oswald.” ! i i I am asking you,: inireference to these six photographs i ' ' i t i i which were not of Oswald, was there any inclination on your part not to provide those materials to the Warren Commission? | Mr, Angleton. I really can't answer you until I see what! paragraph two means. I don't even know whether paragraph two : refers to the photographs because here it says “Wé-have either, passed material in substance to the Commission", which I assume is what I am referring to, in other words. wnat I am saying
35 109 j is that whatever I am objecting to seems to have already been | passed in substance. 2 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I won't quarrel with that. I won't. 7 Guarrel with you fat all. It does say that it was passed in ; 2 5 substance. Perhaps the best thing to do would be to get the | 3 s Rankin letter for you to review and then we will come back | g 7 | to this point later on. . | « | Mr. Angleton. All right. | e : | Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of Oswald's contact with the 1g | Embassies in Mexico City, was that contact considered to be | : 1 significant and important in any way by the iiexico City i : 12 | station? | ih Z 3 || Mr. Angleton. I think all contacts were. | 2 TA | Mr. Goldsmith. All contacts with whom? ! a Mr. Angleton. Americans. | 2 i | = a Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Win Scott about | i‘ tr | Oswald's trip to Mexico City? i « t : . . | z ‘3 Mr. Angleton. No, not to my knowledge. | 7 . 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 179 which is a as | calbe dated 10 October 1963. It is three pages. Now, this ! a —- ay cable contains a correct description of Oswald in the first ; ce anne 22 ; paragraph. Do you know what the source of that correct | 23 description would have been? ho Ge 14 | Mr. Angleton. It looks like it might have been Navy or the Bureau.
36 | 110 ; Mr. Goldsmith. Would that information have been obtained; from his 201 file, do you think? 3 | Mr. Angleton. I would assume so. Wait just one minute. 7 Let me see what the dissemination was on this. This wasn't | = 7 to Egeter. She worked for me. CIA liaison Roman in draft. | ~ . : 1 r é | Does that mean that she was acting as Liaison? So they had | E | a role? : z 2 _ 4 Mr. Goldsmith. Would they have had access to the 201 e | | : 3 ! file? | | | ! : 19 Mr. Angleton. Yes, but they would have access to the ' : M1 | 201 file but the originator here is a fellow from WH Division, = 13 | Bustov. | a z 1 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Charotte Bustoft? | 2 ts \ Mr. Angleton. Charlotte. i. n i a | Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know her? | 2S it 3 7 Mr. Angleton. No. ! z 7 Mx. Goldsmith. The first paragraph also makes reference : | te Oswald by the name "Lee Henry Oswald?” Taat has become | : 7 somewhat subject of controversy by the Warren Commission : § , | exitics. Do. you know how the Agency ever started to refer to 3 H os __ Ys si Mr. Angleton. I would like to -- when I look at this, ee i ‘ /X¢ es cand | " Oswald by an incorreet middle name? . it i | | this is obviously a -- the memo starts getting down here to | f i | ry me ; { i i ; 23 | Therefore, I assume that is either State or Navy. I mean, birth date and all that. It looks like passport information. } .
3 background information concerning Oswald's defection. Would | | that have escalated the significance of his contacts with the | E 7 Soviets in Mexico City, in your opinion? | a 7 | Mr. Angleton. Let me see that again. I think that would g "| be a solid trace. In other words, it would be from Scott's | F | point of view a matter of considerable interest. » ; Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that? | : fo | Mr. Angleton. Because it does not read like a lot of | Z i third hand information. It looks like it is pretty solid | Z 12 | information. It is not a lot of allegations and so on. | ee : 43 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Scott be concerned about the 3 al fact that Oswald was a defector? I guess I am asking you to | 2 il = sl state the obvious. _. : = a Mr. Angleton. He had been: .in-countérintelligence all his) = 17 | life and he had handled an awful lot of Soviet cases. - al | Mr. Goldsmith. The last sentence of pagraph five indi- , : °| cates "Please keep headquarters advised of any further nodes ¢ 0 contacts or positive identification of Oswald." | H | 1! : Assuming that the Mexico City station,.-prior to the j & ca? 33 : assassination, knew that Oswald had also contacted the Cuban | HY 0955 37 lil somebody who had a record on him. is Mr. Goldsmith. The next paragraph makes reference to headquarters and by using the words or the phrase "assuming he tas i { | 23! Embassy, should that information have been communicated to t { i I | that Mexico City station knew", I mean actual knowledge, they |. Docld: 32263411 Page 116 SLOQES SON BEBORTING COMPANY ©
38 112 had linked the contact of an individual with the Cuban Embassy, specifically Oswald, should that information have va { 3 || been communicated to headquarters? Mr. Angleton. You mean if they thought the same. indi- 2  . | vidual hwere had been in touch with the Cubans? a 5 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. een a S | Mr. Angleton. Sure. a 4 Mr. Goldsmith. I note at the bottom left hand corner Ss 4 D> of the document that Thomas Karamessines was the releasing officer. Why would someone as high up in DDO as Karamessines | | have been the releasing officer for a cable of this kind? { . . | Mr. Angleton. I think that the reason for that would be that when you have more than one division involved plus a staff and all that, he probably wanted to have his finger on | REPORTERS BUTLDING, WASHINGTON, B.C. iste ub, 16 Mr. Goldsmith. What other: division besides DDO was | | Ss. 7 involved here? E 7 Mr. Angleton. SR Division. Since the fellow was from 2 \g | Russia and all that Russian background it. would be involved. : ell ‘Mr. Goldsmith. We have Western Hemisphere units con- ——- ne cerned and also Soviet Russian units concerned? SS Mr. Angleton. Thae is right. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Mexico City sta- tion ever obtained a tape’ recording of Oswald's voice? . WwW bee Mr. Angleton. I would assume so but I don't know. I
39 113 i t assume they did when they talked about that previous informa- tion you showed me. Wait a minute. Let me recapitulate: to 3. "According to so and so American spoke proken Russian 4 and said his name was so and so." It was obviously a tape. 2 5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if there were any tape record : pi : ings of Oswald's voice in existence at the time of the assassit 3 7 nation? | | z a ) Mr. Angleton. I don't know. ; 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you a letter dated. | : ‘a | November 23, 1963 which I regret is not in very good form, | Z MH | in other words, a poor ‘xerox. The letter is from Mr. Hoover : 2 12 to the head of the Secret Service. I am only going to ask | | i 2 7m you to read one paragraph in it. starting.at the bottom of page| E ra four, going on to page five. If you have difficulty reading : = tg this, I will be glad to read it to. you. : = té - Mr. Angleton. This is from whom to whom? | = 17 | Mr. Goldsmith. This is. from Mr. Hoover. to Mr. Rowley of : E 1a the Secret“Service. : , | | 15 | , -Mr. Angleton. I can't read it. | € 20 -Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read it then and I apologize for 31 | the poor form. ' . th ge? 74 "The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October | 23 | 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source has reported that an | a 24 : idnvidual identified himself as Lee Oswald contacted the : a3 ' Soviet Embassy in Mexico City."
40 114 j Then it is sanitized. The next relevant sections are nm as follows: Special agents of this Bureau who have conversed | i with us from Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the a individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These special agents are of the opinion htat { i { -In other words, the substance of this paragraph suggests 4% ! | P the above referred to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald." 20024 (202) SS%~2945 — that there was a tape recording that was listened to after the <b assassination by FBI agents. The recording purported to p.c. i . contain Oswald's voice but the agents were of the opinion that it was not Oswald's voice... Do you have any information con- cerning this issue? Mr. Angleton. No. Does; that indicate whose tape it is? i ; - | Mr. Goldsmith. It does not. The inference is that it is) a CIA tape. Frankly, this is a sanitized document. REPORTERS BUTEDING, WASHTHCTON , o i i ‘ i i t f t ‘ Su, 7 . Mr. Angleton. I wondered if the Bureau had a tape. | ‘Mr. Goldsmith. The inference here is tnat at the time boy 3 i i t ‘ 1g) the Bureau was in possession of the tape. | | - Did the CIA's Mexico City station ever obtain a photograph . | 390 Tru STRET, Oo io | of Oswald as a result of its. photo-surveillance operation | against the Soviet and Cuban Consulates? - ea al £27 3 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. — Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that they should have obtained a photograph of Oswald in light of the scope of the Sty AS / 4 Hod t3 be daa coverage? : HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 119
41 115 Mr. Angleton. I don't know how good the coverage was. i In other words, I don't know -- in those days cameras were not: i) hwat they are today, I mean in germs of automated or the type f - , | that takes one ver minute. I don't know what it was set > 3 ‘to. be | | | } : z a 6) Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you have no pe-sonal know- | “ | ° S " ledge of this? Sg! Mr. Angleton. No. I don't know whether this is a movie | g | be - 9 } ox still. ° | a | | 2 oi il Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Win Scott = | " ; | = 1 | whom I take it you regarded as an extremely competent indi- = 34 vidual? | - “| ; «3 . : : ! HE = 44 | Mr..Angleton. Yes. = | , : Z ota | Mr. Goldsmith. Was Win Scott well known for maintaining id | = A | Eo og | an extremely thorough record system? 9 ~ i = re Mr. Angleton. He was. He was always fighting the “A al administration part of the Agency, who always wanted to reduce). - | , — . = ta the files or burn stuff and so on. | = 13 | Mr. Goldsmith. The administration people wanted to burn : é = files and he was inclined to keep them? } mo : j | 1 Mr. Angleton. Yes. . Ra } ce x27 x Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where his files are stored? ! 224 Mr. Angleton. He had a big office. i | Mr. Goldmith. In Mexico City? ‘ Mr. Angleton. Yes. , | HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page i120 ALS 2230
42 116 . : | Mr. Goldsmith. Did Win Scott also maintain materials in | | 8 2 anpersonal safe? 3 | Mr. Angleton. I am certain that he dia. | a i 4 | Mr. Goldsmith. .Do you know where that safe was? | \ ree Mr. Angleton. I don't know but I know it would certainly! = | | = P | be under his eye and it would be:zin his office, I would assume} cs 7 Mr. Goldsmith. After Win Scott's death did you ever visit = | | =, 2 | Mexico City for the purpose of removing materials from Win . 5 | Scott's safe?. 3 74 . | - 19 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I visited there but not for the pur- | = ‘ i | S : i g 7 | pose of removing stuff from the safe. $ 1 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the general purpose of the visit? a = 13 | Mr. Angleton. Well, number one, I was appointed as an = ta | official by Dick to go down there to the funeral. Number two, | = 1s 1 Win was going to write a book, a manuscript. My purpose was. = | | = | 1 to go down and get all copies of the manuscript. | | - 17 Since I was a close friend of his and I knew his wife and : = 12 all that, I combined both things and talked to her and | . 5 | explained our position on it. eS 39 | Mr. Goldsmith. Were you able to obtain this manuscript? =] | Mr. Angleton. Yes. OR aaa 4 A G e279 3 i Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have occasion to review it at i i 33 | all? ft i @ 22 4 Mr. Angleton. I looked through it. He made more than 72 i one draft. : [ i a 4 i i ' i HW 50955 Docld:322963411 Page 121 “. ses . waaay ALESNSON RESORTING COMPAN:
43 117 H ‘ | Mr. Goldsmith. What was the general purpose of the manu- script, to give an account of his experience with the Agency? 3 Mr. Angleton. Well, it was sort of a last will and ; testament of an operator in which a lot of it was camoflaged” | = ; | and romanticized into a story. It had a plot and all that. nu | ; 5 5 Win had written under a pseudonym some seven stories of his S 7 youth’ in Alabama which were sort of Mark Twainish. He had & , | at privately printed. ; 5) It was an extremely good book. TI think that he was try- | : ot ing to write a mystery novel but at the same time he was mak- | 3 1 | ing a lot of observations about the world of espionage and | =. oo: i < a me in particular. Ee : =r Mr. Goldsmith. — Was this particular manuscript ever | ae = 14 published? : | Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge. =) it : ra Mr. Goldsmith. Was it intended to be a fictional or 3 tT nonfictional account? - ; 7 = 13 : Mr. Angleton. . Both. — I mean, it was fictional but it | - 7 was recognizable. I mean, anyone who was in the business would £ 10 | have recognized a great deal in it. | | we 2! oe Mr. Goldsmith. How did the Agency know that Scott was | genes writing that manuscript? | 333 ‘Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I know that his wife, as I recall, his wife didn't know he was writing. I don't know ais / ‘ a re) precisely how we found out, whether he told us or how it came ‘ ppm pene gem eS TENG CONE SY HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 122 ALi RASGN REPORT
44 118 to us. I knew at one time but it slips my mind precisely ee | how we knew. Mm Mr. Angleton. None of them. 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you obtain any materials other than 4 | this manuscript? | | = 5 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I can't remember. I know | 3 P I got an awful lot of material which I turned over to the | 3 5 | Chief of Mission down there to dispatch back through the E a ; pouch. | | - 3 : Mr. Goldsmith. Do. you recall how long the manuscript | z 19 | was? How many pages? g 74. | Mr. Angleton. It was sort of thickish,- about that. thick. = ho - $ 12 (Indicating). I can't tell how many drafts there were. fs 2 13 Apparently it was far’ from being finished. It was well on -- = tA Mr. Goldsmith> Did he ever discuss it with you? & i = 1g | / Mr, Angleton. No. EE Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't we take a brief recess now or | = IT | perhaps Miss Brady will resume questions. “I will review some. ' a | . i g 13 materials that have been provided to me by the Agency. I might 19 | add that so far as I am concerned, we are in. pretty good shape £ 39 in terms of time. | . i ee 1! Miss. Brady. ‘pia you have any contact with Bernard i ry * 2S x | Barker, Howard Hunt or Eugenio Martinez during your CIA career? 23 | Mr. Angleton. Who was the first one? | @ 24 Miss Brady. Benard Barker. | ;