104-10333-10014 out 10% : - : . : a : . Sots ot . 2 ae Assassination Records Review Board < = 600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530 # eo _ (202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457 “lew so" . ‘June 9,.1997 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO . DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION - Stewart B. Aly | IN THIS DOCUMENT. Jonel James R. Moore, Jr., US.A. Associate Deputy General Counsel , Information Management Officer, Office of General Counsel DCSPER (DAPA-ZX) Department of Defense ' 300 Army Pentagon, Room 2D749 + 1600 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-0300 Washington, DC 20301-1600 Re: Proposal fora Multi-Agenty Declassification Review of Joseph Califano’ S Army | Papers under the JFK Act 0 Gentlemen: The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to declassify six boxes of Army records from the files of Joseph Califano. The files date. principally from the period 1962-63, during which Mr. Califano served as Army General Counsel and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The records had been deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration, where they were recently located. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities related to Cuba, is attached hereto. We have identified what appears to us to be equities of numerous military entities in the Califano papers as well as equities of the _ Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Information Agency, and others. Deadlines Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board’s current sunset date of September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the records.’ We have slated the Califano papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997 meeting. The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt and efficient re review of the Califano papers. 'The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the Proposed extension, we may be able to revisit the schedule Proposed t below. ‘Boaan Memaans;: John A. Tunheim, Chair + Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall « William L. Joyce ° Anna K, Neison Execurive Diaecron: David G. Marwell —
13-00000 - Messrs. Aly and Moore June 9, 1997 Page2 — Preliminary Review of Califano Papers The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection; second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the information in other contexts; and third, the Califano papers contain equities of _ humerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral process, would be very difficult and time-consuming.’ Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number _ of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records. Proposal In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an ' alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of the Califano papers. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies with equities in the Califano papers be concurrently present for _ adeclassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to otlier — ‘agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with each other and quickly to resoive questions. Becatuse the Califano papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6 meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Army and the *Ms. Toni Bowie, of the Army Declassification Activity, spent three days reviewing some of the records and making recommendations for referrals to other agencies both within and outside of the military. Although Ms. Bowie worked energetically for three days, it was our sense afterwards that, if we continue at the same pace, the agencies with equities will likely not be able to complete their reviews before the August deadline arrives.
13-00000 Messrs. Aly and Moore’ _ June 9, 1997 Page 3 Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the fecords while Army and DoD make arrangements forall appropriate military entities to be present. , We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a Pee rtanity te reve and elect thee rai ano Papers to Ravean opportunity to review and declassify their equities. I look forward to discussing this issue with you. | cc: Steven D. Tilley, NARA J. Barry Harrelson, CIA Nina Noring, State Richard S. Werksman, USIA William Leary, NSC ‘Carol Keeley, FBI
13-00000 e . JOSEPH CALIFANO PAPERS (6 boxes) Identified by Steve Tilley at NARA, these 6 boxes of papers, almost exclusively from 1962-63, were either generated by, or addressed to Joseph Califano, who at this time was Department of the Army General Counsel and Special Assistant to the Secretary of _ the Army. Most of the documents are short summaries of proposed policy positions, or letters of transmittal, with voluminous appendices attached. Each of the 6 boxes ‘contains approximately 1500-2000 pages of material. Representative Topics: () (2) -@) (4) 6) (6) ICCCA Gnterdepartmental Coordinating C Committee of Cuban A ffairs—the “Cottrell Committee”) meetings on future US. policy toward Cuba. These - documents are generally background papers prepared prior to meetings, — minutes of meetings, or follow-on discussion of action items assigned at meetings of the ICCCA. . Contingency plans for Cuban invasion by the US. military i in the event of a Cuban uprising. Psychological warfare against Cuba. Diplomatic initiatives intended to increase isolation of Cuba. Biographies, and evaluations of Cuban exile leaders. - Intelligence reports and estimates on reported events inside Cuba. (7) Summaries of clandestine paramilitary actions taken against Cuba, and — suggestions for possible future actions. Apparent Equities: Ninety-five per cent of the documents appear to have multiple-agency equities, usually 4 to 6 agencies per document. Based upon staff review, it is estimated that 80% of the documents have State equities, 60% Joint Staff or OSD, 60% NSC, 60% CIA, 15% Army, Navy or Air Force, perhaps 10% DIA, and a small percentage of USIA, Justice, Treasury and FBI. Horne e:\wp-docs\Califano.wpd Pile: 4.0.4
13-00000 ° JOINT: STAFF PAPERS (147 documents) : Using brosid topic guidelines provided previously by ARB staf the Joint Staff at the Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefe Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell Taylor, and Barle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962 5 and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe may be relevant to the assassination. . Topics: . (1) ICCCA (interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs) meetings regarding future US. policy toward Cuba. (2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert paramilitary operations against Cuba. ‘ (3) . Cuban coup planning. | (4) ~ Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu. (5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam). (6) US. military strength levels in Vietnam. Apparent Equities: Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document—usually State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB-. staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection; upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review. Home e: \wp-docs \Jointstaff: wed File: 4.0.4
13-00000 Assassination Records Review Board 600 E Street NW « 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530 (202) 724-0088 « Fax: (202) 724-0457 # Cy RAS 8) OBJECTION TO TELASSIFICATCN ANOD/OR heen ‘ASE OF G4 INFORMATION THES DOCUMENT Stewart F. Aly . Mr. Edmund McBride - - Associate Deputy General General Counsel - Chief, Information Management Office of General Counsel Division. Department of Defense Joint Secretariat 1600 Defense Pentagon Joint Staff © Washington, DC 20301-1600 The Pentagon, Room 23917 Washington, DC 20318-0400 Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor. and Wheeler, and Selected JCS Central:Files: Gentlemen: The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to ‘ declassify approximately 147 records previously flagged by the Joint Staff from both the JCS Central Files, and the papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler. The files date principally from the period 1961-64. The records were flagged during searches directed by Mr. Edmund McBride (Chief, Information Management Division, - - Joint Staff) at the request of the ARRB staff. With one exception, ARRB staff feels that . all records flagged by Mi. McBride’s working group are relevant to the historical understanding or context of the assassination of President Kennedy. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to US. activities related to Cuba, or to Vietnam policy, is attached hereto. We have identified what appear to us to be equities of numerous military entities in these papers, as well as equities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council, and others. Deadlines _ Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board’s current sunset date of September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the - secords.' We have slated these papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997 meeting. 'The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of | ‘the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may Boaro Memanas: John R. Tunheim, Chair > Heary & Graff + Kermit 1. Hall + William L. Joyee » Anna K. Nelson Executive Giaecron: David G. Marwell!
13-00000 Messrs. Aly and McBride June 9, 1997 Page2 The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt and efficient review of these selected papers of Joint Chiefs Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and the Joint Staff Central Files? _ Preliminary Review of Papers of JCS Chairmen and Joint Staff Central Files The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection; second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the information in other contexts; and third, these papers contain equities of numerous ; . military and rion-military agencies, which, under the standard referral process, would. ee be very difficult and time-consuming. Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records. Proposal In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of these papers of the three aforementioned JCS Chairmen and the JCS Central Files. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies with equities in these JCS/Joint Staff papers be concurrently present for a declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own be able to revisit the schedule proposed below. *The Joint Staff’s Initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board, dated February 6, 1997, identified in detail the process by which these records were located— namely, which files were searched, and who participated in the searches. Mr. Edmund McBride, Chief of the Joint Staff Information Management Division, indicated in this statement that the Joint Staff was standing by to expeditiously process these records for declassification in collaboration with other agencies when the ARRB was ready. ARRB staff has only recently completed its initial review of these records, which constitute selectively flagged folders within 40 boxes of JCS and Joint Staff records.
13-00000 Messrs. Aly and McBride June 9, 1997 Page 3 2 equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with each other and quickly to resolve questions. Because these papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at iis August 5-6 meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies - with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If.the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the records while the Joint Staff and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military’. - entities to be present. We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a plan that will provide all agencies with equities in these Joint Staff/JCS papers to have an opportunity to review and declassify their equities. ce: Steven D. Tilley, NARA J. Barry Harrelson, CIA Nina Noring, State William Leary, NSC
13-00000 JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents) Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for'1962. * and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical , understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe may be relevant to the assassination. Topics: (1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs) meetings regarding future US. policy toward Cuba. (2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert paramilitary operations against Cuba. ; (3) . Cuban coup planning. (4) ~ Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu. (5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam). (6) US. military strength levels in Viemam. Apparent Equities: | Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document—usually State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared to expeditiously process these documents for d. ification in collaboration with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection; upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review. Home e:\wp-docs\Jointstaff.wpd File: 4.0.4
13-00000 “is EDS. gy OED "L7208 FAX 202 724 0487 ARRB @ooi @ Road Assassination Records Review Board 600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor » Washington, DC 20630 (202) 724-0088 » Fax: (202) 724-0487 MEMORANDUM CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO a DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR Vi RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION Via Facaimile . IN THIS DOCUMENT July 2, 1997 FROM: Doug Horne, sent cts NSN SUBJECT:. Declassification Session for Califano Papers and Join Staff/JCS Records 1. The joint declassification session mentioned in our letters to the Army (re: thé Téseph Califano Papers) and to the Joint Secretariat (re: Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and selected JCS Central Files) of June 9, 1997 is scheduled to take place during the four-day window Monday, July 21-Thursday, July 24, inclusive. The first session will commence at 9:00 A-M. Monday morning, July 21, at the ARRB offices in room 207 of the Bicentennial Building, located at 600 E Street, NW : (at the corner of E Street NW and 6th Street). 2. Our offices are located equidistant from the following three Metro stations: Archives/Navy Memorial (Yellow Line); Judiclary Square (Red Line); and Gallery Place (Red Line). Parking Garages are located in the basement of the Bicentennial Building, and also across the street from us in the basement of the ARKP building, “ 3. Please fax the names, SSNs, and clearance information for CIA attendees to Tracy ' Shycoff on our staff at fax number (202) 724-0457 prior to close-of-business on Wednesday, July 16,1997. Please indicate on your visit request that the period of the visit is through the end of calendar year 1997, since it is anticipated that our efforts to expedite declassification of. these documents will take more than one session to ‘accomplish. 4. Welaa foward o working noperely with allafour sine th ntepie A ' Seago Memsses: John R. Tunheim, Chair Menry F. Graf « Kermit L. Mail - Willlam 1. doyee ° Anna K; Nelson Execuvive Omecrer: David @. Merwall
13-00000 Confidential 18 July 1997 Memorandum For: David G Marwell Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board Subject: CIA Reviewers - Clearance Certifications 1. The CIA review team for the joint declassification session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS records scheduled for July 21-24 is composed of the following individuals: Charles A. Briggs IC/DCI/CSI/HRG Kathleen Puchnick IC/DCI/CSI/HRG Richard D. Kovar IC/DCI/CSI/HRG S7DU7 ims ICc/DO/IMS — William Perkins IC/DO/IMS. 2. The Agency reviewers listed above have the appropriate clearances to review Joseph Califano's Army Papers and the selected JCS records and files. Official certification of the individuals' clearances will follow. If you have any questions concerning clearances in my_ absence, please contact (Barbara. Standley, 703 ~613~- “18063 SS oo “J. Barry Rakrelson-— ------—-” Project Officer, CIA JFK Review cL sy: (611637/ CL REASON:1.5(c) DECL ON: X1 DRV FROM: COV 2-82 / TH te Lp heaca Confidential JE [) ~ es 21 ply FF 7 \
13-00000 1 08/08/87 TUE 17:24 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB , ‘uul Assassination Records Review Board 600 E Street NW » 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 2056320 (202) 724-0088 » Fax: (202) 724-0457 CIA HAS NO @BJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR . RELEASE OF CiA INFORMATION Via F j ‘INTHIS DOCUMENT => August 5, 1997 TO: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG FROM: Doug Home, Assassination Records Review Board SUBJECT: Invitation to Next Declassification Session for Califano Papers and JCS Records ; a 1. 1 am writing to notify you that the next working session for joint declassification review of subject records in accordance with the standards of the JFK Act is scheduled for Tuesday, October 7 through Thursday, October 9, inclusive, in the ARRB conference room in our second floor offices at 600 E Street, N.W. 2. Our goals for this second session are to complete joint review of the JCS papers, and to open up for review two more boxes in the Califano collection. This seasion will also allow selected agencies (which were not able to complete review of documents available at the firet session) an opportunity to catch up. 3. We see a need for representatives of the CIA to continue to attend these sessions until they are completed. 4, Names and clearances need to be faxed to us only if the CIA attendees for this October session are different from those clearances passed to ARRB in July. Our point- of-contact and fax number for clearances is Tracy Shycoff, at (202) 724-0457. 5. For planning purposes, following this October session, our plans are to host one session per month, of 2 to 3 days duration each time, until the declassification review of the selected JCS papers and the Califano collection is completed. Agencies which require more time are welcome to make individual appointments to review these documents in-between the monthly, group sessions. Boaaw Memennss John A. Tuahelm, Chairs Henry & Geatf + Kermit L. Hall + William L. Joyce »« Anna K. Nelaon Guscunve Dussevou: David G. Marweli
13-00000 Assassination Records Review Board (202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 7246-0457 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO. .. : -BEGLASSIFICATION AND/OR * RWS RELEJ _ RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION . iN THIS DOCUMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN NOVEMBER 18, 1997 - (202) 724-0088, EXT. 253 The Assassination Records Review Board, an independent federal agency overseeing the identification, review, and release of records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, today released approximately 1,500 pages of previously classified military records from 1962-64 that relate to US. policy toward Cuba. , “These documents further expand the historical record by illustrating the United States government's deep interest in developing a policy that would force Castro from power during the early 1960's,” said Dr. Anna Nelson, a memiber of the Review Board. “We now have a new window into the policy options toward Cuba that were being considered and debated at the highest levels of the military services.” The mandate of the Review Board is to make the record surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy as complete as possible. The Board has aggressively sought to — uncover records on U.S. foreign policy that put the assassination into its historical context. The Review Board worked cooperatively with representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to locate records stored at NARA that met t the definition of being “assassination related.” The documents are from the fil me [2 ano served as General Counsel to the Secretary of the Army, the files of joint Chieis o| Staff Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler, and the central files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The records have been transferred to NARA for inclusion in the JFK Collection, which is housed at the NARA facility in College Park, Maryland. These documents are now available to researchers. Copies of selected documents are available from the Assassination Records Review Board, 600 E Street, NW, Second Floor, Washington, DC 20530; telephone number: (202) 724-0088. -~more- Boaro Memseas: John a. Tunheim, Chair + Henry F. Graff ¢ Kermit L. Hall ¢ William L. Joyce « Anna K. Nelson Executive Bernectea: 7. Jeremy Gunn ° Deputy Dinecten: Thomas &. Samoiuk 600 E Street NW + 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530 a
13-00000 The Assassination Records Review Board was .s established by the JFK Act, which was signed into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and sworn in on April- ‘11, 1994. The law gives the Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It is the responsibility of the Board to determine which records are to be made public immediately and which ones will have postponed release dates. The Review Board consists of the following members: Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; US. District Court Judge, District of Minnesota. Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University. Dr. Kermit L. Hall; Dean, College of ‘Humanities, and Professor of History at The Ohio - State University. , Dr. William L. Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and 1 Special Collections at Princeton University. . Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence at The American University. -30-
13-00000 Assassination Records Review Board 600 E Street NW + 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530 (202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN NOVEMBER 18,1997 — (202) 724-0088, EXT. 253 Attached are six selected documents from approximately 1,500 pages of military ‘records that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-64. The records are being 7: released today by the Assassination Records Review Board. Sections of the documents that may be of particular interest to the reader are ¢ marked aby arrows in the margin on the right side of the relevant pages. =. r List of Selected Documents 1. Excerpts from 198-10004-10020 Note: The Record Information Form (document cover sheet) for the compilation of documents in this group is dated 3/1/63, but the excerpted documents are from February 1962. “Possible Actions To Provoke, Harass, Or Disrupt Cuba” 2. Excerpts from 202-10002-10104 February 7, 1962, March 9, 1962, March 12, 1962, March 13, 1962, April 10, 1962 "Northwoods" documents 3. Excerpts from 202-10002-10018 May 1, 1963 “Courses of Action Related to Cuba" 4. Excerpts from 198-10004-10011 December 11, 1963 Memo to Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Secretary of the Army - "Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua" 5. Excerpts from 202-10002-10010 December 19, 1963 - “Meeting with President on Cuba" Beano Memsens: John R. Tunheim, Chair « Henry F. Graff » Kermit L. Hall » William L. Joyce » Anna K. Netson Executive Bsrecron: 7. Jeremy Guan + Daeuty Binsctoa: Thomas &. Samoluk ’
13-00000 * . 6.. Excerpts from 202-10002-10117 January 31,1964 “A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba” ©
13-00000 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER . ORIGINATOR FROM TO . TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE ‘CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS TE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Cuba Selected Documents #1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM 198-10004-10020 CALIFANO PAPERS DOCUMENT INFORMATION MULTIPLE 03/01/63 135 - 7 PLANNING AND POLICY, CUBA = POLICY OBJECTIVES, CUBA CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA LATIN AMERICA SECURITY ACTIONS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT oF SUBVERSIVES CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, CUBA OPERATION MONGOOSE BLOCKADE OF CUBA PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT UNCLASSIFIED OPEN IN FULL OPEN 10/07/97 Package of proposed Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 7. including operations actions to be used against Cuba, _ to apply pressure to the Cuban regime to oust Castro and potential reaction to us ‘involvement .
13-00000 POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, ‘~CUBA- i 1. Operation SMASHER: on Be Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and ; . commercial communications facilities in Cuba. ’ ; th b, Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of 8 4 “special” vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The tube, : . which is available, is virtually undetectable inasmuch a6 ites effectiveness is due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the bage of the tube. The chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor, 2. Operation FREE RIDE: Ssig net ctee, bee wa a. Objective: The objective is to create unrest and dissension amongst the Cuban people. ; or an ° b, Concept: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American ‘or KLM Gne-way airline tickets good for passage to Mexico City, Caracas, etc. (none to the U.S.). Tickets could be intermixed With other leaflets planned to be dropped, The number of tickets dropped could be increased, The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a time period, 3. Operation TURN ABOUT: a. Objective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that his value to the revolutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are * being made for his "removal", ‘ . b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the crecendo increasing until it culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism _ or hardware, m . Special Handling of this Parner is requested. Access should be limites? to idaivigusis requiring “< inate the information heroin in orde: ic anrry out their official duties. - sete Reproduction cf this doctr: or in pert is vruntatte “hE Permission of the issuing offies, tant, Say rhale PVT’ This desumont consists of ...___ pages. Bante a Se Copy # 4... of _. SS copys.
13-00000 4, -Operation DEFECTOR: Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to defect with equipment. a b. Concept: ‘This activity when properly planned and implemented has the a effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity, It also creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies, Could be accomplished by intelligence means and promise of rewards. 5. Operation BREAK-UP: a Objective: To clandestinely introduce corrosive materials to cause aircraft, vehicle or boat accidents. : .. ; em ee b. Concept: This activity, if possible: should be aimed primarily toward the 2 Fore nyt Soviet-provided aircraft. lf properly accomplished it would degrade confidence in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems and seriously affect combat capability. 6. Operation COVER-UP: a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Communist government of Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is merely @ cover. b. Concept: It should not be revealed as to what the cover is--this should Doo - be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation | DIRTY TRICK. : wt “7. Operation DIRTY TRICK: : the MERCURY manned orbit fiight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al Cuba, ; b. Concept: This tobe accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the. Cubans. g. Operation FULL-UP: a. Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated, 2
13-00000 3 3 3 ' bilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches = ::: be. Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological / agent into jet fuel storage facilities. This agent flourishes in jet fuel and grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank. 9.6 Operation PHANTOM: a Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government that _ Clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being regularly conducted. b. Concept: Thig to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT, AND JJ capa-, and air drops have been made in other areas. 10. Operation BINGO: « Objective; The objective is. fo. create. an incident which has, the appearance .... “of a an 5 attack on U.S, facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for - use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba. .b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside the confines of the Guantanamo Base. SNAKES simulate'an actual fire-fight and upon hearing such a sound it is entirely feasible that the immediate reaction on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would, with proper preparation, be followed by a counterattack and with adequate planning the base at G'Mo could disgorge military force in sufficient number to sustain itself until other forces, which had been previously alerted, could attack in other . areas. It is envisaged that a schedule of operations similar to the following ' would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its defeat: (1) Simulated attack on Guantanamo. (2) Word flashed to the President,. (3) President orders counterattack to include: , . (a) Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets « are ‘Cuban airfields. (b) Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communi- : cation in Cuba. {c) Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected . targets /landing areas. (d) Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to pre-selected targets. : (e) Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and further interdict lines of communication. (£) Ships and aircraft would land/airdrop troops and secure airfields, road/#ailterminals, etc.
13-00000 . (g) Resupply and replacement activities. Properly executed, the above could overthrow the Cuban Government in a matter of hours, providing the plan is implemented within the next six months. aj 1l. Operation GOOD TIMES: wo. a. Objective: To disillusion the Cuban population with Castro image by distribution of fake photographic material. ; b. Concept: Prepare a desired photograph, such as an obese Castro with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room im the - Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table briming over with the most delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as _ UMy ration is different.'' Make as many prints as desired on sterile paper and , ‘then distribute over the countrygide by air drops or agents. Thig should put even a Commie Dictator in the proper perspective ‘withthe Maderprivileged © MABSES. ; 12. Operation HEAT IS ON: - Be Objective: To create the impression with Castro Government that certain dyed-in-the-wool Red pilots are planning to defect, thus ; causing a detrimental tightening of security. + pada = bos +e ote Binae b. Concept: It is known that many Cuban refugee pilots are personally acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated Gastro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the Castro intelligence system the fact that these pre-designated Reds are planning to defect for monetary and/or ideological reasons. Security crackdown should help destroy Castro image and also impose unacceptable restrictions on” routine training activities. ances
13-00000 OPERATION: Invisible Bomb 2 The Air Force can utilize the operational characteristics of F-101 or other Century series aircraft to create the impression that anti-Castro 3 . opposition ia continuing. The aircraft operational characteristic to be ‘ exploited ie the “sonic-boom, " . OBJECTIVE: Be 1. To create the impression that isolated bombings are taking place e in Cuba thus maximising harrassment and confusion of the Castro govern- 2 ment. co CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: cad . ’ The "sonic -boom" can. be. employed in several different ways such as an * individual boom at selected spots or a Continuous boom and performed | at either high or low altitudes. It will cause not only apprehension but varying degrees of malicious damage as well,i.e. break all the windows on a street in Havana. 2 ene a Ae 4, The “sonic-hoom" effect can be maximized by planning missions _ for execution during the early morning hours when the populace is sleeping. The Cuban people are generally unfamiliar with this phenomenon, therefore it is felt that the impact for a time would be most beneficial. . 5. The directional aspects of the “sonic-boom" also make it feasible for use in simulating U.S. Naval gun-fire in the immediate vicinity of the Cuban land mass. _ 6 This operation is considered relatively safe and leaves no tangible evidence. It can be planned and executed with a minimum of effort and expense. Special Handling of this paper is requestca. Access should bo limited te inéividuels requiring the inforration herein.in order to curry cut their official duties. aproduction cf this docunent in whole or Gn part ia prohibited exsapt with . . permission of the issuing office. This document consists Of ——f--- - Grek & Be SeebeT Copy #.=4..-. of _-s eonyS , ; maehite et | —E—E—— 3aGas -
13-00000 e Operation "HORN SWOGGLE" —psxation "HORN SWOGGLE! Objective: 1, 6 crash or force down Cuban MIG aircraft wi ith an all weather intercept capability by communications intrusion, . , Concept of Operations: eproduction of this doevment in vhole , ep adn part, _ 2 Closely monitor MIG air/ ground communicatio of determining frequency and terminology usage for p operations, us for the purpose ractice or real GCI - 3. By use of overriding tranamitters and either a decoy aircraft or solid weather conditions, override ‘Cuban.controller and have Cuban refugee Pilot issue instructions: which-tun MIG out of. fuel.or-towardg Florida, - Puerto Rica, Jamaica, a carrier, ete, a Hin RAgieEE Wikeaiwuad bls) Access skovld be Lisitad the inforsution hercin in cider ie offdeisi duties. a5 prohibited exces gith permission of the issuing office. Pret 3 ° Be Copy # a oF za. Copy “* This decumont consists of ~£---— Pad
13-00000 a od off Sa ipreduction of this éacur _ Beet ¢ Operation TRUE BLUE 1. Objective: To degrade Castro and his government in the eyes of the . Cuban peopl& by communications intrusion, Concept of Operations: 2. By utilizing high powered transmitters in the vicinity of Cuba _ (Florida, Imagwa, Jamaica, aboard Naval ship) which have the capability of overriding commercial Cuban radio and TV stations, periodically degrade Castro and other government figures in the minds of the Cuban people. 3. The technique of communications. intrusion could be exploited by pre- taping or live broadcasts of anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda at station breaks, Castro speeches, etc. This idea envisions the use of a Cuban refugee to make such broadcasts and naturally would require close monitoring of stations to be worked. Any mumber of thoughts could be injected such as: ‘ a. “Guba Si, Russia No." | b. Communism exploits the masses, -¢. Communism is ruthless totalitarianism. d. Castro and henchment feast off the land while we are rationed. e. Castro and his reign of terror. f. Castro is a lunatic and should be put away. g. Gastro is the cause of all our troubles. h. Rise up against the pig Castro, etc. etc. 4. If approved this operation could become a continuous project, perhape under control of USIA. ae Special Eandling of this passer is reguasted. &ccess should be limited ts: | dividuals vegquiring the inforsiation herein iu crass te carry s.4 their official duties. | , sh fn vhole win part is prohibited onsen vith pornmission of the isnuin,: ofcise. ; enis document sousisiz of ft. pages: 8 Goat . bs wit we Copy # -L-— of Lun COFYB: Puck 2
fs, 13-00000 SS THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF . WASHINGTON 25, 0.0. ~ “ 2 February 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Edward G, Lanadale, USAF, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense ; Subject: Ideas in Support of Project The enclosed ideas are submitted for ‘ possible use in furtherance of the ob = Project. TI think some of th desire our group bo develop will do so, HH, CRAIG Brigadier General SA Bop Representatiy ; Caribbean Survey Group 6 encls , . lL. Operation Smasher(2Pages) (Ts) _ 2. Operation True Blue(1Page) (75) 3- Operation "Horn Swoggle"(1page (78) 4. Operation "No Love Lost" (lpage . (88) 5. Possible Actions to Provide, Harrass, or disrupt (4Pages)( TS) : 6. . Operation Invisible Bomb’ (1Page) (ts) EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RECRADING; DOD DIB 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY .
13-00000 a ; a, ; Wedd, . ¢ Opération "NO LOVE LOST" 1. Gbjective: To confuse and harrass Castro Cuban Pilots by use of radio conversations. ° 6 2. Concept of Operations: Fly Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft | in proximity of Cuba at ‘periodic intervala while communication monitoring wh oh Cuban air/ground frequencies utilized for airdrome control. Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft would personally know many of the pilots still flying for Castro. Refugee pilot. would get into argument with Castro pilots over radio thus distracting confusing, etc. Would be real trouble for Castro _ pilots in actual weather conditions. Argument could go, “I'll get you you . Red son-of-a-gun, " and call by name if appropriate. Sad w wee 4s roqestad. At s requiring der te caxry out their Snectal Handling of this never Aesess shon.d ba iinftad ts the inforuetécn herein in cz efificial duties. Reproduction Or in pay persaicsic., c This document consists ef f.---- PRses- Copy ¢ -f--- of SJ. Coys « Iunck
13-00000 ohh svar oieks e L Operation SMASHER. 1. Objective: Disrupt or disable military and commercial communications | facilities in Cuba. 2. Technical Requirements: _ a. Detailed information on both commercial and military.communi- cations facilities and capabilities, to include inside and outside plant construction, system networks, equipment detaile (i.e. circuitry, tubes, etc.) location and type of repeator stations. This information.is requiredto  _ — construct a refined device. , b. A Vacuum tube modified in such a manner as to cause a short circuit. This is. possible by inducing silicon carbide (7) inte the base of the tube. When the tube becomes hot the silicon carbide Uquifies and becomes a conductor; whem the tube codls the matter returns to a solid non-conductive state. Such a device (vacuum tube) is available. st 3. Tar gets: ‘a. Cuban Telephone Company. The company provides local and long ' distance telephone service throughout Cuba and also international telephone service. b. Radio Corporation of Cuba Avenida Carlos. The company provides radiotelephone service to American and European countries. It also provides radiotelegraph service and includes leased teleprinter channels. In conjunc- tion with AT&T the company inaugurated over~the-horizon microwave radio service between Cuba and Florida in 1957. This latter made available two-way TV channels. c. Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Founded by IT&T and ATKT, providing six (6) submarine cables linking Havana and Key West. Facility operates in conjunction with microwave link. d. Commercial Radio and Television Stations. e. Military Radio and Land-line Facilities. These include point-to- _ point command and administrative systems, air/ground facilities, navigational aids. Obviously certain commercial facilities provide service to the military therefore disrupting or disabling commercial facilities will affect military communications capabilities. Special Handling of this parer is requested. Access Should be limited to individnals requiring ‘production of this. document in whole the information Lersin in order to carry out their rin part is prohibited excapt with official duties. permission of the issuing office. Drch Ht Yt , This document consists of _. DATOB. oe SLUT Copy gL oe Slo eee:
13-00000 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER ‘RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER Cuba Selected. Documents . JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM . AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 2 202-10002-10104 JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962 3360 (7 FEB 62) ae cm ae ee oe am Gm ae a we wes en ee od GD a a ED we ee ms uD Ee ee wee ten mm ee ome a ew en owe cD me me ee eh a eae ee me ORIGINATOR ' FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS iTE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA ': ‘ . . : JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code_ COMMENTS 40 08 92 80 of DOCUMENT INFORMATION dCs - - NORTHWOODS ‘00/00/62 we 197 “ U. &. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA OPERATION MONGOOSE UPRISINGS IN CUBA COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA SOVIET BASE IN CUBA CARIBBEAN SECURITY PATROL POSTS INVASION OF CUBA JUSTIFICATION FOR.U: S. MILITARY ‘INTERVENTION PAPER,. TEXTUAE DOCUMENT re UNCLABSIFIED m RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 10/07/97 . Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to Jcs recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify US military intervention. . .
13-00000 COPY NO. INLASSIFE) cm oe SPREE Bese Fett waa, Bete, to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - , on NORTHWOODS (s) a report® on the above: subject is submitted for considera- tion by the’ Joint Chiefs of Start. RAIN Pate wos FP, J. BLOUIN M. 3. INGELIDO Joint Seoretariat en , EXCLUDED FROM GD3 . ICS 1969/303 214k {| WNCLAGGIF
13-00000 SPECTAL HANDLING = wisi APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A MEMORARAIM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL BE. G. LANSDALE, Chief of Operations, Guba Project — ’ Subject: Cuba Project’. Peference: Memorandum from Your Office for © Brigden W, H.:Craig, USA, subj: “Special Projéct", dated 27 Jan 62 “a. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of. 4 : the Departuent of Defense, with reapect to the military stake ant xole in the removal of the Communist regime-in Cuba, has been “dotamstnes based upon the following factors: %. National Security Policy, determined by ‘the NSC during _ Yaa eubing of G May 1961. . _b. Current intelligence estimates cf the situation in cuba." . é. pera sony against the Castro regime will be covert, et leaxs initially. ad. Time favors the Castro government. 2. The basis military implications of Castro's Communist governme:. © ave as follows: a. it exposes the Western Hentephere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense cosps as forces are developed. or shifted to meet this threat. be ‘Xt provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Comminist control. Elimination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the ‘world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control’ of additional countries would or could result in: ei Appendix 1 to ' Enclosure A be chp SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
13-00000 ; - - (1) Increased Communist capability: for UCLISSTFED ¢. other nations of the western Hemisphere. (2) Inereased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America. (3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of ‘strategic materials necessary to our military capability. , . (4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage. 3. The urgency of the requirement to remoye the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's sonstantly increasing capabilities. for attacking other nations of the .. Western Hemisphere and for apreading Communian throughout the hemi sphere? This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of. action within the capability of the Communists are considered; : a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air ‘bases in Cuba.” ‘bd. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with muolear warheads; or they eould "furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the ’ ' nuclear warheads. 4, In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements. of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly’ support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of , ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communiat Bloe reactions in areas other then in Cuba is recognized, ge is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war , and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:
13-00000 — TRG ASSIF | SPEOIAL HANDLING REQUIRED ro If the impression is created that there is an urgent, hutanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance fron a government | representative of the Cuban people. i. 20 Lt 48 ammounced incident to the overt militery action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding: free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon’ as the new government acvisesa that they have the capability =! to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS netions. i &. if the military operation. is conducted as quickly as poasivle and with suffieient force co that the Commnist ‘Blos's ability to take effective counter-measures in support or the Castro regine is reduced to & minimum. : é. 25, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against VE forces or property. which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable | portione cf a, b, and ¢ above apply. ; 5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly ‘provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, | personnel and bases. LAS Sipe MAND RT RRIE I Bn EG ALIA GEE AE GRO ES 3 a Appendix 1 to Enclosure A SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED RR
13-00000 . secre baet Ir ae INEREE : : - en PLS LOLI, SOLED ETS OLD PII IE ab eddie viet MIEN Maen Aaa a8 5 eae SOR RSET MA RSOE ND: Hertha stata ne reseaNe ss " . ; 7 eee e MOPAR NERS DO BIR Mitesh a5 4 ca gio SOR: ‘ SH . . ee RR ne ed ed, 7 na ~ SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION - NOTE BY THE SECRETARTES aa , . . te the , ' "| JOINT cHrERS OF STAFF on ° NORTHWOODS (s) A report® on the above Subject is submitted for consider- ation by the Joint Chiefs of Start. F. J. BLOUIN Med, INGELIDO Joint Secretariat ‘a * Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat a EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC . REGRADING ; DOD DIRECTIVE - 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
13-00000  , ‘THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ae WASHINGTON 88, O.2, ” Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief:of Operations, Cuba Project, which : responda to a.request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide. Justification ' for US military intervention in Guba. . @, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submisaions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be sonsidered on e case-by-case basis. ; 3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military ami para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recomended that this responsibility for both overt and ‘-eovert military operati.ong be assigned the Joint Chiefa of For the Joint Chiefa of Staff: Joint chiefs of staf 1 Enclosure Lo Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project. EXCLUDED. FROM GDS snes a HC 4 Siig beh bse obmied i EXCLUDED FROM AnTomaTic GEGRADING; DOD DIE 5200.10 * BOBS HOT APPLY ALR EMA ge SO TET SAS Be SEY Oe
13-00000 a r MEMOSANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY oF DEFENSE - Subsoots Cuba 4. The, Joint Chiefe of State believe’ that the Cuban . problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they gee no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings: or external ‘political, esonemie or psychological persssures. * Accordingly they believe that military intervention the nm by United States will be required to overthrow the present oommunie$ regime. . 2. ‘the United States cannot telerate permnent existence © of @ communist government in the Westerm Hemisphere. The présent regimes in Cuba provides comamism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin Awerica, “he stability of seme governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions - Of the Cuben covernmment. Continued existence of this com - - . | tumist goyernzent increases the probability that one or . more other nations in Latin Ameries will becom: commmist ‘ or commnist dominated. This will greatly inerease the _ preblens currently facing the United States and the Organigzs- “ ' $4on of American States. Uhile considered unlikely, it ia 4 o  " gapsasis for the Sing-Coviss. 3 to establish military : } Lo bases in.Cuba cimilae to US installations eround ‘the bies. i - |- yeriphery. Zstablighment of such bases would increase US -,' , defense. costs as forces were developed or shifted. to met : the threat. - 3. Time favors the Guban regime and the commnist bles. , They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversive efforts in Latin Amrica. Increasing internal security measuxes by police state methedsa decrease : , . FRON saute: . tle + DOD pre sine 4 (ALS
13-00000 (TOF se SEG f AA GURG j ‘meus : the pessibiiity of internal werisings within Guba. ‘The S - steady: improvement in militery defenses atrengthens the - Fegsiatance which must be overcome in the event of US " piid¢ery intervention and could lengthen the time required, te secure control of the government and the island, ‘The continuing indootrination of the Cuban youlth oreaters a growing moleus for a commmist underground after the elimination of “the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is | ateaditly increasing ia. magnitude. ~_ - &, The Joint Chief of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of goneral var. They alse believe ¢hat the intervention oan "be accomplished rapidly enough ‘to minimise vommunist . opportunities for solicitation ef UN action. Ferees available would agcure rapid essential military control of Cube. Contimed police action would be required. 5. In view of the insreasing military and subversive : - threat te the United tates ani. the natiéna of the Western ' Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint - Chiefs of Staff recommen® that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They alse recommend that auch intervention be umertaken as soon as pessible ané preferably before the releate of Matiens) Goara, and Reserve. forces presently on active ‘duty. . . . For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Le L. LEMNETZER Chairmen + Joint Catefs of Staff
13-00000 Townes 98 ULE ET a LEE 9 March 1962 © COPY or UGLASSIFED REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT oP. DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS oF starr CEE ATIVE on THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GR to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAPF on CUBA PROJECT (ts) The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Starr on this matter by 13 March 1962, : = 7 i e Py s é . é EXCUUDED FROM Gps WCLASSIFE PURO a yin 4 C9ee seg ap aes we.
13-00000 CO UNCLASSFED . JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (‘ts) ONT tn description of pretexts which they consider would provid juatafioation for US military intervention in Cuba. — . PACTS HEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2. Ie is ‘recognised that any action which becomes pretext JOSE BI OA BEOEOS AACE 7 for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action. 3. Cogmizande has been taken of a suggested course of actiwn proposed** by the US Navy relating ‘to generated instances in the Guantanamo area. . ”. 4. For additional facts see Enclosure B. DISCUSSION .5. The suggested coursegof action appended te Enolosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering juataf- 9 table " grievences. World opinion, and the United Nations 4 ; . | ferum should be favorably affected by developing the inter- national image of the Cuban government as fash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredioteble threat to the peace of the Western Hemiaphere. 6. While the foregoing premise ean be utilized et the present time 1¢ will continue to hold good only as long as there oan be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is # Memorandum for General Graig from Chief of Operations,’ Cuba Project,” ‘dubjeots ‘operation MONGOOSE", dated § March 1962, on é file in General Craig's office. «e Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from : Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "“Inetanses to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated § March 1962, ; “ on file in General Graig's office. . UNCLASSIFIED PSR IE tan ALINE EE PPS EIDE RSS TREES eee RR CT ee
13-00000 ~o mwestis 8808 NUrUKN “ce la as yet no ‘pilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR te the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warraw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of ved Sf NS CYR BORER OEE the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months. aon CONCLUSION “2. The suggested eourses of action appeniied to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to foeus all efforts on the gpg aOR GEIR LEANER EASILY ROSIE. A objective of justification for U8 military intervention in Cuba. eS RECOMMENDAT IONS 8. It is recommended that: a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Gecratary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations , Cuba Project. ue eee ve eng recone e Bee {This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified ; or specified commands. SNC Ne oAE es PESRAE OTD EEG IINS, a ETN c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US pfficers assigned to NATO activities. d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. “West
13-00000 he. 7: vom vo remo w meen «CLASSI PRETEXES TO JUSTIFY US MULITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA ; oF (Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary : submission suitable only for planning purposes. ‘They are’ . nob, ‘ arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. . Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, “integrated, time-phased plen. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projeots within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military _ intervention in Cuba). Nha Ne, SRS SORGA Teh ice ret S Ten Bae MERE LT EN AE + Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate . provocation: as the basis for US militery intervention in cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 , gould be exeouted as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Gubans of imminent ‘invasion would be emphasized. our military i posture throughout exeoution of the plan will allow a rapid ne nego nee TTT change from exercise to intervention 1f Cuban response justifies. 2.'A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around quantanamo ‘td give gemuine ‘appearance of being done by hostile Guban forces, , 8 a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order): (a) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine ratio. (2). tend friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base. i (3) Capture cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the i base. E (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans). , we ad thee Oot ae Th Annex to Appendix T to Enclosure A ‘peor FAPR—CERAF TW CDEOLAL UAMNLIMA = arans a e
13-00000 (5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; atert fires. (6) Burn afroraft on air base (sabotage). (7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some ‘damage to inatallations. (8) Capture sasault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City. (9) Capture militia group which storms the base. (10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene. {11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mook-viotims (may be lieu of (10)). Jk b. United States would respond by executing offensive 2 f operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying : we artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base. 6. Commence large scale United States military operations. 3. A "Remeber the Maine" incident could be arranged in — several forms: a. We could blow. up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cube. b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. .We could arrange to cause syoh inoident-.--~ - in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, ar both. The presence of Cuban planes ‘or ships mately inveifigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken; smnder attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago : x would add oredibility especially to those people that might _ : have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US sould t follow up with an ain/eea rescue operation covered by US : fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent i crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a‘ helpful ‘ wave of national indignation. . 4. We could develop a Commmist: Cuban terror campaign in » the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. AS Annex to Appendix 8 to Enclosure A
13-00000 Oe ae a ll The terror campaign could be poin en seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Plorida.(real or simulated). We could foster attempts ‘ on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the . . extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastio bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents , substantiating Ouban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government. 5. A "Quban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simlated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the ith of June dnvasion of the Dominican Republic). We a know that Gastro ip backing subversive efforts olandestinely' . a " against Haiti, Dominioan Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example,” advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Aix Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type afroraft could make cane-burning raids at. night. Soviet Bloo incendiaries could be found. ‘This ovwld be coupled _ With "cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments ¢ of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.‘ 6, Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots sould provide additional’ provosation, Haragement of otvid air, attacks on , surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft: by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. . An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially 4f¢ the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the seourity risk inherent in obtaining or modify ~- _ ing an aircraft, However, reasonable copies of the MIG could ‘ . be produced from US resources in about three months. Annex to Appendix : 9 . to Enolosure A § IMCLASGIED ‘ON... LLARF -ARPAtAS OF m mame comm
13-00000 a eet : 5 HELA. "7, wt geoking attempts against olvil six and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the goverment of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged. 8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban’ airoraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to ; Jamaioa, Guatemala, Panama or Venesuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan noute to eross Guba. The passengers sould be a group of college atudents off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-ssheduled flight. "a. An atroraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and - . numberalas an exact duplicate for a civil registered airoraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami. area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual ofvil alroraft and would be leaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases, The actual regiatered aircraft would be converted to a.drone. -“"~ oe +» Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual airoraft will be scheduled to allow a pemissvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point "the passenger -carrying airoraft will descend to minimm altitute and go directly into an‘guxiliery field at Eglin ANB where erréngenents will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the - aircraft to its original status. The drone airoreft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. when over Cuba. the drone will being transmitting on the inter- . national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he. is under attack by Cuban MIG aireraft. ‘The tranemission Will ‘be interrupted by destruction of ‘the airoraft which will be triggered by radio signal, This will allow ICAO radio a cota annex. to Appendix UNCLSH to Enélosure A
13-00000 stations in the Western mi io mls has happened to the airoratt inatead of the US trying to "sell" the inoident. ; 9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Commmist Cuban MiGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack. a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft: will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Floride, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and similate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Grewsa would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry Live ammunition in the event that hostile actions vere taken by the Cuban MiGs. b. On one such Plight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tall~end Charley ab considereble interval between siroraft. While near tha Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been Jumped by Mids and was going dom. No other calls would be made, The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliery. ‘he atroraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a rev tail number. The pllot who had performed the mission under ‘an alias, would resume bis proper identity and return to his normal Place of business. The pilot and airoraft would then have disappeared. a : apposite wale ees elec rF ASFA Se at prectscly the same time that the afroraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface oraft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Guban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as et DEER IESE AAAS EES. gram ee they knew. Search ships and airoraft could be dispatched and parts of airoraft found. Annex ‘to Appendix sean weet ne ebangteebrren 5 bee te ae
13-00000 moses NELASSIie PACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba oan’ be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an , incident upon’ which to base overt intervention, , 2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of start on 7 March 1962, as follows: " _ . ~ determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a deoision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for " positive US military action. * heme, FERg TE LRA CAPITA peaRNr estes s LeRR NCI EREEN, + eb Siege 3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba. et ee & “6S 19697303 i #* JCS 1969/313 12 . Enolosure B J AUST *
13-00000 Cuba Sel _ ected Document JFK ASSASSINATION SyYSTEM . IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : Jcs ; RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10018 RECORDS. SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE (1963 AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Jcs 2304/189 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : Jcs t) FROM : J-5 ‘ TO : JOINT CHIEFS or STAFF TITLE : COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II) DATE : 05/01/63 oe . PAGES : 36 SUBJECTS : POLICY, CUBA REVOLT IN CUBA COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA OPLAN 312 OPLAN 316 DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED “RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL CURRENT STATUS ; OPEN fe OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Report to Joint Chiefs. : and Joint Staff discussing courses Of action toward Cuba. .
13-00000 An fw pw sare trata ¢ Shae Be NEP ade we a as & : iitary forces . Omi oa “ 1% Cle ROR Nee asc * Enclosure to JCS 23 17 ys . 2 ** Attachment to Jcs 230/172 °° *** Attachment to ICs 2304/ JCS 2304/7189 S (Rev: 5/13/63)
13-00000 in control, timing, simplicity z would a fomented revolt. ré would: ats ffidi "tO generat ; Ae ii : woven, , the: staging of a logal;. 12 uprising.as a contrived trictdent’ ‘HOG"be: pres 8. ‘the: ea Ea remove *heecas, Wid’ appear. nd the Wlews. of “the: Joint _ - Chiefs of statr should be: forwarded Committee) for consideration:und * Enclosuxe' to Jcs 1969/217 . SBE SAR Runes SEND wicket Ret see
13-00000 ; SORIA ERE AONE ae ats AA Sit ae, ie Aonger 1D AERIS A oii Botnet neck aot Rio»
13-00000 t - ' . APPENDIX : DISCUSSION IHTRODUCTION i. Purpose. This report is in response to & request from ‘the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider the desira- bility and requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. Tt ‘includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series of incidents asa cause for invasion and consideration of pertinent comments received fron CINCLANT, | » Summary. Study of the desirability and the requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of enginepring an incident or a series of incidents rather than trying to generate and coordinate action from inside involving many Cubans of doubtful reliability leads to the conclusions that: a. Te is unlikely that an effective spontaneous revolt 4 Ra x é § $ 4 & z Fi is will occur in the near future. nee b. Any uprising without US overt. support is likely to be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet - neg BE, military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's. increasingly efficient internal security’ operations. c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro communist regime will risk a direct provocation that could be used eas a pretext for US interverition, ad. Unless the United States intervenes: militarily, the Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and its efforts and ability to Spread international commnism will increase, + The United States. should intervene. militarily in Cuba ‘and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly : BOR Cee ce Siete (Rev. 5/13/63)
13-00000 Ue RIFE perpetrated by ‘the Castro regime to serve as the cause of fnvasion or (b) foment a revolt within Cuba which would ' e811 for us military intervention, f. Engineered provocation would provide greater ‘advantages in control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a widespread effective revolt. However, thé staging of a local , uprising 48 4 contrived incident ‘should not be precluded, « The United States should: (1) Initiate a coordinated program to créate a pre- text for US military intervention in Cuba, (2) In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, con- mending with the; intensification of intelligence collec- tion and sabotage in Cuba, and the ereation of a frame- work for guerrilla activity. (3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro communist. government. h. Implementation of the above would invoive many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary that one governmental organization should. be Given the primary responsibility for developing such a national plan. The Joint Chiefs of starr should participate in the development of this national plan. ; i. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group (S412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57. ; "Je CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba while containing much’ merit, should be re-examined both for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity it envisages, ~——EOR-GRERET =SENSTPEVE 2 Appendix EOD-SRCRET --SENSTTEVE . (Rev. 5/13/63) LSI
13-00000 eee LISA TS IRL “ weg : OF He OO ACHAT b. Conduct ‘physical and psychological military harassment os: ; of the Cuban regime and covert and Clandestine operations as directed. . c. Undertake military action in Cuba in accordance with contingency plang approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and. directed by the President. ‘The primary purpose of the US military intervention would be to assure the overthrow of the Castro communist government and to assist in the establish.» . ment of a new, non-combunist government ‘acceptable to the 3 United States. - The implementation of any of the suggested courses of action. in this study would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that one single governmental. organization be given the primary responsibility for developing a national plan. 21. Because of the extensive military operations involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan. In addition, for a contrived revolt, they should be assigned the specific résponsibility for develop- ing the-military and paramilitary aspects of the plan. This would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by-the United States were an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as the DOD agent. In this connection, CINCLANT has developed a specific concept for political and military action in Cuba. CINCLANT CONCEPT . 22. the CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in Cuba, followed by overt, large-scale US military operations. The preposed timing of operations permite completion in 15-18 months. Supporting operations by CIA, State, and USIA will be required.
13-00000 e., 23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by cra as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban Government (FCG), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and the devdlopment of a suitable cover plan. 24, Actual operations would commence with the execution by CINCLANT of OPLAN 380-63 about 15 Jameary 1964. This plan calls for infiltrating of OW forces into Cuba for area assessment, establishing guerrilla bases, developing military units, establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion. ° On about 15 June 196%, OW forces would be augmented and would accelerate. subversive operations to create conditions favorable for establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for employment. of conventional forces. . 25, CINCLANT then proposed that on about 15 July mobilization b 3 of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Exeoution of - Ey \CINCLANT. OPLAN 312 would commence on 26 July 1964 followed by - - D-Day OPLAN’ 316; about 3 August 1964.- 26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should be noted that the Free Cuban Government would be required to exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's : excellent counterguerrilla ability. “This time requirement appears to be excessive, but. it could be shortened. The criteria for United St ates recognition of a new government could be met in this period. The Free Cuban Government could cleim it: a. Was in actual possession of the governmental machinery. b. Mas administering it with general acceptance by the popula‘tion; and, e. Was prepared to honor international obligations: reese AUST (Rev. 5/13/53) ; 4B Appendix
13-00000 27. The UW forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are approximately: 7 ; (1) Headquarters, Joint - 6 off 42 EM Unconventional Warfare Taslc Force, Atlantic (JUWTFA) Sem A ate AREER RS tee one ar (2) UW Operating Base - «36 off «= BM (3) Support Units - 15 orf 331 EN (+) Special Forces a 1 Group Headquarter ; : (reinf.) 2 Companies (reinf. ¢ . . . (5) Submarines - 2 (6) APD , - 1 (7) SEAL Teams . - ° a (8) Air Commandos - - 150 Personnel - 20 Alrcraft . . : Air Control Team: (9) CIA Forces a Internal and External assets as required by + CINCLANT. 28. GINCLANT does not have UW forces assigned at this time, . however, @ nucleus JUWIPA staff is included within the CINCLANT staff and has the capability for preparing Uw plans for normal contingencies. Planning or conducting UW operations of the magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond current capabilities. 29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the - activation of the JUWIFA as a separate organization and the assignment to it of full wartime headquarters complement of “48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be required. Approval of any concept in principle or for Planning purposes, however, would not necessitate the
13-00000 activation of a separate headquarters. ‘In this case, CINCLANT would re-evaluate his staff capabilities end submit appropriate “Pecommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . , 30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept’ recommended, con~ cerning the use of Cuban nationale in UW operations, that “As oe ‘practical, the Military Services should initially form their Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban unite ...". It da considered that the creation of a "Cuban Expeditionary Force" “in anticipation of its employment in the execution of OPLAN 316. is @ risk which cannot be justified and should not be undertaken. There appears to be no reason, however, why Cubans could not be Py = - MPA ANE aamgtetent: abet. formed inte small teams for use in UW activities. It is estimated that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be used in this role. It would be appropriate for the CTA in a supporting role to select and train‘the individuals forming them into teams of appropriate size to be made available for joint use by CINCLANT or by CIA, as necessary. , 31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, see JCSN- 360-63; , 32. The force levela in CINCLANT OPLANS - 312 and 316 are adequate to cope with the improved Cuban military capability and the presence of Soviet troops on the island. 33. The experience of the JUWIFA during the Cuban crisis in October 1962, indicates that the present military supply system in the conus will be unable immediately to provide equipment and supplies in’ the required configuration for projected UW operations in Guba. The Army is currently atudying prestockage of UW equip- - ment and will submit proposals for approval and financing. ~BOR-SEOREF -SaNeEr ENE (Rev. 5/13/63)
13-00000 - . - fata mire 34. The conceptual outline submitted by CINCLANT foes not. provide an exact plan in detail for contriving a revolt in Cuba, However, his general concept would provide for: “a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion, unconventional warfere, limited conventional actions and finally full-seale invasior in that order, if necessary, : . b. The capability or US to withdraw at any point. in the ‘ process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful revolt, overthrow the present regiine and form a government PURE DOR DNS cen OMELET RC nian ode: favorable to US interests. ce. An ambiguous -atmosphere during the critical phases ‘in its development which would not present the Soviets with a direct. confrontation of bower until events would preclude timely action on their part to Prevent our intended result in Cuba. d. Utilization of the OAS Forum and support without being art ye geet eaey, dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban Government in exile and the final, decisive military action. @- Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements in the US for political and military support without ” depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success of the plan. a £. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all US military posture, until the final decisive stages of the plan are ready for execution, thus Feducing maldeployment time. ; : . g- The most economical use of US resources to accomplish the defeat of Castro communism. i 4 4. he A definite time scale of events culminating in the” defeat of Castro's communtst government and establishing the groundwork for the installation of a-government compatible with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the U8 by 1 October 1964," _ TOR.SECRE . -seusasye Utd BSSIEIEH]
13-00000 cf. . i Cuba Selected Documents e ; #4 , JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : ARMY RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10011 RECORDS SERIES ; CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER DOCUMENT INFORMATION an ‘ ORIGINATOR : ARMY . : FROM : R. D. ALBRO TO : OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY TITLE : TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUA : DATE .: 12/11/63 ‘PAGES : i121 SUBJECTS : ANTIt “CASTRO CUBANS ARTIME, MANUEL CUBAN BRIGADE ‘KENNEDY, ROBERT CUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUA ~ DOCUMENT TYPE ; PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION ': UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL CURRENT STATUS : OPEN TE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97 OPENING CRITERIA : - . COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder i0. Memo . , training of Cubans in Nicaragua, of Manuel Artime, meeting between Kennedy, and Cubans in us Army. ‘regarding recriutment efforts Artime and Robert
13-00000 fade Report 2870006563, 9 Aug 63 Subjeste Haette vioit Nicaragua (0), from USAEKA Hicaragua t #2870009363, 31 Get 63, Subject: ; from USAnMA , Hicamagua office, advised there, revealed no USA Retired, the former trafatng of Cuban lande. RUENTES, Jif: MMenelw0e 1Eoy and Roberto RODRIGUEZ to Nicaragua Saving July and “dugost oes The URARMA' Speculat and GRADED Ar 12 YEAR iNTERVALS: WT AUTOMATICALLY oEcLASsiFIEe ‘bop vIR S200.10
13-00000 Gein} ips. ‘4 hades. 0.) SR oo Mio; Cake BS: + of Ca. | Bixector of Foreiga Intelligence PEL CHICE ab ory, : WVITS BEC ogg: . Ss . 7 BECEIACH WARNING-NOTICE- . qs . POwnenansn AN12 YES: ecay ’ - er 4 NOT avTOMATicALLY EC LASSIF IE "20D oR 5200.10
13-00000 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES SENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE ' PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS E OF LAST REVIEW IPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM. IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION | JCS 202-10002-10010 TAYLOR PAPERS DOCUMENT INFORMATION JCs EARLE G. WHEELER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON CUBA, ‘1100 12/19/63 3 POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA OPERATIONS, CUBA PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT UNCLASSIFIED OPEN IN FULL OPEN 07/31/97 Cuba Selected Documents | #5 HRS, 19 DEC 1963 Wheeler, Box 193. Memorandum reporting meeting with President on Cuba. 1 Document .
13-00000 19 December 1963 . rf ELIONANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Meeting with President.on Cuba, 1100 hra, 19 Dec 1963 1. ‘The following persons were present at the meeting: . White House:......... The President . . Mz. McGeorge Bundy Mr. Smith States cee cccesceccasaeMr. Thompson : Mr. Ball Mr..Johnson * Mr... Martin Mr. Crimmins Detense:.sscecececeee Mere silpatric - . Mr. Vance General Wheeler CIAL cece c cane cecacess. General Carter ; . riz, FitzGerald Mr. Helms Treacury:......-..054 Mr. Dillon USIA: occ ce ccc ween eee Mr. Wilson 2. Myr, FitzGerald briefed the President o . Covering the following areas: n Agency operations a. Collection of intelligence. &. Propaganda activities. ¢. Economic denial actions. d. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection, é. Sabotage and harrassment activities. \ ; £, Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. “ACLUDED FROM Pf TOMATIC REGRADING OOD DIR 5200.1. A677 NOT APPLY SENSITIVE
13-00000 3. a. The President was most interested in economic dential zetiong. He was informed that talks would be undertaken in the — ‘immediate future with representatives of the Canadian and Britich governments relative to the supply of spare parts and critical materials | by Canadian and British firms to Cuba. It was stated that Spanish firms ut@ likewlse active in this area, as well as a number of essentially ityeby-night firms located in a number of foreign countries. No ..putable Asnexican firms are engaged in supplying Cuba and, in fact, have bacn helpful in preventing their foreign affiliates from engaging in this traffic. Apparently, State regards the Canadian, the Britich and the Spanish efforts as being the real trouble spota. The President. Jirected that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governmenta of firms concerned to diseuade them from this practice, b. Under questioning, Mr. FitzGerald stated that exploitation of Cuban military disaffection is a long term undertaking. While there. ‘are disaffected Cuban military men in important poste, they have not, to date, made any contacts with cach other nor formed any sort of group. However, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any successful operation to — overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported by the Cuban military if it is to have any real Mkelihood of success. ; ec. During the discuasion on sabotage and harrasament, the “resident expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at this time for two reasons: (1) Current atte? pts to get OAS agreement to various stions directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and (2) The Soviets seem to be watching closely the new administration's policies toward Cuba, and it might influence unfavorably the success of our efforts to achieve further reductions in Soviet military: ‘personnel in Cuba. 4. Mr. Helms briefed on the significance of the arms cache | iiscovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of sae OAS. survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to date, of tnueir survey. He stated that the group apparently had accepted that the arms had been introduced for subversive purposes, but that the. survey croup was asking of the Venezuclan government further informa- tion reparding propaganda activities directed against the Venezuelan rovernment, etc. He does not expect that the commission will report 2 Ho VET
13-00000 tu the GAS prior to 10 January 1964. In the meantime, our effort is devuted to ascer taining the maxirwarn that the OAS is prepared to do as a result of the Venezuela affaiy. They are hopeful that the GAS wl support an increased surveillance system, He thinks it is too corly tO expect a complete break in cconomic.and travel relations between OAS countries and Cuba. 3. There was come discussion of further actions we might take to increase preesures and harrassments at an appropriate time. Asnony other items rnentioned were the offect of low level reconnaissance flighte from time to time and the dbsirability of executing such flights at intervals to maintain the viability of our "right" te de so, While the President did not express disapprobation, neither did he express ‘ epproval. In fact, no real decisions were taken at this meeting which must be regarded, I think, as being an important orientation session. * Siguee ~ Estle G. Wheeler EARLE G, WHEELER General, United States Army Chief of Staff . TORIES Ta: Chairman, JCS #! One #3 CHO Fa enc 2 Director Jt Staff (Attn: SACSA) #é Army General Counsel #7 cat & ot Toe Bt; “EF ota a rece OL, + ~~ oe
13-00000 a _ Cuba Selected Documents JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER :: ’ RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS SATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 202-10002-10117 gCS CENTRAL FILES 1963 JCSM-77-64 DOCUMENT INFORMATION cs JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE : A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA 01/31/64 58 POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA COUP IN CUBA CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT UNCLASSIFIED OPEN IN FULL OPEN 10/07/97 Box 4. JCS Central Files 1963, regarding Cuba. Memo for Chairman, contingency plans in the event of a coup in JCS
13-00000 WASKENGTON 28, b.¢, USD soe. MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (8) ‘A, Transmitted herewith isa conceptual proposal which has been developed jointly by the Department ment of Defense, + subject as above, é of State, the Depart. and the Central Intelligence Agency. : Z. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba w: which may, ‘i supported by the United States, achieve US national objectives by the. - Glimination of the. communist regime and establishment of a Cuban government acceptable to the United States. : 3. The proposal Provides for US military intervention in a flexible ing from provision of. log . amd. 316, to support a coup in Cuba the attachment hereto. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: . 4 MMJ. INGELIDO Brig Gen, USAF : Secretary : ULSD GROUP | EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC —_ DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION Attachment TOP -SECRET-SENSITIVE- Copy 11 of 22 copies, each of | page, Series A fe corny ont ther caged ethos, ty EVIEWED se er 1989___enen BY IS : ~ CLASSI
13-00000 Sera ied dry ot. eS mS ver Set tem He \ plished, 7 N . , ‘DEPART MENT OF THE ARMY " WASHINGTON 26, D.c. SUBJECT: . A Contingtucy Plan for a Coup in Cuba: (Ss) # Reference: JESM 809-63, Subject as aboye, dated October al, . Enclosed hexgwith are three. topies of the plan on the above subject which has bet: prepared | Jointly ona restricted basis by : sphrinente.pf State and Defense.in coordina. - revised to. reflect seherally thé views of the Joint Ghiefs of Stafi : contained in reference, ‘provides’ a conceptual basis for US response °°." to a Cuban military coup and‘has been.approved by the Secretaries of State:and Deéfenge. and. tie Director, Central Intelligence Agency as a basis. for appropriate detailed planning.” Mr. McGeorge Bundy has _ been adyised of the forégoing and xéquested to.inform the President. of the existence of the: plan.on:a miitable occasion, It is anticipated that the Secretaries of State and Defense may subsequently be requested.to brief the. President on.ite outline, In accordance with :the recommendations contained in paragraph, 8c, page 22 of the plan, itis requested that current CINCLANT plans ' be revised.ag necessary to reflect, the concept of military operations described.in the plan and. that you. advise. me when this has heen accom- PAge 22. f the plan, nce Agen¢y- in coordination with representatives. of ‘the Bepartmentd of State: and-Defense will develop a plan. for the intraduction. of the. "Special Team" into Cuba which will subsequently be circulated for: appropriate action.and further detailed planning by agencies concerned, “¥ EiclostiFe A to Jog osou/a05- - ~ ## Appendix to Enclosure B to a Cyru Tusi_R, Vane .. Secretarylof the Army os YSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED a Enclosure:(3 cys) ey re ON ---4.9: 0075989 em SENSITIVE As Stated CUSSIACATON CONTINUED EXCLNDED FRow aurouArte REGRADING _SCS 2304 (205.97 “S enied No Le OBS v4 a " oS A “ EPPLY
13-00000 er. ee URLS "A CONTINGENCY PLAN. FOR A COUP IN CUBA 1. Problem. To -provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in ae Cuba in’order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in shed replacement of the Communist goverment with one acceptable to the United States; — 2. Assumptions ' a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware » from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (s¢e paragraph 2.4. below) , their revolt . will be supported by the US if a US “special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1) below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met. Thus, the coup could be triggered. in one of two ways: The leaders » in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Goverrment in full expectation of forthcoming a US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, | 1 iess acceptably, the ledders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or j . obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Govern-. ; , ment, hoping that the US will intervene. ; } b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight ) hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from ‘a “special team" which would obtain in- formation to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the - US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required. ; , SYSTEMATICALLY Hai} BY JCS ON f STEP isa ‘Thi do t tad! ; oS ON WLS ee ee Copy No. of copies pages CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED. Series « neh, 486 Control NOZZE_ O39 Y 7,
13-00000 + e. US intervention would be based on: ACL ASSIFIED (1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government + set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action. Zin , abea would rot await formal OAS approval), or . 28 (2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the us determined that the in- surgents met generally the criteria for support, or . &) Intervention by local Soviet forces. PO a. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable, i . recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the situation exist- _ ént at the time: (1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order - to survive. (2) Be prepared to éstablish a Provisional Government, ‘however rudimentary, with same sort of public claim to political viebility to provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots). (3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership. (4) Seize. and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including lavana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Governnent:. e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy af- fecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below. (1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale+ invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re- introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation 2
13-00000 . . : a which could be used as a pretext for such action. (eel LSC ie : (2) By the seme token, it is not US policy to encourage un- organized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. ‘The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed iumediately by, @ planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces. (3) Once.a revolt begins, the involvement. of Soviet forces, either tbactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, - would result in immediate implementation of OPLANS 312 and 316. wa 3. Sequence: of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events: : ee ee en ee Be Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have egreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time. (In theevent that a coup were initiated without prior US InowLedge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering in- formation made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible ‘for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to comnit forces needed to sustain it.) ’ Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on & pre-arranged tasis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would: ,
13-00000 (1) Introduce into Cuba a “special team" to obtain information: which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents. This'..): tean, composed ‘of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA,- would ag meke contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start se * of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report ofthe findings should be received by CIA within twenty- four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents’ plans. In any event, 4merican reliable reports from trained/ observers in Cuba would be of great value to making a decision to intervene in order thatthe US would not commit + YS RAS its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and. - i "expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate - py CINCLANT, vould remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Govern- ment if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made to intervere.) . — (2) order forces needed to esteblish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade ; commence generating and positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316. ec. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source in- telligence assessment including the special team’s report, would be | made to the President. This would be the critical. decision because, once- made, certain actions would ensue immedi ately and, henceforth,
13-00000 —y—E the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These ac- ' tions would include: (1) The assumption by CINCLANE of command of all military and pare-militeary operations in Cuba. (2) Prompt introduction of smal] groups of personnel: for the purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison be ‘with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support F by airdrop-or submarine. Im the event that the US delayed public an- _ ‘nouncement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would Fe be provided in such a manner as to minimize public imowledge of active . . US involvement in Cuba. sn (3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team : to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has “ ce oe : oo e ee ne eae wae ae eee ame Siete not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in oraer to provide: justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS. As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by meane of an air and sea blockade to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral, interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution-2 of the Punta del Esta meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/0C es- tablished a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that support for either side is not provided from external sources, Actually, the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph J.a. below).
13-00000 (4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of por- tions or all of CINCLANT OPLARS 312 and 316. ad. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Goverment and initiating overt military operations, or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support eared for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the Presidential announcement of the biockade and public ‘announcement of the other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and recon- naissance units, thereby providing visibie evidence. to the insurgents : that support i6 forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non~ixitervention while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support. " At the seme time, the US would be generating and positioning forces re- quired for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announc- ing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance end demonstrated US intent would be suffi- client to bring down the Castro.regime, if the coup carried with it e significant element of the Cuban: armed forces. . However, it is probable thet the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would im= plement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as required. 4, Facts Bearing on the Problem. a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveil- lance network, both internally and with resvect tot he air and sea
13-00000 ' OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE | WASHINGTON 25, 0.C. Boe ee - ns . 13 MBACHSIGBDRICCTION TO DECLASSIFIGATION AND/OR RELEASE GF C1A INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROME@¥s DOCUMENT Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) 0 1. Reference. is made to memorandum from Chief of Opera- tions, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: “Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. 2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are for- warded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar sub- missions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by- ease basis. 3, This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions or from other sources, should be developed to focus ail efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere. . h, Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore the. plan should be so time- phased that projects: would be operable within the next few months. . . 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES HOT APPLY ; SNP SEORET-SPECHAE HANDLING -NOFORN-
13-00000 Oe een alee este tobe a Ha eS tonto abe em. - 3 . “te. PRE ees whe Bets acad” fo - Japon EIA HANDLING -HOFORN- reat | a 'S. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommeded that primary responsibility for developing militery and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be as-~- signed the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 78 e ILL i Brig General USA - DOD/JICS Representative Caribbean Survey Group Enclosure Pretexts to Justify Military Intervention in Cuba GF -SECRET-SPECHME HANDLING NOFORH
13-00000 MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (Ts) . 1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, ~ Guba Project, for General craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretezts which the Joint Chiefe of Staff consider would provide justification for 0S military inter- vention in Cuba. . 2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used-as a basis for developing a time-phased plan, The individual projects ean then be considered on a case-by-case basis. . 3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be ‘developed to foous all efforts on a specific ultimate. objective whieh would provide adequate justification for Us military intervention, Such a plan would enable.a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, dirested at other countries as well as the United States. ‘The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued, ‘The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an intere- . national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the western Hemisphere.
13-00000 4, Time is an important faotor.in resolution’ of the Cuban problem, ‘Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that ’ projects would be operable within the next few months. . ‘5. Inasmich as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it 1s.eecomended that primary responsibility fox developing military and para-military aspects of the plan ' for both overt and: covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . Enclosure . . Pretexte to: Justify Military Intervention - in Guba nas oe aes
13-00000 “TOP SECRETS = | . , . a ENCLOSURE PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MELITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (Note: ‘The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submisaion suitable only for planning purposes. ‘They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. fogether with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development — of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba). . 1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate. provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 oc, eould be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow @ rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies. 2. A series of well coordinated ineidents will be planned . ‘to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order): . (1) Staxt rumors (many). Use clandestine radio. (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to atege attack on base. (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base. - ; (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans). ok
13-00000 (5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires. (6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage). (7) Lob mortar shelle from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations. (8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City. (9) Capture militia group which storms the base. (10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene. (11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mook-victims (may be lieu of (10)). b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base. eo. Commence large scale United States military operations. 3. & "Remember the Maine" ineident sould be arranged in several forms: - , a. We could blow up a us ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba. , ; b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters, We cowld arrange to cause such ineident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as @ spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel sould be fairly compelling evidence that the ship | was taken under attack, The nearness. to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an ain/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent orew. Casualty lista in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation. . 4, We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. 4
13-00000 The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. ‘Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government. 5. A "Guban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts olandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage oan be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type atroraft could make cane-burning raids at night, ‘Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground an the Dominisan Repiblic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach. 6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MxG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the seourkty risk inherent in obtaining or modify- ing an aircraft. However, ‘yeasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months. achthF Ct. Ls. oe 5 Boe cae PTC maa ty. a
13-00000 7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Conourrently, gemuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft showld be encouraged. 8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aireraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. ‘The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to gross Cuba. The passengers could be a ‘group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping cf persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight. a. An aircraft at Eglin ARB would be painted and “numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami, area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil airoraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boaxried under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone. , b. Take off times of the drone aiveraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-oarrying airoraft will descend to minimum altitude and go direstiy into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers. and return the airoraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan, When over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter- national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message atating he is under attack by Cuban MIG adroraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the alroraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio 6 ; s AESOS vw? ABS | we'd LSE Fem sal
13-00000 stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the airoraft instead of the US trying to . "sell" the incident. 9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIG@s have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack, a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 airoraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakiz aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida, . These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at — frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least ‘12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MiGs. b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly taii-end Charley at sonsiderable interval between airoraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that Lo he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The atroraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aireraft would then have disappeared. 7 Lo c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft: would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, ete., at approximately _ 25 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. ‘The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and airoraft eould be dispatched and parts ef airoraft found. .
13-00000 9 March 1962 ' ss SOPY.sOF~—sCOPIES SPECIAL D: ION REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND . JOINT CHIEFS OF STAPF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CARTEBEAN SURVEY GROUP f to the ‘JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF en CUBA PROJECT (TS) The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter by 13 Merch 1962. @XCLUDED FROM GDS
13-00000 JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS) THE PROBLEM 1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are te indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cube will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action. 3. Cognizande has been taken of a suggested course of activn proposed™* by the US Navy relating to generated inatances in the Guantanamo area. 4, For additional facts see Enclosure B. ‘DISCUSSION ; 5. The suggested coursegof action appended to Enclosure A . are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justif- jable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the inter- national image of the Cuban government as Yash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere . ‘6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at. the present time it will continue to held good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Gube would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is * Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, - Guba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated § March 1962, on file in General Craig's office. — *# Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: “Instances to | Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (%S)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office. — 2
13-00000 ‘as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months. CONCLUSION 7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions-should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time~phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US militery intervention in Cuba. RECOMMENDATIONS 8. It 1s recommended that: . a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be . forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project. b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands. ce. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to- NATO activities. d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
13-00000 aaa. Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention — in Cuba (TS) ; 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which | responds to a request* of that office for tedef but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention 1n Cuba. : 2. The Joint Chiefs of staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions ‘from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. . Individual projecta can then be considered on a case-by-case paB48. ee ees D - ; C 3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be | given the primary responsibility for developing military and é para-militery aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended — ‘that this hesponsibility for both overt and covert military operationsbe assigned the Joint chiers of, ptatt. * Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba - Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in Gen Craig's office 4 Enolosure A
13-00000 APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA. PROJECT Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention din Cuba (TS) 1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of. Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise desoription of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military inter- vention in Cubs. . 2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It 18 assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used asp a basis for developing a time-phased plan. ‘he individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. — , SL Key D 3. This pian, incorporating projects selected from the . attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to foous all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan poyld enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and | irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. the” plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of - this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible govermment of Cuba and to develop an inter~ national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere. Appendix to 5 Enclosure A
13-00000 4, Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban: problem. ‘Therefore, the plan should be ac time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months. 5, Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that _primary responsibility for developing military and para-militery aspects of the plan Aa 4 for both overt and covert ; military operations be assigned the Appendix to 6 ; Enolosure A -
13-00000 _ gould be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban Ei SPECIAL HA ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A  PRETEXTS {0 JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary —. submission suitable only for planning purposes. ‘They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending omer. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are ‘ intended to provide a point of departure for the development : Mi of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military . intervention in Cuba). + Glnce 1t would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba. @ cover and deception plan, to inolude requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 ¢, reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Gubans of imminent ‘anvasion would be emphasized. Our militery posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies. 2. A series of- weil coordinated incidents Wild be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo ‘td give genuine - appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. a. Inoidents to esteblish a credible attack (not in chronological order): (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio. (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base. (3). Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base, (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans). ; Annex to Appendix 7 to Enclosure A
13-00000 (5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; stert fires. (6) Burn airoraft on air base (sabotage). (7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Seme damage to installations. | (8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City. (9) Capture militia group which storms the base. (10) Sabotage ship in harbor; lerge fires -~ napthalene. (11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)). b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to seoure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base. . 6. Commence large scale United States military operations. 3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms: &. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and _ blame Cuba.. b. We could Blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity ef Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. ‘The presence | of Cuban planes or ships merely inves figating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. ‘The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea. rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a. helpful wave of national indignation. . 4, We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in thie Miami area, in other. Florida olties and even in Washington. Annex to Appendix 8 to Enclosure A
13-00000 os 4  @ ” . “he terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven'in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). we could foster attempts “on lives of Cuban refugees in the United states even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government. 5. A "Quban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be similated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 1ith of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We Ynow that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. ‘These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage oan be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to _ intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or . C-46 type airoraft could make cane-burning raids at. night. Soviet Bloo incendiaries could be found. This sould be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Commmist underground in the Dominican Republi¢é and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach," ” . 6. Use of MIG type airoraft by US pilots could provide . additional provocation. Harassment of civil sir, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone atroraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify- dng an airoreft. However, reasonable copies of ‘the MIG could be produced from Us resources in about three months, Amnex to Appendix ae to Enclosure A
13-00000 7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Conourrently, genuine defections of Cuban oivil and military air and surface oraft should be encouraged. 8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban airoraft has attacked and: shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States -to  Jamaioa, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan voute te cress Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest. to support chartering a non-seheduled flight. @. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered. aircraft belonging to a OIA proprietary organization in the | Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual oivil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under eerefully prepared aliases. The actual registered airoraft would be converted to a drone. b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual -adworaft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point ‘the ‘passenger-sarrying airoraft will descend to minimm altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin APB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the alirereft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter- . national distress frequency a "MAY pay" message stating he is under attack by Cuban ure alroraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the airoraft which will be triggered by radio signal, ‘This will allow ICAO radio 4 amex to Appendix 10. %o Enclosure A
13-00000 stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the airoraft instead of the US trying to "gell" the inoident. . 9. It 18 possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a usar airoraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack. . Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 airoraft- will be dispatched in trail from Homestead APB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir airoraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. “ These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Orews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the cuban MiGs. b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tall-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calis would be made. ‘The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. the alrovart would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a vew tail number. ‘The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place "of business. ‘he pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared. c. At precisely the same time that the aireraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, paracmute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots veturning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they imew. Search ships and airoraft could be dispatched _ and parts ef aircraft found. . | annex to Appendix 12 to Enclosure A
13-00000 ENCLOSURE B FACTS EBRARING ON THE PROBLEM “1. fhe Joint Chiefs of staff have previously stated” that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can’ be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property. which would serve as an incident upon’ which to base overt intervention. 2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of staff on 7 March 1962, as follows: . Noe wo determination that a oredible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop ea Cuban "provocation" as justification for . positive US military action." | Lo 3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop ‘gustification for U8 military intervention in Cuba. wy .#* IES 19697303 #* JCS 1969/313 12 Enclosure B
13-00000 TOP. SECRET . COPY NO. j ' ICS _1969/321 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION Page 2165 .. NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES . to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF | | on NORTHWOODS (8) & report* on the above subject is submitted for consider- ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Oo F. J. BLOUIN M. J. INGELIDO Joint Secretariat * Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat EXCLUDED From Gps EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
13-00000 5 Spa eED pity aes Ae * DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, Dc, ; SENN ROAHINOG! tar a Fever nisicieee oa baie ba Beet Abby
13-00000 et ~ " Gtlert to: expoxt subversion hatin Acnorien, treat and thawagh Cube, there 1e agreement, st the least, that the pragram embodies grave potential ‘hanards for the trissquility of the Hemdaphere, Boyind thi, there ip alse . general achnowlotgamant thatthe subversion problems Ls m net & sew ons, sources of infection 80 1a svach of ee ee oF more. ‘Finally. there is evidense that the U. 8. appreciates these eilities, as sabibited in the depth of ancgeing U. 2. gcogeams tn all of Latin Amarica, . aimed af blunting the Communist subversive thrusts into the continent. ' The question created by the Preaidant's underscoring ef the problem is whether er not our efforts in thig area are adequate «» as to scope, as to coordination, and as to intensity. Is to the view of the Committee that they ate get Rupther, itis she shew of ie: Gamueltine that nape almaed solely. os, / Ainpoding Gre flow of students mad wulersivas to aad from Guha will not, of themselves, greatly abate the problem. There nung? be companion efforts designed both to degrade the basic capability for Gubsncbacad subversion, as well as efforts to develop a more effective resistance sépacity among the Latin American states. The sections te fallow are designed with these two
13-00000 by or through Cuba, there is 2 summary of what we are doing now, and what “the impact of Comsausiot eubresste, theve is a summary of cur current programs and 6 listing of spectiia additional things which we ean do; in other words, & treatment of the subversive question from two pointe of view =- shemmny a0 ns seqnote Cxtas seoghytess a regunde Latin Anseris ot targe ; Fhe following exteting programs ae oll having some adverse effect oa the basic capabilities of the Communists to organize, train, teach, equip, underwrite and export enbversive strength inte Latin America from Gaba: . &. Recotinaissance and Surveillance activities, which unite to Frere intameatin and to represent a satiauing duaest to mavvonsive a Plitas dtp patrol of too Windward Passage. This action contributes to the seatriction of illicit Cuban sea _ trade to Mats and Dominican Repubtie ares. | @) Adreraft patvel flights out of Guantanamo, a These flights, seagmmenting surface surveillance, keap wateh for arn ewatt, fiihing and marehinnt shipping operating in the © Caribbean south | ef Cabs, snd waters adjacent to end orth of Jamaica.
13-00000 (3) &. &, Miliary exeantien of specific sounter~ subversive tasks. _ Tals (neabres nation tahan tn ronpenan te apuitte nents, as These were countered, and prokably ahowted, by the presence ef ¥. & Navy dusteeyers patvolling thé ausstal avena of Coste Kies at the vequest of the changes. in Guban military onpabiiisies, Goose fights serve a0 recedes of 3.8, vighlenee ond daterndaatinn. 2 i (8) Commmniontions InteHigente. All of the above are supported by and given a sense of direction from the great velume of matesial provided through the facilities fe Prapagneds « Radia and Talevision, . ° Qh tue Vetoes: uf Atnialon inate conducts 08/4 kauve of abort wave broadcasts fe Guba daily, These sativa, in some degree, to expose te tha Guban people tha subversive actielting of the Castra regime. (2) Avmnd Forces radio aud television krondenate fram the Cuantaxame Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Gozamuniom by the orientation
13-00000 | Sepang re bh nara an r ona ron ot fat sos Fanere un thei, tisk heap thn eect of everson batone te wy @ Corsant Poltieah Asttons Alm at impeding sheaveh tnt and ont of We ato tes Wehrle nal of agent rab nan fm On. ip to necessary. however, to ouittemglite other actlene whtzh, ‘while tase divadity welated to sabversion, still serve to wenkes Cabs and its Communist dlotateuship, - and thom to alhintuate the problems at ite avsree. it is tow thie reason that thave is presented harein « apgctrum of actions related divcetly to Cuba. While it. ie cbemy notions Usted may extend tha.hesieons sf, sonst in torma of avopa, vigor, ey the reqltemani of ttematonl
13-00000 instructors and:those of the Cuban (0) Increase greatly tie isa PF the Gaban peaple by the Castro “ (4) Conduct airborne te
13-00000 As. re ; set @. wine rae tear Gathering Eilfovte. lege evratre meh mace jd tetelignee on she oatere, a Movecqant of Perssnned, Thaweyfi miiillemred anid lateral pelttheal arzungements wish Satis: Armsetcats stains, cook t0 impeite the mevament of postens inty ond St he evident tint sendy tendo, tn constdevabis Seansity, are senuited to copdact.& dubversive tralsing progtam, not to speak of other - costly factere =-ayme, demolitions, fasl, food, propaganda, ete. Specific ° actions aimed a¢ gedecing the Cuban's rescurces will thus have a diveat oftect upas thely altlity 20 putous thelir program of eubversion, will seuse them. to tun W9:theke mtn internal paohlizos pnd will give the Raseians pause si thes etedenl prion otigvaon whch to eoetty'and meazginalty “peoduetive. tikeotea, every actlan witeh contributes to insiebility, unrest, - correngntinghy bth Gh ay an hte epperomdty te deve Gerard om
13-00000 “pedeicennn, wins hdc ests of Cuba's aecnnmny hapaints Pisses . eatiane stent cotuind il the way Grom dewet denivuetion te enbotnas apenas cleat sudto uyumdselons beech Junpeds) muse Ginn military tayend to staud enttnsily sh Mh ebook Revel and tus to-odaeene cupplicn whieh wold cthewwion hw dedouiad to wuentubre, Grabbing. | @) Dhninish Cuban financial vesourecs. fe) Cansider tatwodnotion af countasfalt cureency tn large quantities, w distert the Cuban finmedisd posture, and to | $0) Gwenta edaptuban aed Masdasied tetweon Oxtons and
13-00000 ry Programs www in detagy . penning te pope heh renin prograne a tasenry thats full Unruh and, tan a tagethon, they have enquatoly mit fortited wer allie to th potatrhee eubereten can he onkd to be under fh centset e.. {U5 Sethasy mefeuts. . _ atte ibe iin Soren i sw paeietig ix bevet wen conte bo sregtacng te ly oh esate enpone tnd ut | down subversive anttvtty. Of thane, tha principal are: af €) Cusstertnenrgeney, satineovarsion ead popdkological aperetions taining through the medium of military miasions and molitle teafniag teams. @ Provision of equipment and material an shoet notice for use - in the face af mawersion of subversive threats. . (@) The conduct af emergency taining programe in saob and slot Ui) Provision of Seenand counbertnvargendy odacasion for Latta Amevican uffigave énd salleted mon in Talted States farvies gehonla and (} Aneiiary slltsay eterta stood es trengthing te ability of Latin Amnedtehn nestles to vestet extoreretans rn Vated eats provision f mlatonnnnnenppest o assistance for Latin American noval gad ats uxits,
13-00000 (o) Officer exchange programs. &) Language training foy Latin American military students. @ interuationsh Army, Kavy and Ais Force Defense Conferences. the Latin Amarican milifery eware of the realities of Gommunism and Communist oubversion. This includes: ; ae eo ‘Pennaletion into Syonish Abd venting of 40,000 wots‘ the sevice of tan paraphtote entitled, “Demecracy versus Gonmnunians. ss | Qh) evelopment of an audto/visunl fii etvip based an the "Demenracy versus Gominuniem pamphlets for the illiterate Latin Ameriean enlisted men. One Hundred and eighty of thaze filma and records have been sent to GINGARIB for farther distribution te the Latin American services. & Thivteen-hundred cogive of the UaLA pamphiet “Tactiees y Divoativas Contwn ie Farce Gommunlota: are being procured for dioteibotion among the ashy Avetiican military, b. Te PoliticosReonomle Eifort (to he supplied by State). c. The Propaganda Effort {he be supplied by USLA). The Intelligence and Non-nttributable Eeforte(to be eupplied by CLA).
13-00000 complete spoatsum of sections, it fp venlined that some say be found . ‘neultable, on polieat ar we grounds: “whieh provides tax suliilobersl enshuage of tadcimatten and saulitlaterah garticipation ts an slesting aystexss each eonntry to he responathle for sree on yoda electra esas of naDigants Wnts eabesibr ey Gonthine the tmpsovecnans of US osmammatéattons tn Latin, America, at high prtenity, te coutstinuts ta the effsativencss of the alexting syétem. be. Multinational Gvusterissurgency Farce. Deplore thn fonablty of ongblaing on GAS Covatentnenrgsocy Holgnde ton tiaphoyreddt Oonimghont Laitta: Acantiew to combat the efiecte of subversion. Suh s prepdsal, made st this tines, would exhibit the erlous determination af the th 8 to cuppest vigeroualy an antlacubvarelon program. &, Teakuing aed Getantetion, Provide for a greatly expanded ob-ol-ovuntry training and otlotiation program iow hey segmenta of cach Latie Amesican country's
13-00000 Panama and/or the United States. coongpeces | GD Petes suzsannal to be achosied 38 Pngank 0 | @) Mowepaper pereannel 26 be wdheckéd within the United fates. (4) Muvecs (male and demande) to be teaiand ie the Waited Guten. () Chri tstnitann to be trained tn Wo fies train | _ Th anasto ouch pt anpnnded emda. peter p teheg gtanetn. the United Stator, to not just te enhance the aiitt and atiitation Uavel af ths people hnvakved tisk, even mera, to expote the Latins te 9 tnftuense, to show them. our country, te poveunde them by love sacsclatian that wet vhow ta correct, and thus to otiffan thal resalva to combet subveratan tn any Gorm. a. Troup Information Program _apand greatly Ge curvest Latin Amertean troup information program in order to educste the Latin Amesican seevieament (and their trian contesnpacilea) vo i wstronsive Gagay Chay he  @ | News and Pyegagands | @ Gudarwrita, 0 aepenseryy sol cota is tnlenenaition | oa An eposition of Jacts on culvaraive feeling, movement of —
13-00000 i] sree ta ter treatin en the rise of Castes. i) Paste an tensor sad sepennston tn Cokin. "May Latta: Amerbean popans, oven the anil caommrunlet ones, are infiltwated by Commended agents and magny at thaly ccdamantite, proet- chee paper ary tne Wy ow pier ad mdarsien tx nes contre i eta to eoey ta truth to the Latin wy Me thn Amen believes what he reads. _ f . 4 6 (3) Dleteibuts Auti~Communist Mitoratare Books ané gumphiete, ta Jaxge mombore, expasing the ‘veality of communiam should be printhd in Spanish and Portuguese end distributed & Treval entre be tried by at We should acoetasicte nid hiohden ecuntorinwurgéasy progracas in cach eountey of Latin Amesica, dvtving for a reaitatie “Interyal Dafonse Plan" for every county and usjing Latin Amatican countztes to ash for US counter- tnouxgency trating ausistince, fox militery, partmilitery and police forces. Bayend Ue wa sheuld Hate pesifia euphsels pce developing civic setion
13-00000 @) Instigate and stage selected terroriat incidents in Latin American countries, designed to implicate Gastre. ~ (a) Aveange tor exdhine sof Sesiaieditas, ema i “Alscovared” in selected Lotin American countrise, ostenstidy exuggted in from Cuba. | St 18 the belief of the Gomuttiee that the setions outlived fn the precoding sections socapaios 4 sorta of steps which fa wane arean will stom > andi othons stench the piogeam af Ouha~besed Yate upset apboesrnton tn Sat America. Zach individual action embodies come clams of usefulness in | itself, and any combination of netions may generate caxrenpongingly favorable regults. There 1s ao peoleund réatioashlp which demands the somMaing of 1h ts secammended, therefore, that on early eclection be made of those ; aatlons Usted above whase execution ts eompatihie with national obligations oud dedications ia other ayeas aad which are within U, 8, capabilitins, aud te tip Hentephere are permitted ti mature, the moze diteheuls will be thats . And finally, recognising the diverse nature @f the Gold Wax activities invelved, it is strongly eecommended that & single pains in the Gevernmont be dentganted and asotgned veepenttiity for euporvising execution ofthe
13-00000 ore t & wee Oia in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to RET While we generaif? concur with the paper prepared by the Department of State, we do not believe that the proposals contained therein present a sufficiently wide spectrum. of options or activities © to impede and stop Castro/Communist subversion in Latin America, Specifically, we recommend the following additional actions: (1) | Measures to attrit Cuban resources: - fa) Purchase the defection of personnel, aircraft, ships, | boats and other valuable items. (b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. These actions ‘should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers "and storage, . (c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft . fights, agents, clear radio transmidsion, beach jumpers) cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus. to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive ‘training. (d) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency undermine confidence.
13-00000 sTeemamnaaes .e - this financial investment in (2) _ The designation of a single point in the Govern~ ' ment to be held responsible for supervising the execution of the total program, @) An intensified and broadened news and propaganda program, including the following: (a) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct an-information program within each country in Latin America using these themes: vetb eileen mares nme | | | 1. An exposition of acts on subversive training, movement of subversives and general oubversive programs. . 2. Objectives of the Communists within each country. | 3. Communist methods of operation. 4. Facts on the decrease in living standards within Guba since the rise of Castro. 5. Facts on terror and repression in Cuba. (b) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Cormuniat Preas | ‘Many Latin American papers, even the anti~ communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their columnists, proof-readers and Hinotypers are bought with communist money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match EWE C ontrol in order to convey the truth
13-00000 eee hehe te to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads: . (c) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature Books and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality of communiem should be printed in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale, (4) Greatly expanded training and orientation in the | United States for key segments of each Latin American country's population, such aa: | (a) Enlisted ae well as officer military personnel to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States. _* (b) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama or in the United States. (c) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within the United States. (a) Nurses (male and female).to be trained in the United States. (e) Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training schools. The thrust of such an expanded training program, taking place in the United States, ia not just to enhance.the skill and education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the Latins te US influence, to show them our country, fo persuade them by
13-00000 close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their resolve to combat subversion in any form.
13-00000 ‘{ aaora or more. Pingliy, . there is. eetdonoe thet the W.B;, ‘Bppresiates these realitica, as exhabet as the depth of prrgoing W.8, programs in all — of Latin Anigyioe, aimed at blunting the Communist subversive 7 + thrusts mnt dohe canbinent. The e iugp tion ereanted by the President's underscoring of the pedtilen is whether er nob our efforts in thin ares are adequate ~~ 88 t6 boope, ag te coordination, ana aa te intensity. ae “is the view. efithis Conant $bee shat they are nos. Parties AG ig the wlew pf: the Cumbviee (het steps sobe aimed soledy Bt tnpeting the Mey of students end suieusye to and {tithe wii nok, of Wenwedven, greatly dhate the | problem. igre ust! be ctsspayitiin efforts desiensd beth. to | degrade nde capability fey Cuben-based subversion, as well as ofthc ‘We devetep a wi ie -effeovive resistance capacity end the Latin dmerdvan states. The sections to fellow are. designed with these: ‘wo requirements in tind Pirst, ‘aun respect to preventing the export of Cemm- © nist cubveradion by or through wade, there is a summary of what we are. + Sains new, and wang we can de in the fubure.
13-00000 Secerid, With respect te assisting the Latin American nations be weaiet the impret 6f Commmist subversion, there — io 2 sumixy of our current programs and 8 listing of specific: eti$sionei things which we oe de; in ether words, a treatment @f the subversive question fren ¢we points of view ~ therapy as regards Cubes peepiy lexis as regards Latin — America at Anree. tha felloxing existing prograus are ali having come eéverss othe on the ‘banle abpebsiities ef the Comeutistes. a) argent, ‘train, teach, equlb, underwrite and expert subversive. pirengt inte Latin Aerts fron Cubas ; Redommidapence and: Sgrveiiiance activities, whieh masa’ provide intornaitven aud te represent & oenbdmiing “feo hte cotton contytbubes to the restristign = oe) ffidesn Sinan asa Sei to HAStd ond Demtatoan Reypblic Bren. oo ou Advoxasts pate fights out of Guantenmne, _&: Shese Plighte, ‘qegmenting surface surveillance, weep wateh for mad erase, fishing and merchant shipping ‘operating an ithe Caribbean south of Cuba, and Weitere © wAjnoent té ana orth ‘Of Jamagen. “ U:8, “Meldtery Sapevtton ef specifie counter cubereive tasks. Pee
13-00000 Tite Letom setian tae ia response te Ccban vevoluttemurtes to Central Auevion. These were oquntered, ant probably shorted, ty the presence Gf UB, Bey destuagars patrolling the coastal aroes | OF Conte Rica at the noquest of the goverment of tint counter. 2 (a) Gvertisant. feo donmens stomgen fo Coban siistary capsbiiinteny, thene Flights sorvir'es = rudder of 0.5. wigs lames Sut deberminetiim. (5) Comomtontiqns Inbelligeiae. Al af the where ere supported by and given ig sense of Girectian from the great volume of Semen buationce tn co _ ett er stn 2-9/4 ns "tn some degree, to capose to the Cuban people the | ‘eutrreasitve ockiritien of the Castro regine. “pe ee ot Coto te rin of
13-00000 @; te Yeron of Vortt Optutien. (1) Eliminatton of Cuba from Hemisphere organi~ sattiens exhibits the penslty for conductive subversive eetivi.tty in her neighboring states. (2) U.3.-Soviet talks regarding removal of Seviet cqubst feroes frum Crba sre productive in thet they ovbtdime the premincre on the USSR and the Cubans, — ‘and imap the subsector subvereton before the workt. %; Surveee Belstiodt sntions Aimed es Ieyeding revel Shs clear that thate sotivities witch relate to the Gomiak of agent movement and the suppewssten of guége~ ganda ceive directly to diminish the Cammmint capebility to export; gubverston fvem Cube. Zt ip necessary, however, to contesipiate other actleii iihioh, while less airectly related th subversion, still serve to weaken Cubs and its Commmntisg ‘dotatersktp, andi thas te eliminate the problen at its agurce. 36 is for this reason thet there is presented herein 4.1 Byestmm of notions related directly to Cuba, While it ts clear thik some actions listed my . creed the hovtaana of feenihdlity, tn tome of wctye, viRr, or the reigiivenenty of inteymitienal velatiens, 2t 4a nover~ — theless eGhsidered necessary that they be set forth in thet _ sabtraty Sn order Shes the, Bresitent may contemplate -the— to _,
13-00000 f- emetty Peytaiagnt Ati ._ (2) @xeuta prebiieis for the Contre yegtaa and. pt mivveretve yogis fy en Satenatftad payeho- Aww 2 tngtont efroxt exphistats the nartente ant ra facings being oninved ty the Canpenincs while Subversive teatneen ie siven Favered treataen AR) Restate tie genoa wetees Living com (g) macnn genity the enmnnt of YOA road “geet time tattoved i faba, ma snbenasey expan a Gn the dupratation 462 sutferitig brought on the | Shen vee be i ten tee eer (8) Coniust atvborms televiaten byoadensts ebm: 24 the Cran powphe and Latin: Amewtoan ubudeate tn Gites dusting on fish thane thet Casio's extrersig f crm Guutaniit to Gurkiey the fommyetlity ot. a @iniueted in Cuba und mustheds of expurtation. A. Movement of Pexporeet. a  Thmengh sutkilsberel and bileteval political prvonaeneste with tittn inarican states, aeck to . Pupede the movimetit 6f persons inte ani out of Cuba. _ fete & be cote Bente)
13-00000 @. Diminish the Fhyateul and, Beonomls Capability of Casto Cubs to Brain and Export Subversives, 3b 18 evident that veaty funds, in considerable _ quentity, ave veqaived to confuct a subversive training regres; mot te oyun it otter eeetiy factors ~ arate : eotionn snot xt xeduatng the Guten! vesournen will tise heve a divest effet upon thety ability to pursus tied poogved of eubvewtion, uit? Gams then to tan to thety oi tiutemnel pephloas and will give the Reesens pauses to the stiaGom et pmeuting 2 progeem which tn onstly and mmginatiy productive, Tdkewine, eyery
13-00000 + (a) Ate eaten sencurgen. (=) Parone tm detection af yore, ati . (o) conta aabtritatable aettoes against peteolems vesturees, upon whieh muah of Cubats | éeonuny depends, ‘these echiens should extend atl ry (e) By natin: ef sabettigenss tadSnattona | conse Cuhest military fevees to atan’ continually | at a high alert Ievel ent tam te einnume mppitten (8) yee sunteion ant epscston branes Caan Hines the asta are deme » mar fear
13-00000 @ Srtott the presence of the Red Ayu tn Gate ter ab tng « wedge Wetwom the 5efiet solaier _ Baveee 4 {estoy Tamatan technic. efter St appeadsing the yoogvens ubdoh are mow Su progress it is nesensary fo reflect tint, exbenmive though they are, many have not yet eccelevated te thedr full thrust and, taken all together, they ire oerteiniy nob fortified cur slltes to - the point. where sutverston san be ¥ntd bo be under full ogmbrel. 2. US Nittteny Betarts. . . . Undted States afiitery forces are new particl~ sides tn a breed apesten of niliteny sod exive-atittiny fusions in Latin Amevies, all of which cantrivate to stueligthentng the abdiaty of the ommtries to expose ead put down mbvereiyé activity. ‘Of these, the 4
13-00000 ef pilitery missions and mobie training teams. AB) Provision of equtyment md materiel on chert. (2) reortaton of sion romances nara rgeny tion fer Latin imertean Otticers ent enlisted men in Undsed Staten Servis Eaheals ani aeademioa. 4S) Provision of sfuie action tresuing ont assintence. <ierpert and sastatsincs fey Latin American ‘neyel (e) ettoer efutanee meagre. : _ Cs) Tangenge qepdning for Latin Anertonn . (2) mere Aamy, Hey an Ate oreo : (e) Conperstivs mapping operation. “TR weed surcrastiins the United Stete: ullitary is embarked on a 7 pevgrem eined at making the Latin American militery ewire of tho realittes of Commmisn ané Commnist eabeemion, ‘Thi Siilendens
13-00000 . (a) translation tite Spanish and printing of $0,000 sets of the series af ten pamphlets _ enbitled, “Demoonioy versus Commmisn”. : (>) Dovetopantt of om entto/risun fin ate ‘tave been sent te GREURID thr further eistrstuten : - {e) edstecenbiontved copia of the USHA pangs ine retin ee Sma . Hasta tmertonn ntttton. ve, he Loo-Rogmbnifh Rftort (to be supplied ty ex: he Fropaganis asters (to be saypited by USKA). 4./the Intelisgence ani Sen-attritetable Eerorts 2. Ripgramp Witen Hay Be Bnttinted. | hein the exes eff Segtitim IX, the pregrems outlined velew axe sists reasenitiie technics sal pruction? conpetense. However, aif they oxtas the deuplete epeoteun of actions, 10 so rena tot far tye -fpend yeaubate, on palletes’ oe other gitmdss : ‘a, Sarvelltances i “Gay mothe 0 cfiboen sen ant constal saves ° lagiee /pregven which yeQyides for miltListerel exchenge ef Seformattos and miltiietere yertiotyetton i an
13-00000 (9) Couttine the inprovenent of US coummmteations an tain haerion, of high pedeakia, te contribute ‘Mivtewe the fosathitty 4¢ expadzing on O06 Combertnrpenay Brigade for euplayaent throaghout sah a poment, nnd #h this time, would extibit the sertomt detominatian of the U.S, te eappert vigorously an anti-subversion progrim, 0, Taaining and Crientition. Provide for 2 greatly expanded out-of-ccuntry toediing end orientation prtgen for lay sqgmants of cach intin Aneriean equstey*s population such ast (2) Enbisted and Gfficey military personel to bs + sebijoles ini Yeu ani/ar the Untted states, Lo “ A2) forsee pamsenidt to be echesied tx mama or —es haneg the scELi sok ecumbions level of the people tumbved Treat» een Op to expone the latins to US influence, ‘tn idhpan thie Gur county, t> penmunds then by clone Se enngointto that our view ie correct, and this to etiffen - thaty,reoabre to coxtat Subversion fm exy form.
13-00000 @. froop Information Progreat « . tnecam service (oat Care svsttanseutnperactco) to the sutwemtee duniiy) they feee. (+ Sos ond Frapegints 1 (1) Vademertte, dist meseemmy, end cominet an Sxfemation pongram:whtkin each cousbyy ini Latin Aahertom wate, Yhowe: gens : (b) Ghjectives of the Commuists within each (4) tects on Yio Geereene in Living stendasee . “yetthin Guba siueethe rise of casteo. 2 (e) Facts on terror and repression in Cubs. (2) Devatey a Poo-tnertens Antt-Comamtst Frees cpmamist ones, sre infiltreted by communist agents and many of thety colmamists, yrosf-resters amd Mnotypers are bought with commmiat money. Circu~ Intion of thece sepiay te avtiriesliy torlated by ow Unibet Stiten mut witeh this fimnctal iavestnent tn NewS contyel tx cedex'to coupay the tiuth to the Min whe, 2fiat tte Saerioun, believes wnt he reat...
13-00000 ae B wowe for an $18 eubexge on travel | | tj So tron Cais Bf uble to achieve & mae ! poco im lsh come of Tain lorry dein - cod ubging Latin suerican comvies to cat for 19 comer training endisimnse, for military, perm tke
13-00000 —————————— i On st anes ne 1 Sttnorers to scinsted Latin Anerionn coumtrlen,, wee ares ogee oe et er’ ae BRE rere: “peenhier ore soreppyen gta oe
13-00000 = ; outlined Sn rratine sete eerie «ifr cose of Cilid-baset Gomusntst siiversion tn latin Anevien, Htegh indéyiduel sation embodies some elewent of usefulness in Steels, ‘und any séaninatiod,¢f aottons shotig/ renovate copresponiingty fayvcrabls wen} ts. Theve ie no profound yer lntLesship ‘whieh desande the sopbiniag of any specific sot” of Bottonds  thevetaire, that an early selestion be mae Of thee sation linted shew thoes exeoution tx a wis coupatibie with national . get - , Salant that they ba ped quley Ante affect since : Nhe subversive infiubness th the Hantsphere are . paras sniror, tit moega-ertanls with be Uist elti= :
13-00000 —~— etain viamait [oF Fe March. 11, 1963 IX.A.3.d.. General. Pressures to Create a Contingency In order to accomplish the overthrow or reorientation of the Cuban regime without harming the United States image and with minimm distortion of bilateral US-USSR relationships, there mist be careful coordination and phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There mst be a plan capable of getting use from where we exe now to where ve want to go, by gradually increasing pressures until the objective is achieved. These pressures © ete should be designed to create opportunities and contingéity-situations mee. for further exploitation, along the way. The optimum orchestration of such @ Cuban program must obviously be developed as the future unfolds. But in order to provide overall guidance within this Government, a plan tracing the mainstreams of effort is required. This plan is divided into eight headings with e gradually inereasing level — of effort described under each of these headings. The progress through the various phases is visualized as taking place in a coordinated but not necegsarily symmetrical manner. In other ywords, we may be in the most vigorous phase of propaganda vhile not yet having reached the fine phase with regard to subversion but nonetheless the decision to proceed to the respective phase ‘in either category would be coordinated as .part of an everall governmental orchestration. A program scenario capable of producing a decisive change or exploitable contingency over an 18-month period follows. US Posture - - Initially the US image should be that of ‘willingness to ao all thet is necessary to keep Castro's military threat nil end his subversive threat to the Western Hemisphere at an acceptably low level. It should be characterized as one during which the USG, having been .
13-00000 rs ‘LY ” extremely reasonable despite Castro's intransigence, is waiting for signe ” of more favorable change in Cubs. Later the US image showld change to one in which the US is being "led" by the majority of the OAS into OAS initiated and sponsored To : a | Pressures against Cube. These vould consist of measures less than those certain to overthrew Castro but going beyond the earlier measures, in the expectation that resulting internal pressures might eliminate Castro _-~ tr provide an occasion for decisive ection. Pressures would be applied on 7 ... 4m such fashion es’ to represent both a carrot to the Cuban people to get rid of Castro regime and a stick toverd the present regime. Still later the US stance should become publicly, "at last” to join the OAS majority = -. _ in seeking vigorous pressures ‘on the Castro”regime_without yet irrevocably 8 , Co committing US prestige to decisive action. ot oo Finally, if end when the orchestration and circumstances have brought the us position to such a point that decisive aetion is possible, and if earlier pressures have not eliminated Castro or do not give promise 7" of eliminating, “sda decisive action might be considered. This need not be an invasion by US forces end could be re-imposition of total blockade or a disarming airstrike, dependent on the circumstances. | “8 OAS Action - - The USG will need to devote major attention to the oi ; strengthening of the solidarity of the OAS as a source of regional _ Opposition to the Castro regime. These efforts should go forward openly along several lines, guite apart from the covert effort to organize the majority on specific issues. . This effort to achieve. soliderity should consist of frequent briefings of the OAS nations through al] appropriate .' channels, Consultative Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, efforts Fas 3. tee. f to set up an OAS military orgenization ‘with occasional commitment of troops
13-00000 ~~) an Ce ts bat ow entt @ * “for training, ‘and all other feasible developments of regional themes, such as intensive efforts to build up the counterinsurgency capabilities of the’ region. -It is very necessary, in view of the general LA situation to continue all measures necessary to isolate Castro. Initial OAS action should be the enlargement of the bases for the invocation of the Rio Treaty. This broadening should be against the con- timed presence of Soviet troops (unless negotiations with the’ USSR indicete that this aspect should be deferred) and/or against Castro's continued | subversive activity. Concomitantly, the recent study of the. Special Consultative Committee on Security should be given wide publicity and , the US should press for implementation of its recommendations, Dot ‘The OAS, in the near future, probably after publication of the results of the foregoing study and enlargement of the basis for invoking the Rio Treaty to include subversion, should again formally warn Cuba against promotion of any more subversive activities. The OAS should formally _state that should Cuban subversive activities rise above some (unspecified) level, a “new condition" would exist which would justify decisive action against Cuba. All episodes of subversion or sabotage which sould be attributed to Castro should be highly publicized. The majority OAS support _ Should be organized to neutralize the Brazilian co-existence theme. " Bilateral approsches and economic quid pro quos should be uged to win Brazil to the U.S. view within OAS. Still later, at an appropriate time, the OAS showld make an official finding, from its studies initiated earlier, that the Castro regime has continued, despite warnings, to conduct egeressive and subversive actions in Latin America. A summary publication of subversive activities or : PAC
13-00000 ‘wae : . + : "Wate Paper should be promilgated through the OAS. Later a “new condition" should be found formally to exist, following which the US would state that the earlier US-USSR mods vivendi regarding” Cuba. bas come to an end. Following the above, -an OAS vote should call for the remaining. LA natiéus——~—__ a to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and for all menbers to restrict their nationals from travel to ‘Cuba. Castro should be officially labeled as @ major threat to the hemisphere and to the objective ‘of the Alliance for Progress. The OAS might then declare that Castro's subversive activity constitutes ' warlike activity and proclaim a prohibition against any warlike activity being conducted by Cuba within en océan and lend area around the entire LA continental and Caribbean erea. Intervention of aircraft and ships carrying arms, subversive agents, propagandsl materials, etc. could be orized. | pj yp‘, ae , Still later at an appropriate time the OAS should vote, under the Rio Pact, to punish Castro's aggression. This action could. take the form of a resolution for all menibers to take such action including the use of force as individually econsidered appropriete or to endorse any specific decisive action to which the merbers hed agreed. The USG should brief its Allies on the views of the OAS and warn that the situation may get worse. later, as a result of “OAS insistence” the Free World should be urged to extend or re-affirm trade eubargos to all items except food stuffs, medicines, and medical. supplies; to: spply shipping , restrictions; NATO should be persuaded to include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM ist (strategic) items is prohibited; free world industrial nations should be dissuaded from shipping to Cube
13-00000 ervueiel spere parts and equipment which are not on the COCOM list. ' Union has no intention of removing any additional military personnel, "fashion as to be clearly visible to the Cuban people; while avoiding Lee Still later the US should increase the Vigor with which she seeks, through. briefings, pressures, etc., to increasé the effectiveness of all economic measures and should seek to persuade all non-bloc nations to limit their airline services to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft serving Cube. At an eppropriate point in She orchestration, food stuffs should be added to the prohibited trade list, with US using ~---—__ ite influence to extend this exbargo throughout the Free World. The ultimate extension of economic actions, would be the application Se of a biockade to Cube. . This could be a phased weapon consisting ofa, blockade on FOL, with the prospect of total blockade to follow. Surveillance over Cuba -~ Until it becomes apparent tint the Soviet aerial. surveillence should be limited to appropriate high altitude coverage with low level surveillance avoided except for thoroughly suspicious indications. - later, at a | suitable point in the orchestration, occasional low altitude surveillance of "suspicious" areas should be undertaken in such AA. defenses. . - Still later, eudtebly timed, the United states/0As should initiate very. frequent low altitude surveillance. This should be increased in intensity to the: point at which our aircraft would Literally seek out AA defense sites in search of provocative acts or, in the absence of Cuban reaction, to deflate Castro's image. BO In any decisive action at the end of the road, surveillance should be at saturation levels.
13-00000 weve noones . a a Regional. Survedllance -- The OAS or the Caribbean nations should take the initiative in organizing, as a part of a Caribbean security arrange- -- tent, a-surface ship and seriel surveillance of the coastal ana offshore waters of the Caribbean nations. These patrols should be progressively moved out from the shores of the nations being protected into the Caribbean approaches to Cuba, tying in with an OAS proclaimed zone in which movement of subversive agents, materials, forces, or arms is prohibited. Toward the : “end of the crescendo, they should operate close to the shores of Cube. | "here should be increasing surveillance and control of land boundaries. There should be improved systematic exchange of intelligence on subversive. . eetivity, ete | Propaganda - ~ There should be established immediately @ redio station ope, (Radio Free cuba), probably in Florida, using covert fumds, with ao geoups. Its content should be the middle cottucrse between VOA and regularly scheduled Cuban broadcasts available to all Cuban political Initially, through public statements, VOA, ete., maintain the theme of the U.S. “watchful weilting" for change in ‘the Castro regine. a Maintain the currently enhanced VOA vave facility beamed $6 Ciba High- 2. °° Might positive results in Ietin America of the Alliance for Progress. We ee _ should warn Guba unofficially through the suggested Radio Free Cuba of the consequences of contimed ‘subversion and of Castro's present track. Still jater, prior to any decisive action, if taken, this thene should go out officially over VOA and in announcements of public officials. Initiate and organize clandestine newspapers and leaflet operations. infiltrate Cuban exile publications. Play up, on all media, the threat
13-00000 ‘of Castro to the regines of the Western Hemisphere. and the objectives of Allience for Progress. Remind the Cuban people that Castro came to power on-a pledge to provide political freedom. Remind them of the social goals he held up while he destroyed that freedom. Contrast their present | , economic chacs with those economic goals of land and housing reform. . Remind them that he preached nationalism while delivering their country vs to the Soviet military occupation. Point out how each shift of goal vas . ‘accompanied by the destruction of earlier ones. Ask what Castro-has left to offer. Conclude that only the mitual fear of retribution among his elite remains to hold then in pover. Use slogans such as "L 64" . a ‘(Liberty in '6h), ete. . Still later initiate through public broadcast, training in the wy sta leter urge the many small revolutionary-cells to make contact > : with neighboring groups. Warn and threaten the Castro regime through ms ell media; exhort the people to organize to-join enlarged resistance groups; _ seek to build up resistance herves. Endeavor to deflate Castro through _--—" these bewadcasts, Stress the freedom-of: the Cuban people, post-Castro, to 7 _ choose their own political and social structure. eo | Subversion -- There should te‘ en initial period of no increase in ~ subversive efforts by the U. 8. until. the bilateral phase of the Cuban affair is completed and it is clear that the 0 Soria Ua WE nenor no additional militery personnel. After that time minimal covert contacts should be established within "Steep, ee oy “"eeetecaen Cuba for the aistribution of newspapers and leaflets. Minimal acts of * - defiance and sabotage should be initiated. For example, exhort groups
13-00000 nae” OF 3 or & friends, without establishing external rebel affiliation, to” mae L'64, ete., on walls orto colt isolated acts of sabotage. ‘The - . Purpose. would be to establish rebel connotation end to generate leadership. a Thais would lead to the esteblishment of rudimentary célivular training oo “4n seditious activity. Minimal supply of critical items should be initiated | to subversive groups within Cuba on a case-by-case basis. Potential leaders . should be identified. Contingency planning, covert and unilateral, should continue. ‘The mmber of Cuban exiles taken into the United States Armed Forces for training and formation of reserve units should be significently increased. A similar program for "freedom fighters for Cuba" should be co , undertaken for volunteers from other LA nations. At a later point in the crescendo, departures from the Cuban armed forces in organized units should ‘be encouraged. All. covert effort should be exerted towerd comrdinating the celle, pockets, and groups resisting Castro, inside and cuteide Cuba. This would bea transition period from sporadic acts in isolation into organized subversion. Fuel ‘and: food suppliés: chowlA be sabotaged. An “organized supply system should be put into effect with large numbers of fishing craft situated around the ieland to make both scheduled supply. of deliveries and deliveries of opportunity. As various groups are ident4- fied in revolt, they should be worked into the supply system. New LA and Cuban fighters training outeside.Cuba, should be intpoduced in the seme. way  frito these organized movements within Cuba. ‘There should be frequent leaks of planned us invasion and eppropriate denials ‘ to frustrate the suspicious Castro. Fleet and sir "training" dembnstrations should be scheduled off Cuba. At the @me time it should be made clear to rebel 7 eaders that an externally leunched invasion is not to be expected until @ revolution has come from within, with external logistic assistance.
13-00000 . the clock to be turned back with regard to social conditions. | _ majority OAS vote still more vigorous pressures should be initisted. it should ve emphasized to the reicl leaders that the U.S. does not expect still later a complete orchestration should be woven together, coming to @ crescendo through the optimal exploitation of all the moin- streams discussed in the categories above. Propaganda should reach the maximum denunciation of the regime, exhorting to revolt, holéing up the prospect of peace and a better life should the Cuban people join their -resistance leaders. Subversion should be stepped up by introduction of all available externally trained vesistense fighters, provision of maximm Logistic support, ete. £% the ap roprdet 2 “rime y if this resistance movement needs the essistance of external forces there showld be an OAS structured air strike, related to an appropriete Castro mis-step, to disarm Cuban . offensive and defensive pover and to destroy ell POL storage. This attack should be coordinated with all-out sabote ze. An invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, if re- quired to save the resistance, once the @11-out internal resistance efforts has been initiated. Criteria -- The pressures discussed in all categories above should . be appropriately coordinated. The period or moderation should end after one or two months when it is apparent that no further Soviet military personnel are to be removed. Moderate pressures should then commence, lasting for a period of two to-three months, until some episode of escalation by Castro or other eppropriate event, makes further pressures feasible. If such an event is not forthcoming, OAS major insistence should lead to escalation of presaures. After enother short period, egeain pre- ferable triggered by an appropriate Castro episode or alternatively by @
13-00000 sit + % Te Castro hag initdated a suitable -mr-Like act, such as fixing . “wa on surveillance aircraft, pressures should be escalated to the maximm immediately rather than gradually. -
13-00000 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS . WASHINGTON 28,2.c. oe nary aarer To 0p-613C/sg Ser 1963 a MAR T1963 | oF Brower —oongrades to CONF upen removal of enolosires HEMO NDUM. FOR MR, J, “A, CALIFANO SPECIAL ASSISTAN ZO TH _ SECRETARY. OF THE ARMY Subj: Interdepartmeatal Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion (0) . Ref: (a) Your Memo No. 13 of 28 FEB 1963 Encl: (1) through (8) Proposed actions (Ts) “le As requested by: reference (ad, specific. and dizect actions... : designed to reselve problems of Cuban subversion are sub< . mitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (8). | ARG. Ceeaicte | WF AWE OT ~ bon 7 a a Bam Di i ‘| EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING _ BOD OR 520010 DOES MOT APPLY = ; : Reproduction of this ccument fn ‘mp Secret "whole er ia part Is p-onbited PAGE NO_1_oF pasts _— tacept with pemnissica of the , sae. copy No._1__oF_1LO__SoPIES Hag offics or ad .
13-00000 . PROPOSED ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT sO BE-TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE US, BILATERALLY, OR THROUGH THE OAS, TO IMPEDE THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE FRAINEES TO AND FROM CUBA Ae Institute effective procedures to insure that U.S, citizens do not travel to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action), oe B. Continue U.S. restriction against U.S, airline service ; ; to Cuba. (This is important te aveld giving other air- - 7 ;. lines an excuse to reestablish air service) (unilateral ce '  } U.S. action). . - ears Ct. Thoroughly examine Latin American Constitutions and laws . on oe to determine the legal capability or impediment to.céntrol of travel of their citizens to and from Cuba- (unilateral U.S. action). . D. Arrange for adverse publicity on individuals whe ere - . _ known to have undergone subversive training in Cuba (uni- lateral U.S. action), ; .E. Spread rumors of epidemics in Cuba (unilateral U.S, action). P, Sabotage aireraft preceeding te and from Cuba (unilateral U.S, actien), ot | Ge Increase U.S. efforts to establish identity of all Latin 7 . americans travelling to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action). . ; a. Encourage Latin American countries to pass new legislation, or enforce existing legislation, restricting the travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action). I, Persuade Latin American governments to prevent re-entry. . to their country of persons suspected to have beea . trained ia subversion ia Cuba (unilateral U.S, action). af ; J. Persuadé LA countries to tighten border security measures wi by appropriate authority (unilateral U.S, actien). Supply : ” equipment and POL for patrol and surveillance. See enclosure (6), ; ‘Ke Cubana’s Britannia aircraft are in disrepair (2 or 3 of 5 are operational). Under existing agreemeats, Cuba must oR . ; . a EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DIWNGRADING / — Reproduction of whole or in part fs prorat oo . 000 Oi £200.10 DOES KOT APPLY, | "+ Issuing offic or higher subi» <eUoSURE A to cNo Serena 200 £5" } od ne ak wee
13-00000 seék Mexican concurrence in using sew equipment (IL~18) on the Havane-Mexilce City reute, We sheuld persuade Mexico to refuse the new aircraft eon grounds of safety, facilities, or other reasons. We should also encourage ~~ Great Britain or other sources to cut off spare parts (unilateral U.S. action), L. Encourage hemispheric countries to deny unscheduled traffic stops: to Cubana afrlines (unilateral U.S. action). M. Persuade friewdly governments in LA and elsewhere to. harass ships and aircraft traveling te Cuba with admini- ~— strative delays (minute examination of air worthiness actions customs, documents, ete. } (unilateral UeSei action e N. Seek arrangement whereby other Latin ‘American eountries §.. .- would cooperate with Mexican efforts to-deny travel their nationals to and from Cuba via Mexice (see Hexico City Tel 2221) (bilateral U.S. action),
13-00000 comprombelng many details of highly seacitive inforaation, Yor- thie reason, the paper focusses on genergl principles. The ay ao Aa | inant intended te ba exitieal, + le not deetaned tbe te ‘Bie to predict the fature,. . The discussion. of: ithe factors conditioning vu. 8. polloy is im the realm of the clandestine aad covert may seem elementary and somewhat philesophicals however, these factors provide the general parameters within which future actions can be considered. Any. attemat to determine the prozortionate influence of any particular it describes briefly a fein of the élementa which mast be ‘considered in the procega of making valid and conclusive. determinations: . bd Rig we: m “Ne fs most desirable to detarmine the « ra abjective iz precise terme. When the. objective is élarified and - “pod DIR 6200610° DOES NOR APPLY
13-00000 Rama Sees seman some intriguing gimmickery. understood, actions can be developed to achieve that objective. The extent of the U. 8, cormmitment,; as.reflected by the determination of the objective, te eran and tas aten at eigulicance ia the . “wader the sitantion currently id in Cuba probably envieages a an citimate v. 8. eure arg: sipemetin here There can bcuseae eae evaatien rr intligenes ‘Fevelt there. are spied gh ncept and certain svave sloke inherent. popekanpe digs cpr Siapeapettionnte rllezer of cousees O8:8 iy 7 in advance ef U. &. policy, and (@) develop- oe Obviously, the. detexymination of U. &, objectives is beyond the realm of the clandestine and. covert and cannot be cone . sidered ia the context of Gubs alone. Serious judgments must be made in gelation te the broad world envircament, Actions against Cabs mey be Seinen © G.- 8. itlena maf canting inane vecarin A god "vale of ound" with respect to clandestine or covert actions te taas the sisks entailed ate in direct proportion — to the nacfalngse of the epezations,
13-00000 - Jt 4s ronsonahle to assume that Cuba will atteibute to the U. a. (at the time of Cuba's choosing) any actions, reel or mamifactared, seaiaciete of te Assuming that the U. 5. Peerigercite he eabjected to  ftgaat reed ses ‘of those who have accesa,. ion appease tobe 55 Bllssy. ‘feteative or secarity precautions eutwelgh er jeopardiae the opera+ tien itself) and reasqnahic safegusrds to insure that the proof of © U. 8. implication eannot be developed. - In this counetitien there lz a mandatory requlzem : - for unanimity of denial qn the part of Y. 6. officials. This aaulaatty mist obtain despite the raagnitade, ‘persistence, ov accuracy of tho | ‘Canteo/ Commnaiee propligauds machine. we reseed Soeunte ee: It ehould be pointed out that as a result of U. Be. Se a: te tae ogsateeey ee eka Hay of Pigs aparailan, . ; Se oa nenbane ance
13-00000 | greater credibility te the accusations of the Castro or Sino/Soviet Bloc and alert our enemies to the possibility that the U, 8, may undertake actions of o less conventional nature, ae waatiuy. he | It may be desirable to undertake actions which achieve Little presse caverage (visibility or noise level). It fe difficult to determing with any accuracy beforehand the extent of the publicity to be achieved. The Castro Regime generally can’ -cantrel the timing and magnitude of public release. The world . press for the most part is not subject to U. & control engept Bo - the U. 8. may achieve success through comer propaganda: os is cnditete Gindinds. that: es 5 increasing’ or abet ie Level da the moat acceptable; :. J atically increased nolae level may be acedptable when arrears aay by eignificant Geadiiae) evert items which serve to distract the. mo Sttention of the publin. ; foot, , There is @ mature) reluctance to undertake clandestine or covert aciiona which regult in the death or serious injury to innocent Cubans. Meaningful actions will cortainly . cauge harm te certain elements, but some of the destructive actions which could be undertaken may be countezproductive iri that they ateike at the wrong targets. Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve » the desired degree of selectivity in uncontrolled operations, imple: ; snented fa secrecy: a ty Gtentlon‘ot fob%,: “‘elothing and, miedtiad ‘shiavtags end the sabotage of storage or distribution facilities undoubtedly may hurt the sconomy but those commiltted to the Castrea Regime may suffer relatively ttle. Such actions may do ttle but weaken an inactive or apathetic populace while increasing the internal security mechaniam.
13-00000 i a : ‘many of the proposals for actions directed against Cuba. When ; _the judgmenta ef varieus individuals differ, the gegulting Ue 8. . too low or the proposals may be of a nature that premature com- mitment and subsequent disclosure would not be desirable since _ the weapen may be worthy of a more far reaching impact. There is an underatendable feusteation in the U. 8. wegerting to the ap=- plicktion of sophisticated clandestine weapons against a sinall state which theoretteally: auld be brought to Ste knees ins rela ‘tively snows period of time through the avplication of | ‘“epicket™ whieh ave of no real or lasting consequence: These could aubjeet the U. 8. to adverse criticiam on moral srounds or extend the parameters of warfare to new dinyinsicns. 7 e Recruitment and Bulle Politics: a The fecruiting problem deserves cousideration in any paper considering clandestine and covert actions. Obviously, the receultment of a sole individual involves a system of screening - which thesretically must not be compromised ofther in the process ot sorting or during the subsequent utilization and poot-utilization perieds.. There is @ marked tendency for Cubans to talk, to brag, or to infer participation in secret operations. Individuals personally | and scores of exile organisations are quick to capitalise on the real , fF imagieary activisies of tieiy members. These Cuban axzile organ- ‘{eatlons compete for yetoguition, pedstige and material support " witth they hope will ster from thely participation in clandestine or eavert activities. There is & constant flew of proposals for action and requests for assistance or official recognition. Some individuals o wore . and erganizations merely deaire to publicize thelr affiliations with geome member of the U. S. Geverament.
13-00000 -of bis Beecher and could have compromised as an otherwise ; ally canbe sisasured in tavms of thelr assimilation and the extent of U. &. commitment and associated security, fm ‘ are not eptisled with a alngle vebulf, but make their offers to ine dividuals in CIA, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice or with members.of Gengress, the presa, end other nonegevatn~ . mental individuals er agencies, A specific actlon or proposal =~ may have had merit at one point, but from a security standpoint, =» the porstetence of the propaser may have negated the potential. a ‘tn oxdar to minimize af@Mation elle: gteups, the most apparent salution which is auggeeted frequently envisages the recruitment of Cubans who have no political afGiline - tens. While this may be possible, experience has ck Sus: it is not probable. Those Cubans in the U. 8. who have absotiate: with U. S. personnel and those who speak English are generally masked. Those whose language capabilities and economic stature combine to mit their social mobility are more likely to turn.to, accept and become involved in the social, political or cultural elolaters of Cubans in the U. 5. There are additional political and psychological - problems in seeking recruits from among Cubans who have fled va and generally desire to yemain united with familits and friends, -.“ Thelr motivation to participate in activities against Castro. gener ‘gabcess fn tha 0, '8. ‘Superience has shown that interasl oppegitlc fete may resent external Guban leadership, Ae the exije Browns oo compete for palitical prestige and material support, so do the © sepresentitives af the internal registance groups. The problems of exiles actemgtng to detain 7 a are discussed eloewhere in this paper.
13-00000 RE calanion and toalcteg colton tb accouplttbed In a duties of : days. There is ne standby reserveir of multi-purpose agents, The operations themselves call for split second timing and are subject both to anture’s slementis (weather, tdes, meen, seasen) aud other usaati« clneted and unpredictable « elvcumstences (Cuban alerts, osatact with OT More effective operstions can be-undertaken when teatty to plow te gractent detail” Frome practival ateagpeate ei tunity to plas in greatest detail, From a practical _i¢is extremely difficult to méintain individual or group motivation-and aggres- sivenase whas operations ara delayed, shatted, aanailed aw subjected to - continual medification. 3. ASEE.TS in considering U. &. asaete for covert and clandestine operations against Guba, ¥e hg weld te FQN ew beletiy tn om Rintorical Contant, the situation whith faces the U. &. Petar $0 Gastro's asemnpiies of power, U. B. & elfurte in the fleid "ef Sntelligesee qua clandestine operations tn Latin America lagged behind ¢ immediate problem areas of the world, At the time Castro ascemed ooatral tn Cube, there waa much open controversy on the question of Gasteo's subservience to communism, but generally it was aesumed that the change of government fn Guba was in the-well-known Latin tradition. Later, it was realized that the change of government was not.just a chatige in personalities, but a revelutianary change in governumentsl system. Ai this point, catty in 1960, plans were developed to assist the people of Gaba in overthrowing thelr r government. This plan
13-00000 n,giteis tn ih lye ote !Blpewaren e oue.n F Cl MERE 7 SS Scat eae Coeds etn culminated in the abortive Bay of Pigs Operation in late Apri 1961. sidents and potential realatease groupe to copoce dhamectr a 1961, the U. a a neti penn espns Het fare 29 " ”  Sacther endanger ety say vecidual aacate in Guba which ram may have ‘gti a Sc ers operator ote ringed sm oe as ie on LATOuMIry tecested thtt on tee ncllakee neiao on eee wate adedatially intelligente agents and could net be epared der ean vepeion t clandéstina operations. Castro had consalldsted bia aesurl mochanteza to the point dust by early 1962 lf wie quite Gi phat lane tions of agente in usefal areas would be most: firet nine months of 1962, che emphasis wae placed on intelligense gathering rather than clandestine operations or politics! action in the tasgat area. Becuee of ertatn operation liane mast of th oper * the wei pees snd “ocnention” ese Ne atenapt was nisdé duping or immediately after the missile erisis te centinus avese has vee dat thts of manch note ee cy Cate ithe Oe ee ment of Defense and within the Centra} Intelligence Agency.
13-00000 © e negentnbninadrane Ea ee we EG eg SAP rr teit ieee De Coated etre tenegetesinge ae adeones eng Byer a caer te OE ACE ETE or ee os Hatt che Many argue, with same , that Shee the opreaioan in of & magaivede thet die DoD usset othe #ésponsibllity, te Ls af tht pubet of losing ite cover ox foondastion wieppings and DeD may suffer the consequences. Except for participation during World War 0, fow individuals in the Depariment af Defease were eoxcerned with clandestine opera- yar Apr Experiences of the wmilitery in Germany, Lace, an) Vletaam served to undesiine many of the capabilities and qupport of this view stems feom the military's frasteation ag GIA's separent teabiiity to take bald actians (probally combined : with come tabarn fingelsm),
13-00000 :  yensitive to the 0 of U, 8, military ecsdureds ia ‘ Ne ee eet Gat exneen cf tauticlt recrenahiiition te the conventional araa. There is same opposition on moraliatic could cubsequentiy. - wellant adversely on the military ootablishment or the pectessional wailitery as a group. Other objections include a velugtante to asrame the weeponetbilities and riche entailed in epexntone of tite a ; inthe past, dee millitexy bas played an ecsentiel rete in three major citegeries «-.mensy, men and materiel. Frem the fiecal stand . pointy the Department ef Delene enn provide vast expendfares with - welatively great desi bility. The vast resources in manpower of the DoD (with miiltary technical and Mugulstic ekille, overseas experience, phyeical cone ditioning and personel dedication and aggreasivendss) provides a very lecrative potential for DoD participation in elaadestine and covert actions. The major problem in this connection is thé separa~ tion of the individual irom the militury Service. The mechanics of tadividual cover, demmy recorde, and the adminletrative processing is eseentially no grent geeblem. The difficaliies appear in the cen ’. ° @hdevation of family and militery associations, It.is zelatively.casy '... bo quididy seqlate asd “sheep dip" an air crew or a.cmall béat craw for one thort misaion; however, thin process té. not daily dutended.” for any proteacted geriad. There is usually a requicement to consider caxefaliy the poy and silewances of military persounel operating Se oe A coniunotion with CLA personnel on clandestine and covert operations. The matertal assets of the Department of Defense.ean play a major role in CIA's overall eperation. DeD can provide cover for many of CLA's training, cupply and storage installations: DoD is involved in curvelflance activities. Tha Do) tnvantory of stexntt
13-00000 ce sis ith tena exes ar nia rates ad ete ten migetens DoD stocks of ams, foodstafis and eqeipment algng ad ies beckage and ship for agvial oF WGPACe ce There ia a genbral misunderstanding conzerning the use of . Ateay Special Forces unite, Navy SEAL teams, Air Force Jungle Jim ge gutahtions or Marine Gexpe epectal unite in covert and clandestine - . @perations.. While it ie eatitaly possible and feasihie to convert individasle ov units for clandestine or covert operations, the basic tlaélon of Special Porces-eriginally was ertented toward the ovgatisa- a ‘quentljr the chatter of petal Pocess wan expanded te Yisorpote Subses in ai 5 in felendly tessitory,: Both éf digad': aaa Crean ae ney tinty event in ectcne cod Ghoce be a lack of emporicace = and doctrine for the commitment of Special Forces in clandastine or covert operations. This genegaily applies to unite of the v zallie ‘tay Services. yt Orns andaharanmnrecbebeplar peary tte de units for example, the ability of our Special Forces to assist in the organiza- ten of a resictance in Cuba in euppert of a conventional military opera~ tien thege, . - It ts essential to an understanding of the problem to. realise that since late 1961, ail U. &. intelligence estimates have indiested that there ig little Mkeliheed of an internally sparked Cuban veeistance 7 be be of any elgnidicanse. _ Agedrding to CIA there is iittle poselttlity Mlon reathing officials of the Gastre Regine: It is gleo estimated that theve i Mttle ikelihead thet any resistance groups would be able to . “held out't in any organized form for more than a week or twe. Castro pereonally is quite aware of he potential of a guerrilla vesietance and moves ruthlgsely, committing disproportionate foreca te ensure that the epask dees not mature. -