' November 30, 1961 December 1, 1961 i Possible courses of action inciuded: (1) the improvement of our maritime capability, (2) preparations for air resupply operations when required, (3) selection or recruitment and training of a few American agents fo (4) somewhat ineredsedktra Regarding the “proposed American agents, the memorandum noted: "These can be men of Latin recial origin and must, of course, be bilingual.” “As to "possible results:" Lansdale concluded:...there'’s much : yless than even chance of achieving by the means herein discussed “Athe® overthrow of the regime. Nevertheless there remains a “significant possibility that this can be done. The possibility can be assessed only if the operations is continued at least to the point where a real effort has been made to builid and organize resistence.'’ Source: Lansdale memorandum, November 3, 1961, 00071-79. presidéntiKennedysDecisionstorBepineMongoose,, A memorandum from President Kennedy was sent to Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, General Taylor, General Lansdaie and Mr. Goodwin, which summarized "the major decisions which have -been made in regard to the Cuba Operation." The mem stated: ‘'(1) We will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project in erder to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime. (2) This program will be conducted under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations. It will be conducted by him through the appropriate regular organizations and departments of the Government." Source: ‘Memorandum, November 30, 1961, (0069~70). REK Informs Special Group of Mongoose. At a Special Group meeting (Bundy net present}, the Attorney General reported "about a series of meatings which had been held recently with higher authority. Out of these had come a decision that higheeepreorutysSnowldibekeivenstocCubas; It was agreed that General Lansdale shouid develop a long-range program which would be reviewed by the Special Group and Page 259 3242739626 Baocld 50955 HY
December 8, 1961 January 25, 1962 pursue a new or revised Cuba policy. nai “nu@leNSeofPantt=Castrozcubanss on: presented for approval to higher authority. At that time, formal language would be proposed to record the decision to if Minutes, December 1, 1961 At 2 Special Group meeting (Bundy not present), General @ program designed to his program is centered ntroduction into Cuba of c sovernment. around the selection and eventual PRA E) T i Perea Pete AEST Tan PEAR . - . and ina 2 position to operate, then a number of collateral supporting actions would be undertaken." The special group agreed that the “immediate requirement’ was to select a age group that could agree on a platform for an eventual new gevernment. When such a selection has been mace "the program will be discussed further with higher authority. Source: Special Group Minutes, December $, 1961. + Ww oe i phe elise is secondary-- money, is to be spared." enorandum, January 19, 1962, from McManus to 1 Group (A) Meeting, January 19, 1962: “REK tells Special Group (A) that Presi- dent is concerned and "It is not only General Lansdale's job to put the'‘tasks, but yours to carry out with every resource at your command. President Informed of Progress. Ceneral Taylor reports to the President that Lansdale has devel oped a concept of operations directed at the overthrow of the Castro’ govern- ment by an internal tevolt of the Cuban people and has as~ signed 32 initial tasks to State, Defense, CIA, and USIA. The President is told that this project involves the canger e of setting of a premature or inadequate revolt which migh Source: Special Group e they are in the country Page 2760 1324259626 Boclda HW 50955
ae Nae” March 5, 1962 March 13, 1962 then require U. S. military intervention to prevent a Hungary- type repression. The President is told a review of progress in February would permit an assessment of the overall feasi- bility of the Cuba project and the SG(A) ready to recommend to the President whatever policy changes were necessary to carry it forward. Source: Memorandum, January 25, 1962, General Taylor to President Kennedy, 02806. Guidelines Outlined for Mongoose. General Taylor's memorandum proposes Operation MONCCOSE was to be developed on the follow- ing assumptions: (a) in undertaking the overthrow of the _target government [Cuba/ “the U. S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes othap final success will require decisive use of U. S. military vatervention."” "The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a deci- sive U. S. capability for intervention." "General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations, calling directly on the participating devartments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these depart- ments and agencies are resvonsible for performance through . normal command channels to higher authority." (00216) "Gen- eral Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning — - and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Croup (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chair- n JCS." (00216) Source: Memorandum by General Taylor, March 5, 1962, 00188. _Svecial Group (A) Considers Taylor Guidelines. The Special Group (A), including Mr. Bundy, agreed to examine General Taylor's guidelines for Mongoose for presentation to higher authority for information. Source: Minutes of Special Group (A) March 5, 1962, 900004. Special Groun (A) Approves Guidelines. The Special Group (A) ne nae anata snrhannrnnnsreanganannnanananaiaannsin. approved Mongoose guidelines, Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting changes proposed by the DCI and DOD/JCS. Source: Special Group (A) Minutes, March 13, 1962. 00006. Page 261 132429626 Bocld ‘HW 50955
March 16, 1962 President Receives Progress Briefing. "In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the Bresidentywassgivensas ephogresstreporti on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines “dated 14 March 1962 were circulated and were used as the ba- sis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of — _ oe visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and they$pectad SHOU EON “quale wigias gation to proceed coceye are So bemanen sdeto indicate that the group to proceed in accordance with the wuidelines." Source: Memorandum, March 16, 1962, by General Taylor, 00008. Bundy Cautions Against Fixed Target Date. LANDSDALE gave progress report. MecCON? states reconnaissance reveals no significant increase in military support facilities in Cuba. McNAMARA suggests need to look for evidence of under- ground installations. HARVEY reports on the interrogation of recent exfiltrees. LEMNITZER outlines Joint Chiefs view of Cuba as threat to U. S. McCONE suggests that the current schedule of covert action should be speeded up even though this would entail increased dangers of attribution to the U. S. Re RUSK's question as to the adequacy of existing go4 policy approvals, "GENERAL LANSDALE said it would be useful : to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents than restricting them to intelligence missions." RUSK said at this time he could see no way in which an organized invasion of Cuba could be justified. RUSK and McNAMARA suggested that the current target date for bringing covert operations to a Stat dyhea £02 sanzuncontzoWlabledact one aati a Sane aca sa : ae Source: Minutes of Group (A), 2 Meeting, “April ‘Ll, 1962, QO0015-17. 32423626 Page 262 Docld 50955 Hiv
June 30 - December 31, 1962 is contained in separate chronolgoy ae 2 ceaprepared by John Bayle. ay Page 263 32475626 Boclda HW 450955
January 4, 1963 Bundy Memo to President on New Cuban Policy. Bundy reports that, as instructed by JFK, he has met with an interagency group to work out new arrangement for handling "Cuban policy and action" in 1963. Time is ripe for this because the Bay of Pigs prisoners are out and Mongoose is at a dead end. -* Bundy proposes a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department to replace the Mongoose office. On policy,sBundy,, Bata lid a eat Se Ut obkemareasu(econo icepréessure re figeds;*;communic cat- oo bare nh ithedissidéentemembers of“Castto® ‘régimes possibly: ‘in=. inggevensPidelshinsens 3!" and a reduction of CIA's role) which require decision. (Source: Memo, January 4, 1963, Bundy to JFK; JFK Library file) JFK Remarks to NSC. At NSC meeting, JFK points out "We must always be in a position to threaten Cuba as a possible riposte to Russia pressure against us in Berlin." (Source: Memo- randum, no author or date, titled Remarks of President Kennedy to NSC Meeting January 22, 1963; JFK Library file.) on Cuban Covert Action. On April 3, 1963, the of advisers for a "meeting on JFK. Meetin met with a number ASR ay "ThesPrésident saidhexdoess ob to: fexile/.:, ; trike. worth argets.-rather than a the fro GHtch their“acts to cate have represented. The President was told by Mr. Bundy that sabotage operations are not now underway because "the special” group had decided... that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it..." ety aw he a In connection with sabotage operations, Mr. Fitzgerald "made : the point that, recent exfiltrees have said that there is now no organized resistence inside Cuba." Robert Kennedy "asked whether it might not be useful to con- sider commando~type raids by groups of from 100 to 500 men. Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that if such groups could be landed it would probabl ly be imposs: ble for them to survive for any H fin any case, vexactionuin, et tae abe ene eae vassuming tshnese the Agency could ~thetnextzsixy ‘months’: tales ee ti eh ee ee EE be given a free rein to proceed.’ Page 264 132429626 Boclda HW 50955
The President summed un the meeting on Cuba by _carecting the following: (a) The intelligenc ‘mate on Castro's probable future strength should be completed as scon as noasibl (o>) CZA should examine exactly what might be wcconplisned in the fielé of sabotage during the next six months. (c) A meets ng should be held next week to review the proposed sabotage pro ara im.'" Source: Memorandum, April 3, 1963 rd < bd ? 3 "Meeting on Cu * (02842-43) President to Consider "Violent Solutions.” writes memorandum fe Bu ney proposing enticin Yt live to U. SS. side. Chase states: ~ understan “April ty, 1963, 4-139 “CK ene rant orate rate tegnerte re Special Groun Recuests Dest truction of Documents for Security the nanene a) spapers: being:. considered -atiitodi nea aa toe Mtave Rec onstao ten estroyed for security reasons. {tne meeting FPESSST the Nentire question of sabotage" and chus the papers referred to may have dealt with sabotage operations. / . tal Group engaged in "a lengthy discussion of the nestion of sabotage...the group recognized that «a examination must be un ken... to derermine whethe to change the present Mr, MeCondexnmessedi: Sea ee eo vedice peed Lo assure the removal of Soviet troops Castro,' vexamot es of and how such aney of activi fy specific operations, the. scale activity would fit into overall policy. Source: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, April ‘li, 1963 (02846-47). Page 265 1324256276 Bocld HY 50955
April 18, 1963 Bundy Expresses Doubts Re Sabotage. On April 18, 1963, the Special Group discussed papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16, 17, and 18. The only reference to the subject matters of these papers was: "Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that the paper of April 17, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program'' consists basically of sabotage and of harassment, P lus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be esponsive to our advice but certainly not to our command. "Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward Cuba is likely LingthesCoordinatot! sis vusrt’thouts: sdrastic change: ingU.cxS. poltey. Source: FEN ote heek BIE DSR SE A hohe AC GE lchl a Beane ar @oecial group minutes dated April 18, 1963 (02848-49). Chase Memorandum to Bundy Re "Short and Sweet” Action on Castro. 4 Prior to Standing Group meeting on April 23, Chase at E Bundy 's request, comments on papers for meeting: VAssuming we are not ' out for Castro Cas tronwerca ivewath happily to get rid of him--a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky approach, or a combination of both.../plockade would be too long, thus/ "Generally speaking, tyfectlonsiwevcontemplate ‘should: be.of zthes Shortwatid:sweetlcvariety i! s scalp for the sake of his scalp, « : ith.happily?<31f not, what is the best way Sok ius. Source: Chase memorandum to Bundy, April 23, 1963, JFK Library file, 4-157. Kaien «S...Measures..for Contingency of Castro andy paper titled "A°SKetch of the Cuba states the "elimination of the Castro REKPKO oses Study. “Deaths Siseission 9) Alternatives," McNamara ‘regime was a requirement” and a U. S. program should arm to ‘create dissidence in Cuba" to allow the U. S. to use force in it support of anti-Castro forces... Page 266 132425626 BDoocld HW 450955
April May 13, porte Lv " ve Mey 14, 1963 1963 perio icshns e ore efwouldetakeyfolLowingucontingencies suchas. the.death of. “Cas. »(2) "A program with the obiective of overthrowing Castro in 18 months," (3) "A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months." (Source: Memroandum, by Bromley Smith, titled "Summary Record of NSC Standing Group meeting, No. 2/63...;" JF& Library ' Robert.Kennedy proposes three studies: (1) "A idtstsvofameasures. file.) for discussion of, among other subjects, “the £ _contangenciies::for- ‘the achtevementtofcwidery 0b Tilustrations which come to mind are: ee OD) Possible: deathvof, Castro.... A Lf athe ene a tee at Source: Bundy Memo, Avril 29, 1963, 4-30, JFK Library file. Bundy Assigns Study Re astro. Disappearance. Standing Group. meeting results “examination of the possible developments in Cuba “LES CASE O° Sholldvdtsappearsfrom: thei scene « This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent" for Group discussion on May 14. Other assignments are for possible use of contingencies to achieve wider political objectives,” economic sabotage, and use of sugar market to harm Cuba. (Source: memorandum, May 2, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group meeting, JFK Library file.) Paper on Castro Death Contingency. Sherman Kent's (CIA) paper discusses “Developments in Cuba and Possible J. Ss. in the Event of Castro's Deat TE th." . Under a heading "The Kent. states: "L£¢astroswere:, sothercthan. éeFethesUs S.cwould=beuwidely <charged with: com-- iplicity 3s even though Castro has many enemies. Source: Draft Memorandum, CIA Officer of National Estimates, May 13, 1963, (JFK Library file). Paper on Castro Death Contingency. At the NSC Standing Group meeting, the Sherman Kent paper ‘Development in Cuba and Pos- sible U. S. Actions in the event of Castro's Death" was not -discussed for lack of time. Source: Summary Record Memorandum by Bromley Smith, of Meeting, May 14, 1963, JFK Library file. Bund: aioe for Standing Group Meeting. In a memo to Group mem- Page 267 232429626 Boclda HW 50955
May 28, 1963 ‘Bundy Sets Agenda for Discussion of Castro Death Contingency. Bundy informs Standing Group that at meeting on May 28, “We should discuss a paper on possible U. S. actions in the event of Castro's death,” and notes Sherman Kent will be present for this purpose. . ; oBundy also notes MeCone wt distribute "two highly sensitive xofepossiblésacttons:unders:consids ationvatsCLA\a/notaspec fied] and Cuban oil supplies. Source: Memorandum, May 28, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group Members; JFK Library File, (L ddiscussedeival munications er should not be made privy to any U. S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret...it was agreed that proposals of this xind which are particularly unusual would be discussed with the Special Group in advance.’ Source: Minutes of Special Group, June 6, 1963. June 19, 1963 JER ZAP. SyeeenKteeen “SabotagesPrograms A meeting was held with "higher authority” (Bundy present) at which a program for "ex- ternal sabotage'' for Cuba was approved with the understanding that operations wiil not begin until mid-July. The program was to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban.economy: (a) electric power (>) petroleum refineries and storage facili- —_ ties (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and * ee manufacturing.” The purpose of this and other programs is to "nourish e spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest.” Source: Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963, "Satotage Program Cuba", Possible Approach to Castro. On June 6, 1963 5 the Special Pao ii. ‘Page 266 1324239626 BDocld HW 450955
August 15, 1963 Special Group Approves Non-Violent Action Against Cuban Trade, : ne Special Group approved a proposal dated August 12, 1963 apparently dealing with a "non-violent program to inhibit free. world and neutral trade with Cuba." ‘Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that tg make this operations convincing, a '! ship will be carried out before the Operation is impleménted and that the reference in the paper to” Th Bundy Receives Summary of Paper on Possible Actions--Castro Suicide Preferable to Assassination. At Buncy's reauest, Chase summarizes State NR: paper entitled | "Cuba: Possible Courses of Action.” Chase's summary states: '...The present importance - of xCastro..as..a.nationalist symbol makes,-him, the obvious. opera- Rates Te ag Behe ayo nbseil eaheawesae done a inne peat f wt De Fh eeee tional. target; assass nation is: excluded: to-- -avoid- ‘Castro! is oe inna Sean Dente ACRE alee inks mene p febee en Na ada ae wets ee : Denney» states: ‘‘Assassina- Mt Lith Gia nimi aati te wc shisamartyrdom. and ; dep cten St ta Pascedeninr ns Fe wasn fh racrefahatical, aREr » July 25, 1963, by G toxdiscredit esto: C) SCASEFQ: + 2c jones ein Sad bia aes in noah ARENT oy nate ce welds Sods ceo, Mad, [iain oe himstoysuicide: ‘orto.acts-. of: complete.irrationality.! urce: tac te ni Si ath tert «See Vine is Ma Sse RS a ead te pL nl (1) Memorandum, September 20, 1963, G. Chase to Bundy OTK ibrary File, 4-119), and (2) Memorandum, July 25, 1963, G. Denney, Jr., of INR to Mr. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuba Af- fairs. aan { October 3, 1963 Separate Minutes kept of Special Group Meeting. On October 3, Nee” 7 1963, the Special Group met and discussed infiltration opera- tions and sabotage during September, as well as "the operations plans of commandos L". Page 1 of these minutes has an under- scored eexs inutes* for additional, items.! There. is no indicat f what “these additional items refer to. (Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatrick, and McCone present) Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, Octeber 3, 1963. big bang’ on a Cuban real sabotage’ applied to Cuban <snipping only. Source: Minutes of Snecial Group Meeting, August 15, 12. Roh Wrrott- Page 2769 232429626 Boclda HW 50955
pears on page 1 under a discussion of Cuban sabotage and in- filtration operations. (Bundy. not present: attending were © f 3 Robert Kennedy, Helms, Chiever, and Steakley.) Source: «Minutes of Special Group meeting dated November 6, 1963. NY fApproach by Castro to U. S. Mr. Bundy told the Special Group that "it has come to the attention to the White House that teats: TOU kektovwhaverautai¢,designed to bring about some 2 gba z ; ; arrangement with the U. S. To hear what Castro has to say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of some use to the U. S."" After discussion, it was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a firm decision at this time (as to an emissary to talk to Castro) but to study the problem for several days and to consider it again. o Source: Minutes of Special Groun meeting November 5, 1963. November 5, 1963 Special Minutes kept of Special Group meeting - RFK Present. ° Note thar the minutes of the Special Group meeting on Novem- ber 5, 1963 contain an underscored item on page 1 stating, T/ la "“seesspecial.minutesforJadditionaluitems." This item ap- Rak /t : Disapproves:CubanvActionsmtokNovembersd2+ On November 6, 1963, higher authority (PRESIDENT KENNEDY) ‘disapproved all Cuban Operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before Noven- ber 12. Two operations dated November 8 and 10 are therefore disapproved." Source: Memorandum for Special Group dated November 6, 1963, entitled Cuban Operations. November 12, 1963 John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara . af an Briefed by CIA on Covers Actions in Cuba. On November 22, os 1963, a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher a Authority’ (President Kennedy). Present were Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, McCone, Johnson, Kilpatrick, Vance, Helms, Fitzgerald, Chiever, and Steakley. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Eiittzgerald.-reported: aera: Oar : ; onCuban*operations“in' f ivecareas 2: (1) cover. 4.(2)@sabotagesand zharrassment;- (3) ‘propaganda,: (4). military © sdisaffection; onomi Beets S)xeconomic-denial. _ Page 270 32473626 Bocld HY 50955
On covert collection, Fitzgerald pointed out that CIA had three kinds of agents activities inside Cuba: (1) "Singleton" opera- tions, (2) Collectien nets, (3) agents involved in black net operations. Some 25 agents had been either captured or killed in the past year. There is increasing effectiveness of Castro's internal security forces, accounting for the less of agents. On sabotage and harrassment operations in Cuba, Fitzgerz ald describec successful operations against four installations » tne belief that these operations have raised the moral of ne pecple in Cuba and continues to keeo pressure on Castro adding to the growing econemic problems facing the country. On disaffections in the military in Cuba, Fitzgerald stated that while the military is loyal, there are indications that some 4 leaders might break with the regime but lack courage and op- perwunity. The principal aim of the U. S. is to "get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to care to talk and plot Castro's downfall with each other." In response to a auestion as to what cecisions remain to be made, Fitzzerald stated that "we were looking for a reaffirma- tion of the program as presented, including sabotage and har- vassment.' After outlining a number of large scale sabotage operations, ''The consensus was that the CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward January.” Source: Memorandum for the Record, November 12, 1963, entitled uban Operations (Special Group File). OO Special Group Approves Infiltration Operations--Keeps Special tes. ‘the Special Group approved various infsitration and exfiitration operations in Cuba. An underscored statement in the notes stating: ''See special minutes for additional items." Scurce: Minutes of Special Group meeting, November 14, 1963. Page 271 232425626 Bocld HY 450955
February April 2, 1964 June 10, 1964 ‘LBJ Disap roves Sabotage Operation. In the period December 5, ugh January 2, 1964, the Special Group approved a num- nfiltration, exfiltration and Sabotage operations in owever, the sabotage operation was di approved by higher authority (President Johnson) on December 29, 1963. Source: Minutes of Special Group meetineson December 5, 6, 19, and 20, 1963, and January 2, 1964. “Special Group to Seek LBJ Views on Sabotage in Cuba. On Janu- ne mere ae ee creer tireennranen rane rt aan ante rie ae eee ary 9, 1964, the Special Groun agreed that “the views of higher luthority (President Johnson) should be obtained on what is de- sired generally in the field of sabotage activities in Cuba." Source: Minutes of Special Group meetings on January 9, 1964. Bundy. Sees Dilemma -in Cuban. Covert Actions: High Risk Actions, Rewarding; “Low Risk-Actions, The Snecial Group discussed covert action potential to weaken the Castro regime. “There was a concensus that the present level of operation was no longer effective in obtaining the basic. obiective of toppling Castro but harrassment might keep the regime off balance." Mr, Bundy summarized the dilemma by noting that the high risk, danger- ous operations are the rewarding ones and the low noise, innocucus operations prove to be unrewarding.'"’ Source: Minutes of Snecial Group meeting, February 14, 1964, Bundy to Submit Question of Cuban Covert Overations to LBJ. On Aprii 2, 1964, the Special Group approved five infiltration operations and five Caching operations in Cuba, but tabled five sabotage proposals, "My So Bundy...stated that: the time ‘was over- due .for submitting. to higher authority the entire question of covert operations against Cuba...7t was hoped that definite policy lines could be determined for future covert activity against Castro." Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting cated April 3, 1964. . - Helms: Memo-to DCI’ on Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro. In a memo to the DCL, Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of, Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U. S. would not condone the bt wa Page 272 50955 Daocld: 32423626 HY
June 18, 1964 os planned actiens. Plans included: L964 by businessman March 3, 1 felals for cash. gnterested in assassinating Fidel he Guevera."’ ''Cameron Source: (03105-0311210). na te Castro, Raul Castro, and knows that ne can indicted for conspiracy." -Memorandum for DCI MeCone from pane Helms re plans of Cuban exiles te assassinate selected June LO, 1964 Cuban exile approach on March 2, to discuss a plan which was embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. fered to assassinate Castro for $150,000. 964 meeting in which Byron still in the Businessman has Latter group has of- Proposes to use 5 men. Cameron says he met an un- * Liy, the Cameron group is =] Lifted group which would be willing te assassinate selected £2 Specifical Ernesto Cuban government leaders, Special Group (303 Me eet ing). ‘Peter wt Cuban review." The memo stated the us a clearer picture of what force serve to embarrass. the U..S. A, int asked: "How close track is the PBI Frank Fiorini and persons of this il tinued: "We also have these reports Coup de: Does the grapevine among the emigres impencing adventures?” A memorandum ““elms memo to DCE entitled Plans of Selected Cuban Leaders, 1° June 1964 from Peter Jessup to M 1& June 1964, Bundy and Special Group (303 Committ Exile Plan to Kill Zo ee eS ne Enforcement Problem. ‘The 303 Committ arising from increased activ vity ont emigre groups, Sassinate independent adventure Castro and general unrest “A paper-was discussed on the: underworld. to assassinate certail was somewhat skeptical of the reported Main. operations. for cash. Who is Bundy Receives Memorandum. re Eyile-Mafia Assassination Plans for Rian Jessup, assistant to Mr. Sundy, Wrote a memorandum to Mr. Eundy subject ‘'303 Committee & meer ’ns might serve to give are at work today which might "the next 120 days." The memo et.al, keeping track of k.'' The memorandum con- of Mafia. plans to perform keeping track of this? keep us well-advised of all attached was described as: Cuban Exiles to Assassinate - Source: Memorandum, eGeorge Bundy. ee) Discuss Report of Cuban inform Robert Kennedy as Law ee meh to discuss "problems the part of organized Cuban ond a surported plets to as=- sta peeety on the is- alles i n Cuban.le aders. Mr. MeCone plot and stated that he }-4 oN Page 273 50955 Daocld: 32423626 HY
fen 19, 1964 would like to go into the matter further. Oth » including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was be mut on notice and snould do everything in its power to ascer rtain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would cali the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement Souree: Minutes of 302 Committee er NE ‘ L a menting T&S June 1964. Bundy has Jessup Meet with Robert Kennedy. re Castro Assassina- tion Report--Roper= Kennedy told failure to prevent can be con- a struedc as condoning. on June 13, 1964, Peter Jessup met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy re: the decision at the 303 Committee meeting of June 13. "In regard to the memorandum to 1 tne DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro regime, it was vointed out that these reports, in effect, out the United States government on notice that. such plotting was afoot failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. The Committee's belief that this was essentially a law enforcement. problem was cited. The Attorney General in- ar ‘cicated that the Department of Justice would look into the mat- t "Source: Memorandum for the record, June 22, 1964, by Peter Jessup. Svecial Group Agrees CIA and FS3I to Meet on Exile-Mafia Plot. The 303/Snecial Group Committee Yagreed that Mr. Fitzgerald meet with Mr. Sam Papich of the FB™ in repard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Nats overtones to assassinate Castre and which the Attorney General apre ead to handle as 2 matter of law enforcement.” Source! Memorandum for the record dated July 31, 1364 and Minutes of 303. Committee meeting, July 30, 1964, Bund Receives McCone Report on FBI Investigation of Exile-Mafia Plot. John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy summarizing the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate government leaders. The memorandum summarized seven reverts rendered by the FBI. Three of the seven persons inter- viewed by the FRI stated they had heard of the plan and two of these persons said they had discussad or reported the plan to the CIA. Source: Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy, August 19, Lo04. oy ‘ 324236026 Page 274 HW 50955 Docld
TOP SECRET TO: FILES. FROM: FREDERICK BARON RE: BUNDY/ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY--RE ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS DATE: JULY 6, 1975 MC_GEORGE BUNDY: TESTIMONY BEFORE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION (Volume 14, Page 1991, April 7, 1975) January, 1961: BUNDY became Special Assistant to the President For National Security Affairs, "Principal Staff Officer" for matters under the Departments of State, Defense, CIA, NSA, and others, relevant to national security. (1993) February, 1966:. BUNDY left position of Special Assistant to the President. (199) ) , BUNDY doesn't remember an “actual decision to go about" assassination of a foreign leader. (1994) BUNDY does have a “vague recollection of the existence or the possible existence © of contingency planning . . . and a contingency capability" for assassination (1994-5). BUNDY said that he knew of no authorization or involvement by anyone on the White House staff or anyone else in assassination planning beyond the contingency stage. (1995) BUNDY could not recall discussion of any plan to assassinate Cuban leaders connected with OPERATION. MONGOOSE, although he could not exclude the possibility that such discussion might have taken place. (1996) BUNDY said that he had no recollection of the discussion or development of an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability to carry out assassinations. (1996) "But I cannot exclude that I heard of that." BUNDY “would have been surprised" if'the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate a foreign leader without his approval, but he "could not exclude that there would be communication with the President by other channels," (1997) BUNDY said that he would not have expected that, during his time in Washington, "the Agency would have undertaken anything like an attack on the life of a foreign leader without direct order from higher authority." (1998) | BUNDY said that he has no recollection of the meeting of August 10, 1962, other than his calendar notation that he was present. (2000) HY 50955 DBocld: 32423676 Page 274
HW 50955 TOP SECRET BUNDY testified that the first time he heard of a possible CIA assassination plot for Cuban leaders in which the MAFIA might have been involved was in the newspapers in 1975. (2002) BUNDY testified that he thought it "not unreasonable that there would have been at least speculative discussions of the possibility of going after the Cuban leadership" in the atmosphere of "all kinds of covert operations" against Cuba. (2002) BUNDY said that he believes the President's authority as Commander In Chief, rather than the statutory language of the National Security Act of 1947, provides authority for covert operations even without a declaration of war. (2004) : ’ BUNDY told the Rockefeller Commission that his “unaided memory is not very good," but if the Commission "had time to do a documentary search and then say here is what. the documents suggest was happening in thus and such a period, what now what do you remember, you would probably find some sleeping cells back here, at least in my own case." (2031) Docld:32423626 Page 276
HW 50955 Bocld: STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK: ss I, McGeorge Bundy, heing first duly sworn, do upon oath depose and state: On April 7, 1975 I testified as a witness before the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Commission). As IT reflected overnight about my answers to certain questions, my recollection was refreshed and the next morning I contacted the Executive Director of the Commission, David W. Belin, and stated that I wished to make some additions to the record. I conferred with Mr. Belin at the offices of the Commission at 712 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., and then Mr. Belin asked me a number of questions to which I gave answers which were recorded on tape. After receiving at transcript of the tape, I made certain additional corrections. The following are the questions and my answers, as I have corrected them. (There is one question and answer that I have stricken because it is a matter of pure speculation.) Mr. Belin: This a memorandum of a conference with McGeorge Bundy on April 8, 1975. Mr. Bundy has refreshed his recollection following his testimony before the Commission on April 7 and wishes to make some additions. to the record, Mr. Bundy: You asked me yesterday whether I had any recollection of hearing the word. "poison", or some thing to to that effect--whether I had any recollection of that kind of activity or proposal in relation to the Castro regime and I think I said I did not, and I did not as of yesterday. But overnight I have had a vague recollection, which I cannot pinpoint in time, that there was discussion that I knew about at some time of a proposal or scheme or project that did involve poison, and the characteristic that sticks in my memory is that it would have involved a rather large-scale use of poison and, as I recollect it, it never came anywhere near approval. Proposals under the MONGOOSE scheme which did come from time to time (nostly not with respect to assassination) were reviewed in the first instance for practicability and only after that for wisdom or political rightness, and I recall NO proposal for liquidation that ever got past the first stage to the second, PROPERTY OF Pye I PUD AUPE opty serene Sy OS Mo PUPP ga: 32473676 Page 277
my - . . —-2?- Mr. Belin: I also talked to you, Mr. Bundy, about whether “SH ==" Or not there might have been any discussion in early 1961 or any other time with regard to a request from the White House to the CJA for the CIA to develop what was called an executive action capability, which was defined as a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required. Do you ever remember any discussions along those lines? Mr. Bundy: Well, I recall the words “executive action capa- bility" more clearly today than I did yesterday, and I think I said yesterday that they rang some sort of bell. Rut I do NOT have any recollection as to when I knew about that or who requested it or how much was done under it. I don't recall having any continuing interest in or information about that particular activity. Mr. Belin: Do you recall that executive action capability =" was in substance discussed as a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations at that time--I'm not saying there was direction to undertake a plan but at least the development of the stand-by capability? hie. Bundy: I think it was something like that--a plan to have some kind of stand-by capability for action against individuals. Mr. Belin: Now, I'm going to turn to the Summer of 1962. a Before we started this transcribing of your remarks you indicated that you don't remember any specific plan pertaining to the attempted poisoning of any Cuban jeader during 1961, but that you do remember some dis- cussion: that may have developed into this area sometime . in 1962. Is that accurate? Mr. Bundy: Well, I think perhaps a slightly more precise way of saying it is that you have described to. me a broad outline of plans as you unterstand them that existed in January ox February 1961 and I simply have no recollection of plans that meet that description. I believe my memory tells me in a more general way that my knowledge of a scheme or idea of using poison probably relates to the year 1962. ‘Mr. Belin: Do you remember any discussions at any meeting ————""_ [71£ Lhe MONGOOSE group where this might have been discussed? Either the general plan of possible liquidation or the particular plan of poison? PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE HW 50955 Docld: 324273626 Page 276
tO tee Conan eines $b Abi in atin gati mate nett ecient ttn int st herb cama Mb ee 4 > > \ i HY 50955 —3- Mr. Bundy: I don't have any recollection of where or how —_ I heard about the poisoning possibility. I do know that I never, knew of any approval of such a plan. My xvecollection is the opposite-~that it was a ha¥€brained scheme that did not receive approval even on the ground of practicability as distinct from the question of whether you would make a final decision to go ahead. Now, ds to meetings where such things might have been discussed, the only one I have any recollection of--and it is a refreshed vrecollection~--I would not have known about it a month ago-- is the one which we discussed yesterday on August 10, 1962 and I do NOT have any recollection of what specifically was said in that meeting. Mr. Belin: Do you have any recollection that there was any direction NOT to undertake any such plans? Mr. Bundy: I think there was a general attitude toward a this matter in which those working on covert operations were sometimes permitted to produce proposals, although I recall nobody encouraging them to do so. As I said yesterday, I draw a sharp distinction between con- sidering contingencies of this sort and actually giving them approval. ‘hat I think is the way in which the Kennedy Administration approached the matter. I do not think there was a flat general ban on considering such possibilities. Mr. Belin: Earlier, before we started taping, you said that if there had been any specific discussion of that, that you were not a party to it and that it might have-—- Mr. Belin: ~-of a direction to carry out a plan, that you . certainly were not a party to such a discussion. Is that what you said? , Mr. Bundy: I am absolutely certain that I nover knew of —_ or believed that there was any authorization to go ahead with an effort to liquidate Castro, or any other Cuban leader. Next question end answer deleted Mr. Belin: Is there anything else that you want to add , so far as clarifying or correcting your testimony of April 7 before the Commission? specee yy OF frurcalt’ rip mere VELA Bt eee ee acon 28 p) THE WHITE Bob Bocld:324273676 Page 279
HY 50955 Docld: 324273676 McGEORGE BUNDY 320 EAST 43°° STREET NEW YORK,N. Y. 1OOI7 1975 JUL [! PH 7: Val SELECT COMMITTEE ON uly 9, MGSMICENCE acTivimes Dear Mr. Baron: You asked me today for a report of what my calendar shows of meetings with Richard Bissell during the early months of 1961. My calendar begins only on January 23 so J have had to start from there. I have no independent recollection of whether I saw Mr. Bissell before that time, though it is quite possible that I did. We have listed both meetings where the notation shows Mr. Bissell's name and where the meeting was one of a group of which he was or could have been a member. The two groups with this characteristic are the so-called Planning Group and the Special Group, and some of the entries simply show the names of the group without the names of the par- ticipants. The enclosed list exactly copies the entries as they were made in my office. We have not included meetings called by the President, be- cause my calendar does not show who was at such meetings or even, usually, what the subject was. There were of course a number of such meetings at which both Mr. Bissell and I were present, on the subject of the Bay of Pigs. Sincerely, hiefiay, Samf McGeorge Bundy Mr. Frederick Baron Room G~308 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D. C. 20510 Page 250
HW 50955 January 27 February Docld: 32423626 11 dunch) “14 15 17 22 23 (mtg. & lunch) 2 8 (lunch) 14 dunch) 16 (lunch) 21 (lunch) 23 (lunch) 28 (lunch) 30 (lunch) Page 251 Rostow and Bissell -- Hay Adams Nitze, Rostow, MeGhee, Bissell Special Group -- CIA Nitze, Wiesner, Bissell -- Rusk's Office McGhee, Nitze, Rostow, Bissell Planning Group =- Metropolitan Club Nitze, Rowe, McGhee, Rostow, Hare, Amory, Bissell Special Group -- Bowles, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell Murrow, Bell (joined for lunch) Planning Group Special Group ~- Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell Special Group Planning Group Bissell at CIA Special Group Planning Group Special Group Planning Group Special Group
HW 50955 " is " 18 " 20 7 24 "OT Docld: 32423626 (lunch) Page 282 Planning Group Special Group Planning Group Rusk, Bissell, Bundy -- at State Planning Group Special Group Planning Group Special Group
McGEORGE BUNDY 320 EAST 43°° STREET NEW YORK,N.Y. 10017 1975 JUL [! PH 7: 2] . : SELECT COMMITTEE ON July g, NIBP ICENCE ACTIVITIES Dear Mr. Baron: You asked me today for a report of what my calendar shows of meetings with Richard Bissell during the early. months of 1961. My calendar begins only on January 23 so I have had to start from there. I have no independent recollection of whether I saw Mr. Bissell before that time, though it is quite possible that I did. We have listed both meetings where the notation shows Mr. Bissell's name and where the meeting was one of a group of which he was or could have been a member. The ' two groups with this characteristic are the so-called Planning Group and the Special Group, and some of the entries simply show the names of the group without the names of the par- ticipants. The enclosed list exactly copies the entries as they were made in my office. We have not included meetings called by the President, be- cause my calendar does not show who was at such meetings or even, usually, what the subject was. There were of course a number of such meetings at which both Mr. Bissell and I were present, on the subject of the Bay of Pigs. Sincerely, hfiny, Bonf McGeorge Bundy Mr. Frederick Baron Room G-308 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D. C. 20510 CF HY 50955 DBocld:324293676 Page 2835
January 27 February i 11 dunch) 14 15 17 22 23 (mtg. & lunch) 8 (lunch) 14 (lunch) 16 (lunch) 21 dunch) 23 (lunch) 28 (lunch) 30 (lunch) WW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 264 Rostow and Bissell -- Hay Adams Nitze, Rostow, McGhee, Bissell Special Group -- CIA Nitze, Wiesner, Bissell -- Rusk's Office. McGhee, Nitze, Rostow, Bissell Planning Group =~ Metropolitan Club Nitze, Rowe, McGhee, Rostow, Hare, Amory, Bissell Special Group -- Bowles, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell Murrow, Bell (joined for lunch) Planning Group Special Group -- Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell Special Group Planning Group Bissell at CIA Special Group Planning Group Special Group Planning Group Special Group
HW 50955 tt 15 tT 18 ia} 20 no 84 nH 87 BDocld: 3242336276 (lunch) Page 265 Planning Group Special Group Planning Group Rusk, Bissell, Bundy -- at State Planning Group Special Group Planning Group Special Group
July 8, 1975 Dear Mr. Baron: You asked me today for a report of what my calendar . shows of meetings with Richard Bissell during the early months of 1961. My calendar begins only on January 23 80.1 have had to start from there. I have no independent recollection of whether I saw Mr. Bissell before that time, though it {s quite possible that I did. We have listed both meetings where the notation shows Mr. Bissell's name and where the meeting was one of a group of which he was or could have been a member. The two groups with this characteristic are the so-called Planning - Group and the Special Group, and some of the entries simply show the names of the group without the names of the par- ticipants. The enclosed list exactly copies the entries as they were made hy my office. We have not included meetings called by the President, be- cause my calendar does not show who was at such meetings or even, usually, what the subject was. There were of course a number of such meetings at which both Mr. Bissell and I were present, on the subject of the Bay of Pigs. Sincerely, McGeorge Bundy Mr. Frederick Baron Room G-308 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D. C. 20510 HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 286
January a OU 27 Rostow and Bissell -~ Hay Adams . February " 11 (lunch) Nitze, Rostow, McGhee, Bissell ” 14 Special Group -- CIA " 15 _ Nitze, Wiesner, Bissell -- Rusk's Office "17. McGhee, Nitze, Rostow, Bissell " 22 ' Planning Group =- Metropolitan Club Nitze, Rowe, McGhee, Rostow, Hare, Amory, Bissell " 23(mtg. & Special Group -- Bowles, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell lunch) © Murrow, Bell (joined for lunch) " i Planning Group " 2 Special Group -- Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell "~. 8 dunch) Special Group " 14 (lunch) Planning Group . Bissell at CIA " 16 dunch) Special Group " 21 (lunch) Planning Group " 23 (lunch) Special Group " 28 (lunch) . Planning Group ¥ " 30 dunch) Special Group HW 350955 DBocld:32423626 Page 287
April -, . " 6 "4d "45 "18 "20 24 dunch) "27 WW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 266 Planning Group ‘Special Group | Planning Group Rusk, Bissell, Bundy -- at State Planning Group Special Group Planning Group Special Group apy ne ee NE ELTA NORTE MR LTT
(McGeorge Bundy) April 29, 1963 Fe May 13, 1963 . ay 1 - ll - Issues and Questions Robert Kennedy proposes three studies: (1) "A list of measures Why interest in Castro we would take following contingencies such as the death of death? , Castro", (2) "A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in 18 months," (3) "A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months.” (Source: Memroandum, by Bromley Smith, titled “Summary Record of NSC Standing Group meeting, No. 2/63...;" JFK Library file.) C Tet Q), Bundy Agenda for Standing Group Meeting. In a memo to Group mem- Why interest in Castro bers,.Bundy asks for discussion of, among other subjects, "the death? possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind are: »+»(b) Possible death of Castro.... Source: Bundy Memo, April 29, 1963, 4-30, JFK Library file.( Tes), Bundy Assigns Study Re Castro Disappearance. Standing Group Does "disappearance" meeting results in assignment of “examination of the possible refer to Castro death? developments in Cuba if Castro should disappear from the scene. This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent" for Group discussion on May 14. Other assignments are for possible use of contingencies to achieve "wider political objectives," economic sabotage, and use of sugar market to harm Cuba. (Source: memorandum, May 2, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group meeting, JFK Library file.) Crate r), draft paper discusses "Developments in Cuba and Possible U. S. |. assassination? Actions in the Event of Castro's Death." Under a heading ''The U. S. Role" Kent states: "If Castro were to die by other than natural causes, the U. S. would be widely charged with com- plicity,"” even though Castro has many enemies. Source: Draft Memorandum, CIA Officer of National Estimates, May 13, 1963, (JFK Library file) (Tob y ): Kent Paper. on Castro Death Contingency. Sherman Kent's (CIA) Is Kent counseling against Page 289 232425626 Boclda HW 50955
(McGeorge Bundy) . -~ 12 - Issues and Questions Bundy Sets Agenda for Discussion of Castro Death Contingency. Bundy informs Standing Group that at meeting on May 28, ''We should discuss a paper on possible U. S. actions in the event of Castro's death," and notes Sherman Kent will be present for this purpose. May 28, 1963 Bundy also notes McCone will distribute "two highly sensitive > “papers” dealing with "a list of possible actions under consid- ~ Veration at CIA" fnot specified/ and Cuban oil supplies. Source: Memorandum, May 28, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group Members; JFK Library File. CTs v), fa Possible Approach to Castro. On June 6, 1963, the Special Group Note interest in talks wit discussed "various possibilities of establishing channels of com- Castro while also seeming munication to Castro. All members of the group agree that this interest in contingency of is a useful endeavor. Mr.. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro his death. should not be made privy to any U. S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret...it was agreed that proposals of this kind which are particularly unusual would be discussed with the Special Group in advance.'' Source: Minutes of Special Group, June 6, 1963 Crotew) June 19, 1963 ¥ ao JFK A roves External Sabotage Pro ram. A meeting was held with pid JFK decide against tal "higher authority" (Bundy present) at which a program for "ex- and in favor of harder sak ternal sabotage’ for Cuba was approved with the understanding tage approach? that operations will not begin until mid-July. The program was to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: (a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and storage facili- ties (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and manufacturing." The purpose of this and other programs is to “nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest. Source: Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963, "Satotage Program Cuba". (45. x) i Page 290 32423626 Bocld 50955 oH” HY
(McGeorge Bundy) . - 13 - eee Issues and Questions are September 20 1963. Bundy Receives Summary of Paper on Possible Actions=~Castro Why is it necessary to ex- : 4 Suicide Preferable to Assassination. At Bundy's request, Chase clude assassination if it ae summarizes State INR Paper entitled. "Cuba: Possible Courses of not being considered? Was wot of * re ' ° ? 7 - : we Action. Chase's summary states: -+.The present importance - Denney asked to consider re of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious opera- assassination? tional target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's martyrdom." The INR paper, July 25, 1963, by G. Denney, states: "Assassina- tion of Castro is excluded in. order to avoid his martyrdom and because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical . retribution. It is preferable to discredit Castro...and drive him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality." Source: (1) Memorandum, September 20, 1963, G. Chase to Bundy (JFK Library File, 4-119), and (2) Memorandum, July 25, 1963, G. Denney. Jr.. of INR to Mr. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuba Af- fairs. (Tal OB Go 2A» | June 10, 1964 Helms Memo to DCI on Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro. In a memo to the DCL, Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U. S$, would not condone the Page 291 1324256276 Bocld fe et ee eee ee nee cage HY 50955
(McGeorge Bundy) - 14 - Issues and Questions planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach on March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the ‘embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has of- fered to assassinate Castro for $150,000. Proposes to use 5 men. . March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an un- wepidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected ar ., syban officials for cash. Specifically, the Cameron group is 3 nterested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto ~-7Ghe Guevera." "Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy." “ Source: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders, June 10, 1964 (03105-031110). (Tal, 26) ae: Bundy Receives Memorandum re Exile-Mafia Assassination Plans for Note Bundy's view below June 18, 19 ‘Bundy, wrote a memorandum to Mr. Bundy subject "303 Committee plots. Cuban review." The memo stated the meeting "might serve to give us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might serve to embarrass the U. S. A. in the next 120 days.'' The memo asked: "How close track is the FBI et.al, keeping track of Frank Fiorini and persons of this ilk." The memorandum con- tinued: "We also have these reports of Mafia plans to perform Coup de Main operations for cash. Who is keeping track of this? Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well-advised of all impending adventures?" A memorandum attached was described as: "Helms memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Leaders, 10 June 1964."- June 18, 1964 Bundy and Special Group (303 Committee) Discuss Report of Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro--Bundy to Inform Robert Kennedy as Law Enforcement Problem. The 303 Committee met to discuss "problems arising from increased activity on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to as- sassinate Castro and general unrest and instability on the is- land." ..."A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plot and stated that he ied Serer (303 Meeting). Peter Jessup, assistant to Mr. that U.S. must prevent suc Page 292 50955 Daocld: 32423626 HY
icGeorge Bundy) - 15 - Issues and. Questions would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement.” Source: Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, 18 June 1964. Creh 2), Bundy has Jessup Meet with Robert Kennedy re Castro Assassina- What was RFK's action in told failure to prevent can be con- response. On June 19, 1964, Peter Jessup met with ‘2p Attorney General Robert Kennedy re: the decision at the 303 a Committee meeting of June 18. "In regard to the memorandum to July 30, 1964 August 19, 1964 the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the United States government on notice that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. The Committee's belief that this was essentially’ a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General in- dicated that the Department of Justice would look into the mat- ter." Source: Memorandum for the record, June 22, 1964, by Peter Jessup. (Tab25) Special Group Agrees CIA and FBI to Meet on Exile-Mafia Pilot. The 303/Special Group Committee "agreed that Mr. Fitzgerald meet. with Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement."". Source: Memorandum for. the record dated July 31, 1964 and Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 30, 1964. (Tab wt K) Bundy Receives McCone Report on FBI Investigation of Exile-Mafia Pid Bundy feel connelled Plot. John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy summarizing take any action? — the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate government leaders. The memorandum summarized seven reports rendered by the FBI. Three of the seven persons inter~- viewed by the FBI stated they had heard of the plan and two of these persons said they had discussed or reported the plan to the CIA. Source: Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy, August 19, 1964. (Tab AL) es 7 a age Page 293 3242362 6 Bocld HY 50955
(McGeorge Bundy) September 23, 1963 Oct 29, 1963 Oct 29, -1963 Oct 30, 1963 -16- SEPARATE DOCUMENTS Bundy Warns Special Group on Security. Bundy points out to the Special Group that “unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the government who have to know a little or much about a U.S.-directed raid against Cuba." . (Source: Memo, Sept 23, 1963, ‘Bundy to Special Group. (Ter ed) Bundy informs JFK of need for White House information. on CIA communications. Bundy asks the President to order that the White House received one copy of all important instructions from State and CIA to the field. Bundy states trouble has arisen from"difference of emphasis" in what.we have sent to the field. © (Source: Memo Oct 29, 1963, Bundy to JFK.) (Tos 2d) on Lodge's movements. Bundy in a checklist iscusses consequence for plausible denial for Amb Lodge's movements. (Source: Memo Oct 29, 1963, title Checklist. )(Te 2&) Bundy cables Lodge re Impending Coup. Bundy cables Lodge that "we cannot accept conslusion that we have no power to delay ora coup." — : Bocld:32423626 Page 294 HY 50955
. ~4- Mr. Bundy: You asked me yesterday whether I had inet Mr. William Warvey~--I think that's his name-- Mr. Belin: Yes Mr. Bundy: -~-and I said I recollected the name and that I thought I had seen him in large meetings. I can check my appointment calendar which is the only official document of record that I have from my Washington days and see whether I met him in smaller meetings ox alone if that would be helpful to you. Mr. Belin: It would. L'a Like to have you do it, please. Mr. Bundy: Fine. Mr. Belin: OK. Well, thank you very much. (END OF TAPE) Following my return to New York I checked my appointment . ‘calendar and there is no entry of William Harvey's name. We did not make a habit of listing all the participants in large meetings, but the calendar would ordinarily show his name if he had come to see me alone or with only one or two others. i: I have no further changes or corrections to make with regard to my testimony before the Commission. pated this 25 day of Gad _, 1975 McGeorge Bundy Subscribed and sworn to before me. this 7S ££ day of Cppsck , 1975 ata n and for New York, New York WONozary> Bublic - : ’ { ee <i Yaa . : . “(7- My tcommission expires on 19 a an wen Le Ys ROSE SLOTTO- ' wee” eh ay yi NOTARY PUBLIC, * lote of Rew York aanpeury A DLAC ho. B& 0600 PROPERTY GF Quaiified ih ngs County ee Ut ee AETEPE Certificate (led ja New York County THE ON RITE BOGUS Cree Commission Exjyeres March 30, 1976 HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page 295
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HW 50955 7 July 75 BUNDY PHONE CONVERSATION: “Bundy said that the fact that the first operational meeting on Executive Action was placed at Jan.25-26 by Harvey's ‘notes indimabesx confirms his own feeling that he was merely informed mgaxkx of the projecy and not a moving force. Bundy thamhztkea said that we &hould question the people who were in before JAnuary 20 (Ike administration) about authorization of the project. — He said he has only two personal papers that bear on our events: 1. a yellow sheet on NSAM-181, which he said is very general and doesn't help supplement the memo itself. 2. calendar notations on the 10 Aug.62 meeting which indicates who. was present. I explained that the meeting may take up to four hours, he said fine. Hés secretary indicated that his first appointment #s not until 3:00. Docld: 32423626 Page 297
HY 50955 “August,16, 1962: Alternate Course B is accepted by SG(A). BUNDY questions submarine activity, there is also question about sabotage. (Shows that there are reservations about vigorous plan) -~Plans are “accepted in principle with the understanding that thajor actions under these general concepts would be approved by the SG(A)...it was emphasized that such approval should be obtained from the Group far enough in advance so as to obviate extensive preaprations and planning for operation which might not actually receive policy approval." (Significance: Shows clear expxectation that SG(A) should approve all major operations far in advance.) ~New guidelines were to be approved by "higher authority”. Memo for Lansdale from Gilpatric (Aug. 17, 1982): At McNamara's request and with Taylor's approval, a sentence was added to proposed MONGOOSE phase II to the effect that " "every effort will be made to avoid attribution to the U.S. and to hold down the damage to our international Prestige".(SIGNIFICANCE: Shows that an operation like assassination, with high danger of damage to U.S. prestige and with reasonable chance of being attributed to the U.S. shoukdxnatxhamemkRenxaEp was contrary to the policy being followed at the Special Group level. The Gilpatric change shows great caution being exercised over operations that represent no more attributability potentiah than an assassination plot.) Draft Memorandum FOR THE PRESIDENT, from TAYLOR-August 16, 1962 “While we believe that this new course of action will create a-ded difficultéés for the regime and will increase the visibility of its failures, there is no reason to hope that it will cause the overthwow of the regime from within.” Docla: 32423626 Page 295